CHAP. XXXIII.
Of Method.
THere are two kinds of disputation:a 1.1 One, when the truth it selfe is subtlely polished in the dispute: The other, when every expression is accommodated to the vulgar opinion; for, we must use popular and usuall words, when we speak of po∣pular opinions, which Panaetius in the like manner hath done.
b 1.2 The first way was peculiar to the Stoicks, short, acute, and spinous, called likewise Logick, most worthy of Philosophy; for this useth definitions, divisions, and the lights which they af∣ford, as likewise similitudes, dissimilitudes, and the nice acute distinction of them.
The vulgar way of dispute is likewise two-fold: One by con∣tinued oration: The other by question and answer; the first cal∣led c 1.3 Analytick, ord 1.4 Rhetoricall; the othere 1.5 Topick, orf 1.6 Dialecticall. g 1.7 Though the first be delightfull, yet the latter is more commo∣dious, when we insist on particulars, and understand what eve∣ry man granteth, what every man denyeth, what we would have concluded from concessions, and brought to an end. For,