The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

About this Item

Title
The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.
Author
Stanley, Thomas, 1625-1678.
Publication
London :: Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring :
1656.
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Subject terms
Philosophy, Ancient -- Early works to 1800.
Philosophy -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 17, 2024.

Pages

Page 19

CHAP. II.

Of the Instruments and rules of Iudgment.

a 1.1 IN the first place, they put the discourse concerning phanta∣sies and sence, as a Judicatory, whereby the truth of things is discerned.

b 1.2 The Senses (according to Zeno, who made many alterations in Dialectick, and asserted many things of the Sences that were wholly new) are joyned by a certain kinde of extrinsecall impul∣sion, termed Phantasy. To these phantasies received by the senses, is added an assention of the minde, which is placed in us volunta∣ry. The phantasie, when seen, is comprehensible; when received and approved, comprehension, and, if so comprehended, as that it cannot be plucked away by reason, Science.

c 1.3 Judgment is a perspection which discerneth a thing.

d 1.4 That which judgeth is taken two waies: 1. By which we say, somethings are, others are not, these are true, those are false. 2. Of Essence only; and this is understood three waies, commonly, properly, and most properly. Commonly, for every measure of comprehension, in which sense, even those things which judge naturally, have this appellation, as sight, hearing, tast. Properly, for every artificiall measure of comprehension; thus a cubit, a ballance, a ruler, a pair of compasses, are called things that judge; but sight, and hearing, and the other common instruments of sense, are not. Most properly, for every measure of comprehension of a thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which sence, those things which belong to the actions of life, are not said to be things judging, but the logicall only, and those which dogmaticall Philosophers alledge for the invention of truth.

The Logicall is subdivided into that from which, that by which, and the application or habitude. From which, the man; by which, the sense: the third is the application of phantasie or sight. For as in the Staticks, there are three things which judge, the weigh∣er, the ballance, and position of the ballance: The weigher is the judge from which, the ballance the judge by which, the position of the ballance, as it were a habitude. And again, as to discern right or oblique things is required, an Artificer, a Ruler, and the application thereof; in like manner in Philosophy are required those three things mentioned to the discernment of true and false: the man from whom the judgment is made, is like the weigher or artificer; to the ballance and ruler answer sense and cogitation, by which the judgment is made; to the habitude of the forenamed instruments, the application of phantasy, by which a man commeth to judge.

e 1.5 The Iudge of truth, they affirm to be comprehensive phantasy,

Page 20

that is, proceeding from that which is: so Chrysippus in the 12th of his Physicks, and Antipator, and Apollodorus. But Boethus holds many judicatories, the minde, and sence, and appetite, and science; from whom Chrysippus dissenting in his first Book of Reason, af∣firmeth the Judicatories to be Sense and Anticipation. Anticipa∣tion is a naturall notion of Universalls. Others of the more anti∣ent Stoicks (as Possidonius saith in his Book of Iudgments) assert right reason to be the Judicatory.

Notes

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