The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

About this Item

Title
The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.
Author
Stanley, Thomas, 1625-1678.
Publication
London :: Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring :
1656.
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Subject terms
Philosophy, Ancient -- Early works to 1800.
Philosophy -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 8, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Reasons or Arguments.

DIalectick is the discipline of speech, concluded by reason. Reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sometimes called also Argument, and Interro∣gation, is, according toa 1.1 Crinis, that which consists of one or more sumptions, and an assumption, and an inference; as,

If it be day, it is light. But it is day: Therefore it is light.
  • Sumption.
  • Assumption.
  • Inserence.

Page 50

The Reason of the Stoicks differs from the Syllogismes of Aristo∣tle in three respects:b 1.2 First, a Syllogisme, according to Aristotle, cannot have lesse then two propositions, a reason may have but one; as, Thou livest, theresore thou breathest: which kinde Antipa∣ter calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Secondly, in Syllogismes, something besides that which is granted in the premises; but in Reasons, the con∣clusion may be the same with both, or either of the sumptions. The first are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as,

If it is day, it is day. But it is day: Therefore it is day.

c 1.3 The second are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as,

It is either day, or not day. But, it is not day, Therefore it is not day.

d 1.4 Lastly, in Syllogismes, the conclusion must necessarily fol∣low, by reason of the premises, whereas there are three kinds of reasons which have not this property: The first, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, al∣ready mentioned: The second 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not methodically conclusive reasons; as

The first is greater then the second. The second is greater then the third: Therefore the first is greater then the third.

This concludes necessarily, but not Syllogistically, unlesse this proposition be put in the first place: What is greater then another, is greater also then that which is lesse then that other. Of the same kinde is that Theorem in the first of Euclid's Elements, This line is equall to that, therefore this line is likewise equall to that, which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this univer∣sall proposition, Those which are equall to a third, are equall to one another.

The third kinde of reasons, from which Syllogism differeth by this property, aree 1.5 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, redundant reasons, and those of two kinds: The first are such as have a superfluous sumption; as,

Every just thing is honest, Every honest thing is good, Every good thing is expetible in it self; Therefore every just thing is good.

Page 51

The second are those in which the proper conclusion is not in∣ferr'd, but something consequent, or accident, as that argument of Epicure:

Whatsoever is dissolved hath not sence, Whatsoever hath not sense pertaineth not to us: Therefore death pertaineth not to us.

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, Therefore whatsoever is dissolved pertaineth to us.

In a reason or argument, the sumption 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the assumption f 1.6 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (termed by Aristotle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉), are axioms received by consent of the adversary, for construction of that which is cal∣led Inference 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (by Aristotle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, conclusion) because it is inferr'd from the rest.

g 1.7 Of sumption and assumption according to Chrysippus, there are foure differences: The first Scientifick: The second Exercitative, or (as Aristotle calls it) Dialectick: The third Probable and Rhetori∣call: The fourth Sophistick.

Notes

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