The Reason of the Stoicks differs from the Syllogismes of Aristo∣tle
in three respects: First, a Syllogisme, according to Aristotle,
cannot have lesse then two propositions, a reason may have but
one; as, Thou livest, theresore thou breathest: which kinde Antipa∣ter
calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Secondly, in Syllogismes, something besides
that which is granted in the premises; but in Reasons, the con∣clusion
may be the same with both, or either of the sumptions.
The first are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as,
If it is day, it is day.
But it is day:
Therefore it is day.
The second are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as,
It is either day, or not day.
But, it is not day,
Therefore it is not day.
Lastly, in Syllogismes, the conclusion must necessarily fol∣low,
by reason of the premises, whereas there are three kinds of
reasons which have not this property: The first, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, al∣ready
mentioned: The second 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not methodically
conclusive reasons; as
The first is greater then the second.
The second is greater then the third:
Therefore the first is greater then the third.
This concludes necessarily, but not Syllogistically, unlesse this
proposition be put in the first place: What is greater then another,
is greater also then that which is lesse then that other. Of the same
kinde is that Theorem in the first of Euclid's Elements, This line
is equall to that, therefore this line is likewise equall to that, which is
true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this univer∣sall
proposition, Those which are equall to a third, are equall to one
another.
The third kinde of reasons, from which Syllogism differeth
by this property, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, redundant reasons, and
those of two kinds: The first are such as have a superfluous
sumption; as,
Every just thing is honest,
Every honest thing is good,
Every good thing is expetible in it self;
Therefore every just thing is good.