The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

About this Item

Title
The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.
Author
Stanley, Thomas, 1625-1678.
Publication
London :: Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring :
1656.
Rights/Permissions

To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.

Subject terms
Philosophy, Ancient -- Early works to 1800.
Philosophy -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 16, 2024.

Pages

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Possible and Impossible, Necessary and Vnnecessary, Probable, Paradoxall and Reasonable axioms.

a 1.1 MOreover of axioms some are possible, others impossible; some necessary, others not unnecessary. A possible Axiom is that which is susceptible of a true praedication, without obstruction from those things, which, though externall, are yet contingent with the thing it self; as Diocles lives. Impossible is that which can never be susceptible of truth, externalls oppugning it, as, the Earth flies. Necessary is that which is so true, as that it cannot any way receive a false praedication, or, may receive it, but those things which are extrinsecall, will not permit that it be true, as Vertue profiteth. Not-necessary is that which may be either true or false, exteriour things not obstructing it, as Dion walks.

b 1.2 These future repugnants and their parts are according to the same manner, as the present and the past. For, if it be true that the thing either shall be or shall not be, it must be either true or false, because futures are determined according to these; as, if a Navy is built to morrow, it is true to say that it shall be built, but if it be not, it is false to say that it shall be built, because it will not be, therefore it will either be or not be, and consequently one of the two is false.

Concerning possibles and necessaries, there is great difference betwixt Diodorus and Chrysippus.c 1.3 Diodorus holds that only to be possible which either is, or will hereafter bee. That which neither is, not ever shall be is impossible. As for me to be at Corinth is possible, if I ever were there, or ever shall be there, but if I never was there, nor ever shall be there, it is impossible. That a Boy shall be a Grammarian is not possible, unlesse here∣after he come to be one.

d 1.4 On the contrary, Chrysippus held, that those things which nei∣ther are nor ever shall be, are yet possible to be, as, to break a gemme, though it never come to be broken.c 1.5 Moreover that from possibles an impossible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true connex: If Dion be dead, He (pointing to Dion) is dead: The

Page 48

antecedent, if Dion be dead is possible, because it may at some time be true that he shall be dead; but this Axiom, he is dead, is impossible: for Dion being dead, the Axiom likewise is abolish∣ed, that he is dead, seeing he is no longer that man, capable of be∣ing demonstrated by the pronoune, He, for, he, is a demonstrati∣on of a living creature. If therefore Dion being not yet dead, this word, He, may be said of him, being dead, it cannot be said, he is dead. So that in this place, he is dead, is impossible. For it were not impossible, if, some time after the death of Dion, of whom it was before praedicated in the connex whilst he lived, it might be again praedicated, he is dead; but because that cannot be, it is im∣possible, that, he is dead, should be praedicated of him.

To conclude,d 1.6 some held with Diodorus, that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity. That to impossible there followeth not a possible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor shall bee true. Others (as Cleanthes and Antipater) that somthing is possi∣ble that neither is nor shall be; that to possible followeth not im∣possible, and that which is past, is not true of necessity. Others, that somthing is possible which is not true; that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity, and that to possible followeth also im∣possible.

Furthermore of Axioms, some aree 1.7 probable, some paradoxall, some reasonable. A probable Axiom is that which perswadeth us by a specious show to assent unto it; as, whatsoever bringeth forth another is a mother; which is falfe, for the hen is not the mother of the egge.

f 1.8 Paradoxall Axioms are those which seem true onely to the wise,g 1.9 contrary to the opinon of all others.h 1.10 These are likewise in other Arts, besides Philosophy; for what is stranger then to prick the eyes for the recovery of sight? If we say this to one ig∣norant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? It is not there∣fore strange, that such things as are true in Philosophy should seem paradoxes to the unlearned.

i 1.11 A reasonable Axiom, is that which hath many conditions re∣quisite to the truth thereof, as, I shall live to morrow.

Notes

Do you have questions about this content? Need to report a problem? Please contact us.