The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. XV.

Of Qualitatives.

a 1.1 QUalitatives have a subsistence, and are separate from their subjects. For qualities (as all other accidents) are bodies, seeing that according to Zeno, nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeall, nor can that which is incorporeall effect any thing; whatsoever effecteth is a body. Effective quality therefore is a body. Matter is expert of quality, but qualities are not expert of matter.

b 1.2 Quality is the habit of that which is qualitative. Qualitative is taken three waies: First, for whatsoever hath difference, whe∣ther it be motion or habit, and whether hardly or easily separa∣able. In this sence, not only he who is wise, but he who stretch∣eth out his hand are qualitative. The second signification in∣cludes not motions but habits only, which they define qualita∣tive, that is, which hath a difference endued with habit, as a wise man, or an armed man. Of these, some are adaequate, to the measure of their pronunciation and consideration; others not adaequate. These they omit, those which are adaequate, equall, and permanent, they call qualitative; as, a Grammarian, and a wise man; neither of these exceeds, or falls short of his quality. Likewise a lover of meat, and a lover of wine, being in act such, as a glutton, and a drunkard, because they make use of those parts which serve to this end, are so called: so that if any man be a glutton, he is consequently a lover of meat; but, if he be a lo∣ver of meat, he is not therefore immediately a glutton; for, being destitute of those parts which he useth in eating, he wanteth the act, but not the habit. Quality is adaequated to qualitative in this last sence.

c 1.3 All qualities are either causes, and then they are called formes; or effects, and then they are generally called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, habitu∣alls, which word Antipater extends as large, as the common ac∣cident, both of things corporeall and incorporeall, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some∣what. Of habitualls there are foure kinds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, when they reside in the minde; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, when they fall from the minde into the voice; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ when by the mo∣tion of the minde, they are praedicated of any thing; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, when they happen to subjects.

d 1.4 Habits are only things united, but those which are conjoyned by contiguity, as a Ship; or by distance, as an Army; in these there can be no habit, nor one thing spirituall above all, nor one reason, whereby they may come to subsist within one habit.

It is common to quality of corporeall things to be the diffe∣rence of their substance,* 1.5 no•• taken severally, but contracted into one notion and property of the minde, nor by time or strength

reduced to form, but by its own tality, according to which the generation of the qualitative subsists.

Power (a species of quality) is that which hath and giveth the faculty of exercising many accidents,* 1.6 as prudence giveth the faculty of walking prudently, and discoursing prudently: or, ac∣cording to some, Power is that which giveth the faculty of ex∣ercising many accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the acts subjected unto it. What Aristotle called naturall Power,* 1.7 they name Aptitude.

Habits are intended and remitted,* 1.8 dispositions cannot be in∣tended or remitted. Thus the straightnesse of a wand, although it may easily be discomposed and bent, is a disposition, for straightnesse cannot be intended or remitted. Likewise the ver∣tues are dispositions, not in respect of their firmnesse and con∣stancy, but because they cannot admit of degrees of more and lesse: but, Arts must either have firmnesse, or not be dispositions. Thus habitude is taken in the latitude of the species, disposition in the chief perfection of the species, and in that which is the most it can be, whether it be easily alter'd (as the straightnesse of a wand) or not.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Dexipp. in ca∣teg. 2. 22.
• b 1.2

  Simplic. in ca∣teg••
• c 1.3

  Bursius in dia∣lect. Cicer. 4. 3.
• d 1.4

  Simplic. in Categ.
• * 1.5

  Ibid.
• * 1.6

  Ibid.
• * 1.7

  Ibid.
• * 1.8

  Ibid.