The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. X.

Of Voice, Speech, and Words.

a 1.1 These three are joyned to one another; that which is sig∣nified, that which signifieth, and the contingent. That which signifieth is the voice, as Dion: That which is signified, is the thing it selfe declared by the voice; it is that which we ap∣prehend, and is present in our cogitation. The contingent is the outward subject, as, Dion himselfe.

b 1.2 Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth, and that which is signified,c 1.3 is divided into two places: one, of Significats; the other of Voice. The place of significats is divided into phantasies, and subsistents on phantasie, dicibles, axioms, &c.

In the other place, concerning Voice, is declared literall Voice, the parts of speech, the nature of Solaecisms and Barbarisms, Poems, Ambiguities, Song, Musick, and (according to some) definitions and divisions.

d 1.4 The phantasies of the minde precede speech, (Of these there∣fore we have already treated) then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking, declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie; For this reason,e 1.5 the consideration of Dialectick, by the joynt consent of all, seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice.

f 1.6 Voice is aire percussed, the proper sensible object of hearing, (as Diogenes the Babylonian, in his Art of Voyce.) The voice of a living sensitive creature, is aire percussed with appetite; the voice of man is articulate, proceeding from the minde: at his four teenth year it is perfected.

Speech (asg 1.7 Diogenes saith) is a literate voice; as, It is day. Word is a significative voice, proceeding from the minde. Lan∣guage is a speech according to the variety of Nations, whereof

each useth its peculiar dialect; as the Attick saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Ionick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Voice and Speech differ, in that voice is a sound, but speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for word is al∣waies significative; but, speech sometimes signifieth nothing, as Blitri, which is no word. To speak and to pronounce differ: voices are pronounced, but things only are spoken:h 1.8 for, to speak is to pronounce a significant voice of a thing that is said.

i 1.9 Hence Chrysippus saith, that he who beginneth to speak and pronounce words, before he can put them in their right place, doth not speak, but thinketh that he speaks; as, the Image of a man is not a man: so in Crowes, Dawes, and Children, when they first begin to speak, the words which they say are not words. He only speaketh, who knoweth to put a word in the right place.

They (particularlyk 1.10 Zeno)l 1.11 took much pains in the invention and expli••ation of words,m 1.12 wherein they distinguished very subtlely. Hence Cicero calleth the Stoicks Architects of words. Ammonius, the Grammarians, followers of the Stoicks.

n 1.13 The Elemen••s of speech are the 24 Letters. Letter is taken three waies: First, for the character of figure which is formed. Secondly, for the element or power: Thirdly, for the name, as A. Of the Elements, seven are Vowels 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 six Mutes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

o 1.14 Of speech there are five parts, as Diogenes saith in his Book of Voice, and Chrysippus (p 1.15 at first they reckon'd but foure, separa∣ting the Articles from the Conjunctions, afterwards the latter Stoicks, dividing the Appellatives from the Nounes, made them five) Noun, Appellation, Verb, Conjunction, Article. (Antipater in his Book of Speech added the medium) Appellation (as Diogenes saith) is a part of speech signifying a common quality; as, Man, Horse. Noune a part of speech denoting a proper quality; as Di∣ogenes, Socrates. Verbe (as Diogenes saith) a part of speech signi∣fying a thing, which is predicated of one or more things, in∣composed; or, as some say, an Element of speech without cases, whereby the parts of speech are connected; as, I write, I speak. Conjunction is a part of speech without cases, conjoyning the parts of speech. Article is an element of speech, having cases; distinguishing the kinds and numbers of Nounes; as, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

q 1.16 Every word, by reason of that which it signifieth, calleth foure necessary things into question, its origine, power, declination, ordination.

As concerning the first, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they conceived, that names were given by nature: the first pronoun∣ced voices, imitating the things themselves, from which the names were afterwards imposed, by wh••ch reason, they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any word, for which

there cannot be given a certain reason. They therefore studious∣ly enquired whence words are deduced, much pains was taken, first, by Zeno, then by Cleanthes, afterwards by Chrysippus, to give a reason of commentitious fables, and to explain the causes of words, why they are called so and so.

This beginning is to be sought, untill we arrive so far, as that the thing agree in some similitude with the sound of the word, as when we say, tinkling of brasse, the neighing of horses, the bleating of sheep, the gingling of chains: These words by their sound, expresse the things which are signified by them.

But, for as much as there are things which found not, in these the similitude of touching hath the same power: As, they touch the sense smoothly or harshly, the smoothnesse or harshnesse of letters in like manner touch the hearing, and thereby occasio∣neth their names. As when we say smooth, it sounds smoothly: so, who will not judge harshnesse to be harsh by the very word? It is smooth to the ear when we say pleasure; harsh, when we say crux, a crosse: the things themselves make good the sound of the words. Honey, as sweetly as the thing it selfe affects our tast, so sweetly doth the name touch our hearing: Soure, as harsh in both. Wool and Bryars, as the words are to the hearing, the things are to the touch. These are conceived to be the infancy, as it were, of words, when the sense of the thing concords with the sense of the sound.

From hence proceeded the licence of naming, according to the similitude of the things among themselves: as when, for ex∣ample, crux, a crosse, is therefore so called, because the harsh∣nesse of the word concords with the harshnesse of the pain which the crosse affecteth. But, Crura, thighes, are so called, not from harshnesse of pain; but, because in length and hardnesse, they are, in respect of the other limbs, like unto the wood of a crosse. Hence it comes to abuse, that the name usurped, not of a like thing, but, as it were neer: for what likenesse is there be∣tween the signification of little and minute, when as that may be little, which not only is nothing minute, but is somewhat grown; yet, by reason of a certain neernesse, we say minute for little. But, this abuse of the word is in the power of the spea∣ker; for, he may use the word little, and not minute. This ex∣ample belongs to that which we will shew, when we call that a fish-pond which hath no fish in it, nor any thing like a fish: It is denominated from fishes, by reason of the water, wherein fishes live. So the word is used by translation, not from similitude, but a certain kinde of vicinity. And if any one should say, that men in swimming resemble fishes, and that from thence a fish-pond is so named, it were foolish to refuse it, since that neither is repugnant to the nature of the thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the purpose, which we cannot dilucidate by one

ex∣ample, how much the origine of the word, which is taken from vicinity, differs from that which is derived from similitude.

From hence there is a progression to the contrary. Lucus is thought to be so named, quod minime luceat; and bellum, quòd res bella non sit; and soedus, quòd res foeda non sit. But, if we derive p••rcus, as some do, à soeditate, it returnes to that vicinity, when that which is made, is named from that by which it is made.

For this vicinity is very large, and divided into many parts, either by efficience, as this word procus à foeditate; from which likewise foedus: or by effect, as puteus, so named, because the ef∣fect thereof is potatio: or by that it containeth, as urbs ab orbe, be∣cause in a place which they liked, they first made a track about it with a plough, as Virgil saith of Aeneas,

—Urbem designat Aratro.

Or by that which is contained, as if horreum were derived from hordeum; or by abuse, as hordeum for wheat, or the whole from a part, as mucro, which is the point for the whole sword; or a part from the whole; as capillus quasi capitis pilus. What need we go a∣ny further? whatsoever else can be reckoned, we may see the origin of the word contained, either in the similitude betwixt things and sounds, or in the similitude betwixt things them∣selves, or in vicinity, or contrariety, which origine we cannot pursue beyond similitude.

But this we cannot do alwaies, for there are innumerable words, the reasons of which ly••hid. To the infancy, or rather stock and seed of such words, beyond which, no origine is to be sought, neither if a man do enquire can he finde any, they proceed in this manner: The syllables, in which v hath the place of consonant, as in these words, venter, vafer, velum, vinum, vo∣mis, vulnus, have a thick, and as it were, a strong sound, which the very custome of speaking confirmeth, when from some words we take them away, lest they should burden the eare; for which reason we say amâsti, rather then amavisti, and abiit, not abi••it, and innumerable of the same kinde. Therefore when we say Vis, the sound of the word having, as we said, a kinde of force, suiteth with the thing which it signifieth. Now from this vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, because they are vi∣olent, vincula seem to be named, and vimen, quo aliquid vincia∣tur. Thence vites, because they claspe about those things by which they grow. Hence also by similitude, Terence calls a crooked old man vietum. Hence the Earth, worn into winding paths by the feet of passengers, is called via; but if via be so named, quasi vi pedum trita, the origine returnes to the vicinity: But let us sup∣pose it derived from the similitude it hath with vitis, or vimen, that is, from its winding, one asketh me why it is called via?

I answer, from the windings and crookednesse thereof, which the antients called vietum; thence the rounds of a wheel vietos. He demands, how vietum comes to signifie winding? I answer, from the similitude of vitis, a Vine: He requires whence vitis is so named? I say, because it doth vincere those things which it comprehends. He questions whence vincere is derived? We say, à vi: He asks, whence vis? We give this reason, because the word in its robust and forcible sound agreeth to the thing which it signifieth. He hath nothing more to demand.

t 1.17 In like manner, in this word Ego, as Chrysippus observes, in pronouncing the first syllable, we depresse the under-lip, as if it were to point to our selves, then by motion of the beard we point to our own breasts: of whichu 1.18 Nigidius hath given more instances, in his Grammaticall Commentaries.

The second question concerning words, is of their power, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of significants; whencex 1.19 Chrysippus divided Diale∣ctick into two parts, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of significants and significats. Here they enquire, how many waies every thing may be said, and how many waies a thing said may signifie.

Here is examined the ambiguity of words:y 1.20 Ambiguity (or amphiboly) is a word signifying two or more things, naturally, and properly, according to the language of the Nation, in such manner, that many senses may be collected from the same words, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which one way signifies, the pot fell thrice, another way, the she-minstrell fell.

z 1.21 Every word (according to Chrysippus) is by nature ambigu∣ous, for the same may be taken two or more waies:y 1.22 Neither is that any thing to the purpose which Hortensius calumniates in Cicero, thus, They affirm that they hear ambiguities acutely, ex∣plain them clearly. The same persons hold, that every word is ambiguous; how then can they explain the ambiguous by the ambiguous, that were to bring a candle not lighted into the dark. This is ingeniously and subtlely said, but like that of Scaevola to Antonius, you seem to the wise to speak acutely, to fooles truly: for what else doth Hortensius in that place, but by his ingenuity and facetiousnesse, as an intoxicating cup, bring darknesse upon the unlearned. For, when they say, every word is ambiguous, it is understood of single words. Ambiguities are explain'd by disputation; no man disputeth by single words, none therefore explaineth ambiguous words by ambiguous words. And yet seeing that every word is ambiguous, no man can ex∣plain the ambiguity of words, except by words, but those con∣joyned and not ambiguous. As when we say, every Souldier hath two feet, it doth not follow, that a whole Regiment of Souldiers that have two feet, should have in all but two feet. So when I say, every word is ambiguous, I do not say, a sen∣tence, nor a disputation, although they are woven of words.

E∣very ambiguous word therefore may be explained by inambi∣guous disputation.

The third question is concerning Declination, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉z 1.23 Some follow Analogie, others Anomaly: Analogie is a like declination of like, in Latine proportio. Anomaly is an inequa∣lity, following the customes of declinations.a 1.24 Chrysippus wrote six bookes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, shewing, that like things are noted with unlike words, and unlike things with like words.

The last question is concerning Ordination, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉b 1.25 Upon this subject Chrysippus wrote two bookes (Laertius reckons more) whose scope is not Rhetoricall, but Dialectick, as will easily appear to the Reader: Of the Syntax of Axiomes: of true and false Axiomes: of possible and impossible: of contingent, and transient, and ambiguous, and the like, which confer nothing to single speech, or pleasure, or grace to elocution.

c 1.26 There are five excellencies of speech, Propriety, Perspicuity, Succinctnesse, Decorum, Elegance. Propriety is a proper phrase, ac∣cording to Art, not after the common expression.

Perspicuity is, when that which is intended is delivered clear∣ly.

Succinctnesse is, when that only is comprised which is necessa∣ry to the thing.

Decorum, is a conformity to the thing.

Elegance is an avoiding of vulgar phrase.

d 1.27 Amongst the faults of speech is Barbarisme, a phrase not in use with the best persons; and Sol••ecisme, a speech incoherently framed.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Sext. Emp. adv. L••g. cap. de vero.
• b 1.2

  Laert.
• c 1.3

  Laert.
• d 1.4

  Laert.
• e 1.5

  Laert.
• f 1.6

  Laert.
• g 1.7

  Laert.
• h 1.8

  Sext. Emp. adv. Leg. cap. de vero.
• i 1.9

  Varro de ling. lat. lib. 5.
• k 1.10

  Cicero.
• l 1.11

  Dionys. Halic.
• m 1.12

  Hieronym.
• n 1.13

  Laert.
• o 1.14

  Laert.
• p 1.15

  Dionys. Halic.
• q 1.16

  S. August•• de Dialect. cap. 6.
• t 1.17

  Galen. de de∣cret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2.
• u 1.18

  Agell. 10. 5.
• x 1.19

  Laert.
• y 1.20

  Laert.
• z 1.21

  Agell. 9. 12.
• y 1.22

  D. August. de dialect.
• z 1.23

  Agell. 2. 25.
• a 1.24

  Varr••. de ling. lat.
• b 1.25

  Dionys. Ha••••∣carn. de compos. verb.
• c 1.26

  Laert.
• d 1.27

  Laert.