The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

THE FOVRTH PART. (Book 4)

CHAP. I.

Of METAPHYSICK.

THE fourth and last part of Philosophy, which treateth of Ens in generall, is by Aristotle termed sometimes, First, Philo∣sophy, sometimes Wisdome, sometimes Theologie, by his followers and Interpreters called Metaphysick, from the order thereof, as Alexander Aphrodisaeus and Philoponus affirm, being placed after Physick, as treating of a lesse known, and more noble object.

Upon this subject, there are fourteen bookes of Aristotle ex∣tant, which, saith Alexander Aphrodisaeus, by the method of the discourse and stile, are easily evinced to be his.

a 1.1 Metaphysick considereth Ens as it is Ens, and the primary cause thereof.b 1.2 Ens is Analogous, praedicated primarily of sub∣stance, which is one essence; of Accidents, not simply, but in re∣gard of their common attribution to substance. Ens thus being one analogically, the science therof is one likewise; but it treateth chiefly of substance, because that is the first essence upon which the rest depend, and from which they are deno∣minated.

CHAP. II.

Of the first Principle.

THe first most common axiom,* 1.3 or complex principle, is this▪ It is impossible that the same thing should be and not be in the same, and according to the same respect.

To this principle,* 1.4 all demonstrations and opinions are redu∣ced. It is it selfe indemonstrable, as being the first; otherwise there would be an infinite progression in demonstration, and consequently no demonstration. There is nothing more known by which it may be proved, no greater absurdity then the deny∣all of it, that an adversary can be reduced to.

With the first negative principle,* 1.5 the first affirmative hath a near affinity. It is necessary that every thing be predicated affirmatively or negatively of another. It is not true in matter of a future contin∣gent determinately, but only indeterminately. This affirmative

principle therefore is not absolutely the first, yet is it true, nei∣ther can there be a medium betwixt contradictory propositions, no more then betwixt even and uneven numbers: Every propo∣sition either affirms or denies, therefore every proposition is ei∣ther true or false; between these there is no medium.

CHAP. III.

Of Substance and Accident.

a 1.6 OF Ens in generall there are three divisions, first, by accident and per se; secondly, Potentiall and active; thirdly, intentionall and reall.

Of Ens by accident there is no Science, for it is in a manner non∣ens, it hath no cause per se; it is not generated or corrupted per se; it is not alwaies, nor for the most part, not necessary, whereas Science is of things contrary to these.

b 1.7 Ens per se is divided into ten Categories. The first is substance, and the first Ens, and consequently the first Category, for it is predicated in quids of the first subject, whereas Accidents are predicated in quale or quantum. Again, substance only is Ens per se, accidents are Ens as they are affections of substance. Substance is the first Ens, by Reason or definition, because accidents are defi∣ned by Substance. By knowledge, because the knowledge of acci∣dents, depends on the knowledge of substance. By time, for there is some substance without accident, as God and Intelligences, but there is no accident without a substance. Likewise material sub∣stances are precedent in Time, at least to some accidents, which arrive unto them after they have some time generated. And lastly, by Nature, for the subject is, by Nature, before that which inhereth in it. Hence this part of Physick treateth onely of substance.

c 1.8 Subject or substance is threefold; matter, form, compositum. The two latter are more Ens then matter, though matter be truly sub∣stance, as being the first and last subject which remaineth, though all the affections of a body be taken away. This is first matter, which in it self is neither compleat substance nor quantitative, nor in any other Category. Neither is it first substance, for that is separable, and may exist by its own power without others. That is likewise a determinate, perfect, singular substance; but matter cannot be separated from form, neither is it singular or determinable.

d 1.9 Form is that which the thing it selfe is said to be, per se, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the being of a thing what it was, the whole common na∣ture and essence of a thing, answerable to the definition. Com∣pound

sensible substances have a proper definition; but ens by accident, consisting of subject and accident, hath not, though it may be by accident described and explained. Even Categoricall accidents being one per se, and of one nature, have a quiddity and definition, not simply as substances, but after their owne manner.

e 1.10 Matter and form are not properly generated, but the whole Compositum, whereto Ideas [separate substances,] confer nothing, neither as efficient, nor exemplary Causes.

f 1.11 The common substantiall, or formall parts of the thing de∣fined, are to be put into the definition of the whole; but the materiall parts of the Individuum it selfe, must not.

CHAP. IV.

Of Power and Act.

a 1.12 NExt Substance we come to Power and Act. Power is either active or passive: Active power is the principle of changing other things, or acting on another, in as much as it is another. Passive power is in a manner the same with active, for the motion of passion and action is really the same, neither can one be without the other, though simply they are diverse, being in different sub∣jects, passive in the Patient, active in the Agent.

b 1.13 Of powers, some are void of Reason, as the power of war∣ming; some rationall, as Arts: The rationall are of contraries, as Medicine is of health and sick; the irrationall of one only, as heat produceth heat.

c 1.14 The power (contrary to the Megarick Philosophers, followers of Zeno) remains; althogh not reduced to act; for we call a man Architect, though he be not actually employed in building. Again, Animals have sense, even when they are not in act. Thirdly, it were impossible any thing could be which were not actually. Possible is that whose power, if it were reduced to act, would not imply any impossibility.

d 1.15 They are mistaken, who think there is any thing possible which shall never actually be, or that there are powers whose acts are impossible; for hence it would follow, that all things should be possible, nothing impossible. Possible is that which doth or may follow from some power; if it never followeth, or com∣meth out of that power, it is impossible. That which is possible therefore, must at some time or other be in act.

c 1.16 Of powers there are three kinds, some naturall, as Senses; some acquired by custome, as playing on a Pipes; some by discipline, as Arts. The two last require previous operations, the naturall do not. Naturall and irrationall powers are necessarily reduced

to act, when the Agent and Patient are at a due distance, and there is nothing betwixt to hinder them. The rationall powers are not so, for they are free to act or not to act as they please.

f 1.17 Act is, when the thing that was in power is otherwise then when it was in power.

g 1.18 All act is before power, and before all nature which is con∣tained under power, by reason, ••ssence, and time. By reason, because power is defined by act. By time, because though power be tem∣porall before act in the same numericall object, for a man may first be learned before he actually be such; yet, in different things of the same species, act is ever before power in time; for nothing can be made or reduced from power, unlesse by an agent actually existent.

Lastly, act is before power in essence; first, because it is later in generation, for generation beginneth from the imperfect state of a thing, and proceedeth to the perfect. Now all generation proceedeth from power to act. Secondly, act is the end of power; but the end, as it is later in generation, so is it more perfect by nature, and first in intention.

CHAP. V.

Of True and False.

a 1.19 THe first division of Ens is into intentionall and reall.b 1.20 The intentionall is either true or false. The intellect asserteth truly, if its judgment be conformable to the thing; falsely, if not conformable, for there is composition and division in the things themselves, as well as in the intellect. Whence if the intellect compound things by affirmation, as they are really compounded, or divide them by negation, as they are really divided, it asser∣teth truly, otherwise falsely. True and false are in the simple apprehension of things, but simply, not enunciatively, so as that truth is nothing, but a simple perception of the object; falshood a non-perception or ignorance thereof, though ignorance be not properly falsity. Whence simple apprehension may be true in it selfe, false it cannot be, for falsity requireth composition.

Complex truth and falshood may be of the same separate sub∣stances.

He cannot be deceived in the knowledge of things immovable, whosoever hath once conceived them immutable; for either he will judge alwaies truth, or alwaies erre, because things im∣movable are alwaies in the same manner. The vicissitude and deception, and true and false judgment, is only in things contin∣gent and mutable.

CHAP. VI.

Of one, the same, and diverse.

a 1.21 ONe is an affection of Ens, not a substance as Pythagoras and Plato affirmed, but a Categoreme, predicated of every thing as it is Ens. To one is opposite many; by privative oppositi∣on, and therefore one is manifested by many, as indivisible by divisible, the privation by the habit. For divisible is more known to sense then indivisible, and multitude then unity. To one are re∣ferred the same, equall, like; to many, di••ers, ••••equall, unlike.

b 1.22 Things are d••verse, either by Genus or species; by genus those which have not the same matter, nor a mutuall generation; or whereof one pertaines to corruptible substance, the other to incor∣ruptible. By species, those which have the same genus. Genus is that wherein those things that are diverse are said to be the same according to substance.

CHAP. VII.

Of immortall, eternall and immoveable substances.

a 1.23 SUbstance is threefold; two kinds naturall, whereof one is corruptible, as Animal, the other sempiternall, as Heaven. The third is immoveable.

That there is a perpetuall immoveable substance, is proved thus. Substances are first Ens, therefore if all substances are cor∣ruptible, all things likewise must be corruptible, which is false; for there is an eternall locall motion, circular, proper to Heaven, which it is not possible should have had a beginning, or shall have a dissolution, no more then time. If therefore Time be eternall as motion, there must necessarily be some incorruptible and eternal substance, not only that wherein that eternall motion exists, the Heaven it self; but one substance, which so moveth, that though it remain its self moveable, yet it moveth others from eternity to eternity, not having only the power of moving, but being conti∣nually in the act of motion. For Plato and the rest, who concei∣ved God to have done nothing for a great while, erre, because that power were frustraneous which were not reduced to act. Besides, motion would not have been eternall, unlesse the moving substance were not only eternall, and in perpetuall actuall moti∣tion; but such likewise, that it could not but it must move all∣waies, as being a pure act void of power.

Hence the substances which cause eternall motion are void of

matter, for they move from an eternall act, and are void of all power.

In things that somtimes are, somtimes are not, power is pre∣cedent to act; but simply and absolutely act is precedent to pow∣er. For, neither things naturall nor artificiall are reduced from power to act, but by somthing that actually exists. Now if the same thing alwaies return by a circular motion, it necessarily followeth, that there is somthing eternall which remaineth ever the same, and operateth in the same manner. Such an eternall first moving substance is the first Heaven. The vicissitude of Gene∣ration and corruption is not caused by the first Heaven, for that moveth alwaies in the same manner, but by the inferiour Orbes, especially the Sun, which by his accession bringeth life, by his re∣cession death to all things mortall.

Thus is the first Heaven eternall, for it is moved with eternall motion; besides which there is somthing which alwaies moveth, and is never moved it self, and is eternall, and substance, and act.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Gods.

a 1.24 THis first mover, moveth in the same manner as things appe∣tible and intelligible, that is, it so moveth others, as it self remaineth immoveable. The motion of the first Agent, as it is the first efficient cause, consisteth in that influence thereof, whereby it concurreth effectively with the inferiour Intelligences in mo∣ving its own orb. Wherefore the efficience of the first mover is an application of the powers of the inferiour movers to their pro∣per works, wherein he concurreth with them actively, and inde∣pendently. Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens, not for the generation of inferiour things (for the end must be more noble then the means) but for that chief and amiable good, whereunto they endeavour to be like, as their ultimate end.

The first mover is void of mutation, an ens, wholly and simply necessary, and consequently the principle of all. Upon this first principle depend Heaven and nature, because without him, their ultimate end and first efficient, nothing can be, or be operated.

This first mover, God, enjoyeth the most perfect life, perpetual and most pleasant, which absolute felicity is proper to him; for as much as he understandeth and contemplateth himself with infinite delight. For, as we are happy in contemplation that lasts but a little while, so is God most happy, in the infinite and most perfect contemplation of himself, who is of all things most admi∣rable.

God is an eternall living being, the best of beings, an immoveable substance, separate from sensible things, void of corporeall quantity, without parts and indivisible; for such must that principle or sub∣stance be which moveth in infinite time. Nothing finite hath in∣finite power. All magnitude must be either finite or infinite. Fi∣nite magnitude cannot move in infinite time; infinite magnitude there is not, as we proved in the Physick.

God is impossible, not subject to alteration; the first locall motion▪ which is the circular, not being competible to God, because he is immoveable, it followeth that other motions that induce passion or alteration, and are later then locall motion cannot likewise be competent to him.

CHAP. IX.

Of Intelligences.

a 1.25 BEsides this first Substance the mover of the first Heaven, th••re must likewise be other substances separate from matter, e∣ternall and immoveable, president over the motions of the in∣feriour orbes; so that after what number and order those orbes are disposed, according to the same are these eternall moving, and immoveable substances ordered.

From the number of the motions may be collected the number of the Sphears, and consequently of the substances moving, which according to Aristotle are 47.

Heaven is numerically one; because the first mover is one. It is an ancient Tradition that these first substances that move the Heavens are Gods. This opinion is truly divine; but what is ad∣ded, that they had the shape of men, or some other Animal, was only invented for perswasion of the common people, for use of Laws, and the convenience of Life. Thus much may serve for a short view of his Metaphysicks.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 1.
• b 1.2

  Lib. 4. cap. 2.
• * 1.3

  Cap. 3.
• * 1.4

  Cap. 4. 5.
• * 1.5

  Cap. 7.
• a 1.6

  Lib. 6. c. 2.
• b 1.7

  Lib. 7. c. 1.
• c 1.8

  Cap. 3.
• d 1.9

  Cap. 4.
• e 1.10

  Cap. 8.
• f 1.11

  Cap. 10.
• a 1.12

  Lib. 9. c. 1.
• b 1.13

  Cap. 2.
• c 1.14

  Cap. 3.
• d 1.15

  Cap. 4.
• c 1.16

  Cap. 5.
• f 1.17

  Cap. 6.
• g 1.18

  Cap. 8.
• a 1.19

  Lib. 6. c. 2.
• b 1.20

  Lib. 9. c. 10.
• a 1.21

  Cap. 2.
• b 1.22

  Cap. 3.
• a 1.23

  Lib. 12. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 14. cap. 6.
• a 1.24

  Cap. 7.
• a 1.25

  Cap. 8.