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a 1.1 EVery externall sense perceiveth the differences of its own object, as sight judgeth of black and white; but the diffe∣rences of divers objects cannot be perceived by the same sense; there is therefore a common sense, which judgeth the actions of externall sense, and the differences of all sensible objects. The judgment being of a sensible object, must be done by sense, and
by one sense only; for, if there were more, one would object one object apart, the other another, and consequently could not judge between them. For, that which judgeth must have know∣ledge of all that whereof it judgeth, which no exteriour sense can afford, as being consined to its proper object.
Common sense judgeth contrary or different sensibles in the same instant, for it discerneth togther sweet and black, bitter and sweet. Hence it is like the center of a circle, which in diverse respects is called one and many. It is one; as all the externall senses are united in it; many, as it is the fountain and judge of them.
b 1.2 Sense differs from Intellect; for sense is in all living crea∣tures, intellect in few. Sense erreth not about its proper object, but is alwaies true; intellect often erreth by false opinions and habits.
Lib. 3. cap. 2.
De anima, lib. 3. cap. 3.