Two compendious discourses the one concerning the power of God, the other about the certainty and evidence of a future state : published in opposition to the growing atheism and deism of the age.

A DISCOURSE ABOUT THE CERTAINTY and EVIDENCE OF A Future State.

HOW much it is below a man to busie himself wholly in the pursuit of earthly things, whe∣ther honour, wealth, or pleasure; and how contemptible a creature he is, notwithstanding all his acquists of outward greatness, unless he does raise his mind to the contemplation of better and nobler ob∣jects, whosoever will reflect seriously upon the nature and faculties of the mind, by which he is enabled to discourse, and reason, and judge of things and of their consequences, unless he is utterly forsaken by his reason, and governed by brutal appetite, will be forced to acknowledge. Besides, there are such continual changes and vicissitudes of things here below, so much uncertainty in them, and withal, so little satisfaction to the rational desires of the soul, such intermixtures of good and evil, ebbs and flows of pro∣sperity,

sickness, and discontent, and disappointments, and various anxieties, arising from irregular passion and di∣stemper of bloud and humours, and a thousand evil acci∣dents, which no wisdom or care can prevent, notwith∣standing the flattering intervals of health, and ease, and pleasurable self-enjoyment, taking up the greatest part of our lives, and death at last, after three or fourscore years at most, seizing upon us, that, even according to the judg∣ment of natural reason, and the more refined Heathen have acknowledged it, the condition of humane life would be very miserable, and all things considered, inferior to that of other creatures, if there were no life hereafter in another world. Nay, amidst those corrupt principles, which barbarousness and sensuality had super-induced a∣mong the wilder sort of Heathen, immersed in blind and stupid ignorance, and destitute of all helps and methods of knowledge and learning, they yet retained a belief and exspectation of another state after this life: this could not be wholly effaced out of their minds and memories: these thoughts pursued them, wherever they went: and when they met with violence and hardship, and were oppressed by the irresistible strength of invaders, and suffered unjust∣ly, in all these straits and difficulties, they comforted them∣selves with faint hopes of it: and tho' they could not by reason of fatal prejudices and prepossessions, taken up from sense, and of the want of the true knowledge of God, and his attributes, have any just apprehension or notion of the resurrection of the body, yet they all concluded unani∣mously for the life, and being, and subsistence of the soul.

So that the wild and savage people of Afric and Ameri∣ca, as well as the more civilized, and cultivated by philo∣sophy and the discipline of laws, give in full evidence a∣gainst the Atheistical wits of the age, who with an unpa∣rallel'd boldness maintain, that when a man has acted his part in this life, he goes off the stage, and disappears for

ever, that the soul like a flame, when the matter, which fed it, is spent, is wholly extinguished, and vanishes into soft air; that we came into the world by meer chance, and shall be hereafter, as tho' we had never been: as the Author of the book of Wisdom elegantly brings in the Gallants of his time triumphing and entertaining themselves with such i∣dle, phantastick, and irrational hopes; chap. ii. 2. and that when a man dyes, there is an utter end of him, a dissolution of soul as well as body, every element taking its own, and the whole swallowed up in the universal mass of matter, out of which it was at first made: sing∣ing out with the chorus in Seneca's Troas:

Quaeris quo jaceas post obitum loco? Quo non nata jacent.

and,

Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors nihil.

But it ought not to be exspected, as to the Heathen, that they, whose eyes were dim and weak, and who were in∣volved in thick clouds and mists of ignorance, should have a clear view and prospect of another world, and that those heavenly objects should appear to them, whose un∣derstandings were darkned with false notions and princi∣ples, in their full brightness. However, it is most certain, that they did believe a life after this: and made it the great incentive and encouragement of virtue and cou∣rage in dying for their country: and when they did ill, and that in the dark, with all possible secrecy and undi∣sturbance, and with all security, under no restraint of law, or fear of punishment; yet their hearts misgave them, and in private and alone they dreaded the evil ef∣fects and consequences of their guilt. I am not back∣ward to acknowledge, that this opinion, belief, and ex∣spectation of another life, might be oftentimes clogg'd in

the best of them with mixtures of doubts: the preposses∣sions of sense stifling the dictates of right reason and the suggestions of natural conscience. Even that excellent per∣son, Socrates, who was one of the first among the Greeks, who freed his reason from the entanglement of vulgar o∣pinions in matters of religion and moral philosophy, which the corrupt Theology of their Poets had introdu∣ced, and who died as it were a Martyr for the unity of the Godhead, spake somewhat doubtfully of it in the dis∣course he had with his friends, the very day of his death: the sum of which is preserved by Plato in his dialogue, * 1.1 entitled Phoedo, or of the soul. He said, he would not be positive and dogmatical: but however he profest his hope, that he should pass immediately to the company of those good men, who died before him, whose souls survived in some happy place he knew not where. This was far from the heroick and steady assurance of S. Paul, who after his second appearance before Nero, when he saw, that there was nothing but death to be exspected from the Tyrant and his bloudy Officers, triumphs in his neer approaches to it, as the entrance to a blessed immortality. 2 Tim. ii. 6, 7, 8. I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight: I have finished my course: I have kept the faith: henceforth is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day. He seemed as sure of it, as if he had had the crown upon his head, and had been actually in heaven. What Philosophy can scarce reach, being at that vast distance from it, that Christiani∣ty easily discovers. Reason is the same in all mankind; but reason, assisted by revelation, is like the eye armed with a Telescope: it not only sees things clearer and bet∣ter, but discovers new objects; such as before lay hid, and were indiscernible to the naked sight. A Christian man, that is, if he be more so, than in profession, and if his immora∣lities

have not altogether corrupted his mind, and plunged him into the very dregs of infidelity, cannot at all doubt of a future state. He looks upon himself as a pilgrime, and is travelling toward a better country, that is, a hea∣venly: here he has no continuing city, but looks for one to come. His hopes are fixed elsewhere: and the doctrine of faith assures him of the certainty and reality of his hopes, and plentifully affords him good and well settled and unmoveable grounds, upon which his expectation is founded.

But setting aside the proofs from the clear, and full, and uncontrollable revelations of Scripture concerning the diffe∣rent states and conditions of happiness and misery in the other world: as having now to do with men, who throw off all belief of the sacred writings of the Prophets and A∣postles, and reject their authority; in order to their con∣viction I will only make use of arguments drawn from the principles of reason and of natural religion, which they pretend to admit and embrace, in proving, that there are things to be hoped for and feared in another world; that is, that there are rewards and punishments to be di∣stributed hereafter according to our good or ill behaviour in this life: and that a full, and positive, and satisfacto∣ry proof of this is derivable from the nature of things, and that such evidence is sufficient, and cannot with any shew or pretense of reason be rejected.

I shall only by way of preliminary lay down this fol∣lowing proposition, of the truth of which these men cannot but be fully sensible; viz. that the belief of this natural truth, so universally received, that is, in all ages and among all nations, is very conducive to, and has a mighty influence upon, the well-being of the world.

It is indeed one of the grand bases and principles of all religion, whether natural, or prescribed by positive in∣stitution. If all things were to end here, and no exspecta∣tion

of any thing future, men would little care to be virtuous or religious for virtues or religions sake. For tho' to live virtuously and religiously, that is, according to the law of nature and the law of God, be agreeable to our rational faculties, and creates a greater joy and sere∣nity in the mind, than what all earthly, sensual, and bru∣tal pleasures, enjoyed to their full height, can afford, and consequently does carry along with it its own reward: yet it is justly to be feared, that the satisfaction of ha∣ving done ones duty would be judged meager and empty in respect of those gross delights of the senses, and be lookt upon as the effect of melancholy and chagrin, and it may be, of mistake and folly; and that religion would have but few votaries upon this noble and generous prin∣ciple. The only business then of life would be how to be rich and great: strength would be the law of justice, and right and title measured out by the longest sword. Innocence would be no security against oppression and violence; but rather their sport and prey. Luxury would go hand in hand with ambition: pleasures, tho' never so unmanly and impure, should be wanting to no sense: the appetite should be sated with wine and lust, and then raised again with charming incentives and provocatives. Men would play the beasts more solemnly, make the whole creation administer to their wantonness and riot, and spend their whole time in the excesses of extravagant mirth and jollity. Conscience, alas, and honesty would be accompted meer empty names: corrupt interest and policy would raise themselves upon the ruines of religion and morality. Deceit and evil arts should soon take place, where there was no hope of prevailing by open force. A mans own will, were it never so unreasonable, should be the onely rule of his life: and the gratification of an irregular appetite should be the onely law of his mind.

Next, the belief of this fundamental truth is the great and necessary support of government. It is like the mid∣dle stone of an arch, which sustains the whole building: it keeps the world from falling into confusion, and re∣lapsing into its original chaos. All government would quickly be at an end: laws would not have sufficient strength to hold men in to their duty; at least, they would be like spiders webbs, onely proper to entangle petty offen∣ders, who could not break through them. They would no longer obey, than they were forced: they would be impatient of living under such restraints, which, as some of our modern Virtuosi pretend, abridge them of their natural liberty: and if so, they were to be treated like wild beasts, and pent up in dens and caves from doing mischief. Every man would pretend to have a right to every thing: and Mr. Hobbs's absurd and phantastic hypo∣thesis about the state of nature would be really introdu∣ced into the world by innumerable instances and examples of cruelty and injustice, to the shame of humane nature, and utter overthrow of humane race. Such continued clashings and fightings would be more fatal and pernici∣ous, than plagues, hurricanes, earthquakes, and inunda∣tions, and would quickly dispeople the earth of all its inhabitants. It is the belief of another world, which secures government, preserves authority, and gives strength to laws.

Fear and hope have a great influence upon our lives: they are very imperious passions, and shew their power sufficiently in all the great transactions of mankind, which are done with reason and design. They are natural to us, and will never forsake us: and their strength increaseth proportionably, according to the nature, and quality, and degrees of those rewards and punishments, on which they are fixt. Now if these rewards and punishments

were only, temporary, if after death there were nothing fur∣ther to be feared or hoped for, men would not value the ut∣most severity of law, to gratifie a passion, suppose lust or revenge: they would willingly run the hazard of dying, so as that they might either enjoy their extravagant phan∣sies, or ruine and dispatch their enemy: death in it self being not so terrible, (the fear of which several passions can easily overcome) but as it is a passage to eternity. He, who is grown so desperate, as not to value his own life, is easily master of another mans: and nothing could deter such an one from acting the greatest villany ima∣ginable.

But now, if there be rewards and punishments after this life ended, if these rewards and punishments be ever∣lasting, if these everlasting rewards and punishments be dispensed and proportioned according to the actions and behaviours of men here in this world, if this be certain, and if it be believed and exspected as certain, the just and well grounded hope of future happiness will power∣fully perswade and incite us to the practises of a virtuous and holy life; and the fear and dreadful exspectation of future endless misery will as powerfully deter us from the commission of those wickednesses, which render us justly obnoxious to such punishments. For who would not be happy for ever, if he either might or could? who in his right wits and calm thoughts would be content to be mi∣serable to eternal ages? who would make it his choice to be damned, if he might avoid it?

Now as to the proof of a future state from the princi∣ples of natural religion, the certainty and evidence of it are founded on the justice of God and his governing pow∣er: which render it undeniably necessary.

Nothing perplext the minds of the ancient Philoso∣phers more, than to see righteous and virtuous men often∣times

afflicted and opprest, and the wicked and dissolute prosperous and triumphant. No phaenomenon whatever, which they pretended might be solved and accompted for by their several hypotheses, without interesting a Deity at all in their solutions, troubled them so much, as this: these difficulties were great and perplext, and disagree∣able, as they thought, to the common notions of reason, equity, and justice, imprinted upon their minds: so that in the tumultuous workings of their thoughts, they be∣gan to question, whether God (for such a supreme be∣ing they could not, they durst not deny) had any thing to do in the government of the world, who permitted such disorders, and seemed so unconcerned. But upon wise thoughts and sedate deliberation they quickly recovered, and generally condemned the doctrine of Epicurus, and readily acknowledged, that all the great revolutions, that were in the world, all the odd and strange events of things, and the different conditions of life, as to good and evil, so seemingly repugnant to the rules of right and wrong, were for wise ends and purposes permitted to come to pass: that there was a soveraign infinite being, who governs the world according to his will and plea∣sure; and that all things are subject to the rules and laws of his wisdom and providence. This, after all their re∣searches into the causes and reasons of things, notwith∣standing the great difficulties, wherewith they had been entangled, was generally acknowledged by them, as the voice and dictate of universal nature and clear and right reason. The Schools of all the sober Masters and Pro∣fessors of Philosophy, both at Athens and Rome, sound∣ed with this doctrine: and all, who pretended to virtue, and honour, and understanding, very few excepted, em∣braced it. It was to the belief of this prime truth, and the practises of religion grounded upon it, that the wise

and judicious * 1.2 Cicero ascribed the asto∣nishing success of the Roman Arms in the several distant parts of the then known world, where their victorious eagles percht; that it was not, because they were more numerous, or excelled either in the arts of policy, or in the art of war, (as if the Galls or the Car∣thaginians had been inferiour to them in valour and discipline, for they had had frequent experience of the contrary, and had been sadly distrest by both; and Brennus and Hannibal were names, which had made Rome to tremble, or as if the other nations, as the Greeks, or the Spaniards, or even their own neighbours and country∣men, the Italians and Latines themselves, whom they con∣quered, and brought under the jurisdiction of their im∣perial City, were not so numerous, or not so cunning and ingenious, and excellent in discipline and civil arts and accomplishments of life) sed pietate atque religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus: but in piety and religion, and in this peculiar wisdom, that they acknowledged, that the great affairs of the world, and all things in it, were govern∣ed and over-ruled by a Deity. This truth they retained, notwithstanding the grievous errors, which they had ta∣ken up concerning the multiplicity of inferior Gods, and the horrible and shameful scandals of their idolatrous worship. But our improved reason, enlightned with the knowledge of the true God, does more fully and clearly, upon just and easie reflexions, prove and make manifest to us, that God, who created the universe, is an alwise God, holy, just, and true; that righteousness is essen∣tial to his nature; that nothing comes to pass, or can

come to pass without his appointment, at least without his permission; that what now seems disorder and chance, is wise contrivance and design; and that all the con∣fusions brought upon the world, tend to illustrate God's wisdom and power, who can and will bring beauty and order out of them.

If all things then in the world are under a law, the law of their respective natures, and act according to the established laws of their creation; and if there be an over-ruling providence seen every where: man certainly, who is capable of a law, by reason of his intellectual fa∣culties and liberty of will, cannot be supposed left to him∣self, to act, as he wantonly pleaseth, without being ac∣comptable to a superior power. He, who made him, and continues his being to him, has a right to govern him, that is, may, if he will, lay down laws and rules for the right ordering of his life: and he has actually done so: and every man is conscious to himself, that he is obliged by virtue of his creation and dependence upon God to obey that law. Now it is not so much the equi∣ty, the agreeableness, the advantage, or necessity of a law, as the sanction, which makes it to be obeyed, and preserves it inviolable. If God then be the governour of the world, and particularly of mankind, and if he go∣verns man according to the laws and rules of justice, the necessary and fundamental maximes of government will oblige us to believe, that he will accordingly reward and punish. There is one Law-giver, who is able to save, and to destroy. But we see daily, how the laws of God are vio∣lated, and that the violators of them oftentimes escape unpunished in this life: and we know, what ill use im∣patient and inconsiderate men have made of this forbear∣ance and long-suffering of God. Is not bloud-thirsty cruelty, for instance, a manifest breach of the law natu∣ral

and divine? that multitudes of innocent persons should be sacrificed to the revengeful and wanton humour of a Tyrant; which was the case of the primitive Chri∣stians during the reigns of the heathen Roman Emperours: who does not detest as impious and inhumane? yet how many of them, who have been guilty of this barbarity, have left the world without any mark of the divine ven∣geance upon them? they having had whole armies to defend them, and assist them in their outragious and bloudy massacres. Who is not concerned for the suffer∣ings of good men in all ages? when they are dead, they are pitied perchance, and men weep over their graves, and celebrate their memories with anniversary orations, and speak great things in praise of their courage and vir∣tue, which no opposition, no trouble whatever, no not death it self, could tire out and overcome. This is all the reward, which they have in this world: and certain∣ly in it self a very poor one, tho' justly due to their name and memory. But while they lived, oftentimes they were destitute, afflicted, tormented, wanting the con∣veniencies of life, exposed to extreme poverty, and to cruel mockings and scourgings, wandring about in deserts and mountains, and retiring to dens and caves for shelter; and outlawed by sanguinary edicts from the society of mankind: and at other times condemned to the flames, or to wild beasts in their Amphitheatres, or to gibbets and crosses, or to wracks and wheels, and such like cruel deaths, with all possible ignominy, as well as torment. Does not the justice of God make it necessary, that there be a distribution of rewards and punishments hereafter, according as every one deserves? Can the government of a most holy and alwise God be supposed imperfect and defective in so necessary a part of it, as is distributive justice? Can God be thought to give laws on purpose,

that they might be broken, and to reward the breakers of them, and to have no regard to those, who consci∣entiously obey them? This most certainly evinceth, that there must be another life after this, wherein God will vindicate the honour of his justice and providence, which now seemingly suffer, and do himself right in the sight of all mankind. If there be a God, there will be a future state, because God cannot be otherwise than just. For tho' he hath an absolute power over his creatures, yet he governs them according to rules of eternal recti∣tude and justice, and has declared from heaven his wrath and indignation against all unrighteousness of men, which is the transgression of those rules, and his veraci∣ty, as well as his justice, will oblige him to make it good.

If it be said, that this evidence of reason is not so clear and convincing, as that, which ariseth from Mathemati∣cal demonstration, or the attestation of sense, tho' it should be granted, nothing can be gained by it to the prejudice of the truth and certainty of this doctrine: which I shall shew in these two particulars:

• I. That this evidence of reason is fully satisfactory of it self.
• II. That in a matter of this nature no other evidence can or ought to be exspected.

I. That this evidence of reason is fully satisfactory of it self, will appear hence, because it is highly irrational to doubt or deny such proofs, as are grounded upon the evidence of reason, meerly upon this pretense, that the evi∣dence of Mathematical demonstration and of sense is clearer. For tho' all the maximes and postulata of Geo∣metry, with the several Theoremes and Problemes built upon them, be in themselves so clear and evident, as that

upon a right perception either of the terms, or of the manner of construction, we readily and easily yield our assent to them without the least demur: and tho' the judgment of sense be certain, that is, when nothing, re∣quisite to make the sensation perfect, is wanting: yet the Sceptick has called in question the truth of both, upon this foolish pretense, that for ought he knows, and can be throughly convinced of, all this Mathematical evi∣dence may be a fatal and settled delusion: that it is pos∣sible, that a man may be most deceived, when he thinks himself most assured: that the collections and inferences of what we call reason may be false and deceitful: that the impressions, which material objects make upon the phansie, may be onely chimerical: that when we see and hear, and discourse, we may but onely think so: that we have as little certainty of things, when we are a∣wake, and are very attentive and serious, as when we are asleep and dream: and that our whole life may be but one continued scene of phansie and imagination. So that the most common, and universal, and establisht truths of nature may be, and have been called in que∣stion by subtil Sophisters, who have a mind to cavil. But who does not deride and condemn such scepticism as very silly and irrational? Men are not to be per∣swaded or disputed out of their senses, and their belief of first notions, by such idle and phantastick suppositions: the possibility of the truth of which is overthrown seve∣ral ways, as, by the reflexions, which the understanding makes upon it self, whereby we clearly know what we know: by our acting according to deliberation and fixt principles: by our being conscious to our selves of the continued and repeated actions of our lives: by con∣firmed and undoubted experience, that, tho' we are de∣ceived, when our outward senses are suspended by sleep,

and the phansie takes a liberty to amuse us with a thou∣sand various shapes and figures, and sometimes with strange conjunctions of things, which neither exist, nor can possibly exist, we make certain conclusions from our awakened senses, when we have the full and entire use and exercise of them: and because it is inconceivable, either how such a delusion should arise of it self, and be essential to the nature of man; or how that God should suffer it; that is, that he, who is of infinite truth, and wisdom, and justice, should force us by the very consti∣tution of our nature to believe a lye, and embrace error under the semblance of truth: and that too without any help or means of discovering our being convinced of our mistake, or at least should leave us to such great in∣certainties, that we should have no 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or rule to distinguish between, and discern truth from false∣hood, and that he should give us reason and sense for no other end or use, but to deceive us, at least to perplex and distract us with doubts and scruples, whether we un∣derstand and see, when we both understand and see.

The certainty and clearness of Mathematical demon∣stration (as also of such propositions, as are said to be aeternae veritatis) ariseth hence, because it is conversant a∣bout things abstracted from matter, or, rather to speak more clearly and distinctly, it is founded in the essential noti∣ons and properties of things, which have an inseparable dependence upon and connexion one with another, without any regard to their actual existence; as that all the lines drawn from the center of a circle to the cir∣cumference are equal; and that the whole is greater than any of its parts: which is infallibly and universally cer∣tain; it being essential to the nature of a thing, consi∣dered as entire and whole, to be made up of many parts united and connected together, and therefore necessarily

greater than any one of those parts actually divided or conceived divided from it. And the like is to be said of all the essential attributes and properties of a sphere, cy∣linder, ellipsis, or any other Geometrical figure whatever: tho' there were no exactly spherical, cylindrical, or ellip∣tical body in nature, or could be framed such by the pow∣er of art. Such speculative truths carry in themselves their own evidence: and the understanding very readily assents to them: and let me add, the more readily, not only, because it would be the effect either of a natural or shamefully absurd stupidity to deny such evidence, which would be the same thing, as to maintain gross and palpa∣ble contradictions; but also because it is no mans interest to do so. For nothing is more certain, than that interest oftentimes rejects the clear results of reason; than that the judgment is oftentimes enclined to pass a wrong sen∣tence, even against knowledge and just proof of the con∣trary, in favour of a false opinion, if it be advantagious; that what we do not like, and is disagreeable to our designs, does not easily get admittance within us: we demur up∣on it, and raise difficulties and doubts, and pretend, that we cannot understand it; when the true reason is, it makes against us, and therefore we will not. And this is one great reason, why the Atheists and Deists set them∣selves against the fundamental truths of religion, and la∣bour so much to confirm themselves in their infidelity, by making use of their wit and the little reason, that is left them, to find out new difficulties, and raise objections, to justifie and defend themselves in their unbelief, in opposition to the rational, wise, and just sentiments of good men, whom they most absurdly represent under the nickname of Believers, that is, credulous. For these men are fully convinced, that their practises are altogether in∣consistent with such professions: that if they admit these

truths, they must quit their present course of life, unless they could have the patience to live under the anguish of self-condemnation, which would turn all their luscious enjoyments into gall and wormwood: that if there be a God, and that his power and justice are equally infinite, he is to be feared and adored: (for who would dare to live in open defiance of his laws, and blaspheme him daily, who believes, that he can punish him eternally for such defiance and blasphemy?) and that if there be a fu∣ture state, they must not then live like the beasts, which perish, and which are altogether unconcerned in it. But the pleasures of the animal life have corrupted their minds: they are immersed in sensuality: they have given up themselves to be governed by their appetite: to gra∣tifie that is their only study and business: it is death to them to think of a sober, restrained, and mortified kind of life: it is not their interest, they know, as the case stands with them, to believe, that there is a heaven or an hell: and therefore we need not wonder, if they cry out, that they see no force in this or that argument, in which the whole world has hitherto acquiesced, as just and sa∣tisfactory, to convince their judgment. Nothing will content them, but Mathematical evidence and demonstra∣tion: tho' it may very justly be feared, that if the evi∣dence, they so foolishly call for, were prejudicial to the end and purposes of life, which they pursue, they would deny even that too.

II. No other kind of evidence in the case of a future state can or ought to be exspected or demanded. And the reason is, because the subject-matter is not capable of it. There are different ways of proving things agreeable to their respective natures, both in Metaphysics, Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and the like; of the conclusions of

which, fairly deduced according to the laws of me∣thod, there can be no just doubt: every science being built upon certain general principles and rules, taken up, either from experience and observation, or else drawn from the common notices and consent of mankind. Of∣ten repeated trials and experiments, which have succeed∣ed well, sufficiently convince us of the truth of several things, which we will not pretend to demonstrate. If a matter of fact, in it self not unlikely, much less im∣possible, be confirmed by credible witnesses, or by au∣thentic records, it would be a very strange piece of nice∣ness in us, to deny the truth of it, and call for demon∣stration: because we have all the assurance, which relati∣on and history can give us, that it is so. To perswade a man, that it is his duty to be just, and honest, and so∣ber, and chast, I am onely to make use of moral argu∣ments. To prove to him, that he has a command over himself, as to his actions, I shew him the absurdities of the doctrine of fatal necessity: and if he should persist and demand further satisfaction, I can do no more, than make an appeal to himself, whether he does not find a power within him of acting or not acting, as he pleaseth: whether he does not deliberate with himself, whether he had best do it or no: and when after some demurs and debates he hath determined his will, of his own accord, which before was indifferent either to this or that, whe∣ther he doth not consult about the means to bring about his design: and upon a survey of several, make choice of such, as he judgeth most proper and effectual. In these and the like cases, we can have no Mathematical evidence and demonstration: yet we cannot rationally doubt of the verity of their proofs: tho' the evidence and assurance be onely moral, yet it is such, as will perswade any man, who is free from unjust and irrational prejudice.

Besides, upon this kind of assurance a 1.3 depends all the actions of our lives. No man can demonstrate to another, who has not been there, that there are such countries, as India, Persia, and Turkey, or such great cities, as Delhi, Agra, Ispahân, and Constantinople; and yet men send their estates thither, tho' they have one∣ly the reports of others for their assurance, and the a∣bility and integrity of the persons, whom they employ and trust in the management of their rich trade. That they are the sons of such and such persons, they are onely assured by the testimony of others, and chiefly of their Parents, who have taken care of their education. It would be idle, monstrous, and unnatural to deny to pay them the respect and reverence, due to them, both by the laws of God and nature, upon a pretense, that they have some scruples upon their minds, whether they be their parents or no: and that it cannot be made out demonstratively to them, that they are so. What other assurance have they, that the deeds and conveyances, whereby they hold their estates, derived down to them from their ancestors, at the sealing and delivering of which they were not pre∣sent, are not counterfeit; and would they be contented to have them called in question upon such a phantastick supposition? No one can demonstrate to himself out of Euclide and Archimedes, that the house, wherein he lyes, will not fall upon his head: and yet for all this bare pos∣sibility he sleeps securely and without any disturbance, and will not lye in the open air. Not to heap up more instances in a thing so common, and every where to be met with.

All satisfaction concerning the certainty of a future state is offered, that can be justly demanded. We have the evidence of reason, and the evidence of religion, which is founded upon the belief of it: the justice of God makes it necessary: and the doctrine of providence and of the government of the world by the alwise and omnipotent Creator suppose it. Things future are not triable by b 1.4 sense: they are the ob∣jects of our hopes, and of our fears, and of our belief, and of our exspecta∣tion; and therefore cannot be proved to exist the same way, as things, which every day present themselves to our sight. But how are these men assured, that there is no future state? what de∣monstration can these great Masters of reason, as they think themselves, whom nothing less will content and sa∣tisfie, bring to the contrary? It is but just and reason∣able, that they who deny, or so much as call in question, the truth of any opinion, tho' built upon probable ar∣guments, should produce arguments, if not of greater, yet at least of equal probability. To deny a thing bold∣ly at first, without giving any reason for the denial, and then to be very peremptory in the affirmation of a con∣trary proposition, is against all the laws and rules of wise discoursing and arguing, and is not the effect of judgment, but of meer trifling and foolish conceitedness: much more when they pluck up the very foundations of a science; when they destroy the principles of nature; when they condemn a truth, as is this of a future state, which all mankind in all ages has received and embraced, except an inconsiderable number of wretches like themselves, they should be throughly convinced before hand, that their proofs are just and good, and little less than infal∣lible. But all which they alledge in behalf of their infi∣delity,

is either, that they cannot frame a just and clear idea of such a state: or else they make some little and unphilo∣sophical exceptions and cavils at terms, as Spirit, incorporeal substance, and the like: which is the way of Mr. Hobbes; (tho' the notion of an incorporeal substance and of thought is as easie to conceive, and as little liable to just exceptions, as of substance in general, or of sub∣stance in extended matter) pleasing themselves onely with the gross images of sensible beings. They cannot pre∣tend to any direct and positive proofs: they neither can nor dare say, that what they imagine is certain and infallible. They only think so, and wish so: and in∣deed for their wishes they have some reason, tho' none for their opinion. For what malefactor can think of his trial and the consequences of it with any kind of pa∣tience, and not wish at the same time, that there were no such things, as a law and a judge to execute that law in their deserved punishment? And besides this, they very foolishly and idly alledge, that they have not spoken with any, who have arisen from the dead to give them an accompt of it: as if before they would be convinced, whether there be such places, as a heaven or an hell, they would have an exact survey taken of them; and se∣veral chorographical schemes and maps made to describe them the better to them. But is not this a most irrational and senseless ground of their infidelity? Have we not in the sacred writings undoubted testimonies of several raised from the dead, beyond all possibility of denial, of which faithful and authentic registers have been made to inform posterity? But may it not also be justly sup∣posed, that these very men, if the most real and certain apparition possible were made to them, after they had recovered themselves from the surprize and affright∣ment, into which such a gastly sight might cast them,

would look upon it onely, as a meer phantome? as Cassius, one of the sect of Epicurus, told his friend Brutus, as Plutarch writes in his life, that the evil ge∣nius, which appeared to him, was the effect of his me∣lancholy; no other than a dream and the roving of his disturbed imagination, when he was between sleeping and waking: or if a dead person, raised again to life, should appear to them, they would cavil, and say, that he had not been really dead: they would find out some such foolish and idle pretense and excuse, and still hold fast their beloved conclusion. The rich man in the Parable, when he was in hell, was very sollicitous for his surviving brethren, that they might not come in∣to that place of torment: and therefore made it his request, that a messenger might be sent thence express to forewarn them; but the proposal was rejected, as un∣just and unnecessary. They were sufficiently instructed out of the divine writings, that there was such a place: the Law and the Prophets were continually read, and sounded in their ears, that they could not pretend ig∣norance. Besides, if they hear not Moses and the Pro∣phets: neither will they be perswaded, tho' one arose from the dead.

But let us suppose, in order to the conviction of these men, if any of them should chance to cast their eyes upon these papers, that there were an equal probability on both sides: that as much might be said against the certainty of a future state, as for it: that God had not so clearly and expresly revealed his will in the holy Scriptures about it: and that the case had not been so fully determined, but yet hung as it were in aequilibrio: yet because it is of an eternal consequence c 1.5, right rea∣son

and common prudence should teach a man to make choice of the surer side: nay, if there were less degrees of probability for it, we should make provision how∣ever, for fear, that it should prove so. If in matters of ordinary speculation, which signifie nothing to our in∣terest and advantage, whether they be true or no, (for what am I the better, whether the Ptolemaic or Coper∣nican hypothesis best solves the various appearances of the heavens) we relinquish the vulgar opinions, which have the prescription of antiquity, and which seem confirmed by sense, as being swayed by more rational proofs and evi∣dences: certainly in a business of such moment, as is the living hereafter for ever in happiness or misery, when there are so many arguments to sway and encline our belief; when we have all the assurance, which things, that are future, and not yet seen, can possibly have: when the danger is so great, and the loss infinite and irrepairable, it is a folly beyond all expression for any person to suffer himself to be cheated, by the corrupt judgment of sense, which in this case cannot pretend to arbitrate, and by the little cavillings and oppositions of a gross phansie, into the belief of the contrary. If one∣ly the probable hope of gain makes men despise cer∣tain danger, and carries them round about the world to the utmost points of East and West: if they undergo, not onely with patience, but with great readiness and chearfulness, all those uneasinesses and hazards, which such long voyages in tempestuous seas, and through va∣rious climates of excessive heat and cold, necessarily sub∣ject them to: if they venture their health, and often∣times their lives: and that too with the good liking and applause of the world, especially if the advantage be a∣ny way proportionable to the danger: certainly the in∣terest of our immortal souls should make us adventure

as much for heaven, a place of infinite blessedness, where we shall live for ever, without feeling the decays of age, and without being weary of those unmixt pleasures, which it affords; and where are heaped up treasures of glory, which no time shall exhaust, if we had not the infallible word of God for it, but onely the dictates of natural religion, and the evidence of right and unpreju∣diced reason.

Columbus had no demonstration, that there were such vast tracts of land on the other side of the great Atlan∣tic ocean, running out almost from one Pole to the o∣ther, which he afterwards discovered: he was onley lead by probable arguments to undertake that voyage: as thinking it very unlikely, that so great a part of the terraqueous globe, over which the Sun passes in his diurnal revolution, should be covered with water. It was lookt upon at first as a project, which had nothing to support it, but the strong phansie of the man, who proposed it: and it was a long time, before he could be furnished with ships, in order to make a discovery. But how were they alarmed at his return with the news, which he brought of another world, which had layn hid for so many ages! how were the opinions of the old Philosophers confuted, that there could be no li∣ving between the Tropics, and especially under the Line, by reason of the intolerable heat, which the per∣pendicular projection of the sun-beams they phansied must necessarily produce: when they were assured from eye-witnesses, that no country in the world could be more populous! Now our B. Saviour, who came down from heaven, has made full and clear discoveries of a glorious kingdom, and has laid down rules and directi∣ons for our journeying thither: rules and directions so

plain, that we cannot fail of arriving at that blessed place, if we observe and follow them. What can any one alledge to justifie or excuse his solly? how can he answer it to God, or to himself, at the last great day, if after all this he should doubt, whether there be such a place, as heaven or no, and so doubt, as wretchedly to neglect the happy opportunities of getting thither at the end of his life?

If, as Socrates argued a little before his death, nothing remains to a man after he is dead, then he would be the less troubled at what he was then about to suffer: for then he should cease to be mistaken, if he were mistaken. But if there be another state in the next life, as there is the highest reason to believe, and no reason to believe the contrary, what a foo∣lish bargain will it appear, the Epicure has made in buying the vain and perishing pleasures of the world at the price of his soul! It will then be an infallible demonstration, that he has acted against the common rules of prudence, in preferring a trifle, a shadow, a humour, before the favour of God; before the fulness of joy, which is to be had in his presence; before immortal blessedness, with which he shall see the righteous crowned; which will heighten his anguish, and make it intolerable: and the thought of this will as much torment him, as the very flames, that he might have been happy as they, but for his own wretched carelessness and obstinate infidelity.

To conclude this short discourse, which I most heartily and passionately recommend to the serious and impartial consideration of all such, as vouchsafe to read it.

Seeing that there will be and must be a day of judgment, in which we shall give a strict accompt of our lives: that there is a future state, whose duration shall be beyond the

limits of time; that, when we depart out of this life, we launch forth into an ocean, which knows neither bounds nor shore: that there are eternal rewards and punishments in the other world: and that according to the tenor and habit of our lives, and the condition we are found in at our death, we shall receive our everlasting doom: how much does it concern every one of us so to live here in this world, that is, in the fear of God and in a consci∣entious discharge and practise of all Christian and moral virtues, as to live for ever happy in the next!

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Plato in Phoe∣done. edit. Cantabr. 88. 1673. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. pag. 82.
• * 1.2

  Cicero in his Oration, de Ha∣ruspicum responsis, which he pro∣nounced in the Senate. Quam volu∣mus licet, P. C. ipsi nos amenius: ta∣men nec numero Hispanos, nec callidi∣tate Poenos, nec robore Gallos, nec artibus Graecos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis ac terrae domestico nativo∣que sensu, Italos ipsos ac Latinos: sed pietate & religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique per∣speximus, omnes gentes nationesque su∣per ••••imus.
• a 1.3

  Estne opus in vitâ negotiosum aliquod atque actuosum genus, quod non side praeeunte suscipiant, sumant, atque aggrediantur actores? As Arnobius adv. Gentes lib. 2. pag. 47. Lugd. Bat. 48. 1651. there shews at large with great sharpness of wit and judgment against the Heathen of his time, who objected credulity to the Christians.
• b 1.4

  Nulla futurorum potest existere comprobatio. Cum ergo haec sit condi∣tio futurorum, ut teneri & compre∣hendi nullius possint anticipationis at∣tactu &c. Arnob. lib. 2. pag. 44.
• c 1.5

  Nonne pu∣rior ratio est ex duobus incertis & in ambiguà exspectatione pendentibus, id potius credere, quod aliquas spes ferat, quam omnino quod nullas? Arnob. p. 44.