Two compendious discourses the one concerning the power of God, the other about the certainty and evidence of a future state : published in opposition to the growing atheism and deism of the age.

A DISCOURSE Concerning the Power of God.

ALL error proceeds from an undue appre∣hension of things; which is caused, either by weakness and shallowness of judgment, when there is a defect and inability in the understanding to search to the bottom of things, to examine with a just and wise severity what∣ever is proposed, before it be admitted, and to weigh all circumstances in an even ballance; that is, according to sober, fix'd, and sure principles, bottomed upon reason, good sense, and unquestionable experience, and agree∣able to the faculties of the mind, and the notions im∣printed upon it: or else,

Which makes the error more dangerous and faulty, by an inconsiderate assent, and an over-hasty partiality, when the affections hinder the calm and deliberate debates of sober reason, and casting a mist before the understand∣ing, altogether blind it: so that it shall not be able to discern truth from falshood, right from wrong, opi∣nion,

and plausibility, and conjecture, from certainty, and knowledge, and demonstration. But where the idea's of things, capable of being fully known and proved, are distinct and proper, where the understanding is sound and clear, and where the operations of the mind are free, and undisturbed, either by irregular passion, or by foolish or irrational prejudice, truth is readily discerned and en∣tertained, and makes its way into the mind, with the same easiness and quickness, as the streams of light flow upon the eye, which is open, and not otherwise indisposed to receive them: by the help of which it may see all those glorious and astonishing objects, that from every part of the visible creation present themselves.

For want of this rightful method and just principle in examining the truth of things, many are very apt and very willing to cheat themselves, and out of a lazy kind of ignorance, and a foolish belief, that all things are, and must be, as they phansie, take up idle and false opi∣nions, and that not only concerning things of nature, (of which be our perceptions true or false, it matters not much in things purely speculative, if they have no influ∣ence upon life, manners, or government; and a latitude of opinion is justly allowable in such things also, as are not capable of a clear and satisfactory decision, either by sense, experiment, or demonstration) but also concern∣ing religion: opinions, which contradict its holy de∣signs, and directions, and commands: such too, as are derogatory to the nature and attributes of God; such, as are altogether dishonourable and unworthy of him, and inconsistent with his divine perfections.

That God is a being absolutely perfect, and conse∣quently of infinite power, nature and right reason, even abstracted from revelation, suggest to every considering man to admit and assent unto: and no one, who hath a∣ny just or true notion of God, can possibly deny it,

without great violence done to his faculties: and yet when any difficulty presents it self, which we cannot ma∣ster, and when we are puzled and dissatisfied in our search of things, we presently fly off, and whatever is above the reach of our nature, or above the comprehension of our knowledge, or above our contrivance, or above our power, must be denied to be possible even to God him∣self, because we cannot conceive it, or rather will not conceive it a right: thus bringing all things down to our narrow and scanty model, and levelling, not onely the highest mysteries of revealed religion, but the essential perfections of the Godhead, knowable by the light of nature, and the principles of natural religion, that there are such, and necessarily must be so, with our low, dull, and earthy phansies.

To obviate these mistakes therefore, which may arise from a misapprehension of this divine Attribute, I shall endeavour to settle the true notion of it: upon the clear∣ing up of which, all those doubts and scruples, and ob∣jections, which some bold and presumptuous men, as void for the most part of all honest and sober morals, as they are of sound learning and philosophy, being equally debauched and corrupted in their understanding, and in their behaviour and practise, are wont as it were trium∣phantly to propose even in places of publick resort, as well as in their ordinary conversation, in this Sceptical and Atheistical age, against a creation, against the mira∣cles recorded in the holy Scriptures, against the doctrine of the ever blessed and adorable Trinity, and of the in∣carnation of the Son of God, and lastly against the be∣lief of a resurrection, and the like, will vanish and dis∣appear; and all those truths, whether natural or re∣vealed, which they with equal rashness and impiety have pronounced impossible, will be found just objects, as to the former, of our knowledge and understanding, and

as to the latter, of faith and of a wise and rational assent.

In order hereento I will shew these three things:

• I. What is the true and proper notion of the divine power; and in what respect it is said, that nothing is impossible to God: that
• II. The attribute of infinite power is necessarily inclu∣ded in the notion and idea of God: and that
• III. It is altogether unreasonable to limit the power of God in things possible, or deny any doctrine of religion, whether revealed in Scripture, or flow∣ing from the principles of natural reason, because it transcends either our power or our understanding.

I. What concerns the first particular, viz. what is the true and proper notion of the divine power, and in what respect it is affirmed both by the voice of nature and Scripture, that nothing is impossible to God, may be com∣prized in these two following propositions.

1. The first proposition is, that God can readily and easily effect and do whatever is absolutely possible to be done.

The world, it is certain, from the beginning has been subject to the laws of Providence, and all things run the course, which was at first set them, and are directed and carried on to the several ends of their creation by an unerring hand: and notwithstanding their several ten∣dencies, all concur to accomplish the great design of God, and that without prejudice to their respective na∣tures. Thus the celestial orbs and vortices have their fixt periods and revolutions: the sun, and moon, and stars are regular in their motion, and take their rounds day and night about the earth: and the great ocean in its ebbs and flows follows the laws of motion and sta∣tick

principles. And so for all other natural Agents: they have their limits set them, which they cannot pass: they only do what is agreeable to their nature; and they can do no more: the powers, whereby they act, being necessary, but withal confined. Yet though this order and course of things be fixt and settled, and seldom interrupted by God, unless to alarm the world, and for some great end, and to shew, that nature depends upon him, and that all things subsist by his power, which is onely able to preserve what it first made: yet there is no re∣pugnance, that things might have been made otherwise, than they are, if it had pleased him. We cannot but ac∣knowledge several possibilities of things, lying in their causes, which we, by reason of our weakness, cannot draw forth into effect: for want of such and such com∣binations, and by reason of several impediments and ac∣cidents, which it is not in our power to remove, or through some indisposition in the matter to be wrought upon, it happens, that those possibilities are not clothed with actual existence: there being no repugnancy in the nature of the thing it self, and the defect wholly ari∣sing from some other cause. Whatsoever effects there are then of the divine power now existing, more may be produced: new species of things may be added, and new worlds made, whatever becomes of the hypothesis of the habitableness of the planets, and of the opinion, that e∣very fixed Star is a Sun, at an almost immense distance from the earth, and from one another: and those things, which are, might have been endowed with different pow∣ers, activities, qualities, impressions, motions, and o∣perations; and matter made capable of other far different modifications, and determinations of particular motions, from which might have been derived inconceivably great variety of other natural productions.

And here it may be necessary to interpose, that God does no more, than what he first wills: his power is di∣rected by his wisdom and divine pleasure, which is the rule and measure of it: which consideration should just∣ly satisfie us about the late creation of this visible world, in which we breath. To call in question therefore the accompts given of it by Moses, who fixes its beginning not many thousand years ago, as our modern Atheists and Deists do, and to object idle, foolish, unlearned, and groundless phansies against those authentick Regi∣sters, acknowledged in all ages since his time, and which the more grave and judicious sort of Heathen Writers have revered, and from whence they have borrowed se∣veral of their tenents both of philosophy and religion, though oftentimes artificially disguised, or corrupted with their fabulous additions, is altogether irrational. For let these men of high-flown wit and phansie deny, if they can or dare, and at the same time pretend to reason like Philosophers and Scholars, whether this is not to pre∣scribe to the almighty and alwise God, what he should have done, and with equal impudence and impiety li∣mit his will. For suppose, for arguments sake, that the world had been created forty or fifty thousand years before, or if they will, so many myriads and millions of years, and that the chronology of the Chineses, Chal∣deans, and Egyptians, which latter is preserved out of the writings of Manetho, a Priest of that country, who li∣ved in the time of Prolemaeus Philadelphus, by Julius Afri∣canus, and out of him by Eusebius and Georgius Syncellus, were not fabulous, and proceeded not from a vain affecta∣tion of Antiquity, but had some ground in nature and history: yet considering the eternal power of the God∣head, the same question might as well be put, (and it may be put thousands of years hence, if the present consti∣tution of the world should continue so long undissolved)

why was it not produced sooner: this mighty space, as it seems to us, poor, frail, and mortal creatures, who are permitted by the great God, who made us, to live here upon earth three or fourscore years at furthest, be∣ing comparatively inconsiderable, and holding no pro∣portion to a duration, which had no beginning. Thus, at last, these conceitedly inquisitive men lose themselves in the rambling and unbounded flights of their phansie, or else run themselves upon this gross absurdity, that dull and unactive matter is eternal, and take upon them to direct an alwise and infinite being, when, and what worlds he should make: not considering, that the mind of God is unsearchable, and past the comprehension of finite understanding, and that no reason ought to be demanded of his divine will and pleasure, and of his actions ad extra, as the School-phrase is.

For want of this consideration also, others there are, and the Platonists especially, who under a pretense of ad∣vancing the divine goodness, do really, and in effect, destroy it; whilst they make the emanations of it phy∣sical and necessary, which are most arbitrary and free, and the pure results of his will.

The powers of moral Agents are at their own dispo∣sal, to use when and how they please: and by this they are discriminated from natural; who act according to their utmost strength and vigour, unless their activity be hindred by a miracle, and from brutes, birds, and other animals, who are devoy'd of reason, and follow their innate instincts, motions, and appetites. Where there is a principle of knowledge and liberty in the mind to guide and direct it, as in men, who have thereby a pow∣er over themselves and their actions, it is far otherwise: and it is not necessary, that they do all which they can do. Nor is this power therefore to be accounted idle, and to no purpose: because they can make use of it, whenso∣ever

it shall make for their interest and advantage, or whensoever their reason, or even their phansie, shall judge it fit and proper to reduce it into act. Much more is this to be allowed to God, whose other attributes are as infinite, as his power: Psalm cxv. 3. Our God is in the heavens; he hath done whatsoever he pleased. Psalm cxxxv. 6. a 1.1 Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven and in earth, in the seas, and in all deep places. And if his wisdom had thought fit, and if he had once willed the same, instead of creating one world, he might have created a thousand.

However, the object of the divine power in its fullest * 1.2 latitude and comprehension, abstractedly considered, is, whatsoever is absolutely and simply possible. By which terms we are to exclude (b)

1. Whatever is contrary to the nature and essential per∣fections of the Godhead. Thus it is impossible for God to lye: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ebr. vi. 18: to which passage, as to many others in that Epistle, * 1.3 S. Clement al∣ludes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: be∣cause he is a God of infinite veracity. God cannot deny himself: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 2 Tim. ii. 13. God cannot but make good his word, whether we will believe, or no: if we are resolved to be Infidels and Scepticks in the midst of so much conviction, which Christianity af∣fords concerning the truth of its mysteries and doctrine, and the truth of its promises: if we throw in our scru∣ples and doubts, and distrust his word, we shall one day be convinced and ashamed of such irrational infidelity: his word shall infallibly be effected; veracity being as es∣sential to God, as necessary existence: and if God cannot but be, he cannot be otherwise, than just and true. If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful; he cannot deny himself. And for the same reason we remove from God whatsoever savours of imperfection, as being repugnant to the idea, which we have of him, who is a being infinitely and ab∣solutely perfect. And in strictness of speech, if such things could be done, he would not be omnipotent; because they are arguments and demonstrations of weakness. For what is a lye, but a plain confession of guilt, and of fear, that we dare not tell and own the truth, when we are demanded it? Unfaithfulness is a breach of that mo∣ral honesty and integrity, which humane nature and the civil laws and rules of government require between man

and man. God is alsufficient, and therefore cannot stand in need of the assistence of his creatures: whereas we want, because we have not an absolute and full power and com∣mand over things, and cannot dispose of them, as and when we will, to supply our selves. Our being deceived proceeds from our ignorance: but God cannot be decei∣ved, because he is omniscient, and knows the secret thoughts and intentions of the heart, and all things are naked and open before him: there being an utter impossibility of er∣ror in the divine understanding. Our sickness flows from ilness of temper, natural decays of animal and vital spi∣rits, and tainted and vitiated bloud and other humors; and death is the punishment of sin, and the effect and con∣sequence of a frail and brittle constitution: the curious machine of the body, being quite worn out by age, at last falling into pieces, tho' otherwise never so carefully pre∣served from the disorders of intemperance, or the mischiefs of chance, or the assaults of violence. All which imper∣fections the very notion of a God does wholly exclude and remove.

2. By this we are to exclude whatever implies a contra∣diction or a repugnancy in its nature; as that the same thing should be and not be at the same time, and in the same manner and respect: and that things, which have been, should now be made not to have been. Things might not have been, before they were: but when once they have been, they cannot but be: which onely is a ne∣cessity by way of supposition. Whatever then is repug∣nant to the nature and essence of a thing is therefore im∣possible, because otherwise the thing would be the same, and not the same: the essence would remain entire, and yet be destroyed at the same time: which is a clear and manifest contradiction. Power therefore, in the essential notion of it, is no way extensible either to the doing or reconciling real and perfect contradictions: because the

opposite terms destroy each other, and consequently there is an utter impossibility of their subsisting together: and if we examine the contradiction thoroughly, we shall find, that there is always in one of the terms a plain and mani∣fest denial of being. Thus to imagine, that the humane na∣ture of our B. Saviour, by reason of its union with the word, should become in a manner immense, and fill all places, because the Godhead does; what is it, but to con∣found essential properties of things, which are altogether irreconcileable? or to assert, that a body, continuing one and the same, should yet be multiplied into several entire wholes: that the entire body of Christ should be in the least crum of a wafer, and the several parts of it be di∣stinct, and retain the same figure and order, and be ex∣tended at their full length, as they lye unconfused as it were in an indivisible point: be in heaven and upon earth at the same time: be upon a thousand altars together in the most distant parts of the world, without any discon∣tinuity, and be brought thither by the pronunciation of five words, not to urge the ugly and horrid consequences, which flow from the admittance of such a grosly absurd opinion; what is it, but to impose, under the pretense of an infallible authority, upon the faith, understanding, and reason of all mankind, and peremptorily lay down contradictory and self-destroying notions, as necessary terms and conditions of Catholick communion? If in things, which are plainly and confessedly possible in them∣selves, we are not to engage the infinite power of God without a just cause, nor to think God almighty obliged to make good our groundless and extravagant phansies: much less are we to destroy the nature of things, and swallow down and maintain real and manifest contradicti∣ons, and make that, which would be one of the greatest wonders of the world, supposing, that it were possible, to be done ordinarily, and every where, and every day, a

thousand times, without any other proof, than our bare phansying so: as they do, who maintain the doctrine of Transsubstantiation in all the School-niceties of it, against Scripture and reason, against the principles of nature and philosophy, against the attestation of sense, and the judg∣ment of antiquity, and against the experience of all man∣kind: and do all this, rather than admit of a figurative expression in the words of the Institution.

In favour of this monstrous tenent, the Romanists ob∣ject to us the incomprehensibility of the mysteries of faith; and hence think, that they may elude all those unanswer∣able difficulties, which this new doctrine is charged with, and that there is argument enough to satisfie their doubts in that misapplyed saying, the effect, it may be, of rap∣ture and indiscreet devotion, Ideo credo, quia est impossibi∣le. But the great disparity, which is between them, is easily obvious to any one, who will give himself leave to consider things calmly and fairly, and not suffer himself to be imposed upon by a pretense of an authority, abso∣lutely to be obeyed and submitted to, as well in doctrine, as in matters and decrees of discipline, without the least scruple and hesitation. As,

1. That there is the highest reason in the world to be∣lieve the mysteries of faith, tho' they transcend our ut∣most capacity; because they are expresly and clearly re∣vealed in the writings of the new Testament. It is the greatest security of our faith imaginable, that God has said it; and therefore let the thing revealed seem never so unlikely and harsh to my understanding, I have as much reason to believe it, as any thing, which happens ordina∣rily every day, and presents it self to my senses; nay more: for there is a possibility, that a particular person may be deceived sometimes, not to say all mankind, even in a matter of sense: but there is an utter impossibility, that God should be deceived in any proposition he has

thought fit to reveal. But this they will not pretend to say for their Transsubstantiation, that there is the same e∣vidence of Scripture for it, or indeed, that they have a∣ny evidence at all, as many of their own party have con∣fessed; and for want of which they have recourse to the authority of the Church. Besides, their greatest stress for the proof of it wholly lyes upon a gross and unnatural sense of words, which are capable of a far easier and more agreeable interpretation, especially when the other words, used by our B. Saviour in the blessing and conse∣cration of the wine, are most certainly and undeniably fi∣gurative.

2. These articles are essential to the Christian faith: the doctrine of it cannot be entire without them: and besides, they were explicitely believed and assented to, as to the matter of them, from the first ages of Christanity, tho' there were some disputes raised about the terms, by which they were expressed, and a latitude used in the ex∣plication of them: and the disbelief or denial of them was justly branded with the odious name of heresie in ge∣neral Councils: and the dissenters anathematized and thrust out of the communion of the Church, and the true doctrine of the Christian religion, as delivered by Christ and his Apostles, secured and established against the cor∣ruptions and innovations in after-times by publick Creeds universally received. Whereas this is a meer novel do∣ctrine, first brought into the Church the better to esta∣blish the gross errors and superstitions relating both to the opinions and practises of Image-worship, and advancing by degrees in times of horrible ignorance and corruption of manners, till it came first to be decreed and established an article of faith by the Assessors of the Lateran Coun∣cil: besides, it does no way serve or promote the inte∣rests of Christianity, but does very much prejudice

it, and expose it, I am sure, to the contempt of the ene∣mies of it, both Turks and Jews, who choose rather to continue in their infidelity, than submit to it upon their first disbelieving their very senses.

3. There is a vast difference between them in respect of their subject-manner. Things relating to God are above the level of our understanding; most of our little know∣ledge being derived from sense, which cannot reach those objects, that are altogether abstracted from it: whereas this falls under the examination of our senses and reason: they are things we every day converse with: things we may safely pretend to judge of, as being every way proporti∣onable to our faculties.

4. These articles of faith involve in them no true and real contradiction, as the doctrine of Transsubstantiation does. The Christian religion proposes nothing to our belief, but what is possible, and therefore credible; as has been proved by several learned men of our Church against the heterodoxies and blasphemies of the Socinians: nothing, which contradicts or thwarts the common and established notions of nature: I say, the doctrine of it, as it is con∣tained in the Scripture, and according to the ancient tra∣dition of the Catholick Church, and the explications of the first oecumenical Councils: to both which, tradition and authority, next to the sacred Scripture, which is the rule of faith, we ought to have regard even in controversies of faith; and not as it is perplext and entangled by the bold niceties of the School-men, who have corrupted the truth and sim∣plicity of the Christian religion by the mixtures of the phi∣losophy of Plato and Aristotle. So that we do not limit the divine power, or deny it to be infinite, as the bigot∣ted Romanists pretend, because we reject this figment of Transsubstantiation, as a false, absurd, and contradictory doctrine, (besides the other above-mentioned exceptions, which no sophistry or cavil can honestly and truly put by,

or justly satisfie) which they ought to prove to be in the number of things possible. All which we believe from the nature of this attribute, as we are obliged, that God can do.

2. The second proposition is this, that nothing can hinder the effects of God's power, if once he has willed and determined the same * 1.4. And of this truth, both of nature and religion, the very Heathen had a fixt belief and apprehension, viz. that all opposition made against God was vain and ineffectual: and that though some, according to the fictions of their Poets, were so foolish, as well as im∣pious, to make a war upon the Gods, and attempted to pluck Jupiter out of his throne; yet they always came by the worst, and were cast down from their hopes, and from those mountains, which they had laid one upon a∣nother to scale heaven with, to feel the revenging effects of that power, which before they had so much slighted. Here below power may be either balanced and resisted with success, or else it may be undermined or baffled by wit, and policy, and stratagems of war: and great armies have sometimes been routed and vanquished by inconsi∣derable numbers, and have met with shameful defeats and overthrows. But the divine power is irresistible: there is no withstanding it: the whole creation must needs tremble and sink at the presence of God: and this the proud Assyrian King was forced to confess, when he was recovered from his phrensie: Dan. iv. 35. That the inhabi∣tants of the earth are reputed as nothing, and that God doth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, and say unto him, what dost thou? So that we see, that the credi∣bility of this article is founded not onely upon Scripture and revelation, but upon nature and right reason: which I shall more fully prove, by making good.

II. The second general head, that the attribute of in∣finite power is essentially involved in the notion and idea of God.

Power in it self is an excellence and perfection: and things are more or less valued according to the greater or lesser degrees, which they have of it. I do not mean that force and energy onely, such as is found in inani∣mate beings, arising from the several dispositions of mat∣ter, whereby they are apt to make those great alterations, that are in the world: because their operations are neces∣sary, but withal limited to a few particular effects: nor such a power, as is in brute creatures, arising from the strength and quantity of animal spirits, from the temper of bloud, and from the make and constitution of their bodies: but such a power, as is directed by reason, and is arbitrary and free, and may be used or not used, accord∣ing as upon debate and deliberation shall be judged most convenient: such a power, as extends it self to various objects, and effectually brings to pass, what is designed in the mind, and contrived in the brain: a power, where∣by a man has a full command over things, and can sub∣ject them to his will and disposal, and make use of, so as to advance himself, and get the mastery over others, and make himself be dreaded every where. Yet however such a one, who has attained a despotick power, whether rightfully by succession, or by force of arms and cruelty, or by the arts, whether of lawful or wicked, policy, may please himself with the success of his councils and strata∣gems and dextrous management of affairs, both in peace and war, and phansie great matters of himself, and swell with the thoughts of his acquired greatness: he is not able to withstand the least sickness: this can soon mortifie him, and bring him upon his knees, and make him sensible of his weakness, and the folly of his pride. When God does but arm the most despicable creatures against him, and

gives them a commission to assault and invade him, the least infliction baffles and routs his hopes and confidences, gives him a fair prospect of himself and of his defects, and shews him, what a miserable creature man is at the best, who cannot secure himself of health, of happiness, of life for one moment. By this he is made to see and acknowledge, that there is something above him, to whom he is accountable, that orders and disposes of all things at his pleasure: that all that power, which is distributed among so many creatures, in such a strange variety and subordination, is derived from some supreme being, in whom it is united, and infinitely much more: and if that he withdraw his influence, or blows upon any counsel, it comes to nothing, and the designs of these mighty men, who have got the empire of the world into their hands, are soon at an end together with their lives, and they faint away, and drop into their graves, and all their thoughts perish; because all the power they have is but the communication of his will, an emanation of his pro∣vidence, and an imperfect shadow of that power, by which he governs the world: all second causes being in∣fluenced by him, and acting onely by virtue of what they have received. For it is the plain and unconstrained col∣lection of reason, that nothing has of it self a power to act, whereby it contributes to make up the harmony of the world: that their essences and the operations, flowing from them, are both limited, and are easily dissolvible by that power, which first made them; and that they have a dependence upon a being, which is infinite, and al∣mighty, and independent. What a blot and stain would it be to that fair idea of a God, to imagine, that any thing possible could be above his power, or too hard for his omnipotence? what were this but to cloath him with the infirmities of a man, to level him with his creatures, and to take off that essential and necessary distinction

between them? This power then must be infinite: for what can limit or restrain it? who can put a force upon him, or stop his procedures, when there is nothing equal and co-ordinate? can man, whose breath is in his nostrils, who a few years since had no being, and that which he has, he owes wholly to another, born an infant into the world, made to his hands: he, as soon as he comes to years, and can use his reason, and discern things, quickly perceives his weaknesses and wants, and cannot help him∣self. Can the united strength of other creatures? They act onely, as they are directed: all that they have is plain∣ly borrowed, and at the disposal of him, who made them. They may be traced to their originals, and are pe∣rishable in their natures: it is the power of God, which, as at first gave, still continues to them their being.

Now to demand, why is there then no infinite effect of an infinite power? is to forget, that this implies a con∣tradiction: infinity being an incommunicable attribute, and onely peculiar to God; and therefore the distance will ever remain infinite between the opposite terms of such a relation, as that of the Creator to the creature. But God has given sufficient displays of his power, and the effects of it are so various and innumerable, that they are convincing and demonstrative arguments of its being infi∣nite, and that no power less than such could ever have produced them. The invisible things of God from the cre∣ation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things, that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. i Rom. 20. We judge of worldly productive power by vast piles of building: but what is a Pyramid, or an A∣quaeduct, or a Colossus, or an Amphitheater, to the or∣derly and glorious frame of things? how pitiful and mean in comparison of the heavens? Let us cast up our eyes thither, and there behold * 1.5 the several orbs moving on in an uninterrupted order, the swiftness of their motion,

and withall the greatness of their bodies, that the earth, about which poor mortals contend so much, and to get a little part and share of, which they cannot possess long, venture their quiet and their lives, and oftentimes their very souls, is but a point in respect of them: the vast di∣stance between us and the heavens: the glorious and in∣exhaustible brightness of the sun and the stars, and the kind influences of them upon all things here below, and the like: and we cannot but be filled with the admiration of God, who made them. The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work. Let us re∣flect upon the situation of the earth, how it is hung upon nothing in the middle of the heavens, having no foun∣dation to rest upon, but a magnetical vigour, imprinted by the hand of God, whereby the parts of it are so firm∣ly united, all of them tending toward the center by an in∣nate principle of gravity, that, if it were possible for it, according to the phansy of Archimedes, to be moved out of its place by any engine, it would return speedily to it again: the virtue and fruitfulness of it in producing those various sorts of plants, flowers, and trees, with those se∣veral minerals and metals, and other fossils, which lye hid in the bowels of it: the great variety of living crea∣tures, which serve for the ornament and beauty of the creation: and above all, let us contemplate man: the curious make and frame of his body, and the uses of each part: but chiefly the faculties of his mind, whereby he is able to govern himself and the other creatures subject to him, and even make use of those things, which he can∣not alter and change, and derive a benefit from them to himself.

Now the conclusions, naturally arising hence, are

1. That the builder and maker of all is God: because this frame and constitution of the world is above all crea∣ted strength and power, and things could not make them∣selves,

but owe their being and original to his divine will, and to his infinite power and wisdom: and

2. That he, who made the heavens, and the earth, and all things therein, who has hung up those lights in the sky, which flame so brightly: who has imprinted such a swift and unwearied motion in the stars: who has filled that vast distance of space between us and them with so subtil and perspicuous a body: who has cast the earth in∣to such a figure, that every part of it might enjoy the in∣fluences of the heavens with the greater advantage, and as it were interchangeably and by turns: who has caused those deep channels for the waters, upon which Ships may pass from one extreme part of the world to the other, and keep up and maintain a commerce with all mankind; and the like: He can do much more: his power is not confined to any one effect: if he does but once will the same, presently a new world shall start up out of nothing. For what shall hinder? it being equally easie to an infi∣nite and inexhaustible power to make more, as one. Who questions an Artists power, who has brought some curious piece to perfection, whether a statue, or a picture, or a watch, or a medal; but that supposing the same conve∣niences, he can make more according to the first model, and vary and alter it according to the several workings and movings of his phansie? and if this be so easily con∣ceivable, and withal so agreeable to reason, who can doubt of those lesser things, which have been brought to pass in the several ages of the world: such, as are the al∣terations of the course of nature for a time, as the stand∣ing still of the sun and moon, (that disorder in the heavens, which this interruption might cause, being soon after re∣moved, and the former regular motion restored) the di∣viding of the red sea into two parts: the waters of it rising up and standing on an heap, the wonders of Aegypt, and all those stupendious miracles, wrought by our blessed Saviour

and his Apostles? for if we consider things thoroughly, as great things are done every day: but the commonness of them takes away the wonder, and makes us slight and neglect them. Let us embrace either of the two Hypo∣theses, it matters not. One would judge it more incre∣dible, that so great a body, as the sun, or earth, should move at all, than that the motion of the one or other should be interrupted and stopt for some hours, but that our senses and the interchanges and vicissitudes of day and night, and the several seasons of the year, assure us of it: and it is as great, if not a greater, wonder, that the tides should be so regular and periodical according to the course of the moon, and that this flux and reflux should be made twice almost in five and twenty hours, than that the waters in a small gulph, as is the Arabian, should rise and swell as it were into a mountain, and leave part of the channel dry and bare, and to be passed over on foot. They will say, that these admirable effects are according to nature: a word used by these men, who are afraid to own a Deity, to very ill purposes. But what do they mean by nature? Do they mean a principle of things, void of life and understanding? but can the stately, and curious, and regular frame of things flow from such a principle? Can that, which has no sense, or understanding, or life, or skill, be the author of such beings, which are endowed with all? How comes it to confer that upon others, which it has not in it self? If they say, that they mean by nature that order of things, which was fixt and established by God, the supreme cause, in the beginning, by which the world is ordinarily go∣verned: why then will they deny the God of nature to be able to alter it, when it shall make for his glory? A serious reflexion upon the ordinary works of nature will quickly silence all those doubts and scruples, which have been raised by a company of ignorant, illiterate, and de∣bauched

Atheists and Deists against the belief of the mi∣racles recorded in the Scriptures, and confirmed by un∣questionable evidence of thousands, who have seen them done, and were actually present at the doing of them, upon this foolish pretence, because they seem to contra∣dict the present state of things, as if that could not be al∣tered, changed, and exceeded: which is nothing less, than to limit and tye up as it were the hands of an al∣mighty Agent. Thus nature and reason fully and uncon∣strainedly give in their suffrages to the truth of this arti∣cle: and certainly, tho' some shallow wits may acquiesce in second causes, and think, that they have attained their end, if they can find out some of the nighest and most immediate, and relying very vainly and presumptuously upon the supposed strength of the Atomical or Mechani∣cal philosophy, go about with great impiety to exclude God from having any thing to do either in the making or governing the world: yet whosoever, like a wise and true Philosopher, and sober rational man, will search fur∣ther into the originals of those immediate and funda∣mental causes of things, and carefully observe, how they are linked and tyed together; in what excellent order; and to what wise ends and purposes; he will find him∣self under a necessity of having speedy recourse to the in∣finite wisdom and power of God: and therefore, as that excellent person, the Lord Verulam, observes in his Es∣says; God never wrought a miracle to convince Atheism: because his ordinary works sufficiently convince it.

Now as it is altogether absurd to proceed upon slight and narrow principles, taken up from the observation of the present and usual state of nature, to the prejudice of the truth of miracles, which suppose it alterable, and actually at that time altered: so it argues the same pre∣sumption and folly to doubt of the possibility of a thing, and deny the great truths and principles of religion, whe∣ther

natural or revealed, meerly because they are above our faculties, and are not proportionable to those ideas and conceptions, which we derive from sense and the im∣pressions of outward objects. Which is

The third general head of this discourse, which I un∣dertook to make good: namely that

III. It is altogether unreasonable to deny the verity of the divine attributes, and limit the power of God in things possible, or refuse to submit to the belief and ac∣knowledgment of the mysteries of faith, because they transcend either our power, or our understanding and com∣prehension. Which proposition I shall consider in its particular branches.

1. It is most unreasonable to lay a restraint upon God almighty, and limit his power, and deny any thing to be possible, which is no way repugnant to the essential perfections of the Godhead, and does not involve in it self a real and manifest contradiction, upon this pretense, because it transcends our power, or the whole power of created nature.

In this indeed, as I have intimated above, we have the advantage of all other creatures here below, that they act either necessarily, or else spontaneously onely * 1.6, that is, according to natural instincts, and are hurried on to their several objects by the force and sway of their appetites, and consequently do nothing by deliberation and choice. Thus the birds build their nests spherically, and the bees are very artificial and curious in making the hony-comb, and the silk-worm and the spider spin a very fine and subtil thread: they perform the task, which the wisdom of the great Creator has set them, and are directed to those ends by his omniscience, and to those onely: for they cannot vary these actions, peculiar to each, according to their different powers. It is man onely in this visible world, tho' sent into it weak, and helpless, and unarmed,

who, when grown up to maturity of years and judgment, by the help of his wit and reason, can conquer the other creatures, and make them serviceable to his uses, and easi∣ly master them, notwithstanding their wildness and fierce∣ness, and hereby exercise an entire dominion over them, as being constituted Lord of the creation: who can first design and contrive, and then perform and execute, what lyes within his reach and within his view. It is by this, that he has invented that great number of instruments and engines, whereby he reaches heaven, and takes an ac∣compt of the order and motion of the stars, and of their several periods and revolutions, tho' at that vast distance from them, and makes them serviceable to the measuring of his time, and directing him in his travels and voyages. It is by this, that he dares commit himself to that incon∣stant element, and by the directive virtue of a contempti∣ble stone, as it appears to be, tho' more valuable for this admirable use, than all the diamonds of India, can find his way in the great ocean, where there is no track, and encompass the world from one pole to the other, and keep pace as it were with the sun in its eastern and we∣stern course. It is by this, that he raises stately mansions and fortifications, for his pleasure and defense, cuts through rocks, and joyns distant rivers and seas by artificial chan∣nels, and invents those curious manufactures, together with that great variety of other artificial productions, which serve both for ornament and convenience. And all this is done by a dextrous and skilful application of actives to passives: by framing and shaping the materi∣als, which are made to his hands: by putting different things together, by enquiring into their nature and use: by study, and experience, and observation: by often re∣peated and adventurous tryals: by casting about in his thoughts, how to secure himself of success: by proceed∣ing slowly and by degrees, according to method and or∣der:

and the success has been glorious and admirable, and a new world of things has been added; and every where, except in sandy deserts and uncultivated plaines and for∣rests, and in such countries, where the wild people are not reduced to gentleness and civility of manners, are erected monuments of mans wit and power. But how great soever this may seem, yet it is very little, and piti∣ful, and inconsiderable in comparison of what he does not know, and what he cannot do: thousands of things there are above his power, which neither his wit nor his arm can reach: it is not in his power to create one atome of matter: he does but disguise things all this while, and put them into new shapes. All that he can pretend to, is but to know nature; and that very imperfectly, and to imitate it, as well as he can, and draw rough copies of that perfect original. For how rude, and homely, and inartificial are the best pieces of the ablest Artists, if com∣pared with the curiousness, with the neatness, with the beauty of natural compositions! These are so curious and admirable, wrought with such excellent and extraordinary skill, that the most sagacious and inquisitive cannot fully comprehend them. All things are so exactly and geome∣trically fitted to their proper uses, even the least fibre, and the minutest particle, tho' imperceptible to the naked eye: there being nothing idle and useless in nature. There is so much accuracy and perfection in the meanest and most contemptible pieces of the creation, that the more a wise man, a Philosopher, considers, the more he is at a loss: and the result of his serious thoughts, after they have been long busied and tired out in the search, is this, that they are all the works of a divine hand, guided by an infinite wisdome. Thus every considering man, even by a slight, much more serious and deliberate, contemplation of na∣ture, cannot but be fully satisfied and convinced, that there is an all-powerful being, which has wrought all

these glorious effects: or else such a one, if yet such a silly creature, which has the shape, and pretends to the reason of a man, can be found, must fall into this prodi∣gious and irrational error, which no one can be guilty of without the just imputation of phrensie, that all that he sees, is not the production of contrivance and design, but meerly of accidental hits, strugglings, and conjuncti∣ons of little particles of matter, floating up and down in an infinite empty space: that things fell into this admira∣ble order and frame, which has distracted and confound∣ed the wits of all ages fully to understand and make out satisfactorily, at first as it were of their own accord, as if they had had life, and sense, and power to determine their own motions, and mutually agreed to do this, ha∣ving first made themselves: or which is as gross and foo∣lish a phantasie, (though herein the Aristotelean Atheist thinks himself a fine wit and a subtil arguer in compari∣son of the Atheists of the Epicurean sect) that they are improduced and eternal: that the sun moves in the E∣cliptic to the great advantage and benefit of the world, and not in the Aequator, or in any of the Parallel Circles, meerly because it happened so after long shiftings and in∣finite irregularities of motion: and that it still keeps the same course as it were out of choise, and sympathy, and good nature. But now how difficult, how false, how ridiculous, to say nothing of the impiety of it, must such a way of arguing and proceedure be, to judge of God by our narrow scantlings of wit and strength, to measure his power by our weakness, and the good or ill success of our endeavours and undertakings: when we are ignorant of the utmost strength of nature; what may be done by the conjunction and combination of se∣veral beings; how and in what manner they may operate one upon another; and what effects they may produce: and especially, if we reflect, that many things have been

pronounced impossible, and given over as such, that is, in respect of us, and not in the nature of the things themselves, and for the wit and art of man to effect, which have been discovered by the industry of after-times. Why then should any man pronounce a thing impossible, which involves in it no repugnancy to actual existence, and hereby pretend to overthrow the doctrine and faith of miracles, because they are above the strength of nature? when the power of God, as has been proved, is immense and infinite: and by the same argument he may as madly conclude, notwithstanding his high-flown pretensions of arguing according to the principles of strict reason, se∣veral things in the world, nay the world it self, not to be made, and maintain dull and stupid matter to have been eternal: which is a manifest gross absurdity: meerly upon this supposal, because if they were made, they must be made by a power above natural and humane.

2. It is most unreasonable to reject the articles of re∣vealed religion and the mysteries of faith, because we can∣not fully comprehend them. Before these men, whether Deists, or Socinians, renounce the belief of such articles and mysteries, let them try their reason in explaining the difficulties of nature: let them resolve all those Pro∣blemes, if they can, which have exercised the Philoso∣phers of all ages: and if upon trial they cannot satisfie themselves or others in those ordinary phaenomena, where they have their senses to assist them: if they cannot tell, how things are done, which are done daily: if many of the ordinary operations of nature be abstruse and unintel∣ligible: if they cannot trace her in all her labyrinths and windings, and are quite tired, and forced at last to give over the pursuit: if plain matters of sense cannot be ful∣ly accompted for: why should they presume upon the strength of their little knowledge, and make their reason the measure and standard of divine truth, allowing that

onely to be true and certain which suits with it? He is very unfit to judge of any piece of art, suppose a picture or a watch, who knows nothing of design or clock∣work; and especially at first view, without taking no∣tice of the several shokes and lines, and the proportion of the parts of the one, or the hidden springs and wheels of the other, which give it that orderly and regular mo∣tion. And if an Artist reject their judgment, as foolish and incompetent, because grounded on no principles of knowledge and skill: shall we not much more reject these mens either bold determination or peremptory de∣nial of things, which they neither understand, nor have throughly considered? such, as pretend, that they can∣not believe either a creation, because they cannot tell how to admit of a vast empty space, before the world was made, or how it should be made, no matter prae∣existing; or a resurrection, because they cannot see how the scattered atomes of dust shall rally and reunite, and constitute the same man again: such, as disbelieve the arti∣cles of the Christian faith, because they cannot form clear ideas, and full and comprehensive notions of them: and upon the same pretense these very men, who will be∣lieve nothing, but what they can make out and demon∣strate by reason, will, if they follow their own princi∣ple, quickly commence down-right Atheists, and deny God to be infinite, omniscient, and eternal: of which necessary and essential attributes of the divine nature we cannot have complete and adequate conceptions, our nar∣row faculties being no way capable of it. But if there be such a vast difference between man and man, upon the accompt of education, industry, experience, learn∣ing, and the several ways of advancing and improving rea∣son and the natural faculties of the mind: if the con∣ceptions of things be clear, easie, and distinct in some, without wracking or straining the phansie, which are

clouded, perplext, and confused in others, by reason of some natural or accidental hinderances and disadvantages, through dulness and stupidity, or settled prejudice: if we are ignorant of the possibilities of nature, and cannot tell, how far and in what manner natural causes may act: what can be more unreasonable and unjust, than for a man, whose knowledge is scanty, and power confined within a narrow circle, and who is so apt to mistake in his judgment of things, to oppose his reason to God's in∣finite wisdom, as if it were equally clear and comprehen∣sive; to pretend, that his conceptions are the adequate measures of truth; and that God can do no more, than what he, poor finite shallow creature, is able to think; and to reject clear and express revelations of God concern∣ing himself, upon the accompt of a phansied incongruity and a seeming repugnancy to his reason? If the creatures, which are of a different order of being from us, cannot at all, much less fully, understand and comprehend what we do according to the dictates of reason and wisdom, and the results of deliberate counsel and study: because life, and sense, and animal motion are not able to reach so far, without the assistence of an higher and nobler fa∣culty: what an unpardonable piece of arrogance is it for a man to think his reason able to comprehend the things of God, when there is such an infinite disproportion be∣tween them; and call in question the truth of the divine revelations; and measure all by this crooked and deceit∣ful rule, whether it be agreeable to his phansie or not? It is a most rational and infallible ground of faith, that God, who has revealed these mysteries, cannot utter a falshood. It is more certain than demonstration, if God has once said it. There are some monsters in the world, whose lusts and debaucheries have suggested to them doubts about the being of God, and the truth of his attributes: and a consciousness of their guilt has made

them wish, that there were none. No one was ever found, who acknowledged a God, and did not at the same time acknowledge, that he was just and true. Py∣thagoras found no opposition, when he taught, that there were two things, by which men became like to God; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by speaking truth and doing good: both perfections naturally streaming from the divine nature. So that upon the whole matter it will appear, that it is nothing but pride and a pre∣sumptuous conceit of mastering all the difficulties of re∣ligion by the strength of reason, which put them upon the denial of these revealed truths, and that this pride and presumption are altogether unjust and unreasonable. Which was the thing to be proved.

From this necessary, essential, and fundamental notion of the divine power, these following inferences, rela∣ting to practise, may most certainly be drawn:

1. That we are to repose our whole trust and confi∣dence in God, whose power is infinite.

We naturally fly in case of distress and danger to a power, which is able to protect and relieve us. There is no man, but needs a support some time or other. Men are not always able of themselves to resist successfully the assaults of envy and malice: but this way envy may be at last conquered, and enemies brought over and recon∣ciled, or else defeated. Let this therefore be the great comfort of our minds, that God is both able and ready to assist us in our utmost and greatest dangers, and in all the particular difficulties and distresses of our lives, which may befall us. It was a reflexion upon this, which made David break out into those triumphant ex∣pressions: Psalm xlvi. 1, 2, 3. God is our refuge and strength, a very present help in trouble: therefore will we not fear, tho' the earth be moved: and tho' the mountains be

carried into the midst of the sea: tho' the waters roar and be troubled: tho' the mountains shake with the swelling there∣of. And v. 7. The Lord of hosts is with us: the God of Jacob is our refuge.

2. That we are to stand in fear and awe of God, and do nothing, which may displease him.

Fear is a passion, which usually results from a reflexi∣on upon power: and according to the nature and de∣grees of it, the fear will rise and encrease proportion∣ably; and therefore the power of God, who is able to punish us eternally, is a most rational ground of fear. S. Luke xii. 4, 5. says our B. Saviour to his disciples; Be not afraid of them, who kill the body, and after that have no more, that they can do: but I will forewarn you, whom you shall fear; fear him, who, after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell: yea, I say unto you, fear him. And with this argument the heroic woman encouraged her young son to endure the torments and cruelties of Antiochus, as his six brothers had done before him, rather than save his life by violation of the divine law: I beseech thee, my son, look upon the heaven, and upon the earth, and all that is therein: and consider, that God has made them of things, that were not; and so was mankind made likewise. Fear not this tormentor, but being worthy of thy brethren, take thy death, that I may receive thee again in mercy with thy brethren: as you may read the tragical history in the se∣cond book of Maccabees, chap. vii. Whosoever reflects seriously * 1.7 on God's infinite power, will never pre∣sumptuously do such things, as may draw on him his displeasure: and upon a true sense of his guilt, will be restless, till by repentance and a good life he is reinsta∣ted in the love and favour of God.

3. That the sense of our weakness and defects should teach us humility and modesty in our enquiries into the great mysteries of religion: there being as great reason for us to submit our understanding to the revealed truths of Scripture, as our will to its commands. He, who re∣ligiously adores and believes a God, and acknowledges him to be a being infinitely perfect, will not dare to que∣stion the truth of his revelations: and as firmly will he believe, that all those promises and threats, which are contained in the holy Scriptures, which have a reference to a future state, shall one day be fulfilled. For with what pretense can any one doubt or disbelieve their fulfilling, who reflects upon God's truth and power? All doubt or distrust ariseth from a double cause, either because men are not real in what they say, and so intend it not: or else want power to make their words good: neither of which can possibly have any place here. For God is a God of infinite veracity, and all his promises are infalli∣bly real and firm: and he is able to perform them. We value not indeed those menaces, which are the effects of an impotent passion; when we are out of their power, and when they cannot reach us: but there will be no fly∣ing from God: his eye and hand will find and lay hold on us, wherever we are. He, who made me at first, and placed the several parts of my body in that comely or∣der, in which they stand, and which from time to time in continuance and in the succession of a few months were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them, he can raise up this very body at the last day, and will raise it up: and of this I cannot pretend to have the least ra∣tional doubt, were it ten thousand times more difficult to conceive, than it is: because he has absolutely pro∣mised it, and his veracity is obliged for it, and his infi∣nite power can easily make it good. Does God threaten impenitent and incorrigible sinners with everlasting tor∣ment

in hell; I with trembling submit to the truth of this threatning: because he can easily continue a creature in a miserable being, unconsumed, and that for ever: and I know he will do it, because he has said it. And upon this belief and assurance we are to provide accord∣ingly, that so we may avoid the strokes, the fierceness, the terribleness of his revenging hand, and may partake of those most glorious promises, which his goodness and mercy in Christ our Saviour has made over to us in this life, and which his infinite power will make good to us for ever in the next.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Theodo∣retus in loc. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The things, which now exist, are not fully proportionable to the divine power, so as to exhaust it, but onely agreable to his divine will and pleasure. For God could have created more and greater things than these: out he would only make so many, and of such sorts, species, and denominations, as it plea∣sed him.
• * 1.2

  (a) The Greeke and Latine Fa∣thers are very copious and careful, even to a philosophi∣cal niceness, in their explications and illustrations of these common notions about the just and proper object of the divine power: a collection of which the Reader may find in Bishop Pearson's elaborate and learned Commentary on the Apostles Creed, where he treats of this particular argument, as of the rest of the Articles, with great accuracy and judgment. More authorities might easily be added by one of ordinary reading: but I forbear at present; it being a common place: and shall content my self onely to adjoyn the concurrent testimonies of the Master of the Sentences, and Thomas Aquinas. Petrus Lombardus lib. 1. Sententiarum xlii. distinct.

  Sunt alia quaedam, quae Deus nullatenus facere potest, ut peccata: non enim potest mentiri, non po∣test peccare. Sed non ideo omnipotentiae Det detrahitur vel derogatur, si peccare non posse dicitur: quia non esset hoc potentiae, sed infirmitatis. Si enim hoc posset, omnipotens non esset. Non ergo impotentiae sed poteatiae imputandum est, quod ista non potest. Again, Manifestum est, Deum omnino nihil posse pati, & omnia facere posse, praeter ca sola, quibus ejus dignitas laederetur, ejusque excellentiae derogare∣tur: in quo tamen non est minus omnipotens. Hoc enim posse non esset posse, sed non posse Herein following the doctrine of his Master S. Augustine, in his book de Symbolo, which he there cites: Deus omnipotens non potest mori, non potest falli, non potest miser fieri, nec potest vinci. Haec utique & hujusmodi absit, ut posset omnipotens. Si enim bujusmodi passionibus atque defectibus subjici posset, omnipotens minimè foret: and in his book de spiritu & literâ: Non potest Deus facere injusta, quia ipse est summa justitia & bonitas. Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica part 1. quaest. xxv. Artic. 3. Ea quae contradictionem implicant, sub divinâ omnipotentiâ non continentur: quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde convenientius dicitur, quod ea non possunt fieri, quam quod Deus ea non possit facere. Post. Peccare est deficere à perfecta ratione: unde posse peccare est posse deficere in agendo; quod repugnat imnipotentiae. Et propter hoc Deus peccare non potest, quia est omnipotens. The whole of what has been said both by Fathers and Schoolmen upon this subject, is summed up by the learned Dr. Overall, (then Dean of St. Pauls, and afterwards Bishop of Nor∣wich) in a letter to his Friend, H. Grotius, written 16 May 1613. in this brief definition and sentence: Potentia [Dei] activa, qua omnia possibilia, quae non implicant contradictionem, impotenti∣am, iniquitatem, aliudque quid Deo indignum facere possit.
• * 1.3

  In Epistola ad Romanos: edit. Oxon. 1633. 48. pag. 36.
• * 1.4

  Vid. S. Cle∣mentem Ro∣manum pag. 36, 37.
• * 1.5

  Vide hac de re S. Clemen∣tem Roma∣num eleganter differentem, pag. 27, 28.
• * 1.6

  Arnob. adv. gentes, lib. 2. Lugd. Batav. 4^o. p. 55, 56.
• * 1.7

  Vide S. Cle∣mentem, p. 37.