A vindication of Dr. Sherlock's sermon concerning The danger of corrupting the faith by philosophy in answer to some Socinian remarks / by William Sherlock ...

A VINDICATION OF Dr. SHERLOCK'S Sermon before my LORD MAYOR, &c.

WHEN I receiv'd the threatning and boast∣ing Message from some busy Factors of the Socinian Fraternity, what work they would make with my late Sermon before my Lord Mayor, concerning the Danger of corrupting the Faith by Philosophy, my greatest Concernment was, how to meet with their Answer, which usually comes last to my hands, and how to bear the Drudgery of reading it; for their Ar∣guments have been spent long since, and that little Wit they had is now degenerated into Railing. That scurri∣lous Treatment they have lately given to so many Excel∣lent Persons, especially to that Great Man the Bishop of Worcester, is a fair Warning to all who dare oppose them, what they must expect: And besides the Experience of their many former Civilities, I had more than ordinary reason to expect it now, they being touch'd in a very sen∣sible part, without any other Defence to make: And this Author has not deceiv'd my Expectations; for upon a

Perusal of his Remarks, I find nothing of Argument, a very little Wit, and abundance of Railing. His Wit and Railing be to himself; but I am sorry I can find nothing that looks so like an Argument, as to administer occasion for any useful Discourse. This there is no help for; if Men will write Books without any Arguments to be an∣swered, there is nothing to be done, but only to shew that they have offered nothing to the purpose, or that needs an Answer: And this will be done in a few words; for he has disputed at large against what I never said nor thought, but has not one word against any part of the Argument of that Sermon.

His Title-Page pretends a great Zeal for the Doctrine of the Catholick Church, and of the Church of England, con∣cerning the Blessed Trinity: Which is as true, as that Richard Baldwin printed this Pamphlet, who has publickly disown∣ed it in Print: But though a Socinian Conscience can di∣gest such Godly Cheats, as a piece of Wit and Artifice, yet a Wise Man would not venture on them, because Man∣kind hate to be abused, and grow very jealous of Men of Tricks. And yet had we to deal with Modest Men, it would be thought a little of the latest for a Socinian to talk of defending the Doctrine of the Catholick Church, and of the Church of England, concerning the Blessed Trinity: For their Cant about Real and Nominal Trinitarians, and Three Infinite Minds and Spirits, is too well known to pass for so much as a Jest any longer; and till they can defend the Judgment of their Disinteressed Person a little better than by scorning the Answer, which they will never be able to make any other Reply to, it were time for them, could they find any thing else to say in the room of it, to let that alone. And yet this is what he would bring this pre∣sent Dispute to, if he knew how: He often flirts at Three Infinite Minds and Spirits, though there is no such Expres∣sion in the whole Sermon; but still he says I intimate this

in asserting a Real Trinity: Now if Three Infinite Minds and Spirits be essential to the Notion of a Real Trinity, (as his Inference supposes) it is the best Vindication that could possibly be thought of for that Expression: For not to believe a Real Trinity, is to deny the Father to be a True and Real Father, and the Son to be a True and Real Son, and the Holy Ghost to be a True and Real Spirit; and this is to deny the Catholick Faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which cannot be a Real Trinity, cannot be really Three, if each of them be not truly and really what is sig∣nified by those Names. But though that Phrase of Three Infinite Minds and Spirits was used very innocently by me, only to signify Three Infinite Intelligent Persons, each of which is Infinite Mind and Spirit, and neither of them is each other, which is the Catholick Faith; yet I freely ac∣knowledge, as I have done more than once, That it is liable to a very Heretical Tritheistick Sense, if understood absolutely, and in that Sense I always disowned it: And it is a sign Men have very little to say, when they make such a noise with an inconvenient Form of Speech,* 1.1 though ex∣pounded to a Catholick Sense: But the Margin will direct the Reader where he may find the true State of this Con∣troversy.

But what is all this to my Sermon? which neither ex∣plains nor defends any particular Hypothesis about the Tri∣nity, but is a general Vindication of the Christian Faith from the Pretences of Reason and Philosophy. But, The Doctrine of the Catholick Church, and of the Church of England, concerning the Blessed Trinity, explained and as∣serted▪ against the dangerous Heterodoxies in a Sermon by Dr William Sherlock, &c And, Remarks upon Dr. Wil∣liam Sherlock's (False and Treacherous) Defence and Ex∣plication of some Principal Articles of Faith, &c. were more specious Titles, and both so good, that they knew not which to chuse, and therefore adorned the Title-Page

with one, and the Frontispiece with the other, that if ever a poor Sermon was confuted with Titles (which have a strange Magick in them) this is utterly undone.

But it is time to consider his Remarks, which exactly an∣swer the Title, that they are nothing to the purpose. I am not at leisure to follow him in all his Harangues; and his Wit and Buffoonry I despise too much to take notice of it; and when it appears that a Man has discharged all his Ar∣tillery of Witticisms against his own Mistakes, he is witty at his own Cost too.

He has made an Abstract or Summary (as he calls it, P. 4.) of my Sermon, but in his own Method, his own Words, and directly contrary to my Sense: That is, he has abstracted from every thing that is in the Sermon, that no Man living by his Abstract can tell what the Subject or Drift of the Sermon was, or any one Argument contained in it: I'm sure I who made the Sermon, knew nothing of it but by mere guess, as I read it in his Abstract; and would those Men who read these Remarks, be but so fair and honest as to read the Sermon too, there would need no other Answer.

The First Branch of my Sermon in his Abstract (P. 8.) is this; Philosophy and Reason are the only things which those Men adore, who would have no God at all. And what makes some Men Atheists and Infidels, even the Philosophick Tin∣cture, and their adherence to Natural Reason, the same makes others to be Hereticks, that is, to be Arians, Socinians, and Pelagians. Now any one would think that this were one of the Heads of my Sermon; which is so far from truth, that there is no such Proposition to be found there, but the contrary to this is to be found there in express words.

In the first Page of my Sermon there are these words: What some Men call Philosophy and Reason (and there is no∣thing so foolish and absurd which some Men will no call so) is

the only thing which those Men adore, who would either have no God, or a God and Religion of their own making. And what Attempts some have made to undermine all Religion, and others to corrupt and transform the whole Frame of the Chri∣stian Religion, upon a pretence of its contradicting Natural Reason and Philosophy, is too well known to need a Proof. And soon after (P. 2.) This vain Pretence to Reason and Philosophy; the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the vain deceit in my Text, which is applicable to all vain spurious Philosophy, as well as Platonism, and is so meant by the Apostle. And P. 7. Truly that which makes some men Infidels, makes others He∣reticks, that is, a vain Pretence to Philosophy.

Now let any man judge, Whether this be to charge Atheism, Infidelity, and Heresy, upon Reason and Philo∣sophy, or upon what some men call Reason and Philosophy, which may be very foolish and absurd? Whether the Pre∣tences of contradicting Reason and Philosophy, and the vain Pretences to Philosophy, signify Reason and Philosophy?

This is wilful Misrepresentation; for it is impossible he should mistake, I having expresly distinguisht between these vain Pretences to Philosophy, and true Philosophy, (p. 3.) Whoever considers what an Enemy these vain Pre∣tences to Philosophy have always been to Religion, will see need enough for this Caution (of the Text.) True Reason, and the true knowledge of Nature, which is true Philosophy, would certainly direct us to the acknowledgment and worship of that Supream Being, who made the World, and yet we know, there never was an Atheist without some pretence to Philosophy: Though it seems, as this Author tells us, (p. 9.) there has been an Arch-heretick, even Socinus himself without it; and so may all his Disciples be too, and yet be vain Pretenders to Reason and Philosophy; however, I am as Orthodox in this Point, as my Lord Bacon himself, whom he objects against me, whose Sense I exactly expressed, though not his Words.

But nothing can more fully declare my sense in this par∣ticular, than what the Reader may find (p. 10.) 2dly. Let us now consider what great reason we have to reject all the vain Pretences to Reason and Philosophy, when opposed to a Di∣vine Revelation. For that i•• all the Apostle intends in this Caution, not to discourage the use of Reason, or the study of Philosophy, which are great improvements, and a delightful entertainment of Human Minds, and with a wise and prudent conduct may be very serviceable to Religion too; but we must not set up any Conclusions in Philosophy against the Christian Faith; nor corrupt the Faith with a mixture of Philosophy; nor reject any Revealed Truths for want of Natural Ideas to conceive them by. Nothing can be plainer than this; That I am very far from condemning the sober use of Reason and Philosophy, though with the Apostle, I will not allow them to oppose the Authority of a Divine Reve∣lation. So that our Author need not be so terribly fright∣ed, as if this Innocent Sermon were a designed revenge against the Oxford Heads, the Learning of the Place, and Philosophy it self, (p. 1.) (though the Apostle indeed will not allow Philosophy alone to make Decrees in Ar∣ticles of Faith); here is no danger of setting up Folly and Falshood (which would be to encroach upon his Province) or of writing a second Moriae Encomium, or praise of Folly. Here is no danger, that the Articles of Faith should disagree with true Reason and Philosophy, though a vain appearance, a Socinian Philosophy, may contradict the Articles of Faith. Nay my Lord Mayor, and the Court of Aldermen, (p. 9.) notwithstanding this Sermon, may very safely send their Children to Cambridge or Oxford, if they get good Tutors for them, who will reach them no Socinian Logick or Phi∣losophy: And which is more, we may confute Atheists and Infidels by Reason and Philosophy, (p. 8.) without being at the charge of buying a massy Quarto Bible, with Clasps, and Bosses, to knock'em down with: As he very wit∣tily,

and with great reverence to the Holy Scriptures, ex∣presses it: For Reason and Philosophy may confute Atheists and Infidels, though they have no Authority to make or unmake Articles of Faith, as to matters of pure Revelation. Nay more than this still (if it be possible to please him), we will allow Reason and Philosophy to confute Heresies, though not to judge absolutely in mat∣ters of Faith: Which I suppose is the reason, why, as he observes (p. 9.) Hereticks, many of them, are no less bit∣ter against this same (damnable) Philosophy: They protest, especially in their Latin Works, that 'tis this Philosophy that corrupted and debauched Divinity. Damnable is a very fashionable word, and shews him to be well bred, and to have good Acquaintance; but it is a very great Truth, That though Catholick Christians would never build their Faith on Philosophy, yet Hereticks have always had great reason to rail at true Philosophy, as I observed in my Ser∣mon (p. 10.) The importunity of Hereticks did very often engage the Catholick Fathers in Philosophical Disputes; but this they did, not to explain the Christian Mysteries by Philo∣sophy but only to shew, that as incomprehensible as these My∣steries are, the Philosophy of Hereticks, and their Objections against these Articles, were very absurd. And such Disputes as these may sometimes be absolutely necessary, and of great use to shame these vain Pretences to Philosophy, while we do not put the trial of our Faith upon this issue. And thus much for his first Proposition, (for it is none of mine) that Rea∣son and Philosophy are the two Idols of Atheists and Hereticks, and that make Atheists to be Atheists, and Hereticks to be He∣reticks, (p. 12.)

His second Proposition (Ibid.) runs thus. That to ascer∣tain the very and true Faith, we must attend only to that meaning of Scripture which the Words and Phrases do imply: Rejecting all mixture of Reason and Philosophy in our Di¦sputes about Religion, and our Inquiries about the meaning of

Scripture. Now let any Reader try, whether he can find any such Proposition as this in all my Sermon, either in words or sense. I could not for some time guess, what shadow of pretence he could have for charging such a Pro∣position on me: I did indeed in some principal Articles di∣stinguish between Faith and Philosophy; between what is revealed in Scripture, and what Philosophical Disputes, which the Scripture takes no notice of, have been raised about them, and warned all men from mixing and corrupt∣ing the Faith with Philosophy; but does this forbid us Expounding Scripture agreeable to Reason and common Sense, and Philosophy too, where Sense, and Reason, and Philosophy, are proper judges? They are not the su∣preme and absolute judges in matters of pure Revelation; But does it hence follow, that they cannot judge of their proper Objects? Do I any where say, That we must al∣ways expound the Scripture to a literal Sense? That when Christ is called a Way, a Door, a Rock, we must under∣stand this literally? And yet this is plainly what he would have to be my Sense, as his beloved instance of Transub∣stantiation shews.

In this Sermon I have given no Rules for Expounding Scripture, which in time I hope I may. But what I assert is this, That when by all those Methods which Wise Men observe in expounding any Writing, we have found out what the true sense of Scripture must be, we must not re∣ject such Doctrines meerly because natural Reason cannot conceive or comprehend them. That Revelation as to such matters as are knowable only by Revelation, must serve instead of Sense, natural Ideas, and natural Reason, (p. 11.) This gives a plain Answer to all his Cant about Transubstantia∣tion, from our Saviour's words, This is my Body, (p. 12.) For is there no way of knowing what is Bread, and what is Flesh, but by Revelation? Is not this the proper object of Sense and Reason? And then it does not come within

my Rule; for Sense and Reason must judge of their pro∣per Objects, though Revelation must serve us instead of Sense and Reason, as to such matters as can be known only by Revelation; that is, as I expresly add, we must upon the Authority of Revelation believe things which we do not see, things which we have no natural notion or conception of, things which are not evident to natural Reason: As for in∣stance, If it be Revealed in Scripture that God has an Eternal Word, his Only-Begotten Son; and that in time this Word was made Flesh and dwelt among us; this Son of God became Man; that God sent forth his Son made of a Woman, made under the Law: Though neither Sense nor natural Ideas, nor meer natural Reason, give us any notice of it; yet if we will own a Revelation, we must believe it upon the sole Authority of Revelation: But though Revelation in such cases be Sense and Reason to us, because we have no other means of Knowledge; yet Sense must judge of the natural Objects of Sense, and Reason of the Objects of natural Reason; but Revelation was ne∣ver intended to unteach us what Sense and natural Reason evidently teach, and therefore it cannot teach us, that Bread is Flesh, and Wine is Blood.

But this Socinian is got so far towards Popery, that he will not allow Sense to be judge of this matter, whether the Bread be Transubstantiated or not, and that for a very pleasant Reason; his words are these, (p. 13.) He cannot have recourse to Sense in the case, 'tis only Reason and Philo∣sophy can help him out: For though the Apostles, who saw and tasted that it was Bread only, and not Flesh, might have ap∣pealed also to their Senses; yet we that never saw or tasted the Substance which Jesus gave then to the Disciples, can know by Reason and Philosophy only, by nothing else, that it was not his Flesh and Blood: That is, I can't know by Sense that Christ gave Bread and Wine, and not Flesh and Blood to his Disciples, because I did not See and Taste my self

that very Substance that Christ gave to his Disciples: But can I judge by Sense that what I my self See and Taste in the Lords Supper, is Bread and Wine after Consecration, not Flesh and Blood? For that is the Question between us and the Church of Rome; not, whether we receive the same now which Christ gave to the Apostles in the first Institution (which they take for granted, and to question which, is meer Scepticism) but what that change is, which the words of Consecration make in the Elements to this day; and if we cannot judge of this by Sense, the Church of Rome have a better Plea for themselves than I thought they had. And if I can't now judge by my own Senses what it was Christ gave to his Apostles, and what they Saw and Tasted, I fear it will much weaken some other very good Arguments against Transubstantiation.

But how will this Socinian, who rejects the Evidence of Sense, confute Transubstantiation? Why that is easily done by Reason and Philosophy; as thus, The Text ex∣presly says, it was Bread which he blessed and brake, and called it his Body; therefore it was his Body in Sign and Significati∣on, not in Reality. All this is Arguing, 'tis Reason that convinces us, not Sense, that the Substance he divided to them was indeed Bread, not his Flesh, which he neither blessed nor brake.

This is Reasoning indeed; But did I ever reject Reason∣ing and Arguing about the meaning of Scripture Words and Phrases, and the true Sense and Interpretation of Scri∣pture? Is there no difference between Reasoning about the Sense of Scripture, and setting up the Conclusions of meer natural Reason and Philosophy against the plain and evident Doctrines of Scripture? It is certain I made a ma∣nifest distinction between them, p. 9. In all these cases we are concerned to enquire what the true sense of the Article is; for this the Scripture teaches, and so far our Faith is concern∣ed, and these are not only justifiable, but necessary Disputes,

if the true Faith be necessary. And such were the Disputes of the Catholick Fathers with the Sabellian, Arian, and Photinian Hereticks, &c. So that I allow of Arguing and Reasoning as much as he does; and add, But that which we are to beware of, is not to mix Philosophy with our Faith, nor to admit of any meer Philosophical Objections against the Faith, nor to attempt any Explication of these Mysteries, beyond what the Scriptures and the Faith and Pra∣ctice of the Catholick Church will justify. This distinction he knew very well, but very honestly dissembles it, and endeavours to impose upon his Readers, as if Reasoning and Arguing about the Sense of Scripture, and resolving our Faith into meer natural Reason and Philosophy, were the same thing.

He was aware what Answer would be given to this, and therefore in the very next Paragraph he confutes his own Reasoning from Scripture, and proves that the Text does not confute Transubstantiation: But if our Preacher, says he, believes it was only Bread, because the Text it self calls it Bread (which was his own Argument), let him consider, that seeing what was called Bread before Christ blessed it, after the blessing he calls it his Body; we cannot know by Sense or by the Text, but by Reason and Philosophy only, that it was not changed (by the blessing) into what now he calls it, namely, his Body. But if This signifies Bread, then. This is my Body, signifies, This Bread is my Body; and if Bread be his Body, then his Sacramental Body is not Flesh: But I do not in∣tend to dispute this Point with him, but only observe, That to set up his Reason and Philosophy to be absolute Judges in Matters of Faith, he will not allow either Sense or Scripture to confute Transubstantiation.

It cannot but give all sober Christians a just Indignation, to see the most Sacred and Venerable Mysteries perpetual∣ly ridicul'd at this Prophane rate! In the Reign of King James there was a Pamphlet published to reconcile men to

Transubstantiation, by representing the Doctrine of the Trinity to the full as absurd, and chargeable with as many Contradictions as Transubstantiation it self: This was then charged on the Papists, and they were sufficiently ex∣pos'd for it; but a Great Man has lately informed us, That it was writ by a Socinian, to make men Papists or Socini∣ans, as it should happen; which was a Glorious Design at that time of day, for men who take it ill if you will not allow them to be Protestants, and to enjoy the Liberty of Protestants: For they could not but see that Popery was then grown very Fashionable and Tempting by the Fa∣vour and Frowns of a Popish Prince; and that the gene∣rality of Christians did so firmly believe the Doctrine of the Trinity, that could they have persuaded them, as they endeavoured, That Transubstantiation was as reasonable a Doctrine as the Trinity, it was much more likely that they would turn Papists than Socinians.

Instead of Popery men are now running into the other Extremes of Atheism, Deism, and a Contempt of all Re∣veal'd Religion, and that upon a pretence of making mere Natural Reason and Philosophy their sole Guide and Judge; and now our Socinians have a new Game to play; and if they dare not absolutely deny the Authority of Re∣velation (which in many Instances they have shewn a good Inclination to), yet they give a superior Authority to Reason, which will serve as well, and make less noise than to reject all Revelation. And if you shew them how absurd this is, to pretend to own a Divine Revelation, and to make Revelation submit to mere Natural Reason and Philosophy, they presently take sanctuary in Transubstan∣tiation, and defend it against the Evidence of Sense, and the Authority of Scripture, to make Reason and Philoso∣phy the Supreme Judge in Matters of Faith; and in the mean time matter not what becomes of Religion, what advantage they give either to Popery or Deism, so they can but expose the Faith of the Trinity.

He has given us a little Specimen of it here; * 1.2 but the same Author, as far as I can guess from the same Words and the same Thoughts, has with his usual Civility attack'd my Lord Bishop of Sarum upon this Argument, which upon this occasion I shall briefly consider.

His Lordship in vindication of the Christian Mysteries, with great reason rejects Transubstantiation out of the number of Mysteries, because it contradicts Sense in the Object of Sense; his words are these: Transubstantiation must not be a Mystery, because there is against it the Evidence of Sense in an Object of Sense: For Sense plainly represents to us the Bread and Wine to be still the same that they were be∣fore the Consecration. Now I cannot think this Author in earnest in the two first Answers he gives to this. His first Answer is, That it is not pretended by the Papists, that the Bread and Wine have received any the least Change in what is an Object of Sense. This is a Discovery worthy its Au∣thor, that the Papists don't deny that they see, and feel, and taste, and smell the sensible Qualities of Bread and Wine: For who ever charged them with such a Contra∣diction to Sense as this? But our Senses judge of the Sub∣stances of things by their sensible qualities; judge that to be Bread and Wine, which has all the qualities of Bread and Wine: And therefore to say, as the Papists do, That what our Sight, and Taste, and Smell tell us has all the qualities of Bread and Wine, is not Bread and Wine, does not indeed contradict our Senses as to sensible qualities, but contradicts that Judgment our Senses make of the Natures of things from their sensible qualities: And this is that Contradiction to Sense which the Bishop justly charges upon Transubstantiation; as is evident in his very words.

In his Second Answer he Disputes against the Infalli∣bility of our Senses, as he calls it, by such Common Ar∣guments as every Freshman knows how to Answer; only I do not remember, that the Delusions of our Dreams

used to be objected against the Evidence of Sense; but suppose our Senses may deceive us in some few instan∣ces wherein both Sense and Reason can Correct the mi∣stake, must they therefore deceive in the Nature of Bread and Wine? Can he prove, that they ever deceive us with Qualities and Accidents without a Substance? For that is the Cheat of Transubstantiation: It is not pretended, as he observed in his First Answer, That our Senses de∣ceive us in the Colour, or Figure, or Taste, or Smell of Bread and Wine; and therefore all his instances of the Deception of our Senses are nothing to the purpose; but let him give us any one instance of the other kind, if he can, and then we will believe Transubstantiation in Contradiction to our Senses.

But does he consider, what the Consequence of this Argument is? He will not allow it a good Argument against Transubstantiation, That it contradicts Sense, be∣cause our Senses may deceive us in the Objects of Sense (which by the way makes his instance of the Delusions of Dreams, which are not the Objects of Sense, very im∣pertinent;) now if contradiction to Sense be not a good Objection, because Sense is not Infallible, what will be∣come of his great Argument of Contradiction to Reason? For all men confess, That Reason is not so Infallible as Sense is, as is evident from all the Disputes and Clash∣ings of Reason, and those Absurdities and Contradicti∣ons which contending Parties mutually charge upon each other; and if a Contradiction to Fallible Sense be not a good Objection against the Truth of any thing, how comes a Contradiction to much more Fallible Reason to be so unanswerable an Objection? And then we may much more safely believe a Trinity in Unity, notwith∣standing all their pretended Contradictions to Reason, than we can believe Transubstantiation in Contradiction to Sense. But in his Third Answer, he seems to be in good earnest, and I shall consider it as such; and it is this.

Transubstantiation is contradicted by Sense, saith his Lordship, in an Object of Sense; therefore 'tis a false My∣stery. This is as much as to say, That a Faculty or Power judging of its proper Object, always judges truly, and must determine our Belief. He must say this, or his Reasoning is nothing. I ask now of what Faculty or Power is Almighty God the Object. He will Answer, God is the Object, not of Sense, which discerns him not, but of Reason, which disco∣vers, and sees this most Glorious Being. Therefore Reason, by his Lordship's own Argument, judges infallibly concerning God, and must determine our Belief about him: We must hearken to Reason, when it finds Contradictions in what men affirm concerning God. Now notwithstanding his vain Brags, and his Triumphant Challenge to the Bishop, a very little Skill will Answer this Argument. For,

1. The Bishop need not say, because it is not true, That every Faculty and Power judges as certainly of its proper Object, as Sense does, and then his Argument is quite lost: For if Sense judges more certainly than Reason, then a manifest Contradiction to Sense is a more unanswerable Objection, than any appearing and pre∣tended Contradictions to Reason. I believe this Author is the first man who ever thus universally equalled the Evidence of Reason to that of Sense; or that ever affirmed, that Reason could judge infallibly of God. And if Reason may be mistaken (which I shall take for granted) especially in the Infinite and Incomprehensible Nature of God, some appearing Contradictions, or what some men will call Contradictions, are not a sufficient reason to re∣ject a Revelation, and to disbelieve what God tells us of Himself, and his own Nature.

2^dly. Whatever certainty we allow to our Faculties in judging of their proper Objects, we must extend it no farther than to what belongs to the judgment of that Fa∣culty: The same thing may be the Object of different

Faculties, as it is of our different Senses; but every Fa∣culty, and every Sense, judges of nothing in any Object, but only what belongs to it self. All the Objects of Sense are the Objects of Reason too; but Sense judges of nothing but what belongs to Sense, and Reason of what belongs to Reason; and Reason can judge no far∣ther of any Object, than it is knowable by Reason; and not only the Divine, but even Created Nature has such Secrets and Mysteries as are not knowable by Reason; and there∣fore it is manifest Ignorance or Sophistry, to conclude from God's being the Object of Reason, therefore Reason judges infallibly concerning God: For, not to Dispute about the Infallible Judgment of Reason, God is the Object of Reason, because Reason can know something concerning God; but God can be the Object of Reason no farther than he is knowable by Reason; and therefore if there be any thing which Natural Reason cannot know of God (as I hope this Author himself will own), with respect to such matters God is not the Object of Rea∣son, and Reason cannot judge at all, much less judge in∣fallibly concerning God. But as Sense leaves room for Rea∣son in the same Object, so Reason leaves room for Faith.

But must we not hearken to Reason when it finds Contra∣dictions in what men affirm concerning God? Yes, most certainly, as far as God is the Object of Reason, and knowable by Reason, but no farther; for in such matters as Reason cannot judge of at all, it cannot judge of Con∣tradictions. Sense and Reason can judge of Contradicti∣ons only for themselves, or as far as their judgment reaches, but may appear Contradictions themselves to each other. As for instance:

Reason assures us that Man consists of Soul and Body, which are closely united to each other, and yet the Union of Spirit and Matter is no better than contradiction to the judgment of Sense; for Sense knows no Union but by Con∣tact,

nor any Contact but between Bodies, which have ex∣tended and solid Parts, that can touch each other; so that an Union without Contact is one contradiction to the judg∣ment of Sense, and a Contact without extended solid parts, which a Spirit has not, is another; and yet Reason does not matter these Contradictions to the judgment of Sense, because Sense is not the Judge of such things: And it is the same Case between Reason and Faith, which receives its information from a Divine Revelation, concerning such Matters as are not knowable by Natural Reason: should Reason contradict Faith in such Matters as Reason is no Judge of, this is no more an Objection against the Superior Evidence and Authority of Faith, than the Judgment of Sense is against the Evidence of Reason; such Contradi∣ctions are not in the nature of things, but are owing to our ignorance of Nature, and presumption in judging of what we cannot understand.

The Example he gives of such a contradiction to Rea∣son, is a Trinity of Persons, every one of which is perfect God, and yet all of them but One God; but for my life, I cannot see this plain Contradiction, That Three Persons, each of which has all the Perfections of Divinity, and is perfect God, should be so essentially united in the s••me One Eternal and Infinite Nature, as to be but One God. This is not a Contradiction in terminis, it is not Three Persons and but One Person, or Three Gods and but One God, but Three Divine Persons, and One God. If the Unity of the Godhead consisted in the Unity of a Person, I grant it would be a flat Contradiction to say, Three Persons and One God, which would be equivalent to Three Gods and One God; but if the Unity of the Godhead consists in the Unity of Nature, that there is but One Eternal and Infi∣nite Nature, which is the One God, and this Unity, and Identity of Nature be perfectly and entirely preserved in Three Divine Persons, it is so far from a Contradiction to

say, That Three Persons are One God, that it would be a Contradiction to say, That Three Divine Persons, who have the same One Identical Nature, should be more than One God; for that is to say, That One Divine Nature, which can be but One God, is Three Gods.

Now this is all that Natural Reason tells us of the Unity of the Godhead, That there is, and can be, but One Eternal Infinite Nature, which is but One God; this we expresly teach, and therefore do not contradict Reason; but then Scripture tells us, That there are Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to whom the Name and Attributes of God, and therefore this One Infinite Undivided Nature, belong. This Reason boggles at, and Socinians call a Con∣tradiction; but it is such a Contradiction, as Sense would judge the Union of Spirit and Matter to be: At most it is an imaginary Contradiction in the Subsistence of the Di∣vine Nature, which Reason knows nothing about, and therefore can make no judgment of; and such appearing-Contradictions are no Objections, because they may be no Contradictions; as we are sure they are none, when the Doctrines charged with these Contradictions are taught in Scripture.

There is one distinction, which seems to me to set this matter in a clear light, and to answer all the Pretences of Contradictions; and that is, The distinction between Con∣tradictions in Logick and Philosophy. A Contradiction in Logick, is when two Propositions in express terms con∣tradict each other; and all men grant that both parts of such Contradictions cannot be true, as that there are Three Gods, and but One God, which is to say, that there are, and that there are not Three Gods; that there is, and that there is not, but One only God. A Contradiction in Phi∣losophy, is when any thing is affirmed concerning the Na∣ture or Essential Properties of any Being, which seems to contradict all the Notions and Ideas we have of Nature in

other Beings, and such Contradictions as these may be both true; for the Natures of things may be contrary to, and contradict each other and yet both of them be true and real Beings. There are infinite Instances of this in all Nature; the Ideas of Hot and Cold, of White and Black, of Light and Darkness, of solid and fluid Bodies, of Matter and Spirit, are direct Contradictions, in this notion of a Con∣tradiction, to each other: And had we known but one of these Opposites by our Natural Ideas, and the other had been revealed to us, we might as justly have cried out of Con∣tradictions, as the Socinians now do, when you mention a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature. For Heat contradicts the Idea of Cold, and Fluid of Solid; as much as Three Persons in the Unity of Nature, con∣tradicts the Unity of Nature in the Unity of a Person: This latter indeed is the natural notion we have, That there is but One Person in One Subsisting Intelligent Na∣ture; for we have no example of any thing else, and there∣fore can have no natural Idea of any other Unity; but this does not prove, that it cannot be otherwise; for there may be Oppositions and Contrarieties in Nature; and did we but consider what an infinite distance and unlikeness there is between God and Creatures, we should not think it reasonable to judge of the Divine Nature by the Ideas of Created Nature.

This is a very real and sensible distinction between Con∣tradictions in Logick, and in Nature and Philosophy, and there is a certain way to know them: Logical Contradi∣ctions are always immediately reducible to is, and is not; for they affirm and deny the same thing in the same sence: The Contradictions in Nature and Philosophy are only the opposition and contrariety there is between the Ideas of se∣veral Beings, which can never be reduced to a Contradiction in Logick, but through Ignorance or Mistake, by changing the sense and use of words. Let any Socinian try the Ex∣periment

in the Doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, and re∣duce it to such a Contradiction if he can. A Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature, is a Contra∣diction to that Idea we have of the Unity of Person and Nature in created Beings, but this is no Contradiction in Logick; for it is not a Contradiction in the same Nature and Being, as all Contradictions in Logick must be, but it is a Contrariety or Contradiction (if we will so call it) between the Unity and Personalities of two very different Natures, the Divine and the Created Nature; and all the Contradiction that can be made of it, is no more than this, That the Unity of the Divine Nature, which is perfect and undivided in Three distinct Persons, contradicts the Noti∣on of Unity in a Created Nature, which admits but of One Person in One Individual Nature: But there are a thousand such Contradictions in Nature, that is, different Natures, whose Ideas are opposite and contrary to each other, and yet all of them real Beings: But could they make a Trinity in Unity contradict it self, that the Trinity should in express terms destroy the Unity, and the Unity the Trinity, this would be somewhat to the purpose; for it would prove a Contradiction in Logick, when the Terms destroy each other; but then the Trinity and Unity must be the same; a Trinity of Persons, and but One Person; or a Trinity of Natures, and but one Nature: But a Tri∣nity of Persons, true, proper, subsisting Persons, in the Unity of Nature, which is the Catholick Faith, is not a Contradiction in Logick, though it contradicts the Notion of Human Personalities, which it may do, and yet be very true. This is abundantly enough to shew the Weakness and Folly of this Socinian Cant about Transubstantiation; the Impiety, Prophaneness, and mischievous Consequen∣ces of it, let others consider.

His Third Charge is, That I say, That as we are Chri∣stians, and unless we will be understood to reject the Supreme

Authority of Divine Revelation, we must believe those Do∣ctrines which are thought to be most mysterious and inconcei∣vable, notwithstanding any Objection from Reason or from Phi∣losophy against 'em. He that believes no farther than Natu∣ral Reason approves, believes his Reason, not the Revelation; he is a Natural Philosopher, not a Believer. He believes the Scriptures as he would believe Plato or Tully, not as Inspired Writings, but as agreeable to Reason, and as the result of wise and deep Thoughts, p. 14.

Here he has taken some of my Words, and so put them together, as to conceal the whole Force of the Argument, which he always takes care to do. My business (P. 10, 11, &c.) was to prove,

That we ought to believe those Doctrines which are thought the most mysterious and in∣conceivable, notwithstanding any Objections from Na∣tural Reason and Philosophy against them: And this I proved from the Nature, Use, and Authority of Re∣velation. That Revelation, as to such matters as are knowable only by Revelation, must serve instead of Sense, Natural Ideas, and Natural Reason. That if we believe upon God's Authority (which is the strict Notion of a Divine Faith) we must believe without any Natural Evidence, merely because God has revealed it; and then we must believe such things as are not evident to Sense and Reason. That to believe no farther than Natural Reason can conceive and comprehend, is to re∣ject the Divine Authority of Revelation, and to destroy the distinction between Reason and Faith. He that will believe no farther than his Reason approves, believes his Reason, not the Revelation, and is in truth a Natural Philosopher, not a Believer.

Here any man may perceive that our Socinian was plainly baffled, for he has not one word to answer, but only says, that I contradict this my self in my Vindication of the Do∣ctrine of the Trinity, where I assert, That suppose the

natural Construction of the Words of Scripture import such a Sense as is contrary to some evident Principle of Reason, I won't believe it: Of this more presently; but what is this to the purpose? Is there no difference between what Reason can't conceive, comprehend, approve, and what the Reason of all Mankind contradicts? No difference between believing what we do not see, what we have no na∣tural notion or conception of, what is not evident to natural Reason, and believing in contradiction to sense, and such natural Notions, and natural Evidence, as all Mankind agree in?

But he is very much troubled, according to his Principle of believing Scripture no farther than Natural Reason and Philosophy approves, how to distinguish between be∣lieving Plato and Tully, and believing a Revelation. He says, They look upon Plato and Tully, as great Men, but Fallible (p. 15.) and therefore may take the liberty to dissent from them; and believe them no farther than Reason approves: Very right; but will he believe the Scripture any farther than Reason can conceive, compre∣hend, approve? Have a care of that: But they will do as well; if Reason will not approve of such Scripture Doctrines, as it can't conceive and comprehend, they will Expound and Torture Scripture, till it submits to Rea∣son: For it is more congruous to think, that an Inspired Writer uses a Figurative, or it may be a Catachrestical (very Catachrestical) Expression or Phrase, than that he delivers flat contradictions, or downright impossibilities: That is to say, they must by all means believe, or pretend to believe, the Scripture; but then they must never own any thing to be in Scripture, which their Reason calls a flat contra∣diction, or downright impossibility; which is the very same thing; for the reason why they will not allow, that the Scripture contains any thing, which their Reason does not approve, is because they must believe the Scripture, but

must not believe it beyond their own Reason and Compre∣hension; and the only difference they make between Plato and Tully, and the Scripture is, That they can safely reject their Authority, when they please, but must be at the trouble of Expounding away whatever they do not ap∣prove in the Scripture.

This is what I told them in the Vindication; and as Impious as this Author thinks it, I will venture to Tran∣scribe that whole Paragraph.

But I have not done with our Author thus;* 1.3 but must give him a little more about Expounding Scripture ac∣cording to Reason: For I affirm, that Natural Reason is not the Rule and Measure of Expounding Scripture, no more than it is of Expounding any other Writing. The true and only way to interpret any Writing, even the Scriptures themselves, is to examine the use and propriety of Words and Phrases; the Connexion, Scope, and De∣sign of the Text, its allusion to Ancient Customs and Usa∣ges, or Disputes, &c. For there is no other good reason to be given for any Exposition, but that the words sig∣nify so, and the circumstances of the place, and appa∣rent Scope of the Writer requires it.

But our Author (as many others do) seems to con∣found the Reasons of believing any Doctrine, with the Rules of Expounding a Writing. We must believe no∣thing that contradicts the plain and express Dictate of Natural Reason, which all Mankind agree in, whatever pretence of Revelation there be for it; Well, say they, then you must Expound Scripture so as to make it agree with the necessary Principles and Dictates of Reason: No, say I, that does not follow; I must Expound Scri∣pture according to the use and significations of the Words; and must not force my own Sense on it, if it will not bear it. But suppose then, that the Natural Constructi∣on of the words import such a sense as is contrary to

some evident Principle of Reason; Then I wont believe it. How? Not believe Scripture? No, no. I will be∣lieve no pretended Revelation, which contradicts the plain Dictates of Reason, which all Mankind agree in; and were I persuaded, that those Books, which we call the Holy Scriptures, did so, I wou'd not believe them; and this is a fairer and honester way, than to force them to speak, what they never intended, and what every impar∣tial man, who reads them, must think was never intend∣ed that we may believe them: To put our own Sense on Scripture, without respect to the use of words, and to the Reason and Scope of the Text, is not to believe Scri∣pture, but to teach it to speak our Language; is not to submit to the Authority of Scripture, but to make Scri∣pture submit to our Reason, even in such matters as are confessedly above Reason, as the Infinite Nature and Essence of God is.

Though I am never so well assured of the Divine Au∣thority of any Book, yet I must Expound it, as I do other Writings; for when God vouchsafes to speak to us in our own Language, we must understand his words, just as we do, when they are spoke by men: Indeed when I am sure that it is an Inspired Writing, I lay it down for a Principle, That it contains nothing absurd and contradictions or repugnant to the received Principles of Natural Reason; but this does not give me Authority to Expound the words of Scripture to any other sense, than what they will naturally bear, to reconcile them with such Notions as I call reason; for if one man has this liberty, another may take it, and the Scripture will be tuned to every man's private Conceit; and therefore in case the plain sense of Scripture contradicts those Noti∣ons I have of things, if it be possible to be true, I sub∣mit to the Authority of Scripture; if it seems to include a Contradiction and Impossibility, if that Contradiction

be not plain and notorious, and in such matters, as I am sure, I perfectly understand, there I submit again, and conclude it is no Contradiction, though I cannot com∣prehend how it is; if I can by no means reconcile it, I will confess, I do not understand it, and will not pretend to give any sense of it, much less to give such a sense of it, as the words will not bear.

His Fourth Charge is, that I say, Difficulty of concei∣ving a thing, nay, the absolute unconceivableness of it, must not hinder our assent to what is contained in Revelation; because we do not disbelieve what is made known to us by Sense or by Reason, notwithstanding any difficulty or incon∣ceivableness adhering to such things. These are neither my Words nor my Argument. My Argument is this; That since, as I had shewn, in matters of pure Revela∣tion, which can be known no other way, Revelation must stand in the place of Sense and Reason, we must al∣low no Objections against revealed Mysteries, but what we will allow to be good Objections against Sense and Reason. Now no man questions the truth of what he sees and feels, or what he can prove to be true by plain and undeniable Reason, meerly because there are unconceivable difficulties in it, as there is in every thing, even the most certain and familiar things in Nature: And if revealed Truths are not more un∣conceivable than many Natural Objects of Sense and Rea∣son, why should their being unconceivable be a greater Obje∣ction against believing a Revelation, than it is against be∣lieving our Sense and Reason in matters equally unconceivable? (Serm. p. 13.)

This Argument is easily understood, but can never be Answered; and therefore he wisely resolved not to under∣stand it. In Answer to this he tells us, That he does not always believe his Senses, nor his Reason neither, when it is not clear, but perplext with difficulties, or darken∣ing

doubts, but especially when there is a remarkable and ma∣nifest inconceivableness. Nor do I require he should; but my only Question is, Whether he does not believe, both his Senses and Reason, that there are many things in the World, whose Natures are so mysterious, that he cannot conceive or comprehend the Reasons and Philoso∣phy of them? That though he sees Men and Beasts, Heaven and Earth, Sun, Moon, and Stars, he will not believe, that there are such things as he sees, because he cannot understand the Philosophy of their Natures, and sees a great many things done by them, which are per∣fectly unaccountable, and would have been thought ab∣solutely impossible, had we not seen them done? These are all the contradictions and impossibilities, which I say men may make or find, when they know not the Philosophical Na∣tures of things, nor how they act, and yet will be reasoning and guessing at them; which this wise Author calls a Ser∣mon for Contradictions. But do I require any man to believe Contradictions? Nay, do I say, that there are any such Contradictions? But this, I say, that there are such unconceivable Mysteries, in all Created Nature, much more in the Incomprehensible Nature of God, as some Gotham Philosophers (as he who knows them best calls them) charge with impossibilities and contradicti∣ons; and yet these Gotham Philosophers are so wise as not to disbelieve their Senses as to the being of those things, how unconceivable and incomprehensible soever their na∣tures are; and this is all I ask, that in matters of pure Re∣velation we give the same credit to Revelation, that in the Objects of sense we give to sense, i. e. not to disbelieve what is revealed, As, that God has an Eternal Son, and that this Eternal Son in time was made Man, because the Eternal Generation and Incarnation are inconceivable Mysteries; as we do not disbelieve, that there are any Men in the World, because Human Generations, and

the Union of Soul and Body are inconceivable Mysteries in Nature.

Towards the Conclusion of my Sermon, I Answered Two Objections against believing a Revelation as to such Doctrines which are inconceivable and incomprehensi∣ble to meer Natural Reason. And here to prepare the way, he first scorns the Objections, as never made before, or however by none but my self. That I pass over known and very dangerous Objections, and Answer only to Chimera's and Follies, never suggested or thought of by any. (p. 18.)

I am glad to find, that he grows ashamed of these So∣cinian Chimera's and Follies; but let us hear what they are.

1. It is thought very unnatural, that when God has made us reasonable Creatures, and therefore made natural Reason to us the measure of truth and falshood, he should require us to believe without Reason, as we must do, if he reveal such things to us, as we do not, and cannot possibly know the rea∣sons of: If we must believe with our understanding, how can we believe things, which we cannot understand? Now this Socinian does not believe, that any Sect of Religious ever made this or the like Objection; Let him, as he says, snuff his Candle once more, and look into the late Socinian Pamphlets: What is the meaning of all their Zeal for Reason in this Cause, of their great noise and outcry about Mysteries, Nonsense, Contradictions? What is the meaning of their Expounding Scripture by Reason, not like Fools, but like Wise men? Why has this Author shewn such a furious Zeal against believing a Revelation not∣withstanding any Objections from meer Natural Reason and Philosophy against it? If, as he now says, our Rea∣son and Understandings are finite and imperfect, and the Wisdom and Power of God most perfect: Therefore he may reveal many things to us, to be believed by us, though we understand them not, nor have any other cause of our believing

them, but only God's Revelation of them, (p. 19.) Nothing can be more true, than what he says, that Reason is the measure of truth and falshood, but not the frail Fallible Rea∣son of Men, but the Infallible Wisdom of God. If he be sincere and hearty in this, we are perfectly agreed; for this is the very Doctrine of my Sermon, which he has so furiously opposed, or would be thought to oppose; for to speak the Truth, he has not opposed the Doctrine of my Sermon; but, in his own Language, his own Chime∣ra's and Follies.

But here is either a Fallacy in his Words, or he gives up his Cause, which it is plain he never intended: The Question is not absolutely, What is the Rule and Measure of Truth and Falshood, but what is so to us? Now if he will allow, that Frail and Fallible Reason is not a Rule to us, then we may believe things, which our Reason does not approve; nay, which it may judge improbable and false: And if the infallible Wisdom of God be a Rule to us, it can be so only in a Revelation, and then we may and must believe the infallible Wisdom of God in a Revela∣tion against the Objections of Frail and Fallible Rea∣son.

And one may easily guess, there is something amiss still, notwithstanding all these concessions; for as silly an Objection, as he says, this is (which I am glad to hear), he will by no means own, that I have Answered it, and then I have very ill luck indeed, to make a silly Objection, which was never made before, and not be able to Answer it when I have done.

The Answer I give to this Objection is this, That the Matter of the Objection is not true; for we do under∣stand both what it is we believe, and the reasons why we believe it; and this I suppose may pass for an Answer to that Objection: But then it is farther Objected, That we believe such things, whose Natures we cannot understand,

and cannot account for by natural Reason: To this I An∣swer, That Reason is not the judge of the Nature and Phi∣l••sophy of things, nor does it require us to believe nothing but what we thus understand and comprehend: For then, as I had shewn, we must no more believe Sense and Reason, than Revelation: And this I take to be a good Answer too; but then to shew the reason of this, I add: When we make an Objection against any thing, that it is without Rea∣son, or as we apprehend, contrary to reason, we must first consider, whether it be the proper Object of Reason; other∣wise it is no Objection; as it is no Objection against sounds, that we cannot see them, nor against colours, that we cannot hear them; because sounds are not the object of sight, nor colours of hearing. This, I think, is plain Sense, and good Reason too; but this he says is no Answer to that Objection, Why should reasonable Creatures be obliged to believe things without Reason? Nor was it ever intended as an immediate Answer to it; the Answer I give is, That we are not oblig'd to believe without Reason; but when such Men as this Author Object farther, That to Believe things, whose natures we do not understand, and cannot account for by natural Reason, is to believe with∣out Reason; it is a proper Answer to say, That Reason is not judge of the Nature and Philosophy of things, and nothing can be said to be without Reason, or against Reason, which is not the object of Reason; as no man pretends, that the pure Natures and ••ssences of things, or their Essential Reasons, Properties, Unions, Operations, are; (Serm. p. 19.) But herein, it seems, I was mistaken; for I have met with a Man at last, who makes Reason the judge of all this; for if these be not the Objects of Reason, Reason has no Object at all; for our Reason can be no otherwise employed, but either about Substances, or their Unions, Essential Reasons, Opera∣tions or Properties, (p. 20.) Very right! we may know something of all this; but I speak of the Philosophy of

Nature: Now can this new Philosopher tell us, What the pure simple Essence and Substance of any thing is? What naked Matter stripp'd of all Accidents and Qualities is? How Soul and Body are United, which cannot Touch each other? How a Spirit should feel Pain or Pleasures from the Impressions on the Body? How we Think and Reason? Nay, How we See and Hear? How Thought moves our Bodies, and excites our Passions? And a Thousand such like Mysteries; which could he Unriddle, he would infinitely gratify the Inquisitive world: But Christianity not Mysterious, and the Philosophy of pure simple Nature, are too great Discove∣ries for one Age; and yet if ever this happens, they must go together.

For as I observed, this is all the incomprehensibility men have to complain of in the Doctrine of the Trinity and Incar∣nation: The first concerns the pure Nature, Essence, Sub∣stance, of God, and the Essential Distinction and Unity of the Godhead, which we neither do, nor can know any thing of; for all Nature is a Secret and Mystery to us, much more the Infinite Nature of God. And the second concerns the Union of the Divine and Human Nature in the Person of Christ; which is a Mystery, but what we ought not to complain of, since the Philosophy of all Na∣tural Unions is a Mystery to us. These things are not the Objects of Reason; and therefore though we believe them upon the Authority of a Revelation, without understand∣ing the Mystery of them, this is not to believe without, or contrary to Reason. And what now does this Socinian say to this? truly not one word, but falls out with Socinus and Crellius, and some of his best Friends, for talking so much of Mysteries, (which by the way shews, that this is not such a new and unheard of Objection, as he would pre∣tend) for now he has found out, that there is no Mystery at all in the Doctrines of the Trinity, and Incarnation; and he is in the right, if his Socinian Explication of these

Doctrines, (which destroys the Mystery, and the Catho∣lick Faith together) may pass for the Doctrine of the Church. But there has been enough said of that in the distinction between Real and Nominal Trinitarians examined, which the Reader may consult, and this Author answer, at his leisure; though I am very sensible he can never want such Answers as this for any thing.

2dly, The Second Objection against such a Revelation, as contains matters which natural Reason cannot comprehend, is, to what purpose such a Revelation serves? what merit there can be in believing such Doctrines? and of what good use such a Faith can be to us? Serm. p. 2••. This is another Objection, which he thinks no Sect of Religious ever made (p. 24.) but the Irreligious m••y make this Objection, and there are more than one Sect of these.

As to the usefulness of it, I observed, That though neither Natural, nor Revealed Knowledge extends to the Reasons and Causes of Nature, and of Essential Properties and Opera∣tions, yet both Natural and Revealed Knowledge is of as much use to us, as if we did perfectly understand all the Secret and Incomprehensible Mysteries of the Nature of God, or of the Natures of Creatures. Both Natural and Revealed Know∣ledge are alike upon this account, that they only acquaint us what things are, and what ends they serve, and then we know what use to make of them, without understanding the Secret My∣steries of Nature. This I shew'd both in the Knowledge of Nature, and of God, and added; We may make all the use that can be made of this World, and of every thing in it, without understanding the Essential Reasons and Causes, or Internal Nature of any thing. This last Clause he fixes his Remarks on; and that he may have something to re∣mark, he changes my Words thus. We may use the World as fully, and every thing in it to as good purpose, as if we understood the Reasons and Internal Natures of things. And then adds, No, Trisler; not so fully, nor to so good pur∣pose,

as if we better understood the Natures of things. Now this fully, and to as good purpose, are not my Words but his own; nay we can make no use at all of it, but only so far forth as we understand the Nature and Reasons of things in it. We can use nothing to any purpose, till we know or under∣stand something of its nature; and no farther can we apply it and use it, than we understand its Nature, and know its Pro∣perties and Powers. Now this is not meerly trifling, but Knavery: He represents me very ridiculously asserting, That we may as fully, and to as good purpose use every thing in the World without knowing its Nature, Vertues and Properties, as if we knew them; whereas I expresly assert, That we must first know, what things are, and what ends they serve (and the better we know this, to be sure the better) and then we know what use to make of them, with∣out understanding the secret Mysteries of Nature. That is, when by Experience and Observation, we know what things are good for, we know how to use them without understanding the secret Mysteries and Philosophy of Na∣ture: As how God created all things out of nothing; how the Corn grows, or our Food nourishes us, and the like: And thus I shew'd it was as to the Doctrine of the Trinity, and Incarnation, that how unaccountable soever these Mysteries be, it is the most useful and necessary Know∣ledge in the world.

But there is one thing still behind, which I find nettles this Author; and I don't wonder at it: To shew how much it became the Goodness of God to reveal these Myste∣ries of Salvati••n to us, I observed, That the lapsed state of Human Nature makes Supernatural Knowledge necessary: — For though Natural Knowledge must be allowed sufficient to all the ends of Human Life, while man continued Innocent— Yet when man had sinned, he forfeited the Favour of God, and a natural Immortality; and whether he should be restored or not, and by what means he should be restored, depended

wholly on the Sovereign Will and Pleasure of God. And therefore the Light of Nature, though it could direct an inno¦cent man how to please and worship God, and to preserve him∣self Immortal, it could not teach Sinners how to make Attone∣ment for Sin; nor give them any certain Hopes that God would for••ive sins, and bestow immortal Life on them: Which makes it necessary, that the Religion of a Sinner be a Revealed Religion. This he imperfectly transcribes, and adds; True, but not in the least to the purpose: 'Tis no An∣swer to that Objection, but to another: Namely to this; Why Revelation or a ••upernatural Knowledge is necessary? Here he had overshot himself, in allowing Supernatural Knowledge necessary, and therefore immediately qualifies it with, or how∣ever highly requisite, which declares this Socinian's Opinion, That we might have been saved without the Knowledge of Christ or the Gospel-Revelation; for I know nothing that can make any thing more necessary, than the necessi∣ty of ••alvation: And therefore if it be not necessary, but only highly requisite, we might be saved without it: He adds the Reason why he says this is nothing to the pur∣pose. The Obje••tion was concerning a Revelation and Faith, not intelligible, or not conceiveable; the Answer is only con∣cerning Revelation or Supernatural Knowledge) in general, Why it was given to men. But it is neither so, nor so; the Objection concerns the use of such a Revelation as con∣tains matters which Natural Reason cannot comprehend; This part of the Answer proves from the lapsed state of Human Nature the absolute Necessity of the Gospel Reve∣lation, which contains these Mysteries. For if Nature can't save us, it can't discover to us the way of Salvation nei∣ther; and if we must be saved by a Supernatural Grace and Power, it must be supernaturally revealed; and what is Su∣pernatural is the Object of Faith, not of Natural Knowledge. Serm. p. 24.

But he adds, There is a great difference between Superna∣turally revealed, and unconceivable; the whole Christian Re∣ligion, the Precepts as well as Faith of it, is a Supernatural Revelation, and yet a System so intelligible that it must be taught to the Women, to the Poor, and ••ven to little Children. This is true, but there is a difference between Supernatural Knowledge, as opposed to Natural Knowledge, and Super∣natural Revelation: Such things as Nature can teach us, may be supernaturally revealed, and the degeneracy of Mankind may make this, in his Language, highly re∣quisite; as the Nature and Providence of God, a future State, and the differences of Good and Evil: But Superna∣tural Knowledge is a Knowledge which Nature cannot teach, but must be learned only by Revelation; and this is the Knowledge, and a Mysterious Knowledge it is, which the lapsed state of Human Nature makes necessary, as ne∣cessary as the Salvation of Sinners by the Incarnation and Death of the Son of God: Which makes a great differ∣ence between the Precepts and Faith of the Gospel, though both contained in the same Revelation.

He adds, It was not made the matter of Supernatural Re∣velation, for its Difficulty, Mysteriousness, or Transcendency of the Human Understanding, but to ascertain the Truth of it, and to enforce its Authority in the world. Which is in plain English to say, That the Design of the Gospel-Revelation was not to teach us any thing beyond the Discovery or Comprehension of meer Natural Reason, but only to give greater Certainty and Authority to the Laws and Religion of Nature And here, for a conclusion, I joyn Issue with this Socinian (and am glad to take the least Hint for some useful Discourse), Whether the Gospel Revelation contain any thing which Nature could not teach us, and which Natural Reason cannot comprehend; or were only intended to give greater Certainty and Authority to the Religion of Nature?

That the Gospel is a New Revelation of what Nature could not teach, nor meer Natural Reason comprehend, I shall prove; not from the Name or Notion of Mysteries, which these men so foolishly and absurdly ridicule; but from the express Authority of St. Paul, 1 Cor. 2.14. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, be∣cause they are spiritually discerned. A brief Explication of which Words will be of great use in our present Di∣spute.

The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Natural Man, as Theophilact and other Greek Fathers observe, is the man who judges only by Natural Light and Reason, and will receive and believe nothing beyond what Nature teaches: And the Context proves this to be the true meaning of it. This account the Apostle gives of the Graecian Philosophers, That as the Jews required a sign, so the Greeks seek after wisdom, 1 Cor. 1.22. nothing would content them but some Philosophical Speculations, and Natural Proofs and Demonstrations of Faith; which in this Chapter he calls, The enticing words of man's wisdom, and opposes to the demonstration of the spirit, and of power: that is, to the Evidence of Miracles wrought by the Spirit of God; which are a more certain and infallible Proof than all their Pretences to Reason and Demonstration: For where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? for after that in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom (by natural Reason and Philosophy) knew not God, it plea∣sed God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that be∣lieve, 1 Cor. 1.20, 21. These are the men who rejected the Faith of Christ, of whom the Apostle here speaks, and gives an account of the reason of their Infidelity in these words, The natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God.

Which will more fully appear, by examining what these things of the Spirit of God are: And it is evident from the whole Context, that they are matters of pure Revelation, which can be known only by the Revelation of the Spirit, or the whole Oeconomy of our Salvation, by the Incarna∣tion, Death, Resurrection, Ascension, of Jesus Christ, the Eternal Son of God, which is the Subject of the Go∣spel-Revelation. This he calls, The Wisdom of God in a Mystery, even the hidden Wisdom, which God ordained before the world to our glory, ver. 7. and what this is, immediately follows; Which none of the princes of this world knew; for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory; which can refer only to the Dispensation of Grace by Jesus Christ. This Nature could not teach us, as it is written, Eye hath not s••en, neither ear heard, neither have entred into the heart of man, the things which God hath pre∣pared for them that love him, v. 9. That is, such things as neither Sense, nor Natural Reason could inform us of: But God hath revealed them to us by his Spirit, for the Spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God; for what man knoweth the things of a man, but the Spirit of a man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the spirit of God: Now we have received not the Spirit of the World, but the Spirit which is of God, that we may know those things which are freely given us of God: Which proves that these are properly the things of the Spirit, which could never be known but by the Revelation of the Spirit: For they are the deep things of God, his Secret Counsels and Purposes for the Redemption of Mankind; the free Results of his own Wisdom and Goodness, the things which are freely gi∣ven us of God; and therefore can be known, and can be revealed only by the Spirit; and these are the things of the Spirit, which the natural Man, the vain Pretender to Reason and Philosophy, receiveth not. Now can any man desire a plainer Proof than this, how incompetent a

Judge meer natural Reason is of the Mysteries of Faith, of the whole Oeconomy of Gospel-Grace? For what the natural Man does not receive, that meer natural Reason does not receive; for the only Reason why the natural Man does not receive it, is because natural Reason does not receive it; and what is foolishness to the natural Man, is foolishness to natural Reason; and what the natu∣ral Man cannot know, because they are spiritually discern∣ed, that natural Reason cannot discern.

Now can there be a plainer Proof than this (if we be∣lieve St. Paul) that there are such Doctrines contained in the Gospel, as natural Reason does not receive, or ap∣prove, but rejects with scorn: For it is not said, That the natural Man cannot by the mere Light of Nature find out, or discover these things of the Spirit; that he had asserted before, but these words give a reason of the Infidelity of the Wise Men, the Scribes, the Disputers of this World, who rejected the Faith when it was preached to them by the Apostles; that the natural Man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, does not receive or approve the Faith; and not only so, but rejects it as foolishness, as absurd, contradictious, impossible, un∣worthy of a Man of Reason, and Philosophy. Like the Philoso••hers of the Epicureans, and the Stoicks, who en∣countred St. Paul, when he preached at Athens; and some said, What will this babler say; other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods, because he preached unto them Jesus and the res••rrection. 17. Acts 18.

If then there be such Doctrines as these in the Gospel-Revelation, it is certain, it can be no O••jection against any Article of the Christian Faith, that meer natural Reason does not receive, approve, comprehend it, but accounts it absurd, ridiculous, foolish; for thus the things of the Spi∣rit of God were to the natural Man in St. Paul's days, and thus they will always be. Nay if the things of the Spirit of God are so far above the comprehension of Hu∣man

Reason, then such Doctrines as meer natural Rea∣son does not receive, have this Mark and Character of Divinity, if they are contained in the Gospel-Revelation: Nay, let me add farther, That those Doctrines which have been always owned and defended with the warmest Zeal by the Catholick Church, and opposed and rejected with as great scorn and contempt by Pagans, Infidels, and He∣reticks, as a contradiction to the Reason of Mankind, and the Philosophy of Nature, are most likely to be the true Christian Faith; for this proves that the Christian Church always believed them to be Gospel-Doctrines; and Infidels and Hereticks rejected them as incomprehensible, and inconceiveable, and absurd to Human Reason; and such the Doctrine of the Trinity, and Incarnation, and Cross of Christ, have always been to such natural Men.

Nay, farther: If there be such Doctrines in the Gos∣pel-Revelation, which meer Natural Reason receiveth not, but accounts foolishness; then it is certain, that is not the true Christian Faith which contains none of these Mysteries, none of this hidden Wisdom, none of these deep things of God. Let the Socinian then tell us, What things there are in their Faith, which the Natural Man receiveth not, which are above the comprehension of meer Natural Reason: They glory that they have no such incomprehensible Mysteries in their Faith; that they have a reasonable Faith, that they have stript Christian Religion of Riddles and Mysteries, and fitted it to the level and comprehension of Human Reason; but this very thing wherein they glory, is a demonstration against them, that Socinianism is not the true Christian Faith; for that contains such Doctrines, as the Natural Man and meer Natural Reason receiveth not.

They commonly laugh at that distinction between things contrary to Reason, and above Reason, which Hu∣man Reason is no judge of. We assert, That a Divine

Revelation can never contradict true Reason; for a Di∣vine Revelation must be true, and true Reason is true, and Truth cannot contradict Truth: But we assert, that there are many things in the Christian Faith which are above Reason; which Reason is not a competent judge of, and which Natural Men may call contradictions, if every thing must pass for a contradiction to Reason, which meer Natural Reason does not receive, approve, allow. But after all, they must find something above Na∣tural Reason, if they will believe like Christians; for such things there are in the Christian Faith, and then let them distinguish as they can between contrary to Reason, and above it.

But I must take notice of one thing more in these words, the reason why the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, and cannot know them, viz. because they are spiritually discerned, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they are to be known and judged of only by Spiritual Arguments and Methods; and therefore the Natural Man, who re∣jects all means of Knowledge but Natural Reason, can never know them. The Truth and Certainty of our Faith must be learnt, not from the Evidence of Natural Reason and Philosophy, which was the Evidence the Philosophers expected. The Greeks seek after Wisdom, 1 Cor. 1.22. But ••t. Paul tells us, That Christ sent him to preach the Gospel, not with Wisdom of words, lest the Cross of Christ should be made of none effect. v. 17. &c 2.4, 5. And my Speech and my Preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom; but in demonstration of the Spirit and of Power. I did not confirm my Doctrine by Natu∣ral Reasons and Arguments; but by the Evidence of Mi∣racles wrought by the Power of the Holy Spirit; That your Faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. And the true Interpretation, and ad∣mirable Wisdom of these Divine Mysteries, must be spi∣ritually

discerned also. Which things also we speak not in the words which man's Wisdom teacheth; but which the Holy Ghost teacheth, comparing spiritual things with spiritual. There is a spiritual Language belongs to spiritual Things; and we must learn the true Sense and Interpretation of the Faith, not from Natural Ideas, or the Words and Notions of Philosophy, that is, in the Socinian Language, by Expounding Scripture by Natural Reason; but by studying the Language of Scripture, and the meaning of the Holy Ghost in it, especially by comparing the Old and the New Testament together; Spiritual things with Spiritual: This is a way of Learning which Natural Men despise, and therefore cannot know the things of the Spirit of God, which must be spiritually discerned. All this I think abundantly proves that there are such Mysteries in the Christian Faith, as meer Natural Reason cannot discover, cannot prove, cannot receive and comprehend, cannot in∣terpret; which shews what reason we have to distinguish betwen matters of pure Faith and Philosophy; and what danger there is of corrupting the Faith by Philosophy.

And now I think I may conclude; for I suppose no body will expect, that I should defend my self against his ridiculous Charge, That I am a Socinian; which had he believed, I should have found better treatment from him: But I shall leave him to rave by himself, and look upon all these Hurricanes of Fury and Vengeance, as a good sign that they feel themselves mortally Wounded.

THE END.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Distin∣ction be∣tween Real and Nomi∣nal Trinita∣rians exa∣mined, &c.
• * 1.2

  Considera∣tions on the Explicati∣ons of the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 21, 22.
• * 1.3

  Vindicati∣tion, p. 150.