The present state of the Socinian controversy, and the doctrine of the Catholick fathers concerning a trinity in unity by William Sherlock ...

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE SOCINIAN Controversy.

CHAP. I.

SECT. I. The Present State of the Socinian Controversy; the unreasonableness of it; and how to reduce the Di∣spute to the Original Question.

THE Faith of the Holy Trinity is so fundamental to the Christian Reli∣gion, that if Christianity be worth contending for▪ That is: For if God have not an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, the whole Mystery of our Redemption by Christ, and of our Sanctification by the Spirit, which in its Con∣sequences is the whole of the Gospel, and distinguishes it from all other Religions, is utterly lost.

Those various Heresies relating to the Divinity, Person and Offices of Christ and the Holy Spirit, which began to appear even in the Apostolick Age, and have ever since un∣der several forms and disguises disturbed the Peace of the Church, is proof enough, how much the great Enemy of Mankind thinks himself concerned by all possible means to corrupt this Faith; and that great, unwearied, unconque∣rable Zeal, wherewith the Catholick Fathers have al∣ways defended this Faith, shews of what importance they thought it; and therefore it is no wonder, and ought to give no scandal to Christians, that these Disputes are again revi∣ved among us with as much fury and insolence as ever; for there never was a more unhappy Season for the Enemy to sow his Tares. But that which is most to be lamented is, That the lukewarmness of some, and the intemperate Zeal of others, have given greater scandal to the World, and more shaken the Faith of Christians, than all the Opposi∣tion of our Adversaries could have done. I need say no more, the Case is too well known, and the Evil Effects too visible among us.

I will make no new Quarrels, if I can help it, but sin∣cerely endeavour to prevent the Mischiefs of what has al∣ready happened, as far as is nec••ssary to secure the Faith of Christians, and to wrest those Weapons out of our Enemies hands, which some professed Friends have unwarily furnish∣ed them with.

To do this, I shall endeavour in the first place to restore this Controversie to its original state, and take off those Vizards which make it appear very frightful to ordinary Christians.

This Dispute about the Holy and ever Blessed Trinity, has of late been dressed up anew with some old School-Terms, which how proper soever they may be to give Learned Men a more distinct Idea and Conception of that

Adorable Mystery, only amuse common Christians, and confound them, instead of teaching them better.

This, as it was at first occasioned by Hereticks, who denied or corrupted the Christian Faith, which forced the Catholick Fathers to use some unscriptural Term••, which by degrees improved into great Subtilties, and disturbed the Church with very nice and wrangling Disputes; so our Modern Socinians at this day place the main strength of their Cause in these Disputes, and think it a sufficient Confutation of the Faith of the Ever Blessed Trinity, that the Trinitarians themselves cannot agree about the Sense of Person, Hypostasis, Substance, Nature, Essence, nor in what Sense God is One and Three; but advance very different, and, as they think, contrary Hypotheses, to reconcile the Unity of God with the distinction of Three Persons in the Godhead. As if there were no difference between what is fundamental in this Faith, and such Metaphysical Speculations: As if no man could believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, with∣out determining all the Disputes of the Schools. Learned men may dispute these matters, and things may so happen as to make such Disputes necessary; but the Faith of Chri∣stians may be secured, and Heresies may be confuted, with∣out them. The Faith is plain and certain, even all that is necessary to the purposes of Religion; but men may leap out of their depths, where they can find no footing; and when such Questions are asked, as no man can certainly answer, it is very likely, that they will be answered very different ways, and upon very different Hypotheses; and there is no great hurt in this neither, while these different Hypotheses are neither made new Articles of Faith, nor new Heresies, but serve only for Hypotheses, to give a pro∣bable Answer to such Questions as ought never to have been asked; and to stop the mouths of Hereticks, when they charge the Catholick Faith with Nonsense and Con∣tradiction.

To distinguish rightly between these two, will set this Controversy upon its true ancient bottom; which will spoil the Triumph of our Adversaries, and possibly may rectify the Mistakes, and allay and qualify the intem∣perate Heats and Animosities of those whom a common Faith ought to make Friends.

SECT. II. How to reduce this Dispute concerning the Trinity, to Scripture Terms.

THE Catholick Fathers have always appealed to the Form of Baptism as the Rule and Standard of Faith; that as we are baptized, so we must believe, In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. This is a plain simple Faith, which every Christian may under∣stand, and which every Christian must profess, That there is an Eternal Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eter∣nal Spirit, of the same Nature▪ and inseparably united to himself; and that this Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the joint Object of the Christian Faith and Worship.

This is the true Christian Faith, and this is all that we are concerned to defend against our Adversaries; and would men stick to this, without engaging in Philosophical Dis∣putes, which we know little or nothing of, and which the Scripture takes no notice of, we should soon find how weak and impotent all the Attempts of Hereticks would prove. Whatever Disputes there are about the signification of those words Nature, Essence, Substance, Person, Hypostasis, Sub∣sistences, Relations, &c. there is no Dispute about the sig∣nification of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; we have natu∣ral Idea's belong to these words, when applied to Creatures; and when God is pleased in Scripture to represent himself

to us under th••se Characters, if we must understand any thing by them, we can understand nothing else, but what the words signify all the World over: only allowing for that infinite distance there is between God and Creatures, which requires us to abstract from all material and creature imperfections. We must not think that God begets a Son as men do, by corporeal passions, or division of his sub∣stance; or that he begets a Son without himself, or sepa∣rate from himself▪ or that because a Creature-father is al∣ways older than his Son, therefore God can't beget a Son co••ternal with himself; for all these Circumstances do not belong to the essential Notion of a Father, but of a Crea∣ture-father: But then it is essential to the Notion both of Father and Son, that the Father communicates his own Nature to the Son, and that the Son receives his Nature and Being from his Father; that Father and Son do truly and really subsist by themselves, though they may be, and when we speak of God the Father and his Son, are insepa∣rably united to each other: that the Son, with respect to his Nature, is perfectly the same that his Father is: the son of a man, as true and perfect Man as his Father is; and therefore the Son of God, as true and perfect God.

By these Arguments the Catholick Fathers confuted both the Sabellians, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but Three Names; and the Arians, who denied the Consubstantiality of the Son, or that he had the same Nature with his Father, For both these Heresies de∣stroy'd the essential Notion and Idea of Father and Son; which includes in it both a real distinction and sameness of Nature; that they are as really Two, but infinitely more one and the same, than any other Father and Son in Nature are.

Now I cannot see, but that as these Names and Chara∣cters are better understood, and liable to less dispute; so they convey to our Minds a more distinct conception of

God the Father and his Eternal Son, than any other artifi∣cial Terms.

Were there no Controversy about Nature, Essence, Per∣son, Substance, Hypostasis, yet they immediately convey no Idea of God the Father and his Eternal Son to my mind, much less give me a more distinct Conception, than these Terms Father and Son do: For they neither acquaint me what God is, nor what Father and Son is; and as the Schools themselves assert, cannot be Univocally, or in the same sense spoken of Creatures and of God, who is Super-Essential, above all Praedicaments and Terms of Art; that is, Nature, Essence, Substance, Hypostasis, Person, do not, and cannot signify the same thing, when spoken of God, as when applied to Creatures. And this has occasioned all those Disputes concerning the Use and Signification of these words, when applied to God; which indeed is no reason for wholly discarding these Terms, which the Perverseness and Importunity of Hereticks has forced the Church to use, and which have now been so long used, that the Ec∣clesiastical Sense of these Words is very well known to Learned men, if they would be contented to use them in that Received Ecclesiastical Sense in which the Catholick Fathers have always used them; but yet it is a reason not to clog the Faith of ordinary Christians with them, who are not skilled in Metaphysical and Abstracted Notions; and it is a reason to reduce the Controversy, as much as possibly we can, to Scripture Terms; when these Artificial and Me∣taphysical Terms divide even the Professors of the Catholick Faith, and give too just occasion to the vain Boasts and Triumphs of Hereticks.

To represent this matter plainly, I observe, That all all those Unscriptural Terms which the Catholick Fathers made use of for the Explication of this Adorable Mystery, were intended for no other purpose, but to give us some di∣stinct Ideas and Conceptions of what the Scripture teaches

concerning the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, by using such Terms as signify something in Creatures, which bears some, though a very imperfect, anology and resem∣blance to what we are to conceive of God. And therefore the Fathers justifie the use of such words, by shewing, That all they mean by them is contained in Scripture, and reject any Words, and any such Sense of Artificial Words, as cannot be justified by Scripture: Which, by the way, is a more infallible Rule than all Metaphysical Subtleties, to find out in what sense the Fathers used such Words, by ob∣serving to what Scripture-Notions they apply them, and how they justifie their use from Scripture, when they are Disputed.

If this be the truth of the Case, as it certainly is, then the Catholick Faith does not depend upon the use of these Terms, for it was before them; for they were intended on∣ly to explain and illustrate the Catholick Faith, and to comprise Scripture-Notions in Terms of Art, which must be acknowledged to be of great use, and was by experience found to be so in the Disputes with ancient Hereticks, while the Fathers agreed in the sense of these Terms. But when these Terms themselves are become the great matter of Dispute; and men who, as is to be hoped, agree in the Catholick Faith, cannot agree about the Pro∣priety and Signification of such Terms, nor how they are to be applied and used, whether in the singular or plural Number, whether substantively or adjectively, in recto or obliquo; and our Adversaries abuse such Disputes to the Reproach of the Catholick Faith, as a perplex'd, uncer∣tain, contradictious Riddle and Mystery, which men can know nothing of, or can never agree in; it becomes absolutely necessary at present to take this Controversy out of Terms of Art, and to let our Adversaries see, That our Controversy with them is not concerned in these Disputes: That it is not about the Signification and Use of such

words as Essence, Nature, Substance, Person, &c. but, Whether the Supreme, Eternal, Self-originated Father, have not an Eternal Son, eternally begotten of himself, and an Eternal Spirit, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, eternally proceeding from them: And whether this Eternal Son, and Eternal Spirit, are not True and Perfect God.

In this all sincere Trinitarians do heartily agree with each other, and are ready to join issue upon this State of the Controversy, with all their Adversaries, of what de¦nomination soever. And if we can prove from Scripture, That God has an Eternal Son begotten of himself, and that this Eternal Son is True and Perfect God, as the Father is; and that the Father and Son have an Eternal Spirit, who is True and Perfect God, as Father and Son is; I hope this is a sufficient Confutation of Socinianism; and yet all this may be proved, without concerning our selves in any Me∣taphysical Disputes: And therefore such Disputes as these, though they give opportunity to our Adversaries to make some Flourishes, and to cast Mists before peoples eyes, are not of that moment as they would represent them; they neither prove Socinianism to be true, nor the Catholick Faith of the Trinity to be false or uncertain.

I do not intend at present to dispute this Point with the Socinians, Whether the Son and the Holy Spirit (for there is no dispute about the Father) be not each of them True and Perfect God: This has been proved often enough al∣ready, to the satisfaction of all sober Enquirers, who pay a just Veneration to Scripture; and shall be done again, when a fair occasion offers: But the Question under De∣bate now is, Whether we cannot explain and defend the Doctrine of the Trinity, without the use of Ecclesiastical or Scholastick Terms; and whether the Disputes of Di∣vines about the Use and Signification of such Terms, proves any D••sagreement in the Faith, when they all con∣sent

to the Scripture Explications of it. The great Dispute is about the Distinction and Unity of the Godhead, and by what Terms to express this Wonderful Distinction, and Won∣derful Vnion, as some of the Fathers call it. All sincere Trinitarians do agree, That God is Vnus & Trinus, One and Three; but we having nothing in Nature like this, we know not by what Names to call it: Those who have most critically examined the force of words, find them all upon some account or other defective, or improper for this pur∣pose: That St. Austin well said, That in these Sublime Mysteries we can no more express what we conceive of them in Words,* 1.1 than we can conceive of them as they are. When we profess to believe that there are Three in the Unity of the Godhead the next question is, What Three they are? That is, By what common Name to call them, which may be multiplied with them, or spoken of them in the Plural Number; which St. Austin thinks not easily found.* 1.2 The Greeks called them Three Hypostases, which signifies Three Individual Sub∣stances: This seemed hard to the Latins, who acknowledged but One Substance in the Godhead, and therefore they called them Three Persons; though this did not satisfy St. Austin,* 1.3 who looked upon Person as an Absolute, not a Relative Term, and therefore the Plural Predi∣cations would not agree with his Rule, quae ad se dicuntur; that what is predicated absolutely, must be predicated only in the Singular Number: And in truth, if this be a good Rule, it is a demonstration that there can be no common Name for these Three; for what∣ever is a common Name for them all, must be absolutely predicated of each of them: And therefore St. Austin

could give no other reason why we say Three Persons, and not Three Essences, or Three Gods, but only this, That since we acknowledge there are Three, it is fitting to agree upon some common Name to denote the Trinity by; and Ecclesiastical Use had given this Signification to the word Person.* 1.4

But then besides this, the great Dispute is, What is meant by a Person, when applied to the Three in the Blessed Tri∣nity: Some adhere to the old approved Definition of a Person, That it is the Individual Substance of a Rational Nature; which is the very definition of the Greek Hypostasis,* 1.5 as Boetius owns. Others are afraid of this; for if every Person be an Individual Substance, and there are Three Persons, they know not how to avoid the Consequence, That then there are Three Individual Sub∣stances in the Trinity. And consequently, since we can have no other Notion of the Divine Substance, but Infi∣nite Mind and Spirit, there must be Three Infinite Minds and Spirits in the Godhead, which they think infers Three Gods. And therefore they will not allow a Person to be a Substance, at least not an Individual Substance, but a Mode, or at most a Mode of Subsistence, or Relation, or Property, or a Person, in the Tragedian or Comedian sense of a Per∣son, as one represents and personates another; or to signify an Office or Magistracy, and so one man may be as many several Persons as he has Offices.

I can't answer for all these different significations of the word Person, as applied to this Sacred Mystery, especially

as they are used by some Modern Writers; for I believe there is no such material difference between the Fathers and the Schools, as some men imagine; of which more here∣after: But as to my present purpose, I must profess, I can see no necessity why we must find out a Common Name for the Three in the Blessed Trinity, when the Scripture has given us no Common Name for them; much less why we should dispute eternally about the propriety and use of such words, to hazard the Catholick Faith, at least the Ho∣nour and Reputation of it, together with the Peace of the Church. If I am asked not only Who but What the Three in the Ever-blessed Trinity are? I know no better Answer to make, than what the Scripture has taught me, That they are God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost; which signifies all that can be express'd by any Artificial and Unscriptural words; is an Answer liable to no Excepti∣ons or Misrepresentations, and in which all must agree, who believe a Trinity; and it shames and silences all those Disputes which are often occasioned by other words, though never so wisely and reasonably chosen.

This Answer shews us what their Nature is, what their Distinction is, and what Relation they stand in to each other; which is the most perfect knowledge we can have of the Ever-blessed Trinity in this world.

SECT. III. That the Title of GOD, attributed in Scripture distinct∣ly to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, gives us the best Account of their Nature, and must determine the Signi∣fication of Ecclesiastical Words.

1. AS for the first, the design of some common Name for these Three, is to form some common Notion and Idea of them, in which they all agree: And is any thing else so common to them? Is there any thing else which is common to them, but the Name and Nature of God? Can any thing else give us so true and perfect a Cha∣racter and Idea of each of them, as this does? When we say the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God, we attribute every thing to each of them, which sig∣nifies any Perfection; for the Idea of God comprehends all possible Perfections: And we reject every thing which has the least signification of Imperfection; we abstract our minds from all Material and Creature-Images, which Names common to Creatures are apt to impose upon us; and when we are forced to apply any such Names to God, we learn from hence in what Notion to understand such Words, when applied to God.

Men may very subtilly distinguish between the formal Conceptions of Nature, Essence, Substance, Hypostasis, Existence, Subsistence, Person, Personality, Suppositality, and the like, and neither understand God nor Creatures much the better for it: But let them but tell us what they mean by these Terms, and then every Child can tell whe∣ther they belong to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, or not: For as far as they are included in the Notion of God, and

signify true Divine Perfections, so far they belong to all Three: For if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, then Father, Son and Holy Ghost, each of them by themselves are whatever is included in the No∣tion and Idea of God, excepting their Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, whereby they are distinguished into Three.

As for Example: If by Nature, Essence, Substance, Existence, Subsistence, however they may differ in their formal Conceptions, they only mean a true and real Being, who actually, perfectly, compleatly is what it is; God is Essence, Substance, Subsistence, in the most perfect sense of all; for he is All Being; his Name is Iehovah; which as Learned Men most probably conclude, signifies a Pleni∣tude and Perfection of Being, which is such a Perfection as includes all other Perfections in it; for Perfect Being is every thing which perfectly is.

This is the peculiar Name and essential Character of God, and of God only: God is, that is, is Eternal, Essen∣tial, Immutable Life and Being; in which sense the Apo∣stle tells us, That He only has Immortality. Creatures are, but are not Essential Life and Being: Being is not inclu∣ded in the formal Conception or Definition of any Created Nature. Man is a Reasonable Creature, was a true Defini∣tion of Human Nature, before any man was created; and would be so for ever, though all mankind were annihilated. And therefore we may reasonably enough in Creatures di∣stinguish between Nature, Substance, Existence, Subsistence; if by Nature we understand that Idea or Pattern according to which they are made; and by Substance, that which is made, whatever it is, whether Matter or Spirit, which is the Subject of those Moral or Natural Perfections which belong to the Idea of such a Creature; and by Existence and Sub∣sistence, their actual Being which they receive from their Maker, with regard to their compleat or incompleat manner of Existence.

But now we can form no Idea of God without perfect life and being; for whatever else, according to our imper∣f••ct manner of conceiving, is contained in the Idea of God, is nonsense and contradiction without it: Infinite Wisdom, Infinite Power, and Infinite Goodness, is the Idea of nothing, without Eternal and Necessary Being; and an Infinitely Perfect Nothing is a contradiction in the very Notion. But Infinite, Perfect, Life, and Being, in∣cludes all other Perfections, and is the most simple and comprehensive Idea of God; for whatever perfectly is, is whatever is any real Perfection. So that there is no foun∣dation, nor any occasion, for such Distinctions, of Essence, Nature, Substance, Existence, Subsistence, in God; for his Essence, Nature, Substance, is his Being; and his Being is perfect Existence and Subsistence. These Terms differ in their formal Conceptions, when applied to Creatures; but in essential Life and Being, these cannot be formally distinguished; for we cannot conceive Existence or Subsi∣stence, as superadded to Nature, as we do in Creatures; because Necessary Essential Being, is the Divine Nature: Nor can we distinguish between Essence, Nature, and Sub∣stance, because there is no distinction in God between the Subject, and its Faculties and Powers, which is the Foun∣dation of that distinction in Creatures. Men, who do not love to use words without any Notion belonging to them, find themselves extremely puzzled to fit any distinct Ideas to these words when applied to God.

When the Fathers and Schoolmen apply these Terms to God, they take care to shew how differently they are used when applied to God, from what they signifie when ap∣plied to Creatures: They assert the most absolute simpli∣city of the Divine Nature without the least composition, and indeed expound all these Terms to the sense of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & Esse, to signify the most Absolute Being, or the most Per∣fect Is, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who is Simple, Perfect Existence: One.

St. Austin, whose Authority is sacred in the Schools,* 1.6 will furnish us with say∣ings enough to this purpose. Nothing is more certain with him, than that in God, to Be, to Live, to Understand, or whatever else we can attribute to God, is all the same, is Perfect Being, or Essence: And therefore he owns the impropriety of those Terms, Substance,* 1.7 and Subsistence, when applied to God. But notwithstanding this, that God is the most Pure Simple Being, without any imaginable composition, yet since we cannot comprize all that is necessary for us to know of God, in one simple uncompounded thought, we must un∣avoidably conceive the Idea of God by Parts, under different formal Concepti∣ons, such as his Wisdom, his Power, his Goodness, his Truth and Faithful∣fulness, &c. for such distinct representations as these, God makes of himself in the Holy Scriptures; they are what we can distinctly apprehend, and are absolutely ne∣cessary for the Government of our lives, and to know what we are to expect from God. But such distinctions as we can frame no distinct conceptions of, as are apt to cor∣rupt our Notions of God with corporeal Representations, and perplex our Minds with endless and inextricable diffi∣culties, ought to be cautiously used, and carefully explain∣ed, to prevent all mistakes, and to reduce them to such plain and simple Notions, as come nearest to the absolute simplicity of the Divine Essence.

And now, I suppose, it will admit of no dispute, Whe∣ther the Father, who is God, be Essence, Substance, Sub∣sistence; or whether the Son, who is God, be Essence,

Substance, Subsistence; and so in like manner the Holy Ghost. For this signifies no more than To Be in the most perfect and absolute sense of Being, which is the first and most simple Idea of God, Absolute Essence and Being. So that if the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Ghost is; each of them is Essence, Substance, Subsistence, in the most Per∣fect and Absolute sense of these Terms: For if each of them is, and each of them is God; each of them is, only in that Notion of Being, which is included in the Idea of God, which contains the most absolute Perfection of Be∣ing; that is, all that is absolutely Perfect. And will any Trinitarian deny, That the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Ghost is? And then I know not what other Dispute there can be about this matter; if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, then the Father is, the Son is, and the Holy Ghost is, in the most Perfect No∣tion of Being, and that is all that is meant by Essence, Sub∣stance, Subsistence, when spoken of God.

In the same manner we may examine the signification of the word Person, which has occasioned no small Dispute. We say that there are Three Persons in the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and each of these Divine Persons is in himself True and Perfect God. Now if we must call these Divine Three, Three Persons, (which long Use and Custom has made Reasonable, and in some mea∣sure Necessary) the most certain way to determine the sig∣nification of Person, when applied to God, is to consi∣der in what sense one who is True and Perfect God, may be called a Person; for GOD is the Scripture Name and Character which is distinctly attributed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and therefore that must give the Significa∣tion to all other words of Human Use and Institution, as far as relates to this Mystery.

These words Person and Hypostasis, were very anciently used, without any Definition to determine their Significa∣tion,

till they became matter of dispute. Boetius has given us a definition of Person; which has been generally allowed of ever since, that a Person is an individual Substance of a rational Nature. Let us then examine whether this definition can belong to a Divine Person, to one who is True and Perfect God.

As for Substance, Boetius tells us, That it is essential to the Notion of Person;* 1.8 for a Person cannot subsist in Accidents, (much less in Modes, which are less than Accidents); and it is certain no other Notion of Person can belong to one who is God: For a Person who is God, must be Substance in the most Per∣fect and Absolute sense; that is, as I have already explain∣ed it, Perfect Being and Essence: As St. Austin expresly tells us, That in God,* 1.9 to Be, and to be a Person, is the same thing; and that when we say the Person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the Substance of the Father; and thus it is with respect to the whole Trinity.

It is certain St. Austin never dream'd of defining a Person, much less a Divine Person, by a Mode: For to make a Person, who is God, and therefore the most Perfect Being, a Mode, which if it be any thing, is next to nothing, no Substance, but a meer Modifi∣cation of Substance, is both new Divinity, and new Philosophy, unknown either to Fathers or School∣men.

But meer Substance can't make a Per∣son, unless it be a Living,* 1.10 Understand∣ing Substance, the Substance of a ratio∣nal Nature: And this must be the No∣tion of a Person, when applied to God; for God is Pure Infinite Mind and Intellect, the First and

Supreme Life and Intellect; in whom, to Live, to Under∣stand, and to Be, is the same thing; as I observed before from St. Austin; and if a Divine Person signifies One who is God, every Person in the Godhead is Supreme Absolute Life and Intellect: And this is what we must understand by a Person, when we say, That the Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person; for no other Notion of a Person can belong to any one, who is True and Perfect God.

There is another Term of great consideration in this de∣finition, which still remains to be Explained, and that is Individual, That a Person is an Individual Substance of a Rational Nature; which Boetius opposes to Vniversal Substances,* 1.11 which are no∣thing else but the abstracted Notions of generical or specifick Substances; which have no real and actual Subsistence, and therefore are not properly Substances,* 1.12 but only the Ideas of Substances, and therefore are not Persons neither; for Substance and Person are only in Singu∣lars and Individuals, which Subsist by themselves. Thus Human Nature considered in general as common to all Mankind, has no actual Subsistence, and therefore is not a Human Person, but it subsists only in particular Men, and that makes every particular Man a Human Person; for the Person of the Man, is nothing but the Man himself. And so St. Austin tells us it is in the Holy Trinity; the Person of the Father, is the Father himself; and the Person of the Son, is the Son himself; and if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three, they must be Three Persons; for each of them is himself, and not the other; and Three Selfs are Three Persons; I, and Thou, and He, are Personal Pronouns: I my self, Thou thy self, He himself; by which Argument the Catholick Fathers prove

against the Sabellians, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three Persons, by these Personal Pronouns, which the Scripture applies to them; as our S••viour speaks of himself in the first Person, I and my Father; of his Father in the Second Person, I thank Thee, O Father; of the Holy Ghost in the Third Person, when He the Spirit of truth shall come. Now I, and Thou, and He, must signifie Three distinct Persons, or Three Selfs: Person indeed, as St. Austin ob∣serves, is not a Relative Term, but is spoken ad se of the thing it self: For if Person were a Relative, then as we say, The Father is the Father of his Son, so we must say, The Person of the Father is the Person of the Son, which is absurd; but yet Person must be praedicated Plurally ac∣cording to the number of Selfs; for as many Selfs as there are, so many Persons are there; for Selfs make numbers, because one self is not another. Three singu∣lar intelligent Selfs, singulares intelligentes, as Melancton calls them, is the proper Notion of Three Persons; and in this sense, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, are Three Persons, if each of them be True and Perfect God. For God is certainly himself. If the Father be God, the Father himself is God; if the Son be God, the Son himself is God; if the Holy Ghost be God, the Holy Ghost himself is God. This is the plain ex∣press Doctrine of Scripture, and what every man may understand, and what every one who believes a Trinity must profess, and no man needs believe more.

SECT. IV. These Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, prove the real Distinction of Persons in the Trinity.

II. THESE Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, especially when the Name GOD is Attributed to each of them, That the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, proves a real and substantial distinction be∣tween them; for these are opposite Relations which cannot meet in the same Subject: For a Father cannot be Father to himself, but to his Son; nor can a Son be Son to himself, but to his Father; nor can the Holy Ghost Proceed from himself, nor in this sense be his own Spirit, but the Spirit of the Father and Son, from whom he Proceeds. And therefore the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit; nor the Son the Father, or Holy Spirit; nor the Holy Spirit either Father or Son: And yet, if each of them be God, each of them Per∣fectly is, or is Perfect Being, and therefore are as Perfectly Distinct, as three which perfectly are, and are not one another. To talk of Three Distinct Beings, Substances, Minds, or Spirits, may be Misrepresented by perverse Wits, to the prejudice of the Divine Unity, though the Catholick Fathers, besides Hypostasis, did not scruple to use the same, or other equivalent Expressions, concerning the Holy Trinity, when they disputed against the Sabelli∣ans; yet if we believe a Trinity, whether we will or no we must acknowledge Three; each of which Perfectly Is, or is Perfect Being, and no one is the other: For if we deny this, we must either deny, that the Father Is, or that the Son Is, or that the Holy Ghost Is; and to deny either of these, is to deny a Trinity.

And if it be Objected against this, That according to St. Austin's Notion, (though it was not peculiarly his, but common to all the Greek and Latin Fathers, nay to the Schoolmen themselves, and must be owned by all Men of Sense) that esse, vivere, intelligere, sapere, velle, bonum esse, magnum esse, &c. to be, to live, to understand, to be wise, to will, to be good, and to be great, or what∣ever else we can attribute to the Divine Nature, is but unum omnia, all one and the same in God: I say, if it be Objected, that the consequence of this is, That to say, that in this sense of Is, the Father Is, the Son Is, the Holy Ghost Is, is equivalent to asserting Three Distinct Substances, Minds, Spirits, Lives, Understandings, Wills, &c. in the Trinity, I cannot help it. St. Austin was never yet charged with Tritheism. Let them either deny what St. Austin and the rest of the Fathers teach about this mat∣ter, and try if they can defend the absolute S••mplicity of the Divine Nature without it; or let them deny, if they think good, that the Father Is, the Son Is, and the Holy Ghost Is, in this Notion of Perfect and Absolute Being; or try if they can find such a medium between Perfect Is, and is not, as can belong to any Being which is True and Perfect God; or allow (which is the true solution of it) that Is, and Is, and Is, Essence, and Essence, and Essence, are but One Eternal Is, One Eternal Essence, as they are but One God: Of which more presently.

I always was of opinion, that these Terms in the plural number, ought not to be familiarly used, because few Men can conceive of them, as they are worthy of God; and therefore the Fathers were v••ry cautious in using them, which they ve∣ry rarely did, but when they were extorted from them by the perverse importunity of Hereticks; but I cannot see how it is possible to deny three Selfs, or three Is's in the U••ity of the Godhead, without denying a Trinity; and if each of these Three be himself and not another, and each of them

Is, and Is by himself; this is the least we can say of the Ever Blessed Trinity, and this is all with respect to their Distinction, that we need say of them. So that if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be so in a true and proper Notion, are in truth and reality what these Names of Father, Son, and Spirit, signify: That the Father is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a true, proper, natural, Father; the Son 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a true, proper, genuine, Son; and the Holy Ghost, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in a true, proper sense, the Spirit of the Father and the Son, as the Catholick Fathers always Professed; they must be as truly and perfectly Distinct, as Father and Son are.

The only Question then is, Whether these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify naturally and properly when spoken of the Holy Trinity, or are only metaphori∣cal and allusive Names; though what they should be Me∣taphors of, is not easy to conceive, and as absurd to con∣ceive, that there should be any Metaphors in God, who is all Perfect Essence and Being. The Divine Nature and Perfections, which we cannot conceive of as they are, may be expressed by Metaphors taken from some thing which is analogous in Creatures; upon which account we read of the Hands, and Eyes, and Ears, and Bowels, and Mouth of God. Creatures may serve for Metaphors, for Shadows, and Images, to represent something of God to us, but the reality of all is in God. So that we may allow Father and Son in some sense to be Metaphorical Names, when applied to God; not that God the Father is not in the highest and most perfect sense a Father; and his Son a most proper, natural, genuine Son, but because the Divine Generation is so perfect a Communication of the Divine Nature and Being from Father to Son; that Human Generations, Creature-Fathers and Sons, are but obscure, imperfect images and resemblances of it. When any thing is spoken Metaphorically of God, the Metaphor and

Image is always in the Creatures; the Truth, Perfection, and Reality of all in God. And if this be a certain and universal rule, then if God be a Father, if he have a Son, an only B••gotten Son, Begotten Eternally of himself, not Made, nor Created, but Begotten; though this Eter∣nal Generation be infinitely above what we can conceive, yet it is evident, that God the Father is more Properly and Perfectly a Father, and his Son more Properly and Perfectly a Son, than any Creature-Fathers or Sons are.

But, I think, this will admit of no Dispute, if we own, that God has a Son, who is himself True and Perfect God▪ For a Son, who is Perfect God, is God of God. That he is a Son, proves that he receives his Nature from his Fa∣ther, for this is Essential to the Notion of a Son; That he is Perfect God, proves the Perfection of his Generation from the Perfection of his Nature: For to be Perfect God, of Perfect God, is to receive the Whole, Perfect, Undivi∣ded Nature of his Father, which is the most perfect Ge∣neration that is possible, for a Whole to beget a Whole. And if God the Father, and his Son, be Truly and Perfect∣ly Father and Son, they must be Truly and Perfectly Di∣stinct; That is, they are in a proper sense Two, and by the same reason, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three: And we need no other proof of this, but the ve∣ry Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, if we under∣stand them in a proper and natural Sense.

SECT. V. These Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, prove the Unity, Sameness, Identity of Nature and God∣head.

III. THESE Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as they signify and prove a real Distin∣ction between these Three, so they also signify and prove the Unity, Sameness, Identity of Nature, and Godhead: Which reconciles the Faith of the Trinity with the Faith of one God: The same One Divine Essence and Godhead, being and subsisting, Whole, Perfect, and Entire in each of these Divine Three.

I shall Explain and Confirm this matter more at large hereafter; and therefore at present shall only briefly repre∣sent this Notion, and the reason of it.

One Eternal Self-Originated Divine Nature, is One Di∣vinity and One God; and nothing can destroy the Unity of God, but what destroys the Unity of the Divine Na∣ture, by Division or Multiplication: And if this be the true Notion of the Unity of God (and if it be not, I would desire to know, why this is not, and what is) then the Unity of God may be preserved in Three, each of whom is True and Perfect God, if the same One Divine Nature, or Divinity, subsists distinctly in them all: And the very Characters and Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do necessarily infer and prove, the same One Divinity in them all: And therefore the Christian Trini∣ty is so far from contradicting, that it establishes the Faith of one God: As to explain this in a few words.

All Christians agree, That God, whom we call the Fa∣ther, is an Eternal Self-Originated Being, who had no be∣ginning of Being, and received his being from no other, and that there is no other Self Originated Being, but him∣self. This is the Notion which all Mankind have of One God, That there is one Infinite, Eternal, Self-Origi∣nated Being or Nature; and if there be (as it is certain there is) but one such Nature and Divinity, there can be but One God. And this is Established in the Christian Faith, which owns but One God the Father, who is there∣fore in Scripture, in a peculiar manner, called the One God, and the Only True God.

Thus f••r all Christians are agreed; but here our Arian and Socinian Adversaries stop: For how can the Son be God, and the Holy Ghost be God, if the Father be the on∣ly Self-Originated Being, and the One True God?

Now the very Notion of a Son Answers this difficulty, or at least proves, that so it is, however it may exceed our finite Comprehension.

It is Essential to the Notion of a Son, to be of another, of him, whom we call his Father, and to receive the same Nature from him. Man begets a Man, and God begets God; but there is an infinite distance between these two, as there is between God and Creatures.

When Man begets a Man, he does not Communi∣cate his own whole entire numerical Nature to his Son, but with part of his own Substance Communicates the same specifick Nature to him, or a Nature of the same kind; and therefore a Man and his Son are two Men, as having two particular Natures, though specifically the same.

But if we believe, that God has a Son, begotten by him of himself, I say, not created out of nothing, nor made of any other prae-existent Nature or Substance, but eternally begotten of himself, we must acknowledge,

that the Father and the Son are perfectly One, excepting that one is the Father, and the other the Son.

All men, who know any thing of the Divine Nature, know, that God is the most Pure, Simple, Uncompound∣ed Being; and if God, who has no parts, and cannot be divided into any, begets a Son, he must Communicate his Whole, Undivided Nature to him: For to beget a Son, is to Communicate his own Nature to him; and if he have no parts, he cannot Communicate a part, but must Communicate the Whole; that is, he must Communicate his whole self, and be a second self in his Son.

Now a Whole, and a Whole of a Whole, are certainly two, but not two Natures, but one Nature, not meerly Specifically, but Identically One; for it is impossible that a Whole, which is Communicated without Division, or Separation, should have the least imaginable diversity from it self, so as to become another Nature from it self; for a Whole of a Whole must be perfectly and identically the same with that Whole of which it is; for a Whole can be but One. This is that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ Sameness and Identity of Nature, which the Fathers assert, and whereon they found the Unity of the Godhead. And this is the meaning of that distinction of the Schools, between unum numero, and re numerata, one in number and in the thing numbred. Two must always be allowed to be Two in number, as Father and Son are, though they are but One in re numeratâ, in the Sameness and Identity of Nature, as Christ tells us, I and my Father are One; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Neuter-Gender, which must relate to Nature, not to Number.

To distinguish or multiply Natures, there must be some real or notional diversity and alterity between them, as Boetius observes: But a Whole can never differ in the least from the whole of which it is, no more than the same Whole can differ from it self; and it is this Sameness and Identity, which is called a Numerical Unity of Nature,

and is peculiar to the Divine Nature, there being nothing like it in Creatures: Not that the Divine Nature consi∣dered as in the Father, is the same in number with the Divine Nature as communicated to, and subsisting distinct∣ly in the Son; for then the Father and the Son can't be two; for the Person of the Father and his Divinity, or Di∣vine Nature, is the same; and the Person of the Son, and his Divine Nature is the same; and if this Oneness relate to number, there can be but One Person, as there is but One Nature: but a Numerical Unity of Nature does not ex∣clude a Number of Persons, each of whom has the whole Divine Nature Perfectly and Distinctly in himself; it does not exclude the actual and perfect communication of the same Divine Nature to more than one, but only excludes all imaginable diversity and alterity; and what is not aliud, is unum; that which is not another thing, another different Nature, is but One: That is, the Divine Nature is nume∣rically One, in opposition to any other Absolute, Self-ori∣ginated Divinity, not in opposition to the Eternal Com∣munications of its self to the Son and Holy Spirit. If the Divine Nature, as actually and distinctly subsisting in Three, be as perfectly One, as the Idea of God is One, as any specifick Notion, suppose of Human Nature, is One; then it is Identically and Numerically one and the same. And indeed this is the true reason why the Catho∣lick Fathers so often represent the Unity of the Divine Nature by Allusions and Metaphors signifying a specifick Unity; because the Divine Nature, as subsisting in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is as perfect••y one and the same, as the specifick Notion and Idea of any Nature is, which ab∣stracts from all the diversities and differences which are found in Individuals. Which one Observation will help us to expound several disputed passages in the Fathers, as I could easily shew, were that my present business.

Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though they have one undistinguished, undiversified Nature, and therefore are One in Nature; yet are Three in Number, because they have this one undivided, undistinguished, undiversified Nature, after a different manner, which the Greeks called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the manner of Existence, or the manner how they come to be, which though it sounds very harshly when applied to that which has no beginning of Being, (as most other expressions do, when applied to God, and Criticized on by perverse and Comical Wits) must be allowed in such a qualified sense as is proper to an Eter∣nal Being, or we must deny Eternal Generation and Pro∣cession, which is, though not the beginning, yet a Com∣munication of Being: And thus the Fathers 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Mode, or manner of Existence, and Being is, that he is Self-originated, and receives his Being from no other; the Son's is, that he is Eternally Begotten of the Father, and receives his Nature and Being without any be∣ginning, from the Father; the Holy Ghost's is, that he Eternally Proceeds from Father and Son; and this is all the distinction that is between them: They have but one undivided, undiversified Nature; but these opposite Rela∣tions necessarily prove them Three in Number, as I have already shewn; though the Divine Essence, the res nume∣rata, is but One; it being Communicated from Father to Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Ghost, Whole of Whole; which makes it perfectly one and the same Un∣divided, Undiversified, Essence, Subsisting Distinctly, but not Separately, in Three.

That this is the true Notion both of the Fathers and Schools, and all that the wisest Schoolmen meant by the Singularity of the Divine Essence and Nature, which they acknowledged to subsist in Tribus Suppositis, or Per∣sonis, whole and entire in Three distinct Persons or Sub∣jects, may appear in due time, when Men have recovered

their Temper so far, as to be capable of hearing Reason, and of understanding plain Sense. But my only design at present is to shew, that these Relations in the Ever Blessed Trinity, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Vindicate the Faith of the Trinity from the Imputation of Tritheism.

Three Gods must signifie Three Absolute, Independent, Self-originated D••vinities, Three such as we acknowledge the Person of the Father to be, who is Infinitely P••rfect, and is of himself; and all the Catholick Fathers acknow∣ledge, that Three Fathers would be Three Gods: Three such Absolute Beings, though equally Perfect, and every way alike, would be Three Divine Self-originated Natures, or Three Individuals of the same specifick Nature; that is, Three Gods, as Three Individuals of Human Nature are Three men.

But Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not Three Abso∣lute Divine Natures, nor Three Individuals of One speci∣fick Nature, but are Three Singulars of One Individual Nature, Communicated whole and entire from Father to Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Ghost: So that there is but one and the same Divine Nature in all Three, and therefore but One Divinity, and One God; unless one and the same Divine Nature can be Three Gods. To number Three, each of whom is himself True and Perfect God, does not prove Three Gods, unless you can multiply and number Natures too; for One Divine Nature is but One God; but Three Gods must have Three Appropriate, and Incommunicable Divine Natures; which the very Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, deny in the Christian Trinity. There is but One Self-originated Divi∣nity in the Person of the Father; and the very Name of Son proves that he is not of himself, but has, and is, all that he has, and is, from the Father, and is all that the Father is: H•• i•• G••d ••f G••d; now God of God, is Another, and is True and Perfect God, but is not Another God, be∣cause

he receives all from his Father, has the same Divine Nature that his Father has, has nothing but what his Father has, and has all that his Father has; T••tus ex Toto, Whole of Whole; which is but One Undivided, Undiver∣sified, One Numerical Whole, One God.

This seems to be the true Reason why St. Austin, and after him the Schoolmen, lay such stress upon the Relations in the Trinity, to salve the Unity of the Divine Nature. For by Relations the Schools mean, Relationes Subsistentes, Subsisting Relations, or Relatives, not Relations without a Subject; which St. Austin rejects as absurd: For nothing can be Predicated Relatively which has not some Being and Substance of its own to be the foundation of that Relation: A Man who is a Master,* 1.13 a Man who is a Servant, must be a Man, or he could not be the Subject of any Relation, either of Master, or Servant; and thus, as he adds, Father must signifie a positive Being, something that he is him∣self, or else there is nothing to sustain a Relation to another; and the like must be said of the Son and Spi∣rit.

Now these Relations in the Trinity, of Father, Son, and Spirit, though each of them have the whole Divine Na∣ture and Substance, do yet prove that there are not Three Absolute Independent Divinities, but only One Divine Nature and Substance: As St. Austin speaks of Father and Son, utrunque Substantia, & utrunque Vna Substantia; they are both of them Substance, and both of them One Substance; for the Son must receive his whole Being from his Father, and therefore have the same One Nature and Substance that his Father has; which proves, that a Tri∣nity of Relatives can be but One God, because they can have but One Divine Nature in them all. But this is beyond my present design.

Thus I have given a short view of the Catholick Faith of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity: We are B••ptized into the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; and if we are Christians, we must Believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and we need not believe nor understand any more than what these Names, when applied to God, do plainly and necessarily signify. This I have explained as easily and familiarly as possibly I could, that ordinary Christians, who are not skilled in School Terms or Subtilties, may know what they are to Believe, and see the plain Reasons of it. This is what all Christians, who sincerely Believe a Trinity, are agreed in; That there is an Eternal Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, of the same Nature with himself: That the Father is God, God of himself; The Son is God, God of God, True and Perfect God, Begotten of his Father from all Eternity; That the Holy Ghost is God, True and Per∣fect God, Eternally Proceeding from Father and Son: That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost Father or Son; but they are Three, truly and really distinct from each other: But that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have all the same One Divinity, Communicated from the Father to the Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit, and therefore are but One God. All this, as I have shewn, is necessarily inclu∣ded in the Names and Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which if they be not empty Names, but signify any thing real, must signify all this.

And what is there unintelligible in all this? Such a Di∣stinction, and such an Unity as is signified in the very Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove that God is Three and One: If the Father is himself True and Perfect God, the Son himself True and Perfect God, the Holy Ghost himself True and Perfect God, and the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father,

nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son, then there are Three, each of whom is in himself True and perfect God, and that is a Divine Trinity: And if the Fa∣ther communicates his whole Nature without division or se∣paration to the Son, and Father and Son communicate the same whole Nature to the Holy Spirit, they are in the most perfect notion One, there being one and the same whole entire perfect Divinity in all Three. A Whole, a Whole, and a Whole, are Three in number, but are but one Iden∣tical Nature; for a Whole of a Whole must be the same Whole; and in this Unity of Nature consists the Unity of the Godhead.

I grant a Whole of a Whole is very unconceivable to us; and so is the Notion of an Eternal self-originated Being, and of Creation, to the full as unconceivable, as the Eternal Generation of a Whole from a Whole: But this is a diffi∣culty in the Notion of an Eternal Generation, not of a Trinity in Unity: If God begets a Son, as the Scripture assures us he has an only begotten Son, he must communi∣cate his own Nature to him; and besides the Testimony of Scripture, That all the Father has is the Son's, his whole Nature and Divinity, Reason assures us, that God being a pure simple Being, without composition or parts, if he com∣municate his Nature to his Son, he must communicate it whole and entire, without division or separation; and if this be so, it is certain, that Father and Son, he who be∣gets, and he who is begotten, are Two; and it is as certain, that the same whole Divinity, communicated by the Father to the Son, is but the same One Divinity; and One Di∣vinity, though actually subsisting in Three, can be but One God, not Three Gods. It is certain, this is the most perfect Unity that can be, between Three who are truly and really the same, and yet distinct; for they can n••ver be more One, than to be Three Sames, and Three Wholes; for the Communication of a Whole may make a Number, but cannot distinguish or multiply Nature.

SECT. VI. Concerning the Unity of God.

BUT our Socinian Adversaries, and some who would not be thought Socinians, have espoused such a Notion of One God, as makes the Faith of a Trinity absolutely irreconcilable with the Faith of One God.

By One God, they mean One who is God; but the Faith of the Trinity owns Three, each of whom is by himself True and Perfect God; and I grant it is as absolutely im∣possible to reconcile these two, as it is to reconcile Con∣tradictions; for to say that there is but One who is God, and to say that there are Three, each of whom is God, is a manifest Contradiction; and yet without saying this last, we must deny a Trinity. It is in vain to think to solve this with Words without Sense: If there is but One who is God, we must either make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Names, or Modes, or Manifestations of the same One Nu∣merical Divine Person; which was the ancient, exploded, anathematized Heresy of Noetus and Sabellius; or we must make the Son and Holy Spirit to be mere Creatures, if we allow any Personality to them, as Arius, Macedonius, Paulus Samosatenus, and such like Hereticks, and our Mo∣dern Socinians do.

But we, with the Scriptures and the Catholick Church, reject this Notion of the Unity of God, which is to assert the Unity, but to deny a Trinity. And because this seems to be so prevailing a Notion at this time, I shall shelter my self as well as I can, under the Authority of the Catholick Fathers, and the Catholick Church.

That there is but One God, was always the Faith of the Catholick Church, as appears from all the Ancient Creeds;

but then they did not believe in One God, as One God sig∣nifies One Divine Separate Person; which is never ex∣pressed in any Christian Creed, but in One God the Father, who has an only begotten Son, and an Eternal Spirit, in the Unity of the same Godhead. There is no Christian Creed, which teaches the Belief of One God who is not a Father; and if the One God be a Father, he must have a Son of his own Nature and Substance; and the Son of God, consubstantial with God the Father, must be God the Son. This is what Tertullian tells us,* 1.14 That there is One God, with his Oeconomy, that is, with his only begot∣ten Son, and Eternal Spirit. The Ca∣tholick Church so believed in One God, as to acknowledge Three Persons, Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, each of which is truly and really God,* 1.15 as they must necessarily do, if they believed a Trinity: And upon this account they were charged with Tritheism, or with asserting Three Gods, because they owned a Trinity of Divine Substantial Persons, really distinct from each other, each of which is truly and perfectly God. So that this is no new Charge against the Asserters of a Real and Substantial Trinity; and the Ancient Christians had no regard to it; for Tri∣theism in this Objection signified no more than the B••lief of the Trinity, or of Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, which is the true Christian Faith. As to shew this briefly:

In answer to this Objection against the belief of a Real Substantial Trinity, from the Unity of God, they tell us it is Judaism and Heresy, to place the Unity of the God∣head in the Unity of a Person; to teach that there is but

One Divine Person, as there is but One God.* 1.16 We may find enough to this pur∣pose in Tertullian against Praxeas, and Athanasius against the Sabellians; in St. Hilary, St. Austin, and many others.

Athanasius commends the Iews for op∣posing the Polytheism and Idolatry of the Gentiles:* 1.17 But then he charges them with as great Impiety themselves, in denying the Son of God, by whom all things were made, and in accusing those of Polytheism who worship the Father by the Son.* 1.18—And he exhorts his Readers to separate themselves from those Iudaizers who corrupt Christiani∣ty with Iudaism, who deny God of God, and teach One God in the Iewish Noti∣on of it: In which he taxes the Sabelli∣ans, who taught that the Word of God is like the Word and Wisdom of a Man,* 1.19 within him, in his Heart and Soul; and therefore that God and his Word are but One Person.

St. Hilary frequently takes notice of this Corruption of the Evangelical Faith, as he calls it,* 1.20 under the Pious Profession of One God, to deny the Only begotten God, to deny Christ to be born God, or to be True God, but only a Powerful Creature, thereby to preserve the Faith of One God, which they think the Birth of God does overthrow. In which he distinctly charges the Sa∣bellians and Arians; the first for making God but One Person, for fear of intro∣ducing

a Trinity of Gods with a Trinity of Persons; the other for making Christ a mere Creature, though the first and most powerful Creature, for fear of making a Second God, should they have owned him to be God of God, of the same Substance with the Father.

In opposition to this, he tells us what the true Faith is,* 1.21 which they have learn∣ed from Divine Revelation, Neither to preach Two Gods, nor One Solitary Divine Person (for so solus must signi∣fy in this place); and undertakes to prove both from the Evangelists and Prophets, That when we profess our Faith in God the Father, and God the Son, we must neither own God the Father and God the Son to be One Per∣son, as the Sabellians did, nor Two different Substances, as the Arians did: For when God is born of God, this Di∣vine Nativity will neither admit a Unity of Person, nor a Diversity of Nature: For Father and Son, he who begets, and he who is begotten, must be Two Persons; and the Son who is begotten of the Substance of his Father, must be consubstantial with him.

It were easy to multiply Quotations to this purpose, both out of these and numerous other Ancient Writers; but this is Proof enough, that the Primitive Fathers would not be frighted out of the true Catholick Faith of a Real and Substantial Trinity, by the loud Clamours of Tritheism; but rejected such a Notion of One God, as confined the Godhead to One Single Solitary Person, as Iudaism, and an Anti-trinitarian Heresy. For we know in what sense the Iews owned but One God; viz. in the very sense that the Socinians and all Anti-trinitarians do; that is, That there is but One who is God, but One Divine Person; and in this sense these Ancient Fathers rejected it.

But besides these general Sayings, they industriously con∣fute this Notion of the Unity of the Godhead, which con∣fines it to one single Person; that the One God is so One, that there is and can be but One Divine Person, who is true and perfect God.

The Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament do expresly teach, that there is but one God; This the An∣cient Hereticks perpetually objected against the Doctrine of the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity: And St. Hilary observes,* 1.22 what danger there is in answering this Objection, if it be not done with great caution: For it may be equally impious to deny, or to affirm it. For the True Catholick Faith of One God lies between two such contrary Heresies, as are ready to take advantage one way or other, whatever Answer you give. If you own that there is but One God, without taking notice, that this One God has an only begotten Son, who is True and Perfect God, the Arians take advantage of this against the Eternal Godhead of the Son: If you say, That the Father is God, and the Son God, and yet there is but One God, the Sabellians hence conclude, That Father and Son are but One Per∣son, as they are One God.

But in opposition to both these He∣resies, he tells us,* 1.23 That though the Catholick Church did not deny One God, yet they taught God and God, and denied the Unity of the Godhead both in the Arian and Sabellian No∣tion

of One God. And consequently, That they profes∣sed to believe God, and God, and God, though not Three Gods, but One God; yet in that very sense which both Ancient and Modern Hereticks call Tritheism.

There is no dispute but the Scripture does very fully and expresly teach us, That there is but One God. Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord, 6. Deut. 4. which our Saviour himself approves, 12. Mark 29. and the Scribe expounds 32. Well master, Thou hast said the truth, for there is One God, and there is none other but He: And this is often confirmed both in the Old and New Testament: But then the Fathers think that they have an unanswera∣ble Argument to prove, That by One God, is not meant, that there is but One who is God, because the same Holy Scriptures which teach us, that there is but One God, do attribute the Name, and Dignity, and Power, and all the Natural Perfections of God, to more than One.

St. Hilary explains this Argument at large;* 1.24 the sum of which in short is this: That we must learn the knowledge of God from Divine Revelation; for Hu∣mane Understandings, which are ac∣customed to Corporeal and Bodily Images, are too weak of themselves to discern and contemplate Divine things; nor is there any thing in our selves, or in Created Nature, that can give us an adequate notion and conception of the Nature and Unity of God: We must believe God concerning himself,* 1.25 and his own Na∣ture, and yield a ready assent to what he reveals to us. For we must either deny him to be God, as the Heathens do, if we reject his Testimony; or if we believe him to be God, we must

conceive no otherwise of him, than as he himself hath taught us.

This is very reasonable, if we believe upon God's Au∣thority, To believe all that God reveals, and to expound the Revelation by it self; not to put such a sense upon one part of the Revelation, as shall contradict another; but to put such a sense upon the words, as makes the whole consistent with it self.

As in the present Dispute concerning the Unity of God. The Scripture assures us, that there is but One God, and we believe that there is but One God. Excepting the Va∣lentinians, and such kind of Hereticks, all Christians, both Catholicks, and Hereticks, agree in this Profession. But the Question is, In what sense the Scripture teaches that there is but One God? Whether this One God signifies One single Divine Person, or One God with his Only begotten Son and Eternal Spirit, who have the same Nature and Divinity?

The Arians and Socinians embrace the first Sense of the words, That One God is One Divine Person, and for this reason will not own Christ, or the Holy Spirit, to be True and Perfect God, because there is but One God, and Three Divine Persons, they say, are Three Gods. Now unless we will pretend to understand the Divine Nature, and the Divine Unity, better than God himself does, we must refer this Dispute to Scripture; and if we have the same Authority to believe more Divine Persons than One, that we have to believe but One God, then the Unity of God in the Scripture-notion of it, is no Tritheism, nor any ob∣jection against the belief of a Trinity; for there may be but One only God, and yet Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the same Godhead.

This is St. Hilary's Argument,* 1.26 and it is a very good one, That Moses himself, who has taught us, that there

is but One God,* 1.27 has taught us to con∣fess, God and God; that we have the same Authority to believe the Son of God to be God, that we have to be∣lieve One God. And therefore, though we do, and must believe One God, we must not so believe One God, as to deny the Son of God to be God, for this is to con∣tradict Moses and the Prophets.

This Argument he prosecutes at large throughout the IV^th and V^th Books of the Trinity, and alledges all those Old Testament Proofs for the plurality of Divine Persons, and for the Divinity of Christ; which, whatever opinion some Modern Wits and Criticks have of them, have been applied to that purpose by all Christian Writers from the beginning of Christianity; and were that my present Bu∣siness, might be easily vindicated from the Cavils and Ex∣ceptions of Hereticks.

St. Paul tells us, That there is One God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and One Iesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him, 1 Cor. 8.6.

St. Hilary finds this God of whom are all things,* 1.28 and this Lord by whom are all things, in the Mosaical History of the Creation. And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters,* 1.29 and let it divide the waters from the wa∣ters; and God made the firmament, and divided the waters, &c. 1. Gen. 6, 7. Where, as he applies it, the Father commands, and the Son, his Almighty Word, makes all things. So the Psalmist tells us of the Father, He spake, and it was done; he com∣manded, and it stood fast, 33. Psal. 9. Or as it is in the 148^th Psal. 5. He commanded, and they were created. And by whom they were created, St. Iohn tells us; In the begin∣ning

was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made, that was made, 1 Joh. 1, 2. This he thinks proves a plain distinction of jubentis Dei, & facientis Dei, God that commands, and God that does; for common sense will not allow that they should be one single Solitary Person, much more reason have we to distinguish them, when both the Old and New Testament distinguish them.* 1.30

But whatever dispute this may admit, that Account Moses gives of the Creation of Man, he takes to be an un∣exceptionable Proof of a Plurality of Divine Persons; And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.— So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him, 1. Gen. 26.27. Now if we un∣derstand these words as spoken by God,* 1.31 in the same sense as we should and ought to understand them, had they been spoken by men, (which St. Hilary lays down as a Principle, That God speaks to us as we speak to one another, and ex∣pects to be understood by us according to the common use and acceptation of such forms of speech) then let Vs make man in Our Image,* 1.32 after Our Like∣ness, cannot signify a singular and soli∣tary Person;* 1.33 for such a form of speech naturally imports a Plurality of Per∣sons, and a common Nature and Like∣ness. No single solitary Person speaks

to himself to do any thing, but only wills and chuses what to do,* 1.34 and exe∣c••••es his own purposes; much less does he speak to himself in the Plural Num∣ber, which in common use signifies some Companions and Partners in the work.* 1.35 Let Vs make, cannot signify One single Person, nor can Our Image admit Two Persons of an unlike and different Nature, when the Image is but one and the same;* 1.36 and therefore this must prove, that there are more Divine Persons than One, and that they have all the same Divine Nature.

Were God but one single and solitary Person, this would be a most unaccountable form of speech; and there can be no pretence to put such a harsh sense on the words, un∣less we certainly knew that there was no other Divine Per∣son, but he who spoke; but then if instead of knowing this, we certainly know the contrary; that when God made the World he was not alone, but had his Eternal Sub∣stantial Wisdom, the Person of the Eternal Word with him, by whom he made the world, this puts the matter out of doubt: And this St. Hilary proves fr••m that ac∣count which Solomon gives of Wisdom, 8 Prov. 22, &c. The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the begin∣ning, or ever the earth was. —Then I was by him, as one brought up with him, rejoicing always before him: And there∣fore the Father was not alone, and did not speak to himself when he made the world;* 1.37 his own Wisdom, a Divine Eternal Person, co-operating with him, and rejoicing in the Perfection of his Works.

But besides this, he proves at large, that the Angel which so often appeared to Abraham, Hagar, Iacob, to Moses in a Burning Bush, and is in express terms cal∣led God, the Judge of the world, the God of Abra∣ham, and Isaac, and Iacob, was not a Created Angel, nor God the Father, and yet was True and Perfect God, even the Son of God, who in the fulness of time became Man; and adds several Passages in the Psalms and Prophets, which plainly own a Divine Person, di∣stinct from God the Father, to be True and Perfect God.

I need not tell those who are acquainted with the Writings of the Ancient Fathers, that they all in∣sist on the same Arguments to prove the same thing; that there is not in any one point a more universal Con∣sent amongst them, which is too Venerable an Autho∣rity to be over-ruled by Criticism; it being no less than a Traditionary Exposition of Scripture from the Apo∣stolick Age. But I am no further concerned in this at present, than to shew what Notion the Catholick Fa∣thers had about the Unity of God. These Fathers did not fence against the Objection of Tritheism, by di∣stinguishing away the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, by making the Son God ex accidenti, & secundum quid; for they knew nothing of an acci∣dental or secundum quid God; which I must own sounds to me very like Blasphemy and Contradiction; that when this Name God, signifies the most necessary and absolutely Perfect Being, any Person to whom this Name does naturally and essentially belong, should be God by Accident, or only in a limited and qualified sense: But without fearing the Charge of Tritheism, they with Moses and the Prophets own another Divine Person distinct from the Father, but as Real and Sub∣stantial a Person, and as truly and perfectly God, as

the Father is: Insomuch that Tertullian, when he had alledg••d that T••xt, 45. Psal. 6, 7. which the Apostle to the Hebrews applies to Christ, 1. Heb. Thy throne, O G••d▪ is for ever and ever, the scepter of thy Kingdom is a right scepter. — Therefore God thy God hath anoint∣ed thee with the oyl of gladness above thy fellows; was not a••raid to add,* 1.38 Ecce Duos Deos! Behold Two Gods! That is▪ Two Divine P••rsons, each of whom is by himself truly and essentially God; for notwithstanding this, he would not say there are Two or Three Gods, and gives his reason for it: He owned a Plurality of Gods, even Tritheism it self, in that sense of the word Tri∣theism which the Arians and Sabellians objected against the Faith of the Trinity, as Three Gods signify no more than Three Divine Substantial Persons, each of whom is truly and perfectly God, as having distinctly in himself the whole and perfect Divine Nature; but this he and the other Fathers deny to be Tritheism; they are God, and God, and God, but not Three Gods: And they think it a sufficient proof, (as any man would, who believes the Scripture) that this is not the Scripture-Notion of Tritheism, because the same Scripture which teaches us that there is but One God, attributes not only the Name and Title of God, but the Divine Nature and Perfections, to more Persons than One. And this is the only Answer that need be given, and the best Answer that can be given to this Objection of Tri∣theism; for God knows his own Nature, and his own Unity best: And it is enough for us to acknowledge God to be One, as the Scripture teaches him to be One; that is, that there is but One God, but that this One God has an Eternal only begotten Son, and an Eternal Spirit, in the Unity of the same God∣head.

This is the account Tertullian gives us of those Expressions,* 1.39 when the Scri∣pture asserts that there is but One God, and that there is none besides him. For without denying the Son, we may tru∣ly affirm, That there is but One only God, whose Son he is. For though he has a Son, he does not lose his Name of the One and only God, when he is named without his S••n; and so he is, when what is said, is appropriated to him as the first pers••n; for in the order of Nature, a•••• of ou•• Conceptions, the Father is befo•••• ••he Son, and therefore must be named b••••ore him: So that there is but One God the Father, and besides him there is no other; which does not deny the Son, but another God; which rejects the multitude of False Gods which the Heathens worship∣ped; but the Son, as being inseparably united to him, is included in the Unity of the Father's Godhead, though not named; which as he well observes, he could not be, without making another God of him. Had the Father said, There is no other God besides me, except∣ing my Son, this had made the Son another God, a new separate Divinity; and would have been as improper, as if the Sun should say, There is no other Sun besides me, excepting my Rays.

The Sum of which is this: That the Title of the One and only God, and besides him there is no other God, does in a peculiar manner belong to the Father, who is the One only God with his Son and Spirit; but this does not exclude the Son or Spirit from being true and perfect God;

for they are not other Gods from the Father, but have the same Divinity, and are inseparably ••mited to the Father, and therefore are included in the ••••ity of the Godhead, without being named; whereas th••••r being named would have excepted them out of the Unity of the Godhead, and made other Gods of them: And though the Son when he is named al••ne,* 1.40 is cal∣led God, this does not make Two Gods, because he is God only by his Unity with his Father.

St. Hilary gives much the same ac∣count of it;* 1.41 That when the Scripture teaches that there is One God, and no other God besides him, this does not ex∣clude the Son of God from being true and perfect God, because the Son is not another God:* 1.42 He being of the same Substance with God the Father, God of God, and inseparably united to him: Another God does not signify another Divine Person,* 1.43 but another Divinity, another separate and independent Prin∣ciple and Fountain of Deity. And be∣sides this, St. Hilary endeavours to prove at large from several Texts of the Old Testament, that this very expressi∣on, of one God, and no other besides him,* 1.44 is applied not only to the Fa∣ther, but to the Son, and is very just∣ly applicable to each of them, be∣cause each of them have a Personal and Incommunicable Unity. The Fa∣ther is the One God, and there is none besides him; for he is the only Deus

Innascibilis, the only God, who is God of himself, without any Communica∣tion of the Divine Nature to him from any other Divine Person. The Son is the One God, and there is none besides him; that is, the Deus Vnigenitus, the only begotten God; and there is no other begotten God but he: So that each of them is the One God: For between One and One, that is One of One, there is no Second Nature of the Eternal D••ity.

I shall not dispute these matters now, which will be more proper in another place; it is enough at present, that we learn from them what Sense these Fathers had concern∣ing the Unity of God; viz. That it is not the Unity of a S••ngle Person, so as to exclude all other Persons from the Name and Nature of God, but a Unity of Nature and Principle; That there are not Two different Divinities, nor Two Principles of Divinity, which have no Communica∣tion with each other; but that there is One Self-originated Being, who communicates his own Nature, without Divi∣sion and Separation to his Eternal Son, and by and with his Son to his Eternal Spirit. Thus St. Hilary concludes this Dispute, That to confess One God, but not a solitary God (that is,* 1.45 not one single solitary Person) is the Faith of the Church, which confesses the Fa∣ther in the Son: But if out of ignorance of this Heavenly Mystery, we pretend that One God signifies One single Divine Person, we know not God, as not owning the Faith of God in God.

This is plain sense which every Christian may under∣stand, and what every one must believe who wi••l be a Christian: We must believe in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the

Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son; and that each of these Three is in himself, as distinguished from the other Two, true and perfect God; but though they are Three, and each of them true and perfect God, yet they are not Three Gods, because there is but One and the same Divinity in them: The same individual numeri∣cal Divine Nature, being whole, perfect, undivided in them all; originally in the Father, by Generation in the Son, and by Procession in the Holy Ghost, as I have al∣ready explained it, which is the most perfect Unity we can conceive between Three Wholes, or Three, each of which have the same whole undivided Nature distinctly in themselves.

If this will not be allowed to be such a Unity as is inclu∣ded in the Notion of One God; that the natural Notion of One God is of One only who is God, which is contra∣dictory to the belief of Three, each of whom is in him∣self true and perfect God; the answer the Catholick Fa∣thers give to this (as I have now shewn) ought to satisfy all Christians; that this is not the Scripture-notion of One God, That there is but One, who is God; because the same Holy Scriptures which teach us, that there is but One God, do also teach us, that there are Three in the Unity of the Godhead. That not only the Father is God, as an Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Being, and upon this ac∣count in a peculiar manner called the One and only true God; but the Son also is true God, and the Holy Ghost true God, by the Communication of the same Divine Nature to them. Now God knows his own Nature and Unity best, and if he declares himself to be but One God, but yet requires us to believe his Eternal Son to be true and perfect God, and his Eternal Spirit to be true and perfect God; it is certain that the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost is very reconcilable with the Unity of God. For as far as Revelation must decide this Dispute, we are

as much obliged to believe, That the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, as we are to believe, That there is but One God.

Those who will not acquiesce in this, must appeal from Scripture to Natural Reason, which is a very absurd and impudent Appeal; for the plain sense of it is this, That they will believe their own Reason before the Scriptures, in matters relating to the Divine Nature and Unity, which all wise men acknowledge to be so much above human comprehension: That is, That they know the Unity of God better than God himself does; or, which is the same thing, That they will never believe any Revelation to come from God, or any thing, how express soever the words are, to be the meaning of the Revelation, any far∣ther than their own Reason approves it: Of which more elsewhere.

And yet I dare appeal to any man of a free and unbiass'd Reason in this Cause, What is that Natural Notion we have of One God? Is it any thing more, than that there is and can be but One Eternal Self-originated Being, who is the Principle or Cause of all other Beings? And does not the Scripture, do not all Trinitarians, with the whole Catholick Church, own this? Do not all the Christian Creeds teach us to profess our Faith in One God the Father, from whom the Son and the Holy Spirit receive their God∣head? Thus far then Scripture, and Reason, and the Ca∣tholick Faith agree: Does Reason then deny, that God can beget of himself an Eternal Son, his own perfect Image and Likeness? If it does, then indeed Scripture and Reason contradict each other: But I believe these men will not pretend to prove from Reason, That God could not beget an Eternal Son; and if this cannot be pro∣ved by Reason, as I am certain it never can, then Reason does not contradict Scripture, which teaches us that God has an only begotten Son: And if God have an only be∣gotten

Son, Reason will teach us that the Son of God must be True and Perfect God, and yet not another God, be∣cause he has one and the same Nature with his Father.

This is all that any Christian need to believe concerning this matter, and all this every Christian may understand; and all this every one who sincerely believes the Faith of the Holy Trinity, does and must agree in: Those who do not, I will at any time undertake to prove to be secret He∣reticks, and Enemies to the Christian Faith: and as for those who do, I will never dispute with them about some Terms of Art, and the Propriety of Words, in a matter which is so much above all words and forms of speech.

And here I leave this matter upon a sure Bottom; and here we are ready to join Issue with our Socinian Adversa∣ries. Our only Controversy as to the Doctrine of the Trinity with them is, Whether the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each of them, be True and Perfect God: If we can prove this, which has been the Faith of the Catholick Church in all Ages, we need dispute no other matters with them; nor can any Disputes among our selves give any Support to their Cause. A Dispute about Words may look like a difference in Faith, when both contending Par∣ties may mean the same thing; as those must do, who sin∣cerely own and believe, That the Son is True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost is True and Perfect God, and that neither of them are the Father, nor each other.

And therefore those different Explications of the Do∣ctrine of the Trinity which the Socinians of late have so much triumphed in, and made more and greater than real∣ly they are, and more sensless too by their false Representa∣tions, can do them no real service among Wise Men, tho it may help to amuse the Ignorant. If any men have subtilly distinguished away the Catholick Faith, they may take them to themselves, and increase their Party by them: But if this were the Case, as I hope it is not, it is no Ob∣jection

against the Catholick Faith, that some men openly oppose it, and others, at least in some mens opinions, do secretly undermine it. There is reason to guard the Chri∣stian Faith against all inconvenient or dangerous Explica∣tions, which seem to approach near Heresy, if this be done with due Christian Temper and Moderation; but I hope the Disputes of the Trinitarians are not so irreconcilable, but that they will all unite against a Pestilent and Insolent Heresy, which now promises it self glorious Successes only from their private Quarrels.

CHAP. II. An Examination of Some Considerations concerning the Trinity.

SECT. I. Concerning the Ways of managing this Controversy.

BEfore I put an end to this Discourse, it will contribute very much to the better understanding of what I have said, and give a clearer Notion of the Use of it, to apply these Principles to the Examination of a late Treatise, en∣tituled, Some Considerations concerning the Trinity. The Author I know not; he writes with Temper; and though he takes the liberty to find fault, he does it Civilly, and therefore he ought to meet with Civil Usage, and so he shall from me, as far as the bare Censure of his Principles will admit.

I was, I confess, startled at the first entrance, to find him own the Vncertainty of our Faith in these Points (concern∣ing the Trinity);* 1.46 for if after the most perfect Revelation of the Gospel that we must ever expect, and the Univer∣sal Tradition of the Catholick Church for above Sixteen Hundred years, this Faith is still uncertain, it is time to leave off all Enquiries about it. As for the many absurd and blasphemous Expositions that have been made of this Doctrine; if by them he means the Ancient Heresies which infested the Church, they are so far from rendring our Faith uncer∣tain, that (as I shall shew him anon) the very Condemna∣tion of those Heresies by the Catholick Church, gives us a more certain account what the true Catholick Faith was. I agree with him, that the warm and indiscreet Management of contrary Parties, has been to the Prejudice of Religion, among unthinking people, who hence conclude the uncer∣tainty of our Faith; and it concerns good men to remove this Prejudice, by distinguishing the Catholick Faith from the Disputes about Ecclesiastical Words, and the Catholick Sense of them; and I hope I have made it appear this may be done, and then the Faith is secure, notwithstanding these Disputes; and as for any other Offence or Scandal, let those look to it, who either give or take it.

This Considerer dislikes all the Ways and Methods which have hitherto been taken to compose these Disputes.

1. He dislikes those who are for reverencing the Mystery of the Trinity,* 1.47 without ever looking into it at all; who think it proposed to us only as a Trial and Exercise of our Faith; and the more implicit that is, the fuller do we express our Trust and Reliance upon God.

Now if by not looking into it at all, he means not enqui∣ring what they are to believe concerning the Trinity, nor why they believe it; this I acknowledge is a very odd sort of Faith; but I believe he cannot name any such men whose

avowed Principle this is: An Implicit Faith is only merito∣rious in the Church of Rome, but then an Implicit Faith is to believe without knowing what or why; but these Igno∣ramus or Mystery-Trinitarians (as some late Socinian Consi∣derers have insolently and reproachfully called them, and whom our Author ought not to have imitated) never teach such an Implicit Faith as this, much less admire the Tri∣umph and Merit of Faith in believing Contradictions, and the more the better. Under all the appearance of Modesty and Temper, these are very severe and scandalous Reflecti∣ons upon some of the Wisest and Greatest Men amongst us, and which this Considerer had little reason for, as will soon appear.

The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity is the most Funda∣mental Article of the whole Christian Faith, and therefore an explicite Knowledge and Belief of it is essential to the Christian Profession, and thus all Protestant Divines teach; and whatever Voluminous Disputes there may be about it, the true Christian Faith of the Trinity is comprized in a few words, and the Proofs of it are plain and easy: For the Scriptures plainly and expresly teach us, that there is but One God; and that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; that the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father, nor the Holy Ghost either Father or Son; as I have already explained it: This we all teach our people to believe upon the Authority of Scripture (which is the only Authority we can have for matters of pure Revelation), and expound those Texts to them which expresly contain this Faith, and vindicate them from the Cavils and perverse Comments of Hereticks: And this, I think, is not to reverence the Mystery, without ever looking into it at all, when we look as far as we can, till Revelation bounds our prospect: And this is to look into it as far as God would have us, and as far as is necessary to all the purposes of Religion; that is, as far as the knowledge of this Mystery is of any use to us.

Now when this is done, there are a great many wise men who think we ought to look into this Mystery no further; and there seems to be a very good reason for it; viz. because with all our looking, we can see no further. There are indeed some curious Questions started about re∣conciling the Unity of God with the belief of a Trinity, in which there are Three, each of whom is by himself True and Perfect God; for if there be but One God, how can there be Three, each of whom is True God? Now whatever Answer may be given to such kind of Objections and pretended Contradictions, these Learned Men think there is no reason to clog the Christian Faith with them, nor to disturb the minds of ordinary Christians with such Subtilties: That the Authority of God who has revealed this, and the acknowledged Incomprehensibility of the Di∣vine Nature, is a sufficient Answer to all Objections; and as ridiculously as a Witty Man may represent this, That is the truest Faith, not which can believe Contradictions, but which can despise the pretence of Contradictions, when opposed to a Divine Revelation; for that resolves Faith wholly into Divine Authority, which is the true Notion of a Divine Faith.

To say that this will not suppress any of our Doubts or Disputes in Religion, is a manifest mistake; for such a pro∣found Veneration for the Authority of God, would silence them all: And whatever is the Natural Propension of the Soul to the search of Truth, Natural Reason will tell us, that there are a thousand things which we can know no∣thing of, and that it is in vain to search after them; but that the Divine Wisdom is unsearchable, and therefore God is to be believed beyond our own knowledge or com∣prehension; and when we are agreed about the Truth and Certainty of the Revelation, that will silence all our Disputes about what is revealed, and set bounds to our En∣quiries.

And I never knew before, the danger of submitting our Reason to Faith, of a blind resignation of judgment (as he is pleased to call it) to a Divine Revelation,* 1.48 for that is the matter in debate. Blasphemies and Contradictions may, and have been imposed upon mens Faith, under the Venerable Name of Mysteries; but such Blasphemies and Contradicti∣ons were never revealed in Scripture, and therefore belong not to the present Enquiry, which only concerns believing what we allow to be revealed, without looking any farther into it. We allow all men to examine the Truth and Cer∣tainty of the Revelation, and to examine what is revealed; but here we must stop, and not pretend to judge of what is revealed, by the measures of human Reason, which is so inadequate a Rule for Divine and Supernatural Truths. This is all very plain; and if he will allow the Truth of this, he must confess, that what he has said upon this first Head is nothing to the purpose. It is a very popular thing to decry Mysteries, and to cry up Reason, but to be very cautiously imitated, because it is generally found that such men are either no great Believers, or no very deep Reasoners.

2. In the next place he tells us of a very strange sort of men, who call the Doctrine of the Trinity an Incomprehensible Mystery,* 1.49 and yet are at a great deal of pains to bring it down to a level with Human Vnderstanding; and are all very ear∣nest to have their own particular Explications acknowledged as necessary Articles of Faith. An Incomprehensible Mystery is what Human Reason cannot comprehend; to bring an Incomprehensible Mystery down to the level of Human Vn∣derstandings, is to make it comprehensible by Reason; and those are notable men indeed, who undertake to make that comprehensible by Reason, which at the same time they acknowledge to be incomprehensible: It is to be hoped this Considerer does a little mistake them: Men may be∣believe the Trinity to be an Incomprehensible Mystery,

and yet speak of it in words which may be understood, which does not pretend to make the Mystery comprehen∣sible, but to deliver it from Nonsense, Jargon, and Heresy; that is, not to explain the Mystery, which is and will be a Mystery still, but to secure the true Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, which they desire may continue an Article of the Christian Faith still.

* 1.50There are, he tells us, a third sort of men who are for no Mystery; that is, the Socinians; and I was glad to find them censured and rejected, but wonder'd how they came to be numbred among those men who have laboured in this good design of explaining the Trinity,* 1.51 and reconciling the Disputes about it.

Well: All these Methods have proved ineffectual; let us then (to omit other matters) enquire what Course our Considerer took to make himself a fit and competent Judge of this Controversy: Take the account of it in his own words; I have endeavoured to deliver my self from Preju∣dice and Confusion of Terms, and to speak justly and intelligi∣bly:* 1.52 And not being yet prepossess'd in favour of any particular Explication, the better to preserve my freedom of examining the Subject in hand, I have purposely forborn to search the Fa∣thers, Schoolmen, or Fratres Poloni, or read over any later Treatises concerning this Controversy, while I was composing the present Essay, resolving to consult nothing but Scripture and my own Natural Sentiments, and draw all my Reflections from thence, taking only such which easily and without con∣straint offered themselves.

Thus Des Cartes made a New Philosophy, and this is the best way that can be thought of to make a New Faith. This has an appearance of great Indifferency and Impar∣tiality, but it is a great mistake when men boast in this as a virtue and attainment, and an excellent disposition of mind for the Examination of Matters of Faith. I never in my life yet saw any one example to the contrary, but

that when men who had been educated in the Christian Faith, and tolerably instructed in the meaning and the rea∣sons of it, could persuade themselves to be thus perfectly in∣different whether it were true or false, but this indifference was owing to a secret byass and inclination to Infidelity or Heresy. It is in vain to pretend such an absolute freedom of Judgment, without being perfectly indifferent which side is true or false: For if we wish and desire to find one side of the question true, and the other false, this is a Byass, and our Judgment is not equally poiz'd. And certainly in mat∣ters of such vast consequence as the Christian Faith, and especially that great Fundamental Article of the Holy Tri∣nity, such an Indifferency as this is, can never recommend either an Author or his Writings to sober Christians. Will this Considerer then own, that it was indifferent to him when he undertook this design, whether the Doctrine of the Trinity should upon Examination appear true or false? If it were not, the Socinians will tell him that he had not pre∣served a Freedom of Judgment, and then he did well in not consulting the Fratres Poloni, for he had condemn'd them without hearing; or if he were persuaded concern∣ing the Doctrine of the Trinity, Was it indifferent to him whether the Sabellian, or Arian, or True Catholick No∣tion of a Trinity, contained in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, were the True Faith? That is, Was it indifferent to him, whether the Ancient Heresies condemn'd by the Catholick Church, or that Faith which the Catholick Church has always own'd and professed, be the True Faith? For my part, I confess, I am not thus indifferent; I will never shut my eyes against plain Conviction, which is all the Freedom of judging which is allowable; but my Prejudices are, and I hope always will be, on the side of the Catholick Faith. No wise man can be thus indifferent. And we shall find this Considerer was not so very indiffe∣rent; for the main Principles he reasons on, are some Po∣pular

Mistakes and Prejudices, which he seems to have espoused without due Consideration.

But let us allow him to be as free and unprejudic'd as he pleases, I cannot think that he took a good method to un∣derstand this Sacred Mystery. He laid aside Fathers, School∣men, and other later Treatises concerning this Controversy, and consulted nothing but Scripture, and his own natural Sen∣timents. To consult Scripture is indeed a very good way, and absolutely necessary in matters of pure Revelation, which can be certainly known no other way; but the Fa∣thers at least are very good Guides, and have very great Authority in expounding Scripture; and our Natural Sen∣timents, otherwise called Natural Reason, is a very bad, a very dangerous Expositor of Scripture in such Supernatu∣ral Mysteries, and has no Authority in these mattters; and how our Considerer has been misled by his Natural Senti∣ments, will soon appear.

A few words might serve for an Answer to the Considerer; but since this is the great Pretence of Socinians and other Hereticks, to set up Scripture and Natural Reason, against Scripture and the Traditionary Faith of the Catholick Church; and our Considerer and some other unwary Wri∣ters chime in with them, it will be very necessary to shew how this betrays the Catholick Faith, and makes Reason and Criticism the Supreme Judge of Controversy; and then men may dispute on without end, and believe at last as they please.

* 1.53The Considerer tells us, I take it for granted in a Prote∣stant Countrey, that Scripture is the only Standard of all ne∣cess••ry Revealed Truths: Neither in the present Case is there any room for a Traditionary Faith. For besides that all the Fathers and Ancient Writers ground their Exposition of the Trinity wholly upon Scripture, I cannot conceive that the Sub∣ject is capable of a plainer Revelation; as I shall endeavour to shew more fully in the following Discourse. What this last

Clause means, we shall understand better hereafter; but his denying a Traditionary Faith, is very extraordinary; for if we can prove from the most Authentick Records, what the constant belief of the Catholick Chu••ch has been, especially in the first and purest Ages of it, This I take to be a Traditionary Faith; nor is it the less Traditionary because the Fathers and Ancient Writers sound their Expositions of the Trinity wholly upon Scripture: For if this be true, then we have a Traditionary Faith of the Trinity, and a Traditionary Exposition of the Scripture, for the Reason and Proof of that Faith, both in one; which I take to be a greater Authority, and safer Guide, than mere Scripture and our Natural Sentiments: And though Protestants al∣low Scripture to be the only Standard of Faith, yet he might have remembred, that the Church of England re∣quires us to expound Scripture as the Ancient Fathers ex∣pound it.

But this Wholly is a Mistake; for the Primitive Fathers pleaded Tradition as well as Scripture against the Ancient Hereticks, as two distinct, but agreeing Testimonies; as this Author might have known, would he have been plea∣sed to have consulted Irenaeus and Tertullian de praescriptio∣nibus, with divers others. What he means by a plainer Revelation, I cannot tell; it makes it somewhat plainer, to know what the Catholick Faith has always been, and what the Catholick Interpretation of Scripture has always been; which is the plainest and strongest Answer to Wit and Cri∣ticism, and Natural Sentiments, when they contradict this Traditionary Faith. But to discourse this matter more particularly, I shall enquire,

1. What that Catholick Church is, from whence we must receive this Traditionary Faith.

2. What Evidence we have of this Tradition concerning the Trinity, in the Catholick Church.

3. Of what Authority this ought reasonably to be in ex∣pounding Scripture,

SECT. II. Concerning the Traditionary Faith of the Church, with respect to the Doctrine of the Trinity.

FIrst then, Let us consider what that Catholick Church is, from whence we must receive this Traditionary Faith.

Now since Christ gave the Supreme Authority of preach∣ing the Gospel, and planting Churches, to his Apostles, those only must be reckoned the true Apostolick Churches, from which we must receive the true Christian Faith, which were planted by the Apostles, or by Apostolick men, and lived in Communion with them.

It is not sufficient to prove any Doctrine to be the true Primitive Faith, That it was preached in the Apostles days, but that it was the Faith of the Apostolick Churches, which were planted by the Apostles, and received their Faith from them; for that Only is the Primitive and Apo∣stolick Faith. And therefore though Arians and Socinians could prove their Heresies to be as Ancient as the Aposto∣lick Age, (as we grant something like them was) this does not prove theirs to be the true Christian Faith, if it were not the Faith of the Apostolick Churches.

And this was very visible in those days, what these Churches were which were planted by the Apostles, and lived in Communion with them, and is very visible still in the most Authentick Records of the Church. For the Hereticks which sprang up in that Age, separated them∣selves from the Apostles, and thereby made a visible distin∣ction between the True Apostolick Churches, and Hereti∣cal Conventicles: And in after-Ages they either separated themselves, or were cast out of the Communion of the

Church. This St. Iohn accounted a great advantage to the Christian Church, and an Infallible Proof of False Doctrine and Heresy, as it certainly was at that time; for if the Apostles taught the True Faith, those who separated from the Apostles, and preached another Gospel, which they ne∣ver learnt from them, must be Hereticks; 1 Ioh. 2.18, 19. Little Children, it is the last time; and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come▪ even now there are many Anti∣christs; whereby we know that it is the last time: They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they no doubt would have continued with us; but they went out, that they might be made manifest, that they were not all of us.

The Separation of Hereticks in that Age was a visible renouncing the Apostolick Faith and Communion; and therefore how many Heresies soever started up, it was still visible, where the Apostolick Faith and Tradition was pre∣served; and this was of admirable use to preserve the Faith of the Church sincere and uncorrupt: For had these Hereticks continued in Communion with the Apostles and Apostolick Churches, and secretly propagated their Here∣sies, and infected great numbers of Christians, without di∣viding into distinct and opposite Communions, it would have been a great dispute in the next Age, which had been the true Apostolick Faith, when the Members of the same Churches, which all their time lived in Communion with the Apostles, should preach contrary Doctrines, and pre∣tend with equal confidence, Apostolick Tradition; which the greatest Hereticks might very plausibly have done, had they always lived in Communion with the Apostles: But they went out from us, says St. Iohn, that they might be made manifest, that they were not all of us; that the world might know how to distinguish between Catholick Chri∣stians, and Hereticks; and between the True Catholick Faith, and the Corrupt Innovations of Perverse men.

And this I take to be a good reason to this day, why we should keep the Communion of the Church sincere and uncorrupt, and not set our doors open for Arians and Socinians, and all sorts of Hereticks to mix with us▪ For though, since the C••mmunion of the Church has b••en so broken and divided by Schisms, and Factions, and H••re∣sies, it is no proof of the True Apostolick Faith, merely that it is the Faith of such a Church, (though the Church of Rome still vainly pretends to such Authority) yet it would soon ruin the Christian Church, and the Christian Faith, to have no distinction preserved between true Apo∣stolick Churches, and the Apostolick Faith, and the Conven∣ticles of Hereticks, the impure Off-spring of Cerinthus and Ebion, of Photinus or Arius. And therefore I cannot but abhor that Accommodating-Design which some men have expressed so warm a Zeal for, to Comprehend away the Faith of the Holy Trinity, in some loose general Expres∣sions, without any particular determined Sense, and to purge our Liturgies of every thing that savours of the Worship of the Blessed Trinity, that Arians and Socinians may join in Communion with us: Which is a plausible Pretence, under the Notion of Christian Charity and Communion, to be∣tray the Christian Faith: Not expresly to renounce it, but to bury it in silence, as a Useless and Church-dividing Dispute. I am satisfied this Holy Faith can never be Confu∣ted; but could these men prevail, it might soon be Lost.

But to return: This is a sure Foundation for our Enqui∣ries into the Faith of the Primitive Church, To know what the Primitive Church is; for otherwise we may mistake Old Heresies for the Primitive Faith. But those Churches which were planted by the Apostles or Apostolical men, and received their Faith from them, and lived in Commu∣nion with them, are the true Primitive and Apostolick Churches, and their Faith is the true Primitive Apostolick Faith; and what that was, Iustin Martyr and Irenaeus as∣sure

us; The Faith and Worship of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: And what their Faith was as to all these Three Divine Persons, is evident from the Writings of those Ancient Fathers, who preserved the Succession and Com∣munion of these Apostolick Churches. But this is not what I intend at present; but from hence it appears, That those Ancient Heresies which were rejected and condemn∣ed by the Apostolick Churches, as soon as they appeared, could not be the Apostolick Faith. These Hereticks separa∣ted from the Apostles, and Apostolick Churches, and therefore could not receive their Faith from them; nor did they pretend to this, while the Apostles lived, though they forged new Gospels, and Acts, and Revelations for them when they were dead. And thus all the Heresies of Simon Magus, Menander, Cerinthus, Ebion, Valentinus, and all those other Divisions and Subdivisions of Hereticks, who denied or corrupted the Doctrine of the Divinity of our Saviour, or his Incarnation, are all rejected from the Apo∣stolical Faith; for these Hereticks did not receive their Do∣ctrines from the Apostles and Apostolick Churches, as they themselves owned by their Separation from the Apostolick Churches; and these Churches gave Testimony against their Corruptions, as soon as they were known; and there is no need of any other Confutation of them, if we allow the Doctrine of the Apostles to be the only Infallible Rule of Faith.

This is the Argument from Prescription, which Tertul∣lian insists so largely on, and is frequently urged by Ire∣naeus, and other Catholick Writers; which is not, as some mistake it, an Argument merely from Antiquity; for though the true Faith was ancienter than any Heresies, yet some Heresies had Antiquity enough to make them vene∣rable, if that alone would do it; but the Argument was from the Tradition of the Apostolick Churches, which were planted by the Apostles, and had preserved an un∣interrupted

Succession from them, and all the world over taught the same Faith, without any material change or variation: Whereas none of these Heresies, how Ancient soever they might be, could pretend to such an Original, were never taught by the Apostles, or any Apostolical men, nor were received or owned by any Churches planted by them. And this is an unanswerable Argument, as long as we can reasonably suppose the Tradition of the Catholick Faith, and the Communion of the Church, was preserved entire, which it visibly was, at least till the first Nicene Council; and during all this Period, had we no other ways to know it, we might learn the Faith of the Catho∣lick Church, by its opposition to those Heresies which it condemned.

2dly. And this is the only Evidence which I shall at pre∣sent insist on for the Catholick Tradition of the Faith of the Holy and Ever blessed Trinity; for we may see the plain Footsteps of the Ancient Catholick Tradition con∣cerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in those Ancient Heresies.

Simon Magus was the first Heretick we read of, and may be very justly accounted the Father of many of the Anci∣ent Heresies, having led the way, and sown the Seeds and Principles of them.

Now if we believe that Account which Epiphanius gives of him, this wicked Impostor pretended himself to be God, both Father and Son, and affirmed that his Lewd Woman, who was called sometimes Helena, sometimes Selene, was the Holy Ghost.

These Names and Distinctions of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, he could not possibly learn from any persons, but only from the Christian Church, in which he was baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. And therefore we may observe, that before his Baptism he only pretended to be some Great One, and the

deluded people thought him to be the great power of God, 8. Acts 9, 10. But when he was baptized, and soon a••ter apostatized from the Christian Faith, the Devil, whose great Power he was, set him up for the God of the Christi∣ans, both Father and Son. And though he blasphemously attributed these Titles of God the Father and Son to him∣self, and wickedly corrupted this Faith, by making the Father and Son but one Person under different appearances; that he appeared to his Countreymen the Samaritans as God the Father, and to the Iews as the Son; yet there had been no pretence for this, had not the Christian Church owned Jesus Christ, the Son of God, to be true and perfect God. For had the Father been God, and the Son a mere Man, it is certain Father and Son could never be the same Per∣son: And besides the Wickedness and Impudence of the Impostor, in pretending himself to be Father and Son, it had been ridiculous to pretend this to Christians, had he not known that the Catholick Faith taught the Son to be True and Real God, as well as the Father; and then if he could persuade them that he was God the Father, he might with the same ease persuade them that he was God the Son too, under a different appearance.

Thus when he pretends that his wicked Strumpet was the Holy Ghost, by whom he created the Angels, which created the World; the very Prophanation of this Holy Mystery shews what the Faith of the Church in that Age was concerning the Divinity of the Holy Ghost; for he could have no other Inducement to make his Woman, whom he calls the Holy Ghost, such a Divine Power, but because he knew the Christian Church believed the Holy Ghost to be God, and the Spirit of God, as he made her to be his Divine Creating Intelligence.

Another Heresy concerning the Person of Christ, at∣tributed Divinity to him, owned him to be the Son of God, though not of the Maker of the world, (who they

said was but an Inferior Angel), but of the Unknown and Incomprehensible Father; and that he appeared indeed in the world like a Man, but was no true and real Man. Now what should put such a wild Conceit as this into their heads, had they not known this to be the Catholick Faith, That Jesus Christ was the Son of God? Their eyes could not see him to be God,* 1.54 but they saw him to be a Man, and yet they deny him to be a Man, and teach that he was the Son of God, in the form and apparition of a Man: Which is a plain indication what the Catholick Faith was, That Christ was both God and Man. This they could not believe, that the Son of God would so unite himself to Human Nature, as to be∣come true and real man; and yet they thought it so evi∣dent that he was the Son of God, or at least saw that this Faith was accounted so sacred, that they would not ven∣ture to deny that, and therefore chose to deny his Huma∣nity, and make a mere Apparition of him.

But then on the other hand, Cerinthus and Ebion thought it too evident to be denied, That he was a true and real Man; and therefore they taught, That Iesus was a Man, and no more than a Man, born as other Men are, of Io∣seph and Mary. But then it is worth considering, how they came to make this the distinguishing Doctrine of their Sect, That Christ was but a mere Man, if the Apostolick Churches, whom they opposed, and from whom they sepa∣rated, had not taught, That he was more than a Man, That he was God as well as Man. Was there ever any Dispute either before or since, concerning any other Man in the world, who was owned to be a Man, Whether he were a mere Man or not? When one sort of Hereticks deny Christ to be a Man, and another deny him to be God, and both of them in contradiction to the Apostolick

Faith, it is a very strong presumption at least, what the True Catholick Apostolick Faith was, That Christ was both God and Man.

And yet Cerinthus himself, though he makes Jesus to be a mere Man, owns Christ to be a Divine Person, and that this Christ descended on Jesus at his Baptism, in the form of a Dove, and rested on him, or dwelt in him, and wrought Miracles by him, but left him at his Crucifixion, and flew up again to Heaven.

So that, according to Cerinthus, from the time that Jesus was baptized, till he was crucified, the Divinity was very nearly and intimately united to him; not that he was God and Man in one Person, as the Catholick Faith teaches, but yet that Jesus Christ was a Divine and Human Person, though Christ was one Person, and Jesus another. And therefore as the Nicene Creed (which we find also in the Ancient Oriental Creeds) teaches us to believe in One God the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible; not to exclude Christ from being the Maker of the World, but in opposition to those Hereticks who would not allow the Supreme God, who is the Father of Christ, to be the Maker of the World, but attributed the Creation of this World to one or more Infe∣rior Angels; So they add, And in One Lord Iesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, in opposition to those who made Christ and Jesus Two Persons. And yet in this very Heresy we may see what the Ancient Catholick Faith was, That Jesus Christ was God and Man; as Cerinthus himself owned, though he would not unite Christ and Je∣sus into One Person, nor make the Union inseparable.

The Valentinian Heresy, though dressed up after the mode of the Pagan Theology, was a manifest Corruption of the Christian Faith, under a Pretence of a more perfect knowledge of Divine Mysteries; and we may still see the broken Remains of the Catholick Tradition of the Trinity among them.

Their Pleroma, by which they seem to understand the Fulness of the Deity, as St. Paul uses that Phrase, 2 Col. 9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, That the fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Christ bodily. I say, this Pleroma consisted of several Aeons or Divine Persons, which were propagated from the Unknown and Incomprehensible Father in gradual Descents, and all together made up the Compleat and Perfect Deity; which were more or fewer, according to the various Fan∣cies of Hereticks.

Now from these wild Conceits we may in some measure learn what the Catholick Faith was: That the Godhead was not confined to one Single and Solitary Person, but that there is such a Foecundity in the Divine Nature, as communicates it self to more Persons than one. For had it been the known and received Faith of the Christian Church, That there is but One Person in the Godhead, as well as but One God, there had been no pretence for these Hereticks, who called themselves Christians, and boasted of a more perfect knowledge of the Christian Faith, to have invented such a number of Aeons, which they included within their Pleroma, as the several Emanations of their Deity. And we may observe, that most of the Names which they gave to their several Aeons, are Scripture-Names and Titles, which the Pagan Theology knew no∣thing of, and which they could learn no where, but from the Christian Church.

Basilides, I think, was one of the first who gave us any distinct account of these Aeons, which was new modell'd by Valentinus, and other succeeding Hereticks; and his first and Supreme Aeon,* 1.55 as Epiphanius tells us, was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; The Unbegotten One, who only is the Father of all, and by others is called the Propater, and the Unknown, Invisible, Incomprehensible Father.

Now though the Heathens very familiarly call their Su∣preme God, the Father of Gods and Men, with respect to his Creating Power; yet as the Notion of Father is found∣ed in a substantial Generation, as these Hereticks plainly understood it, so it is the peculiar Character of God un∣der the Gospel, who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son. It is certain the first Person in the Godhead was never called the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the One that is unbegotten, but to distinguish him from One who is be∣gotten; the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the only begotten; who is God al∣so, but God o•• God. And it is observable what Tertullian tells us of Heracleon,* 1.56 That he made his first Ae••n to be illud quod pronunciat, which some Criticks not understand∣ing, think to be a defect in the Copy; but the sense is plain, that his first Aeon is he that pronounceth, or speaketh; by which he represented the Eternal Generation of the Word: So that his first Aeon is the Pronouncer or Speaker, that is, the Father of the Eternal Word, which St. Iohn tells us was in the beginning, was with God, and was God: Which shews that this is nothing else but a disguized Cor∣ruption of the Catholick Faith, concerning the Eternal Generation of the Word from the Eternal Unbegotten Father.

To confirm this, I observe farther, That most of the Names which they give to their other Aeons, are such Names, Titles, or Characters, as the Scripture gives to Christ, or the Holy Spirit, which they have multiplied into so many distinct Persons or Aeons, such as the Mind, Word, Prudence, Power, and Wisdom; Truth, Life, Light, the Only begotten, the Paraclete, and the like.

Valentinus indeed, as Epiphanius observes, did model his Thirty Aeons according to Hesiod's Genealogy and Number of Gods, and with some manifest allusions to them; but yet he retained as many Scripture-Names as he could, the better to reconcile unwary people to his fabu∣lous

Genealogi••s, as the hidden and mysterious sense of Scripture. And it is impossible such Fables should ever have obtained any Credit, had they not been grafted on the Catholick Faith, and pretended to improve it with new degrees of Light and Knowledge.

When these Heresies were pretty well silenced, up start Noetus and Sabellius, who ran into the other Extreme. The Valentinians had corrupted the Doctrine of the Trini∣ty, by multiplying Three Divine Persons into Thirty Aeons, besides all their other Pagan and Fabulous Conceits about them: This offended these men, as downright Poly∣theism (as indeed it was no better); and to avoid this, they reject a Trinity of Real and Substantial Persons, for a Trinity of Names; that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names of the same Person, who is sometimes called the Father, at other times the Son, or the Holy Ghost, with respect to his different Appearances or Ope∣rations: Or they made the Son and Holy Ghost not Two Persons, but Two Personal Attributes in God, his Wisdom, or Power: Or they made the Trinity but Three Parts of One Compounded God, as a Man consists of Body, Soul, and Spirit; which of late have been revived among us, un∣der different Names.

After these men, arose Arius and his Followers, who out of great Zeal also for the Unity of God, framed a New and more Subtile Heresy: They were sensible that Father and Son were not Two Names, but Two Real Distinct Persons, and therefore they attributed the whole entire Divinity to the Father, and made the Son not to be God by Nature, but the most Perfect and Excellent Creature, as Perfect an Image of God, as any Creature can be, but not Consubstantial with God, nor Coequal and Coeternal with him.

All these Heresies were rejected and condemned by the Catholick Church in their several Ages, as soon as they

appeared, and were taken notice of: And this is one very good way to learn what the Catholick Faith was, from its Opposition to those Heresies which the Catholick Church condemned, and from the Corrupted Remains of the An∣cient Faith which appeared in them. For these Hereticks were originally Christians, and professed themselves Chri∣stians, and therefore did not wholly renounce the Christian Faith, but grafted their Heresies on it.

As to confine my self to the Subj••ct of the present Dispute, What we are to understand by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Whether Three Distinct, Real, Substantial Persons, or not; each of whom is distinctly by himself True and Perfect God, but in the Unity of the same Di∣vine Nature and Godhead. Now that this was the received Faith of the Catholick Church, we may learn both from the Valentinians▪ Sabellians, and Arians.

Though the Valentinians, as I observed before, had cor∣rupted the Doctrine of the Trinity, either with the Pla∣tonick Philosophy, as that it self had been corrupted by the Iunior Platonists; or with the Pagan Theology; yet the Propagation of their Aeons in different Degrees and Descents from the first Supreme Aeon, the Unbegotten One, and the Invisible and Incomprehensible Father, as they stile him, shews what they thought the Catholick Faith was, con∣cerning the Eternal Generation of the Son, and Procession of the Holy Spirit, which they took to be a Substantial Generation and Procession; and accordingly in imitation of this Faith, asserted a Substantial 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Ema∣nation of one Aeon from another; and which is more, none of the Ancient Fathers who wrote against this He∣resy, as far as I have observed, ever quarrel with them upon this account. Nay Tertullian, though he abominates these Heresies, owns this Probole or Emanation in a true Catholick Sense; and tells us, that these Hereticks bor∣rowed this word from the Catholick Faith, though they

fitted it to their Heresy: And challen∣ges any man to say whether the Divine Word be not produced by the Father;* 1.57 and if it be, Here, says he, is the Prola∣tion or Emanation, which the true Catholick Faith owns. And adds, That the fault of this Heresy was not their producing one Aeon from another, but that besides the number of their ficti∣tious Aeons, they did separate these Emanations and Aeons from their Au∣thor; that the Aeons knew not the Fa∣ther, nay, desired to know him, but could not know him; and was e'en dis∣solved with Passion and Desire; where∣as in the Catholick Faith there is the most Inseparable Union of the Son with the Father, and the most Inti∣mate and Perfect Knowledge of him. So that Tertullian allows of a Real and Substantial Production of the Person of the Son from the Person of the Father; as the Valentinians pretended of their Aeons; and as∣serts, that these Hereticks learnt this from the Catholick Faith of the Tri∣nity: And that the Church must not reject this Probole, Prolation, or Emanation, in an Or∣thodox, Catholick Use of those words, because Hereticks abuse them, to countenance their own Heresies.

As for the Noetians and Sabellians, (for however they explain the Doctrine of the Trinity, whether by Three Names, or Three Powers, or Three Parts, while they Teach, That the One God is but One Single Person, the Heresy is the same) it is impossible the Catholick Church

should reject this Heresy, without asserting Three Di∣stinct, Real, Substantial Persons in the Unity of the God∣head, each of whom is as True and Perfect God, as each of Three Men, Peter, Iames, and Iohn, is a True, Per∣fect, Distinct Man; though these Three Men are not uni∣••ed, as the Three Divine Persons are.

The occasion of this Heresy was, That they thought that Three Real Distinct Persons in the Godhead were Three Gods; and therefore, though being profess'd Christians, and consequently baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, they durst not deny Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, yet neither would they own Three Divine Persons, but turned them into Three Names, or Three Parts of One Person; which has much more sense in it than Three Modes; though Three Modes of the same Person, let them call them Three Personalities if they please, is the same Heresy, if there be but One Suppositum; as One Man may be the Subject of Three, or Three and twenty Modes, and be but One Human Person still.

Noetus and Sabellius did certainly apprehend, that by Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Catholick Church under∣stood Three Distinct, Substantial, Divine Persons, or else why should they charge them with Tritheism upon this ac∣count, and turn Three Persons into Three Names, or Three Parts of One and the same God, to avoid the Impu∣tation of Three Gods? And if this had not been the belief of the Catholick Church, what meant their Zeal against this Heresy? For all the Wit of Man can't find a Medium between Sabellianism, and Three Divine Substantial Per∣sons. A Trinity must be Three Somewhats, as it has been lately called; and then it must either be One Suppositum or Person, under Three Names, or Three Modes, or com∣pounded of Three Parts; or be Three Distinct Suppositums and Persons. Now if this had been the Catholick Faith, That the Trinity is but One Suppositum or Person, under

Three Names or Modes, &c. I cannot imagine why the Ca∣tholick Church should have quarrell'd with these Hereticks, or they with the Catholick Church, unless they both mistook one another: But if the Sabellians and Catholicks understood themselves and each other, and did intend to contradict each other, we certainly know what the Catho∣lick Faith was: For there is nothing contradicts a Noetian and Sabellian Trinity, but a Trinity, of Distinct, Substan∣tial, Divine Persons.

And Novatianus well observes, That these Hereticks did acknowledge the Divinity of Christ; That whoever Christ was, it was evident from those Characters given of him in Scripture, That he was True and Perfect God: And be∣cause the Father is True and Perfect God, and Christ True and Perfect God, for fear of owning Two Gods, they make the Father and the Son to be but One and the same Person.* 1.58

The Arians denied the Eternal Godhead of Christ, and made a Creature of him, though the most excellent Crea∣ture, the Minister and Instrument of God in making the World; and the reason of this Heresy was the same; viz. for fear of a Plurality of Gods, should they allow Christ to be True and Perfect God. And this still is a plain evidence what they thought the Catholick Faith to be; not only that Christ was True and Real God, but that he was Truly and Really a Distinct Person from God the Father; so di∣stinct, that if they should acknowledge him to be True God, he would be a Second God; which they thought contradict∣ed the Faith of One God.

Well: Though they would not own him to be True God, yet they own him to be a distinct Person from the Fa∣ther, as distinct as God and a Creature are distinct. Do the Catholicks now quarrel with the Arians, that they have made a Substantial Person of the Son (as in reason t••ey ought to have done, had th••y not believed the Son to be a distinct Substantial Person); this Dispute we hear nothing of; but the only Dispute was concerning the Con∣substantiality of the Son with the Father; and that proves, that they did own the Son to be a Substantial Person; for were he not in a true proper sense a Person, and a Substan∣tial Person, he could not be Consubstantial with the Father.

Nay, St Austin expresly tells us, That Arius agreed with the Catholicks against the Sabellians,* 1.59 in making the Son a distinct Person from the Father; and if so, the Catholicks taught, That the Son was as distinct a Person as Arius did, though not a Separate and Created Person, as he did.

Now when Arius would have reduced Christ into the number of Creatures, though he made him the first and most excellent Creature, created before the World, and God's Minister in making the World, as like to God as a Creature can possibly be, but not of the same Nature with God; the Catholick Church would not bear this, but in a most Venerable Synod collected from most parts of the Christian World, condemn this as contrary to the Faith al∣ways received and owned in their several Churches.

Thus far, at least, the Tradition of the Church was Sa∣cred and Venerable, and the concurrent Testimony of all these several Churches, was a more certain Proof of the Apostolick Faith, than all the Wit and Subtilty of Arius: For Wit may patronize New Errors, but cannot prove That to be the Ancient Apostolick Faith, which the Church had never received from the Apostles, nor ever heard of before.

This I take to be a very sensible Proof what the Faith of the Christian Church was, from the Times of the Apo∣stles till the Council of Nice; and consequently, what that Faith was which the Church received from the Apostles: And this abundantly satisfies me, That whatever loose Ex∣pressions we may meet with in some of the Fathers, before the Arian Controversy was started, and managed with great Art and Subtilty (though I know of none but what are capable of a very Orthodox Sense), it is certain that they were not Arians, nor intended any such thing in what they said. For had Arianism been the Traditionary Faith of the Church, it must have been known to be so; and then how came the Church to be so strangely alarm'd at the first news of it? Or what shall we think of those Ve∣nerable Fathers and Confessors in that Great Council, who either did not know the Faith of the Church, or did so horribly prevaricate in the Condemnation of Arius, when they had no other apparent Interest or Temptation to do so, but a Warm and Hearty Zeal for the Truly Ancient and Apostolick Faith?

It is certain Arius never pretended Catholick Tradition for his Opinion, but undertook to reform the Catholick Faith by the Principles of Philosophy, and to reconcile it to Scripture by new-coin'd Interpretations; though in this he fail'd, and found the Great Athanasius an over-match for him.

It is not with Faith, as it is with Arts and Sciences of Human Invention, which may be improved in every Age by greater Wits or new Observations; but Faith depends upon Revelation, not Invention; and we can no more make a New Catholick Faith, by the power of Wit and Reason, than we can write a True History of what the Apostles did and taught, out of our own Invention, with∣out the Authority of any Ancient Records: Men may do such things if they please, but one will be Heresy, and the other a Romance.

And yet this is the bold and brave Attempt of Secinus and his Disciples: They are so modest indeed, as not to pretend Antiquity to be on their side; they can find no other Antiquity for themselves, but in Cerinthus and Ebion, who separated from the Catholick Church, and were re∣jected by them; and it does not seem very modest, to set up such men as these, against the Universal Consent of the first and purest Ages of the Church.

The Socinians, who know very well what the Charge of Novelty signifies in matters of Religion; That a New Faith is but another Name for New Heresies; Though they re∣ject the Doctrine of the Fathers, and the Catholick Tradi∣tion of the Faith from the Apostolick Age, yet they ap∣peal to Scripture and Natural Sentiments, as the greatest and best Antiquity, in opposition to Apostolick Tradition. This is our Considerer's way, which he prefers before a Traditionary Faith; and by the same reason the Socinians may oppose it to a Traditionary Faith: And if we must always expound Scripture by our Natural Sentiments, this Author had best consider whether he can prove a Trinity by Natural Reason; or fairly reconcile the Natural Notion of One God, with the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, or of Three, each of whom is True and P••rfect God, from the mere Principles of Natural Reason; for if he can't, he must not in his way find a Trinity in Scripture: But of this more hereafter.

3. Let us now, in opposition to this pretence, consider of what Authority the Traditionary Faith of the Catholick Church ought to be, in expounding Scripture.

The Holy Scripture, at least in pretence, is allowed on all hands to be a Compleat and Authentick Rule of Faith; but the question is, since men differ so much in expounding Scripture, What is the safest Rule to expound Scripture by; whether the Traditionary Faith of the Church, or our Na∣tural Sentiments, or Natural Reason?

I do not mean, that we must learn the Critical Sense of every Text from Catholick Tradition; for we have not in all points such a Traditionary Exposition of Scripture; though even in this respect, we shall find that the Catho∣lick Fathers have unanimously agreed in the Interpretation of the most material Texts relating to the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and the Divinity and Incarnation of Christ. They sometimes indeed alledge such Texts, especially out of the Old Testament, as our Modern Criticks will not allow to be proper and apposite; but even this shews what their Faith was; and yet these very Expositions, which have been so anciently and unanimously received (though they may appear at this distance of time too forc'd and mystical) have too Sacred and Venerable an Authority to be wantonly rejected. We may learn from Christ and his Apostles, what mysterious and hidden Senses were contain'd in the Writings of the Old Testament, such as it is very probable we should never have found in them, had not Christ and his Apostles explained their meaning: And the nearer any Writers were to the Apostolick Age, the more they were addicted to these Mystical Interpretations; which is a good reason to believe that they learnt it from the Apostles themselves.

But this is not what I now intend; my present Argu∣ment reaches no farther than this; That if we can learn what the Doctrine of the Catholick Church concerning the Holy Trinity, and the Divinity and Incarnation of Christ has always been: Then

1. It is very reasonable to conclude, That they received this Doctrine from the Apostles, it being the Faith of those Churches which were planted by the Apostles, received their Faith from them, and always lived in Communion with them.

2. This makes it reasonable to believe, that this very Faith is contained in the Writings of the New Testament; for, I suppose, no man questions, but that the Apostles taught the same Faith by Writing, which they did by Preaching; and then this is a Demonstration against all such Interpretations of Scripture as contradict the Catholick Faith; whatever fine Colours Wit and Criticism may give them. Nay,

3. It is a certain Proof, That these Primitive Christians, who received these Inspired Writings from the Apostles which now make up the Canon of the New Testament, did believe that the same Faith which the Apostles and Apostolical men had taught them by Word of Mouth, was contained in their Writings; for they could not possibly have believed both what the Apostles taught, and what they writ, if their Preaching and Writings had contradict∣ed each other. We know what the Faith of the Primi∣tive Church was, and we know they received these Apo∣stolical Writings with the profoundest Veneration, as an Inspired Rule of Faith; and had we no other presumption of it but this, we might safely conclude, That they found the same Faith in these Writings, which the Apostles had before taught them by Word of Mouth.

But besides this, we find that all the Catholick Writers appeal to the Scriptures, and prove their Faith from them; and the Authority of such men who were so near the Foun∣tain of Apostolick Tradition, must be very Venerable.

4. I shall only add this, That since we know what the Catholick Faith was, and how the Catholick Fathers ex∣pounded Scripture, if the Words of Scripture will natu∣rally and easily admit that Sense, much more if they will not admit any other Sense without great force and violence, let any man judge which is most safe and reasonable, to expound Scripture as the Catholick Faith and Catholick Fathers expound it, and as the Scripture most easily and na∣turally

expounds it self, or to force New Senses and Old Heresies upon Scripture, which the Catholick Church has always rejected and condemned.

This, I hope, may satisfy our Considerer, that he did very ill in rejecting a Traditionary Faith, and venturing to expound Scripture by his Natural Sentiments, which is a very Unsafe Rule in Matters of Pure Revelation, of which mere Natural Reason is no competent Judge.

SECT. III. What is sufficient to be believed concerning the Trinity.

THus far, I fear, our Considerer has been a little un∣fortunate; or if it do not prove a Misfortune to him in forming his Notion of a Trinity, his Luck is better than his Choice.

* 1.60Let us proceed to his next Enquiry, What is sufficient for Christians to believe concerning the Trinity; or, which is all one in this case, what is necessary to be believed? What the meaning of this Question is, I can't well tell; nor why he makes sufficient and necessary all one; for, at least, they are not always so. That is sufficient which is enough for any man to believe; that is strictly necessary which every man must believe: But let him take his own way; he quits the Term sufficient, and enquires what is necessary to be belie∣ved; whereas in many cases, that which is absolutely ne∣cessary for all, may not be sufficient for some: I should much rather have enquired how much may be known concerning this Glorious Mystery, than how little will serve the turn; which argues no great Zeal for it.

Well: What is necessary to be believed concerning the Trinity? He answers, Nothing but 1. What's possible to be believed. And 2. What's plainly revealed.

Here we begin to see what the effect is, of consulting nothing but Scripture and Natural Sentiments. I hope he meant honestly in this; but if he did, he expressed him∣self very incautiously; for these two Conditions are very ill put together, when applied to matters of Revelation. Plainly revealed, had been enough in all reason, unless he would insinuate, that what is plainly revealed may be im∣possible to be believed; and that how plain soever the Re∣velation be, men must judge of the possibility of the thing by their own Natural Sentiments, before they are bound to believe it; which makes Natural Reason, not Scripture, the final Judge of Controversies.

But we must follow him where he leads us; and thus he divides his whole Work. 1. To consider how far it is possi∣ble to believe a Trinity. 2. What the Scripture requires us to believe in this matter.

As for the first, he tells us, There are two requisites to make it possible for us to believe a thing. 1. That we know the Terms of what we are to assent to. 2. That it imply no Contradiction to our former Knowledge: Such Knowledge I mean, as is accompanied with Certainty and Evidence.

This in some sense may be true; but as it is thus loosely and generally expressed, it is very like the Socinian Cant and Sophistry.

By knowing the Terms, he means having distinct Natu∣ral Ideas of what is signified by such Terms; as he himself explains it;* 1.61 — I can believe it no farther than the Terms of which it is made up, are known and understood, and the Ideas signified by them consistent. So that all Divine Myste∣ries must be examined by our Natural Ideas; and what we have no Natural Ideas of, we cannot, we must not believe: And this once for all condemns all Supernatural Faith, or the belief of Supernatural Objects, though never so plain∣ly revealed; for we have no Natural Ideas of Supernatu∣ral Objects: And though Revelation may furnish us from

the Resemblances and Analogies in Nature with some Arti∣ficial Ideas, this will not serve the turn; for though they know what such Terms signify when applied to Natural, they know not what they signify when applied to Superna∣tural Objects, nor have they any Ideas to answer them: As for Instance; We know what Father and Son signify when applied to Men; but when we say, God is not only Eter∣nal himself, but an Eternal Father, who begot an Eternal Son; these Terms of Father and Son, begetting and being begotten, must signify quite otherwise than they do among men, something which we have no Idea of; and therefore say the Socinians, All this is unintelligible and impossible to be believed, unless we can believe without understanding the Terms: This Considerer asserts the Premises, he had best consider again how he will avoid the Conclusion.

Another Socinian Topick is Contradiction, and this our Considerer makes another requisite to the possibility of be∣lieving, That the thing do not imply a Contradiction to our former knowledge; that is, to any Natural Ideas: And here he learnedly disputes against believing Contradictions; and that it is not consistent with the Wisdom, Iustice, and Goodness of God to require us to believe Contradictions.* 1.62 But if instead of all this he had only said, That God cannot reveal such plain and evident Contradictions, as he cannot require us to believe; and consequently, That whatever is plainly revealed, implies no Contradiction, how much soever it may be above our comprehension, because God does require us to believe what he plainly reveals; this had put an end to this Dispute, and left the belief of the Trinity possible, whatever difficulties we might apprehend in con∣ceiving it: But this great Zeal against believing Contra∣dictions, when applied to the belief of the Trinity, is a very untoward Insinuation, as if the Doctrine of the Tri∣nity, as commonly understood, were clogg'd with Con∣tradictions, and that we must cast all such Contradictions

(which in the Socinian account is the Doctrine it self) out of our Faith; and therefore, That whatever the Scripture says, we must put no such sense on it as implies any Contra∣diction to our former knowledge. This is an admirable Foun∣dation for Considerations concerning the Trinity; and what an admirable Superstructure he has rais'd on it, we shall soon see.

I may possibly discourse this Point of Contradictions more at large elsewhere; at present I shall only tell this Author, That as self-evident as he thinks it, this Proposi∣tion is false, That it is impossible to believe what implies a Contradiction to our former knowledge; and that God cannot require us to believe it.

I grant that all Logical Contradictions which are resol∣ved into is, and is not, are impossible to be believed, because they are impossible to be true; and such is his Contradicti∣on about the Whole and its Parts; for to say, That the Whole is not bigger than any of its Parts, is to say, That a Whole is a Whole, and is not a Whole; and that a Part is a Part, and is not a Part. But contradictory Ideas may both be true, and therefore both be believed, and every man believes great numbers of them: The Ideas of Heat and Cold, White and Black, Body and Spirit, Extension and No Extension, Eternity and Time, to have A Beginning and to have No Beginning, are contradicto∣ry Ideas, and yet we believe them all; that is, we be∣lieve and know that there really are such things, whose Natures are directly opposite and contrary to each other. Now when there are such Contrarieties and Contradictions in Created Nature, it may justly be thought very strange to true Considerers, that our Natural Ideas should be made the adequate measures of Truth or Falshood, of the Possibilities or Impossibilities of things; that we must not believe what God reveals concerning himself, if it contra∣dicts any Natural Ideas. And yet I challenge this Consi∣derer, and all the Socinian, Sabellian, Arian Fraternities,

to shew me any appearance of Contradictions in the Do∣ctrine of the Trinity, but what are of this kind; that is, not Logical Contradictions, but Contradictions to our other Natural Ideas: And if our Natural Ideas of Created Nature contradict each other, it would be wonderful in∣deed if the Divine Uncreated Nature should not contra∣dict all our Natural Ideas. Every thing we know of God is a direct Contradiction to all the Ideas we have of Crea∣tures; an Uncreated and a Created Nature, an Infinite and a Finite Nature, are direct Contradictions to each other: Eternity without Succession, Omnipresence with∣out Extension, Parts, or Place; a pure simple Act, which is all in one, without Composition; an Omnipotent Thought, which thinks all things into Being, and into a Beautiful Order; these and such like Ideas of God are di∣rect Contradictions to all the Ideas we have of Creatures; and can any Contradiction then to any Ideas of Created Nature be thought a reasonable Objection against believing any thing which God reveals to us concerning himself? But of this more hereafter.

SECT. IV. Concerning his State of the Question, That One and the Same God is Three Different Persons.

THese are his Preliminaries, Axioms, Postulata's, all in the strict demonstrative way; but now he comes to apply all this more closely to the business in hand; but then he very unfortunately stumbles at the Threshold.

The Proposition he proposes to examine by these Princi∣ples, is this, That One and the same God is Three Different Persons.* 1.63

Where he met with this Proposition in these very Terms, I know not; I'm sure there is no such Proposition in Scri∣pture, nor did I ever meet with it in any Catholick Wri∣ter: It is very far from giving us a true and adequate Noti∣on of the Catholick Faith concerning the Trinity; it is of a doubtful signification, and in the most obvious sense of these words (which I fear will appear to have been intend∣ed by this Considerer) is manifest Heresy: For if by One and the same God, he means, That there is but One who is God; and, That this One and same God is Three different Persons; it is the Heresy of Sabellius at least, if he would have owned the Term different, which inclines more to the signification of diversity, than of mere distinction, which savours of Arianism, and more properly relates to Natures than to Persons.

We meet with different forms of speech in Catholick Writers concerning the Unity and Trinity in the God∣head, all which must be reconciled, to form a distinct and compleat Notion of the Trinity. That Deus. est Vnus & Trinus, God is One and Three, is very Ancient, and very Catholick. That the Father is the One God, in a peculiar and eminent sense, is both the Language of Scripture, and of the Church. That each Person, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is by himself True and Perfect God, is likewise the Doctrine both of the Holy Scriptures, and the Catho∣lick Fathers. That the Trinity is One God; That Father and Son are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Vnum, One Divinity, Christ himself teaches us: That Father, Son, and Spirit, are also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One, St. Iohn teaches us. And nothing is more familiar both with the Greek and Latin Fathers, than to call the Trinity One God; and in consequence of this, That One God is the Trinity; though this they rather chose to express by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Divinity in Three Per∣sons. And whoever would give an account of the Catho∣lick Faith of the Trinity, must have respect to all these No∣tions,

and not content himself with any one of them, as, to make the best of it, the Considerer here does, when he only proposes to enquire, How One and the same God is Three Persons: But he ought to have enquired also in what sense each Person is by himself True and Perfect God; and the Person of the Father in a peculiar and eminent sense the One God; and to have framed his Notions of Unity and Distinction with an equal regard to all these Catholick Ex∣positions; which would have secured him from the Sabel∣lian Heresy, which now his Words are very guilty of, whatever He himself be.

But let us now proceed to his Examination of these Terms, God, Vnity, Identity, Distinction, and Number, and Person.

* 1.64As to the Notion of a Deity, he confesses he has not a ful•• and adequate Idea of God; but yet he knows which of those distinct Ideas he has in his mind, are applicable to God, and which are not. But the present question does not conce••n the Idea of God, which I hope we are all agreed in, That God is a Being infinitely perfect: But whether this Name God, in the Question of the Trinity, signifies only One who is God, or One single Divine Person? Or, Whether this Name, and the perfect Idea which belongs to it, be appli∣cable distinctly to Three, to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; That each of them is True and Perfect God, and neither of them is each other, and all Three but One God? This had been the true Explication of the Term God, as applied to the Doctrine of the Trinity, To have told us what is meant by God, when this Name is peculiarly attributed to the Person of the Father, when it is attributed to each Person distinctly, and when it is jointly attributed to them all, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God: ••t is certain all this must be resolved into the same One Di∣vinity, which is perfectly in each of them, and insepara••ly and indivisibly in them all: And the true stating of his

matter had been very proper, and would have saved all his other Labour. And therefore to save me some labour, I will briefly tell him how the Catholick Fathers under∣stood it; which is the only possible way I know, of recon∣ciling these different Expressions.

When they tell us, That the Person of the Father is in an eminent and peculiar manner the One God; by this they understand, That the Father alone is self-originated, and from himself; That the Whole Divinity and Godhead is originally his own, which he received from no other: Which is the first and most natural notion we have of God, and of One God.

When they say, That though the Father in this sense be the One God, yet the Son also is True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost True and Perfect God, they ascribe Divinity to the Son and Holy Ghost, upon account of the Eternal and Perfect Communication of the Divine Nature to them: For he who has the True Divine Nature, is True and Perfect God: And therefore the Son, who is eternally begotten of his Father, of the Substance of his Father, and is Consubstantial with him, is True and Perfect God, but God of God; and the like may be said of the Holy Spirit, who eternally proceeds from Father and Son.

When they teach, That the Trinity is One God, they mean by it, That the same One Divinity does subsist whole and entire, indivisibly and inseparably, but yet distinctly in them all, as I have already explained it: So that the Uni∣ty of the Godhead gives an account of all these Expressi∣ons, Why the Father is said to be the One God, and yet that the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost God, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One God. All this is taught in Scripture, and is the Faith of the Catholick Church; and I would never desire a better Proof of the Truth and Cer∣tainty of any Notion, than that it takes in the whole My∣stery,

and answers to every part of it; which no other account I have ever yet met with, can do.

SECT. V. An Examination of his Notions and Ideas of Unity, Distinction, Person, &c.

AND now the Sabellian Scene opens apace: If the He∣resy of Sabellius was, That there is but One who is God, but One Divine Intelligent Person, as well as One Divine Nature, this our Considerer expresly owns, and does his Endeavour to prove it absolutely impossible that it should be otherwise; that is, That the Catholick Faith, asserted and defended by the Catholick Church, against Sabellius, is absolutely impossible.

* 1.65To explain the word Person, he tells us, It signifies one of these two things; either a particular Intelligent Being; or an Office, Character, or some such complex Notion, applicable to such a Being: If you would know in which of these senses we must understand the word Person, when we say there are Three Persons in the Trinity;* 1.66 he tells us plainly, That the simple Idea (of God) can be applied but to One single Person, in the first sense of the word Person, as it signifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, or Principle. — And that all the Personal Distinction we can conceive in the Deity, must be founded on some accessory Ideas, extrinsecal to the Di∣vine Nature; a certain Combination of which Ideas, makes up the second Notion signified by the word Person.

And for this he appeals to Natural Sentiments, mista∣king Heresy for Nature. And if we fairly and impartially examine our own Thoughts upon this Subject, we shall find, That when we name God the Father, we conceive the Idea of God, so far as we are capable of conceiving it, as acting so and

so, under such respects and relations; and when we name God the Son, we conceive nothing else but the same Idea of God over again, under different relations; and so likewise of the Holy Ghost. Noetus, Praxeas, or Sabellius, never taught their Heresy in more express words than these.

And what is to be done now? Must we dispute this Point over again with the Considerer, and confute a Heresy which has been so early, so often, and so constantly con∣demned by the Catholick Church? For my part, I can pre∣tend to say nothing new, which has not long since been much better said by the Catholick Fathers; and therefore before we part, I shall acquaint him with their Judgment in the Case, and leave it to rest on their Authority and Reasons.

But it may not be amiss to mind this Considerer, That he has all the Schoolmen (as far as I have heard, or had op∣portunity to consult them) as well as the Catholick Fa∣thers, against him, in his Notion of a Person; for they all receive Boetius's Definition, That a Person is an Individual Substance of a Rational Nature. Or it may be the Authority of Melancthon may be more considerable with him; who tells us, That the Church in this Article of the Trinity understands by Person, an Individual,* 1.67 Intelligent, Incommunicable Substance: And adds, That the Ancient Ecclesia∣stical Writers distinguish between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that there is but One Es∣sence or Nature, and Three Hypostases; that is, Three really subsisting, not com∣mentitious, vanishing, confused, but distinct, particular, Intelligent Persons. And the Cen∣sure he passes upon Servetus upon this score, is very re∣markable.

That Fanatical Fellow Servetus plaid with the word Person,* 1.68 and con∣tended, That in Latin it anciently sig∣nified a Dress or Habit, or the distin∣ction of an Office; as R••scius is some∣times said to act the part of Achilles, sometimes of Vlysses: Or, the Person of a Consul is one thing, and the Person of a Slave is another, as Cicero speaks; that it is a great thing to maintain the Character of the Person of a Prince in the Commonwealth: And this Ancient Signification of the Word he slily wrested and applied to the Article concerning the Three Per∣sons of the Godhead: But let us fly from, and abhor such wicked Artifi∣ces; and know, That the Church speaks after another manner; and that Person signifies an Individual, Intelli∣gent, Incommunicable Substance. And it will be of great use to form and fix this Notion in our minds; to contemplate the Baptism of Christ, where all Three Persons were most evidently represented and di∣stinguished: The Father spoke in an audible Voice, This is my beloved Son; the Son is seen standing in the River; and the Holy Spirit descends on him in a visible Appear∣ance.

But since the Considerer makes a great Flourish with his Ideas, and clear and distinct Conceptions, and fetches his Proofs from the most intimate knowledge of Nature, he may take it ill if no notice or regard be had of them: We see very well where he has been trading; and I doubt the Ingenious Author of Human Vnderstanding, will have more Disciples of different kinds than he was well aware of, in

whom he will have no great reason to glory: For it re∣quires more Skill than every man is Master of, to form simple and distinct Notions and Ideas, and to apply them dexterously to their proper Subjects. And to refer all men to Natural Ideas and Perceptions, when so very few know how to distinguish between Natural Notions, and the Preju∣dices and Prepossessions of Education, the Delusions of Fancy, and the Byass of Inclination, is like the Quakers appeal to the Light within, which is just what every man will have it to be.

Our Considerer reduces all the Notions he can find of Vnity and Distinction, to Three Heads: The Unity or Di∣stinction of Ideas, of Principle, and of Position; and un∣dertakes to prove from them all, That it is impossible, or absolutely unconceivable, that there should be more than One Intelligent Person, in the proper Notion of a Person, in the Godhead.

Now in the first place I would be glad to hear a good reason why the Considerer takes no notice of that old re∣ceived definition of One, that Vnum est Indivisum; that is One, which is Undivided: The most perfect One is that which neither is nor can be divided; an absolute perfect Monad, which is absolutely and perfectly Simple, without any Parts to be divided into: And this is the Unity of the Divine Nature, as Scripture, Fathers, Schoolmen, and all men of improved and exercised Reason teach; and it is strange he should not find this Notion of Unity among all his Natural Ideas, which is the only Natural Notion of the Divine Unity, and belongs to no other Being. And this would have given him a true Catholick Notion of the Uni∣ty of God in a Trinity of Persons; for all agree, That the Divine Nature is indivisibly and inseparably One.

And this is another thing I would be glad to know the reason of, Why in such an Enquiry concerning the Unity and Distinction of the Trinity, he takes no notice of that

Old Catholick distinction, That God is One in Nature, and Three in Persons; which would have been a good direction to him, what kind of Unity, and what distinction to have enquired after: What Unity belongs to Nature, and what it is which distinguishes Persons: But our Considerer has no regard to the different Notions of Nature and Person, but applies all his Notions of Unity to a Person, which as far as they are true, belong to Nature, and from the Unity of Nature proves against the Catholick Faith, that there can be but One proper Divine Person.

And there is one thing I am sorry for, That having men∣tioned a very good Notion, he let it slip between his fingers without making any use of it.* 1.69 He tells us, That Identity is nothing else but a repetition of Vnity, as Number is of dif∣ference. This is very Catholick, and it is great pity we hear no more of it. Upon this Principle the Fathers justi∣fy the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons: For the Divine Nature is but One, a perfect Monad, and is communicated whole and entire, without the least Divi∣sion or Separation, to the Son and Holy Spirit, and there∣fore is perfectly and identically one and the same in all Three; for the perfect repetition of a Monad and Unit makes no Number: God, and God, and God, are not Three Gods, but One God, because the same Divine Na∣ture, without the least difference or diversity, is distinctly in them all; and the repetition of what is perfectly the same, makes no Number; but Father, Son, and Ho∣ly Ghost are three, for they are really distinguished from each other, not by any difference of Nature, but only by Personal differences, or the different manner of having the same Nature: That the Father has the Whole Divine Nature originally in himself, is God of himself: The Son receives the same Divine Nature by an Eternal Generation, and is God of God: And the Holy Ghost in like manner by an Eternal Procession from Father and Son: This incom∣municably

distinguishes Persons, that one can never be another; and this is difference enough to make a Number; not to make Three Gods of them, because the Divine Na∣ture is perfectly One and the same in Three, but to distin∣guish them into Three Persons, each of whom is True and Perfect God, and all but One God. Why the Considerer should wave such a Notion as this of Unity and Distincti∣on, which any one would have thought his own Notions of Identity and Number must unavoidably have led him into, I cannot guess; but I hope this may satisfy him, that there are other Notions of Unity and Distinction, than what he insists on, and such as may be as easily understood, and which fairly reconcile the belief of Three proper Divine Intelli∣gent Persons, with the Unity of the Godhead: But let us now briefly consider his Ideas of Unity and D••stinction.

1. The first is, The Vnity of Idea: This he discourses of very confusedly,* 1.70 and does not seem well pleased with it himself: The Unity of the Idea he places in being perceiva∣ble at one view, and having one uniform appearance: Which makes it one Idea indeed, right or wrong, but proves no other kind of Unity: This he grew sensible of, that the reality of things may not answer our Ideas or Appearances; and I know not how they sh••uld, unless our Ideas answer the Reality of Things; for Things are to be the Patterns for our Ideas, not our Ideas for Things.

But the Considerer, by forsaking his good old Rules, for new Methods of Thinking, has quite mistaken the Questi∣on. When we enquire into the general Notion of Unity, the meaning is not, When we conceive of any thing as One, but what it is that makes any thing One. The Unity of Idea, whether simple or compounded, may be Answer enough to the first Question, Tha•• a••l that is comprized in one Idea, if our Idea be right, belongs to one thing; but, as he owns, we cannot prove that our Idea answers the

Reality of Things, and therefore I know not what this Rule is good for at all. But our general Notion of Unity is of a very different Consideration; and our particular Ideas of particular Things, contribute nothing to it: For the question is not, How many Things are united in One Being? or, How many partial Conceptions are united in One Idea? But, What it is that makes it One; or what the formal Conception of its Unity is?

But our Considerer takes heart at last, from the Unity of the Idea of God, to prove that there can be but One Di∣vine Person in a proper sense; or but One who is True and Perfect God.* 1.71 His Argument is this; We cannot conceive that any Object should be truly and adequately represented to any Mind or Vnderstanding under One Idea, and truly and adequately represented under Three Ideas. And what is the Cons••quence of this? That he tells us plainly, That all the Perfections (of the Deity) though considered separate∣ly under different apprehensions by our imperfect Faculties,* 1.72 being really but One simple Idea, can be applied to but One sin∣gle Person, in the first sense of the word Person, as it signifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, and Principle.

1. Now in the first place this Argument supposes an Idea which truly and adequately represent its Object, and yet our Considerer is so modest as not to pretend to a full and ade∣quate Idea of God: And therefore, according to his own way, he can never conclude from the Idea of God, That it can belong but to One single Person, because he has not an adequate Idea of the Divine Nature; and then there may be something in the Idea of God, which he does not comprehend, which may make it applicable to more Per∣sons than one. Certainly it seems very reasonable, when we confess that we have not an adequate Idea of the D••∣vine Nature, to refer this whole Dispute, not to Natural Ideas, which can never determine it, but to Revelation,

which is more certain and more perfect than our Natural Knowledge.

2. I grant, That One Object cannot be truly and adequate∣ly represented to my mind under One Idea, and truly and ade∣quately represented under Three different Ideas: But it is as true, That One and the same Idea may be truly and ade∣quately applied to Three distinct and different Persons: The adequate Idea of Peter can be applied to none but Peter▪ but the Idea of Man, or of Human Nature, may be truly and adequately applied to Peter, Iames, and Iohn, and to every single human Person in the world.

The Idea of God, as abstracted from the Consideration of a Trinity of Persons, is only the Idea of the Divine Nature, which is but One, and can never be Three diffe∣rent Natures; for the Divine Nature always was, and al∣ways will be but One and the same; and this is that One Object which is adequately, in his sense, represented by One Idea. And this is the account the Catholick Fathers give of the Unity of God, That there is but One Divinity, One Divine Nature in Three Persons; and thus the Trinity is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the One Divinity, that One Object re∣presented by the One Idea of God. The Divine Persons are not distinguished by any difference of Nature, which is One and the same in all, but by Personal differences; That the Father is unbegotten, the Son begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son: These are Three different Ideas for the Three Divine Persons; but the Idea of the Divinity is but One, as the Divine Nature is One and the same in all.

Could he indeed prove, That the Idea of God is not on∣ly One simple Idea, but the Idea of One single Person, that would be somewhat more to the purpose; it would be such an Argument against a Trinity of Persons, from the Idea of God, as Necessary Existence, as included in the Idea of God, is for the Being of God: But this he can never

prove; and at best, these Arguments from Ideas are thought too fine and subtle by most men.

2. His next kind of Unity is a Vnity of Principle; that is One thing, which has but One Principle of Action: And we cannot conceive that One Principle or Nature should be but One,* 1.73 and yet Three different Principles and Natures. But I suppose he can conceive, That if One and the same undivided Principle and Nature be and act in Three, these Three are One by the Unity of Principle and Nature. And this is the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, not Three different Principles and Natures in Three Persons, but One and the same Principle and Nature, inseparably and indivi∣sibly subsisting and acting in Three: Upon account of which Identity of Principle and Operation, the Catholick Fathers asserted but One Life, Energy, and Power, not confusedly, but distinctly in Three; which asserts the Unity of Principle, together with the real distinction of true and proper Persons. If indeed he can prove from his Vnity of Principle, That One Nature and Principle can live, subsist, and act but in One; such a Unity of Principle as this, will admit but of One single Person, and must overthrow the Catholick Faith of a Real Trinity. But though the Unity of Principle does prove That to be but One, which has but One Principle; it does not prove, That this One Nature and Principle can be but in One.

3. His Third kind of Unity is very surprizing, especi∣ally as applied to the Unity of God; it is the Unity of Position,* 1.74 of Place, or of Vbi. When we perceive any Object in a continued Position, bounded and fenced out from other things round about it, all within such Terms and Limits we call One. Bless me! thought I; How is this applicable to the Unity of God? who has no Body, no Parts, no continued Position; can't be bounded and fenced round about, nor confined within Terms and Limits; and therefore can never have this Vnity of Position, which is a very sorry kind of Unity at best.

His Philosophy belonging to this Head is very admira∣ble; but to let that pass, he would not be thought to at∣tribute Extension to Spirits;* 1.75 but the Idea of a Point is more applicable to Spiritual Beings; but a Physical Point is ex∣tended still, though it be the least conceivable Extension, and has parts, and therefore can't represent simple Unity, and is the Idea of Body, not of Spirit. Nor does he think local presence or determination any way contained within the Idea of a Spiritual Being, and therefore this can't belong to the Unity of a Spirit. Well: But he is not able to comprehend the Vnion or Separation of Two Spiritual Beings,* 1.76 without con∣sidering them in the same or different Localities.

I know not how to help this, that he can't conceive of Spirits, but only after the manner of Bodies. Are Spirits united by Juxta-position of Parts, or Penetration of Di∣mensions? If not, One Vbi can't unite them, though Se∣parate Vbi's may prove them Separate.

But still what is all this to the Unity of God? Why, he tells us, It is plain at first sight,* 1.77 that we cannot possibly conceive God under any difference of Position: I add further, That we cannot conceive God under any Position, and therefore the Unity of Position can never belong to the Vnity of God. But the reason he gives why we can't conceive God under any difference of Position, is, because we cannot exclude Omnipo∣tence from any imaginable point of Space; nor can we include it in it; which proves that God has no Position, but is pre∣sent without Position, as he is without Extension, and without Parts. God needs no place to subsist in, but is Place to himself, and Place to every thing else; as the Hebrews called God Mak••m, or Place; according to S. Paul's Notion of it, That in him we live, move, and have our being; that as all things receive Being by his Almighty Word, so all things subsist in Infinite Mind, as the Ideas and Notions of things do in Finite Minds. God could not create any thing without himself, because

there is nothing extra without him; and this is the Omni∣presence of God, not his Commensuration to Infinite Space; which is a gross Corporeal Representation of Omnipre∣sence by Infinite Extension, or Commensuration to Infinite Extension, and makes something else as Infinite as God, viz. Infinite Space, which must be commensurate to God, if God be commensurate to Space; but the Omnipresence of God is his Comprehension of all things in himself.

And yet his way of proving the Omnipresence of God from his Omnipotence, That we cannot exclude Omnipotence from any imaginable Point of Space, if by Omnipresence he means an Essential Omnipresence, as he must do here, is not so self-evident as he seems to think it: The only foundation of it is this, That nothing can act where it is not; which holds true only where Contact is necessary to Action, that is, only in Bodies, whose Power consists in Contact, or touching each other; but any Being which acts without Contact, as God certainly does, may be Omnipotent, without being Omnipresent; that is, may act at an Infi∣nite distance, without any Local Presence with the thing on which it acts. It is the first time, to the best of my re∣membrance, that ever I met with this Notion, That 'tis the limited Powers and Faculties of Created Beings, which are the foundation of all local distinction.* 1.78 Finite Creatures in∣deed have finite and limited Powers; but it is not the limi∣tation of their Powers and Faculties, but of their Presence, which makes a local or Vbi distinction: If this were so, Power must be proportioned to Presence, which we know is false; for the greatest things, which fill the largest space, are not the most powerful: Spirits, which fill no space at all, have the greatest Power, and most enlarged Faculties.

But it is time to see the Pinch of this Argument from the Vnity of Position; and the Sum of it is this: Whatever is One, must be in some One Place or Vbi, which distin∣guishes and separates it from other things: That he cannot

conceive the distinction of two or three Beings from each other, without considering them in so many different Pla∣ces or Localities: That God is Omnipresent,* 1.79 and he can no more conceive Three Omnipresent, than he can conceive Three straight Lines drawn between the same Points. That is, in plain English, There are not Three Distinct Infinite Spaces for Three Distinct Omnipresent Persons to be in, and there∣fore there cannot be a Trinity of True and Proper Persons; but as there is but One Omnipresent Divine Nature, so there can be but One single Omnipresent Person; and there is an end of the Trinity, till we can find room in the world for Three Persons, each of whom is Omnipresent.

I perceive our Considerer has not been so fair and equal as he pretended to be. He would not consult the Fathers, for fear of Prejudices and Prepossessions; but either good Wits jump, or he has taken care to consult the Ancient He∣reticks; for this was the old Sabellian Argument, which was long since answered and scorned by Athanasius; as he will find in the Chapter of Sabellianism, to which I refer him and the Reader.

But in good earnest, does any sober Christian want an Answer to this Argument? Does God then fill a Space, as Bodies do, that Three Divine Omnipresent Persons must have Three separate Localities, and be commensurate to Three Infinite Spaces? Has God any Place; does he sub∣sist in any thing but himself? If the Considerer can't con∣ceive any Beings to be distinct without distinct Localities, How does he distinguish God from Creatures, when he owns that God is in every imaginable Point of Space, that is, in the very same Vbi's and Localities, whereever any Creatures are?

But do not all Catholick Christians own, That there is but One Infinite, Inseparable, Undivided Nature, in Three Persons? And must this One Undivided Monad be in Three separate Localities, because it subsists in three distinct Per∣sons?

especially when these distinct Persons are whole and entire in each other; as our Saviour assures us, I am in the Father, and the Father in me. And is not this a won∣derful demonstration against Three Real and Proper Per∣sons in the Trinity, That there cannot be Three such Infi∣nite Omnipresent Persons, unless they subsist in Three Infi∣nite and Separate Localities? But enough of this in all reason.

These are the Premises, from whence with so much open Assurance and Confidence he draws that Sabellian Conclu∣sion,* 1.80 That the Idea of God being really but One simple Idea, can be applied but to One single Person, in the first sense of the word Person, as it signifies a particular Intelligent Being, Nature, or Principle. — From whence, he says, it follows, that according to the Notions we are capable of framing of Vnity and Distinction, — all the Personal distinction we can conceive in the Deity, must be founded on some accessory Ideas, extrinsecal to the Divine Nature. So that there is not a Tri∣nity in the Divine Nature, as the Catholick Church has al∣ways believed; but the Divine Nature, which really is but One single Person, is a Trinity with respect to something which does not belong to the Divine Nature, but is extrin∣secal to it. Whether these be not New Terms and New Do∣ctrine too, unknown to the Catholick Church, or known only as condemned Heresies, I appeal to all men, who will consult any Catholick Historian, or any Catholick Father, without prejudice.

And here I might reasonably enough break off; for I have followed the Considerer till we have heard him demon∣strate against a Trinity of Real, Proper Persons in the Unity of the Godhead; which puts an end to the whole Dispute about a Trinity in Vnity, because there is no such thing. He has found out indeed a Unity for God, but it is not a Unity in Trinity, but the Unity of One single Per∣son; and he has found a Trinity, but it is not a Trinity in

the Unity of the Divine Nature, but a Trinity of extrinse∣cal accessory Ideas. But since he has used some Art in pal∣liating this Heresy, it will be necessary to take off the Disguise.

The first step he makes to it, is by seeming to own,* 1.81 That there may be some greater Mystery and Obscurity in the Doctrine of the Trinity, than that Account which he has given of it: But if this Account, says he, of the Trinity be too easy, and falls far short of those high expressions of distin∣ction found in Scripture (as I think it does), and no other, grounded upon any Notions our Souls have framed of Vnity and Distinction, can be true or consistent (as I have before parti∣cularly proved), then it necessarily follows, That God must be One and Three in some way or manner not conceivable by human Vnderstanding. Here he thinks he has found a safe Retreat: He asserts, and proves (as he would have us believe) from all the Notions of Distinction and Unity which our minds can frame, That God is and can be One in no other Notion, than of One single Person, in the first and proper sense of a Person, for an Intelligent Person; and that God neither is nor can be Three in the sense of Three Proper Distinct Persons: If you charge him with Sabellianism for this, then he retreats to an obscure, confused knowledge; to such a way and manner of God's being One and Three, as is not conceivable by human Understanding.

Well: But will he allow us with this obscure and confused knowledge, to believe the Holy Trinity to be Three Divine, Proper, Distinct Persons, and One God, in a way and man∣ner unconceivable by Human Vnderstanding? By no means! This he has proved by all the Notions of Unity and Di∣stinction cannot be true or consistent; nor is it possible for us to believe what we do not understand the terms of, or what contradicts our former knowledge; and we are not bound to believe what is not possible to be believed, nor can God in Justice or Goodness require such a Faith of us,

as we have already heard: So that Sabellianism we may believe, and must not believe any thing contrary to it; and then we may believe that there is something more in it than we understand, if we please.

And therefore we may observe, That he is not concerned about any difficulties in the Notion of the Divine Unity, which all Catholick Writers have been most concerned for; how to reconcile the Unity of God with a Trinity of Di∣vine Persons; but that which troubles him most, is the Distinction, which the Catholick Fathers never disputed about, but positively asserted in the most proper and real sense, against the Sabellian Hereticks: But he seems sensi∣ble, as well he may be, that the Sabellian Notion of Per∣sons falls very short of those high Expressions of Distinction which are found in Scripture: And here it is that he allows of an obscure and confused Knowledge. When he has re∣jected a True Personal distinction, all other kinds of di∣stinction he can think of, will not answer those high ex∣pressions of distinction found in Scripture; and therefore provided you do not believe them distinct Persons, you may believe, if you please, that there is some other un∣known and unconceivable distinction between them.

This is plainly what he means by his obscure confused Knowledge, by his general confused Faith, by his general con∣fused Notion of the Trinity; and therefore he religiously keeps to that form of words, That One and the same God is Three; which must be understood in his Notion of One and the same God, that is, One single Person; for all his Notions of Vnity and Distinction are on purpose designed to prove, That One God can't be Three, in a true and proper Notion of a Person; and therefore he never so much as names that question, How Three Divine Persons are One God? Which can never be reconciled to a Sabellian Unity of a Single Person.

SECT. VI. What it is the Scripture requires us to believe concerning the Trinity.

THE Considerer having laid the Foundations of Sabel∣lianism in his Natural Sentiments, proceeds to exa∣mine what the Doctrine of the Scripture is concerning this matter; and to reconcile the Scripture to his Natural Sentiments; though the more reasonable and safer way had been first to have learnt the Faith from Scripture, and then to have corrected the Mistakes of his Natural Sentiments by Scripture.

I do not intend to enter into a long dispute with him here, but shall only let the Reader see what it is he would prove, and what he asserts; for his whole business in short is to prove, That the Sabellian Notion of the Unity of God, or of One single Person, and of Three Names, Titles, Cha∣racters, extrinsecal Respects and Relations, is the True Scri∣ture Doctrine of the Trinity.

This he very freely tells us,* 1.82 That the Sum of all that the Scriptures plainly and expresly teach concerning a Trinity, is this, That there is but One only God (and what he means by One only God, we have often heard), the Author and Maker of all things: But that One God ought to be acknowledge and adored by us under those Three different Titles or Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: Which Words are very re∣markable. He does not say, That this One God is to be ac∣knowledged and adored in Three, who have the same One Divinity subsisting whole, and perfect, and distinctly in each of them, which is the Catholick Faith: But this One God is to be acknowledged and adored by us under these Three different Titles and Characters of Father, Son, and Holy

Ghost: So that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not the One God, for neither of them is God, but they are only the different Titles and Characters of the One God▪ And though God, when represented by different Characters, is God still under each Character, yet neither of the Characters is God, no more than the Titles and Characters of a Man, is the Man.

Now one might have expected that the Considerer should have proved, That the Scripture-Notion of One God is, That there is but One single Divine Person (in the true and proper Notion of the word Person) who is God; and that these Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do not in Scri∣pture signify Three Distinct, Real Persons, but are only Three Different Titles and Characters of the same One Di∣vine Person: This indeed had effectually proved what he pretends to; but he was too wise to attempt either. The first he says nothing at all of, but takes it for granted, that he has demonstrated That by his Natural Notions of Unity and Distinction; but had he not first demonstrated that nothing could be true and consistent, and that God can re∣quire us to believe nothing which contradicts his Natural Notions, he should have a little enquired what the Notion of Scripture is about this matter: But taking it for grant∣ed that he had already demonstrated this, That One God signifies One single Person, he only proves, That the Titles and Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, belong to God; and therefore, That these Terms must all be so un∣derstood, as to include the same God (the One single Di∣vine Person) in their Signification.* 1.83

The first, I think, he proves well enough, That these Titles and Characters of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be∣long to God; and this vindicates him from being a Soci∣nian: But when he applies all these Titles and Characters to One and the same God, that is in his sense, to One and the same single Person, this proves him to be a Sabellian; for

this was the Doctrine of Noetus and Sabellius, That these different Titles and Characters did belong but to One single Person, who is God.

He proves, That these Titles and Characters, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do signify God, from the forms of Baptism, Salutation, and Blessing. Go teach all nations,* 1.84 baptizing them in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. The grace of our Lord Iesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all. From whence, as he adds, I infer, That all these terms, Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, signify God; because I cannot pos∣sibly conceive 'tis agreeable to the nature of the Christian Re∣ligion, that the Ministers of it should teach, baptize, or bless the people in any other name but God's. I like this Argument very well, but if it proves any thing, it proves more than he would have it, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each of them by himself true and perfect God, and not all Three One single Person; for it seems altogether as absurd to teach, baptize, or bless in Three Names and Titles, when there is but One single Person signified by those Three Names. And therefore his Inference is not very plain,* 1.85 That if any One of these Terms signify God, they must all Three signify God; and if all Three signify God, they must all Three signify One and the same God; for God is One.

This is very artificial, but not plain: The consequence is plain, That if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the Names of God, they must all signify One God by the Unity and sameness of Nature, because there is but One God; but not by the Vnity of Person, because the Scripture mentions Three, each of whom is God: Which proves, That God is One in Nature, but Three in Persons; as the Catholick Church has always believed.

As for what he adds, That the One Supreme God, the Lord and Maker of all things, is here meant by the word Fa∣ther, is a thing not questioned; and therefore S••n and Holy

Ghost are terms expressive of the same Divine Nature; may in some sense be allowed, if he will distinguish between Nature and Person; but according to the sense of Scripture, and the belief of the Catholick Church, Father, Son, and H••ly Ghost, are the names of Three Real, Distinct, Divine Persons, not of One Divine Nature, in the sense of One Pers••n.

But though we allow this with the Catholick Church, That the Father is the One Supreme God; we have no reason to allow this to the Considerer, who will not allow Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, to be Names of Divine Persons, or to be Names or Relations of the Divine Nature, considered as the Divine Nature; for he says they are extrinsecal, that is, ••xtra-essential, Ideas, Titles, Characters, Respects, Re∣lations; and therefore Father, according to this Hypothesis, is not the essential Name of the One Supreme God, but given to him for some extrinsical and extra-essential reasons; is his Name, not by Nature, but by Institution, and then must be proved to be his Name; which the mere form of Baptism cannot do, for the Name God is not expressed in it; much less does it prove, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One and the same God, or One single Person.

It is evident indeed from other Texts, That Father is the Name of God, but then it is the Name of God the Father; and the Son is the Son of God, and the Holy Ghost the Spirit of God, the Spirit of the Father and of the Son; and this does prove, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have the same One Divinity, the same One Divine Nature, as the very Names and Relations of Father, and Son, and Spirit, prove: But surely this does not prove, That God the Fa∣ther, and his Son, are the same One single Person, as well as One God; for Father and Son all the world over signify Two distinct Persons; for no One Person can be Father and Son to himself; nor can the Eternal subsisting Spirit of God be the same Person with that God whose Spirit he is.

Unless he allows that Father in the form of Baptism is the Name of a Person, he can prove nothing from it; and if Father be the Name of a Person, Son, and Holy Gh••st, must be the Names of Persons also; and then the Names and Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove, That they are not One single Person, but Three Persons.

Thus he proves the Son to be God, from that Religious Worship which is paid to him; which does indeed prove him to be God, but not the same One Person with the Fa∣ther: Our Considerer is much mistaken, if he thinks it sufficient to prove, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the Titles and Characters of the same One single Person, who is the One God, if he can prove that each of these Names signify One who is God. And the truth is, if these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, do not signify Per∣sons, they cannot signify God; for then they are not Names of Nature, but something extrinsecal and accessory to the Di∣vine Nature;* 1.86 and therefore they may be the external Deno∣minations of him who is God, but not the Names of God, considered as God, and therefore cannot signify God; be∣cause they do not signify the Divine Nature in the Persons of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but something extrinsical and accessory, that is, something which is not essential, and therefore which the Divine Nature might be without. I hope the Considerer did not think of this Consequence, That it is possible that God might neither have been Father, Son, nor Holy Ghost; which yet must be allowed possible, if these be mere extrinsecal and accessory Titles and Characters: Nay, this must be allowed, unless we will grant that these Names signify Three Real, Subsisting, Intelligent, Coeternal Persons, in the Vnity of the same Godhead.

But these Three Persons do somewhat puzzle him. That God should be called Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is as easily to be believed, as that he should be called Adonai, Elohim,* 1.87

and Jehovah: That the same thing should be signified and ex∣pressed by several Names, is no such incredible Mystery. Which still shews us what it is he believes and would prove in all this, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names of that One single Person, who is God. But, as he proceeds, if we allow that these terms, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are all applied to God in Scripture, 'tis not thought sufficient to say, That these are Three several Names, which signify God; but we are further required to believe, That God is One and Three; the same God (not the same single Person), but Three different Hypostases or Persons; and that one of these Three Hypostases or Persons is both God and Man.

These are the Hard Sayings which puzzle some mens under∣standings. This is the Faith of the Catholick Church, and will always be Hard Sayings to Sabellian Understandings, which they will never be able to reconcile with their Hy∣pothesis of One single Person in the Godhead. But let us hear how he clears himself of these difficulties.

* 1.88He observes in the first place, That these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are applied to God in Scripture in a dif∣ferent way from what any of his other Names are. So far he is in the right; but what is this different way? In short, it is this; That the other Names of God signify only partial Con∣ceptions of the Divine Nature, such as Self-existence, Pow∣er, &c. and are all contained within the same Idea of God, and therefore cannot be the foundation of any distinction in the Godhead. Let this pass. But each of these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, includes the whole Idea we have of God, and something more; as being extrinsecal and accessory to the Divine Nature, and the whole Idea of God full and compleat, before the application of these terms. Let us examine this first.

He says, Each of these Names includes the whole Idea of God. I beseech you how can that be, when they signify something extrinsecal and accessory to the Divine Nature, and

the whole Idea of God may be conceived full and compleat without them? For if these Names are not included in the Idea of God, which is full and compleat without them (which Assertion, by the way, overthrows the whole Christian Faith of the Trinity), how can they include the Idea of God in them, which they are not so much as any part of, much less the whole, and something more?

I grant the Names of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, may connote the Idea of God, as the Name of a King and a Fa∣ther connote the Idea of a Man who is King and Father, which I suppose is all he intends by it; but then the King must be a Man, and the Father must be a Man, to connote the Idea of Man: And thus in the Blessed Trinity; if these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, connote the Idea of God, the Father must be True and Perfect God, and the Son must be True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost must be True and Perfect God; for neither Father, Son, or Holy Ghost, connote the Idea of God upon any other ac∣count, than as the Whole and Perfect Divine Nature sub∣sists in each of them, and that makes the whole Idea of God belong to each of them.

To proceed: He tells us, That though all these Names are separately and together affirmed of God, yet each of them in so peculiar a manner, that there are several occasions, where, when one of these terms is used with relation to God, 'twould be improper to use either of the other. That is, when it is pro∣per to call God Father, it is improper to call him, Son, or Holy Ghost, and so on the contrary: But the reason of this in his Hypothesis, is not that their Persons are distinct and incommunicable, but that there are several occasions which make such change of Names improper: As a Man who is a King, a Husband, and a Father, all these Names do se∣parately and together belong to him, but you must have a care of speaking improperly, by applying these Names to improper Relations.

Well: however, From hence, he says, it follows, that these Three Names of God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must de∣note a Threefold difference of distinction belonging to God. I grant, it makes a distinction of Names and external Offices and Relations in God, but no distinction of Hypostases and Persons, which was the distinction to be shewn; but this he absolutely rejects; for it must be no other difference or distinction, but such as is consistent with the Vnity and Sim∣plicity of the Divine Nature. This we would all subscribe to, did he mean honestly; but his Vnity and Simplicity of the Divine Nature, is nothing else but the Unity and Sim∣plicity of One single Person; and all the distinction he will allow these different Names to make, is no more than what One single Person is capable of.

For each of these Names includes the whole Idea we have of God, and something more. Very right; if we allow these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be the Names of true and proper Divine Persons; for then each of them is true and perfect God, and the whole Idea of God is included in each of them, because the whole Divine Nature is in each of them; otherwise neither of these Names include the Idea of God, but only connote it, as I have already ob∣served.

And what he adds, That as far as these Names express the Nature of God, they all adequately and exactly signify the same; is very true also, if by the same, he means the same Nature, not the same One single Person: And then what he adds, 'Tis the additional signification which makes all the di∣stinction between them, is very true also; but he ought to have told us what this additional signification, this something more than the whole Idea of God, is, which is included in these Names, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and then we might have known what this distinction is.

All the additional signification that I know of, is this; That Father signifies God, includes the whole Idea of God;

but besides this, Father, when it signifies God, signifies a Self-originated, Unbegotten God, who is God of himself, and begets a Son of his own Nature, and Coeternal with himself. Son signifies God, but begotten God, God of God, the living and perfect Image of his Father. Holy Ghost sig∣nifies God, but God proceeding eternally from Father and Son, in the Unity and Perfection of the same Divine Na∣ture. And this is all the difference between them, not a difference of Nature, but a distinction of True, Real, Pro∣per Persons.

The Considerer seems to allow this.* 1.89 That Person is a proper Name for this distinction; For Father, Son, and Holy Ghost — have plainly a Personal significati••n; each of them, with∣out any figure of speech, being determined to signify some In∣telligent Being acting in such a manner as is there related.

These Words would betray an Unwary Reader, to be∣lieve the Considerer as Orthodox as the Nicene Fathers, and that he did acknowledge Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be Three Persons, without a Figure, as a Person signifies an Intelligent Being; but he has secured himself against this Imputation by an artificial addition, some Intelligent Being acting in such, or such, a manner: He will not allow Per∣son to signify absolutely an Intelligent Being▪ but an Intelli∣gent Being with respect to some peculiar manner of act∣ing; and thus One single Person, in the proper Notion of Person, for an Intelligent Being▪ may sustain Three Persons, or Personal Characters, with re••pect to extrinsecal Relations, and the different manner of acting.

The whole Mystery and Sophistry of this, is, That God, who is One single Person, is upon different accounts sometimes called the Father, sometimes the S••n, and some∣times the Holy Ghost; and therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, have a Personal signification, each of these Names signify Person in a proper sense, that is, the Person of God; but all of them separately and together, signify but One and

the same single Person; for they are all of them attributed to God, and God is but One, or One Person, though this One proper Person may sustain Three figurative Persons, or Personal Characters. This is plain dealing: and this is his Answer to his first Hard Saying, That God is One and Three; the same God, but Three different Hypostases or Per∣sons: That God is One and the same single Person, under Three Personal Characters, which may be called Three Persons, because each of them signifies the True and Pro∣per Person of God.

And here we see in what sense these Gentlemen allow, That each Person is Substance, is Mind, and Spirit, and yet that God is but One Substance, One Mind, and Spirit; viz. in the very same sense that this Author affirms that God is but One single Person, and yet that the Father is a Person, the Son a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person; and for the same reason, that they decry and abhor Three Substances, Three distinct Minds and Spirits in the God∣head, though affirmed to be indivisibly and inseparably One Infinite Substance, Mind, and Spirit; for the same reason they reject Three Intelligent Substantial Persons; though our Modern Sabellians have been more cautious generally than this Considerer, not to own it in express words.

Now as for these Terms of Three Substances, and Three Minds, there may be good reason to let them alone, tho when rightly explained no reason to condemn them of He∣resy; but we must insist on Three Distinct, Infinite, Intelli∣gent, Substantial Persons, Each of which is Mind and Sub∣stance, and One is not the Other: If they disown this (as the Considerer does) they are downright Sabellians; if they own it, we have no farther Dispute about this matter.

Let us now consider his other Hard Saying, That One of these Three Hyp••stases or Pers••ns should be both God and Man.

Now the Hardness of this Saying is not, That it is hard to prove from Scripture, that so it is; or that it is hard to conceive how God and Man can be united; which is all that he touches on: But it is and always will be a Hard Saying to the Considerer upon another account; that is, To recon∣cile it with a Trinity of One proper single Person, and Three Personal Characters.

The Doctrine of the Incarnation is this; That the Eternal Son of God became True and Perfect Man, by taking the Human Nature into a Personal Union to him∣self. That the Son only became Man, not the Father, nor the Holy Ghost: That two perfect distinct Natures, the Divine and Human Nature, were without Confusion uni∣ted in the One Person of Christ; and that this One Person is the Eternal Word and Son of God. Now if there be but One single Person in the Godhead, and Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names, or Personal Characters of this One single Person, How can the Son be Incarnate, and not the Father, nor the Holy Ghost? It is only a Per∣son that can be Incarnate, for a Personal Character can't be Incarnate without the Person; and if there be but One single Person, and this same One Person is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, it is impossible that that Person who is the Son, should be Incarnate, but the Person who is the Father and the Holy Ghost, must be Incarnate also; be∣cause the same Person who is the Son, is the Father and the Holy Ghost.

The short Question is this; Whether a True, Proper, Divine Person was Incarnate, in the Incarnation of Christ? If not, then Christ was not a Divine Person, how Divine soever he might be upon other accounts; the Divine Na∣ture did not pers••nally subsist in him, he was not personally True and Perfect God; and then the Person of Christ was no more than a Man, whatever Divine Influences he might receive from God: But if the Divine Nature were truly

and properly Incarnate in the Person of Christ, then if there be but One single Divine Person in the Godhead, but One Divine Nature▪ in the sense of One single Person, then the whole Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which are but One True and Proper Person, was Incarnate in Christ.

This is the true difficulty, and he is so wise as to take no notice of it. It does not appear to me, that he believes one word concerning the Incarnation of God, or of a True Divine Person;* 1.90 he says, He that is in Scripture called the Son of God, did appear in the likeness of men: He certainly was a True Man, but that is not our present dispute; Was he in his own Person True and Perfect God? Was he a Human Person; or the Person of the Son of God appear∣ing in Human Nature?

* 1.91He was, he says, in the Form of God, before he took the Nature of Man upon him. This sounds well; but why does he not speak out, and tell us what this Form of God is? Whe∣ther the True Divine Nature subsisting in him, a True Di∣vine Person?

Well: But God did suffer himself to be worshipped and adored in and by the Man Christ Iesus; the least that can be inferred from which is, That God was more immediately and peculiarly present in Christ, than ever he was said to have been any where else? as in the Heavens, the Jewish Temple, be∣tween the Cherubims, in Prophets and Holy Men, who spake as they were moved by the Spirit. Now all this might have been spared, would he but have said, That the Person Iesus Christ was worshipped with Divine Honours, as being in his own Person True and Perfect God, as well as Man; and without saying this, he says nothing to prove that Christ is the Son of God Incarnate.

To say, That God did suffer himself to be worshipped in and by the Man Christ Iesus, as he was worshipped in the Hea∣vens, in the Jewish Temple, between the Cherubims (for that

must be the force of the Comparison) does no more prove Christ to be God, than it proves the Heavens, the Iewish Temple, and the Cherubims, to be God: It may prove a more perfect symbolical Presence of God in Christ, which he calls the Fulness of the Godhead, but not the Incarnation of the Son of God. But this is not the Doctrine of Scri∣pture, merely to say, That God suffers himself to be worship∣ped in the Man Christ Iesus; as if God, and the Man Christ Iesus, were not One Person; but that he commands us to worship that Person who is called Christ Jesus, not as a Man, in whom the Power of God dwells, and is present, as in the Heavens, or in the Jewish Temple, or in the Prophets and Holy Men (who were never for this reason thought the Objects of Worship) but as his own Eternal Son Incar∣nate. That all men should honour the Son, as they honour the Father; which does not only signify to honour the Father in the Son, but to pay Divine Honours to the Person of the Son, which makes them distinct Objects of Worship, and therefore True and Proper Persons, not Personal Cha∣racters, which may be distinct Reasons of Worship, but are not distinct Objects.

But we shall better understand this, by the account he gives of the Union of God and Man, In what manner Soul and Body, or God and Man, are united, is not the question; for we know nothing how this Physical Union is made; but the question is concerning the Nature and Kind of this Union: Whether, as the Soul and Body are united in One Person, so as to be One Man, so God and Man are united in One Person: That as the reasonable Soul and Flesh is One Man, so God and Man is One Christ. Whe∣ther the Divine and Human Natures are united in One Per∣son; or God be united to Man only as an assisting Princi∣ple, by a perpetual and constant Influx of Divine Powers and Virtues. These two are vastly different: The first in∣deed

always includes the second in the most perfect man∣ner, but the second does not always infer the first.

A Personal Union is always a Union of Life, Influence, and Power; as he describes the Vnion of Soul and Body; That there is some Intelligent Power that makes use of the Or∣gans of my Body, and acts in conjunction with the motions there produced: This is all true, and necessarily consequent up∣on a Personal Union, but a very lame account of the Vital Union of Soul and Body; for thus Angels may use the Bodies they assume, without a Personal Union: But a con∣scious Life, Sensation, and Government, which makes One self, is a great deal more than to act in conjunction with the Motions of the Body. The Union of Influence and Power may be without Personal Union, and therefore does not al∣ways make One Person.

It is the first we enquire after, it is the first the Scripture teaches, That the Word was made Flesh; That God sent forth his Son,* 1.92 made of a woman: This is the Catholick Faith of the Incarnation; but this the Considerer takes no notice of; but all he says, relates only to the Union of Influ∣ence and Power.

And I may, says he, as well consider God united to Man, when he so acts by the Ministry and Operation of Man, that the Actions of God seem conveyed to us the same way as the actions of one man are to another. But does this make God True and Perfect Man? This falls short of the conjunct Operations of Soul and Body, which are much more close and intimate than the actions of one man are to ano∣ther; however, to be sure the actions of one man upon another, do not make Two such Men One Person; nor therefore can the like Influence of God on Man, make God and Man One Person. But he proceeds:

Had those who upon some occasions spake by the Extraordi∣nary Assistance of a Divine Power, been constantly so directed and assisted, how could they have distinguished the Motions of

their Souls from the Impressions of God? Just as they did when they were sometimes thus assisted; for External Im∣pressions are always distinguishable from Internal Motions. But suppose they could not distinguish them, does this prove that God is Incarnate in such men; or would it be a reason to worship such men as God?

He adds, And why then should we not think such an extra∣ordinary Power as this, as much united to such men, as that common ordinary Power we call the Soul, is to those Bodies in which it acts and exerts it self. The Answer is plain, be∣cause it would be an External, not an Internal Principle of Life, and Motion, and Sensation, how constant soever its Influences were. He calls it an Extraordinary Power, which shews that it is not a Natural Principle of Action; it is an Extraordinary Power united to a Man, and therefore the Man is the Person, this Extraordinary Power only an exter∣nal assisting Principle, of the same kind with that in Pro∣phets, though more constant and regular in its actings: But here is nothing of Incarnation in all this.

Is this Extraordinary Power a Divine Subsisting Person, in the true and proper Notion of a Person? Is it the Son of God, that Eternal Word, which was in the beginning, was with God, and was God? Is this Extraordinary Power so uni∣ted to Human Nature, as to become Man? Is it the Person of Christ Jesus, who was conceived in the Womb of the Virgin, lived in the World as a Man, suffered, and died, and rose again from the dead, and now sits at the Right Hand of God in the highest Heavens? Not one word of all this, which is the true Mystery, and the only Use of this Doctrine of the Incarnation, whereon all our Hopes of Salvation by Christ depend. This Extraordinary Power is not a Person, but such a constant regular Inspiration, as he says, some are of opinion the Soul of man is: But whether that be so or not, as he thinks m••st probably it is not (which yet argues some kind of Inclination to it), yet it seems to him

plain from Scripture, that such a Power as we ascribe to God (he will not say such a Power as is God, or a True Divine Person) did as constantly and regularly act in and through Christ, as the Human Soul is perceived to do in any other man. That such a Power did constantly appear and act in Christ, is true; but whether by Nature, or by a constant and regu∣lar Inspiration, is the Question. Our Saviour proves his Divine Nature from his Works; our Considerer thinks it proves no more than a constant and regular Inspiration: The first is necessary to the Catholick Faith of the Incarnation, That the Word was made Flesh; the second proves him only to be an extraordinary and perpetual Prophet: The first makes him True God-Man; the second makes him only a Divine Man. And this is all he can mean by this Power regu∣larly and constantly acting in and through Christ: For if Christ be God-Man, he is this Divine Power in his own Person; it is his Divine Nature, not an external adventitious Princi∣ple, how regularly and constantly soever it acts; it is not merely an uninterrupted Presence and Concurrence of the Deity with the Man Christ Jesus, as he represents it, but the Personal Union of the Divine Nature of Christ to Hu∣man Nature. He was not only as conscious of all the Divine Perfections in himself,* 1.93 as a man is conscious of his own thoughts, (which yet, by the way, is absolutely impossible, without being True and Perfect God in his own Person), but he knew himself to be God, the Eternal Son of God, not the same Person with his Father, but One with him.

Were a man thus regularly and constantly Inspired, he would know that he was thus Inspired, and he would also know, that these Divine Perfections are not in himself, not seated in his own Human Person, nor under the Conduct of his own Will, as his own Natural Powers are, and therefore must know himself to be a mere Man still, not God-Man.

So that this constant and regular Inspiration, this uninter∣rupted Presence and Concurrence of the Deity, which is all he allows in this matter, cannot make any Person God-Man. This Inspiration is not a subsisting Person, is not the Person of the Son of God, is not Incarnate by its Union to Man, no more than it is Incarnate in other Prophets: The Man is the Person, and therefore a mere Creature still, tho never so Divinely Inspired.

This is such an Incarnation as Socinians themselves own, in as high expressions as the Considerer can invent. Cerin∣thus owned something more, That Christ who descended on Iesus at his Baptism, was a Divine Person, not a mere Inspiration, and rested on him, and was most intimately united to him, till his Crucifixion. That Sect of the Noe∣tians and Sabellians who were called Patripassians (for they do not seem by the accounts we have of them, to have been all of that mind) did acknowledge the Incar∣nation of God in a true and proper sense, as the Catholick Church did the Incarnation of Christ: But then their Tri∣nity being but One proper single Divine Person, distinguish∣ed by Three Names or Personal Characters (which is the express Doctrine of the Considerer) their whole Trinity was Incarnate, suffered, and died, in the Incarnation and Sufferings of Christ, the Father as well as the Son; as it must of necessity be, if there be but One Divine Person, who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and if this One Per∣son is in a true and proper sense Incarnate: But this the Catholick Church abhorred and condemned, under the name of the Patripassian Heresy. Others of them were Sabellians in the Doctrine of the Trinity, but Photinians, or Samosatenians, that is, Socinians, as to the Doctrine of the Incarnation, as Athanasius often intimates: And if I understand him, this is the Considerer's way, who believes a Trinity in One single Person, and an Inspired Man for a God Incarnate.

And thus we have lost the Trinity and Incarnation, and must part with every thing which is peculiar and essential to Christianity, with them. And now one would wonder after all this, what he has to say more about the Faith of the Trinity and Incarnation; and yet this is his next En∣quiry,* 1.94 What the Scriptures necessarily oblige us to believe in this Point, that is, concerning the Trinity and Incarnation? Though he has been careful all along never to use this term Incarnation, as being sensible that all he said about God-Man, would not reach the Catholick Notion of Incar∣nation.

When I met with this Enquiry, I was in hope that there was something behind to unsay all that he had hitherto said; for if what he has already said be true, it is certain the Scripture requires us to believe nothing about them. But upon Examination I found, that the Question was fal∣laciously stated; and the true meaning of it was, What the Scriptures oblige us to believe, instead of what has hi∣therto passed for the true Catholick Faith of the Trinity and Incarnation? I shall not dispute this Point with him now; to shew what he means, will be Confutation enough.

* 1.95We must not, he says, look upon the Doctrine of the Tri∣nity as a nice abstracted Speculation, designed for the exercise of our Vnderstandings; but as a plainer Revelation of God's Love and Good Will towards men, and a greater Motive and Incitement to Piety than ever we had before this Doctrine was delivered.

This we grant, That the Christian Faith is not designed merely for Speculation, but for Practice; but yet all the Doctrines of Faith are matters of Speculation, and the Doctrine it self must be believed in order to Practice, or else the Revelation of it is of no use at all.

The Question then is, Whether we must not believe the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation? Or how much we must believe of them? Must we not believe, That God

has in a true and proper sense an Eternal and Only-begotten Son, begotten from Eternity of his own Substance; his True, Perfect, Living, Subsisting Image? Must we not be∣lieve, That this Eternal Son of God did in a true proper Notion become Man, by uniting Human Nature to his own Person; and that in Human Nature he suffered and died for the Redemption of Mankind? Truly, No; if I understand him: All this is a nice abstracted Speculation, and a very perplexing exercise of our Vnderstandings; and we are bound to understand no more by God's giving his own Son to dye for us, but his Love and G••od Will to Man∣kind, as it is a great Motive and Excitement to Piety.

But how can we learn God's Love and Good Will to Man∣kind, from this Doctrine, if it be not true? if God have no Eternal Son, and therefore did not give his Eternal Son to become Man, and to suffer and dye for us? The Gospel proves the great Love of God to Sinners, by the Incarna∣tion, Death, and Sufferings of his Son; that if we do not believe this Doctrine strictly and literally true, we lose the Gospel Proof of God's Love to Sinners, and of the Virtue and Efficacy of Christ's Death and Sacrifice to expiate our sins, and of the Power of his Intercession as the Eternal, Only-begotten, and Well-beloved Son of God.

But our Considerer will not allow this: These Titles and Relations must be chiefly c••nsidered with reference to the great Work of Man's Salvation: But must they not be considered as Three distinct proper Persons in the Unity of the God∣head, who have their distinct Parts and Offices in the Re∣demption of Mankind? No; but distinct Relations and Offices of One and the same single Divine Person, who is the One Supreme God, and is All in One, Father, Son, and Holy Gh••st, Saviour, Mediator, Comforter.* 1.96

But how then can these Titles and Relations signify an Eternal Distinction in the Godhead, an Eternal F••t••••r, an Eternal Son, and an E••ernal Spirit, when th••se Of∣fices

relating only to Man's Salvation were not Eter∣nal?

This he resolves into the Eternal Purpose and Decree of God, to redeem Mankind by the Death and constant Mediation of a Man chosen and enabled for this work by the Fulness of the Godhead dwelling in him: And in consideration of his Passion and Intercession, to impart such Gifts, Graces, and Spiritual Assistances, as would be sufficient to render this Re∣demption effectual to the saving of much people. So that God decreed from Eternity, upon his Foreknowledge of Man's Fall, that in order to redeem Man he would take upon himself the Distinctions and Offices of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; Saviour, Mediator, and Comforter, in time; and this is all the Eternal Distinction in the Godhead.

Well: But it seems God did not decree from Eternity to redeem Man by his own Son, but by a Man chosen and enabled for this Work by the Fulness of the Godhead dwelling in him; that is, as we have already heard, by an Inspired and Deified Man,* 1.97 not by a God Incarnate: It is the Man who is the Sa∣viour and Redeemer, though he be ena∣bled to this work by the Fulness of the Godhead, or a constant regular Inspiration: This is downright Socinianism; the Catholick Faith is, That it is the Son of God who redeems us, though he redeems us in Human Nature.

But if God redeems us by a Man, however he be enabled by a Divine Power, Why is he said to give his Son for us? For this Divine Power is not a Person, and therefore no Son, nor is the Man his own and only begotten Son.

Now this would be a difficulty indeed, were we to un∣derstand God's giving his own Son for us, in a proper literal sense; but this is nothing but Figure and Representation, if we believe the Considerer.* 1.98 His words are these; Thus when God is pleased to represent his Love to Mankind in the

highest Image of Nature, that of a Father sacrificing an only∣begotten Son, the exact Transcript and Resemblance of him∣self, perfectly innocent, and obedient to his Will in all things, we are to believe (that God did thus sacrifice his Son, as he assures us he did? No; but) that by the Sufferings and Death of Christ, God has given greater Proof of his Love to∣wards us, than any man is capable of doing to another; and that such an action of an Earthly Parent suggests the nearest and likest Conception we can possibly frame of what our Heavenly Father hath done for us; though at the same time we must ac∣knowledge it comes infinitely short of expressing the Riches and Fulness of his Mercy and Loving kindness. It does so in∣deed. To believe that God has actually given his own Eternal and Only-begotten Son for us, as the Scripture as∣sures us he has, is a much nearer and truer Conception of what God has done for us, and infinitely exceeds all earthly comparisons. Abraham's offering his Son Isaac at God's Command, was an Image and Figure, but a Typical Figure of it; but it was a Type without an Antitype, if Christ was not as truly and properly the Son of God, as Isaac was the Son of Abraham. But if we will believe the Consi∣derer, the Scripture does not oblige us to believe this; if we do but believe, That God is as good to us as if he had sacrificed his only Son for us, we need not believe, That he did sacrifice his Son. I have no Patience to proceed any further; if this be true, there is an end of the Faith and Hope of Christians.

CHAP. III. A Brief Account of the Sabellian Heresy, and by what Arguments the Catholick Fathers opposed it.

THE Considerer has given us the most Compleat and Artificial Scheme of Sabellianism that I have yet met with, a••d has very fairly and openly confessed his De∣sign, to prove, That One God must signify that there is but One who is God, but One single Divine Person, in the proper Notion of a Person, as it signifies an Intelligent Being. I have endeavoured to shew him his Mistake, and what it is that has mis-led him; and how hopeless an Attempt it is to reconcile his Hypothesis with the Catholick Faith of the Trinity and Incarnation.

This is so bold an Attempt, openly to assert and defend a Heresy which has been constantly condemned by the Catholick Church, since its first appearance, that I am apt to hope he does not believe his Hypothesis to be Sabellia∣nism, or that Heresy which now is best known by that name, though Sabellius was not the first Author of it. And therefore I will shew him what Sabellianism is, and how the Fathers opposed it.

There were Two Points in dispute between them and the Catholick Christians.

First, Concerning the Personality of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

Secondly, Concerning the Unity of God, Whether it were the Unity of One Person, as they pretended.

That we may rightly understand this matter, we must distinguish between the several kinds of Sabellianism, be∣cause the Arguments and Answers of the Fathers are some∣times adapted to one, and sometimes to another Notion of it. That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were but One Per∣son, was asserted by them all, but explained very different∣ly, and that altered the state of the Question, and required different Answers.

1. As first, They made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be only Three Names, Appearances, or Offices of the same Person, as I observed before: And then the state of the Question was not, Whether the Son was a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person, in as true and proper a sense as the Father was a Person? For this they owned by making Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Names of the same Person; whereas it is impossible they should be the same Person, if the Son were not a Person, nor the Holy Ghost a Person. If the Son be the same Person with the Father, the Son must be a Person, for no Person can't be the same Person: Which is the same Argument to prove that these Hereticks owned Christ to be a True and Real Person, that Novatianus used (as I observed before) to prove that they owned Christ to be true and perfect God, because they made him the same with the Father, who is true and per∣fect God, and a true, and real, and substantial Person. And if he be the very same with the Father, he must be the same we acknowledge the Father to be; viz. a true and real Person, and perfect God.

The Dispute then which the Catholick Fathers had with these Hereticks, with respect to this Notion, That Father, Son▪ and Holy Ghost, were the very same Person, was not, Whether the Son was a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Per∣son? but, Whether the Son and Holy Ghost were truly and really distinct Persons from the Father, as the Catholick

Church always believed? or, Whether they were the same Person, distinguished only by Three Names.

Now when the Fathers asserted not only the Personality of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (which this Notion did not oppose), but the real distinction of Persons, That the Son was a Person, but not the same Person with the Father, they must ascribe the same kind of Personality to the Son, which they do to the Father; That the Son is as truly and really a Person as the Father is, though not the same Person; as truly a Person as God would be, were there but One Person in the Godhead, as these Hereticks affirm∣ed. For according to all the Rules of Disputation, we must take Words in the sense of those whom we oppose; for otherwise it is a mere wrangle about Words, without op∣posing one another. And therefore since the Sabellians by Person understood such a Person as every single Person is, (for they made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but Three different Names of the same single individual Person) no∣thing could oppose or confute them, but to prove, That Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three distinct Per∣sons, in the same Notion of a Person which belongs to eve∣ry single individual Person, as far as mere Personality is concerned. For to prove them Three in any other sense, whether Three Modes, or Three Powers, or Three Parts of the same One single Person, is what they would have; and allow them to be but One Person, and they will dispute no further; nay, will give you leave to call Three Modes, or Three Names, or Three Parts of the same One Person, Three Persons, if you please.

But for the clearer understanding of this matter, we must consider by what Arguments the Ancient Writers opposed this Heresy.

Tertullian, in opposition to Praxeas, reduces this to a short Question, Whether God have any Son, and who he is,

and how he is his Son.* 1.99 For if God have a Son, the Son must be as true and real a Person as the Father, and Father and Son must be Two distinct Persons; for the same Person can't be both Father and Son to himself; the very Names of Fa∣ther and Son signify, that one is of the other, and we must understand things to be what they are called, whether Fa∣ther or Son, which can no more be the same than Night and Day, with respect to these different Relations. The Father makes the Son, and the Son makes the Father; and those who receive these Relations from each other, can never be these Relations to themselves, that the Father should make himself a Son to himself, or the Son make himself a Fa∣ther to himself. This Order God has in∣stituted in all other Beings, and he ob∣serves it himself. A Father must of ne∣cessity have a Son, to be a Father; and a Son must have a Father, that he may be a Son, but to have, and to be, are two things; as for instance, for a man to be a Husband, signifies that he has a Wife, not that he is a Wife to himself; and thus to be a Father, signifies to have a Son, not to be a Son to himself; in such Relations we must be one, and have another; that to be both is to be neither, because we can have neither. If I be Father and Son to my self, I am no Father, because I have no Son, who makes a Father, but am Son my self;

and I am no Son, because I have no Father, who makes the Son, but am Son my self; and thus while they make Father and Son one and the same Person, they destroy the Notion both of Father and Son.

Now would any man have argued at this rate, who did not believe Father and Son to be real and Substantial Per∣sons, and as distinct from each other as a human Father and Son are; for if they be not, all this reasoning from the di∣stinct Relations of Father and Son, which require a real di∣stinction of Persons, is quite lost: And whether this Ar∣gument be good, or no, (which is not the present Enqui∣ry) it is certain that whoever uses it, if he understands himself, must believe, That Father and Son signify as true and real Relations, and as real and distinct Persons in the Godhead, as they do in human Nature.

The like may be said of that other Argument against the Father and the Son being One and the same Person, That then the same Person must, in order of Nature, be both before and after himself; for he who begets must al∣ways in order of Nature (though not of Time, in an Eternal Generation) be before him who is begotten by him: That as Father, he is before himself as Son; as Son, he is after himself as Father; which had been Iudicrous trifling, if they had not believed a real substantial Genera∣tion of the Person, and consequently that the Son is a real substantial Person: For this Argument will not hold in the Generation of Modes and Postures, or in one part of the Deity generating another.

Thus to prove the distinction of Per∣sons between Father and Son,* 1.100 they urge all those Texts in which the Father speaks to or of the Son, and the Son speaks to or of the Father; which are so many, and so well known, that I need not transcribe them. And Tertullian lays

it down as a certain Rule, That he who speaks, and he to whom he speaks, and he who is spoken of, cannot be one and the same Person; for this is such perverseness and deceit as does not become God; that when he himself is the Person to whom he speaks, he should speak in such a manner as if he directed his speech to another, and did not speak to himself. And therefore when the Father says, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. When Christ tells us, That God is his Fa∣ther; That he came forth from the Father, and came into the world, and again leaves the world, and goes to the Father: When he says, I and my Father; and I will pray the Father,* 1.101 and he shall send you Another Comforter: I, and He, and Ano∣ther, must signify Three as Real and Di∣stinct Persons, as these words signify in common speech.

Thus they prove the distinction of Persons between Fa∣ther and Son, from those Texts which tell us, That the Father sends the Son, and the Son is sent; That the Father anoints, and the Son is anointed; That the Father gives Commands, and the Son receives them, and doth the Will of his Father; That the Father knows the Son, and the Son the Father; That he sees all that the Father doth, and can do all that he sees the Father do: For there must be distinct Subjects for such different Acts; the same Per∣son, with respect to himself, can't with any propriety of speech be said to send, and to be sent; to anoint, and to be anointed; to command, and to obey; to come forth from himself, and to come into the world, and to leave the world, and go to himself: And therefore he who sends, and he who is sent, &c. must be Two.

Nay, it is well observed by these Fathers, That Christ himself expresly teaches us, that He and his Father, with respect to the distinction of Persons, are Two; so Two, as

to make a Legal Testimony of Two Witnesses; 8. Iohn 13,— 18. When the Pharisees objected against him,* 1.102 That he bore Record of himself, and there∣fore his Record was not true: He an∣swers, And yet if I judge, my judgment is true, for I am not alone, but I and my Father which sent me. It is also written in your law, That the testimony of two men is true; I am one that bear witness of my self and my Father that sent me beareth witness of me. This is as express as words can make it. If Father and Son were but O••e single Person, Christ could not have said, I am not alone, but I and my Father which sent me; for one single Person is in this sense alone, how many Names soever he has; and if he and his Father are not Two distinct Persons, they are not Two Legal Witnesses, as Two distinct men are.

These and such like Arguments we may find in all the Ancient Writers who have engaged in this Controversy; and from hence we learn not only what they thought of the distinction of Persons between Father and Son, but what kind of Person they believed the Son to be; such a Person as has a Personal Knowledge, and Will, and Power, who is capable of being sent, of receiving and executing Commands, and has all this as distinctly in himself, as he is a distinct Person. The Father knows the Son, and the Son knows the Father, but each of them know by their own Personal Knowledge; the Father wills, and the Son wills, and wills all the same with the Father, but each of them wills by his own Personal Will; the Father works, and the Son works, and they inseparably do the same things, but each of them work by their own Personal Power.

Knowledge, and Will, and Power of acting, is essential to the Notion of a Person, and therefore every distinct Per∣son must have a distinct Personal Knowledge, and Will, and Power; and those must acknowledge this, who prove the distinction of Persons from distinct Personal Acts, as all these Fathers did. This is all we ask, when we assert a distinction of Persons in the Trinity; and this we must in∣sist on, or deny a Trinity; for if there are not Three who have all the same distinct Personal Acts, there cannot be Three distinct compleat Persons; for Personal Acts shew a Person, and distinct Personal Acts prove distinct Persons; and in this sense (as all these Arguments prove) the An∣cient Fathers owned a distinction of Three Persons in the Unity of the Godhead.

Their distinction between Deus invisibilis, and Deus visi∣bilis, the invisible and visible God, whereby they proved the real distinction between God the Father and God the Son, is an undeniable Proof of their Opinion in this mat∣ter; for I urge it no farther.

It was the received Opinion (as far as I can find) of all the Ancient Fathers, till St. Austin, That God the Father never appeared in any visible Representation of himself; for he tells Moses, No man can see my face, and live: And St. Iohn assures us, No man hath seen God at any time, but the only-begotten Son,* 1.103 who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath de∣clared him: And yet in the Old Testa∣ment we frequently read of God's ap∣pearing to men, which they therefore expound of God the Son, and that his Appearance in a visible Form was a Pre∣ludium to his Incarnation.

This we may see largely proved by Tertullian and St. Hi∣lary, and observed by St. Athanasius; and the plain conse∣quence they draw from it, is, That this invisible and visi∣ble

God cannot be one and the same Person; and the con∣sequence is so sel••-evident, that it needs no Proof; but it evidently proves what a real, substantial, as well as di∣stinct Person they thought the Son, who could visibly ap∣pear, while the Father remained invisible; for as a visible and invisible God can't be the same Person, so a visible God must be a real substantial Person.

And though St. Austin was of opinion, That those Three Men which appeared to Abraham, were the Three Persons of the Sacred Trinity, and thereby rejected the distinction of the invisible and visible God, by attributing a visible Ap∣pearance to God the Father, which none of the Ancients had done before him; yet by these Three distinct Appear∣ances he confirmed the real distinction of the Divine Per∣sons, who were as distinct Persons as they appeared to be, and therefore as distinct as Three Human Persons, for they appeared as Three distinct men. And therefore he observes, That whereas Two of these Three went to Lot in Sodom, Lot speaks to them as to One, 19. Gen. 18. And Lot said unto them,* 1.104 Oh, not so, my Lord: And justifies Lot in this, That though they were two, yet they were equal, and he would not divide the Fa∣ther and Son; and urges this against the Sabellians, who made Father and Son One Person. I do not justify St. Austin in this, because I doubt whether the Argument be good; but by this we may understand St. Austin's Judgment of the real distincti∣on of Persons.

And to the same purpose the Voice from Heaven at our Saviour's Baptism, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; and the Descent of the Holy Spirit like a Dove, and lighting upon him, is urged by the Ancient Fathers to prove a real Trinity of Divine Persons:* 1.105 The Voice from the Father in Heaven, the Son on earth, and the Holy Ghost

descending like a Dove; which being Three distinct Manifestations,* 1.106 and all at a time, must represent the Father who spoke from Heaven, the Son who was on Earth, and the Holy Ghost who de∣scended like a Dove, to be Three distinct Persons, not One single Person, which cannot speak of himself in the Third Person, nor descend on himself in a distinct visible Appear∣ance.

The Sabellians being unable to maintain this Point, which is so manifestly absurd, and so irreconcilable with all the forms of speech used in Scripture concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, found it necessary to allow some di∣stinction between them, but yet were so afraid of Tritheism, that they kept religiously to their main Point, that One God was but One Person, and therefore would admit of no other distinction but what was reconcilable with the Unity of a Person.

2. Hence, secondly, some of them taught, That the Son is distinguished from the Father, not as one Person is distinguished from another, but as a man's Word or Wisdom which is in his Heart and Soul, may be distinguished from himself; that is, That the Son is not a living, substantial, subsisting Word, no more than the Word of a Man, which is only the motion of a living subsisting heart, but does not live and subsist it self, but being spoke it vanishes, and being often repeated, never continues;* 1.107 and therefore is not another Man, nor Man of Man, nor with Man; as the

Divine Word is true and perfect God, God of God, and God with God; and therefore they make God and his Word but One Person, as Man and his Word is One Man.

In answer to this, St. Athanasius urges all those Texts which prove Christ and God the Father to be Two distinct Persons; for if they be Two Persons, then the Son is as True and Real a Person as the Father is. This I have al∣ready taken notice of, and need not now repeat it; only I cannot but observe what Athanasius tells us of these He∣reticks, That when they were convinced by the plain Evi∣dence of Scripture, that God the Father, and Christ who called himself the Son of God, were Two Persons, they then took Courage, and owned Christ to be a Person, but not a Divine Person, as the Eternal Word of God, but only a Human Person, as he was Man. But Athanasius tells them, That this was neither better nor worse than the Heresy of Paulus Samosatenus, or what we now call Socinianism, to make Christ a mere Man; for he can be no more, if the Divine Word, which St. Iohn tells us was Incarnate, be not the Person: If the Word Incarnate be the Person, then Christ is God-Man; if the Man be the Person, he can be no more than a Man.

This Athanasius confutes at large, and proves, That what Christ says of himself, cannot belong to a mere Man. But that which I would observe, is this, That both these Hereticks, who denied the Divine Word to be a Person, and Athanasius and the other Catholick Fathers who affirm∣ed him to be a Person, agreed very well in the Notion of a Person, viz. That a Person is a distinct, intelligent Being, who does really and actually subsist, and subsists distinctly from all other intelligent Beings. That the Divine Word in the Godhead is such a Person as a Man is in Human Nature: Such a Person these Hereticks would allow Christ to be, considered as a Man; and such a Person Athanasius affirms

Christ to be, considered as God, or the Divine Word; for otherwise they wrangle about words, and do not oppose each other.

The Fathers proved, That Christ was a Person, and a distinct Person from the Father, by those Texts which re∣present him as speaking to and of his Father, and which attribute many Personal Acts to him: The Sabellians could not deny but that these were Personal Acts, and did prove Christ to be a real subsisting Person; but then would not allow the Word to be the Person, but only the Man Christ Jesus to be the Person: The Fathers, on the other hand, allow their Notion of a Person, which is the only true in∣telligible Notion, but prove, That the Divine Word which was Incarnate, not merely the Man Christ Jesus, was this Person; and therefore that this Divine Word is a real, sub∣stantial, subsisting Word, not like the Word of a man, which is a transient Act, but has no subsistence of its own.

The Sabellians would have allowed a Trinity of Persons in any other Notion of a Person, than as a Person signifies a real, subsisting, intelligent Being; but the Catholick Fa∣thers would own no other Notion of Person but this; and taught that there were Three Persons in the Trinity, in the same sense in which the Sabellians denied there were Three Persons; Three such Persons as they affirmed there was but One; that the Son and Holy Ghost were Divine Persons, in the same sense that the Sabellians owned the Father to be a Person; that is, Three such Persons as they called Three Gods.

The reason of this I'm sure is not to be answered, That if the Catholick Fathers understood what they did, when they opposed the Sabellians, who made the Divine Word only to be the Word of a Divine Person, but not a Di∣vine Person himself, they must assert the Divine Word in a strict and proper sense to be a Divine Person, and not

merely the transient Word of a Person, which has no sub∣sistence; which is a more sensible Argument than all the Criticisms about Persona and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And yet they ex∣press themselves so fully and clearly in this matter, that there is no need of gu••ssing at their meaning.

Tertullian reduces this Dispute to this one single Question,* 1.108 which is the true state of it; whether the Son and Word of God, consider∣ed as distinct from God the Fa∣ther, be a Substance, and has a Sub∣sistence of his own: Which he expresly affirms, and offers his reasons for the Proof of it.

This he tells us is necessary to make the Word a real Being and Person, Res & Persona, that he have a real Substance, and a Substance of his own, proper to himself, per Substantioe proprietatem, without which he cannot be Second to God; nor the Father and the Son, God and his Word, be Two.

Now for the Son and the Word to be a substantial Being per proprietatem Substantioe, by a Substance proper to him∣self, as distinguished from God the Father, must signify, That the Personal Substance of the Son is not the same, but a distinct Substance from the Personal Substance of God the Father; so distinct, that the Father and Son are Two Persons, in the same sense and notion that the Father is One Person.

In answer to their Objection, That the Word of God was but like the Word of a Man, which was nothing else but a Voice and Sound, a Vibration of the Air, which conveyed some Notions to the Mind, but was it self Emptiness and Nothing, without any Substance of its own; he answers, That God himself is the most real and perfect Substance, and therefore whatever proceeds

from (or is begotten of) his Substance, must be a real substantial Being;* 1.109 much less can the Son and Word, who gave Being to all other Substances, be an insubstantial Nothing himself: For tho there may be equivocal Causes, which may produce things of a different na∣ture from themselves, yet nothing can produce nothing.

He argues farther, That this Word is called the Son of God, and God; The Word was with God, and the Word was God: And that Word which is the Son of God, and himself God, can't be an insubstantial Nothing, unless God him∣self be Nothing. If God begets a Son, he must be a sub∣stantial Person, as all Creature-Sons are, much more the Son of God: And such a Son who is himself God, must have all the Reality and Perfections which belong to the Notion of God.

But he argues farther, from what St. Paul tells us, That he was in the form of God, and thought it not robbery to be equal with God. In Effigie, in the Image of God. Now, says he, in what Image of God, was he? Certain∣ly in another, but not in none:* 1.110 The meaning of which is, That every Per∣son, as a Person, has his own Personal Image; but thus he was not the Perso∣nal Image of the Father, because he was not the same Person with the Father; but yet if he was the Image of God, he must be his True, Substan∣tial, though not his Personal Image; the true living Image of his Father's Person, but not his Person. He seems in∣deed in what follows, to have entertained too gross and corporeal imaginations of the Substance and Image of God;

but this was his own Mistake, and a Mistake only in Philo∣sophy, not in the Traditionary Faith of the Church; for which only we alledge his Authority. And the Conclusion of this Argument most fully acquaints us what he under∣stood by a Person: Whatever, says he, the Substance of the Word is,* 1.111 that I call a Person; and to that I give the Name of Son; and by acknowledging him the Son, I own him to be second to the Fa∣ther. Whoever reads this, must confess, That Tertullian did believe Father and Son to be Two di∣stinct substantial Persons; that though the Son be of the same Substance with the Father, as begotten of his Father's Substance, yet the Personal Substance of the Father was no more the Personal Substance of the Son, than Father and Son were One Person.

Novatianus, who was Cotemporary with St. Cyprian,* 1.112 though a Schismatick, was charged with no Heresy in this Ar∣ticle; and he opposes the Sabellians with the same Arguments, and almost in the same words that Tertullian and done be∣fore him: And tells us particularly, That this Divine Word, which is the Son of God, begotten and born of him, is not a mere Sound or Voice, like the Word of a Man, but that substantial Virtue and Power which proceeds from God: A Divine Substance, whose Name is the Word: Such a Word as is both the Son of God, and God: God proceeding from God, and making a Second Person in the Godhead.

Epiphanius, in opposition to the Heresies of Noetus and Sabellius, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One Substantial Person, affirms over and over, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy

Ghost Substance, that is, each of them Substance by him∣self, and as distinct in Substance as they are in Person: Three Substantial Persons, which are not one another, nor all the same. These Hereticks allowed the Father to be Substance, the Son Substance, the Holy Ghost Substance, but denied them to be Three in Substance, but taught that they were but One Substance, as they were but One and the same Person, Three Names, or Three distinct Virtues and Powers of the same One Substance or Person. And therefore when in opposition to these men Epiphanius as∣serts, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy Ghost Substance, he can mean no less but that each of them is as distinctly Substance as he is a Per∣son; for to oppose One Substance, and One substantial Person, you must assert, not Three diverse or different Sub∣stances, but Three as distinct in Substance as they are in Person, or Three distinct substantial Persons.

Epiphanius asserts against these Hereticks, That the Son is not the Father, but truly and properly a Son, begotten of God the Father, as to Substance. Now a Son which is substantially begotten of the Father, and is not the Father, must in Substance be distinct from God the Father, that is, a distinct, tho not separate Substance from God the Father.

Athanasius also is very positive in this, That this Divine Word is a Perfect Son of a Perfect Father, Being of Being,* 1.113 the Image or Character of his Father's Sub∣stance, not an insubstantial Word, but a living Power, and the Author of Life to all things; not like the Power of a Man, which denominates a Man power∣ful; for the Power of Man is not his Offspring or Son, whereas this Power of God is his Son; that the Father is Perfect Power, as the Father of Power,

and the Son Perfect Power, as born of him. It were end∣less to transcribe such Sayings as these out of the Fathers; but I cannot miss Athanasius his Argument from those words of our Saviour, I am in the Father, and the Father in me. Now, says he, the Father is not the Word in the Heart of the Son,* 1.114 and therefore neither is the Son the Word in the Heart of the Father, but the Living Word, begotten eternally of the Living God the Father, and being without be∣ginning with the Father; insomuch that we cannot conceive the Father ever to have been alone: Which attributes as compleat and distinct Personal Subsistence to the Son as to the Father: That if the Father, who has the Son in him∣self, be a real, subsisting Infinite Person; the Son, who has the whole Father in himself, must be as real, subsisting, In∣finite a Person; for there is the same reason of both.

The Answer Athanasius gives to a Sabellian Objection against the substantial Generation and Subsistence of the Word and Son of God, is an unanswerable Proof what he thought of this matter.

The Objection is this, That if the Word and Son be truly and substantially begotten, this substantial Word must go out of the Father, and subsist separately from him:* 1.115 Whereas the Word which is in God must be inse∣parable from him, and not appear out of him; for how should he appear out of God, when God fills all places, even Heaven and Earth, and there∣fore there is no place for the Word to subsist in, where God is not?

In answer to this, Athanasius first ob∣serves what this Objection is levelled against, viz.* 1.116 To disprove the true and proper Generation of the Son, his Eter∣nal Procession from the Father, and Sub∣sistence with the Father; that the Fa∣ther does not compleatly and perfectly subsist by himself, nor the Son compleat∣ly and perfectly subsist by himself. This is the Faith the Sabellians opposed, and which Athanasius defended, as the Argument it self will assure us; which contradicts no other Notion of Generation or Subsistence, but a substantial Generation, and a compleat Personal Subsistence of the Word; but they could not imagine how the Word should be substantially begotten, and com∣pleatly and perfectly subsist by himself in his own Person and Substance, distinct from his Father's Subsistence and Person, without going out of the Father, and subsisting in a separate place from the Father, as all Created Births do, which opposes nothing but a real substantial Birth, and a compleat distinct subsistence of the Word; and therefore this is what the Sabellians took for the Catholick Faith, and this is what Athanasius defends: Who tells them that this is a very igno∣rant mistake,* 1.117 to think that God is cir∣cumscribed by place, and to conceive the Son in another place, and to ima∣gine that the Father and Son must be divided and separated, one in this place, and another in that, if we acknowledge that the Son is begotten of the Father, and does appear and subsist by himself, distinct from the Father: This he proves from Scripture; That there is no place that can contain God, and

therefore we must have no imagina∣tion of Place, when we think of God, the Son, and the Holy Spi∣rit; That these are false and Athe∣istical Reasonings; That the Omni∣presence of God is not a co-extension with all Creatures, which is a bodily or kind of Corporeal Omnipresence; but his Power holds and contains all things, for Power is unbodied and in∣visible, which neither encompasses o∣ther things, nor is encompassed by them; and therefore it is impious to ask for, or to conceive what is the Place of God, of the Word, or of the Holy Spirit. And if a man will deny that the Son is or was begotten, because he cannot conceive nor find out the place of his Essence or Sub∣stance, for the same reason he may de∣ny that there is a Father, or that there is a God.

So that Athanasius acknowledges the Son to be as true and substantial a Son, as the Father is a substantial Father; and that he does as perfectly and compleatly subsist by himself, as the Father does; but denies that it hence fol∣lows, as the Sabellians objected, That the Son, if he be a distinct substantial Person himself, must be divided and parted from the Substance of his Father, and that if he sub∣sist distinctly by himself, he must subsist in a separate place from his Father; that this distinction of Persons and Sub∣sistence cannot be conceived without a Local Separation.

For he tells them, All these Mistakes are owing to Cor∣poreal Imaginations; that they conceive of God after the

manner of Bodies; that because Body cannot generate another, without parting and dividing of Substance, nor subsist without being in some place, nor subsist distinctly without being in distinct and separate places, therefore if God beget a Son, and this Son subsist distinctly by himself, this Son must go out of the Divine Substance, and be lo∣cally separated from God the Father, as a human Son is from his Father; whereas the Divine Nature and Substance cannot be divided, nor does God subsist in a place; and therefore the Son may be substantially begotten of the Fa∣ther, and subsist distinctly by himself, without any division of the Divine Substance, or separation of place.

Let us now proceed to a Third sort of these Hereticks, who did allow a real and substantial difference between Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, but made God a compound Being, but one Person, as well as one God, and that Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, were the Three Parts of this One God. This St. Austin calls Triformis Deus; and tells us,* 1.118 That these Hereticks did not allow the Father to be Perfect in himself, nor the Son Perfect in him∣self, nor the Holy Ghost Perfect in him∣self; that neither of these considered by themselves were Perfect God, but that all Three together made one Compleat and Perfect God.

This all the Catholick Fathers unanimously reject, and for the same reasons; because there can be no composition in the pure and simple Nature of God; and it was the received Doctrine of the Catholick Church, That each Person is by himself True and Perfect God, not an incompleat Part of the Deity.

Thus Athanasius warns us against this Heresy,* 1.119 which conceives the Trinity like Three Bodily Parts, inseparably united to each other; which, he says, is an ungodly reasoning, contrary to the Nature of Perfect Unbodied Beings; and therefore attributes the Perfection of the Godhead to each Person, who are a real Trinity, inseparably united in the same Form and Nature. That the Father is Perfect Essence and Being, without any defect, the Root and Foun∣tain of the Son and Spirit: That the Son in the Fulness of the Deity is the Living Word, and Perfect Offspring of the Father: That the Spirit is the Ful∣ness of the Son, not Part of another Being, but Whole and Entire in him∣self: That we must conceive them inseparably united to each other, but yet Three real subsisting Persons in the same Form and Species, which is originally in the Father, shines in the Son, and is manifested by the Holy Spirit. And therefore he adds, That he did not compound the Trinity, nor force it into a Monad or Unit (that is, One single Person) to preserve the Uni∣ty of the Godhead; nor conceive of God as of a Man, who is com∣pounded of Three Parts, Spirit, Soul, and Body; for such a compo∣sition cannot belong to a simple Na∣ture.

This is the constant language of the ancient Writers,* 1.120 That the Divine Na∣ture is not compounded of Parts, nor is God a compound Being; that each Person in the Trinity is a complete and perfect Person, and Three complete and perfect Persons cannot be One by Com∣position, as Three incomplete Parts are: that each Person by himself is perfect God and perfect Essence, though when we unite them and number Three, we acknowledge but One perfect God: for the Deity is not compounded but in Three,* 1.121 each of which is complete and perfect, there is One perfect Being, with∣out Composition, and without Parts; that is, the same One Divine Nature subsisting distinctly, not by Parts or Composition, but Whole and Entire in Three.

Let us now then consider the true state of the Question between these Sabellians, and the Catholick Fathers: These Hereticks owned at last, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be Three distinct Substances, but not Three substantial Wholes, but Three substantial Parts, which by their Union and Composition made up One whole intire God. The Catholick Fathers join with them so far, as to own these Divine Persons to be Three substantial subsisting Persons, but reject their Notion of a compounded God, or Three Parts of the Deity, with the utmost abhorrence, and affirm, that each Person is by himself entire and perfect God, per∣fect and complete Divine Essence or Substance, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Damascen speaks; and that they are not One God by Composition, or as One Person is One God, but as Three

complete and perfect Persons, each of which is perfect God, can be One God.

Now I think after this we need not dispute, what the Metaphysical Notions of Person and Personality are: for a Person in this Sacred Mystery, signifies One who is true and perfect God, and therefore is whatever God is; for the true and perfect definition of God, must belong to every Person who is true and perfect God. If then we acknow∣ledge God to be Infinite Substance, Mind, Life, Knowledge, Power, every Person who is God must be all this; and if each Person be true and perfect God, and yet no One Person is the other, nor the Motion, Affection, or perso∣nal Power, nor part of the other, then each Person is di∣stinctly and by himself complete and perfect God, and therefore has distinctly in himself all those Attributes and Perfections which belong to the perfect Notion and Idea of God; and to make any Person less than what God is, is to make him no God.

But Athanasius has another Argument against the Sabellian compounded Deity,* 1.122 which must put all Compositions of the Deity for ever out of countenance. The Scripture assures us, that God sends his Son, and that the Son sends the Holy Ghost; whereas were the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three inseparable Parts of one com∣pounded Deity, how could this One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, send part of himself, and one part of the same One God send another?

To send, and to be sent, necessarily supposes Persons really and substantially distinct, such as can give and re∣ceive, and execute Commands, who have distinct Under∣standings, Wills, and Powers of Action, for no other Beings are capable of sending or being sent; and Three

such distinct Persons, each of which is complete and per∣fect God, is the Trinity asserted by the Catholick Fathers, in contradiction to the Heresy of Sabellius.

But there is one very good Rule of Athanasius,* 1.123 which is worth observing in this Controversy, That we must not imagine to find the Unity of the God∣head by denying Three, but we must find this Unity, or Monade, in Three. The Sabellians took the first way to secure the Catholick Faith of One God, they denied Three real, distinct, sub∣stantial Persons in the Godhead; but the Catholick Faith owns Three real, distinct, substantial, divine Persons, and teaches that these Three are One God; not with such an U∣nity as belongs to One Person, but as Three Persons are One God: which should be a warning to some late Writers, who think they cannot sufficiently defend the Unity of God, without opposing a real and substantial Trinity, which is to oppose the ancient Catholick Faith.

To conclude this Chapter, the result of the whole in short is this, That in opposition to the Noetians, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be only Three Names of the same One Divine Person, whom we call God, the Catholick Fathers asserted that they were Three distinct Persons, not the same Person under Three Names, or Three Appearances; in opposition to those Sabellians, who denied the Substantiality of the Son, and of the Ho∣ly Ghost, but made the Son like the Word in the mind or heart of man, which had no substantial, permanent Sub∣sistence of its own, and the Holy Ghost in like manner to be a transient efflux of Power from God; so that God the Father was the only subsisting Person, and the One God, but the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the insubstantial, transient Word and Power of God. These ancient Fa∣thers in like manner asserted the Substantiality of the Son,

and of the Holy Ghost, that they were real, distinct, subsisting Persons, as true and perfect Persons as the Fa∣ther himself is: in opposition to those Sabellians who as∣serted a compound Deity, and made a Trinity of Parts, instead of a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the God∣head; they unanimously rejected all composition in the Deity, and asserted each Person distinctly by himself, not to be a part of God, but true and perfect God.

Now had these Fathers asserted nothing positively con∣cerning the Three Divine Persons, but only rejected these Noetian and Sabellian Heresies, it had been evidence enough what their Faith was concerning the Ever-blessed Trinity; for remove these Heresies, and all such as are manifestly the same, however they may differ in words, and there is nothing left for any man to believe concerning a Divine Trinity, but the true Catholick Faith of Three real, distinct, substantial, Divine Persons, each of which is distinctly, and by himself complete, entire, perfect God▪ For if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not one and the same Person, distinguisht only by Three Names, according to their different Appearances and Operations; nor one single Person with two personal Vertues and Powers, called the Son, and the Spirit, like the word and emotion in a man's heart, which is no person, and has no subsistence of its own; nor three parts of one compounded Deity, as a man is compounded of Body, Soul, and Spirit, then of necessity Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be Three complete, substantial, subsisting Persons, Thr•••• such Persons as the Sabellians would allow but One: f•••• ••f they ••e not the same, nor affections and motions of the ••ame, nor parts of the same, there is nothing left but to own them Three completely and perfectly subsisting Person.

If God be One, not in the Sabellian ••otion of Singu∣larity, as One God signifies One single Person; but O••e in Three, without parts or composition, as the Father as∣serted

against Sabellius, then each Person must be by him∣self complete and perfect God; for God cannot be One in Three Persons, unless each Person be perfect God; for un∣less this One God be perfect God in each Person, he cannot be perfectly One in Three. If the Unity of God be not the Unity of a Person, it must be the Unity and Sameness of Nature, and the inseparable Union of Persons; and this is the Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, which the Catholick Fathers taught, and which is the only thing they could reasonably teach, when they had rejected the Sabel∣lian Unity. There is no medium that I know of in this Controversy concerning the Unity of God, between the Unity of One single Person, and that Oneness which re∣sults from the Unity, and the Consubstantiality of Nature, and inseparable Union of Persons; and therefore if the first be Heresy, the second must be the Catholick Faith; and whatever Notions men advance against this, is Sabellianism in its Principle, and last result: for if the Unity of God be not the Union of Three complete Divine Persons, each of which is distinctly by himself perfect God, it must be the Unity of One Divine Person, which is the Sabellian Unity.

CHAP. IV. Concerning the Homoousion, or One Sub∣stance of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

IN the last Chapter I have plainly shewn what Sabellia∣nism is, and by what Arguments the Catholick Fathers opposed and confuted it, which is proof enough what they meant by Person, when in opposition to Sabellius, they taught that there were Three Persons in the Unity of the Godhead; not Three personal Characters and Relations, which Sabellius owned, but Three true and proper Per∣sons, each of whom is by himself true and perfect God.

But yet the Nicene Faith of the Homocusion, or One Sub∣stance of Father and Son, is so expounded by some, as to countenance the Sabellian Heresy, which all the Nicene Fathers condemned, though one would think that should be an unanswerable Objection against it; this has made it so absolutely necessary to the Vindication of the Catholick Faith, and to compose some warm Disputes, rightly to un∣derstand this matter, that I shall carefully inquire what the Nicene Fathers meant by these terms of the Homoousion, and One Substance, which they have put into their Creed, as the most express opposition to the Arian Heresy.

And we cannot long doubt of this, if we consider the true state of the Arian Controversy: There was no Dis∣pute between the Arians and Catholicks concerning the Personality of the Son; they both condemned Sabellius, and therefore One Substance, when opposed to the Arians, can't signify a Sabellian Unity.

The Arians and Sabellians both agreed in this, That One God is but One Divine Person, who is truly and properly God; and that to assert Three Persons, each of which is true and perfect God, is to make Three Gods. The Sabel∣lians, to avoid this Tritheism, make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One Divine Person, and in that sense but One God. The Arians on the other hand, allow Father and Son to be two real distinct Persons, but attribute true and perfect Divinity only to the Father, and make the Son a Creature, though the most excellent Creature, made be∣fore the World, and as like to God as any Creature can be, and the Minister of God in making the World.

This Heresy was condemned by the first general Council assembled at Nice; and if we would understand the Nicene Creed, we must expound it in opposition to the Arian He∣resy, without running into the other Extreme of Sabellia∣nism. And therefore when we are taught to believe in One Lord Iesus Christ, the Only begotten Son of God, begot∣ten of his Father before all Worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of One Substance with the Father, by whom all things were made; Wemust understand a Son, who is a distinct Person from his Father, as the Arians allowed him to be, but not a made or created Son, as they taught, but a Son by Na∣ture, begotten of his Father's substance, and that not in Time, but from all Eternity; and therefore not a Creature, but God by Nature, true and perfect God, as God of God, begotten of God, and therefore of One Substance with the Father; not in the Sabellian sense, as One Substance is One Person, but as One Substance signifies the same Nature, in opposition to the Arians, who made him not only a di∣stinct Person, but of a different Nature, like his Father, but not the same; not of the substance of his Father, but a new created Substance, made out of nothing, as all other Creatures are. The opposition of this Creed to the

Arian Heresy is certainly the best way of expounding it, and then we find nothing in it, but the true ancient Catho∣lick Faith, of the real distinction of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence. But the present Inquiry is, What is the true Notion of the Homousion, or One Substance of Father and Son; and besides that positive account the Fa∣thers give us of it, we may learn this from those false Glosses and Interpretations which they reject, and those Rules they give for the expounding these words.

SECT. I. The true Sense of the Homoousion, from those Mis∣representations which were made of it, and the An∣swers which were given by the Nicene Fathers to such Objections.

1. FIrst then, Let us consider what Misrepresentations were made of this disputed word Consubstantial, by the Enemies of the Catholick Faith, and what Answers the Fathers gave to such Objections. St. Hilary mentions three in the beginning of his 4^th Book of the Trinity; and I shall consider them in the Order in which he sets them down.

1. The first is, that this word Ho∣moousion,* 1.124 or Consubstantial, is no better than Sabellianism; that it makes the Father and the Son to be but One, by One singular Substance, which being Infinite, extended it self into the Vir∣gin's Womb, and taking a Body of her, in that Body took the Name of Son; and thus they say some former

Bishops understood it, and is therefore to be rejected as Heretical; which, as he adds, is the first misrepresentation of the Homoousion.

Thus he observes in his Book de Sy∣nodis,* 1.125 that the Fathers in the Council of Antioch, which condemned Paulus Samosatenus, did also reject the Homoou∣sion, because Paulus thereby understood the singularity of the Divine Nature and Substance, which destroys the real personal distinction between Father and Son; and adds, that the Church, though it retained the word Homoousion, still re∣jects that sense of it as profane. The Learned Dr. Bull, notwithstanding St. Hilary's Authority, can't believe that either Paulus or Sabellius did upon choice own the Homo¦ousion, but only put a forced and unnatural sense of it,* 1.126 to favour their Heresies; and seems to have very good rea∣son on his side; but that is not the present question, How perversly soever Hereticks understood this word, the Ni∣cene Fathers rejected this sense as profane and heretical. Now if One Substance does not signify One singular Sub∣stance in the Sabellian Notion of it, which leaves only a Trinity of Names or Modes, instead of a Trinity of Per∣sons, then Three consubstantial Persons must signisy Three substantial Persons, who have the same Nature and Es∣sence, but not the same singular Sub∣stance. And St. Basil tells us,* 1.127 that this is the proper acceptation of the word Homoousion, which is directly opposed to the Sabellian as well as to the Arian He∣resy, as it destroys the Identity of Hy∣postasis, and gives us a complete and perfect Notion of distinct Persons; for

the same thing is not consubstantial to it self, but to ano∣ther; that there must be another, and another, to make two that are consubstantial.

Another Objection against the Homo∣ousion was this,* 1.128 That to be consubstantial, or of One Substance, signifies the com∣munion of Two in some other thing, which is in order of Nature before them both; as if there were some prior Sub∣stance or Matter, of which they both did partake so as to have the whole Substance between them; which makes them consubstantial, or of one Substance both partaking of the same Being, Na∣ture, or Substance, which was before them both;* 1.129 and therefore they rejected the Homoousion, because it did not pre∣serve the relation between the Son and the Father, and made the Father later than that Substance or Matter, which is common to him with the Son. This also St. Hilary tells us the Church re∣jects and abominates;* 1.130 for nothing can so much as in thought be before the Substance of the Father;* 1.131 and the relation between Father and Son signifies to be∣get, and to be begotten, not to be both made of the same Substance.

* 1.132A third Reason they assigned against this word Homoousion was this, That to be Consubstantial, or of One Substance, in the strict and proper acceptation of these words, signifies, that the genera∣tion of the Son, is by the division of the Father's Substance, as if he were

cut out of him, and One Substance divided into Two Per∣sons, and so Father and Son are of One Substance, as a part cut out of the whole, is of the same nature with that from whence it is taken.

This was objected against the Homoousion in the time of the Nicene Council, while this word was under debate, which Socrates gives a more particular account of. The rea∣son those Bishops, who refused to subscribe to the Nicene Faith, gave against the Homoousion, was this,* 1.133 That that only can be said to be Consubstantial, which is of another, either by division, or by efflux and emana∣tion, or by prolation or eruption: by eruption, as the branches sprout out of the root; by efflux, according to the manner of human generations; by di∣vision, as the same mass of Gold may be divided into two or three golden Cups; but the Son is of the Father neither of these ways, and therefore they rejected this Faith, and ridiculed the Homoousion.

For this very reason Eusebius of Caesarea was for some time in suspense about the Homoousion,* 1.134 which he afterwards rea∣dily received, when the Council had declared in what sense they understood it, and rejected all corporeal passions, all division and partition, change and diminution of the Di∣vine Essence; which pure, simple, unbodied, eternal, un∣changeable Mind is not capable of. Now all that I shall observe at present is, That this very Objection, which was thought so formidable, necessarily supposes that both they who made it, and they who were so much concerned to answer it, did acknowledge a substantial generation of the Son; for this whole Dispute is downright Nonsense with∣out it: If God the Father in begetting his Son, does not

so communicate his own Nature and Substance to him, as to make him a true substantial Son, of the same Substance indeed, but yet as distinct in Substance from the Father, as he is in Person, How ridiculous is all this Dispute, how the Father communicates his own Nature to his Son? for ac∣cording to these men, he does not communicate or propa∣gate his own Nature and Substance at all, there being but one singular solitary Divine Nature and Substance, with a Trinity of Names, Modes, or Offices, and therefore no danger of any division or partition of the Divine Sub∣stance.

The Dispute between the Catholicks and the Arians about the generation of the Son was this: They both owned against the Sabellians, that the Son is a real, sub∣stantial, subsisting Person; but the Question was, whence he had his Nature? whether he was created out of No∣thing, and consequently had a beginning of Being, as the Arians affirmed; or was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the Substance of his Father, and so coeternal with his Father, as the Nicene Coun∣cil affirmed, That the Substance of the Son was of the Sub∣stance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light. Against this the Arians objected, That the Son could not be of the Sub∣stance of the Father, without the division of the Father's Substance, which is impossible in an infinite uncreated Spi∣rit, as God is; which Argument is only against a substan∣tial generation. The Nicene Fathers allow this Objection to be good as to corporeal generations, but deny that it is thus as to the Eternal Generation of the Son of God; for an Eternal, Uncreated, Immutable Mind, if it can com∣municate its own Nature at all, (and we learn from Scri∣pture, that God has a Son) must do it without division of parts; for the Divine Nature and Substance has no parts, and is capable of no division: And it is very absurd to rea∣son from corporeal Passions, to the Affections and Opera∣tions of Spirits, much more of an infinite eternal Spirit.

Had not the Arians understood the Catholick Fathers, of the substantial Generation of the Son, they had more wit than to urge an Argument to no purpose; for where there is no communication of Substance, it is certain there can be no division of it: And had not the Catholick Fathers owned this substantial Generation, they would have re∣jected the Argument with scorn, as nothing to the pur∣pose, and not have distinguished between corporeal gene∣rations, and the Generation of Eternal and Infinite Mind. That though Bodies cannot communicate their own Na∣ture and Substance without division, yet an Eternal Mind can; so that from these perverse Interpretations of the Homoousion, which the Catholick Fathers rejected, we may learn what they meant by it: for if Father and Son are not Consubstantial in the sense of the Sabellians and Modalists; that is, that Father and Son are not One Per∣son with Two Names, nor One singular solitary Substance common to them both, then the Father must be a substan∣tial Father, and the Son a substantial Son, and these Two substantial Persons are Consubstantial, as having the same One Divine Nature and Substance intirely, perfectly and distinctly in themselves, without any division, diminution, or separation of Substance, by a complete and perfect Ge∣neration, whereby the Father communicates his whole in∣tire Nature to the Son without any change or alteration in himself.

SECT. II. Some Rules for expounding the Homoousion; and in what Sense the Fathers understood it.

SEcondly, Let us now examine what account the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers give of the Homoousion, and in what sense they understood it. But before I tell you what they expresly say of this matter, I shall observe by the way two or three Rules they give us for expounding the Homoousion, which are of great use in this Enquiry.

1. The first is, To give the Homoousion the right place in our Creed, as the Nicene Fathers have done. They do not tell us abruptly, in the first place, That the Son is con∣substantial, or of one Substance with the Father. They first tell us, That Jesus Christ our Lord is the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father, that is, of the Sub∣stance of his Father, before all Worlds, God of God, Light of Light, Very God of Very God, Begotten, not made; and then they add, Of One Substance with the Fa∣ther.

This St. Hilary lays great stress on, and his Reason is very considerable;* 1.135 be∣cause if in the first place we say, Father and Son are consubstantial, or of One Substance, this is capable of an Hereti∣cal as well as Orthodox Sense, as we have already heard; for they may be One Substance in the Sabellian Notion, as that signifies One Person; or One by the Division or Partition of the same

Substance, of which each has a part; for all these per∣verse Senses may be affix'd to it, when this word Consubstan∣tial, or One Substance, stands singly by it self, or is put in the first place, without any thing to limit or determine its signification. And therefore a true Catholick Christian must not begin his Creed with saying, That Father and Son are of One Sub∣stance;* 1.136 but then he may safely say One Substance, when he has first said, The Father is unbegotten, the Son is born, and subsists of his Father, like to his Fa∣ther in all Perfections, Honour, and Nature; not of nothing, but born; not unborn, but coaeval; not the Father, but the Son of the Father; not a Part of the Father, but All that the Father is; not the Author, but the Image, the I∣mage of God, begotten of God, and born God; not a Creature, but God; not Another God, of a different Kind and Substance, but One God, as having the same Essence and Nature, which differs in nothing from the Substance of the Father; that God is One, not in Person, but Na∣ture, Father and Son having nothing unlike, or of a diffe∣rent kind in them: And after this we may safely add, That Father and Son are One Substance, and cannot deny it without Sin.

This is as plain as words can make it, and needs no Com∣ment, but fixes and determines the Catholick Sense of the Homoousion. For if we must acknowledge the Son to be con∣substantial, or of one Substance with the Father, in no other sense than as a True and Real Son is consubstantial, a Son, not created out of Nothing, but begotten of his Fa∣thers Substance; the Son of God, who in his own proper Person is true and perfect God; not a part of God, but all

that God is; not One God, as One Person with the Father, but as having the true Divine Nature distinctly in his own Person. This is a Demonstration that the Nicene Consub∣stantiality, is the Consubstantiality of Two real substantial Persons, who have the same Nature distinctly subsisting in each of them.

2 Another Rule for expounding the Homoousion is, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, are equipollent terms; that to be of one Substance, and to be in all things alike to each other, signify the same thing. I know the Fathers condemned the Arian Homoiousion; for they asserted, That the Son was like the Father, in opposition to his being of the same Nature with the Father, and therefore this was an imperfect likeness and resemblance, or indeed no likeness at all; for a created and uncreated Nature are at such an infinite distance, as to have no true and real likeness to each other; to be sure not such a likeness as there must be between a Son and a Father: Nay sometimes they would not allow, that likeness can be properly applied to two in∣dividual Natures of the same species, as to two individual human Natures, which are not like to each other, but are the same. But yet whether it was proper or improper, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to be upon all ac∣counts, and every way perfectly alike, was allowed to be very Orthodox; and therefore St. Hilary in his Book de Synodis, approves several Oriental Creeds as very Ortho∣dox, though they left out the Homoousion, because they in the most express terms confessed the perfect likeness and similitude of Nature between Father and Son;* 1.137 which they guarded with the utmost Caution, a∣gainst the perverse Interpretations both of the Sabellian and Arian Hereticks. And he disputes at large, That perfect similitude is a sameness and equality of

Nature; and calls God to witness, that be∣fore he ever heard of those words Homo∣ousion, and Homoiousion,* 1.138 he always thought that what is signified by both these words, is the same: that perfect likeness of Nature is the sameness of Nature; for nothing can be perfectly alike, which has not the same Nature. And this he says he learnt from the Evangelists and Apostles, before ever he heard of the Nicene Faith, which he had not heard of till a little before he was ba∣nished for that Faith. This observa∣tion is of great use, as St. Hilary notes, to confute Sabellianism, and to fix the true sense of the Homoousion: for if to be Consubstantial, or of one Nature, signifies a perfect likeness, similitude, and equality of Nature, Consubstantiali∣ty must at least signify Two, who are thus consubstantial, as likeness, simili∣tude and equality does; and these Two must have One and the same Nature, not in the sense of Singularity, and Sa∣bellian Unity, but of likeness and simili∣tude: that Father and Son are One Substance, not as One Person is One with himself, but as Two Persons are One by a perfect likeness and similitude of Nature, which must be the true meaning of Consubstantial, if Consubstantiali∣ty and likeness of Nature be the same.

3. I observe farther, That the Catholick Fathers did not make the Homoousion the Rule of Faith, that whatever sense some critical Wits can put on it, must therefore be owned for the Catholick Faith; but they chose it as the most comprehensive word, to comprize the true Catholick

Faith, and to detect the Frauds of Hereticks. They taught no new Faith by this word, but what the Catholick Church had always taught, but secured the Faith by it against the shifts and evasions of H••reticks. This is the defence they made to the Arian Objection, That it was an unscriptural word; they confessed the word Homoou∣sios was not to be found in Scripture, but the Faith expressed by that word was:* 1.139 Thus St. Austin answers Pascen∣tius, and tells us, That Christ himself has taught us the Homoousion, where he says, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and I and my Father are One; and expounds this of the Unity, Dig∣nity, and Equality of Nature: And adds, That it is not the word, but the thing signified by that word, which is so terrible to Hereticks; and if they would dispute to purpose, they must not reject the word, but the doctrine it contains. And thus Laurentius, who presided in that Dispute, gives judgment in this Controversy,* 1.140 That the Homoousion was not the Name of the Christian Faith, but signified the Equality of the Trini∣ty; and that though this word be not in Scripture, yet the thing signified by it is true; and we must believe honou∣rably of the Unity, lest we injure the Trinity.

We may find enough to this purpose in Athanasius, De Decret. Syn. Nic. and elsewhere, of which more presently. And therefore St. Hilary, in his Book de Synodis, which he wrote to some Catholick Bishops, who were very Or∣thodox in the Faith, and yet doubted of this word Ho∣moousion,

tells them,* 1.141 That they are to consider what the Synod intended by that word, and not reject the word, un∣less they rejected the Faith taught by it, and would profess those Arian Do∣ctrines, which the Council condemned in it.

This is the constant language of the Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, when the Dispute is concerning the use of this word, which gives us this certain Rule for expounding the Homoousion, that we must understand it in no other sense than what the Nicene Fathers intended by it; for if we do, we may acknowledge the Homoousion, and yet deny the Nicene Faith. What they taught by this word, that we must own; and what they rejected by it, we must reject. And though we may fancy that this word signi∣fies more than what the Nicene Fathers understood by it, (as we have heard what perverse Senses the Hereticks fixt on it) yet it being not a Scriptural, but an Ecclesiastical word, it must be expounded to that Sense, and no other, which placed it in the Creed.

SECT. III What the Nicene Fathers meant by the Homoousion.

AND this brings me to a more particular Account of the Homoousion, and what the Nicene Fathers under∣stood by it.

Eusebius Pamphili, who at first doubted about the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that Christ was of the substance of the Father, and consubstantial, or of One Substance with him; gives an account to his Coesareans of the Reasons which

moved him afterwards to subscribe to that Form of Faith; as appears by his Letter to them, recorded in Socrates his Ecclesiastical History. He tells them, That he did not admit these words without due examination; but when he found there was nothing meant by them, but what was truly Catholick and Orthodox, he com∣plied for Peace sake.* 1.142 For by the Son's being of his Father's Substance, they meant no more than that he was of the Father, not as a part of the Father, or of his Substance; and when the Son is said to be consubstantial with the Fa∣ther, they did not understand this after the manner of Bodies by division,* 1.143 ab∣scission, or any change of the Father's Substance; but the only meaning is, That the Son has nothing like a crea∣ted Nature, but is in every respect per∣fectly like his Father, as not being of any other Substance or Nature, but of the Father.

Athanasius gives us a very particular account what it was that forced the Ni∣cene Fathers to add those two words to their Creed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Son is of the Substance of the Fa∣ther, and Consubstantial, or of One Substance with the Father; which was to cut off all Evasions and Subterfuges from the Arian Hereticks, and to force them to confess the Truth, or to confess their Heresy, which they endeavoured to palliate and conceal under ambigu∣ous words.

When the Nicene Fathers taught, That the Son is of the Father,* 1.144 the Arians were contented to allow this, but meant no more by it, but that the Son is of the Father, as all other Creatures are of God; and therefore they added, That the Son is of the Substance of God, to distinguish him from all Crea∣tures; and this is the true interpreta∣tion of that Phrase, That the Son is of the Substance of the Father, that he is no Creature.

Thus when the Fathers taught, That the Word was the true Power and Image of the Father in all things, and inva∣riably like the Father, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Arians owned this also in a qualified sense, because Creatures are said to be the Power, the Image,* 1.145 the Likeness of God, and therefore they were forced to express the sense of Scripture, and what sense they understood the Scripture in, concerning the Son's being the Like∣ness and Image of God, by adding, that the Son is Consubstantial, or of One Sub∣stance with the Father, to declare that the Son is not so of the Father as meerly to be like him,* 1.146 but to be the very same in likeness and similitude to the Father; and to be inseparably uni∣ted to his Father's Substance, and that he and the Father are One, as he him∣self hath said. The Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word,

like the light and its splendor; and this the word Homocu∣sios signifies, and was used by the Council to this very end, to distinguish and separate the Word from all created Nature, as appears from the Anathema they immediately denounce against those who said, That the Son of God was produced out of nothing,* 1.147 was a Creature, of a mutable Nature, the Workmanship of God, or of any other Substance but the Sub∣stance of the Father: And therefore he adds, That those that dislike these words, ought to consider the sense in which the Synod uses them, and to anathematize what the Synod anathematizes; and then if they can, let them quarrel with the words; though he is very confident that no man who owns the sense of the Council, and under∣stands the words in their sense, can dislike the words. From whence it appears, that Athanasius would have allowed those for Orthodox Christians (as I observed before St. Hi∣lary did) who should confess the Eternal Generation of the Son, that there was no time before he was, and that he had no beginning of Being; that he is no Creature, nor of any other Substance, but only of the Father, and that he always was inseparably united to him, and one with him, though they should have boggled at those words, That the Son is of the Substance of the Father, and con∣substantial with him. But the true reason why the Nicene Fathers did so earnestly contend for these words, of the Substance of the Father, and Consubstantial, was because they found by experience, that no other words would hold the Arian Hereticks, who concealed their Poyson under any other form of words, though in appearance very Or∣thodox; as the Catholick Bishops found to their cost in the Council of Ariminum, and upon several other occasions; which* 1.148 is the account the Synod of Paris gives the Eastern

Bishops of this matter: But though they desired that all would agree in the use of this word, as most expressive of the true Catholick Faith, yet they never rejected the Com∣munion of any Bishops merely upon this account, while they prosessed the true Catholick Faith, which the Nicene Council intended to signify by this word, and condemned those Arian Blasphemies which they intended to condemn by it.

Before this Council had taken the Homoousion into their Creed, and made it the Test of the Catholick Faith, Dio∣nysius Bishop of Alexandria, in his Book against the Sabel∣lians, had let drop some Expressions, for which he was charged with denying the Homoousion, and accused for it to his Name-sake Dionysius, then B••shop of Rome, which oc∣casioned his Apology to the Roman Bishop, which Athana∣sius gives us an account of.

He owns, That he did say that the word Homoousion was not to be found in Scripture,* 1.149 yet what he taught of Christ did plainly signify what is meant by the Homoousion, that he is no Creature, but homogeneous, or of the same Nature with his Father, which he explained by Human Births, which are manifestly of the same kind; there being no difference of Nature between Parents and Chil∣dren, who differ only in this, That Pa∣rents are not their own Children; whereby he signified that God the Fa∣ther and God the Son had but one and the same Nature, though the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father. The same, he says, he represented by other similitudes of Homogeneous Pro∣ductions; as a Root and its Branches,

the Fountain and Rivers, which are not the same with each other, but have the same Nature. These are true Catholick Representations of the Homoousion, and this Dionysius thought a sufficient Justification of his Faith, and Athanasius thought so too, with∣out using that term; especially if we add what he discourses more at large, de Sent. Dionysii contra Aria∣nos.

I shall only observe farther, That the Learned Dr. Bull takes this very way to prove that the Ante Nicene Fathers did own the Faith of the Homoousion, or that the Son is consubstantial to the Father, though we seldom meet with the word it self in their Writings; because they teach the same things which the Nicene Fathers intended by that word:* 1.150 As 1. When they affirm the Son of God is not only of the Father, but that he proceeds from, and is begotten of the Father. 2. That the Son is the True, Genuine, Pro∣per, Natural Son of God. 3. When they explain the Ge∣neration of the Son, by the Root and its Branches, the Sun and its Rays, the Fountain and River, which are of the same Nature, and therefore represent the Father and Son to be of the same Substance. 4. When they except the Son of God out of the number of Creatures, and deny him to be a Creature. 5. When they ascribe such things to the Son, as are proper and peculiar only to the True God. 6. When they affirm the Son of God not only to be God, but expresly own him to be true God, God by Na∣ture, and One God with the Father.

This is the true Notion of the Homoousion; and now let any man judge, Whether a Consubstantial Trinity be a Tri∣nity of Personal Characters, Relations, or Names, or of

Real, Substantial, Subsisting Persons. If we will allow ei∣ther the Nicene Fathers, or the Arian Bishops to be well in their wits, can we think that there would have been any such Disputes between them, as whether the Son be Co∣eternal with the Father, or had a Beginning? whether there were any time, the least conceivable moment be∣fore the Son was? whether he was made 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, crea∣ted out of nothing, as all other Creatures are, or begot∣ten of the Substance of the Father, and is the true, ge∣nuine, natural Son of God, or a Son only by Adoption? whether he be true perfect God, in opposition to the most perfect created Nature, or be only a made and Creature-God? whether he be Consubstantial with the Father, or have only a Nature like the Fathers, but not the same? and whether he be like his Father in all things, in Substance and Essence, or only in Will and Affection. I say, Could any men in their wits dispute such matters as these, un∣less both sides were agreed, that the Son is a Real, Substan∣tial Son, as human Sons are, who are begotten of the Substance of their Parents; that he has a Subsistence of his own, distinct from his Father's Subsistence; that he has a Substance of his own, eternally begotten of his Father's Substance, and therefore the same, but proper and pecu∣liar to his own Person, which makes him the Son, and not the Father. For till these things are agreed, there is no foundation for the other Disputes; for if the Son have no real Subsistence of his own, who would dispute whether he began to subsist in time, or did subsist from all Eternity? If he have no Substance of his own, is it not ludicrous to dispute whether he be of the Father, that is, have his Substance of his Father's Substance, or be a new created Substance, as like his Father's Substance as a created Sub∣stance can be, but not the same? For if he have no di∣stinct Substance of his own, neither of these can be true. To what purpose is it to dispute, whether he be a begotten

or created God, if he be not as true and perfect a Person, and as true and perfect God (upon the Catholick Hy∣pothesis) in his own Person, as the Father himself is?

In short, to conclude this Argument, If the Homoousion signifies, that the Son of God, who is Consubstantial to his Father, is no Creature, was not made out of Nothing, had no Beginning of Being, is of his Father's Substance, begotten of his Substance from all Eternity, a true and perfect Son of a true and perfect Father, and upon all ac∣counts the very same that the Father is, excepting that he is the Son and not the Father, it is impossible the Nicene Fa∣thers should have been either Sabellians or Modalists.

SECT. IV. A more particular Inquiry into the full Signification of the Homoousion, with respect to the Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature.

THAT the Nicene Fathers did by the Homoousion, or One Substance of the Godhead, understand some∣thing like what we call a Specifick Sameness and Vnity of Na∣ture, might be proved by numerous Quotations, had it not been sufficiently done already by Petavius, Curcelloeus, Dr. Cudworth, and others; whoever will be pleased to read the Testimonies they produce in this Cause, will never be able to make any other tolerable Sense of them.

They apply this word Homoousion to things, which are specifically One, or which have the same Specifick Nature, as a Tree and its Branches, a Fountain and River, as they call God the Father the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Root and Fountain of the Son, and Holy Spirit;

the Sun and its Rays and Splendor;* 1.151 as Christ is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the brightness and refulgency of his Father's Glory. They prove that Christ has the same Nature with his Father, because all true, natural, genuine Sons have so; and therefore if he be as truly and properly the Son of God, as Isaac was the son of Abraham, he must be Con∣substantial to God the Father, as Isaac was to Abraham, which we know is a Specifick Vnity of Nature. And the Council of Chalcedon expresly affirms, That Christ is Con∣substantial to his Father, as to his Godhead, or Divine Na∣ture; and Consubstantial to us as to his Manhood, or Human Nature; and if the Homoousion signifies the same, or some∣thing analogous in both, we know what this sameness of Nature means; for it is impossible to reconcile this to one singular Nature and Unity. Christ is not Consubstantial to us upon account of the same singular human Nature in him, and in all Mankind; for every Man has a particular human Nature of his own, and so had Christ; but the Nature is specifically the same in Christ, and in us that is, it is a true human Nature, and this makes Christ and us Consubstantial. And if there be any thing like this, though in a more perfect degree, in the Consubstantiality of Fa∣ther and Son, it must signify not one singular Nature; which cannot be said to be Consubstantial to it self, but the Consubstantiality of Two Persons really and substantially distinct, but united in the same common Nature, or the same Divinity: And therefore nothing is more common, than to render the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unius generis, and by such like words, as every one knows signify a Specifick Vnity. That the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the One Divinity, and One Divine Essence, is a com∣mon Nature, the same in all Three Persons communicated by the Father to the Son, and by Father and Son to the Holy Spirit, is so universally acknowledged, that it needs no proof; the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, fre∣quently

occur in the writings of the Nicene Fathers, which signify the One Divinity to be a common Nature to the Three Divine Persons.* 1.152 This is the very account St. Basil gives of the difference between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Essence and Person; that Essence signifies a common Nature, which is in more than One, and may be spoken of more than One, as a species is predicated of its Individuals. Man is a common Name for all Men, because Humanity is a com∣mon Nature, which is alike in Peter, and Iohn, and Iames, and all the Men in the World: But Hypostasis or Person, though it signifies the Nature also, yet not in that general Notion, as common to all of the same kind, but as actu∣ally subsisting in Particulars, which are distinguished from each other by their distinct Subsistence, or by such other Properties and characteristical Marks as are peculiar to each of them, and not common to the whole kind, as the persons of Peter, and Iames, and Iohn, though they have the same common Nature, are yet distinguished from each other. Now if the One Divine Nature be in this sense a common Nature, that it is really and actually communica∣ted by the Father to the Son, and Holy Spirit, and does distinctly subsist whole and entire, and perfect, in all Three Divine Persons, it cannot be One singular solitary Nature, which cannot subsist distinctly in Three; for in perfect sin∣gularity there can be no distinction: nor can One singu∣lar Nature be Three Subsistences, when there is but One which subsists.

Athanasius, or whoever was the Author of that Treatise of the common Essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, proves that all Three Persons have the same common Nature from the same Names, and Attributes, and Works, Dominion, and Power, ascribed distinctly to them all; and gives this account, why, though the Father be God, and the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet we must not say that there are Three Gods, but One God in Three Persons▪

because a common Nature has a common Name, as he shews, that all Mankind in Scripture are called one Man,* 1.153 upon account of their common Nature; and if this be allowable among men, to unite all Mankind in one Name, and to speak of them as one Man, notwithstanding all that diversity which is between them in external form, strength, will,* 1.154 affecti∣ons, opinions, &c. how much more rea∣sonable is it to call the Three Divine Persons One God, who are distinguished and separated from the whole Creation by One undivided Dignity, One Kingdom, One Power, One Will and Energy.

And that we may not suspect that by One common Nature they meant One singular Substance and Nature,* 1.155 common to Father and Son (which it is impossi∣ble to form any Notion of) St. Basil tells us what he meant by a common Na∣ture, such a Nature as has the same No∣tion and Definition, that is, which is common, as a Genus or Species is com∣mon: As for example; If the Father, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as to his Suppositum, or Substance, be Light, we must acknow∣ledge 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Essence and Substance of the Son to be Light also; and whatever other Notion we form of the Being and Essence of the Father, the same we must apply to the Son. And herein he places the Unity of the God∣head, or the One Divinity; that though the Divine Persons differ in Number,

and in their peculiar Characters, yet that Divine Nature which subsists distinctly in each of them, has but one and the same Notion and Definition, and therefore is but one and the same in all. If this be not a specifick Sameness and Unity, all our Logicks deceive us: I'm sure the Unity of an Individuum or singular Nature was never thought to con∣sist in a common Notion or Definition of its Nature; and yet this is the account which the Fathers unanimously give of the One common Divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

No man who understands any thing of this Controver∣sy, can be ignorant of that famous Dispute de Ingenito & Genito, concerning the Vnbegotten and the begotten Nature. By this Sophism the Arians endeavoured to prove, That the Son could not be Homoousios, consubstantial, or of the same Nature with the Father, because an Unbegotten Na∣ture cannot be the same with a Begotten Nature.

Now had the Catholick Fathers believed the singularity of the Divine Nature in the modern Notion of it, this Objection had been unanswerable; for it is absolutely im∣possible that the same singular Nature should be both be∣gotten and unbegotten, as much as it is that the same single Person should be both begotten and unbegotten. I desire to know, how any Sabellianist, who acknowledges but One singular solitary Substance of the Deity, would answer this Objection; I know no possible way they have, but to deny that the Divine Nature of the Son is begot∣ten; that though the Son be begotten, his Divine Nature is not begotten, but only his Personality, or Mode of Subsistence, without a begotten subsisting Nature: And this, indeed, would effectually answer the Objection; for if there be not a begotten and unbegotten Nature, the foundation of the Objection is lost. And this is so obvious an Answer upon the Hypothesis of Singularity, that it is sufficient to satisfy any thinking man, that the C••tholick

Fathers did not believe this Singularity of the Divine Es∣sence, since none of them ever gave this Answer to the Objection.

But we need not guess at their meaning; for they them∣selves expresly reject this Answer, which is the only proper and pertinent Answer upon this Hypothesis; and give such other Answers as contradict the Notion of the Singularity of the Divine Essence. As strange as some think it, the Catholick Fathers, from the very beginning of Christiani∣ty, owned the Divine Nature and Substance of the Son to be begotten; nothing is more familiar in all their Wri∣tings, than 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Natura genita, Deus genitus, uni∣genitus Deus.* 1.156 St. Gregory Nyssen agrees this matter with Eunomius, that the Divine Nature of the Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Begotten Substance; so does St. Basil, so do the other Fathers. When Eunomius objected, That God being unbe∣gotten, cannot admit of Generation, St. Basil allows this to be true in one sense, viz. That he who is unbegotten cannot in his own proper Nature be begotten, because it is impossible that an unbegotten Nature should it self be be∣gotten: But the other sense of the words, That he who is unbegotten himself can't beget, so as to communicate by a substantial Generation his own Nature to the Son, he re∣jects as Blasphemy both against Father and Son; which is a plain demonstration what St. Basil's Judgment was about an unbegotten and begotten Nature.

Eunomius urged, That unbegotten, and begotten, are both Names of Nature, and therefore must signify two Na∣tures as different from each other, as unbegotten and begot∣ten are. Now to prove that begotten is not the Name of Nature and Substance, St. Basil uses this Argument, That if 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 be the same, if begotten and substance signify the same thing, then as he who is begotten is the begotten of him who begets, so we may in like manner

say,* 1.157 that he who is begotten is the Sub∣stance of him who begets, and then the Name begotten will not signify the Sub∣stance of the only begotten Son, but the Substance of the God of all: that as the Son is the begotten of God, so he is the Substance of God; and thus the begotten is the Substance of the un∣begotten, which, he says, is ridiculous. And yet as ridiculous as St. Basil thought this, those must of necessity own it, who assert but One singular Substance of the Deity; for if there be but One Sub∣stance in the sense of Singularity, the Son (if he have any Substance) must be the Substance of the Father; he who is begotten, must be the Substance of him who is unbegotten. Thus much I think is certain, That if St. Basil was in his wits, he would never have used this Argument, had he believed that Father and Son are but One singular Substance; and yet elsewhere he ex∣presly tells us, That the Nicene Fathers distinguished the Hypostates of Father and Son, when they called the Son Light of Light; for the Light which begets, is not the Light which is begotten, though their Nature is the same, they being Light and Light.

Once more, to prevent if it be possible all manner of Evasions, since some Moderns distinguish between the generation of the Son, and of his Substance, and will allow that the Son is begotten, but not his Substance. I observe that St. Basil rejects this distinction

between the Son and his Substance. Eunomius durst not say that the Son was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, made or created out of nothing, this being so expresly condemned by the Nicene Council, which the generality of Christians received as the Rule of their Faith, and therefore he endeavoured to cheat them into it before they were aware, by a new form of speech:* 1.158 He says, That the Substance of the Son was begotten, having no Being before its own proper subsistence, and was be∣gotten before all things by the Will of God. This was very craftily expressed, to insinuate that there was a time when the Substance of the Son did not exist; for it could not be before it was begotten, and had a proper subsistence of its own. St. Basil exposes this So∣phistry at large, and shews, that by the same Argument they might prove, that there was a time when the Father's Substance was not; for that could not be older than its own subsistence: But if the Father be Eternal, though his Substance could not be before its subsistence, so may the Son be also, by an Eternal generation and subsistence. But that which I would take notice of is, that St. Basil observes the vain Sophistry of this way of speaking, that when he durst not say that the Son was of nothing, or that there was a time when he was not, he insi∣nuates the same thing concerning the Substance of the Son,* 1.159 as if the Son and the Substance of the Son were two things. Now if the Son and the Sub∣stance of the Son be the same, then if the Son is begotten, the Substance of the Son is begotten; if the Son be not the Father, the Substance of the Son is not the Substance of the Father. And yet all the Philoso∣phy of the ancient Fathers, not excepting St. Austin him∣self, would not allow of any difference between the Per∣son

of the Father, and his Being, Essence, Substance, Sub∣sistence, Nature, nor between the Person of the Son, and his Being, Subsistence, Nature, &c. and therefore the Son is as distinct from the Father in Nature, Being, Life, Sub∣stance, as in Person and Subsistence.

But to proceed: There was no dispute between the Ca∣tholicks and the Arians about the singularity of the Divine Substance, they both rejected that as Sabellianism, and as∣serted Father and Son to be as distinct in Nature and Sub∣stance, as they are in Person; and therefore this Objection de ingenito & genito, concerning the unbegotten and the begotten Nature, was intended not to prove a numerical distinction, (which it effectually does) but a specifick difference and diversity of Nature between Father and Son; that the Son is no more consubstantial to the Father, than to be unbegotten and to be begotten are the same. The whole Controversy turned upon this one Point, Whether unbegotten and begotten, were Names of Nature; and con∣sequently, whether to be unbegotten, and to be begotten, made a specifick difference of Natures. This the Catho∣lick Fathers unanimously denied; and not to take notice of all they say on this Argument, there is one Answer which they all give, very observable to my present purpose, and that is this: That to be unbegotten or begotten, makes no specifick difference in created Natures, and therefore there is no reason to say that it makes any such diversity in the Divine Nature; and they all give the Example of Adam, Seth, and Eve, who all had the same human Nature;* 1.160 and yet Adam was un∣begotten, as being immediately formed by God. Seth was begotten, as being Adam's Son; Eve was not begotten, but made of one of Adam's Ribs: But this makes no diversity of Nature, but only distinguishes them by their manner of

Existence, or coming into Being, and there is no imaginable reason why the same specifick Nature considered in its Individuals, may not have very diffe∣rent Beginnings, without any alteration of Nature. Nay, as Damascen observes,* 1.161 thus it is in all the several species of Crea∣tures; for the first in every kind is un∣begotten: And though the Divine Na∣ture in all Three Divine Persons is Eter∣nal, without any Beginning; yet if to be unbegotten, or to be begotten, make no diversity of Nature in Creatures, there is no reason to say that it makes any such difference in the Divine Na∣ture. This is so plain and express, that I need add no∣thing to shew how this overthrows the Opinion of Singu∣larity, and owns a Specifick Unity and Sameness of the Divine Nature: That though the Father be unbegotten, and the Son begotten, yet they are Consubstantial, or of the same Nature; not with the Sameness of Singularity, which is impossible, but with such a Sameness of Nature as is between two of the same kind and species, as the Example of Adam and Seth proves. And I need not prove, that a Specifick Sameness of Nature, supposes a real di∣stinction of Persons, who agree in this One same Na∣ture.

SECT. V. That by the Homoousion, or One Substance, the Ni∣cene Fathers did not meerly understand a Specifick, but a Natural Unity and Sameness of Substance be∣tween Father and Son.

BUT yet after all this, the Catholick Fathers did not allow the Divine Nature in a strict and proper Notion to be a species, which is only a notional and logical Unity and Sameness of Nature; for the Divine Nature, which is perfect Essence, is not logically, but essentially One, though it subsists distinctly in Three Persons, and this was the Faith of the Catholick Fathers. On this one Point the whole Controversy turns, concerning the Singularity of the Di∣vine Nature, or the Plurality of Divine Natures multiplied with the Persons, and consequently that great Controver∣sy of all, whether a Trinity of true, real, substantial Per∣sons, be essentially One, or Three Gods.

To represent this as plainly as possibly I can, we must consider the difference between a Spe∣cifick and a Natural Unity,* 1.162 between be∣ing One in Notion, and One in Nature. The first is, when from that agreement which we observe in the Natures of se∣veral Individuals, we form a Notion of one common Nature which belongs to them all; as the Notion of Humanity, or Human Nature, which belongs to all men, and affords a common Name, and a common definition to them: But this is only the work of the mind, for there is no such one common Human Nature

actually existing in all Mankind;* 1.163 but every man is a man by himself, and has a particular Human Nature, as he has a Soul and Body of his own, which is not the Soul and Body of any other man in the world. And thus Damascen owns, it is with all Creatures of the same kind, who in truth and reality are distinct separate Beings, who subsist apart by themselves, as Peter and Paul, and all other men do, and are united only in a common Notion, not in a common sub∣sisting Nature, which is one and the same in all.

But then he tells us, that it is quite otherwise in the Di∣vine Nature, which is a common Nature, and yet but One; not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; not meerly in our notion and conception, but in truth and reality; the same One Divine Nature, without the least diversity or separation, actually and distinctly subsisting in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which being perfectly the same is but One, and re∣ally and substantially subsisting in Three is a common Na∣ture, which is equally and perfectly in them all. Thus Damascen has declared his Opinion fully against the notio∣nal and specifick Unity of the Divine Nature, that the Di∣vine Nature is One, only as Human Nature is One, be∣cause it has one common Name and Definition, which be∣longs to all of the same kind; whereas there is no one com∣mon Human Nature in Subsistence, but only in Notion: But the same One Divine Nature actually subsists in Three, and is the same One Divinity in Three. And that this was the true Sense of all the Catholick Fathers will appear, from considering some Notions which were common to them all.

1. They all agree, That there is but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but One Divinity, and One God; and One God, because but One Divinity; and for this very reason no∣thing is more familiar with them, than to call the Holy

Trinity One God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Divinity in Three perfect Hypostates. Now will any man say, That the One Divinity, or One Divine Na∣ture, and One God, is a meer Notion? Is not the Unity of God the fundamental Article of Natural Religion? And if this One Divinity does really, immutably, inseparably subsist in Three Divine Persons, as it must do, if these Three Divine Persons with respect to this One Divinity, are naturally and inseparably One God, Can this One com∣mon subsisting Divinity be a meer Notion, which has no Hypostatical Subsistence, but only subsists in Thought? Can the Specifick Notional Unity of Human Nature, make three men one man, as the One common Divine Nature makes Three Persons One God? If the Unity of the Divine Nature be but a Notion, the Unity of God, the Unity of the Trinity, which is this One God, must be a meer Notion also? And so, in truth and reality, there is no more One God, than there is but one man.

I readily grant, That the Father may be, and often is, in a peculiar manner called God, and the One God,* 1.164 as distinguished from the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Spi∣rit; but I deny, that he is called the One God, as considered without them, or so much as in thought separated from them: If we do not include the Son and the Holy Ghost in the Unity of the Godhead, we must deny their Godhead also; unless we will say, that there is One God, and besides him two Divine Persons, each of which is God, but not the One God: Which must introduce a Plurality of separate Gods: For if they be not One, they are more than One; and if One Person be the One

God without the other,* 1.165 they cannot be One God. This shews, what necessity there is of owning the Holy and Ever-Blessed Trinity to be the One God, and One Divinity, naturally and essentially One; and then the necessary Conse∣quence is, That this One Divine Nature, which actually and substantially subsists in Three distinct Divine Persons, who for that reason are naturally and essentially One God, cannot be a mere Common Specifick Nature, but One Com∣mon Subsisting Nature.

But what possible Sense can we make of this? One Com∣mon Subsisting Nature, which is really, actually, indivisi∣bly, One, and yet is Common, that is, does really and di∣stinctly subsist in more than one. To be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to be Common, and to be One, not in Notion, as a Species is common to all the Individuals, but in the truth and reality of Nature sounds very like a Contradi∣ction. When we say the Divine Nature is common to Three Persons, and subsists distinctly in three, we deny it to be One singular solitary Nature, which can subsist but in one, and constitute but One Person, which was the Sa∣bellian Notion of the Divine Unity, which the Catholick Church condemned, as destroying a Real Trinity, as I have shewn at large: But how then can this Common Na∣ture, which is not singular, but subsists perfectly and di∣stinctly in Three, be actually and essentially One; for a Natural Unity is a Numerical Unity, is one in number, which, one would think, should signify a singular Nature, for so it does in all Creatures: And when we speak of the Unity of the Divine Nature, it cannot be one by compo∣sition, which the absolute simplicity of the Divine Nature cannot admit. This is the great difficulty, which we must not expect perfectly to understand, because a Finite Mind can never comprehend, that is, can never have an adequate

notion of what is infinite: But I shall give some account, what the Catholick Fathers have said of this matter, which will satisfy us, that it is a natural, not a mere Specifick Unity, which they intended; and will give us such a no∣tion of this Venerable Mystery, as will deliver it from all inconsistency, and contradiction.

2. I observe therefore, That the Catholick Fathers lay the foundation of this Sameness and Homoousiotes of Nature in the Eternal Generation of the Son, of the Substance of the Father. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Nicene Creed is opposed to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 That the Son is not of nothing, as all Creatures are, but receives his whole Substance of the Substance of his Father: St. Basil in express words makes Generation essential to the notion of the Homoousion: For such Beings as upon account of likeness of Nature may be call'd Brothers to each other, are not therefore Homoousious; but when the Cause, and that which actually subsists from, or out of that Cause, have the same Nature, then they are Homoousious to each other:* 1.166 And in opposition to that Perverse and Here∣tical Sense, which some affixed to the word Homoousion, that it signified two made of the same Substance by the divi∣sion and partition of it, as two Shillings cut out of the same piece of Silver;* 1.167 be∣sides all other Blasphemies, the same Fa∣ther tells us, That this destroys the Faith both of Father and Son; for in this Sense, to be of one Substance, can make them no more than Brothers:* 1.168 And I need not observe, that all the Fa∣thers prove the Son to be Consubstantial to the Father, because he was not made, nor created, but begotten of his Father's Substance; which does not refer merely

to a specifick Sameness of Nature, but to the substantial Communication of the same Nature from Father to Son; which is therefore not in meer Notion and Idea, but substantially the same in both:* 1.169 for they would not allow that a mere specifick Sameness of Nature made Two Persons Consubstantial unless one of them received his Nature and Sub∣stance from the other.

And this seems no improbable account why the Nicene Fathers in their Anathema's, added 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: when they teach that the Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the Substance of his Father, in opposition to his being 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of nothing, they must, by the Substance of the Father, mean that Divine Nature and Substance which is the Person of the Father; for there is no other Notion of begetting a Son of his Father's Substance: nor is any other sense of the words directly and immediately opposed to his being made of nothing. But then since Ousia does often signify a spe∣cifick Nature, which the Philosophers call a second Sub∣stance, to prevent this mistake, they added Hypostasis, which signifies a first Substance, or a subsisting Nature; and condemn those who say the Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of another Nature, specifically different from the Nature of the Father, as the Arians taught; or that he was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of any other Substance than that which is the Substance of the Father, and consequently not begotten of the Father: for both these are essential to the Notion of the Homoousion, to have the same Nature for kind, or the true perfect Divine Nature, and to receive this Nature from the Father by a substantial Generation; and the Council condemns those who deny both or either of these. I must add one thing more to make this Notion complete; that as the Son is begotten of the Substance of the Father, so

he receives his whole Substance from the whole Substance of the Father.* 1.170 This is the constant Doctrine of the Fathers, That the Son is Totus ex Toto, Whole of Whole; That the Divine Generation is not like Human Generations, by corpo∣real Passions, by a division of the Fa∣ther's Substance, by a partial efflux or emanation; but the Father, without any division, diminution, or alteration of his own Substance, communicates his whole Divine Nature to the Son; That the Son is perfectly and entirely all and the same that the Father is. Thus they expound those sayings of our Sa∣viour, All that the Father hath, is mine. All things are delivered unto me of my Father. As the Father hath life in him∣self, so hath he given to the Son also to have life in himself. Not to signify an external arbitrary Gift and Donation, but the Eternal Communication of his whole Divine Nature to the Son; that he is Life of L••fe, Light of Light, God of God, Very God of Very God. For this Reason the Arians rejected the Homoousion, because they thought it absolutely impossible that the Father should beget a Son of his own Sub∣stance,* 1.171 without a division of his Sub∣stance; that he should communicate the whole D••vine Nature to his Son, and have the same whole Divine Nature himself. And the Fathers allow, that this is above Hu∣man Comprehension, as the Divine Nature it self is; but

think those men little consider the true measure of Human Understanding, who will not believe that God has a Son, because they cannot comprehend the inessable Mystery of the Eternal Generation.

The Scripture assures us that God has a Son, that Eternal Word, which was in the Beginning, was with God, and was God.

The very Notion of a Son, signifies that he has the same Nature with his Father,* 1.172 and receives his Being and Na∣ture from his Father, is Substance of his Father's Substance; for thus all other Sons receive their nature and substance from their Parents.

The absolute simplicity of the Divine Nature, whi••h has no Corporeity, no Composition, no Parts, and therefore can be divided into none, proves that the Divine Generation can have no∣thing like to Human Generations, no more than God is like a man; and there∣fore must be as much above Human Comprehension, as the Divine Nature is. We certainly know what it is not, That it is not by any separation or division of Substance; for the Divine Nature is a pure, simple, indivisible Monade; but how this Monade can communicate it self, we cannot tell: But this we know, That if a Monade does generate, it must gene∣rate a perfect whole; for when the whole is a simple, indi∣visible, uncompounded Monade, it must generate its whole, or nothing.

Thus much is evident,* 1.173 That to com∣municate a whole, perfect, undivided Nature and Substance, is the most per∣fect Generation. He is the most per∣fect

Father, who communicates his whole Substance to his Son, without division or separation; who without ceasing to be what he was himself, be∣gets a Son wholly and perfectly the same with himself: For the more per∣fectly One Father and Son are, the more perfect is the Generation; and they cannot be more One, than to be One and the same Substance, com∣municated whole and entire from Fa∣ther to Son. There is nothing like this in human Births; for the imperfection of created Nature will not admit it; the Father communicates the first Seeds and Principles of Life with part of his Sub∣stance, but the Child is nourished, grows and encreases to its just proportion by adventitious matter, which never was the Substance of the Father, and there∣fore Father and Son are not One Substance, though the Father communicates the same specifick Nature with part of his Substance to his Son.

Now though we cannot conceive how a whole begets a whole, yet we must grant that this is the most perfect Generation; for to generate, is to communicate Nature and Substance, to beget 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, another self,* 1.174 as the Ancients speak of the Divine Generation; and then the more perfectly the Son is the Father's self, the more perfect the Generation is; and therefore thus God must beget a Son, if he begets at all; for he must beget in the most perfect manner. And thus the Son must be begotten, if he be

begotten at all; for if he be a Son, he must be of his Fa∣ther's Substance, and that not a part, but the whole; for the Divine Substance must be a perfect indivisible Insepara∣ble Monade.

This Eternal Generation of the Son is a great and un∣conceivable Mystery, and has always been owned to be so by the Catholick Church; we have no Notion or Idea of it, but no more have we of the Eternal Existence of the Divine Nature it self, without any Cause or Beginning, or of the Creation of all things out of nothing, or of the Na∣tural Production and Propagation of Created Beings; our present Inquiry is not concerning the Mystery of the Eter∣nal Generation, but concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature in Father and Son, in what sense they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the same Substance, and that the Eternal Generation gives an account of: For if the Father communicate his whole Nature and Substance to the Son, without division and separation (which is the Catholick Faith) the Son must of necessity have the same one Substance with the Father; for a whole same of a whole same, cannot be ano∣ther, and therefore must be the same One Substance, whole of whole.

St. Athanasius reasons very subtilly against the Arians upon this Point: They taught that the Son was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, made of nothing, as other Creatures are. Then, says he, he must be the Son of God by participation; what is it then he partakes of? Other Creatures are the Sons of God by the participation of the Holy Spirit; but the Holy Spi∣rit is given by the Son, not the Son, as the Eternal Son of God, sanctified by the Spirit; for the Spirit receives all from Father and Son, not the Son from the Spirit.

He must then partake of the Father: But what is that, and whence is it?* 1.175 If that he partakes of be something Extra∣essential to the Father, which is not the

Father's Nature and Essence, then he does not partake of the Father, but of that Extra-essential Being, whatever it is; and then he is not second to the Fa∣ther, that whereof he partakes being be∣fore him; nor is he the Son of the Fa∣ther, but of that Extra-essential Being or Nature, by the participation of which he obtains the Title and Chara∣cter of Son, and God. But this is very absurd, since the Father calls him his Beloved Son, and the Son calls God his own Father; and therefore is not a Son by Extra-essential Participations, but Son is the name of him who participates in the Nature and Substance of the Fa∣ther. But then again, If that which is participated of the Father, be not the Nature and Essence of the Son, the same Absurdity returns, there being some middle Term between these two, To be of the Father, and the Nature of the Son, whatever that Nature be; which proves that the Nature of the Son is not of the Father, and therefore he is not the Son of the Father, for Nature makes a Son.

All this being so absurd, it is necessary to own, That the true genuine Son of God is all that He is, of the Es∣sence and Substance of the Father: For when God is thus wholly and perfectly participated, it is the same thing as to say, that God begets; and to beget, signifies, that he begets a Son.

And therefore, though all things by the Grace of God partake of the Son, he will not allow us to say,* 1.176 That the Son partakes of any thing, which implies, that the Son is one thing, and that which he partakes of, is another; But that which is the participation of the Father, that is the Son.

This is the most Natural and Essential Unity that is possible to be conceived, That the whole Son is nothing else, but the whole, entire, immediate participation of the Father's Substance, and therefore must be as perfectly One with the Father, as the Father is One; for there is but one and the same Substance, which is the Substance of the Fa∣ther, and by an Eternal and Ineffable Generation, the Sub∣stance also of the Son. Though Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are Three Real distinct Persons, and each of them have the whole entire Divine Nature in himself, yet there is but One Divine Nature, One Divinity in them all, and therefore they are but One God.

This is the Account St. Hilary gives, why we may say God is One, and One, and One, but not Three Gods: Be∣cause the Divine Nature is not multiplied with the Persons. Thus speaking of the Father and Son, he tells us, That the Son is One of One,* 1.177 and therefore they are both One: For between One and One, that is One of One; there is no S••cond Nature of the Eternal Divinity.

For as he adds elsewhere,* 1.178 The Nature of the Father is born in the Nativity of the Son, and for this Reason, the Father and Son are One God, because the Son is God of the Nature of God: But their being thus One, does not destroy the

subsisting Nature of the Son, but in God, and God pre∣serves the Nature of One God. And therefore the true, absolute, and perfect Profession of our Faith is,* 1.179 To confess God of God, and God in God, not after the manner of Bodies, but by Divine Powers; not by transfusion of Nature into Nature, but by the Mystery and Power of the Di∣vine Nature: For God is of God, not by dissection, protension, or derivation, but by the Power of the Divine Nature subsists by his Birth in the same Nature. — Not so the same Nature, that he who is born, is he himself who begets; (for how is that possible, since he is begotten) but he who is begotten subsists in the same whole entire Nature, which is his whole entire Nature who begets.

And this Perfect Unity Sameness, Identity of Nature, he resolves into the Mystery of the Divine Generation, Virtute Naturoe, & Mysterio & potestate Naturoe, for since he is not begotten of any other Substance or Nature, but of his Fa∣ther's Substance, and that not after the manner of Bodies, by dissection, protension, or derivation, but by the My∣sterious Power of the Divinity, which communicates it self whole and perfect, there must be the same One Divinity in both. And he appeals to every man's Understanding,* 1.180 what the natural Inter∣pretation of these words are, That the Son is of the Father; for can of the Fa∣ther signify, that he is of any other than the Father, or that he is of nothing, or that he is the Father himself? He is not of another, because he is of the Father; for a Son cannot be God, if he have

any other Father but God, and therefore is God of God. He cannot be of nothing, because he is of the Father; and whoever is begotten, must be begotten of the Nature of him who begets. He is not the Father himself, because he is of the Father, and the Birth of the Son speaks a ne∣cessary relation to the Father.

Now a Son, who is so of the substance of the Father,* 1.181 as to be nothing but what he is from the Father, and to be all that the Father is, whole of whole, must have the same One Nature, Sub∣stance and Divinity with the Father; for whole of whole must be the same whole.* 1.182 And yet if he be so of the Father, as not to be the Father, but the Son,* 1.183 he must be distinct in sub∣stance from the Father. He is true and perfect God, but he receives his Divini∣ty by his Birth; he is God of God, not God who begets, but God, who is be∣gotten, not of nothing, but of his Father's substance, who is unbegotten.

And therefore though St. Hilary, and all the Catholick Fathers with him, reject all Corporeal Passions in the Di∣vine Generation, all Corporeal Desection, Division, Efflux, or Emanation of the Divine Substance, which is incorporeal and indivisible, yet they all assert a true and proper gene∣ration of the Son, and an impassible production and prola∣tion of him, whole of whole. And St. Hilary tells us,* 1.184 that for this reason the Arians, under a specious Pretence of condemning Valentinus his Emanations and Aeons, denied the prolation of the Son from the Father, only to deny his generation; whereas some kind of pro∣lation

is essential to the very Notion of a Birth, which cannot be conceived without it; and therefore we must not wholly reject all Prolation and Produ∣ction of the Son from the Father, but only reject all Corporeal Emanations, which are very imperfect Images of Divine Mysteries, and have nothing like the eternal generation of the Son, but only that the Son is truly begotten of his Father's Substance.

This is that adorable and unsearchable Mystery of the Divine Generation: The Son is truly and properly begot∣ten, receives his whole Being and Nature from his Father, is substance of his Father's substance, whole of whole, and therefore one and the same substance with the Father; not that substance, which is the Person of the Father, nor a new or another separate substance, as it is in human generations, but the nature and substance of the Father, born and re∣peated in the Nativity of the Son, as St. Hilary speaks:* 1.185 The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but One Divinity, One Infinite, Eternal nature and substance; but they are thrice this One substance, and as perfectly and distinctly Three in this One substance, as any other Three are Three substances.

St. Austin was certainly in the right, when he asserted, That the Divine Nature and Essence must not be consi∣dered either as a Genus or Species, nor the Divine Persons as Individuals, and shews particularly the impropriety of each; though he knows not under what Notion to conceive them,* 1.186 but in∣clines most to some common matter or substance, which is the same in all, as carrying the nearest resemblance and

analogy in it: though this he does not very well like nei∣ther, of which more presently. It will be of great use briefly to consider this matter; for the difficulty consists more in want of words to express this Unity and Distin∣ction by, than in the Notion it self.

The singularity of the Divine Essence and Substance in the Sabellian Notion of One Substance, the Nicene Fa∣thers universally rejected, as irreconcilable with a real distinction of Persons, which destroys the Faith of a Real Trinity. A mere specifick Unity of Nature and Substance, which is a meer Logical Notion, falls short of the Natural and Essential Unity of the Godhead; and yet we have no word to serve as a middle Term between the Unity of singularity, and a Specifick Unity of Nature. For there is no such Unity as this in Created Nature, and therefore no name for it; and yet the Unity of the Divine Nature in a Trinity of Persons, is neither of these, but bears some re∣semblance and Analogy to both. As to shew this briefly. The Unity of the Divine Nature is not a meer Specifick Unity. A Species is only an Idea, or Pattern of Nature, according to which particular Creatures are formed; and such Creatures as are made according to the same Pattern, are specifically the same; and as far as we can observe this Correspondence and Ideal Sameness of Nature, so we rank them under the same Species. So that there can be no Species but among created Beings; for they must be all made, and made according to the same Original Pattern. But an Eter∣nal and Necessary Nature was not made, and therefore not made according to any Pattern, nor can any other be made according to its Pattern; for what is made cannot be Ne∣cessary and Eternal. So that the Divine Nature can be but One, and One Numerical Nature is no Species; it can communicate its own Substance by an Eternal Generation and Procession, but it can't be a Pattern and Idea for any other Beings of the same kind, which are not its own Sub∣stance.

* 1.187For this reason St. Austin rejects this specifick Unity; he distinguishes be∣tween saying, That the Divine Persons are Vna Essentia, & Vnius Essentiae, One Essence or Substance; and that they are ex Vna Essentia, of One Essence. The first may signify a natural Unity, and must do so when applied to the Trinity. The second signifies only a common spe∣cifick Nature and Unity. When we speak of men we may use either expression, that they are One Essence, or that they are of One Essence, because in both Ca∣ses, when applied to Creatures, One Es∣sence signifies specifically as a common pattern of Nature, according to which not only Three, but many Threes may be made: But the whole Divine Essence is in the Trinity, and cannot subsist in any other Person, and therefore is not a common specifick Nature.

But then there is something in the Divine Nature, as sub∣stantially communicated to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, which bears some analogy to a Species, and to a Specifick Unity; and for this reason the Catholick Fathers in their Disputes both with the Sabellians and Arians, frequently express the Unity of the Nature, as subsisting in Three Di∣stinct Persons, by a Specifick Unity.

The Notion and Idea of a Common Nature, which sub∣sists in many Individuals, is called a Species; the same com∣mon notion and definition belonging to all the Individuals of the same kind: Now if we believe the Doctrine of a Real Trinity, we must acknowledge, That the same One Divine Nature, which is originally in the Father, is communica∣ted to the Son and Holy Spirit, and does subsist distinctly and substantially in all Three; and therefore has this re∣semblance

to a Species, that it is a common Nature, which has the same Notion and Definition, and is the same in Three, but not meerly by a Notional Identity and Same∣ness, but by the Real Identity of Substance; there being but One Divine Substance, unmade, uncreated, unbegot∣ten, but communicated whole and entire to the Son by an eternal generation, and to the Holy Spirit by an eternal Pro∣cession: so that the Divine Nature is so far a Species, as by its actual communication to the Son and Holy Spirit, and its distinct subsistence in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, it is in truth and reality a common Nature and Substance, which a Species is only in Notion and Idea. The Notion and De∣finition of human Nature in Peter, Iames, and Iohn, is the very same, and therefore there is a specifick Sameness and Unity of Nature between them. The Divine Nature in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the same, not merely in Notion and Idea, but Substantially the same; and there∣fore all the names of a Specifick Sameness and Unity, do in a more perfect and excellent manner belong to the Sameness and Unity of the Divine Nature, as Subsisting Perfectly, Indivisibly, and yet Distinctly, in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: And when we speak of the Sameness of the Divine Nature, as subsisting distinctly in Three Divine Persons, we have no other words to express it by, but such as signify a Specifick Unity; and we must use such words as we have, and qualifie their sense as well as we can.

As for instance: Those words, whereby we signify a common specifick Nature, which is One and the Same in all the Individuals of the same Species, are the best we have to express the Unity of the Divine Nature, as common to Three Persons, and thus the Catholick Fathers use them without scruple, and speak of the Unity of the Divine Na∣ture, and of its being common to all the Three Divine Per∣sons, in the same Words and Phrases, as they use con∣c••rning a common specifick Nature: Which leads some

into a great mistake, as if they meant no more by it but a specifick Sameness, and Unity of the Divine Nature; that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have one Substance no otherwise, than as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, have one and the same Humane Nature: For the Divine Nature is not One merely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not in mere Notion and Idea, but actually, indivisibly, inseparably, One; nor is it a common Nature, merely as it has a com∣mon Name and Definition, but by an actual Inexistence in Three.

For the same reason it is very difficult what Three to call Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, so as to avoid the Heresies of both Extreams; for there is no Example of such Three in Nature: They are certainly Three, for the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, nor the Son the Father, or the Holy Ghost, and each of the Three is perfect God, and therefore an Infinite Mind, an Infinite Spirit, and the most Perfect Essence and Substance: And that Substance which is the Person of the Son, is not that Substance which is the Person of the Father, no more than the Person of the Son is the Person of the Father, or an unbegotten is a begotten Nature and Substance; and therefore in opposition to Sa∣bellius, they asserted Three Substantial Persons, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Hypostases, or Personal Substances, as Hy∣postasis signifies; tria in substantia, tres substantias, tres res, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and yet at the same time did assert, That there is but One Divine Nature and Substance, which indi∣visibly and inseparably, though distinctly, subsists in all Three.

For the understanding of which we must observe, That as the Divine Nature, which is common to Three, is not a mere Species, but is really and actually One and the same in all; so these Three Divine Persons, which have one and the same common Nature, are not in a strict and proper no∣tion Individuals of the same common Nature: Though we

have no Names for these Three, but such as signify Indivi∣duals, as Persons, Hypostases, Subsistences, &c. and there being no Created Person, Hypostasis, or Subsistence, but what is an Individual.

To shew you the difference, with respect to the notion of an Individual, between the Three Divine Persons, and three individual Humane Persons, I observe, That every Humane Person is such an Individual as has a particular Humane Nature of his own, which is not the particular Nature of any other Person; the notion and definition of Humane Nature is the same in all men; but the same Nume∣rical Humane Nature does not subsist in all, but every par∣ticular individual man has one particular individual Hu∣mane Nature appropriated to himself, that is, which is his particular Person; and as many particular Persons as there are, so many particular Humane Natures, and particular men there are.

But now the Divine Persons are not Three such Indivi∣duals as these; because they have not three individual Di∣vine Natures, but the same One Divine Nature common to them all, originally in the Father, and communicated whole and entire to the Son by an Eternal Generation, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit by an Eternal Pro∣cession.

How impossible soever it is, for our finite Understand∣ings, to comprehend these Mysteries of the eternal Gene∣ration and Procession, it is not so hard to conceive the dif∣ference between Three Persons who have One individual Nature common to them all, but subsisting so distinctly in each of them, as to make them Three distinct Persons; and Three Persons who have Three Individual Natures of the same Kind and Species.

As for Instance; Three Human Persons, which have Three individual Human Natures, are by the confession of all Mankind Three Men: But could we conceive One in∣dividual

Human Nature, which originally constitutes but One Person, to Communicate it self Whole and Entire, without Division or Separation to Two other Persons, we must acknowledge Three Human Persons, each of which Persons is distinctly and by himself, True and Perfect Man, but not Three Men; for Man is a name of Nature, and if Persons can be multiplied without multiplying the Nature, (as we at present suppose) there must be Three Human Persons in One individual Human Nature, that is, Three Persons and One Man; but not Three Men, no more than Three Human Natures.

Thus it is with respect to the Divine Nature: Were there Three individual Divine Natures Self-originated and Inde∣pendent on each other, though perfectly the same in their Notion and Definition; Three such Persons would be as Perfectly Three Gods, as Three Human Persons, that have Three individual Human Natures, are Three Men. But whereas the Scripture teaches, and the Catholick Church has always believed, there is but One Infinite, Self-originated, Divine Nature, Originally in the Father, and by Communication in the Son, and Holy Spirit; these Three Divine Persons are each of them True and Perfect God, but not Three Gods; because they have not Three Individual Divine Natures, but One Divine Nature subsisting distinctly, but Whole and Perfect in them all.

This, I think, may give us some Notion of One Nume∣rical Common Nature, which is no Species, and of Per∣sons, which are no Individuals. St. Austin shews particularly,* 1.188 how impro∣per it is to call the One Divine Essence a Genus, and the Three Divine Persons Species; or to call the Divine Essence a Species, and the Divine Persons Indivi∣duals; for in both these cases we must multiply the name of Essence with the

Species and Individuals, as we not on∣ly say three Horses, but three Animals; and as Abraham, Isaac and Iacob, are three Individuals, so they are three Men; in consequence of which, we must not only say Three Divine Persons, but Three Divine Essences, not One Essence. But besides this, One Essence can't be a Genus, because what is but One can have no Species: nor can it for the same rea∣son be a Species, because what is One can't be subdivided into Individuals, as though Man, considered as a Species, is divided into Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob, yet One Man can't be subdivided into Three Men; for One Man is One single Man. Why then do we say, One Essence, and Three Substances or Persons; (which are St. Austin's words, who always ren∣ders the Greek Hypostases by Substan∣ces, and makes Substances and Persons equivalent) for if Essence be a Species, as Man is, there can be but One Essence in the Sense and Notion of One Man: which, by the way, he objects as a great Absurdity, for it is the Sabellian He∣resy.

Thus far St. Austin was certainly in the right; but here I think, with all submission, this great Man missed the true Notion which he had so happily started. One Essence can't be a Species, because what is but One, can have no proper Individuals under it, as One Man can't be subdivided into Three Men: But then he might have applied Individual to Essence,

which One Essence naturally led to; and have found Three Persons in One Individual Essence, which would not indeed be Three Individuals of One Species, but Three Singulars of One Individual Nature. And though One Man, who is but One Individual of Human Nature, can't be subdivided into Three proper Individuals, yet to conceive One Indivi∣dual Human Nature to be communicated whole and en∣tire, without division or separation to Two others, is the truest Image of Three distinct Persons in One Individual Essence, and the only possible Explication of totus ex toto, whole of whole, which is the true Catholick Faith. Such an One Essence is no Species, but yet is a common Nature; and such Persons are not what we call Individuals, as not having each of them a particular individual Nature to himself, but yet they have a particular singular Subsist∣ence as other Individuals have, and are each of them by himself as true and perfect God, though all but One God, as every individual Man is true and perfect Man.

It seems plain to me, that this is the very Notion St. Austin intended, in what he immediately adds, the commu∣nis eademque materia, that One common Matter which he prefers before either a generical or specifick Unity. That the same One Divine Essence is common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; not as if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, had their Subsistence out of the same common Essence, as three golden Statues are made of the same Gold; this per∣verse Exposition of the Homoousion was rejected with abhor∣rence by the Catholick Fathers, as I shewed before; and St. Austin expresly rejects it here, and therefore though these Three Persons are One Essence, una essentia & unius essentiae, he will not allow us to say, that they are ex una essentia, out of One Essence, as golden Statues are of, or cut out of the same Gold; nay, nor as Three Men are of the same Nature, that is, which is specifically, not identical∣ly the same, as I observed a little above. Now remove

these two Notions of One common Essence, and there re∣mains only a third, which is that very Notion I now insist on, One and the same Essence common to Three, by a per∣fect communication of the same One whole undivided Essence.

And this answers exactly to that Notion of St. Austin, which he could find no Image of in Nature; that the Es∣sence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is not more or greater all together,* 1.189 than the Father alone, or the Son alone: but these Three Substances or Persons, if they may be so called, all together are equal to each single Person, which a carnal Man cannot apprehend. But now if we believe a whole of a whole, we must confess that it is impossible it should be otherwise; for if the Son have the same whole Essence with the Father, if the Father be the whole Divine Essence, if the Son be the same whole Divine Essence, and so the Holy Ghost; the same whole, though subsisting distinctly in Three, can never be greater nor less than it self: Three Persons are more in number than One, but One and the same whole undivided Essence can be but one whole.

This is the true Notion (and there can be no other Ca∣tholick Sense made of it) of what the Fathers so univer∣sally teach, That there is in the Trinity Vna Substantia, but not unus subsistens, One Substance, but not one only who subsists; when yet at the same time they as universally ac∣knowledge, That the Father is Substance, the Son Sub∣stance, the Holy Ghost Substance; and neither of them each other: That the Person of the Father is the Essence and Substance of the Father, the Person of the Son the Substance of the Son; that the Person is not one thing, and the Essence and Substance another, as St. Austin upon all occasions teaches: Now that there should be but One

Substance, and Three substantial Subsisting Persons, can never be reconciled any other way, than by the perfect Communication of the same whole undivided Essence and Substance of the Father to the Son and Holy Spirit.

For the same reason they tells us, That the Father is Wisdom, the Son Wisdom of Wisdom, and yet but One Wisdom; the Father is Spirit, the Son Spirit, and the Ho∣ly Ghost Spirit, and yet not Three Spirits, but One Spirit; and the Father is God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, yet there are not Three Gods, but One God: For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One God is the One Divine Essence; and One Divine Essence, though distinctly subsisting in Three, is but One God, though every Divine Person having the whole Divine Essence in himself, is True and Perfect God. Three Divine Natures, though specifically the same, and perfect∣ly alike, would unavoidably be Three Gods, as three par∣ticular Humane Natures are three men; but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a thrice subsisting Monade, as Dyonisius the Areopa∣gite, calls the Divine Essence, is but One in Three, and therefore but One God in Three, because but one Divine Essence.

In this Sense we are so often told, That in the Trinity there is alius & alius, another and another, that is, distinct Subsisting Persons, who are not each other, but not aliud in the Neuter Gender; not another Essence or Nature, not only not specifically another, as the Arians asserted, but not another Nature, though of the same Species, but the same One Individual Nature communicated whole and un∣divided to more than One.

Upon the same account, the Father is acknowledged by all Catholick Writers to be the One only God, and they an∣swer the Objection of Tritheism, by this very Principle, That they own but One Eternal, Self-originated, Unbe∣gotten Father, and therefore but One God; They grant, That Three Fathers would be Three Gods; but when there

is but One Eternal Father, though he have an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit, there can be but One God.

Now what is the meaning of this? Is it because none is, or can be God, True and Perfect God, but he, who is God of himself, Self-originated and Unbegotten? This would destroy the Perfect Godhead of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and answer the Objection of Tritheism by denying the Trinity. And it is certain this could not be their mean∣ing, because they owned the Sameness and Equality of Na∣ture, of Majesty and Glory, of Wisdom and Power in Fa∣ther, Son and Holy Ghost, only allowed the Prerogative of the Father 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in the name and relation of Father:* 1.190 And when the Arians woul•• prove the diversity of Nature between Father and Son, by this Argument, That the Father is un∣begotten, and the Son begotten, they denied that this inferred the least difference or inequality of Nature.

Now if the Divine Essence be God, and there be a per∣fect equality of Nature between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though the Father be unbegotten, the Son begot∣ten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from both; I desire to know, Why Three Persons, each of which is True and Per∣fect God, though one be unbegotten, another begotten, and a third proceeds, be not as much Three Gods, as Three that are unbegotten, are Three Gods.

The natural Notion of God is an Eternal, Unmade, Un∣created Essence, which gives being to all Creatures; but neither Begotten, nor Unbegotten, belongs to the natural Notion of God, but is matter of pure Revelation; and therefore Three that are Eternal, as to the natural Notion of God, are as much Three Gods, as Three that are Un∣begotten.

The true Account of it then is this, That One Father, who is unbegotten himself, but begets a Son, is but One eternal Divine Essence, which he eternally communicates whole and undivided to the Son, and therefore is but One Divine Essence still, and therefore but One God: whereas Three Unbegottens, who do not communicate in each other, and neither give to, nor receive from any other, must be Three absolute independent Divine Essences, and therefore Three Gods. And therefore they do not call the Father the One God, merely because he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unbegotten, but as he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Fountain of the Deity, who communicates his own whole Divine Nature and Essence to the Son and Holy Spirit:* 1.191 For this reason Athanasius condemns Sabellius, for say∣ing that there is but One only God in the Iewish Notion of One God; not meaning thereby, that there is but One only who is unbegotten, and who only is the Fountain of the Deity; but that there is but One God, as having no Son, nor living Word or true Wis∣dom.

It were easy to enlarge here, and to improve this Obser∣vation for the Explication of several difficult Passages in the Fathers; but this may satisfy us, that the Catholick Fathers by One Substance did not mean a meer specifick, but a natural and essential Unity.

SECT. VI. A more particular Inquiry what the Catholick Fathers meant by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness and Iden∣tity of Substance in the Holy Trinity.

WHat I have discoursed in the last Section concern∣ing the Homoousion, and One Substance of the God∣head, will receive a new Light, if we consider what the Catholick Fathers meant by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness, Identity, and Inseparability of Essence and Substance, whereby they explain the Unity of the Divine Substance, and the Unity of the God∣head.

The Learned Jesuit Petavius has two large Chapters, to prove that both the Greek and Latin Fathers did assert the Singularity and Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature and Substance. And I freely grant, That as Singularity is opposed to a mere specifick Unity, he has unanswerably proved it; but why he or the Schools should chuse a word to represent the Sense of the Catholick Fathers by, con∣cerning the Unity of the Divine Substance, which they themselves rejected as Sabellianism, I can't account for; for singularis & solitarius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, the Singularity of Nature and Substance, were rejected as suspected terms at least, though they allowed the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness and Identity of Nature; the Vnitas, but not Vnio; the Unity, but not Union; which St. Hilary so often calls impia Vnio, a wicked Union, as destroying the real distinction of Persons, and consequent∣ly the true Faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

* 1.192And to do Petavius right, he rejects such a notion of singularity, as denies the Divinity to be a Common Nature; as if it could subsist only in One Person or Hypostasis, which he owns to be Sabellianism; and that for this reason some of the Fathers (he might have said, most, if not all the Ancient Fa∣thers) did reject the use of such words, and taught, That the Divine Nature is One, as any other Nature is, which is common to more than one: And acknowledges, that St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, St. Austin, and others, do expresly deny that God is a sin∣gular Being, and reject the Notion of singularity from the Divine Essence.

Now such a singularity as this, as admits of a real and substantial Communication of the Divine Nature, whole of whole, to the Son and Holy Spirit, is certainly the Doctrine of the Catholick Fathers, and what they meant by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Sameness or Identity of Nature in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in which they placed the Unity of the Godhead.

That there must be this Sameness and Identy of Nature in all Three Divine Persons, is evident from the last Section; for a whole of a whole, must be identically the same Whole; not so the same, as one singular Whole is the same with it self, but as the same Whole, which thrice sub∣sists, without the least conceivable difference, is the same with it self in Three. And that this is what the Fathers meant by that Sameness of Nature, wherein they placed the Unity of the Godhead, it were easy to prove by nume∣rous Authorities; but some few may serve in so plain a Case.

One St. Hilary will furnish us with Testimonies enow of this nature: He places the Sameness of Nature between Fa∣ther and Son in this, That the Son has by his Eternal Nati∣vity the Nature of the Father, without the least dissimilitude or diversity;* 1.193 in∣differens, indissimilis, indiscreta Natura; and this makes the Father and Son One God: But then at the same time he care∣fully and expresly rejects the Notion of Singularity, Solitude, and Union.

Petavius quotes several Passages out of St. Hilary, to prove this Singularity of the Divine Essence;* 1.194 but all that they amount to, and all that he pretends to prove by them, is, That the Unity be∣tween Father and Son is greater than a Specifick Unity, or a Communion in the same Specifick Nature; and this I readily grant; and he might,* 1.195 if he had pleased, have transcribed half St. Hilary de Trinitate & de Synodis, to the same purpose: And this is so universally the Doctrine of all the Greek and Latin Fa∣thers, that there was no difficulty in multiplying Authorities to this purpose. And I dare ap∣peal to any man who is competently skill'd in these Matters, and will impartially examine the Testimonies Petavius has produced for the Singularity of the Divine Essence, Whe∣ther the most pertinent of them all prove any more than this, That the Nature of the Father, without the least al∣teration or diversity, is communicated whole and perfect, without any division or separation of Substance, to the Son, (of which more presently); not that the same singular Nature and Substance which is the Person of the Father, is also the Person of the Son; which makes the Father and

Son to be but One Person, as well as One Nature and Sub∣stance; but so One, that the One Nature, Substance, and Divinity, which is the Father, is wholly and perfectly the same in the Son, excepting this, That one is the Father, and the other the Son: Which is not the Unity of Singula∣rity, which is properly the Unity of a Person; but the Uni∣ty of Identity and Sameness, which is the Unity of One Individual Nature, which is common to more than one. I don't intend to transcribe all the Quotations of Petavius, which he has alledged to this purpose; but yet I will give such a general View of them, as may satisfy any impartial Reader as to this Point; not to confute Petavius, who, as I have already observed, rejects the Sabellian Singularity; but to undeceive those who mistake Petavius and the Schools too, as will appear more hereafter.

I shall only premise, That it had become the Learning and Acuteness of Petavius to have reconciled the Fathers with themselves; for they were Wise Men, and true Rea∣soners, and knew very well what a Contradiction meant; and therefore we ought not easily to believe that they per∣petually contradicted themselves.

He acknowledges and proves, That the Catholick Fathers did teach a Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature;* 1.196 That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have One Divinity, as Peter, Iames, and Iohn have one Human Nature; and he alledges the Authorities of the same Fathers, to prove the Singula∣rity of the Divine Nature, That it is an exact, perfect, in∣divisible Monad: And this also they do plainly teach: But then he should have considered how to have reconciled these two; for it is certain, that if the Divine Nature be an indivisible Monad, it can't be a Species in the common Notion of a Species; and if it have any thing anolagous to a Species, it can't be a singular Monad, because it must be a common Nature, which subsists in more than one; and Singularity is properly the Unity of a Person, not of a com∣mon

Nature. Petavius was very sensible how inconsistent these two kinds of Unity are; and yet that the Fathers did most commonly explain the Unity of the Divine Nature by a Specifick Unity, and did more cautiously mention the Unity of Singularity; he might have said, did absolutely reject it, as St. Hilary does in a hundred places. And was not this a much better reason, so to qualify the Notions of a Specifick Unity and Singularity of Nature, as to reconcile them to each other, than to make the Fathers contradict themselves; which destroys three parts of their Reasoning about the Unity of the Godhead, and very much weakens the Authoity of all the rest?

The Apology which Petavius makes for the Fathers will by no means salve this matter. He tells us, That if we speak of God according to the exact Rules of Philosophy;* 1.197 the Three Divine Persons are not so of One Substance or Homoousion, as Peter, Paul, and Iohn; and so far he is in the Right, as I have already shewn: But then what he adds is a very heavy Charge upon the Catho∣lick Fathers; That they taught this almost in every Dispute they had with the Arians. Now if this be true, what Apology can be made for them? for, it seems, they confuted the Arians upon false and dangerous Principles, and were either ignorant themselves of the true Catholick Faith, or did prevaricate in it.

But let us hear what Excuse he makes for them: He says, They are not to be blamed for this, nor accused of Igno∣rance, as if they understood nothing of the Numerical Unity of the Divine Essence,* 1.198 and owned no other Unity but what is like the Unity of Human Na∣ture; for they did know the first, but very prudently used the Specifick Unity, as an Example whereby to repre∣sent

the Divine Unity: But if there be nothing in the Divine Nature, which is analogous to this Specifick Unity, and may be truly and properly represented by it, as the best Image we have in Na∣ture, I cannot understand either the Prudence or Honesty of this. Yes, he says, they were to take Care so to op∣pose Arianism as to avoid Sabellianism, which otherwise they might easily slip into: And therefore so tempered their Style as to speak more sparingly of that highest Unity and Conjunction, which Gregory Nyssen calls a Perfect Monad, lest they should seem to favour a Sabellian Solitude and Singula∣rity, but did more freely use the Examples of a Specifick Uni∣ty, which was sufficient to confute the Arians; who as∣serted the Diversity and Dissimilitude of Nature between Father and Son, which cannot be between those of the same Kind and Species; and yet at the same time shewed how far they were from Sabellianism.

That this is a very false account of the matter appears from the former Sections of this Chapter, and will appear more fully from what is to follow; but if it were true, it would be a very scandalous account; for the sum of it is this, That to oppose Sabellianism and Arianism, the ancient Fathers advanced a false Notion of the Divine Unity, and dissembled the true one: Which is no great commendation of the Catholick Faith, that it needs such Arts, nor of the Catholick Fathers to use them; when both these sorts of Hereticks, as I have often observed, charged the Ca∣tholick Faith with Tritheism, and made that the very Rea∣son of their Heresies. Can any man think it prudent in these Fathers to conceal or very cautiously mention the true Notion of the Divine Unity, and to insist on a Specifick

Unity, which, if we believe Petavius, is no better than Tritheism; which would rather have confirmed them in their Heresies than have confuted them?

These two Heresies being in two extreams, the Catho∣lick Faith must be in the middle, and the only true Medi∣um between them, is a real distinction of Persons, with∣out the least diversity of Nature; and this is what they meant both by their Monad, and Specifick Unity, the per∣fect Sameness and Identity of Essence, actually, indivi∣sibly, inseparably subsisting in Three, a thrice subsisting Monad, or Individual Essence or Substance, but not one Singular and Solitary Substance. And if this be all that Petavius means, as he seems to own, we are agreed in this Point: But because some think that he means more, and sometimes he says what seems to imply more, I shall shew that he has proved no more.

He begins with Athanasius; who tells us,* 1.199 That the Fa∣ther gives all to the Son; and yet that the Father hath the same All himself; for the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father.* 1.200 Which only proves, That the Father communicates his own Whole Nature to the Son; that he gives the Whole to the Son, and has the whole himself; which is the Same, but not One Singular So∣litary Godhead, for it is the Whole in Two: But yet it is the Godhead of the Son, and the Godhead of the Fa∣ther. And the Father and Son are Two, but yet the God∣head an inseparable, indivisible Monad.* 1.201 And therefore this Wonderful Divine Monad must not be divided into Three Godheads. And having quoted some other Passages of that Father to the same purpose, he concludes with a very remarkable one out of his Exposition of Faith.* 1.202 That we must not conceive Three Divided and Separate Hypostates

in the Godhead, after the manner of Bodies, as it is among men; which, like the Pagans, would introduce a plurality of Gods: But as the River, which pro∣ceeds from the Fountain, is not divided from it, though they have Two Forms and Two Names; for the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father; but the Father is the Father of the Son, and the Son the Son of the Father. For as the Fountain is not the River, nor the River the Fountain, but both are One; and the self-same Water (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) flows out of the Fountain into the River (and so is the very same in both) so is that Divinity, which is communi∣cated from the Father to the Son, without any Efflux, Emanation or Division. This Petavius lays great Stress on, and it is a most express Testimony against such a meer Spe∣cifick Unity in the Godhead, as there is between Three In∣dividuals of the same Species, as between Three Men. But then it is as express and positive a Testimony against a Singular and Solitary Divinity, and confirms the Notion of the perfect Communication of the same Individual Nature and Godhead from the Father to the Son, which is as per∣fectly One and the Same in both as the Water is, which flows out of the Fountain into the River: But with this difference, That the manner of Communication is not the same, not by Efflux and Emanation after the manner of Bodies (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I wonder Petavius should transl••te perenniter) not as Waters flow out of the Fountain, which the Catholick Fathers always disowned; but by the Ineffable Mystery of the Eternal Generation, as I have shewn above.

The next Father he appeals to is Gregory Nazianzen, whom at other times he has much ado to excuse from Tri∣theism. And he tells us, That there is but One God, because there is but One Di∣vinity,* 1.203 and those who are of him (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of this One God, that is, the Son and Holy Spirit) are reduced to One, tho' we believe them to be Three: viz. by that One D••vinity, which perfectly subsists in each of them: And adds, If we may express this in short,* 1.204 it is One Vndivided Divinity in Three Distinct Persons (for so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 must here signifie, not Di∣vided or Separate, but Distinct) like the Vnion of Three S••ns, which would give but One Vndistinguished Light. One would wonder how this should prove One Singular Divinity, which it expresly rejects, unless Three Suns are One Single Solitary Sun, and give but One Single Solitary Light. Such Expressions as these prove no more than One Undivided Divinity in Three, not One Singular Divinity.

But the same Father starts an Objection; That since the wisest Philosophers owned but One Divinity in all their Gods, as we acknowledge but One Humanity in all Man∣kind, and yet they believed Many Gods, as we acknow∣ledge, there are Many Men, though but One Common Humanity: Why must not we confess, That Father, Son and Holy Ghost are Three Gods also, though they have but One Common Divinity? This Petavius says, Causoe jugulum petit; and it is indeed an unanswerable Objection against a meer Specifick Unity of Nature, which is Multi∣plied in Individuals, and therefore must Multiply Gods as well as Men; but the Perfect Communication of the Same Whole Individual Nature does not Multiply Natures or Di∣vinities, though it Multiplies Persons. And this is the

very Answer Greg. Naz. gives, which I had observed before from Damascen, the distinction between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That there is not One Common Subsisting Human Nature in all Men, and therefore Human Nature is One, only in Notion, not in Reality, every Particular Man's hav∣ing a Particular Human Nature of his own; and therefore there are as many Men, as there are Subsisting Human Na∣tures; but the Divine Nature is One and Common, not in meer Notion and Idea, but by an Actual Communication without Division or Separation: This proves it to be One Individual, but not a Singular Nature; for it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and One Undivided Divinity, though in a Wonderful and Ineffable manner it Actually Subsists in Three, can be but One God.

His other Quotations out of the Greek Fathers are all to the same purpose, and are resolved into the force of such words as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and their rejecting not only Three Gods, but Three Natures, Three Essences, Three Divinities; and that not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which specifically differ from each other, but even 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, those which are spe∣cifically the same, as Sophronius speaks; which are un∣answerable Testimonies against a mere Specifick Unity of the Divine Nature; but confirms what I have all along as∣serted, That the same One Undivided Divinity subsists actually and inseparably, but distinctly in Three, and there∣fore is One common Individual, but not a Singular Nature: And the Latin Fathers, to whom he appeals in Chap. 14▪ speak all to the same purpose, and one Answer serves them all.

To give an Account of the Meaning and Reason of these Expressions, which Petavius insists on to prove the Singu∣larity of the Divine Essence, will be much more instructing and satisfactory, than to comment upon every particular Quotation: And therefore I shall, 1. Enquire what the Fa∣thers

meant by this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Sameness and Identity of Nature. 2. How they proved the Unity of the Godhead from this Sameness of Nature. 3. How they distinguish'd the Divine Persons in this Sameness of Nature.

1. As for the first, That the Fathers by this Sameness and Identity of Nature did not mean One singular, solitary, Personal Nature, is abundantly evident from what I have already discours'd: The Fathers, in opposition to Sabellius, universally rejected One singular, solitary Nature and Sub∣stance, as destroying a Trinity of Real Persons; for in their Philosophy, One singular Substance is but One Person; and therefore Three Persons, each of which is by himself True and Perfect Substance, can't be One singular Substance; which is Proof enough, that when they explain the Unity of the Divine Substance by its Sameness and Identity, they could not by this Sameness and Identity mean Singularity; but such a Sameness as is between Real, Distinct, Subsisting, Substantial Persons, who are every way alike, without the least Change or Variation: Which the Greek Fathers commonly call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the Latin Fa∣thers, as St. Hilary especially, Indifferens & Indissimilis Natura.

That this is the True Notion of this Sameness and Iden∣tity of Nature appears from those Representations which the Catholick Fathers make of it, viz. That it is such a Sameness and Identity, as there is between a Perfect, Liv∣ing, Subsisting Word, and that Perfect Mind, whose Word it is; such a Sameness as is between Father and Son, be∣tween the Prototype and the Image, between the Seal and the Impression; between Life of Life, Wisdom of Wisdom, Power of Power, &c. neither of which is the other, and yet both are the same.

That God hath an Eternal Word, which was in the Be∣ginning, was with God, and was God; that this Eternal Word was the Son of God, and this Son the Perfect Like∣ness

and Image of his Father, the Brightness of his Glory, and the Express Character of his Substance, is the known Doctrine of the Scripture and Fathers.

That this Word is not like the Word of a Man, but the Substantial, Essential, Living, Subsisting, Omnipotent Word; and this Son a True, Natural, Genuine Son, and this Image a Substantial, Living Image, and a Living, Substantial Character of the Father; that this Word is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Distinct Person from him, whose Word he is; that the Son is not the Father, nor the Father the Son, but that they are alius & alius; that the Image is not the Prototype, nor the Prototype the Image, nor the Chara∣racter and Impression, that whose Character it is; I have already proved to be the Received Doctrine of the Catho∣lick Fathers against the Sabellians, and were there any oc∣casion for it, I could confirm it with innumerable Testi∣monies: The only Question then is, What this Sameness and Identity of Nature is. And if we will allow for that difference there is between God and Creatures, we may learn, as the Fathers teach us, what this Sameness of Na∣ture between the Divine Persons is, from the Sameness and Identity between a Mind and its Word, between Father and Son, between the Prototype and the Image, the Seal and its Character and Impression.

Now what this Sameness and Identity is, is so visible, that a few words will explain it.

It is not the Sameness of Singularity; for the Mind and its Word, a Father and Son, the Prototype and its Image, the Seal and its Impression, are visibly Two: Nor is it the Sameness of meer Likeness and Similitude, how Exact and Perfect soever we conceive that Likeness to be; for every one must confess, that there is a vast difference between the Perfect Likeness of Two Minds, Two Men, Two Origi∣nals, and Two Seals, and that Sameness, which is between a Mind and its own Word, a Father and his own Son, a

Prototype and its own Natural Image, and the Seal and the Impression which is made by it; just as much difference as there is between Similitude and Nature, or between a per∣fect Likeness of Nature and Identity.

And therefore the complete and adequate Notion of S••meness and Identity between Two, who are really distinct in Subsistence and Personality, and are not each other, must be this, That an Eternal Unproduced Person produces another in his own Nature, Whole, Perfect, Entire, with∣out the least Conceivable or Possible Difference or Diver∣sity; excepting this, That One Produces, and the Other is Produced: For Two such, who distinctly subsist, are really Two Persons in One and the Same Individual Nature.

Thus it is with a Perfect Mind and its Perfect Living, Subsisting Word, which is perfectly it self, as its own Per∣fect, Natural Image; Two in Number, but One in Re, in Nature. Thus it is with a Father and such a Son, as is Whole of Whole, they are Two and the Same, the Son the Natural Living Image of the Father, in whom the Fa∣ther sees Himself, and is seen in Him, as Christ tells us, He that hath seen me hath seen the Father: Which is agree∣able to the common Forms of Speech, to call the King's Picture or Image, the King, as the Catholick Writers fre∣quently observe; which would be exactly and philosophi∣cally true, were it a Perfect, Natural, Living, Insepara∣ble Image: And this is what the Catholick Fathers call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness or Identity of Nature; as might easily be proved by numerous Citations: But I will content my self with a few.

The Nicene Fathers taught, That the Father and the Son were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the same Nature and Substance: This, as I observed before, they explain by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Perfect Invariable Likeness and Simili∣tude, without the least Difference and Diversity; and

this is what they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness and Identity of Nature, which cannot be the Sameness of Sin∣gularity, but the Sameness of Indifference and Indiversity; such a Sameness as is between Two, which are perfectly alike, and differ in nothing from each other.

Athanasius gives this account, why the Nicene Fathers taught, That the Son was Homoousios, of the same Substance with the Father, that they might signifie that the Son was not only like the Father, but so of the Father,* 1.205 as to be the same in Likeness: Now the Sameness and Identity of Like∣ness cannot be the Sameness of Singula∣rity; and yet this he calls the Sameness and Identity with his Father; That the Son is the Natural Genuine Son of the Father, and the Word God's own pro∣per Word; and the invariable Likeness between the Light and it's Splendor; the Unity of Nature and the Identity of Light: With several Expressions, noted in the Margin, which signifie the most perfect Sameness in Nature.

Thus the Son is the Image of God, the Character of his Substance, Nature and Essence; which is the Language of Scripture, and the constant Doctrine of the Fathers: And from hence they con∣clude the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the per∣fect Sameness and Identity of Nature between Father and Son, or a perfect Likeness and Similitude. By which Argument they prove, That he is no Creature, but that he is Eternal and Om∣nipotent, and all that his Father is; be∣cause

this is the Nature of a Perfect Living Image, to be perfectly all and the same that the Prototype is.

Thus St. Basil tells us,* 1.206 That the Seal is seen in the Impression, and the Proto∣type is known by its Image, from that Sameness and Identity which is in both: Which he calls also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

This sufficiently proves what the Catholick Fathers meant by this Sameness and Identity of Nature; not the Sameness of singularity, which they always rejected as Sa∣bellianism, but such a Sameness as is between Two, who have the same Individual Nature, subsisting so distinctly in each of them, as to make them Two, but without the least con∣ceivable or possible Change or Alteration; such a Sameness as is a perfect likeness and similitude, which cannot be in singularity. But because Petavius lays great stress upon these Expressions, it will not be amiss to give two or three direct and positive Proofs of this matter.

Athanasius expresly cautions us against this,* 1.207 That when we hear that the Son hath all that the Father has, this invaria∣ble likeness and sameness of what the Son has, may not mislead us into Sabel∣lianism, to say, That the Son is the Fa∣ther himself: And tells us, That the Fa∣ther gave all to the Son, and that the Fa∣ther hath all again in the Son; and the Son having all, the Father again has the same all; for the Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father.

Gregory Nyssen, or St. Basil, for the same Treatise is ascribed to them both,* 1.208 proves both the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from the nature of an Image; That the Son is both the same with the Father, and another; for so an Image is both the same with its Prototype, and yet another; not the Prototype it self. And adds, that we may see the Father in the Son, not considered as unbegotten, for then he would be upon all accounts the same, and not ano∣ther, which destroys the Nature and Character of an Image.

The same account St. Hilary gives of an Image,* 1.209 That it signifies a perfect like∣ness and similitude of Nature between Two; for no Man is his own Image, but the Image represents the Prototype: And therefore there is a Father, and there is a Son, if the Son be the Image of the Father; and being an Image, the Son must necessarily have in himself the Nature and Essence of his Father. Which he urges as a direct Confutation of the Sabellian Singularity. But there is no need of multiplying Authorities in this Case, since it is so very obvious to every one, who ever look'd into the Fathers, That the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness and Identity, and the Community of Nature, though they differ in their formal Notions, yet both equal∣ly belong to the same Divine Nature; and the same Identical Nature, which is also a common Nature, can't be One in the Notion of Singularity.

2dly. Having thus shewn what the Catholick Fathers meant by the Sameness and Identity of Nature in Father

and Son, I proceed to shew, That herein they placed the Unity of the Godhead, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the One Divinity, and what account they give of this matter.

The Defence they generally make for the Unity of God in a Trinity of Divine Persons, is reducible to two Heads; this Sameness and Identity of Nature, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or inseparable Unity; which Two make up the compleat Notion of the Divine Unity; but I must now consider them apart.

That the Catholick Fathers did resolve the Unity of God into this Sameness and Identity of Nature, That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though they are Three Real, Proper, Distinct Persons, yet have the same One Divine Nature, which subsists whole, and perfect, and distinct, without any Change or Variation in all Three; and that therefore they are not Three Gods, but One God, is so very plain, that there is no need of multiplying words about it. The One God in the Catholick Language is One Divine Nature in Three Persons; and this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this One Es∣sence, and One Divinity, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are often used as equivalent terms, the Unity, Iden∣tity, Propriety, and Sameness of Nature; as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, one and the same. All those Passages quoted by Petavius, though they do not prove the Singularity of the Divine Nature, yet prove the Unity of the Godhead,* 1.210 by the per∣fect and invariable Sameness of Nature, in the sense now ex∣plained.

But the Testimony of St. Basil against the Sabellians is so full and express to this purpose, that I shall represent this matter in his Words, wherein he agrees with all the other Catholick Fathers.

Though (Father and Son) are Two in Number,* 1.211 yet are they not divided in Nature; nor does he who says Two Persons, alienate them from each other.

There is One God, because a Father; but the Son also is One God, not Two Gods, because of the Sameness and Iden∣tity of the Son with the Father; for there is not One Divinity in the Father, and Another in the Son; nor One Nature of the Father, and another of the Son. When therefore you would distinguish the Persons, number them distinctly, the Father by himself, and the Son by himself; but if you would avoid Polytheism, con∣fess but One Nature in them both, which rejects both the Sabellian and Anomoean Heresy. But when I say One Na∣ture, you must not imagine that Two Persons are made of One Nature,* 1.212 as it were by a division of it into two Parts; but only conceive the Son subsisting of the Father, as his Principle and Origi∣nal: Nor must you conceive that Father and Son are so of One Nature, as parta∣king of some One Same Nature and Substance antecedent to them both; for we do not call them Brethren, but Father and Son, which signifies the Sameness and Identity of Nature. For the Son is of the Father, not made by his Command, but begotten of his Nature; not by Division of the Father's Substance; but the Son shines forth whole and perfect from a perfect Fa∣ther, without any diminution of him. And therefore, as he proceeds, do not charge us with Preaching Two Gods, or Polytheism; for we Preach not Two Fathers, or Two Prin∣ciples, and therefore not Two Gods, which was the Impiety of Marcion: Nor do we make the Father and Son of a dif∣ferent Nature, unlike to each other, as the Anomoeans do. —But where there is but One Principle, and One Begot∣ten of it, One Prototype, and One Image, the Unity is preserved: Because the Son who is begotten of the Father,

and imprints his Father's Nature and Es∣sence on himself, as an Image,* 1.213 he has an invariable Likeness, as a Son he retains the same Nature and Substance. Now as a man who calls the King's Image or Picture the King, does not make Two Kings, nor deny him whose Image it is, to be the King, much less reason is there for such an Imputation in this Case. For here,* 1.214 when we hear of the Image of God, we must conceive nothing less than the Brightness of his Glory. But what is this Brightness, and what is this Glory? That the Apostle adds, The per∣fect Impression or Character of his Sub∣stance. And therefore Substance is the same with Glory, and Character with Brightness: So that the Divine Glory remaining perfect and undiminished, emits a perfect Splendor and Brightness: And thus the very Nature of an Image expounded as it becomes God, confirms the Faith of One Divinity. For the Fa∣ther is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; because such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such as the Son is, such is the Father: And thus Two are One, because the Son in nothing differs, as receiving no other Form or Character, but that of his Father. And therefore I say again, One and One, but an un∣divided Nature, and never-failing Per∣fection. And therefore there is One God, because by both the same perfect Divine Form and Nature is seen wholly and perfectly subsisting in both.

This I think is as plain as words can make it, both what St. Basil meant by the Sameness and Identity of Nature, and that herein he placed the Unity of the Godhead; and were there any occasion for it, it were easy to confirm this by the concurrent Suffrages of Athanasius, Gregory Nyssen, and Gregory Nazianzen, St. Cyril, and other Greek Fathers, almost in the same words.

St. Hilary and St. Ambrose, to name no more of the La∣tin Fathers, are so express in placing the Unity of the God∣head in this perfect Sameness, Indifference, Indiversity of Nature between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that there is no need of any other Art, but barely to represent their Words;* 1.215 and therefore I shall only refer my Readers to some few Quotations in the Margin.

It cannot be denied, but that all the Fathers unanimously agree in this Account of the Unity of the Divine Nature in Three Distinct Persons: Which should make modest

men very cautious of charging it with a direct Contra∣diction to all Reason and Philosophy: But Modesty and Reverence to the Catholick Fathers, are none of the pre∣vailing Virtues of this Age.

But is it indeed such a Contradiction to say, That the same Nature, which is perfectly and in every thing the same in Three, is but One Nature in Three, and that such Three have not Three Natures, but One Nature? Is it such a direct Contradiction to Sense and Reason, to say, That there is alius, & alius, & alius, in the Trinity, but not aliud? That there is Another, and Another, and Another Person in the Holy Trinity; but that there is nothing in any One of these Persons, which can be called Another thing from what is in the other Two? This is so far from a Contradiction, that it seems plain Sense, nay, plain De∣monstration to me, That Three Persons who have nothing in themselves but what each of them have, without the least conceivable Variation, are in Nature but one and the same; and though each of them be Another Person, yet not Another Thing, or Another Nature.

There are several Examples in Nature which justify this distinction between alius & aliud, and must make all think∣ing men confess that they cannot speak properly without it. I would not be mistaken in this matter, and therefore desire the Reader carefully to observe, That I do not alledge these Instances which follow, as Resemblances of the Tri∣nity, but only as Examples of a perfect Sameness and Unity in Nature; where we must confess, That the thing is but One and the same, and yet that there is Another and Ano∣ther: And if there be any Images of this in Nature, there is no reason to call this a Contradiction in the Faith of the Trinity.

Let me then ask this plain Question: When Five hundred Men hear the same Man speak, do they all hear one and the same Voice, or Five hundred Voices? It will, I think, be

granted, that it is but one and the same Voice which they all hear, and yet it is heard five hundred times, and is distinct∣ly in five hundred Ears: The Voice is essentially one and the same in all, and yet no man dares deny that the Voice in Peter's Ear is another from that Voice which is in Iohn's Ear; and therefore is Another and Another, but not Ano∣ther Thing: And were a Voice Essence and Substance, there would be One Nature, Essence, and Substance, in a Plurality of Hypostases.

Thus Sight furnishes us with as many Examples of this as Hearing: When five hundred Men see the same thing, the Object is one and the same, and yet is Another and Ano∣ther, according to the number of the Persons who see it: Is one and the same in Nature, and subsists the same, and yet distinctly in each eye.

Sight and Hearing approach nearest to an Incorporeal Nature, and therefore give us the nearest Resemblances of a Spiritual Sameness, Unity, and Distinction: But we have still more perfect Images of this, in what is more perfectly Spiritual.

The same Notion and Idea, though it subsist in Ten thou∣sand Minds, is perfectly the same in all. A perfect true Idea of any thing, is and can be but One; and therefore how many Minds soever it subsist in, it must be one and the same in all; but yet the Idea in the Mind of Peter is not the same in Subsistence with the Idea in the Mind of Paul: It is Another and Another, and yet the same Idea in Nature and Essence: As suppose the perfect Idea of Hu∣manity, or Human Nature, and the perfect Idea of the Di∣vine Nature; if they be true and perfect, they are perfectly the same in all the Minds in the World; and nothing but the different Notions men have of things, can multiply such Ideas.

Now if we advance but one step higher, we shall plainly see what this Unity of Sameness is; what the true Notion

of it is, and how far it reaches: For though this be abso∣lutely essential to the Divine Unity, yet as I have already noted, and will appear more hereafter, this is not the com∣pleat and adequate Notion of it.

Let us suppose then that Human Nature, for instance, did subsist as perfectly the same in Peter, Iames, and I••hn, as the true and perfect Idea of Human Nature is one and the same in all; that a Man were nothing else but the living subsisting Idea of Human Nature, without the least change or variation in Nature to distinguish one from another: I say, in such a Case as this, would not Three such Persons be perfectly one and the same, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in the Sameness and Identity of Nature, which would be as perfectly and invariably the same, as the common Notion and Idea of Nature? Would not Human Nature be as per∣fectly the same in Three Persons or Subsistences, as the Idea of Human Nature is one and the same in Three Minds? Or could we in proper speaking, with reference to this Sameness of Nature, any more say that there are Three Men, than that there are Three Humanities, when a Man is nothing else but the subsisting Idea of Humanity? Would not, as far as this Sameness and Identity reaches, Human Nature be a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; not merely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, both One and a Common Nature, not merely by a Logical and Notional Unity and Community, but by an actual Subsistence in all, without the least difference or di∣versity? As the Idea of Human Nature is both One, and Common to the whole Kind.

This indeed is but an imaginary Case, as to Finite Crea∣tures, who never were, and never can be so perfectly One and the same, as their Idea is; but yet it is the properest and most sensible representation we can make of the Same∣ness and Identity of the Divine Nature, which has really and actually all that Sameness and Identity which we only suppose in Creatures to help our Conceptions of the Divine

Unity; how different Hypostases may be One in Nature by this Sameness and Identy of Nature.

The Divine Nature and Essence is more perfectly simple and uncompounded than any Notion and Idea which we can frame of it; and therefore must subsist as simply as the simplest Idea, and consequently must be as perfectly one and the same in all Three Persons of the Trinity, as the same Idea is one and the same with it self: And though this be not the whole notion of the Sameness and Identity of Na∣ture, which requires not only two perfect Sames, but that one be of the other without division or Separation; yet this is essential to this Notion, and there can be no Identity of Nature without it: This is what the Catholick Fathers in∣tended in many Passages, which some Modern Writers have so miserably mistaken and misrepresented, as to charge those Wise men, and Learned Philosophers, with the most wild and absurd Conceits, and those great Advocates of the Ca∣tholick Faith with the worst of Heresies, even Tritheism it self. I can't do right to my Cause, without doing right to these great Lights of the Church, in giving a plain account of this matter.

And to explain what they meant by this Sameness and Identity of Nature, and to shew how groundless this Impu∣tation of Tritheism is, I shall begin with their natural Proof and Demonstration of the Unity of God against the Pagan Polytheism, which they unanimously resolve into this Same∣ness and Identity of Nature. They prove, that there can be but One God, and One Divinity, because the Divine Nature is not capable of the least conceivable change and diversity, which is necessary to make a Number: For what is, and always must be the same with it self, cannot be ano∣ther, or a Second Nature; and One Divinity is but One God.

This they prove from all the Notions which we have of God, especially that comprehensive One of an Absolute and

Perfect Being; for Absolute Perfection is, and can be but One, without any possibility of change; for all change and di∣versity must be either for the better or for the worse, and Absolute Perfection can admit of neither; and without di∣versity and alterity there can be but One. An Infinite Na∣ture, which nothing can distinguish from it self, can be but One; and could we imagine any thing to be added to, or taken from it, to make this distinction, it would destroy, not only its Unity, but its Infinity too; it would indeed make a Number, but not of absolute perfect Beings.

If we consider the Divine Perfections by themselves,* 1.216 it is impossible to con∣ceive any difference or diversity, and consequently any number in them: Is not Eternal Truth, and Infinite Wisdom, and Omnipotent Power, always one and the same? Can Eternal Truth, and Infi∣nite Wisdom in any thing vary from it self, to make two Eternal Truths, and Infinite Wisdoms? Now remove all pos∣sible diversity, and you necessarily de∣stroy a plurality of Gods; for a Perfect Sameness and Identity must reduce us to the belief of One God: For what is per∣fectly the same, is not many, but one. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Well! But can't there be more than one of these Eternal, infinitely Wise, infinitely Good, and Omnipotent Natures? No: For if this Nature must of necessity be always the same, and is unmade and self-originated, it can be but one: For though in Created Natures several of the same kind may be made according to the same Pattern, there being nothing in the Idea of any Created Nature which hinders the mul∣tiplication of its Individuals, yet a Nature which subsists of

it self; and is absolutely uncapable of any diversity, and consequently of number, can be but One; for a Self-sub∣sisting Nature must subsist according to its own Essential Idea, that is, according to its own Nature, and that is but One; for as far as we can judge of these Matters, what we cannot possibly conceive should ever be Two, we must con∣clude to be One.

But besides this, these Fathers observed, That if there were more than one Self-originated Divinity, or more Di∣vine Natures than one, they must be divided and separated from each other; for if to the Sameness and Identity of Na∣ture you add an inseparable and indivisible Union too, it is impossible they should be more than One. And yet two or more such divided and separated Natures are inconsistent with the Notion of a Divine Nature and Essence, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Uncircumscribed, and Omnipresent; where∣as two Divided and Separated Natures, which are not where each other is, must be Circumscribed, and not Omnipre∣sent, and this destroys the absolute Perfection of both; for a confined and limited Presence, as it is an imperfection it self, so confines and limits all other Perfections, as it confines Wisdom, Power and Goodness within a certain limited Sphere of Action.

And now it may be, some may think that these Argu∣ments conclude as strongly against a Trinity of Divine Per∣sons, each of which is by himself True and Perfect God, as against a plurality of Divided and Separate Divinities; and upon second thoughts, I suspect this may be what our Con∣siderer intended in those surprizing Arguments, of the Uni∣ty of Idea, and the Unity of Position and Place, to prove, that there can be but one single Person, in the true and pro∣per notion of a Person, for an Intelligent Person, in the Tri∣nity; this to be sure is the Argument which a Socinian Wri∣ter alledges with so much triumph out of Athenagoras to disprove the Trinity, though that very Ancient and

Learned Writer understood very well the difference between Polytheism and the Trinity, and at the same time confutes the one, and professes the other; which might have made that Author suspect, that he did not understand the true force of this Argument, since not only Athenagoras, but all the other Fathers, thought it a good Argument against Po∣lytheism, and at the same time a Confutation of the Charge of Polytheism against the Faith of the Trinity.

Gregory Nyssen, and Damascen, and many others, having confuted the Pagan Polytheism, or plurality of Gods from the Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature, which can admit of no change or diversity, and therefore not of num∣ber; they immediately proceed to consider the distinction of Persons and Hypostases in the perfect Unity and Simpli∣city of the Divine Nature, in opposition to the Iewish No∣tion of One God, for One Single and Solitary Divine Person.

And here they undertake to prove by Natural Argu∣ments (of which possibly more hereafter) that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Divinity, must have an Eternal Subsisting Word, which is Life, Wisdom, Power, all the same in his own Person that God is, but yet another Person: For the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Divinity is not without its Coeternal Word,* 1.217 and Coessential Reason and Wisdom; and the same they teach and prove concerning the Eternal Spirit; so that they make Father, Son, and Spirit, to be essential to One Divi∣nity, not as parts, but as perfectly whole, and the same in Three distinct Hypostases, which they think necessarily in∣cluded in the Perfection of One Divinity, as Reason and Word is essential to a Created Mind. This is what they mean by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Di∣vinity in Three Perfect Hypostases; not that Three Hypo∣stases are united, as it were ex post facto, into One Divinity; but that One Divinity does subsist Eternally, Essentially, and Inseparably, in Three Hypostases, which are necessary

to compleat the Notion and Definition of One Divinity. Thus it is certain Melanchton understood it, and therefore rejects the Definition which Plato gives of God, That he is an Eternal Mind, the Cause of all Good in the World; for though he owns it to be True and Learned, when rightly explained, yet he says it is defective, and must be supplied by the Gospel Revelation. That God is a Spiritual Intelligent Essence,* 1.218 Eternal, True, Good, Iust, Merciful, most free, of Infinite Power and Wisdom, the Eternal Father, who from Eternity begat a Son, his own Image, and the Son, the Coeternal Image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, pro∣ceeding from Father and Son.

So that the Holy and Ever Blessed Trinity is but One Eternal Coessential Divinity; that were there more Divini∣ties than One, there must of necessity be more Trinities also, according to the Doctrine of these Fathers; which is evi∣dence enough, that this Argument against a plurality of Divinities from the perfect Sameness and Identity of the Di∣vine Nature, which can't be multiplied, can't concern a Trinity of Real Subsisting Persons in the same One Eternal Undivided Divinity: For the same One Divinity is not multiplied by a Trinity of Persons Coeternal and Coessen∣tial; if this be the Nature and Unity of the Deity, to subsist whole and perfectly in Three, which was the constant Doctrine of the Fathers, and which this Argument don't oppose; nay so far from it, that it as evidently proves the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons, as it confutes a Plurality of Godheads and Divinities; for if the Sameness and Identity of Nature will not admit of a Plurality of Divini∣ties, then if Three are perfectly One and the same in Nature, they are but One Divinity, One God. Thus the Incircum∣scriptibility or Omnipresence of the Divine Nature is a good Argument against a Plurality of God's, or Divinities, which

must be separated, if they be more than One, and therefore circumscribed, or of a limited and confined presence; but it is no Argument against a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of Essence, which are all mutually in each other, and there∣fore equally Unconfined and Omnipresent, and perfectly One by an Essential and Inseparable Union. And are not these Fathers now like to prove very notable Tritheites, who prove the impossibility, that there should be more Divini∣ties than One, and the perfect Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Divine Persons, from that perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature which is between them?

But yet for all this Tritheites they are and must be, if they acknowledge Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be One God, in no other sense than Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are one Man; that is, because they agree in the same common Na∣ture, which has the same notion and definition, and is up∣on that account One and the same in all. This is what they are charged with, and I should not have wondred at it, had only some Careless and Unskilful Readers charged them with it, for they do say something which at first view may look like it; but then such Sayings as manifestly con∣tradict their avowed Doctrine, not only in other places of their Writings, but in those very Places where these Sayings are found, ought in all Reason and Justice to be expounded only by way of Analogy and accommodation, as containing some imperfect Image and Resemblance of that, which Na∣ture has no proper and adequate Example of. This must be allowed in all the Natural Representations which are made by the Catholick Fathers of the Unity and Distinction of the Ever-blessed Trinity; or there is not one of them, but what literally and Philosophically applied, would furnish out some new Heresy: This I have already shewn in the Speci∣fick Unity of the Divine Nature, which the Nicene Fathers did teach in a qualified Sense; though it appears from all I have said in the last, and this present Section, how far they

were from thinking the Divine Nature to be a meer Species, or Logical Notion, though it has this resemblance to a Spe∣cies, that it is One and Common, but not merely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not in meer Notion and Idea, but by an actual Subsistence and Inexistence in all Three, being as perfectly, wholly, indivisibly the same in all, and in each of the Di∣vine Persons, as a Specifick Nature is Notionally and Ideally one and the same in every individual of the same kind, which, as I have made appear, is that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Sameness and Iden∣tity of Nature, wherein they place the Unity of the God∣head. And yet this is the only foundation of the present Charge, that they make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be One God only by a Specifick Unity, as Three Individuals of the same kind and Species, suppose Peter, Iames, and Iohn are one Man. That all this is a mistake, is evident, because these Fathers do not resolve the Unity of the Godhead into a meer Specifick Unity of Nature; and the occasion of this mistake is great Inadvertency, as will appear in a very few words.

Gregory Nyssen is principally charged with this Paradox, and in vindicating him, I shall vindicate all the rest.

* 1.219The Question which Ablabius desired him to resolve, was this, That since Pe∣ter, Iames, and Iohn, though they have but one common Humanity, are yet called three Men; and no man denies, but that the name of Nature may be mul∣tiplied, when there are more who are united in the same Nature, how comes it to pass that we contradict this in the Mystery of the Trinity? that we ac∣knowledge Three Hypostases, who have the very same Nature, without the least difference or diversity, and yet teach, that the Divinity of Father, Son, and

Holy Ghost, is but One, and forbid saying, that there are Three Gods?

Now the better to understand the Father's Answer, we mu••t observe that this was an Arian Objection against the Homoousion, or the perfect Sameness, Indifference, and Equa∣lity of Nature between Father and Son: For the design of it was, as St. Gregory himself observes, to reduce them to this dangerous Dilemma, either to assert Three Gods,* 1.220 which is un∣lawful; or to deny the Divinity of the Son and Holy Ghost, which is impious and absurd. If they denied the Sameness and Equality of Nature, then the Son and Holy Ghost are not True and Perfect God, consubstantial with the Fa∣ther; or if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have the same One Common Nature, and are perfectly consubstantial, then they are Three Gods; as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, who have the same One Common Humanity, are Three Men; and there is the very same reason for calling Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Gods, that there is for calling Peter, Iames, and Iohn, Three Men; that is, the same Nature common to them all.

This was the Objection St. Gregory was to answer; and therefore his business was to prove, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not, and ought not to be called Three Gods, as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are and may be called Three Men; and therefore he must prove, That they are neither Three nor One, in the same sense that Three Men are Three and One; for if they were, they would be as truly and properly Three Gods, as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are Three Men; and no more One God, than they are One Man; which had been to give up the Cause to the Arians, instead of answering their Objection.

This may satisfy any man, that those Learned Persons are very much mistaken, who charge such a sense upon this Father, as is directly contrary to his design; for he under∣stood the Laws of Reasoning better. Neither he, nor any other Father I ever yet met with, asserted that Peter, Iames, and Iohn, were but One Man; or that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God no otherwise than Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are One Man; which yet is what has been charged upon them.

But does not Greg. Nyssen say, That it is a catachrestical way of speaking,* 1.221 tho become common and familiar, to mul∣tiply the name of Nature with the Indi∣viduals of the same Nature? As to say, That there are many Men, because there are many who have the same Human Nature.* 1.222 —But if we would speak accu∣rately and properly, we should say that there is but one Man, how many soever have the same Nature: And does not he apply this to the Unity of God? And can this have any other sense, than that the same Divine Nature makes Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One God, as the same Human Nature makes all the Men in the World but one Man? The Interpretation of which seems to be, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are as much Three Gods, as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are Three Men; but that it is very improper to call either the one or the other Three, for they are but One, by One Common Nature.

Now this Father does indeed say, and so many others of them say, That the name of Nature ought not to be multi∣plied with the Individuals; but he was far enough either from saying or thinking what he is charged with, That Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are not Three Men, but One Man;

or that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One God in no other sense, but as Three Men are One: And a due atten∣dance to the Series of the Argument, would have discover∣ed the Falseness and Absurdity of this Imputation; which therefore I shall briefly explain.

The Arian Objection which St. Gregory undertook to an∣swer, as I observed before, was this; That since the Catho∣lick Church owned the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be consubstantial, and to have the same undiversified Na∣ture, they must for that reason be Three Gods; as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, upon account of the same common Hu∣manity, are acknowledged to be Three Men: That is, that whether in God or Man, the same Nature in Three must make Three Individuals of the same Kind and Spe∣cies; and therefore as the same Human Nature in Three makes Three Men, so the same Divine Nature Three Gods.

In answer to this, St. Gregory first observes, That it is not the same common Nature which distinguishes and mul∣tiplies Individuals, no, not in Men: Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are not Three Individuals in the Species of Humanity, merely by having the same Nature (which is the force of the Arian Objection); for what is perfectly the same in all, can't distinguish or multiply them. And this is plainly all that he means, when he says, That the name of Nature ought not to be used plurally; and therefore Man being the name of Nature, and signifying the same with Humanity, we ought no more, if we speak properly and Philosophically, to say Three Men, than Three Humanities, or Three Hu∣man Natures; for he proves, that the name Man does not distinguish one Man from another, nor can we single any particular Man out of a Crowd by that Compellation; for there is but One Man,* 1.223 or One Huma∣manity in them all; that name not be∣longing primarily and immediately to the Individuals as such, but to the com∣mon Nature.

Well; but are there not Individual Men then, as well as a Common Nature? Yes, without doubt; but they are distinguished and multiplied, not by the Common Nature, which is the same in all, but by such pe∣culiar Properties as diversify and distin∣guish Common Nature,* 1.224 as it subsists se∣parately in particular Persons, and that makes the Number, though Nature be one and the same, a perfect indivisible Monad.

This is not merely to criticize upon Words, or to dispute against the common Forms of Speech, but to give a true Philosophical Reason of their different Use, when applied to God and Creatures. We commonly call Peter, Iames, and Iohn, Three Men, and right enough; but then they are not Three Men merely upon account of the same Com∣mon Humanity in them all, (which was the Arian Ob∣jection); for Humanity is but One in all, and what is per∣fectly One can't be numbred. To say there are Three Hu∣manities, all Men grant to be absurd; and yet it is to the full as absurd, to say that Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are Three Men, merely upon account of the same Humanity, strictly and precisely taken, as to say that there are Three Huma∣nities: So that though Peter, Iames, and Iohn, could not be, nor be called Three Men, without the same Common Nature, yet some peculiar, distinguishing, diversifying Pro∣perties make them Three Men. Could Human Nature sub∣sist as perfectly and indivisibly the same in Three, as the perfect Idea of Humanity, their Persons might be distin∣guished, but their Nature would be as perfectly One, as the Idea of Humanity is one and the same in distinct Minds; and in this Case (as far as this perfect Sameness of Nature can make them one, which, as I have observed, is not the compleat Notion of the Divine Unity, though it be essen∣tial to it) they might be called Three Human Persons, but

not Three Men: But such peculiar Properties as diversify and thereby distinguish the same common Nature into Par∣ticulars, make the Number: Which is one reason why we must not say Three Gods, as we do Three Men, though the same Divinity be common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; because this same One Divinity subsists whole and perfect, without the least Change, Diversity, or Alteration in Three: That though their Persons are distinct, the Di∣vinity is perfectly One and the Same in All, and therefore they are but One God.

So that these Fathers do not insist on a mere Specifick Unity, but on the Sameness and Identity of the Divine Nature in Three, as the reason why we must not say that there are Three Gods; for the same One undiversified Divi∣nity can be but One God. And therefore having answered that Popular Objection, That Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are allowed to be called Three Men, upon account of the same common Nature, by shewing that it is a great Popular Mi∣stake, that merely the same One Common Nature makes them Three Men, or will justify their being called so; this Father proceeds to shew, That there is such an Unity be∣tween Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as is not, and cannot be between any Three Creatures, though they partake of the same Common Nature: Such an Unity as makes Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, essentially One God, though Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are Three Men. Nay, such an Unity, as even a perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature cannot make between Creatures who have an absolute and separate Subsistence.

This gives a reasonable Account of this whole Argument, and vindicates it from those Absurdities which are charged on it. It was necessary to lay the Foundation of the Divine Unity in the perfect and invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature: For if the Divine Nature in Three is not per∣fectly the same, it cannot be One; for Diversity and Alte∣rity

makes a Number: But if it subsist as perfectly the same in Three, as its Idea is the same, it must be as perfectly one as its Idea is one. No, say these Arians, the same Na∣ture subsisting in Three, becomes Three Individual Natures of the same Species; and the name of Nature must be mul∣tiplied with the Individuals, as all allow it must be as to Men, who partake of the same Common Nature: For Pe∣ter, Iames, and Iohn, are acknowledged to be Three Men, though they have but one common Humanity; and by the same reason, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be Three Gods, if they have the same common Divinity.

To which St. Gregory Nyssen answers, That it is not the common Humanity which makes them Three Men; for that which is but one and the same in all, can't distinguish or multiply them; and therefore in strict and accurate speaking, as Man signifies pure and abstracted Humanity, we cannot properly say Three Men, because there are not Three Humanities; and accordingly, the name Man does not and cannot distinguish one Man from another, nor is ever used to that purpose; but that which multiplies Na∣ture, and the name of Nature, are those peculiar Proper∣ties which distinguish and diversify Nature, as well as Per∣sons; and thus the common Nature, with diversifying Pro∣perties, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is distinguish'd and multiplied by a kind of Composition; for the same Nature with one peculiar diversifying Property, is distinguish'd from the same Nature with other Properties; and thus the same Nature divided and distinguish'd with these Properties, makes a Number, and gives the name of Nature to each Individual Person, and thus it is in all Creatures: But where the same Nature subsists in Three, without any thing to distinguish or diversify Nature, as it is in the Blessed Trinity, though the Persons may be distinguish'd, the Na∣ture and the name of Nature can be but One: Which is the reason why Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but One

God, because they have but One undistinguish'd, undi∣versified Nature, though their Persons are distinct.

This is the true Account of this Matter; which is so far from such a mere Specifick Unity of Nature as is between Three Men, that it is that very Sameness and Identity of Nature, which the Catholick Fathers make essential to the Unity of the Godhead.

And the better to understand this, we must consider their Philosophy about Numbers; for according to them, nothing properly but Alterity and Di∣versity makes a Number:* 1.225 What is per∣fectly the same, is but One, as Boetius tells us; not by a Singularity, but by a perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature. In this sense it is, that Greg. Nazianzen, St. Basil, and others, teach, That God is One, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not in Number, but Nature; whereby they do not mean that there are more Gods in Number than One; but that the Unity of the Godhead does not consist in the Unity of Number, but of Nature; and that the Unity of Nature consists in the invariable Sameness and Identity of it; and therefore where the Divinity is perfectly the same, there is but One God. Thus Greg. Nyssen tells us,* 1.226 That the same Divinity may be numbred, and yet rejects all Number; that is, the Divinity may be numbred with the Persons, as when we say the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; but the Divine Nature being perfectly the same in all, that can't be numbred; that we must not say there are Three Gods, or Three Divinities.

Boetius has given the best Account of this, according to the Philosophy of the Ancients, by distinguishing between Numbers; for he says, Number is twofold, that by which we number, and that which is in the things numbred: As

to the first, the repetition of Units makes a Number, for One, and One, and One, are Three; and both the Catho∣lick Fathers and Schools reject this kind of Number, which is a Species of Quantity, from the Divinity; for God is un∣der no Predicament, and therefore the Unity of God not reducible to the Predicament of Quantity; for God is be∣fore and above all Unity, as he is above Substance, above Essence, above every thing which we have any Notion or Conception of; as Dionysius the Areopagite speaks.

But as to the things numbred, the Repetition of Units does not multiply,* 1.227 or make a Number in things, where the Nature is perfectly the same; for it is not a Repetition of Units, but Alterity and Diversity, which multiplies Na∣tures: To say God, and God, and God, does not make Three Gods, because there is but one and the same Divinity in Three: And this is what they mean by the Numerical Unity of the Divine Nature; not that Unity or Unit which is the beginning of Number, but the Unity of Sameness and Identity; which Tho. Aquinas calls unum non numero, sed re numerata; One, not in the numbring Number, but in the thing mumbred; or as the Fathers speak, not in Number, but Nature.

The better to understand this matter, we must consider what St. Basil discourses about the Unity of God, in answer to those who charged the Doctrine of the Trinity with Tritheism;* 1.228 viz. That they acknowledged One God, but not in Number (the numbring Number) but in Nature: For that which is One in Number, is not truly One, nor per∣fectly Simple in Nature; but all men acknowledge God to be the most Sim∣ple

Uncompounded Being, and there∣fore he is not One in the Notion of this numbring Number.

This he proves by an induction of particulars; we say,* 1.229 the World is one in number, but not one in nature; for it is compounded of great variety of Crea∣tures; and we say, one Man, but Man is compounded of Body and Soul; and even any Angel is not perfectly pure and simple, but is compounded of Es∣sence and Qualities, such as Holiness, which is not pure and simple Nature, for it may be separated. He adds, that Number is a Species of quantity, and an∣swers to the Question, How many, which properly belongs to a Corporeal Nature:—And indeed all Number denotes such things as have a material, or at least a circumscribed and limited Nature, but Monad and Vnity denote the Simple, Uncompounded, Uncircumscri∣bed Infinite Essence: And when he says, That Number must belong to things of a Circumscribed Nature, thereby he tells us, he means, not merely such things as are circumscribed by Place, which pro∣perly belongs to Bodies; but all such Natures as have a limited and confined Idea, as all Created Natures, whether Body or Spirit, have, whose Natures are limited, circumscribed, fixt and deter∣mined by that Infinite Mind, which gives being to them.

The meaning of all which is this, That to make a Num∣ber, there must be Alterity and Diversity in Nature, or a separate Existence: But a Perfect, Simple, Uncompounded

Nature, can admit of no possible alteration and diversity; for the same Nature can never differ from it self, without some kind of composition; and where there is no difference and diversity, there can be no number, and an Infinite Un∣circumscribed Nature can never be divided and separated, or subsist a-part, and therefore can't be numbred: So that Number can belong only to Created Natures, which are compounded and finite, and therefore by some diversifying Qualities or Affections, and a separate Ex••istence may be di∣stinguished into Individuals, which may be numbred; but the Unity of the Divine Nature, which is a Perfect Indivi∣sible, Uncompounded, Infinite Monad, is not the Unity of Number, but a Perfect Invariable Sameness and Identity, and an Indivisible, inseparable Union.

Now some Men, who do not duly attend to the nature and design of these Reasonings, apply all this to prove the Perfect Singularity of the Divine Essence, in the most strict and proper notion of Singularity, as that signifies One in Number; which contradicts the whole Intention of this Hypothesis, which is to prove, that the Unity of God does not consist in the Unity of Number, but of Nature; and that the Unity of the Divine Nature is not a Unity of Num∣ber, but a Unity of Sameness, Identity, and Inseparability. This is a Matter of great consequence, and therefore let us consider it over again.

This distinction between the Unity of Number, and the Unity of Nature, was alledged by the Catholick Fathers to avoid the Charge of Tritheism: The Sabellians and Arians asserted the Unity of God to be a Unity of Number; that One Divinity is not One, unless it be One in Number, One Single Solitary Divine Nature: And this, say they, is in∣consistent with the Trinity of Divine Persons, each of which is in his own Person True and Perfect God: For Three such Divine Persons must be Three Gods, Three Divinities, if each Divine Person have the True Perfect Divine Nature in

himself; and it is impossible to understand what a Divine Person is, without the Divine Nature: So that if the Father be God, the Son God, the Holy Ghost God, if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, be Three, they must be Three Gods.

This was the great Difficulty, and it is the only material Difficulty to this day. To have asserted but One Singular Divine Nature, which is but One in Number, had given up the Cause to the Sabellians or Arians: For then either Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, are but Three Names or Of∣fices of the same One Divine Person, who is the One God, as the Sabellians taught: Or Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not a Consubstantial Trinity, but the Father alone is God, and the Son and Holy Ghost but mere Creatures, how Excellent Creatures soever they are.

On the other hand, should they have denied that Three Ones make Three, this had been false counting, as the So∣cinians tell us now; and therefore to avoid both these Ex∣tremes, they distinguish between the Number by which we reckon, and the thing which is numbred; and thus they find a Real Trinity in Perfect Unity: As Greg. Nyssen tells us, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the very same thing, the same Divinity, is both numbred, and not subject to Number. It may so far be numbred with the Persons, as each Divine Person has the whole and perfect Divinity in himself, but yet the Divinity can't be numbred; not because it is One Single Solitary Divinity, for it really subsists in Three; but by reason of that perfect Sameness and Identity, which admits of no Number; for that which is perfectly one and the same in Three, can't be numbred.

Had they thought of such a Singularity of the Divine Nature, as is but One in Number, they must have disputed at another rate against Sabellians and Arians. Would they have taught, That the Divinity may be numbred, and yet is without Number? Which is impossible to be true of the same singular Divinity, which is but One in Number, and

therefore can never be more than One in Number; that is, in that Father's sense, cannot be numbred, much less can the same Singular Nature be numbred, and incapable of Number, that is, be One, and More than One.

Would they have taken so much pains to prove, That Sameness and Identity of Nature excludes all Number; if by this they had meant the Sameness and Identity of Singu∣larity, as the same thing is one and the same thing with it self, which is no great Mystery? And is it not evident, that this whole Dispute is concerning the Unity of the Di∣vine Nature in Three distinct Persons, and consequently, concerning that Sameness and Identity of Nature which is between Three who have the same Nature, and therefore not One in the Notion of Singularity, which is One in Number, not in the Sameness and Identity of Nature?

Would they have insisted on that distinction of Units in Number, and Units in Nature; that the first multiplies, the second does not, had they believed that there are no Units in the Divinity; not One, and One, and One, but only One Singular Divinity? At least, could Boetius, who so particularly explains and urges this distinction, intend to prove by it the Singularity of the Divine Essence, when at the same time he defines a Person to be the Individual Sub∣stance of a Rational Nature; and assigns this distinction as the Reason why though we number Three in the same Di∣vinity, yet there are not Three Divinities, or Three Di∣vine Natures or Essences; because the Repetition of Units in the thing to be numbred, where there is a perfect Same∣ness and Identity of Nature, makes no Number?

In this sense it was, that the Schools asserted the Singu∣larity of the Divine Substance; because the Divine Sub∣stance, by reason of its perfect Sameness and Identity can't be numbred, and what can't be numbred, they call a Sin∣gular Substance: But they expresly reject (as the Catho∣lick Fathers did) Singularity in the sense of Solitude, as it

signifies one alone by himself, without any Communion or Fellowship (consortium) with any other in the same Di∣vine Essence. And therefore the Master of the Sentences expresly distinguishes between Diversity,* 1.230 Singularity or So∣litude, and Unity and Trinity, Distinction and Identity. Now let any man judge, what that Unity is, which is not Singularity or Solitude, but a Unity in Trinity; and what that Distinction is, which is perfect Identity without any Diversity: For my part I can make nothing of it, but this perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature in Three, which numbers Persons, but not Natures.

Estius takes notice of that Objection against the Trinity, That the Father is God, and the Son is God, therefore the Father is the Son; which Consequence is resolved into that Maxim, Quaecunque eadem sunt uni tertio, eadem sunt inter se, whatever things are the same with the same Third, are the same with each other: To which he answers, That this Rule holds true only where the Third is a perfect Singular: Deus autem non prorsus singulare nomen est, but God is not up∣on all Accounts a name of Singularity, that is, does not sig∣nify One only who is God; but signifies such a Singular Na∣ture as is communicable to Three, Significat enim Naturam Singularem, sed quae communicari possit tribus suppositis: That is, It is not a Singular Nature,* 1.231 with the Singularity of so∣litude, because it is communicable, and can subsist distinctly in Three, but only with the Singularity of Identity, as he explains it from St. Hilary, Dist. 23. Sect. 4. to which he refers his Reader. So that though the Schools did use this Phrase of a Singular Nature and Substance, which the Catho∣lick Fathers rejected as Sabellianism, yet they did not use it in that Sense, which the Fathers rejected, for One Solitary Nature, which can be but One Person; and therefore Estius observes, that Aquinas uses this name of Singularity, when applied to the Divinity, non simpliciter, sed cum cautela, not simply and absolutely, but with caution, and qualifies it with

ut sic liceat loqui, if I may have leave so to speak: And he imitates this Caution himself, Dist. 23. Sect. 1. when he tells us, That the Divine Essence may quodam sensu in a certain sense be said to be individual, as it neither is a Genus nor Species, but res una numero, & ut it a dicamus singularis, nu∣merically One, and if we may say so, Singular; though it be not individual, in the sense that Boetius defines a Person to be an Individual Substance, because it is not incommuni∣cable.

This shews, That though the Schools have in this Que∣stion changed the Ancient Catholick Language, by teach∣ing, That the Divine Essence is Vna Numero, & Singularis, One in Number, and Singular; whereas the Catholick Fa∣thers denied that God was One in Number, but only in Na∣ture, and denied the Singularity of the Divine Nature (which Confusion, and appearing Contradiction of Terms occasions great Mistakes) yet they meant the very same thing, and their Philosophy about Singularity and Number was the same: For they taught a Communicable Singularity of Na∣ture, which is opposed to a Sabellian Solitude, and rejected the numbring Number from the Divinity. They univer∣sally deny, That God is One in that sense of Unity, which is the beginning of Number: For Number is a Species of Quantity, & nascitur ex divisione continui, is made by Di∣vision; and to assert God to be One in this Sense, is to as∣cribe Quantity to him; for nothing can be thus One, but what has Magnitude and Figure, that is, nothing but Body; for Number, as it is a Species of Quantity, can belong to nothing, but Body, which has divisible Parts, and Exten∣sions, and Magnitude, which may be One or more. This is certainly true, as to that kind of Number, which is a Species of Quantity; for that can measure only such things as have Quantity: But then they were sensible, that other Beings are numbred besides Bodies, even Incorporeal Spi∣rits, who have no Quantity, Parts, or Divisibility, and yet

these we number, when we say, a Hundred, or Thousands, or Millions of Angels. This they own, and call it a Trans∣cendental Number, that is, such a Number as is not reduced to the Predicament of Quantity: But that is little to the purpose; if Spirits, which have no Quantity may be num∣bred, what is it that makes a Number in them? And why may not Number then belong to the Divinity, though it be not quantum, have no Predicamental, that is, Corporeal Quantity? To this they answer, That this Transcendental Vnity adds no form to the thing, but only signifies the thing it self, as undivided from it self: Well! But if this be all, then God, who is thus indivisible from himself, may as properly be called One, as One Angel is said to be One: No, say they, For to entitle any thing even to this Transcendental Nume∣rical Unity, ratione rei subjectoe Naturam ejus designat ut li∣mitatam, atque extra res alias positam, it must be considered to have a Finite and Limited Nature, and to subsist separate∣ly from all other Beings, and to be diversified from each other in Nature or Qualities. Res una ab alia, Natura vel qualitatibus discreta intelligitur. But now Unity in God, though it resemble this Transcendental Unity, as adding no Form to God; that is, not supposing him to be Corporeal, as the Predicamental Unity does, yet it does not signify any thing limited and finite in God; but only his Undivided In∣separable Being: As Number in God (that is, the Trinity) does signify the real distinction of Three, Non ita tamen, ut ea plura Natura vel Qualitatibus discreta intelligantur, & sin∣gula suis velut limitibus circumsepta. But not so, as if these Three were distinguished and separated by Nature and Qua∣lities, or as if each of them had their own Separate and Cir∣cumscribed Bounds and Limits.

This is the Account Estius gives us of Unity and Number in God, dist. 24. sect. 1. which perfectly agrees with that Account I have already given of this matter from St. Basil: That an Infinite, Undiversified, Indivisible Nature (as the

Eternal Divinity is) is neither One nor Three, in the same Sense, and for the same Reasons, which give these Deno∣minations to any Created Beings. And therefore there are no Arguments in Nature to confute the Unity of the God∣head from a Trinity of proper Subsisting Persons, nor a Tri∣nity of Persons from the Unity of the Godhead, because Three and One in God do not signify what they do in Crea∣tures.

This appeared a great difficulty to the Master of the Sen∣tences,* 1.232 That since we neither allow of Diversity nor Singu∣larity, Multiplicity nor Solitude in the Trinity, what should be the meaning of One, and Two, and Three, of Trinity and Plurality, and Distinction, as when we say, One God, Two Persons, Three Persons, more Persons, distinct Per∣sons; or a distinction of Persons, Plurality of Persons, a Trinity of Persons, which seems to ascribe a Numerical Quantity, a Multitude and Multiplicity to God. To this the Master answers, That these words, when applied to God, are rather intended to remove every thing from God, which is inconsistent with the Perfect Simplicity of the Di∣vine Nature, than positively to affirm any thing of him: This Answer does not please Estius, because it seems to im∣ply, that God is not in a true and proper Sense One and Three; but this is his own Mistake: For Peter Lombard meant no more but this, That though God be in the most perfect sense One and Three, yet those positive Ideas, which we have of One, or Two, or Three, of Distinction, and Trinity, when applied to Creatures, do not belong to the Divine Nature; and therefore we must conceive of them in God, rather by way of Negation, than by any positive Ideas, by denying such things of God, as are inconsistent with the Perfect Simplicity of his Nature; which is true of most other Divine Perfections, that we have rather a negative than positive conception of them, as attributed to God; for Wis∣dom, and Power, and Goodness in God, are no more re∣ducible

under the Predicament of Quality, as they are in Creatures, than the Unity of God is reducible to the Pre∣dicament of Quantity.

Thus he tells us, when we say One God, we thereby ex∣clude more Gods, but do not attribute the quantity of Number to God; that is, we do not mean that there is One God, in that Notion of One as it is the beginning of Number, which is a Species of Quantity, for so nothing can be One, but what has Quantity, which God has not: Thus when we say, One Father, and One Son, the meaning is, that there are not many Fathers, nor many Sons. When we say there are more Persons, we exclude Singularity and Solitude, but do not introduce Diversity or Multiplicity into the Divine Nature. Thus Three Persons does not signify the Quantity of Number, or any Diversity (as it is in Creatures) but only determines our Thoughts to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that each of these Persons is in the Godhead, and none else. Distinct Persons, or Distinction of Persons, excludes Confusion and Mixture; signifies that they are Another and Another, without any Diversity, or Sabel∣lian Confusion. The meaning of which is, That we must not form such a Notion of One God, as we have of One Man, nor of Three Persons, as of Three Men; but must acknowledge One God, in opposition to more Gods, or more Divinities; and Three Persons, in opposition to Sin∣gularity and Solitude in the Divinity: All which resolves it self into the Unity of Identity, which excludes both all manner of Diversity, and Singularity and Solitude.

SECT. VII. Concerning the Distinction of Persons in the Unity and Identity of the Divine Essence.

THIS fairly brings me to the Third Enquiry I pro∣posed, concerning the Real Distinction of the Di∣vine Persons, in the perfect Sameness and Identity of Na∣ture; how we can distinguish Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, when their Nature is perfectly One, by the Unity of Iden∣tity and Sameness. This is the Seat of most of those nice distinctions which we meet with both in the Fathers and Schools, and therefore it deserves to be carefully examined; for a sensible Account of this Matter would answer many great Difficulties in the Doctrine of the Trinity: And to this purpose I shall first give a general Account of it, accord∣ing to those Principles which I have now laid down; and then more particularly explain what the Fathers and Schools say of it; which will appear to be no such Mysterious Nonsense, as the Adversaries of our Holy Faith would re∣present it to be.

1. The general Account of this is very short: The Ca∣tholick Fathers universally teach, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each of them by himself in his own pro∣per Person, True and Perfect God: That the same One Whole Undivided Divinity subsists distinctly in each of them: That the Person of the Father, as he is True and Perfect God, is the whole Divinity; That the Person of the Son, as True and Perfect God, is also the same One Whole Divinity; and so of the Holy Ghost: That this Divinity is One and the Same, not by an Unity of Singula∣rity

and Solitude, which is irreconcilable with the Notion of a Real Trinity; for One Singular Divinity can be but One Single Divine Person; but by the Unity of Sameness and Identity, which admits of a Trinity of subsisting Per∣sons in the same undiversified Nature: That whatever the Father is, That the Son is, and that the Holy Ghost is.

That a Divine Person is nothing but the Divine Nature and Essence; for the perfect absolute Simplicity of God admits of no imaginable Composition, not so much as of Nature and Suppositum, or that which is the subject of all Natural Powers, as it is in Created Beings.

This makes it very evident that these Divine Persons are not distinguished by Nature; for there is nothing in Nature to distinguish them, it being perfectly and invariably the same in all; and where there is no distinction, there can be no Number; for which reason they will not allow that the Divine Essence is multiplied with the Persons, there being but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, one and the same Divinity in them all.

They agree farther, That the Divine Persons are incom∣municable: That the Person of the Father is not, and can never be the Person of the Son; nor the Person of the Son, the Person of the Father; nor the Person of the Holy Ghost, the Person either of Father or Son.

But then this seems to make the difficulty insuperable; That if a Divine Person be nothing else but the Divine Na∣ture, how there should be Three such distinct incommuni∣cable Persons in the same undivided, undistinguished Divi∣nity? Why we may not call Three Divine Persons, who have each of them the whole Divine Nature distinctly and incommunicably, Three Divinities, as well as Three Di∣vine Persons, when a Divine Person is nothing else but the Divinity? And then Three distinct Persons must be Three distinct Divinities.

This Unity and Distinction in the Godhead has always been acknowledged by the Catholick Fathers to be a Great

and Inexplicable Mystery, a wonderful Union, and won∣derful Distinction. Damascen, as I observed above, tells us, That the Divine Nature, though subsisting in Three Per∣sons, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, really and actually One, not merely notionally One,* 1.233 as Human Nature is, which subsists only in Individuals, and has a particular, distinct, separate Sub∣sistence in every particular Man, and therefore can be One in its Individuals in no other sense, but only as the same common Notion and Definition of Humanity belongs to them all; that is, Human Nature is One in all the Men in the World, not by a Real Subsisting, but by a Specifick No∣tional Unity: But the Divine Nature is One with a Real Subsisting Unity, being perfectly the same in Three, with∣out any Division or Separation: And an indivisible, insepa∣rable, undiversified Same, is really and actually One, ac∣cording to the most simple Notions we can form of Unity.

But what room then does this leave for a Real Trinity of Persons, in this One, Simple, Uncompounded, Indivisible, Inseparable Nature?

To this he answers, That this Real Distinction of Per∣sons in the perfect Unity and Simplicity of Nature, may be known and understood by Reason, though there be nothing in Nature to distinguish them. Father, Son,* 1.234 and Holy Ghost, are upon all ac∣counts perfectly One, excepting this, That one is Unbegotten, the other Be∣gotten, and the third Proceeds. We acknowledge One God, distinguished only by these Personal Properties of Pa∣ternity, Filiation, and Procession, as a Cause, and that which is caused; and as each of them has a compleat perfect Hypostasis, distinguish'd only by these different Modes of Subsistence.

This proves a Real Distinction, without any Diversity, Division, or Separation, and therefore a Real Distinction in perfect Unity.

The Divine Nature is Infinite and Un∣circumscribed,* 1.235 and therefore the Divine Persons cannot be divided and separated from each other, but are perfectly in each other, without Confusion. The Divine Nature is perfectly One in Three, by the Unity of Sameness and Identity, and therefore there can be no diversity or division of Will, or Counsel, or Ope∣ration, or Power: Now a Nature which is perfectly the same, and undivided, must be perfectly One. But then Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are certainly Three; for He who begets, is not He who is begotten, for nothing begets it self: To beget, and to be begotten, and to proceed, are the Characters of Per∣sons, and can belong only to True, Real, Substantial Per∣sons: He who begets, must be a Person, and so must He who is begotten, and He who proceeds; they have each of them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whatever makes a compleat and perfect Person; but then these Three can never meet in the same Person, and consequently must distinguish Per∣sons; for the same Person can't be unbegotten, begotten, and proceed; can't be the Cause, and that which is caused.

This is demonstratively certain, That a begotten and un∣begotten Person, and consequently a begotten and unbe∣gotten Nature (a Divine Person being nothing else but the Divine Nature) are and must be Two, and never can be each other; and therefore this distinguishes Persons, though it makes no distinction or diversity in the Divine Essence; as the Catholick Fathers proved against the Arians, that to be unbegotten, and to be begotten, does not. But to be unbegotten, to be begotten, and to proceed, whatever

you will call them, whether Personal Properties, or Modes of Subsistence, though they do not make the Persons, that is, are not the formal Notion of a Person, yet they cer∣tainly distinguish them, or prove them to be as distinct and incommunicable, as Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceed∣ing; for if these Terms or Characters can never signify each other, then the Persons characterized by them can never be each other: And this is all the distinction that can be in an undistinguished, undiversified, undivided Essence.

Well; but still the difficulty remains, how to distinguish between Essence and Person in God; for if Person be Na∣ture and Essence, and each Person distinctly in himself be the whole Divine Essence, or the whole Divinity, how can we avoid acknowledging Three Essences, and Three Divi∣nities, as well as Three Persons in the Trinity? Now the account of this must be taken from the nature of that Di∣stinction and Unity which is in God; for such a Distincti∣on as does not destroy the Unity, can't multiply Natures, though it distinguishes Persons. Each Person is the Divine Nature, but without any diversity, division, or separation of the Divinity; and what is Identically and Indivisibly the same, is but One. The Divine Nature, as self-originated and unbegotten, is the Person of the Father; as communicated by Generation, is the Person of the Son; as proceeding is the Per∣son of the Holy Ghost, and these are Three; but the Son is be∣gotten of the Substance of his Father, and the Holy Ghost pro∣ceeds from Father and Son, without any diversity, division, or separation of Substance, and therefore the Divinity is but One. The Divine Nature subsists distinctly and in∣communicably in Three, according to their distinct Cha∣racters of Unbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding; and these we call Persons, because they bear some Analogy to Individuals in created Beings, which in an Intelligent Na∣ture are called Persons; but they are not Three Divinities, because the Divine Nature, though it be distinct, yet is un∣diversified,

and undivided in Three, and therefore is but One in Three.

This seems to me a very intelligible Account of a Tri∣nity in Unity, and the difference between Person and Es∣sence, though a Divine Person is the Divine Essence. When we distinguish between Person and Essence, and say there are Three Persons and One Essence, by Essence we mean an undistinguished, undivided Divinity, which is but One; by Three Persons we mean the Divine Essence, unbegotten, and communicated by Generation, and Procession, which are really distinct Persons, and subsist distinctly, but i•• the Unity of an undistinguished and undivided Divinity; which makes them really and actually Three and One; the same without diversity, and distinct without division. And this seems to be the reason why the Catholick Fathers, tho they called the Di∣vine Persons Tres Res, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Tres Sub∣sistentes, Three Things, and Three that subsist, yet were more cautious in calling them Three Natures, or Essences, or Substances (though there are some Examples of this kind), because though the Divine Essence subsists distinctly in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which makes them Three Distinct, Real, Subsisting Persons, yet the Divine Nature is not distinguished nor separated, but is perfectly One, Same, Undivided Essence; and therefore Vna Substantia, though not Vnus Subsistens; One Substance, though not One, but Three, that subsist.

What I have thus briefly represented, I hope I have pro∣ved in the First Chapter, from the Authority of Scripture, and Reason founded on Scripture: And from what I have already discoursed of the Doctrine of the Fathers, it may appear to careful and intelligent Readers, who use such Ap∣plication as this Argument deserves and requires, that this is their Unanimous Sense also. But yet as far as it is possible, to clear this Matter more fully, and vindicate the Fathers and Schools from those Obscurities, Inconsistences,

and Contradictions which are generally charged on them in so concerning an Article, I shall reassume this Matter, and particularly shew,

1. That what they call a Divine Person, is the Divine Essence and Substance, and nothing else.

2. That this Divine Essence and Substance, as constituting these Divine Persons, is proper and peculiar to each, and incommunicable to one another; and therefore that this Divine Essence and Substance, as subsisting distinctly in Three, is no more numerically One, than their Persons are One.

3. What difference they made between Nature and Es∣sence, and Hypostasis and Person.

4. Whether the Catholick Faith of a Real and Substan∣tial Trinity, can be as reasonably and intelligibly explained by the Notion of One Singular Substance in the Divinity, as by asserting Three Personal Substances or Suppositums: And whether the Singularity of the Divine Essence in this Notion, deliver the Asserters of it from any Inconveniences and Objections which the contrary Opinion is thought lia∣ble to.

1. As for the first, That a Divine Person is the Divine Essence, it is and must be in some sense acknowledged by all who profess the Faith of a Real Trinity; for there can∣not be a Real Trinity of Divine Persons, if each Person be not True and Perfect God, that is, the whole Divinity, or Divine Nature and Essence. And therefore those who assert in the strictest sense the Singularity of the Divine Essence, yet assert, That this One Singular Essence subsists distinctly in each Divine Person; which, whether it be to be under∣stood or not, yet is an acknowledgment that there is no con∣ceiving a Divine Person without the Divine Essence: But we need not be beholden to any man for this Concession, for the thing is plain and evident in all Catholick Writers.

Petavius has very critically observed the different use of Words in Catholick Writers, relating to this Venerable My∣stery; such as Essence, Nature, Substance, Hypostasis, Sub∣sistence, Person, &c. which sometimes occasioned great Misunderstandings between them, and is to this day made a pretence of charging the Fathers with great Uncertainty and Obscurity, and with contradicting each other, and themselves.

This of late has been much insisted on, in order to dispa∣rage the Authority of ••, as Zealous, Contentious Bigots, who neither understood one another, nor them∣selves, nor the Catholick Faith, but so confounded Terms, that we can never certainly know what they meant; or used such dangerous Terms, that if we rely too much upon them, we m••y easily m••stake H••resy for the Catholick Faith. Were this true, our Case would be very bad; but two or three Observations will set this matter in a clear light.

1. That very Ambiguity which the Fathers are charged with in the use of Words, does certainly prove, that by a Divine Person, they meant the Divine Essence, Nature, and Substance.

The plain Case is this. The Catholick Fathers did univer∣sally own and profess a Trinity in Unity, Three Persons, and One God; So that there was no difference in their Faith, how different soever their words were: The most common Terms, whereby they exprest the Unity of the Godhead, were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Vna Esse••••••••, Vna Natura, Vna Sub∣stantia; One Ess••nce, One N••ture, One Substance; and a Trinity they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Hypostates; and the Latins Three Persons; but sometimes we meet in undoubt∣ed Catholick Writers wi•••• the direct contrary Expressions, such a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Tres Substantiae, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Substances, and One Hypostasis: The usual way of reconciling this seeming Con∣tradiction

is by saying, That when these Fathers use such Expressions, as Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Sub∣stances, they do not understand this of Three divers, or spe∣cifically different, Essences, Natures, Substances, which is Arianism, but of Three Persons; and when they affirm, that there is but One Hypostasis, they do not by One Hyposta∣sis mean One Person, which is Sabellianism, but One Na∣ture, Essence, or Substance: As we know this very Con∣troversy about One or Three Hypostases, was thus com∣posed in the Alexandrian Synod, where Athanasius presided: And no doubt but this is the true Solution, since those, who were neither Arians, nor Sabellians, could not understand such Expressions in any other sense.

But then the Question still remains, How this Ambigui∣ty should happen, or how it comes to pass, that such contradictory Terms, as One Essence, and Three Essences, One Substance, and Three Substances, One Hypostasis, and Three Hypostases, should both be Orthodox and Ca∣tholick.

Now the only Account I can give of this matter, is this; That these Terms, Essence, Nature, Substance, Hy∣postasis (which originally signifies Substance, of which more presently) may signify, as the Philosopher speaks, ei∣ther the First or Second Substance; either the common Na∣ture, which has the same notion and definition, common to the whole Kind, as Humanity, which is the same in all Men; or a Singular Subsisting Nature, and Substance, which in Creatures we call Individuals, and in reasonable Creatures, Persons: Now in analogy to this common Specifick Na∣ture, which is one and the same in all its Individuals, the Catholick Fathers taught but One Essence, Nature, Sub∣stance, and in this sense but One Hypostasis in the Godhead, that is, a Consubstantial Trinity, in analogy to the several Individuals of the same Species, in whom only this common Nature did really and actually subsist; they ordinarily assert∣ed

Three Hypostases, sometimes, as we see, Three Natures, and Essences, and Substances, in the Trinity, that is, Three Real, Substantial, subsisting Persons; and in this sense, Three Essences, Three Natures, Three Substances, was accounted Catholick Doctrine. St. Hilary allows Tria in Substantia, or Tres Subs••antias, Three in Substance, or Three Substances, for Tres Subsistentium Personas, Three Subsisting Persons. And St. Greg. Nyssen, in answer to Eunomius, who asserted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Essences, or Substances, says,* 1.236 That if he understood this distinction of Substances only in opposition to Sabellius, who gave three Names to one Suppositum, or Substance, that not only he, but all Catholick Christians, assented to it: His only fault being in this Case, that he uses improper words, Three Essences, for Three Hypostases.

Now that which I observe from hence is this, That had they not believed each Divine Person to be distinctly by himself the Divine Nature, Essence, and Substance, there could never have been any occasion for this Dispute about One Essence, Nature, Substance, Hypostasis, and Three Essences, Natures, Substances, Hypostases; nor for that known Distinction, by which they reconciled this difference between Essence and Hypostasis, that the first signifies some∣thing analogous to a Common Specifick Nature, the second to Individuals. If the Divine Nature subsisted in Singula∣rity, or were but One Singular Subsisting Nature, Essence and Hypostasis must signify the same thing; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Essence is Substance, and so is Hypostasis, and in this sense, they must both signify a first Substance, and then one singular Subsisting Nature or Substance; and three singular Subsist∣ing Natures and Substances, is an irreconcilable Contra∣diction. Had the Singularity of the Divine Nature been the Catholick Faith, we should never have heard of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the Common Nature and Essence of the Divinity; for Singular and Common are express Con∣tradictions, and a Singular Subsisting Nature can have no∣thing

thing analogous in it to a Common Specifick Nature: If each Divine Person be not the Divine Nature▪ Essence, Sub∣stance, there can be no Pretence, that Essence and Sub∣stance should ever signify a Person, nor can any Interpreta∣tion make Three Essences and Substances Catholick Do∣ctrine, if there be no sense, wherein Three Persons may Orthodoxly be called Three Essences and Substances; as there can't be, if a Person, as a Person, be not Essence and Substance: And on the other hand, if Hypostasis, which is the peculiar and appropriate Name whereby the Greek Fa∣thers denote a Person, do not signify Essence and Sub∣stance, it could never be Orthodox to say, that there is but One Hypostasis, no more than it is to say, that there is but One Person in the Trinity.

2. But to set aside this Dispute concerning Three Es∣sences, Three Natures, Three Substances, and One Hypo∣stasis in the Trinity, which though allowed to be Catholick, yet were sparingly and cautiously used, because they were liable to Heretical Senses; I observe farther, That these words, Essence, Nature, Substance, are distinctly applied to each Person of the Holy Trinity, which could not be Orthodox, were not each Person distinctly in himself, Es∣sence, Nature, Substance.

What I have already discoursed with relation to Sabellia∣nism, and upon several other occasions, sufficiently proves this, and I shall not trouble my Readers with a needless Repetition: Petavius owns it, and has given several In∣stances of it, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Essentia, Natura, Substantia, do not always signify the common Essence of the Divinity, but the Divine Persons; that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is the Person of the Father, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Person of the Son, which is undoubtedly true; but still Essence signifies Essence, and Nature Nature, and Substance Substance; and the only reason he has to say, That in this construction the Words signify a Person, is because they are used singularly, and

construed with the name of a Person, as the Essence and Substance of the Father, or of the Son: But this is no rea∣son, if the Essence be not the Person; if the Essence of the F••ther do not signify that Essence which is the Person of the Father; and the Essence of the Son, that Essence which is the Person of the Son: For if a Divine Person be not the Divine Essence, Essence can never signify Person: And yet if they do believe that each Divine Person is by himself in his own Person Essence and Substance, the whole undivi∣ded Divinity, I cannot imagine the reason of this Criticism, why they should be more afraid to say the Essence and Sub∣stance of the Father, than the Person of the Father, unless it be, that this does not so well agree with their Notion of the singularity of the Divine Essence, as I doubt indeed it will not, especially if we add, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Unbegotten and begotten Substance, the one the Per∣son of the Father, the other of the Son; of which more here∣after; but this is not to learn our Faith from the Fathers, but to expound them by our preconceived Opinions.

3dly, I observe farther, That all those words, which are more peculiarly appropriated to signify the Divine Persons, were always used by Catholick Writers in the notion of Sub∣stance, and were never thought Catholick in any other sense.

Hypostasis is the most received word among the Greek Fathers, to signify a Person; and One Essence and Three Hypostases was the Catholick Language. Now it is agreed on all hands, That Hypostasis literally signifies Substance; and as I have already observed, the only dispute about it was, that some by Hypostasis understood the Common Nature and Substance in the notion of Essence, and for that reason asserted, That there is but One Hypo∣stasis, as there is but One Essence in the Trinity; others understood a singular Subsisting Nature and Sub∣stance, and in this sense asserted Three Hypostases; but none of them ever understood Hypostasis in any other

notion, but that of Substance, either a Common, or Indi∣vidual Substance: And to prevent this Ambiguity, as far as they could, which might conceal very different Heresies, Sabellianism on one hand, and Arianism on the other, and many times occasioned the Orthodox to suspect each other of these opposite Heresies, though Essence and Hypostasis signified much the same thing, yet they appropriated the name Essence to signify a Common Nature and Substance, and Hypostasis to signify Individuals: As we learn from St. Basil, Greg. Nyssen, Damascen, and many other Catho∣lick Writers, who assign this difference between Essence and Hypostasis.

But yet this did not wholly silence this Dispute among the Greeks, much less did it satisfy the Latin Fathers, who knew no difference between Essentia & Substantia, but translated the Homoousion by Vnius Substantiae; and therefore it was as great Heresy to them to say Three Substances (as they translated the Greek Hypostases) as to say Three Essences in the Trinity: St. Austin professes, That he knew not what the Greeks meant by One Essence, and Three Substances; and for the same reason, it is well known, St. Ierom rejected Three Substances, for both by Essence and Substance they understood a Common Nature, which made it Heresy in∣deed to assert Three Substances, which in this acceptation of the word must signify Three divers Substances, which specifically differ: And therefore tho they did not reject the Greek Faith, but did believe as heartily as they, that each Person by himself was perfect Hypostasis and Substance, and rejected the Sabellian One Hypostasis, and One Substance; yet they did not like the Phrase of Three Hypostases, and Three Substances; for they knew no difference between Three Substances and Three Essences, and by both understood Three different Kinds and Species of Beings. And for this Reason, both to secure the Catholick Faith from such a diversity and dissimilitude of Nature, as Three Essences

and Substances may signify, and from a Sabellian Unity and Singularity, they chose such words, as signified a Real Perfect Subsisting Being, but did not immediatly and for∣mally signify Essence and Substance, tho they did necessarily suppose and connote it. Such among the Greeks are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, among the Latins, subsistentia, suppositum, res, ens: Existence, Subsistence, Subject, Suppositum, Thing, Being, which every one sees, must signify something as real, as Essence, and Substance, and must necessarily include Essence and Substance in their very notion; and that thus they were used by the Catholick Fathers, Petavius proves by numerous Quotations,* 1.237 which the Reader may consult at his leisure. And though some of these words are sometimes used singularly of all Three Divine Persons in the notion of a Common Essence and Substance, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, res, in which sense St. Austin called the Trinity unam summam rem, yet both Fathers and Schoolmen did without any scruple use them in the plural number, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, tres subsistentiae, tres res, tria supposita, tria entia realia, that the Divine Persons were Three Existen∣ces, Three Subsistencies, Three Suppositums, Three Things, Three Real Beings; and why not then Three Essences, and Three Substances, since every suppositum, every Thing, every Real Being, is Essence and Substance; the reason of which is plainly this, That Essence and Substance, unless qualified with some limiting Adjuncts, signify the formal Reasons of things, and can't be multiplied without diversi∣ty; whereas the other Terms signify nothing but Real and Actual Existence, which does not diversify, and therefore not multiply, the Essence; for Three Suppositums, Three Subjects, Three Things, Three Real Beings, may have One Essence, Nature, and Substance, formally, identically, and invariably the same.

But there is some dispute about the use of those words, Existence and Subsistence. Petavius observes a great difference between the Ancient and Modern use of them:* 1.238 That the Ancients used them in a Concrete Sense for Person and Substance, that which does really exist and subsist, as he proves by several Quotations; but that the Schoolmen use them in an abstract Sense, for the modifications of Substance, which they call Modes, which together with the Substance constitute what we call Persons (of which more hereafter) and this may be true as to some later Schoolmen; but the more Ancient, and many Modern Schoolmen, retained the Old Catholick use of the words; and Suarez could trace the Doctrine of Modes no higher than Durandus.

* 1.239 Peter Lombard is express in it, That Three Persons are tres subsistentioe, tres entes, Three Subsistencies, Three Beings, and tres subsistentioe vel entes, & subsistentioe vel subsistentes, Subsistencies or Beings, Subsistencies or those that subsist.

* 1.240 Thus Tho. Aquinas tells us, That Persons are res sub∣sistentes, subsisting things: And in answer to that Ob∣jection against a plurality of Persons in the Godhead, that a Person, according to Boetius, being rationalis na∣turoe individua substantia, the Individual Substance of a Rational Nature; if there be a plurality of Persons in the Godhead, there must consequently be a plurality of Substances; he tells us, That Substance either signifies the Essence, or the Suppositum; that in this last sense it is used in the definition of a Person, as appears by the addition of Individual, which is what the Greeks call Hypostasis, and therefore assert Three Hypostases (In∣dividual Substances) as we do Three Persons; but we don't use to say Three Substances, by reason of the equivocal use of the word, lest we should be thought to assert Three Essences in the Godhead. From whence

it is plain, that by Three Subsisten∣cies, Tho.* 1.241 Aquinas understood Three that subsist; Three Individual Substances, in the Notion of Three distinct Supp••si∣tums, though not of Three different Es∣sences; for this is the true distinction he makes between Suppositum and Essence, that they both signify Substance, but the one signifies as Matter, and the other as Form; and therefore the Plurality of Suppositums of Subsistencies does not multipl•• ••••e Essence or Form, for Three may be perfectly One in Nature and Essence; but to multiply Essences, to say there are Three N••tures, or Three Essences, is to diver∣sify them, and to make Three Gods specifically and essen∣tially different.

After this, I need not add much concerning the Notion of Person. The Ciceronian sense of this word (too much in use of late), wherein the same Man may be said to sustain several Persons, according to his different Relations, Offi∣ces, and Quality, has (as I have observed before) been rejected by all Catholick Writers, as Sabellianism.

St. Austin, generally speaking, is the Text to the Master of the Sentences, and He to the Schoolmen; and that Fa∣ther is express in it, that Person is Essence and Substance; that the Person of the Father is the Essence and Substance of the Father: From whose Authority P. Lombard concludes, That Person is used in the Notion of Substance;* 1.242 That when we say the Father is a Person, the sense is▪ the Father is the Divine Essence. He observes from the same Father, that the Latins used Person in the same sense that the Greeks used Hypostasis, which in Latin literally sig∣nifies

Substance; but yet they were very cautious of say∣ing Three Substances, as the Greeks did Three Hypostases; because though the Greeks distinguished between Essence and Substance, that Essence expressed the formal Nature of things, Substance what in Creatures we call the Matter or Suppositum, yet the Latins knew no such distinction; and therefore Three Substances to them was the same with Three Essences, which would assert a diversity in the Di∣vine Nature: And this he shews was the only Objection St. Hierom had against Three Substances, or Three Hypo∣stases, which he allowed in the Notion of Tres Personas subsistentes,* 1.243 Three subsisting Persons, but not of Three Na∣tures or Essences; and this Solution he acquiesces in, That Tres Personoe sunt Tres Substantioe,* 1.244 scilicet, Tres Entes, pro quo Groeci dicunt Tres Hypostases; That Three Persons are Three Substances, that is, Three Real Beings, which the Greeks call Three Hypostases. And though he observes that Person may sometimes signify that Personal Property whereby one Divine Person is distinguished from another,* 1.245 yet he will not allow us to call Three Persons Three Properties, but Three Subsistencies, or Three Hypostases; for the Property is not the Person, but only distinguishes Persons; of which more hereafter. And he reduces the several acceptations of Person, as used in the Doctrine of the Trinity, to these three. 1. That it sometimes signifies the Di∣vine Essence, as it does when we speak singularly of any One Person; for the Person of the Father is the Divine Es∣sence, and so of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. 2. Sub∣sistencies and Hypostases, as when we speak in the Plural Number, Three Persons are Three Subsistencies, Three

Hypostases, but unius Essentioe, of one and the same Es∣sence. 3. A Property, as when we distinguish the Persons by their Personal Properties.

Thomas Aquinas, and generally the Schools, receive and vindicate that Definition which Boetius gives of a Person, That it is the Individual Substance of a Rational Nature, as I have already observed, whereby they expresly tell us, that they understand Aristotle's Substantia Prima, or a Sub∣sisting Individual.

St. Austin thought that the Greeks might as well have used Prosopon as Hypostasis,* 1.246 for what the Latins called Per∣son; and why they rather said Hypostasis, he could not tell, unless perhaps the Propriety of their Language required it; and this was the truth of the Case; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 was a very ambiguous word, taken originally from the Stage, as Per∣sona also was, and signified that Vizor which was put over the Face, to represent the Person whom they intended to act, and so was used to signify a mere Appearance and Repre∣sentation, not a Real Subsisting Person; and therefore St. Basil tells us,* 1.247 That the Sabellians who owned but One Essence and Hypostasis in God, yet 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Scripture represented God under different Personal Appearances, sometimes as the Father, sometimes as the Son, or Holy Spirit; and adds, That therefore those who affirm that Father, Son and Holy Ghost are but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One in Subject, Hypostasis, or Suppositum, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three perfect Per∣sons, or Prosopa, or Appearances, justify the Charge of Sa∣bellianism imputed by the Arians to the Catholicks. And in another place he tells us, That those who say that Es∣sence and Hypostasis are the same,* 1.248 are forced to acknow∣ledge 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, only different Prosopa, o•• Appearances; and while they are afraid to own 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Hypostases, they relapse into the Sabellian He∣resy. And therefore Petavius truly observes, That though

the Catholick Fathers did not scruple the use of this term Prosopon, yet they used it in the sense of Hypostasis; and the Notion of Hypostasis joined with Prosopon, makes up the true Catholick Notion of a Person, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.249 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which, as he says, proves that these Persons have not one simple 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Suppositum, nor are merely different Functions and Energies of the same Individual Being, but that the Diversity and Multiplicity is in the Subject it self, and that there are Three truly and really distinct, and that subsist distinctly.

This I hope is a sufficient Proof of the first thing propo∣sed, That a Divine Person is the Divine Essence and Sub∣stance; but I added also, That it is nothing else; and I must speak something briefly to this.

The absolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature, which admits of no kind of Composition, neither of Parts, nor of Substance and Accident, nor of Nature and Suppositum, that which has, and that which is had, is the universal Do∣ctrine both of the Catholick Fathers and Schools, as I need not prove; and the necessary Consequence of this is, That a Divine Person can be nothing else but the Divine Nature, Essence, and Substance; for were a Divine Person the Di∣vine Nature and something else, there must be a Composi∣tion in the Divine Nature, something superadded to it, to make it a Person.

The Unity of the Divine Nature in a Trinity of Per∣sons, as I have shewn at large, is resolved into the perfect invariable S••meness and Identity of Nature (the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) in Three; and therefore each Divine Person must be the whole Divine Nature and Essence, and nothing else; for otherwise the Divine Essence could not be perfectly

one and the same in Three, but would be distinguished and multiplied by some new Accidents and Modifications, as Hu∣man Nature is in distinct Human Persons.

A Trinity of Persons is a known Objection against the absolute Simplicity of the Divine Nature; and the Answer to it is as well known, That those Relations which distin∣guish Persons, make no Composition in the Divine Nature; and then a Person can be nothing else but the Divine Na∣ture, if there be no Composition to make a Person: But of this more presently.

2dly. The next thing I proposed was this, That accord∣ing to the Doctrine both of Fathers and Schools, the Di∣vine Essence and Substance, as subsisting distinctly in Three, is proper and peculiar to each, and incommunicable to one another.

This is so universally acknowledged by all who own real and substantial Persons, that I need say little of it. I have produced several express Testimonies already out of the Fa∣thers to this purpose; and indeed to say, That the Substance of each Person is proper and incommunicable, is no more than to say that their Persons are incommunicable; that the Father is not, and never can be the Son, nor the Son the Fa∣ther, nor the Holy Spirit either Father or Son; which is what they meant by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, properly and appropriately Father and Son; that the Father never was nor can be a Son, nor the Son a Father. Thus their different Characters prove an incommunicable distinction between them: The Son is the Image of God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Living Substantial Image; but the Image, tho by an Identity of Nature it is the same with the Proto∣type, yet it is not and never can be the Prototype; not imaginale, but imaginalis imago, as Victorinus Afer speaks; not the Person, nor Personal Substance of the Father, but the express Image of his Person and Substance.

In Boetius's Definition of a Person by individua substantia, the Schools, as far as I have observed, universally under∣stand incommunicabilis substantia, an incommunicable Sub∣stance; and therefore, as I observed before, though they as∣sert the Divine Essence to be singularis, yet it is singularis communicabilis, a communicable Singular; but a Person is substantia individua, or singularis incommunicabilis, a singular incommunicable Substance.

Now this started a great Difficulty; How the Essence and Substance of the Father, which is but One, can be both communicable and incommunicable. The Person of the Father, which is his Divine Essence, is incommunica∣ble, and yet the Father communicates his own Divine Nature and Essence to the Son and Holy Spirit, without communicating his Person.

Of the same Nature is what the Schools teach concern∣ing the Divine Generation and Procession. They allow that the Father does truly and properly, not metaphorically, be∣get the Son, and that the Son is truly and properly begot∣ten; and that the Father by Divine Generation communi∣cates the Divine Essence to the Son; and that the Son has all that he has from the Father, and is all that the Father is, excepting that he is not the Father, but the Son: And yet they will not allow that the Divine Essence either begets, or is begotten, or proceeds.

They have a great Authority against them in this, as they all own; for the Fathers made no scruple to say, That God begat God, Essence Essence, Wisdom Wisdom, Life Life; and that the Son is begotten, and only begotten God, God of God, Light of Light, Wisdom of Wisdom, and be∣gotten Wisdom. Upon these Authorities Richardus Victori∣nus contends earnestly, that we ought in plain terms to own,* 1.250 That Substance begets Substance, and that those who deny it, reject the Doctrine of all the Catholick Fathers: But Peter Lombard, and most other Schoolmen, especially

since the Council of Lateran, justify themselves in this mat∣ter, by saying, That the Fathers intended no more in such expressions, than what they themselves own, though they reject that way of speaking. When the Fathers taught, That God begat God, Essence Essence, Substance Sub∣stance, Wisdom Wisdom, Life Life, they meant no more, than that the Father, who is God, Essence, Substance, Wis∣dom, Life, begat his Son, who is also truly and really God, Essence, Substance, Wisdom, Life; and the reason why they rather chose to say, That the Father, who is God, and Essence, and Wisdom, begets the Son, who is God, and Essence, and Wisdom, &c. than to say, That God begets God, Essence Essence, Wisdom Wisdom, is this, Because God, and Essence, and Wisdom, &c. signify absolutely, and so may multiply Gods, Essences, Wisdoms; as when we say Man begets a Man, the begotten Man is as absolute∣ly a Man, as he who begets; and he who begets, and he who is begotten, notwithstanding their relation, are two ab∣solute Men: And therefore, to prevent all such mistakes, and to secure the Catholick Faith of the Real Distinction of Persons and Suppositums in perfect Unity, without the least diversity or multiplication of Essence, they attributed Active Generation to the Person of the Father, and Passive Generation to the Person of the Son; which proves a Real Distinction of Persons and Suppositums (for he who begets cannot be he who is begotten), and yet preserves the Uni∣ty and Identity of the Divine Nature.

But how can this be, if Person and Essence, Suppositum and Nature be the same, as it is in God? For then if the Person be begotten, the Essence, which is that Person, must be begotten also; and if the Person begets, the Essence must beget. Now this is in some sense true; and therefore the Catholick Fathers promiscuously used these terms; That the Father begets a Son, or God begets God, or Es∣sence begets Essence; and the Schools themselves own,

That the Father, who is God, begets the Son deitatem ha∣bentem, who has the Divinity, the Divine Nature and Es∣sence, and has it by his Generation and Birth; which in reality is the same, though they thought the expression less liable to mistake. For the truth of the Case is this; The Schools, that asserted the perfect Singularity of the Divine Essence, fenced against all Expressions of an abso∣lute signification, which multiplied Natures; for Two abso∣lute Natures cannot be singularly One; and therefore would not say, that Nature and Essence begets, or is begotten; for in these Propositions, the terms Nature and Essence, un∣less qualified and restrained, signify absolutely, and so infer Two absolute Natures and Essences, that which begets, and that which is begotten; and therefore they rather call this a Communication than a Generation of Nature, because this last signifies relatively: That which is commu∣nicated, may be a Singular Nature, which subsists di∣stinctly in more than one, but with a necessary relation to its Original, and such a Communication does not multiply Natures, but only Essential Relations. And this is the difference they made between Deus & Deitatem habens, God, and one who has the Divinity; that God signifies absolutely, an Absolute Independent Divinity, which has no relation or communication with any other; but One who has the Divinity, may signify One, who has it, not originally and absolutely, but by communication from ano∣ther, and in an Essential Relation to him, as the Son and the Holy Spirit have, which is the same Divinity in Three, and but One in Three. And therefore I think the Schools were very much in the right, for rejecting Tres Dii, Three Gods, when at the same time they owned Tres Deitatem habentes, Three who have the Divinity, for these do not signify the same thing: The first, unless qualified, is Poly∣theism; the second, the Christian Trinity in Unity; though I confess, I should not chuse to call the Father, One who

has the Divinity, but simply God, because he is absolutely and originally so, and not by communication; and for that reason is both in Scripture, and in the Fathers, eminently call••d God, and the One God,* 1.251 whereas the other Divine Per••••••s are the Son of God, and the Spirit of God; and as Te••••••••••ian observes, never called God, when joined with the Father, though they are, when spoken of distinctly by themselves.

For the same Reason the Schools forbid the use of Ab∣stract or Sub••tantive Terms in the Plural Number, when we speak of the D••vine Persons, but allow of Plural Adje∣ctives, because Substantives signify absolutely, and multi∣ply Natures, as well as Persons or Suppositums, but Adje∣ctives may signify relatively, and multiply Persons with∣out multiplying Natures; as Three Eternals, Three Omni∣potents, Three Infinites, in a Substantive sense, signify Three Eternal, Omnipotent, Infinite, Natures, as well as Persons; but Three, who are Eternal, Omnipotent, Infi∣nite, signify a Trinity of Eternal, Omnipotent, Infinite, Per∣sons, but do not necessarily signify a Trinity of Natures, since these Three may subsist in the same Eternal, Omni∣potent, Infinite Nature, and each of them have this Eter∣nal Infinite Nature, and all the same. But still the diffi∣culty remains, if Person or Suppositum and Nature be per∣fectly the same, How the Father can communicate his Na∣ture, and not his Person? How there can be Three In∣communicable Persons, and Suppositums, and but One Na∣ture, and that communicable to more than One?

That thus it is, and how it may be, is better explained by an Example, than by any words without it:* 1.252 And I shall in∣stance in a living substantial Image: This is the true Character of the Second Person of the Trinity, that he is so the Son, as to be the Living Perfect Image of God, as has been ex∣plained at large elsewhere, as you may find in the Margin. Now every man must confess, that the Prototype and the

Image are two distinct Incommunicable Suppositums, the Prototype is not the Image, nor the Image the Prototype; and yet we must confess, that there is, and must be, but one and the same Nature in both, not Specifically, but Iden∣tically the same, for a perfect Image is, and can be nothing but the same that the Prototype is, the same Eternity, the same Life, the same Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, but all this not Personally the same, for their Persons are not, and cannot be the same; but identically and invaria∣bly the same, or else it can't be a true and perfect Image. And this makes it evident, that though Person and Nature be perfectly the same in God, yet when he begets a Son, he neither begets his own Person, nor Nature, which would be to beget himself, which St. Austin, and the Schools after him, reject as absurd; for an Image of God is neither the Person, nor the Personal Nature of God, but of the same Nature with him, and perfectly the same, there being no other difference between them, but that one is the Proto∣type, the other the Image; one the Father, the other the Son. So that when God of his own whole perfect Substance begets a whole, perfect, living, substantial Image, he does not beget himself, but another; he does not beget his own Nature, nor another Nature like his own, but his own Image, of the same Nature with himself: He begets ano∣ther Person, who is as truly and perfectly God, as the true, perfect, living, Image of God must be perfect God, but he does not in an absolute sense beget God, neither se Deum, nor alium Deum, as the Schools rightly determine, neither himself God, nor another God; for he neither begets his own Essence and Divinity, nor another Divinity, but ano∣ther, who is the perfect Image of his own Divine Essence: And what is here said of the Generation of the Son, as the living subsisting Image of God, must be applied to the Pro∣cession of the Holy Spirit, who is the Eternal Spirit of God, as the Son is his Image.

This is what the Catholick Fathers call the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that One Divinity, in which they place the Unity of God: That there is but One Absolute Divini∣ty, or Divine Nature, which is the Person of the Father, who is therefore eminently acknowledged to be the One God, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Fountain of the Divinity, that is, of the Divinity of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, which are not two other Absolute Divinities, for then they would be two more Gods, besides the Father; but the Divi∣nity of the Son and Holy Spirit is the same One Divinity of the Father, as an Eternal, Perfect, Begotten, Living Image, and an Eternal Proceeding Spirit, each of which is in himself true and perfect God, and all Three but One God, or One Divinity, not merely because they receive their Divinity from God by an Eternal Generation and Procession, nor as they have a Divinity, or Divine Nature specifically the same with the Father, which alone can no more render them One God, than Father and Son are One Man; but as the singular individual Divinity of the Father is in the Son and Holy Spirit; as it is manifest the singular individual Nature of the Prototype is, and must be in its living sub∣stantial Image, without which it is not a Natural Image, though it may have a perfect likeness of Nature, if it have an absolute Nature of its own: This is what Tertullian tells us, That there is unus Deus cum oeconomia, One God with his Economy; and what St. Hilary and others so often tell us, That the Father does not cease to be the One God by having a Son, since the Son is God by Nativity and Birth, and Authoritate Paternoe Naturoe, by having his Father's Nature, who is the One God.

And this is all that the Schools mean by the Singularity of the Divine Nature and Essence; and it is impossible they should mean any thing else, when they teach, that this singular Nature is communicable.

They allow, as I have already shewn, that Nature and Person is the same, that each Person is Suppositum and Sub∣stance, a singular incommunicable Substance, and there∣fore that there were Three Suppositums, and in that sense Three Substances in the Trinity; but not Three Natures and Essences, though each Person be distinctly by himself, the Divine Nature and Essence. Now since what is strictly singular, is Numerically One; and what is Numerically One, and never can be more, can't be multiplied, as that seems to be, which is communicated, what sense can there possibly be in a singular communicable, which seem to be contradictory Terms?

But this is very good sense, and very Catholick Doctrine, if we understand this Singular Communicable, as the Schools did, of One absolute Divinity, or Divine Nature, which is so singular, that it can be but One, as is demonstrable by Reason: But yet may beget its own essential Image, which is not another Divinity, or another Nature, but its own singular Nature in its Image, which is another Suppositum and Person, but not another Nature.

That this is the Sense of the Schools, and all that they meant by the Singularity of the Divine Essence, is evident from the whole Doctrine of Relations. A Trinity of Pro∣per, Real Persons, each of which is Nature, Essence, and Substance, was made an Argument against the perfect Uni∣ty, as well as against the perfect Simplicity of the Divine Nature, for Plurality and Unity are opposed to each other. To this the Schools answer, That a Plurality and Unity of the same kind, are indeed opposite to each other, and can∣not be reconciled; as a Plurality of Natures cannot be re∣conciled with the Unity of Nature, nor a Plurality of Per∣sons with the Unity of a Person; but a Plurality of Persons and Unity of Nature may be reconciled, and thus it is with the Trinity in Unity; for though each Divine Person be the Divine Nature and Essence, yet Three Divine Per∣sons

are not Three Absolute Natures and Essences,* 1.253 but Three Relations in One Singular Absolute Nature.

SECT. VIII. Concerning the Divine Relations.

BUT it will be of great use more particularly to consider this Doctrine of Relations, without which it is im∣possible rightly to understand what the Schools teach, about a Trinity in Unity: And to reduce it into as narrow a com∣pass as I can, I shall 1. shew, What the Schools mean by Relations in the Divine Nature. 2. Why they insist so much upon Relations.

1. What they mean by Divine Relations. Now they tells us, That they are real Relations, not made by the Mind from some external Respects and Habitudes which it observes between things, but antecedent to all the Acts of Reason in the things themselves: That they are not inhe∣rent Accidents, but Substance, and subsisting Relations; not relative Names and Appellations, but the Relatives themselves; the Persons related being the Relations, and the Relation the Person; which are therefore by some cal∣led Substantiae Relativae, and Entia Realia Relativa, Rela∣tive Substances, and Real Beings, but Relative; that is, not Absolute Substances, and Absolute Beings, with a Relation, as it is in Creatures, where the Son is as Absolute a Man, and as Absolute a Person as the Father is, though they are related to each other as Father and Son; but the very Sub∣stance and Person is the Relation.

Before I shew, That this is the Doctrine of the Schools, the better to understand what they say, and the Reasons of it, it will be necessary to give as plain and intelligible an Idea of this as I can; especially since I find some Learn∣ed Men boggle very much at the Notion of Relative Sub∣stances, which are not merely the Subjects of Relations, but the Relations themselves.

What their Objection is against this, I can't tell, unless they think that a Relative Substance is not True and Perfect Substance; which is very far from the Notion of the Schools, who attribute compleat and perfect Subsistence to these Divine Relations or Persons, not as Accidents in their Subjects, nor as Parts in a Whole, which is their Notion of Substance and compleat Subsistence; but a Relative Sub∣stance only signifies such a Substance as is not the Original, but is all that it is from another, which they call the Rela∣tio Originis, not merely such a Relation as is between the Cause and the Effect, which is seldom a substantial subsist∣ing Relation, but the Relation between Substance and Sub∣stance, when one Substance, in the notion of Suppositum, is wholly and perfectly derived and expressed from the other.

The easiest Representation of this, is the relation between the Prototype or Original, and its Image; which is not a mere Relation of Likeness and Simili∣tude,* 1.254 but of Origination, that the Image is taken from the Original, which is the foundation of the Relation. Though Two Eggs were never so perfectly alike, yet One is not the Image of the Other, because it is not of the Other, nor its na∣tural Representation, though perfectly like it; but the Image is that which re∣sults from the Object, like a Face in the Glass, or the Impression of a Seal; and the whole Essence of such an Image, as

an Image is relative. And it is the same case as to a living substantial Image of that Life and Substance from whence it proceeds; it is as perfect Life and Substance it self, as its Original, or else it could not be a natural Image of Life and Substance; but yet it is Relative Life and Substance, Life of Life, the Prototype begetting its own Image in a per∣fect Identity and Sameness of Nature, Whole of Whole. And this is the Notion of the Schools concerning Relative Substances, which is intelligible enough.

And that this is what they mean by Relations in the God∣head or Divine Nature, is as plain.

The Master of the Sentences tells us, That these Names, Father, Son,* 1.255 and Holy Ghost, signify the Properties of Paternity, Filiation, and Procession; for they are Relatives, which speak a mu∣tual respect, and denote Relations, which are not Accidents in God, but immuta∣bly in the Persons themselves; so that they are not mere relative Appellations, but are Relations or Notions in the things themselves, that is, in the Persons.

And by this Argument Tho. Aquinas proves, That these are real Relations,* 1.256 and are really in God, because the Father is so called from the Relation of Pater∣nity, and the Son from Filiation; that were not Paternity and Filiation realiter in Deo, real subsisting Relations in the Divinity, it would follow, That God is not really Father or Son, but only ac∣cording to different Conceptions,* 1.257 which is the Sabellian Heresy. And proves, That these Relations in God are real, be∣cause they are Divine Processions in the

Identity of Nature; that is the Son, who proceeds from the Father in the Identity of the same Nature; and the Ho∣ly Spirit, who proceeds from Father and Son in the Identity of the same Nature: For they called both the Generation of the Son, and the Spiration of the Holy Ghost, Processions, as the Greeks did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the one processio intellectus, the other amoris. Now these real Processions are Respects in the nature of things, and such Respects are real Relations;* 1.258 for when any thing proceeds from a Principle of the same Nature, both that which proceeds, and that from which it proceeds, must ne∣cessarily be of the same Order, and there∣fore have a real respect to each other. Divine Processions in the Identity of Nature must be related to each other in the Unity of the same Nature, and must be substantial subsisting Relations; for they are no other than the Persons themselves, who thus proceed.

It is a received Conclusion in the Schools,* 1.259 That a Relation in God is the same with the Divine Essence: That Per∣sonal Relations are not reipsa distinguish∣ed either from the Persons or the Essence. And Gilbertus Porretanus, who taught the contrary, was forced to recant in the Council of Rhemes. The real Distinction of these Relations in the Unity of the Divine Nature, is another avowed Doctrine of the Schools; and by a real Distinction they mean a Distinction in re, in the Subject and Suppositum: And this they prove from the real Distinction of Persons, which are distinguished only by Relations: From a real Trinity, which is One in Substance, but multiplied by Relations, (relatio multiplicat Trinita∣tem;) and therefore unless these Relations be really distin∣guished from each other, there can't be a Real, but only a Notional Trinity, which is Sabellianism. That these Rela∣tions

which constitute the Trinity, are opposite Relations,* 1.260 which require distinct Subjects, as Paternity and Filiation, for no man can be Father and Son to himself: That these Divine Relations are real Relations, and therefore must be really distinct or else they are not all real, unless they be really opposed to each other, which makes a real distincti∣on; and therefore there must be a real distinction in God, not as to any thing absolute (secundum rem absolutam), which is the Divine Essence, which has the most perfect and simple Unity, but secundum rem relativam, with respect to a Relative Being and Subsistence: So that these Relations are Relative Beings▪ Relative Subsistences, and, as they are sometimes called. Relative Substances, which are really di∣stinct, though not in Nature, yet in their Suppositums; not as T••ree Absolute Beings, which makes a distinction in Nature, but as Three Real Subsisting Relations, in the Unity of the same Nature.

But not ••o multiply words in so plain a Case, I shall ob∣serve bu•• one thing more to this purpose, and that concerns the Dispute conc••••ning the Number of the Divine Persons. The Catholick Faith owns a Trinity, or only Three Divine Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, Father, Son, and Holy 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and it is the known Doctrine of the Schools, That the Relation is the Person; How comes it to pass then, that when there are Four Relations in the Godhead, Pater∣nity, Filiation, Active Spiration, and Procession, there should be but Three Persons?

Now the Answer, which Aquinas and others give to this Difficulty, is this. That it is not every Relation,* 1.261 but only opposite Relations, which constitute and distinguish Per∣sons; for more Pers••ns are more subsisting Relations really distinct from each other; but there can be no real distin∣ction between the Divine Relations, but upon account of their relative opposition: And therefore two opposite Rela∣tions must belong to two Persons, but such Relations as are

not opposite to each other, must belong to the same Per∣son; and therefore Paternity and Filiation must belong to two Persons, as being relatively opposed; and therefore a subsisting Paternity is the Person of the Father, and a sub∣sisting Filiation the Person of the Son: Which can never be one Person, as requiring distinct Suppositums for such oppo∣site Relations: But now the other two Relations, Spiration and Procession are not opposed to either of these, but only to each other: And therefore Spiration does not constitute another Person, as not being opposed either to Paternity or Filiation, and therefore may and does belong both to Father and Son; but Procession must constitute a Third Person, as opposed to Spiration, and so necessarily distinguished from Father and Son.

And therefore, though there are Four Relations, yet one of them, Spiration, is not separated from the Person of the Father, and the Son, but belongs to them both; nor is it a Property, as not being proper and peculiar to any one Person; nor is it a Personal Relation, or that which consti∣tutes a Person, and therefore there are but Three Relations, Paternity, Filiation, and Procession, which are Personal Properties, which constitute Persons, and therefore but Three Persons.

Now this Answer evidently proves, That by Relations they did not mean meer Habitudes, Respects, and Exter∣nal Denominations; for then every Relation must of neces∣sity be a Person, and there must be as many Persons, as there are Relations; but they mean relative Beings, and Subsisten∣cies, and therefore allow no Relations to constitute distinct Persons, but such as necessarily require distinct Subjects; that is, such opposite Relations, as can never meet in the same Subject; and therefore their Suppositums must be re∣ally distinct, as Paternity and Filiation, for no one can be Father and Son to himself. There is no imaginable Ac∣count, why only opposite Relations constitute Persons, but

because they distinguish their Subjects; for when opposite Relations meet in the same Subject, but not in opposition, they do not distinguish and multiply Persons, as the same man may be Father and Son, and but One Person; but when opposite Relations distinguish their Subjects, as the Divine Relations necessarily do, they multiply Persons too: And no Relations, Properties, Notions, according to the Doctrine of the Schools, constitute a Person, but such as distinguish their Subjects, that Three Persons, and Three Relations, are not Three Respects and Denominations of the same Singular Subject, but Three real distinct Relative Beings, and Subsistencies.

2. Let us now consider, why they insist so much upon the notion of Relations, that when they allow every Divine Relation to be the Divine Essence, Substance, an incommu∣nicable Subsistence and Substance, yet they will not allow us absolutely to say Three Substances, but Three Relations, or Three Relative Beings, Subsistencies, or Substances. And the plain and short account of it is this; That this is essential to the Unity of God, and gives us the truest and most perfect conception of a Trinity in Unity. As to shew this particularly;

1. These Divine Relations (though each of them be in∣communicably in his own Person, Essence, and Substance) secure the perfect Unity of the Divine Essence. For Three Relative Substances are essentially but One Substance, which Three Absolute Substances can never be, though they never so perfectly agree in the same Specifick Notion and Idea.

By an absolute Substance, I mean one intire, perfect, indi∣vidual, whole, which is compleat in it self, and subsists compleatly by it self, without any Internal, Essential Uni∣on to, or necessary dependence on, any Being of the same kind: By Relative Substances, I mean, such Substances as are internal subsisting Relations in the same One whole indi∣vidual

Nature: Of Absolute Substances we have as many Instances, as there are particular Creatures in the World; of Relative Substances we have no instance in Created Na∣ture, but some such Images and Resemblances, as may help us to form an intelligible notion of them. Now it is evident, without any need to prove it, that every compleat absolute Substance, how many soever they are, multiplies the Indivi∣duals of the same kind; Three absolute Human Substances are Three Men, and Three Absolute D••vine Substances would for the same reason be Three Gods; but it is ••therwise as to Relative Substances, which are ••ubsisting Personal Relations in the same One individu••l Nature; and it is demonstrable, that the Relations of the same One individual Nature and Substance, can't multiply Natures and Substances, for then they would not be Relations in the same individual Sub∣stance, but would be Ab••olute, not Relative Substances.

As to explain this by a familiar Example. The Fathers, and after them the Schoolmen, find some Images of the Trinity in Human Souls, as Memory, Vnderstanding. Will; or which they think a nearer resemblance, Mind, Know∣ledge, Love: And a late S••cinian is very fond of such a Tri∣nity, as Original Mind, Reflex Wisdom, and Love.

* 1.262Peter Lombard explains this particularly from the Do∣ctrine of St. Austin, and it is evident that all these are very distinct, and never can be each other; but all have a mu∣tual and necessary relation to each other; are in each other, and equal to each other, but are but One, One Mind, One Life, One Essence, and One Substance; because they sub∣stantially exist in the same Soul and Mind, not as Accidents in their Subjects, which may be parted, but as Essential Properties and Powers.

This our Socinian Adversaries like well enough; for these distinct Properties and Powers do not multiply Persons, and therefore though they grant something like such di∣stinct Powers in the Divine Nature, yet still there is but

One Divine Person, and therefore according to their own Notion, but One God.

But this is not the Question, Whether such distinct Fa∣culties, Properties, and Powers, multiply Persons, which we grant they do not, because they do not multiply Na∣tures, and One Individual Human Natu••e is but One Man, or One Human Person; but the Q••estion is, Whether, if instead of these distinct Powers and Faculties, there were real subsisting Persons, as essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, they would any more divide or multiply Nature, than such distinct Powers and Facul∣ties do? And I am pretty confident, no man can give me any good reason, why Relative Subsistencies, or Personal Relations should any more divide or multiply the Divine Nature, than Relative Powers and Properties divide or multiply Human Nature: For if these Divine Persons are as essentially related to each other in the Divine Nature, as such distinct Powers and Faculties are in Human Nature, a Trinity of Persons must be as essentially One in the same One Individual Divinity, as a Trinity of Powers and Facul∣ties are in the same single Human Nature. It is certain, Three such Divine Persons, though each of them be by him∣self true and perfect God, are not Three Absolute Divini∣ties, and therefore not Three Gods, but Three Divine Re∣lative Subsistencies in the same One Individual Godhead, and therefore but One God; as Memory, Understanding and Will, are all that a Mind is, and each of them all that the other is, and yet not Three Minds, but One Mind.

This shews the diff••rence between Absolute and Relative Substances; Three Absolute Substances are always distinct∣ly and separately Three, and can never be any otherwise than specifically One; but Relative Substances may be es∣sentially One in the same One Individual Nature; and this is the Account both the Fathers and Schools give of a Tri∣nity in Unity, Three Relations, or Three Relative Sub∣stances,

or Subsistencies, essentially related to each other in the Unity of the same One Individual Essence.

St. Gregory Nyssen has given the most particular Account of this matter in his Catechetical Oration.* 1.263 To convince the Heathens of the Eternal Subsistence of the Divine Word in the Unity of the same Godhead, he lays the foundation of all in that universally received Prin∣ciple, That the Divinity is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I translate (not, irrational, without Reason, or Understanding, but) not without its Word; which is not the Personal Wisdom of the Father,* 1.264 whereby the Father is wise, as I have already shewn (Chap. 3.) but a Perso∣nal, Living, Subsisting, Word: Which answers to that Word which we feel in our own Minds, and which is essential to all Minds, that no Mind can be with∣out its Word; but is not a vanishing No∣tion and Idea, or a transient sound, as Human words, but answers to the per∣fection of the Divine Nature. And therefore as our Mortal Nature has a Vanishing, Perishing Word, so the In∣corruptible, and Eternally Permanent, Im∣mutable Nature, has an Eternal Subsist∣ing Word. And (as he proceeds) if this Divine Word subsists, it lives; for it does not subsist like stupid inanimate Stones, but as Mind, and Spirit, which must live, if it subsists; and if it lives, the absolute simplicity of the Divine Na∣ture, which admits of no composition, proves that he lives, not by a participa∣tion

of Life, but as Life it self. And if the Word lives, as being Life it self,* 1.265 it must have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a power to do, what it freely wills and chuses. For that which cannot will and chuse (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) does not live; and an Impotent Will is a contradiction to the Nature of God; and therefore its Power must be equal to its Will: But this Di∣vine Word can will nothing but what is good, and wills whatever is good; and being able to effect whatever it wills, is not unactive (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) without doing any thing, but does the good it wills: And since we must acknowledge the World, and all things in it, which are wisely and artifici∣ally made, to be good; all things are the Works of this Living Subsisting Word. This is his Proof,* 1.266 That God has a Subsisting, Living, Almighty, Creating Word, which is another di∣stinct Person from him, whose Word he is. For the Word is a Relative Term, and signifies a Relative Subsistence, and necessarily supposes the Father; for he is not the Word, but with relation to him, whose Word he is. And by this means he tells us, we may escape both the Polytheism of the Gentiles, and the Singularity of the Iews, by acknow∣ledging the Living, Energetical, Ope∣rative Word, which the Iews deny, and the Unity and Identity of Nature, between the Word, and Him, whose Word he is. For as our Word proceeds out of our Mind, and is neither every way the same with the Mind, nor yet upon all accounts another. For that it

is of the Mind, proves that is is another, and not the Mind it self; but as it per∣fectly expresses and represents the Mind, it cannot be another Nature, but one and the same Nature, though a kind of different subsistence. So the Word of God, by a distinct subsistence of its own, is distinguished from him, from whom he receives his Subsistence and Hypostasis; but inasmuch as he is all, and the same that God is, he is perfectly one and the same in Na∣ture.

This is the Doctrine of all the other Catholick Fathers, as well as of Gregory Nyssen, who resolve the Unity of the Godhead in a Trinity of Persons, into Relative Subsistencies in the same Individual Nature, which no more multiplies Natures and Divinities, to make Two or Three Gods, than the Mind, its Word, and Love, make Three Minds.

This is the true and compleat notion of the Homoousion, which (as I have already shewn) does not signify a meer Specifick Unity, but the Unity of One Individual, not Sin∣gular, Nature in Three; that Three Real, Distinct, Sub∣sisting Persons are as intimately and essentially related to each other in the same Individual Nature, as a Human Mind and its Word are; which are not, and never can be two Minds, but one Mind. Two compleat and perfect Minds can never in a proper notion be Consubstantial, or one Sub∣stance, though they have the same specifick Nature; for their Substance is not one and the same, but naturally two, and naturally separable, how closely soever they may be united; but Three Divine Persons, who are essentially rela∣ted to each other in the same Divinity, as the Mind and its Word are, are in the strictest notion Consubstantial, or One

Substance, being essentially related to each other in the same One Individual Nature and Essence.

And here I must take notice of a great mistake, which some Learned Men run into, concerning the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, singular and particular Natures, Substances, and Essences, by which they understand, what some others call Personal Substances; and conclude, That since Philoponus, and others, who asserted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three particular Natures and Essences, or Substances in the Godhead, were charged with Tritheism (as they deserved, if their Opi∣nions be truly represented) those who assert Three Sub∣stantial Persons, or Three distinct Personal Subsistencies or Substances, are liable also to the same Charge. This is a material Objection, and a fair Answer to it will set this whole matter in a clear light.

Now the Answer in short is this, That those who rejected the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and charged it with Tritheism, did not thereby understand particular, personal, relative, Subsisten∣cies or Substances, but compleat, absolute, particular Na∣tures and Substances; not Three Real, Substantial, Sub∣sisting Relations in One Individual Nature, as a Mind, its Internal, Essential, Word, and Spirit, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three; but Three absolute particular Na∣tures, as Three Men, each of whom has a compleat, abso∣lute, personal Nature of his own, are Three. Now if this be the true Account, every one sees the difference between Three personal, relative, Substances or Subsistencies of the same Nature, and Three absolute particular Natures; the first is a real Substantial Trinity, Three Subsisting Infinite Persons in the Unity of the same Godhead. Three Persons, and One God; the other is down-right Tritheism.

And that this is all they meant by particular Individual Natures, I have many Arguments to prove.

For 1st. Had they herein condemned distinct, personal, relative Substances, they had condemned the Faith of the Catholick Church, and relapsed into Sabellianism, as abun∣dantly appears from what I have already proved at large.

2 Those very Persons, who charge Philoponus with Tri∣theism for asserting Three Individual Natures and Essences, do themselves own a Personal Substance.* 1.267 Leontius, as Ni∣c••ph rus tells us, wrote a large Book against Philoponus, and yet he tells us, That the Fathers by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Es∣sence or Substance, and Nature, understood the same thing, and so they did by Hypostasis and Person. That by Essence and Substance, they meant what the Philosophers call a Species; by Hypostasis and Person, what they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Individual Substance: And in this sense he tells us, They acknowledged One Divinity in Three Hypostases, or Three Personal Subsistencies. That there is One Hyposta∣sis (that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) of the Father, One Hyposta∣sis of the Son, and One Hypostasis of the Holy Ghost; that these Three (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) in nothing differ from each other, but only in their Personal Properties, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) that one is the Father, the other the Son, the other the Holy Ghost: So that Leontius owns Three true proper Persons, each of which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Indivi∣dual Substance, which he asserts to be the true Catholick Ecclesiastical Notion of a Person, and each Person as di∣stinct from each other, as he that begets is from him who is begotten; and therefore when he condemned Philoponus for his Individual Natures and Essences, he could not by that mean relative, Personal Subsistencies or Substances.

Theodorus Abucara (if he be the Au∣thor of that Tract against the Severians, Explanatio vocum,* 1.268 quibus Philosophi utun∣tur, which I have sometimes suspected to belong to Theodorus Presbyter Raithen∣sis, who promises such an Explication of

Philosophical Terms at the end of his Treatise de Incarnatione, I say, this Theo∣dorus, whoever he is) expresly charges these 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Individual Natures and Essences with Tritheism; and yet throughout that Treatise teaches, That Hypostasis is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a singular Indivi∣dual Nature; and so does Anastasius Sinaita in his Hodegos; and indeed all the Writers of that Age, who asserted against the Severians the Union of Two Natures in One Person in Christ.

3dly, But we shall soon be satisfied in this matter, if we consider the occasion of this Dispute. The Severians, as they had learnt from their Master Severus, and he from Eutyches, taught, that there was but One Nature, as well as One Person in Christ, and that for this reason, That to assert Two Natures, is consequently to assert Two Persons in Christ, which is Nestorianism; for every Nature is a Person, that it is impossible there should be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Nature without a Personality of its own, for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nature and Person, or Hypostasis, are the same. In opposition to this the Catholicks urged, That if Nature and Hypostasis were so the same, that One Hypostasis is One Nature, and One Nature but One Hypostasi••; then as we assert Three Hypostasis in the Trinity, we must also allow 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Individual Natures and Essences in the Trinity. Philoponus saw that this was an unavoidable Consequence, and therefore rather than own Two Natures in One Person in Christ, he chose to assert Three Individual Natures in the Trinity: And for this, he and his Followers were very justly charged with Tritheism.

And this shews us, what these Individual Natures were, not Three Relative Personal Subsistencies and Substances in the same One Individual Nature, which is but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Divinity; but Three Compleat Absolute Divinities,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three such Divine Natures, as there are Three Individual Human Natures in Three Men: Each of which is by himself, and alone, without communication with any other in the same Individual Nature, One com∣pleat intire Humane Nature, and One Human Person: For this was the rise of the Dispute, concerning the Humanity of Christ. The Catholicks owned the Personality of the Word, but taught that Christ's Humane Nature was so uni∣ted to his Divinity, as not to be a distinct Human Person, but to subsist in the Person of the Word, which is the true Faith of the Word's being Incarnate, or made Flesh, which could not be true, if the Person of the Word were not Incar∣nate, and that could not be true, if the Human Nature in Christ, were a distinct Human Person, as other Men are. On the other hand, the Severians denied the Union of Two Natures in the One Person of Christ, because an Indi∣vidual Human Nature must be a Person, and then Christ must be two Persons, as well as two Natures: So that this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a compleat absolute Individual Nature, such as an Individual Human Nature is, and three such Indivi∣dual Natures make three Men, or Three Gods, and to as∣sert Three such Absolute Divinities, is Tritheism; but this concerns not Personal, Relative, Subsistencies or Substances in the same Individual Nature and Essence; and therefore the Condemnation of Philoponus, or Valentinus Gentilis, and such kind of Hereticks (if they did really teach what they are charged with) cannot aff••ct those, who assert Three real, distinct, substantial, Persons, each of whom is by himself, in his own Person, the whole Divine Nature, Essence, Substance, but are essentially and inseparably rela∣ted to each other in the Unity of the same Individual Es∣sence. The very asserting three relative, personal Sub∣sistencies, or Substances, in One Individual Nature, is a direct opposition to the Doctrine of Philoponus, and the Se∣verians, that Nature and Person is the same, so the same,

that One Nature can be but One Person, and One Person but One Nature, which necessarily overthrows a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Essence, and the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature in the One Per∣son of Christ; but Three Relative Persons and Subsistencies in One Nature, and One Nature and One Person are direct Contradictions, as One Individual Substance, and Three Individual Substances are.

Indeed those who deny Three Relative Personal Sub∣sistencies, that is, Three Real, Proper, Substantial Persons, in the Unity of the Divine Nature, go upon the same Principle with Philoponus and the Severians, that One Na∣ture is but One True and Proper Person, or Hypostasis, and therefore there cannot be Three Proper Subsisting Persons in the Unity of One Individual Substance; which, as Anastatius Sinaita, and the other Catholick Writers of that Age frequently observe, is that fundamental Error, which gave birth to Sabellianism, Arianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychanism; for as different as these Heresies are, the fundamental Principle is the same, that One Individual Na∣ture is, and can be but One Person, and One Person but One Nature: For this reason Sabellius, who acknowledged the Unity of the Divine Nature, rejected a Trinity of pro∣per Subsisting Persons; Arius, who owned a Trinity of Persons, denied their Consubstantiality, or Sameness and Identity of Nature; Nestorius, who owned Two Natures in Christ, asserted also Two Persons; and Eutyches made Christ but One Nature, as well as One Person; and in consequence of this Philoponus (if he was not mistaken) taught Three Individual Natures, as well as Three Persons in the God∣head. So that to make Nature and Person in the true and proper notion of Person commensurate and converti∣ble Terms; that a Nature is a Person, and a Person an In∣dividual Nature; that One Nature is but One Person, and One Person but One Nature; and that Individual Natures

and Persons must always be multiplied with each other, is the fundamental Principle of all the Heresies relating to the Trinity and Incarnation, and then one would think, that those Doctrines which expresly contradict this Principle, and all these Heresies which result from it, should be the true Catholick Faith: And then Three Real, Substantial, Subsisting Persons, or Three Relative Personal Subsistencies, or Substances, in the Unity of the same Individual Essence, or one Godhead, is the True Catholick Faith; and to reject it upon pretence, that this must multiply Natures with Persons, and so make Three Divinities, and Three Gods, is to return to that condemned Heretical Principle, That One Nature can be but One True and Proper Person; which, if Men understand the true Consequences of what they say, must inevitably betray them to Sabellianism, Arianism, or Tritheism. And thus much for the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which, I hope, we shall hear no more of. The Doctrine of Relations demonstrates the Individual Unity of the Divine Essence; for if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though each of them in his own Person be True and Perfect God, yet are not Three Absolute Divinities, but Three Eternal Subsisting Relations, in the same One Divinity, they must be One Individual Essence and Substance, for else they cannot be the Relations of the same One Essence and Substance.

2. As these Divine Relations prove the Individual Unity of Nature and Essence, so they prove the Sameness and Iden∣tity of Nature, wherein, as I have shewn at large, the Ca∣tholick Fathers place the Unity of the Godhead. That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. One Divinity is One God. A few words will serve to explain this, after what I have already discoursed on this Argument.

The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as I have already shewn, does not sig∣nify the Singularity, but the perfect invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; not such a Sameness, as every single Person is the same with himself, but such a Same∣ness

as is between distinct Persons of the same Nature. Now the Doctrine of Relations necessarily infers this per∣fect Sameness and Identity, and this Relative Sameness and Identy proves a perfect Unity.

As for the first, there needs no other proof, but barely to represent it, for it is self-evident: For is it possible, that a Perfect, Living, Subsisting Word should not be perfectly the same with that Infinite Mind, whose Word it is, and from whom it proceeds? That a Perfect, Living, Subsist∣ing Image, should not be perfectly the same with its Pro∣totype, from whom it receives its Being and Nature? For if the Word be not perfectly the same with the Mind, nor the Image with its Prototype, it is not a true and perfect Word, not a perfect Image: By these Relations of Father and Son, of a Mind and its Word, a Prototype and its Image, the Catholick Fathers, as I have already shewn, prove the perfect, invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; for the thing proves it self. The Relation indeed of Father and Son, considered in general, proves no more than a spe∣cifick Sameness of Nature, which may admit of great changes and variety within the same Species; but when God is the Father, and begets a Son of his own Substance, his Nature being absolutely and immutably perfect, he must communicate the same perfect invariable Nature to his Son; especially when this Son is his own perfect living Word, and his perfect Image. But this is not all: A perfect Sameness between Two Absolute Natures, without the least conceivable difference or variation, would not be a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Sameness of Identity; for though they could subsist as perfectly the same, as their Idea is, yet they would be Two Absolute Natures, not One Nature: But a perfect Sameness in Essential Relations, or Relative Subsisten∣cies, proves a perfect Identity of Nature, that they are per∣fectly the same in the same One Individual Nature: As a living substantial Word must receive its substance and being,

whole of whole, from that Mind, whose Word it is; for if it be not the same Substance, it can't be the substantial Word of that Mind, whose Substance it is not; nor can a living substantial Image be any other Substance, than that of the Prototype; for if it were, it might be its likeness, but not its natural Image. And thus this Sameness and Identity of Nature proves each Person by himself to be true and perfect God, and all Three but One God; for each Person, according to this Doctrine, has, and must have, the whole perfect Divinity in himself, and all Three but one and the same Divinity.

3. These Subsisting Relations in the Unity of Nature, give us an intelligible Notion of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, and their mutual 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Inexistence, Inbeing, in each other. That all the Catholick Fathers asserted the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or insepara∣ble Union of the Divine Persons, as essential to the Unity of the Godhead, is so well known, that I need not multi∣ply Quotations to prove it, after what I have already ob∣served to that purpose. But the Question is, What they mean by this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, wherein the Essential Unity of the Godhead consists.

Now it is certain this relates to the inseparable Union of the Persons; for it is opposed to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, divided and separate Hypostases and Persons, which the Fathers charge with Tritheism. The Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.269 inseparable from the Essence and Substance of the Father, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is inseparably in the Father; that he is begotten of the Father without any division of Substance, within the Father, and inseparable from him; so that this does not relate immediately to the Unity of Nature, but the Union of Persons, and therefore can∣not signify the Singularity of the Divine Nature, but the Inseparable Union of real distinct Persons in the Unity of Nature. That the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this Inseparable Union and

Inbeing of Persons, does as necessarily prove the real Di∣stinction of Persons as the Unity of Nature, as St. Hilary, and Athanasius, and the other Fathers, frequently observe, and that proves that the Unity of the Divine Nature, which is the Inseparable Union of Three proper subsisting Persons, is not the Unity of Singularity: Which shews by the way, how improperly the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is made use of to prove the Singularity of the Divine Essence, for it proves quite the contrary; it is the Unity of Three which is a Trinity in Unity; not the Unity of One, which is Singu∣larity and Solitude.

In the next place I observe, That by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 all the Catholick Fathers understand in this Mystery the in∣separable Union of Relatives in the same Individual Nature, not the Union of compleat, absolute Natures, how close and inseparable soever it may be. There is by Nature no Inseparable Union, but in the same Individual Nature. Three compleat Individuals, though of the same Kind and Species, how closely and intimately soever they be united, are not by Nature inseparable nor essentially One, for they may be parted by that Power which united them, and when they are parted, can subsist apart; as Three com∣pleat Minds, how intimately soever they should be united by God, yet can never be essentially and inseparably One, for they are not essential to each other; they might have subsisted apart, and may be parted again, and an External Union cannot so make them One, as to be natu∣rally inseparable. Which I think is a Demonstration that a Natural Inseparability, which is an Essential Unity, can be only in One Individual Nature between such Relatives as are Essential to each other, and can neither be, nor be conceived, divided, or separated: And therefore the Catholick Fathers represented the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by Examples of Natural Unions between things Essentially related to each other in One Individual Nature, which either cannot

be conceived, or at least cannot subsist apart. Of this last Kind are a Fountain and its Streams, a Tree and its Branches, whereby they not only represent the Homoousion, but the Inseparable Union of the Divine Persons, as every one knows; for there cannot be a Fountain but its Wa∣ters must flow out, nor Streams without a Fountain from whence they flow; and though Branches may be separated from the Tree, yet they live no longer than they are united, and are Branches of that Tree no longer: But these are very imperfect Images, and without great caution will corrupt our Ideas of the Divine Unity. Of all Cor∣poreal Unions the nearest resemblance we have of this, and which the Fathers most insist on, is the Sun, and its natural Splendor, for we cannot conceive the Sun without its Splendor, nor the Splendor without the Sun; they never were, never can be parted, and therefore, though two, are essentially one. This Representation the Scrip∣ture makes of it, which calls the Son, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Brightness of his Father's Glory, and in this Sense they teach that he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Light of Light, as it is in the Nicene Creed, whereby they do not mean two distinct independent Lights, which either are or may be parted, though one be lighted at the other (this was the Heresy of Hiera∣chas,* 1.270 as St. Hilary tells us, who repre∣sented this Mystery by two Candles, one of which is lighted at the other, or by one and the same Lamp,* 1.271 which is divided and burns in two Sockets); but that Light and Splendor which is essential to the same Sun, and can never be divided from it, as Athanasius teaches. But the truest Images we have of this in Nature, is the Inseparable Union which is between a Mind and its own

Internal Word, which are so essentially related to each other in the same Indi∣vidual Nature, that they can never be parted, nor conceived apart; the Mind can never be without its Word, nor the Word subsist but in the Mind: It is evident, That two compleat, absolute Minds can never be thus united; for they are not Essential to each other; not naturally one, and therefore not naturally inseparable; but a Mind and its Word, though two, are essentially One, and therefore can never be parted but must subsist together; and these are the Characters the Scripture gives us of God the Father and his Son; the Father Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Mind; the Son his Eternal Infi∣nite, Living, Subsisting Word. And if Father and Son, this Eternal Mind and Eternal Word, be as essentially One, as a mans Mind and his Word are One, this is a Demon∣stration of their Inseparable Union, and gives us a sensible Notion and Idea of it.

This is the account Athanasius every where gives of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Father and Son are inseparably One; the Father being in the Son, and the Son in the Father, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Light in the Sun.* 1.272 To separate the Divine Persons, so as not to be in each other, whatever other Union we own between them, Dionysius of Alexandria charges with Tritheism; for the Divine Word must of necessity be one with God, and the Holy Spirit be and sub∣sist in him. And this Athanasius resolves into such a Sameness and Unity of Na∣ture, as must be between two Relative Subsistencies in the same Individual Na∣ture.

That the Son is in the Father, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Splendor in the Sun; that he is a genuine proper natural Son in the Father's Essence and Substance, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not subsisting out of his Father's Substance, as other Creature Sons do.* 1.273 That the true No∣tion of the Sons being in the Father, is that the whole Being of a Son, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Genuine Natural Birth of the Father's Substance, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Splendor is of the Sun: That the very Being of the Son is the Form of Species, and Divinity of the Father. That as the Sun and its Splendor are two, but not two Lights, but one Light from the Sun enlighten∣ing all things with its Splendor and Brightness; so the Divinity of the Son is the Divinity of the Father, and there∣fore inseparable; and thus there is but one God, and none else besides him.

All this plainly refers to the Insepa∣rable Union and Inbeing of Relatives of the same Individual Substance, which are really distinct, but essentially in each other, as the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word, that Thought it self cannot part them; which is such an Union as can never be be∣tween compleat absolute Substances, which are not natu∣rally Inseparable, nor essentially One. Herein Athanasius places the adequate Notion of the Homoousion, the Same∣ness, Identity, and Unity of Nature. He tells us, That for this reason the Nicene Fathers taught the Homoousion, or

that the Son is Consubstantial, or of one Substance with the Father, to signify that the Son is not only like the Father,* 1.274 but to be so of the Father, as to be the same in likeness; not after the manner of Bodies, which are like each other, but subsist apart by themselves, as Human Sons subsist sepa∣rately from their Parents; but the Ge∣neration of the Son of the Substance of the Father is of a different Kind and Nature from Human Generations, for he is not only like, but inseparable from his Father's Substance. He and the Father are One, as he himself says: The Word is always in the Father, and the Father in the Word, as it is with Light and its Splendor, and this is what the Homoousion signifies; and in like man∣ner he resolves the Sameness, Identity, and Unity of Nature, into this Inter∣nal, Inseparable Union and Inbeing of Three, essentially related to each other in One Individual Divinity.

4thly, That Mutual Inbeing of the Divine Persons, which is their Insepa∣rable and Essential Union, that the Fa∣ther is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the Latins Circumincessio, can be understood only between the Rela∣tives of the same Individual Essence and Substance. The true compleat Notion of this Inbeing or Perichoresis, is not merely a Mutual Presence, or the same Vbi, that where∣ever one is, there the other is; or a kind of Immeation and Penetration of each other, which is a Corporeal No∣tion, and rejected as such by the Catholick Fathers, when

they speak of this Divine Inbeing, as St. Hilary expressly does,* 1.275 inesse autem non aliud in alio, ut corpus in corpore; that they are not in each other,* 1.276 as one Body is in another Body. And when the Arians objected against our Saviour's saying, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; How can this be in that, and that in this? Or how can the Father, who is greater, be at all in the Son, who is less? Or what wonder is it, that the Son should be in the Father, when it is written of us all, That in him we live, and move, and have our being? Athanasius answers, That this is all owing to Corporeal Conceits, as if they apprehended God to be a Body, not considering the Nature of the True Father, and true Son, the Invisible and Eternal Light, and its Invisible Splendor; an Invisible Substance, and its unbodied Character and Image.

But the true Notion of this Inbeing and Pericharesis is the Perfect Unity of the same Individual Nature in Three. That the Nature and Essence of the Father is in the Son,* 1.277 that the Son is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Character, Image, Mind, Divinity of the Father. Here, as Atha∣nasius observes, our Saviour himself lays the Reason and Foundation of this Mutual Inbeing: He first tells us, I and my Father are One; and then adds, I am in the Father, and the Father in

me, that he might shew the Sameness and Identity of the Godhead, and the Unity of Essence. For they are One, not One divided into two Parts, and nothing more than One; for they are Two▪ the Father is the Father, and not the Son; and the Son is the Son, and not the Father, but there is but One Nature; for he that is begotten, is not unlike in Nature to him that be∣gets, but is his Image, and all that the Father hath is the Sons.

There is no need to multiply Quotations to this pur∣pose, which may be met with every where. The Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, as the Nature of the Father is, lives and subsists in the Son▪ not a Na∣ture like the Fathers, but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Fa∣ther's own proper Nature and Essence; they are in each other, as being essentially One, not One merely as being in each other, as it is possible Three may be, and yet not be essentially One, but Three; as Three compleat absolute Minds would be Three still, though they should perfectly penetrate each other: Or as Three Candles in the same Room, are Three Lights though they are perfectly united in One. But Original Mind, its Word and Spirit are and must be in each other, as being Three in One Individual Essence; for the same undivided Essence can't be whole and entire in Three, but those Three must be in each other. If the Divinity of the Father is in the Son, the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father; the Mind is in its Word, and the Word in the Mind: The Son is in the Fa∣ther, as eternally begotten in the Substance of the Father, whole of whole, and essentially one and the same, as the Word is in the Mind, not by such an Union and Penetra∣tion as we may suppose between two Minds, but as con∣ceived in the Mind, and essentially one and the same with it.

Now according to this Representation, which all the Catholick Fathers make of this Mystery, we must of ne∣cessity acknowledge Number without Multiplication, Di∣stinction without Division or Separation, a perfect Trinity in perfect Unity; Three Persons, each of which is by him∣self True and Perfect God, but not Three Gods, but One God: A Mind and its Word are two, and a living, sub∣sisting Word is true and perfect Mind, Mind of Mind, and yet not two Minds, but one Mind; for the Mind and its Word are essentially One, as all Men must confess; the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word, and therefore identically one and the same: for which reason the Fathers acknowledge that the Father is Spirit, the Son Spirit, and the Holy Ghost Spirit, and these are Three, but not Three Spirits, as essentially related to each other in the same individual Essence, essentially the same, and essentially in each other: And thus Will of Will, Wisdom of Wisdom, Life of Life, Power of Power, though they multiply and distinguish Persons, do not multiply Wills, Wisdoms, Lives, Powers, which are essentially One, as the Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are One: They are not One Life, One Will, One Understanding, One Power, in the Sense of but One who Lives, who Wills, who Under∣stands, and has Power; but as the same, identically the same Life, and Will, &c. is in each of them, and indivisibly and inseparably in them all.

And this gives an account of the Unity of Operation, wherein the Catholick Fathers unanimously place the Uni∣ty of God, for One Almighty Agent is but One God, and One Essential Will, Wisdom, and Power, can be but One Agent; and Infinite, Original Mind, and its Eternal subsisting Word can have but One Will, and Wisdom, and Power, for the Will and Wisdom of the Mind is in its Word; the same, not merely specifically the same, or the same by consent, as it may be between Two Minds,

which Will perfectly the same thing, but the same One Individual Will; the Father Wills, and the Son Wills, and they both Will distinctly, but with one Individual Will; as it is impossible that the Word should Will with any other Will, but the Will of that Mind, whose Word it is. And therefore Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though Three Eternal, Infinite, Living, Intelligent, Willing, Persons, which Subsist and Act distinctly, yet being that to each other in a more perfect and excellent manner, that Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are in Men, they must be as perfectly One Almighty Agent as a created Mind is, which Wills and Acts in its Word and Spirit.

The Distinction and Unity of Operation necessarily proves the Distinction and Unity of Essence; it being in our way of conceiving things a necessary effect of it; there must be some real Distinction in the same Nature and Essence, in which there are Three who Act distinct∣ly; and there must be an Individual Unity of Essence, when in Three there is but One Individual Operation; and though these things may be distinguished in Crea∣tures, where we distinguish the Suppositum and the Powers, and give a priority of Nature to the Suppositum, yet Es∣sence and Energy being the same in God, who is a pure simple Act, there can be no priority nor posteriority be∣tween them, but the Demonstration proceeds equally upon Nature or Operation; but that is the best, which is the most intelligible Representation of this Distinction and Unity.

For this reason the Fathers chose to explain the Distin∣ction and Unity of the Godhead by the Distinction and Unity of Operation, which I need not prove at large, as being universally owned, and therefore I shall only ob∣serve, how St. Gregory Nyssen represents this matter.

In his Answer to Ablabius, that there are not Three Gods,* 1.278 he tells us, That the best way to form the clearest and most perspicuous Notion of this, is to examine what this Name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Godhead, signifies. Now whereas some think this a proper Name to signify the Divine Nature and Essence, he asserts with the Scriptures (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) that the Divine Nature and Essence is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without a Name,* 1.279 and can't be signified by words; and that every Name which is given to God, signifies something es∣sential to him, but not his Nature and Essence it self. This he shews particu∣larly in some Names given to God, and affirms,* 1.280 That thus it is in all other Di∣vine Names, that either they remove all Imperfections, or attribute all Divine Perfections to him, but do not declare his Nature: And thus he adds it is in the Name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, God is a S••er, an Inspector, who beholds all things: Now if God signifies him, who sees and knows all things, we must inquire, whe∣ther this All-seeing Power belongs only to one of the Divine Persons of the Tri∣nity, or to all Three: For if this be the true interpretation of the Name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that it is an All-seeing Power, and that He that sees all, is God, we can∣not reasonably deny this to any Person in the Holy Trinity, since the Scrip∣ture

does equally attribute this Omniscience to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

Well! suppose this, as he adds, it does not remove but encrease the difficulty; for though God be not a Name of Nature, but of Energy and Power, if the Name God signifies a Seer and Inspector, and there be Three, who thus see all things, Three must be Three Gods, as we number Persons of the same Profession, who all do the very same things, as well as those who have the same Nature; as we say many Orators, Mathematicians, and the l••ke,* 1.281 as well as many M••n. Now this he answers by the Unity of Energy and Power, which is in each of them, but is but One indivisible inseparable Power; not as it is in Men, who each of them acts separately by him∣self; and though they do the same thing for kind, yet what each of them does, is properly his own doing, and not anothers: They act separately, and produce distinct and separate Ef∣fects, and therefore are many Agents.* 1.282 But it is quite otherwise as to the Di∣vine Nature: The Father does nothing by himself without the Son, nor the Son without the Holy Ghost; but each Divine Operation proceeds originally from the Father, is continued by the Son, and perfected in the Holy Spirit; and therefore the name of Energy is not divided into a number of Agents, because neither of them acts separately by himself.

And this he proves from the Unity of the Effect;* 1.283 that whatever good thing we receive from God, as suppose Life, is attributed to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; but though it be given by Three, that which is given, or done for us, is not Three; we do not re∣ceive three Lives, one from each Per∣son of the Trinity, but we have but one Life, which we receive from them all. Now where there is but One Undivided Effect, there can be but One Natural Agent; for separate Agents will pro∣duce separate Effects; and therefore there can be but one motion of the Di∣vine Will from the Father by the Son to the Holy Spirit, and that without di∣stance and Succession. Now it is plain, that all this does not signify a mere Uni∣ty of Consent, as may be between Three Distinct and Separate Minds, but the Unity of Principle, which acts distinctly, but uniformly and inseparably in Three; the same Divine Will, which is origi∣nally in the Father, acting in the same manner, and with one indivisible motion (as they speak) in the Son, and Holy Spirit; which Unity of Operation, though it admits of distinct Acts, and consequently a real distinction of Per∣sons, yet proves the individual Unity of Essence; for there can be no Unity of Principle or Operation, but in the same Individual Essence; where Three Persons are united in the same Individual Essence, as the Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are in Man.

And here (had there not been enough already said about it) is a proper Place to vindicate that late Representation which has been made of the Distinction and Unity of the Godhead by the self-consciousness,* 1.284 and mutual consciousness of the Divine Persons.

I have met with no body yet so hardy as to deny, that Self-consciousness is essential to the natural Unity of a Person, and that Three Persons cannot be naturally and es∣sentially One without mutual Consciousness. But the great Objection against this Notion (and which I am amazed to find some Learned Men insist on) is the order of Nature, which requires, that a Person should be One by an Unity of Nature, before it can be self-conscious; and that Three Persons must be One by the Unity of Nature, before they can be mutually conscious: For the Unity of Nature, and the Union of Persons in the same Nature, must be before all Acts of Self-consciousness, and mutual Consciousness: And that which in the order of Nature comes after such a Distinction and Union cannot be the cause of it.

But who ever thought of causes of Distinction and Unity in an Eternal Nature, which has no cause? Did the Fa∣thers philosophize thus concerning Priority and Posteriority in the Divine Nature, when they placed the Unity of the Godhead in the Unity of Energy and Operation? For does not the same Objection lie against the Unity of Energy and Operation, that does ••gainst mutual consciousness, (which is essential to this Unity of Energy) that the Divine Persons must first be One, before they can be One Energy and Power? and therefore that One Energy does not cause their Unity, because they must be One,* 1.285 be∣fore they are One Agent. And indeed such Men Gregory Nyssen intimates he had to deal with, who would not allow the Deity to be Energy and Power, but

he thought it not worth the while to dispute that Point with them; for the Divine Nature being Infinite and Incom∣prehensible, the pure and simple Nature of God is not the immediate Object of our Knowledge, can have no name and definition given it; and therefore we can know nothing of it immediately and directly, but by such Essential Attributes and Properties, as we c••n form some no∣tion of.

The not considering this, how perfectly unknown and incomprehensible the Divine Nature it self is, occasioned a late Author to tell us, That An Hypothesis in this Affair, which leaves out the very Nexus, the Natural and Eternal Vni∣on, and insists upon mutual consciousness, which at most is but the consequence thereof, wants the principal thing requisite to the salving the Vnity of the Godhead.

But this is to philosophize about the abstracted Natures and Essences of Things, even the Divine Substance and Essence, which I dare not presume to do. No doubt but God is the most real substantial Being in the World, even Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and there is as little doubt, but there is as real and substantial an Union between them: But I know nothing of the Substance of God, as distin∣guished from his Essential Attributes and Perfections, nor of such a Distinction and Unity of Substance in the Deity, as can help us to form any notion of a Trinity in Unity, and defend it from the Charge of Contradiction and Impos∣sibility, when we have done. For we must have a care of conceiving any Extension, or Parts, or Composition in God, without which we can have no notion of a Distinction and Union of Substances, considered purely under the notion of Substance. And therefore we must be contented to be ignorant of the Substance and Substantial Unions of the

Deity, as we are of all other Substantial Unions. We know not what the Substance of a Spirit is, nor what the Sub∣stance of Matter is, nor what their substantial Unity is: And therefore when we inquire into their Distinction and Unity, we never meddle with the Essential Reasons and Causes of Unity, which are concealed from us, but consi∣der as far as Sense, or Reason, or Observation will reach, wherein the Unity of any thing consists, and when a thing may be said to be One: As to instance at present only in the Unity of a Mind, and in the Union of Soul and Body.

Is there any thing else in the World which can make a Mind one with it self, and distinguish it from all other Minds, but a self-conscious Sensation, that it feels it self, and its whole self, and only it self? I suppose these Men will grant, that such a Mind is One, and but One, and distinct from all other Minds; but Self-consciousness is not the formal rea∣son of the Unity of a Mind, or of a Person, because in or∣der of Nature the Unity of a Mind or Person must go be∣fore Self-consciousness; that is, Self-consciousness is owing to the Unity of Essence, not the Unity of Essence to Self∣consciousness. Well, but what is this Essence of a Mind, and this Unity of Essence, which makes a Mind One? Truly that no body can tell; and therefore to say a Mind is one by the Unity of its Essence, is to say, it is One, be∣cause it is so; for we know no more of the matter: But Self-consciousness is a sensible Unity, which we all feel in our selves, and know our selves from other Men by it.

This Unity of Essence we know nothing of, but by Self∣consciousness; and I desire to know, whatever the Unity of Essence be, whether any but a Self-conscious Unity would make a Mind One, and distinguish it from all other Minds? which shews, that we have nothing to do with the naked Essences and Substances of Things, but with their imme∣diate and essential Properties; and when we know them,

we know all that is to be known of Nature; and therefore we can know no more of the Unity of a Mind than Self-consciousness.

The Substances of things are distinguished from each other by their Essential Properties, and therefore from them we must learn their Unity or Distinction. A Mind is a Substance, and Matter is Substance; and the essential dif∣ference between them, as far as we can understand, is, that a Mind is a thinking Substance, and Matter extended Substance; and therefore we must judge of a Mind by the properties of Thinking, and of Matter by extension: The Unity of a Thinking Substance must consist in the Unity of Thoughts and Sensations, that is, in one Consciousness; and the Unity of an Extended Substance in the continuity of its extension; and to ask farther, what is the cause or princi∣ple of Consciousness in a Mind, or of One Consciousness in One Mind, is to ask a reason of the natures of things; why a Mind is a Thinking Being, and why One Thinking Being has one Center of Thoughts: Why do they not ask also, how Extension comes to be essential to Matter, and how Matter is extended? I know no reason to be given of such matters, but the Will of God, who formed all things according to the Ideas of his own Infinite Wisdom.

This I hope is sufficient to be said concerning the order of Nature, and the priority and posteriority of our Con∣ceptions; for if we do not stop in our Inquiries at imme∣diate and essential Properties, but demand an antecedent Rea∣son for them, this is to demand a Reason of Nature, Why things are what God has made them: Those who are not contented to contemplate Nature in its immediate and Essen∣tial Properties, may philosophize by themselves for me; for there is nothing more to be known without an intuitive knowledge of Nature it self, which none can have but the Author of Nature.

Thus should you inquire of me concerning the Union of Soul and Body; all that I know of it is, That they are uni∣ted in one Conscious Life; That the Soul feels all the Im∣pressions of the Body, and directs and governs it. No, will such Philosophers say, here wants the Nexus, the na∣tural Union between Soul and Body; for they must be One by a Natural Union before there can be this Conscious Life and Sympathy between them, which is not the Union, but the effect and consequent of this Union. Very true! They must be vitally united to have One Life, and to receive impressions from each other; But can they give any other notion of this Vital Union, than that the Body is animated by the Soul, and lives with it? Could these Philosophers tell you, how a Soul, which is an Immaterial Being, could be fastened to a Body, what Union of Substances there is between them, (which is the thing they want to know) would they understand a Vital Union ever the better for it? An Union of Substances seems to signify some kind of Con∣tact, which is hard to conceive between Body and Spirit; but however an Union of Contact, and an Union of Life, are two very different kinds of Union, and do not include or infer each other; and therefore the true Answer to that Question, How Soul and Body are united, is not to say, That their Substances are united or fastened together, which gives us no notion of a Vital Union; but that the Soul lives in the Body, and gives life to it; receives im∣pressions srom it, and governs its motions. But to in∣quire farther, is to inquire into the Reasons of Natural and Essential Unions, which are as great Mysteries as Na∣ture is: We may as well ask, How a Soul lives, as how it animates a Body; and God alone knows both. So that to inquire after the Natural Nexus, or Cement of this Union, is nothing at all to the purpose, and is not the Ob∣ject of Human Knowledge.

Now, though the Vital Union between Soul and Body, and the Union of mutual Consciousness, be of a very dif∣ferent Kind and Nature, yet the Dispute about the Nexus, or the Natural Union of Substances, is much the same.

Consciousness is the Unity of a Spirit; Self-conscious∣ness is the Unity of a Person, and by the same reason mu∣tual Consciousness is a Natural Union of Three distinct Self-conscious Persons in the Unity of the same Nature. And to reject this for want of a Nexus, or the Natural Union of Substances, is as if we should deny the Union of Soul and Body to be an Union of Life or Animation, because this don't explain the Natural Nexus between Soul and Body: If a Mutual Conscious Union be an Es∣sential Union of Three distinct Persons in the same Na∣ture, as a Vital Union is the Essential Union of Soul and Body, we have nothing to do in either Case with the Union of Substances which we can know nothing of, and if we could, should understand these Unions never the better for it. For whatever Union of Substance we may suppose between Soul and Body, and the Three Divine Persons in the Holy Trinity, it is the Kind and Species of Union which gives us the Notion and Idea of it. If you inquire, what Spirit, and what Matter is? It would not be thought a good Answer to these Questions, to say a Spirit is a Substance, and Matter is a Substance, without adding their Specifick Differences, that a Spirit is an intelligent thinking Substance, and Matter is an extended Substance; nor is it a better Answer to that Question, what Union there is between Soul and Body, or between the Three Divine Persons in the Trinity, To say, That their Substances are united, which gives us no distinct Notion of their Union; but a Vital Union, and a Mutual Conscious Union, con∣tain distinct Ideas; and if these be Natural and Essential Unions, though we know no more of the Union of Sub∣stances

than we do, what Substance is, yet we know that the Soul and Body must be one Natural Person, and the Three Divine Persons must be naturally and essentially One God; for a Natural Union makes One according to the Nature of that Union.

It is visible enough what has occasioned this Mistake: Men consider Mutual Consciousness between Three Com∣pleat, Absolute, Independent Minds, and rightly enough conclude, that how conscious soever they were to each other, this could not make them essentially One; for every compleat Mind is One by it self, and not natu∣rally Conscious to any One but it self, and by whatever Power they should be so united, as to be mutually Consci∣ous, this could not make them essentially One; they would be Three Mutually Conscious Minds, not essenti∣ally One Mind; for they are not by Nature One, nor mutually Conscious, and therefore may be parted again, and cease to be so. But then, in this way of stating it, the Objection equally lies against the Perichoresis, the in∣separable Union and In-being of Minds, which can never make Three Compleat Absolute Minds essentially One. But if we apply this to the Union of Living, Subsisting, Intelligent Relatives of the same Individual Essence, to Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, Eternal, Self-originated Mind, its Eternal, Living, Subsisting, Word, and Eternal Spirit, this Mutual Consciousness gives us the most Intelligible Notion of the Essential and Inseparable Union and In-being of Three in One. I dare not say what other Men can do; but I have tried my self, and can form no Notion of an Unity in Trinity, but what either necessarily includes, or ultimately resolves it self into One Natural Essential Con∣sciousness in Three.

The Divine Nature is indivisibly and inseparably One in Three; but we must not understand this Inseparability after the manner of Bodies, whose Parts may be divided and

separated from each other; God is not Body, and has no Parts; but in the Unity of the Godhead there is Eternal Ori∣ginal Mind, an Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, which are inseparable from each other, that is, can never be parted: What then can parting and separating signify in a Mind, which has no Parts to be torn and divided from each other? I can understand nothing by it, but that the Mind does no longer see, and know, and feel its Word in it self, nor the Word the Mind; for this would make a perfect Separation between the Mind and its Word; that Mind has no Word which does not see and feel it in it self; and were it possible that a living subsisting Word should lose all Conscious Sensation of the Mind, whose Word it is, it would cease to be a Word, and commence a perfect separate Mind it self: So that as far as we can conceive it, the Inseparable Union between Father and Son, between Original Infinite Mind, and its Eternal Word, is an inse∣parable Conscious Life and Sensation, which is such a Natural Demonstration of their Inseparable Union, as no other Notion can give us; for all Men feel that a Mind and its Word can never be parted; a Mind can never be without its Word, nor the Word subsist but in the Mind.

Thus what other possible Notion can we form of the Perichoresis, or Mutual In-being of Father and Son, as our Saviour tells us, I am in the Father, and the Father in me, which is their Natural and Essential Unity, I and my Fa∣ther are one? We all feel how the Word is in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word; the Mind knows, and feels, and comprehends its own Word; and a perfect, living, subsisting Word knows and feels that whole Mind, whose Word it is, in it self; for the Word is nothing else but the whole Mind, living and subsisting in the Word, which is another Hypostasis, but perfectly One and the same Na∣ture; and therefore as they know themselves, so they

know and feel each other in themselves. As the Father knoweth me, saith Christ, so know I the Father, 10 John 15. And thus to see and know God by an Internal Sensation, and to be in him, are ••quivalent Expressions in Scripture, 1 John 18. No man hath seen G••d at any time; the only be∣gotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath de∣clared him: Where to see God, and to be in the Bosom of the Father, must signify the same thing; for to be in the Bosom of the Father, is put in the place of seeing God, that is, to see him within, to see him in his Bosom, as the Word sees the Mind, and this is to be in his Bosom, and thus the Son is in the Father.

The same Account we have of the Ho∣ly Spirits being in God, 1 Cor. 2.11.* 1.286 For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of man, which is in him? even so the things of G••d knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God; that is, the Spirit of God is in God, as the Spirit of a Man is in Man, and therefore by this In-being, the Spirit of God knows all the Things of God by such an Internal Conscious Sensation, as the Spirit of Man knows what is in Man.

Thus what is the Unity of Energy and Operation, but the same Conscious Will and Power acting distinctly, but inseparably in Three? for without this Internal Consci∣ousn••ss, they must be Three separate Wills and separate Powers, and produce distinct and separate Effects; but when God, his Word and Spirit are in each other, and see, and know, and feel each other in themselves, as a Man's Mind, his Word, and Spirit, do, though in a more perfect and excellent manner, there can be but One undivided Motion of the Divine Will, as there is but One Conscious Life in Three; the Son lives, subsists, wills, understands, and acts, in and with the Father, and therefore is but One Eternal Life, One Almighty Will and Power.

Now as Novel as some Men think this Notion of the Vnity of Mutual Consciousness to be, we meet with it more than once in express words in S••. Hilary, whose Authority I hope is sufficient to vindicate it from the charge of No∣velty.

Thus with reference to what our Sa∣viour says,* 1.287 No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son, and he to whomso∣ever the Son will reveal him, 11. Matth. 27. St. Hilary observes, (Hilar. de Trin. c. 2) Illis scientia mutua est, illis vicissim c••gnitio perfecta; That Father and Son have a mutual perfect Know∣ledge of each other. And this he asserts to be a Conscious Knowledge, connate with him, a Conscious Sensation of his Father's Nature in himself, which our S••viour himself signifies by his Unity of Nature and Operation with the Fa∣ther; as the Reader may see in the Mar∣gin.

Thus Tertullian long before describ'd this mutual Consciousness between God and his Eternal Word and Wisdom by what we feel in our selves when we silently muse alone, our Word does as it were talk with us, and return our Thoughts to us, is present with us in every Turn, and Motion, and Pulse of Thought, and internal Sensation, as conscious to all within us.

Thus he tells us, That the Son alone knows the Father, and does not his own, but his Father's Will, which he

knows, de proximo, imo de initio; that is, by an immediate Intuitive Know∣ledge, not by External Communication, but by Internal Sensation. Thus the Son does nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father do; in sensu scilicet facientem, in his own Mind and Will; Pater enim sensu agit, the Father does all things by disposing and ordering all things in his own Mind and Will; Fi∣lius vero, qui in sensu Patris est, videns perficit: The Son, who is in the Mind, and Sense, and Will of the Father, sees the Father's Will, and does it: Now let any Man tell me what else can be meant by the Sons being in sensu Patris, & videns in sensu Patris, but this Internal Conscious Sensation. St. Cyril of Alexandria calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.288 that the Son Wills together with the Father, and with the same Will. Dionysius the Areopagite, says,* 1.289 This Union does not only exceed all bodily Unions, but the Unions also of Souls and Minds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And Fulgentius tells us,* 1.290 The Word was with God, sicut in mente verbum, sicut in c••rde con∣silium, as the Word is in the Mind, and Counsel in the Heart.

Marius Victorinus Afer tells us to the same purpose,* 1.291 That the Son being in the Bosom of the Father, signifies, that he is God; that he is in the Bosom and Womb of his Substance, and therefore they are Consubstantial, each of them being in each other, and knowing each other.

But not to multiply Quotations; all those Catholick Fathers and Doctors,* 1.292 who placed the Unity of the Godhead in Consent, (and none of them rejected this in a Catholick Sense) could under∣stand nothing less by it than this mutual natural Consciousness, for any other Con∣sent was down right Arianism, as St. Hilary witnesses; and y••t thus the famous Lucian, whom the Arians would have challenged as theirs, but whom the Catholick Church always owned, expresses it in his Creed; and thus per substantiam tria, per consonantiam verò unum:* 1.293 Three in Substance, but in Consent and Agreement One, is justified by St. Hilary, (Hilar. de Synod.) as ve∣ry Catholick; but then he refers this to the Holy Spirit, who is the substantial Bond and Cement of this Union and Consent. But Gregory Nyssen, who al∣lows of this Unity of Consent, more in∣telligibly represents it by the Consent and Uniformity of all the Motions be∣tween the Prototype and its Image,* 1.294 or a Man's Face in a Glass, which moves and acts with it. Thus Christ is the Image of the Invisible God▪ and is im∣mediately and instantly affected toge∣ther with his Father. Does the Father Will any thing? The Son also, who is in the Father, knows the Fathers Will, or rather is the Father's Will.

But this I think is sufficient to be said about mutual Con∣sciousness, which is so manifestly the Doctrine of the Fathers, of some in express Terms, and of all according to the true In∣terpretation of what they taught, that I cannot imagine the

meaning of this furious Zeal against it, but a Sabellian Zeal against Three Conscious Persons, for one single Self-conscious Nature: As St. Hilary observes in the Dispute between the Sa∣bellians and Arians. The Arians allowed Father and Son to be Two Distinct Persons, but denied their Consubstantiality, or Unity and Sameness of Nature: The Sabellians, who denied the distinction of Persons, but asserted the Sameness, Uni∣ty and Singularity of Nature, which they thought suffici∣ently proved One Person, as well as One Nature (as no doubt but it does) confuted the Arian Dissimilitude of Na∣ture by what our Saviour says,* 1.295 I and my Father are one; which they said could be the Language of none, but of a Nature conscious to it self of its own Identity, and Sameness, which he allows to be a good Argument against the Arians, (which he could not have done, had he not allowed this Consciousness in the Trinity) but then ob∣serves, That the Arians did as eff••ctually consute them, as to the distinction of Persons; and thus between them both the Catholick Faith,* 1.296 of a real distinction of Persons, in the Sameness and Conscious Unity of Na∣ture, was vindicated. In short, If the whole Divine Nature is conscious to it self, as every Created Mind is conscious to all that is in it self; and the Three Divine Persons subsist in the Individual Unity of the same Nature, then these Divine Persons must be intimately and mutually conscious to each other, as a Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are; and however Men please to philosophize about this, as to the prius & posterius, whether they will make the Unity of Nature the cause of this mutual Consciousness, and there∣fore in order of Nature prior to it; or make mutual Con∣sciousness not the cause of this Unity, but the Essential Uni∣on of Three Distinct Subsisting Persons in the Unity of the

same Individual Nature; I will not contend with any Man which of these speak most properly. Consciousness is the Unity of an Intelligent Nature, and the mutual Conscious∣ness of Persons in the same Nature, and the Conscious Uni∣ty of Nature in Three Distinct Persons is the same thing. We cannot conceive the Unity of a Mind without Con∣sciousness, nor any other kind of Unity of a Mind, but a Conscious Unity; nor can we conceive an Internal Essen∣tial Consciousness without an Essential Unity; and if the mutual Consciousness of Persons in the same Nature, is the Consciousness of Nature, I cannot see why we may not say, That it is at least One Notion of the Unity of Na∣ture too.

But to return where I left off, (if this may be called a a Digression) what I have now said, is sufficient to shew, how necessary this Doctrine of Relations is to give us a sen∣sible notion of a Trinity in Unity.

To assert a Real Trinity, we must assert Three Real, Di∣stinct, Subsisting, Substantial, Intelligent Persons, neither of which is each other, and each of which is by himself, in his own proper Person, True and Perfect God: But this, say Sabellians, Arians, and Socinians, is to assert Three Gods; which the Catholick Church always abhorred the thoughts of. Now how the Fathers answered this Charge, and vindicated the Divine Unity in a Trinity of Real Sub∣sisting Persons, I have already particularly shown, as by the Consubstantiality, the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature, whole of whole, their Inseparability, and Unity of Operation; but we can form no distinct Idea of all this, but only among Personal Subsisting Relatives of the same In∣dividual Nature. Whatever is not this, is a meer Specifick Consubstantiality and Identity of Nature, and an External Union, how inseparable soever it be, which must make a number of Individuals in the Divine, as well as Human

Nature: but now it is plain to a Demonstration, That if God hath an Eternal Subsisting Word, and an Eternal Sub∣sisting Spirit, they can be but One Individual Essence, as a Man's Mind, and Word, and Spirit, are One; and there∣fore all Three but One God, as a Man, with his Mind, and Word, and Spirit, i•• but One Man; which is an Intelligi∣ble Notion of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Individual Essence and Godhead: For though the Word of God be a Person, which a M••n's Word is not, yet if his true Nature and Character is the Word, he is the same to the Eternal Mind, which a Man's Word is to his Created Mind, and therefore God, and his Living, Subsisting Word, must be One Individual Essence, as a Man's Mind and his Word are One; a Word must be conceived and begotten of the Mind, and can have no other Substance, if it be a Living, Substantial Word, but that of the Mind; and if it be a perfect Word, the perfect Image of the Mind, it must be whole of whole, all that the Mind is; for the whole Mind is in its perfect Word and Image, and lives and subsists in it, and the whole Word in the Mind. So that the C••eternity, the Coequality, the Consubstantiality, the Identity, the Inse∣parability, the Unity of Operation between God and his Word, is so far from being Jargon, Contradiction, Unin∣telligible Nonsense, that i•• God have an Eternal Word, it is self-evident that thus it must be: When we contemplate the Consubstantiality of Father and Son, under the notion of Substance, we can form no Idea of a whole, which is of a whole, that the Father should communicate his whole Es∣sence, and Substance, to the Son, and be the whole himself; and this is no great wonder, since we can form no Idea at all of the Divine Substance; but we can very well understand, That the Whole Mind must be in its Word, that the Eternal Mind and its Word must be Consubstantial, Coeternal, Coe∣qual, Two, but perfectly the same, inseparably in each other; for all this is included in the very Relation and Notion of a

Mind, and its Word. I'm sure, a Living, Subsisting Word, which is not Consubstantial, Coeternal, Coequal, with that Eternal Mind, whose Word it is; that a Mind should be without its Word; that an Infinite, Eternal Mind, which is perfect Life and Being, should have a vanishing, perishing Word, as Man has; not a living, subsisting Word; that a Mind and its Word should ever be parted; that the Word should not be and subsist in the Mind, and the Mind in the Word; I say, all this contradicts all the Notions we have of a Mind and its Word: We cannot immediately and directly contemplate the Divine Nature and Essence, which is so infinitely above us, and therefore we must con∣template it in such Ideas and Representations, as God him∣self makes of it; and if they are such, as we can form an intelligible notion of, we have no reason to complain of unintelligible Mysteries and Contradictions, though when we reduce it into Terms of Art, we find our Minds con∣founded and perplext, and unable to form any distinct and easy Ideas.

The Arians, to avoid the Consubstan∣tiality of the Son with the Father,* 1.297 would not allow the Term Substance to be used of God; the Catholick Fathers proved, that Substance is in Scripture used con∣cerning God, and that the Arians could not reasonably reject it, because they used it themselves; for though they would not own the Son to be of the same Substance with the Father; they taught, that he was of another Substance, which still is to own Substance in God.

But though God be in the most true and absolute sense, perfect Essence and Being, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or according to

St. Ambrose his derivation of the Word (which shews what he meant by it, whether it shews his skill in Greek or not) that Essence and Substance is that which always is,* 1.298 and that which always is, is God, and therefore God is Essence and Substance, and a Consub∣stantial Son is a true and real Son; for which reason, as he observes, the Arians would not allow the Son to be Consub∣stantial, because they would not allow him to be a true genuine Son;* 1.299 and for this very reason the Nicene Fathers in∣serted the Homoousion in their Creed: But yet if we would rightly conceive of God, of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, of the Unity and Distinction of the Ever Blessed Trinity, we must not form our Notions by the Ideas of Substance and Consubstantiali∣ty, which we have no distinct conceptions of; but we must learn their Unity, Distinction, and Consubstantiality from those Characters the Scripture gives of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. This Rule St. Ambrose expressly gives us with reference to the Son, and the Reason is the same, as to the other Divine Persons. If we would avoid Error, says that Father,* 1.300 let us attend to those Characters the Scripture gives us, to help us to understand what, and who the Son is: He is called the Word, the Son, the Power of God, the Wisdom of God; all this we can understand; and not only St. Ambrose, but all the other Catholick Fathers, as I have already shewn, prove the Consubstantiality, Coeternity, Coequality, Unity and Distinction of Father and Son, from these Names and Characters, which they understood in a true and proper sense, for a Living, Subsisting Son,

and Word, and Power, and Wisdom; and there is no dif∣ficulty in conceiving all this, if we contemplate it in these Characters; nay it is impossible to conceive otherwise of it. As impossible as it is to form any notion at all of those Philosophical Terms, whereby this Mystery is commonly represented, when we abstract them from those sensible Characters and Ideas which the Scripture has given us, and begin our Inquiries with them. It will be of great use to represent this matter plainly, that every man may see what it is that obscures and perplexes the Doctrine of the Trinity, and confounds mens notions about it, to the great scandal of the Christian Religion, and the disturbance of the Christian Church.

The great difficulty concerns the Unity and Distinction of the Ever Blessed Trinity, that they are really and di∣stinctly Three, and essentially One: And this is represented by One Nature, Essence, and Substance, and Three Hypo∣stases; and yet Hypostasis signifies Substance, and every Divine Hypostasis is the whole Divine Essence and Sub∣stance. Now if we immediately contemplate this Mystery under the notion of Substance, it is impossible for us to conceive One Substance and Three Hypostases, that is, in some sense Three Substances, or which is all One as to the difficulty of conceiving it, though the form of Expression is more Catholick; Three, each of which is the whole Es∣sence and Substance, and neither of them is each other; we may turn over our Minds as long as we please, and change Words and Phrases, but we can find no Idea to answer these, or any other words of this nature. But now if in∣stead of Essence and Hypostasis, we put Mind and its Word, we can form a very intelligible notion of this Uni∣ty and Distinction, and prove that Unity of Substance, and Distinction of Hypostases, which we cannot immediately and directly form any notion of. For Eternal Original Mind, and its Living Subsisting Word, are certainly Two,

and neither are, nor can be each other; the Mind cannot be its own Living Word, nor the Word the Mind, whose Word it is; and yet we must all grant, that Eternal Mind is the most Real Being, Essence, Substance, and that a Li∣ving Subsisting Word is Life, Being, Substance, and the very same Life and Substance that the Mind is, and all that the Mind is; for a perfect Living Word can have no other Life and Substance but that of the Mind, and must be all the same that the Mind is.

The Eternal Generation of the Son 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the Sub∣stance of the Father, Life of Life, Substance of Substance, Whole of Whole, is impossible to be conceived, as imme∣diately applied to the notion of Substance; but the Gene∣ration of the Word, Whole of Whole, is very conceivable, for the Mind must beget its own Word, as we feel in our selves; and a Mind which is perfect Life and Substance, if it begets its Word, must beget a Living, Subsisting, Substantial Word,* 1.301 the per∣fect Image of its own Life and Substance. And as impossible as it is to conceive, much more to express in words, this Mystery of the Eternal Generation, yet the necessary relation between a Mind, and its Word, proves that thus it is; we feel it in our selves, though we are as perfectly ignorant, how our Mind be∣gets its dying vanishing Word, as how the Eternal Mind begets an Eternal, Li∣ving, Subsisting Word: And the Generation of the Word includes in it all the Properties of the Divine Generation; that it is Eternal; for an Eternal Mind can never be with∣out its Word; that it is without any Corporeal Passions, or Esslux, or Division, begotten in the Mind, and insepa∣rable from it.

Now if we conceive after the same manner of the Eter∣nal Procession of the Holy Spirit, can any man deny this to be an Intelligible Notion of a Trinity in Unity, though we can form no distinct Idea of One Essence and Substance, and Three Hypostases? For if we can conceive Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; Eternal Original Mind, its Eternal Word, and Eternal Spirit, to be Essentially One and Three, the Catholick Faith is secured, though we do not so well un∣derstand the distinction between those Abstract Metaphy∣sical Terms of Nature, Essence, Substance, Hypostasis, especially when applied to the Unity and Distinction of the Eternal Godhead, which is above all Terms of Art. The Catholick Faith is, That the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God; but yet there are not Three Gods, but One God; and this the Doctrine of the Divine Relations gives us a very intelligible notion of; for we cannot conceive otherwise of the Eternal Mind, its Eternal Word, and Eter∣nal Spirit, but that each of them are True and Perfect God, and yet a Mind, its Word, and Spirit, can be but One, and therefore but One God.

But One Substance, and Three Hypostases, is but a se∣condary notion of a Trinity in Unity, to secure the Catho∣lick Faith against the Sabellian and Arian Heresies: Against the Sabellians the Catholick Fathers asserted Three Hypo∣stases, against the Arians One Substance; and the Essential Relations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, necessarily prove both the One Substance, and Three Hypostases; but though One Substance and Three Hypostases be the Ca∣tholick Language, yet those Men begin at the wrong end, who think to form an intelligible notion of a Tri∣nity in Unity from these abstract Metaphysical Terms. This is not the Language of the Scripture, nor have we any Idea to answer these Terms, of One Substance in Three distinct Hypostases, when we consider them by themselves, without relation to the Divine Nature, to

which alone these Terms can belong, for there is no such thing in created Nature, and therefore we can have no Idea of it. It is abundantly sufficient in this Case, that we have a clear and distinct Notion of One Substance, and Three Hypostases in the Essential Unity and Distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three subsisting Relations in One Individual Essence and Substance, though when we abstractedly consider these Terms of One Substance and Three Hypostases, we can form no consistent Notion or Idea of it. And now let our Socinian Adversaries, who talk so loud of Absurdities, Contradictions, Nonsense, false Counting and Tritheism, try their skill to make good these Charges against the Divine subsisting Relations in the Unity of the same Individual Essence.

SECT. IX. A more particular Inquiry into the Difference between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Nature and Person, with an Account of some Catholick Forms of Speech, relating to the ever Blessed Trinity.

BUT since one Nature and Essence, and Three Hypo∣stases or Persons, is the Catholick Language, and necessary to guard the Faith from those Two Extremes of Sabellianism and Arianism, it will be necessary to consider how to apply these Ecclesiastical Terms to the Three and One in the ever Blessed Trinity. And here, were I so disposed, I might enter into a very large and perplext Dispute; but my design, as far as possibly I can attain it, is only to explain what the Catholick Fathers meant by these Terms, and to give a plain and sensible Notion of them: And after what I have already so largely discoursed concerning Na∣ture and Hypostasis, I have little more to do, than to compare them together, and to shew in what the Catho∣lick Fathers placed this Distinction. And as nothing is of greater consequence, than rightly to understand this mat∣ter, so nothing requires greater Caution, nor greater Ap∣plication of Mind.

Whosoever is conversant in the Writings of the Ancient Fathers, must acknowledge it not only reasonable but ne∣cessary, to distinguish between their Faith, and their Phi∣losophy. Their Faith, which they received srom the Scriptures, and the Universal Tradition of the Catholick Church, is plain and simple, and the same in all. That there is but One God, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit; that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are

each of them by himself, True and Perfect God, and all but One God, which is a Trinity in Unity, and Unity in Trinity; that they are in a true and proper Sense, Three and One. This is the Catholick Faith, wherein they all agree; but then those Philosophical Terms, which the im∣portunities of Hereticks, who corrupted either the Faith of the Unity or Trinity, forced them to use in the Explication of this Mystery, are of a different Consideration: These have not always been the same, nor have all agreed in them; and the wisest Men have owned great Improprieties in them all, when applied to this Sacred Mystery; and indeed it is impossible to be otherwise; for that infinite Difference and Diversity there is between the Divine and Humane Nature, nay all created Nature, can never admit of any Common Terms proper to express both. The most perfect Creatures bear only some imperfect Analogy and Resemblance to what we conceive of God; and therefore when we apply such Words and Terms to the Divine Natur••, as are borrowed from Creatures, (and we have no other) we must under∣stand them only by way of Analogy and Accommodation; and when we expound such Terms as are used by the Ca∣tholick Fathers in such an accommodated Sense, we must apply them no further, than that particular Matter they intended to represent by them. I have already sh••wn this in several particular Passages relating to the Homoousion, but now I am more particularly to consider the difference between Essence and Hypostasis; and I shall only shew how the matter of fact stands, what has occasioned this difficulty, what the true state of the Controversy is, and how we may form some sensible notion of this Distincti∣on; and if I should mistake in so nice a Point as this, I hope it will be a pardonable Mistake, while I make no change in the Catholick Faith, and intend it only as an Essay, if it be possible to silence or qualify the Dispute about words.

The Greek Fathers attribute all the Heresies relating to the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incar∣nation,* 1.302 to this one Mistake, that Es∣sence and Hypostasis are the same; for then if there be but One Essence in the Blessed Trinity, there must consequent∣ly be but One Hypostasis, which is Sabellianism; or if there be Three Hypostases, there must be Three Natures and Es∣sences, either in the Arian or Tritheistick Notion: Thus with reference to the Incarnation, two Natures must be two Persons, or Hypostases, as Nestorius taught, or One Person must be but One mixt and compounded Nature too, which was the Heresy of Eutyches.

This some Fathers thought a fundamental Error in Phi∣losophy, introduced by Aristotle, who makes the first Sub∣stance, which is the only true and pro∣per Substance,* 1.303 to be that which is pre∣dicated of no Subject, nor is in any Sub∣ject, that is, what we call, a Subsisting Individual, as this Man, or this Horse. And therefore Theorianus observes, That the Catholick Fathers understood Essence and Hypostasis in a very different sense from the Greek Philosophers;* 1.304 that is, by Essence, and Sub∣stance, they did not mean one singular Individuum, or sin∣gular Nature and Substance, as Aristotle did; but a com∣mon Nature, not a common Notion, as Genus or Species, which are Aristotle's second Substances, but a common Sub∣sisting Nature, which is one and the same, whole and per∣fect in every Individual of the same kind. And what Ari∣stotle call'd his first Substance, a singular Subsisting Nature, that they called Hypostasis, a common Subsisting Nature, with its individuating Characters and Properties.

It is evident some Ages past, before these words Essence and Hypostasis were thus nicely distinguished, or at least be∣fore

this Distinction was so unanimously received; for as I have already observed, these Words were used very pro∣miscuously, which occasioned the Alexandrian Schism; and it does not appear to me, that this Distinction was setled by Athanasius, and the Bishops with him, in that Synod, as some seem to think; though soon after it gene∣rally prevailed, as we may learn from St. Basil, Gregory Nyssen, St. Cyril of Alexandria, Damascen, Leontius, Theo∣rianus, Theodorus Abucara, Ignatius Sinaita, and generally all the Catholick Writers of the Eutychian and Severian Age, who universally agree in this, That Essence and Hy∣postasis differ as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as that which is Universal, differs from what is Proper and Singular.

Now so far these Fathers were certainly in the right, That if they must apply Philosophical Terms to Divine Mysteries (which the Cavilling Objections of Hereticks made necessary) there was an absolute necessity for them to change their signification; for as there is nothing com∣mon to God and Creatures, so there can be no words in the same sense common to them; but then this only re∣quires an accommodation of words to Divine Mysteries by way of analogy and resemblance, but not to change the Language and Philosophy of Created Nature, which after all our Attempts, and all our Art of Expression, will fall infinitely short of the Divine Nature, and give us but a very imperfect Image of it. And if by such Attempts we confound our Notions and Ideas of Nature too, we shall so much the more confound and perplex our Ideas of God. It may help to ease mens Minds of some Notions which lie cross and uneven: Briefly to state this matter.

I confess, I am not satisfied of that absolute necessity, which some pretend, of stating nicely and Philosophically this distinction between Nature and Person, in order to understand the Doctrine of the Trinity. This was the Catholick Faith long before this Distinction was univer∣sally

received; and Men who understand little of this Di∣stinction, may believe very orthodoxly in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, without it: Nay the best, the safest, and easiest way, to understand these and all other Philoso∣phical Terms applied to the Explication of this Faith, is to fit them to those Scripture Ideas we have of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, each of them True and Perfect God, and all Three but One God, as I have shewn at large in the First Chapter. But since there is a very warm Dispute about Nature and ••erson, and has been for many Ages, and this Distinction is become necessary to secure the Ca∣tholick Faith against the Attempts of Hereticks on both sides, as the Church has found by long Experience; it will be necessary to set this matter in as clear a light as possible we can.

And the best way I can think of to do this, is 1. To consider this distinction of Nature and Person in Creatures: As for instance, in a Man; What the distinction between Nature and Person is in Man; and to shew, which way soever we state this matter, how improper all these No∣tions are to represent this distinction between Nature and Person in the Blessed Trinity. And 2. To shew how the Catholick Fathers accommodated these Names of Essence and Person to the Explication of this Mystery, and what Unity, and what Distinction they intended to represent by them.

1. As for the first, If the Infinite distance between God and Creatures will allow us to Philosophize freely about Created Nature, without incurring the Suspicion of He∣resy; I must confess, I never could form a distinct notion of the difference between a subsisting Nature and Hypo∣stasis, or Person in Man; but do what I can, I can con∣ceive no otherwise of an Individual Subsisting Human Nature, but as of an Individual Subsisting Human Hypo∣stasis,

or Person; nor of an Individual Human Person, than as of an Individual Subsisting Human Nature. And I have some reason to think, that this is not peculiarly my Case; for besides that I find other thinking Men blunder∣ed in this matter, and could never yet meet with a clear and sensible Explication of it; I observe, that there is no word, which in its original institution signifies this diffe∣rence; and it is reasonable to think, as to Created Nature, that Mankind have no notion of that, which they have no word for.

It is sufficiently known, that Hypostasis originally sig∣nifies Essence and Substance, not Person as distinguisht from Nature, which is a later, and a mere Ecclesiastical use of it; and it is confessed, that Persona and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 were taken from the Stage, and when they were applied to signify a true and real Man, they signified only the Man himself, not the Personality of a Man, as distinguished from an Individual Subsisting Nature: And, which is much more considerable, some of the Fathers, as I observed before, confess, that Aristotle knew no such distinction; but in his Philosophy, Essence and Hypostasis signified the same thing; for Nature and Essence, which is his first Substance, is an Individuum, which subsists not as part of another, but as whole and compleat, which the Fathers call Hypostasis; and therefore Aristotle's first Substance, and what these Fathers call Hypostasis, is in Creatures one and the same thing; and yet all confess, That no man ever more nicely distinguisht all the distinguishable Notions in Nature, than Aristotle did, that what escaped his ob∣servation, must be very nice indeed.

And though St. Basil, and St. Gregory Nyssen, and the other Catholick Writers of that Age, do distinguish be∣tween Essence and Hypostasis, that they differ as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, what is common to all the Individuals of the same kind, which is a common Nature, and what is pro∣per

and peculiar to each Individual, and distinguishes one man from another; yet I do not remember, that they quar∣relled with the Greek Philosophers, or apprehended that they themselves taught any new Philosophy in this Point, as afterwards Theorianus, and others did; nor can I see any other difference there is between them, if candidly in∣terpreted, but only in words.

The short account of the matter is this. Aristotle's first Substance, which subsists by it self, these Fathers, as they themselves own, call Hypostasis, not Nature, Essence, and Substance; that is, every subsisting Individuum is Aristotle's Nature, Essence, and Substance, the Fathers Hypostasis; now when they mean the same thing, and own that they do so, so far they are agreed in the thing, and differ only in words. But then these Fathers in every Hypostasis distinguished between the common Nature, and such Personal Properties, which distinguished com∣mon Nature into Individuals, or were Characteristical Marks, whereby to know one Person from another. Now Aristotle indeed never made such a distinction as this; but yet all that is material in it, is included in his Notion and Definition of Substance.

For when these Fathers distinguish in every Hypostasis, what is common to the whole Kind, and what is proper and peculiar to each Individuum, they mean no more by it, but that Peter, for instance, considered as a Man, is perfectly the same that Iames and Iohn are, considered al∣so as Men, though there is something so peculiar to Peter, as to make him a particular Human Person, and to distin∣guish him from Iames and Iohn, and all other Men in the World. Now it is certain, neither Aristotle, nor any Man of sense, would ever have denied any thing of all this; for it is evident, that there is something wherein all Men agree, and something proper to every particular Man. That which is the same in all Men, the Fathers call a common Nature,

and so does Aristotle, a common Specifick Nature; but here is some appearance of difference between them, which I think, if rightly stated, is none at all. Aristotle makes Nature as actually subsisting by it self; as suppose Human Nature in Peter or Iames, to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Individuum, a particular, Singular Nature, and that it is common only in Notion, as every particular Man has a Nature of the same kind, or a true Human Nature.

These Fathers on the contrary affirm, That Human Nature, as considered in Peter, or any other particular Man, is a common Nature, distin∣guished into Hypostases, by something proper, peculiar, and particular to each.* 1.305 That all Nature is common to all the Hypostases of the same kind, and that it is impossible to find a particular and appropriated Nature.

Now as great an appearance as here is of a direct Contra∣diction, a little consideration, I believe, will satisfy all thinking Men, that Aristotle would have owned all that these Fathers say, and then the only Dispute will be, which of them speak most properly, which is of no great mo∣ment in this Cause.

For what do these Fathers mean by a common Nature? Do they mean, that there is but one Numerical Subsisting Nature common to all the Individuals? but one Universal Human Nature in all the particular men in the World? By no means. Damascen expresly teaches, That the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the common Nature in Creatures, is only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to be known by Reason; but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the distinction of Hypostases, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is seeen in the things themselves, in their separate Existence. But what is this common Nature,* 1.306 which is seen by Rea∣son? why, every particular Man is a

reasonable Mortal Creature; each of them is Flesh animated by a reasonable Soul and Mind, and this is the common Nature which is seen by Reason; com∣mon, because it is perfectly and inva∣riably the same in all, though each of these Hypostases, in which this common Nature is, subsist distincty and separately by themselves, and therefore the common Nature too subsists distinctly and separately in these separate Hypostases. Now would Aristotle, or any one for him, deny that his first Substance, though it be an Individuum, which subsists compleatly and separately by it self, is in this sense a common Nature, as being perfectly the same in all the Individuals; or in the Language of the Fathers, in all the Hypostases of the same Nature?

There can be no such thing, as what Aristotle calls a Spe∣cies, if every Individual have not the common Nature; for Nature subsists only in Individuals; and if that be not a common Nature, it cannot have a common Name and Definition; if Human Nature be not perfectly the same in Peter, Iames, and Iohn, the Name and Definition of a Man cannot equally and universally be∣long to them all.* 1.307 And therefore Da∣mascen was certainly in the right, who from an Universal Predication infers, that common Nature is the Species; and that for this reason, Nature is pre∣dicated of its Hypostases, or Individu∣als, because in every Hypostasis of the same kind, there is the same perfect Na∣ture. Every Man has the perfect Nature of a Man; and for that reason, and no other, the Name and Definition of a Man belongs to every Man.

Upon this account it is, that they re∣ject 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.308 a par∣ticular, singular Nature; because then the same Hypostases must have both the same, and a diverse Nature, even the Persons of the Holy Trinity. If Nature be perfectly the same in all the Hypostases, it is a common Nature; but if Human Nature in Peter have any thing peculiar and different from Human Nature in Paul, it is then a particular Humanity, and Peter and Paul are not perfectly of the same kind, which is one Notion, wherein they rejected a particular Nature; which added to what I discoursed above, that by a particular Nature, they meant a whole, absolute Individual Nature, it includes, I think, all that they meant, when they rejected as He∣resy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Three Individual Natures in the Trinity: By Three particular Natures, they always un∣derstood Three Absolute, Whole, Individual Natures, and this alone is Trith••ism, for Three such Absolute Divi∣nities must be Three Gods; but besides this, they thought there could not be Three Individual Natures, without some essential difference to distinguish and number Na∣tures, and this added a mixture of Arianism to Tritheism, and made, at least in part, Three different Divinities, that they were partly of the same, and partly of a different Na∣ture. For, as far as I can understand this matter, the rea∣son why they rejected Singular and Individual Natures, was not, that Human Nature, for instance, does not sub∣sist singly and individually, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Damascen speaks, in Peter and Paul, and every individual Man in the World; but because what is common to all without the least Alterity or Diversity, can be but one in all, for Alteri∣ty and Diversity is necessary ••o make a Number; and there∣fore Nature, which is perfectly the same in all, though it subsists singly in Individuals, is not an Individual it self,

as having no principle of Individuation in it self, that is, no Diversity: For which reason it may be numbred with the Hypostases, with the numbring Number; but the res numerata, that Nature which is numbred with the Hypostases, is but one in all, as I have shewn above.

In this sense also these Fathers rejected an Individual Na∣ture, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in their Disputes with the Severians, concerning the Personality of Christ's Human Nature: These Hereticks taught, That every Nature is an Indivi∣duum, Hypostasis, or Person, and therefore the Human Nature of Christ, if it were true Human Nature, must be a Human Hypostasis or Person too: In answer to which, these Fathers absolutely denied that there is any such thing as an Individual Nature; that pure Nature is no Hyposta∣sis, not that it can't subsist, for the Human Nature of Christ does actually subsist; but that meer Nature has no individuating Principle in it self to distinguish it into diffe∣rent Hypostases, but is distinguished not by any Essential Diversity, but by Personal Properties; that Nature with Personal Properties is a Person, and therefore if there be a Subsisting Nature, which has no Personal Properties, but is distinguished some other way from Human Nature in Human Persons, it is certain it is Human Nature, but no Human Person: And thus it is with the Human Nature of Christ, which is distinguished from Human Nature in all others by its Hypostatical Union to the Eternal Word, which is no Personal Property, and therefore does not make it a distinct Person, though it be a perfect Subsisting Nature.

This is the best and easiest Account I can give of the Philosophy of these Fathers, concerning a Common and Individual Nature, which if it be thought a new way of speaking, yet it is what may be understood, and has a great deal of old Truth in it; and will help us to understand the

Fathers in these Disputes about the Trinity and Incarna∣tion, a little better than I find many men do.

Let us then in the next place, inquire what these Fathers mean by Hypostasis, and how they distinguish it from Nature in Created Beings. Now they themselves tell us, That by Hypostasis, they mean Aristotle's first Substance, or that which subsists by it self; not as a Part in a Whole, nor as Accidents in a Subject, but is a perfect whole it self, and has a compleat Subsistence of its own. What is it then that subsists by it self? For that is Aristotle's first Sub∣stance, and the Fathers Hypostasis: And that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Na∣ture, Essence, and Substance: For nothing else can subsist by it self, as is evident in Aristotle's Definition of Essence and Substance; and though the Fa∣thers put something more into their Definition of Hypostasis,* 1.309 yet it comes all to one. For as Damascen tells us, Every Hypostasis is perfect Nature and Substance; and therefore the Hypo∣stases do not differ from each other in Nature, but only in such peculiar and Characteristical Accidents, as distin∣guish Hypostases. For the Definition of Hypostasis is Nature with its Acci∣dents: That every Hypostasis has the common Nature with its peculiar di∣stinguishing Accidents, subsisting by it self. So that an Hypostasis is nothing else but Nature with its Accidents and distinguishing Characters, subsisting by it self: Now we know Accidents do not subsist by themselves, but if they be Inherent Accidents, they subsist in Nature and Substance; and therefore though they may distinguish Hypostases and Persons, do not constitute an Hypostasis, and therefore are owned to be only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the peculiar distinguishing Marks and Cha∣racters

of Hypostases or Persons, whereby they are known from each other: But the Marks and Characters which distinguish Hypostases, are not the Hypostases themselves; such as the Time when they were born, the Place where they lived, their Parentage, Name, Features of Body, Endowments of Mind, and a hundred other distingushing Marks, for these are very different in different Persons, and as changeable in the same Persons, as Time, Age, Place, Features of Body, Endowments of Mind, Trades, Offices, &c. and yet all these are Persons, and the same Persons under all these Changes.

Now setting aside all these Characters and Accidents, which cannot make a Person, but only distinguish one Person from another, there is nothing left to be the Hy∣postasis or Person, but only the common Nature subsisting by it self: Common, as it is the same in every Individual, but an Hypostasis or Individuum by a separate Existence, or subsisting by it self. For an Individuum, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is one undivided Whole, subsisting by it self, and therefore a whole, perfect, undivided Human Nature, subsisting by it self, is an Hypostasis, or Person, one single, individual Man, though there were no other Mark and Character to distinguish him from other Men, but only this Separate Subsistence.

The Humanity of our Saviour is a plain Demonstration of this, that it is only a Separate Existence, or subsisting by it self (which in Created Beings is the same thing) that makes Human Nature an Hypostasis, or Person. All Ca∣tholick Christians own, that Christ took Human Nature on him, but not a Human Hypostasis or Person, and there∣fore in him we may see the difference between Nature and Person.

What then was Christ's Human Nature? I know no more of it, but that he had a true Body of Flesh, animated by a Reasonable Soul, such a Body, and such a Soul, as

other Men have, and this is Human Nature: But why is not this Human Body and Soul a Human Person too? Did he want the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some pe∣culiar Marks and Characters to distinguish him from all other Human Persons? By no means! He had more of these Marks of Distinction, and more Authentick ones, than any other Man ever had. The Time and Place of his Birth, his Parentage, his Miracles, his Doctrine, the minute Circumstances of his Death, his Resurrection, &c. were foretold by Ancient Prophets, and he distinguished himself from all the rest of Mankind by those wonderful things he did, that if peculiar distinguishing Characters make a Person, he was more a Person than ever any Man was before or since. What then was wanting to make us Human Nature a Human Person? Truly nothing, but only subsisting by it self, which it never did, but in union to the Eternal Word. This I think looks very like a Demonstration, that an Hypostasis is nothing but Nature subsisting by it self; for all that the Humanity of Christ had, without being a Human Person, cannot make a Person, for then the Human Nature of Christ must have been a Human Person too; and that which alone was wanting to make the Human Nature of Christ a Person, which was subsisting by it self, must be the only thing which makes Nature a Person.

I have the rather chose this Instance, because the Huma∣nity of Christ, which is no Person, is often alledged to prove, that there must be some peculiar mode of Subsistence, which must coalesce with common Nature to make a Person.

This, I confess, is Language which I do not under∣stand, if there be any thing more meant by i••, than that Nature subsisting by it self is a Person: For Nature which does not subsist, is nothing but in Idea, and Subsistence is a mere Notion without something that subsists; now we may unite these two Notions of Nature and Subsistence,

and form the Idea of a Subsisting Nature, which is all the coalescing I know of; but actual Production makes a Sub∣sisting Nature, which is not Nature and Subsistence, or a mode of Subsistence coalescing, but Nature in Act. In a Subsisting Created Nature, which does not necessarily ex∣ist, we may distinguish between the Notions of Nature and Subsistence, but a Subsisting Nature is nothing but Nature in being, Nature which is, that is, Nature it self; for the meer Idea of Nature is not Nature. But Subsistence has a Mode, and there must be a peculiar manner of Sub∣sistence to make a Person: Must every Person then have a peculiar manner of Subsistence? Are there then as many peculiar Manners and Modes of Subsistence, as there are, or ever have been, or ever shall be, distinct Persons in the World? This is beyond my Philosophy. I have heard of a Compleat and Incompleat Subsistence, to subsist by it self, or to subsist as a Part in the Whole, or an Accident in a Sub∣ject, &c. but I never could understand, that any other Sub∣sistence strictly belongs to the Notion of an Hypostasis or Person, but to subsist by it self. The Human Nature of Christ did upon all other Accounts, as truly and properly subsist, as any other Man in the World, but was no Person, as not subsisting by it self, but in Union to the Eternal Word; which made it the Human Nature of the Word, which was made Flesh, and dwelt amongst us.

All this Talk about the different Modes and manner of Subsistence, seems to be a mistake of the Fathers Doctrine concerning the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which these Men tran∣slate Modes of Subsistence, of which more anon; but at pre∣sent I only observe, That the Fathers do not place the Per∣sonality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in these Modes of Subsistence, but only distinguish and characterize their Persons by them, and from thence prove the real distinction of Persons in the Individual Unity of the Divine Essence: But then I do not remember, that they so much as distin∣guish

all Created Persons by their peculiar Modes of Sub∣sistence.

I know very well, that both Damascen and others, give an Example of this in Adam, Eve, and Seth; that Adam was immediately formed by God of the Dust of the Earth, Eve formed of one of Adam's Ribs, and Seth begotten of Adam and Eve, which they call their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which in this Example can signify nothing else but their different manner of Production, not different Modes of Subsistence; but then they do not alledge this as the formal Reason of Personality, nay not as necessary to the distinction of Persons, (though such Peculiarities, when∣ever they are, will always distinguish Persons) but all they designed by it, was to prove, that such different ways of coming into being, made no change or alteration in Na∣ture; for Adam, Eve, and Seth, had all the same Human Nature, though formed after such a different manner; in answer to the Arian Objection against the Homoousion, that an Unbegotten and Begotten Nature cannot be the same, and therefore Father and Son not Consubstantial.* 1.310 Indeed this would have been a very ill Example of the Distinction of Persons by these different Modes of Subsistence, because it could only distinguish Adam and Eve from all the rest of Mankind; for all Mankind ever since, excepting our Savi∣our, have come into the World the same way that Seth did, and therefore are not distinguished by a peculiar manner of Subsistence, for they have all the same; and consequently ei∣ther are not distinct Persons, or else such peculiar Modes of Subsistence, coalescing with common Nature, do not con∣stitute the Person. And yet I can meet with no other Ac∣count of any Modes of Subsistence necessary to the consti∣tution of a Created Person (excepting their Personal Pro∣perties and Characters, which do not make, but only di∣stinguish Persons, which are not properly Modes of Sub∣sistence, but Modes, Affections, and Properties of the

Subsisting Nature); but only a sepa∣rate Subsistence,* 1.311 that every Created Hypostasis, or Person, subsists by it self, and separately from all others. And herein both Fathers and Philoso∣phers, notwithstanding some difference in words, seem well enough agreed, and this is all that I need say concerning the Distinction between Nature and Person in Created Beings.

But now every one who understands the True Catholick Faith of the Trinity, must needs be sensible, how impro∣per all this is to explain that Venerable Mystery of One Nature, and Three Persons, in the Unity of the Godhead, if we apply these Terms strictly and properly.

The Catholick Fathers would not allow Aristotle's Defi∣nition of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Nature, Essence, and Substance, that it is that which subsists by it self; because this leaves no possi∣ble distinction between Essence and Hypostasis, without which we can never defend the Faith of One Nature in Three Persons; for what in his Sense thus subsists by it self, is an Individual and Singular Nature, which is the same with Hypostasis, and then it is impossible there should be Three Hypostases in One Singular Nature, which is but One Hypostasis.

But after all, Do these Fathers deny, that the Divine Nature is One Individual Nature? Do they not, as I have largely shewn, make this the Fundamental Reason of the Divine Unity, That there is but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Divinity in Three Perfect Hypstases; and that this One Divinity is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Per∣fect Indivisible Vnit, and Monad; and that in a very dif∣ferent Sense from what they own in Creatures? So that in some Sense these Fathers own, That the Divine Nature is as True an Individuum, and infinitely a more Perfect

Vnit and Monad, than Aristotle's First Substance, though his First Substance is, and can be but One Hypostasis, and the Divine Nature subsists perfectly in Three.

And therefore to qualify this, they tell us, That Nature signifies the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that which is common to all the Hy∣postases of the same Nature; but the Hypostasis is the common Nature with some peculiar and distinguishing Properties, subsisting separately by it self; and this seems to give us a better image and resemblance of One Nature in Three Hypostases; for here is one common Nature, not only in Three, but in all the distinct Hypostases of that Nature, that ever were, or ever shall be: But I'm sure this needs greater qualification, when applied to the My∣stery of the Trinity, than Aristotle's ••irst Substance, or it will unavoidably introduce, not merely Tritheism, but Po∣lytheism without end; for God can limit the Numbers of Created Hypostases, but the number of Hypostases in an Infinite necessary Nature can never be limited, if the Di∣vine Nature be common to the Divine Hypostases, only as Humane Nature is common to Human Hypostases.

They teach, as I have already observed, That Human Nature, for instance, is a common Nature, and that every Hypostasis, or every particular Man has this same common Nature; but then it is a common Nature, not as it is nu∣merically One in all, for it subsists separately in every Hy∣postasis, and therefore in this sense is not One common Numerical, Individual Nature; but it is common only, as it is perfectly the same in all. Which they will not allow to be a meer common Notion, but a common Specifick Nature; for the Nature is the Species, which is the foundation of the common Predication: For there∣fore all Men have the common Name and Definition of a Man, because they have the same common Human Nature.

And thus, though every Hypostasis has not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a particular Nature, as that signifies a distinction in the Nature it self, yet it has the common Specifick Indivi∣dual Nature; that is, that Nature which makes the Spe∣cies, and is common, as it is the same in all, but yet sub∣sists individually 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and separately in each Hypo∣stasis. But now will any Catholick Christian say, that thus it is in the Ever Blessed Trinity? That the One Common Divinity is One and Common, only as One Common Humanity is, that is, that it is perfectly the same in all? not One Individual, but One Specifick Na∣ture: Or will he say, That each Divine Person has one whole intire Specifick Divinity, as every Human Person has a whole Specifick Humanity? As far as I can see, this would as unavoidably make Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Gods, as Peter, Iames, and Iohn, are three Men; and a common Nature, and personal Properties, and different Modes of Subsistence, would no more pre∣vent a Trinity of Gods. than a Trinity of Men.

This, I think, plainly shews, how vain an Attempt it is to find out any Notions of Unity and Distinction, of Nature and Person, or any words to express those Notions by, common to God and Creatures. These Creature-Ideas, and Creature Terms, can be applied to God only by way of Analogy and Accommodation, and that a very imperfect one too.

2. Let us then consider, how the Catholick Fathers ac∣commodated these Names of Essence and Person to the ex∣plication of this Mystery, and what they intended to re∣present by them. I shall do this in as few words as possibly I can, that what I have to say may be the more easily un∣derstood.

They tell us, That all Nature is common, that Human Nature is common to all Mankind, and the Divine Nature common to all the Three Divine Persons, Father, Son,

and Holy Ghost; not that they thought the Divinity or Godhead a common Nature, merely as Human Nature is common, but there is this Analogy between them; that the Divine Nature is not singular, or does not subsist in Singularity, but in Three Hypostases, as Human Nature is common, because it is not confined to one, but is in all Human Hypostases; and that the Divine Nature is per∣fectly and invariably the same in each Hypostasis, as the Human Nature is, which for this Reason is called a com∣mon, not a particular Nature; which is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Sameness, Identity, not Singularity, of Nature in the Blessed Trinity. Thus far the Analogy holds, (which is a direct opposition both to Sabellianism and Arianism) but it reaches no farther; for the Divine Nature is not a com∣mon Specifick Nature, as all Created Nature is common, for the Godhead is no Species; that is, there is, and can be but One God: Which I have already at large shewn to be the Sense of the Fathers. They expresly teach, That the Divine Nature is an Individual Nature, but not Singular; it is common, as being whole and perfect in more Hypo∣stases than One, which excludes Singularity, but it is one whole Entire, Individual Nature; so one Individual, as Human Nature is one in one Man. For though Indivi∣dual and Singular is the same in Creatures, it is not so in the Divine Nature; nor can it be, if the Catholick Faith be One Nature, One Divinity in Three Perfect Hypostases: And if we can form any sensible Notion of this, it will si∣lence all the pretences of Jargon, Nonsense, Contradiction, Tritheism, which are so constantly objected against this Venerable Mystery. And therefore I shall briefly inquire, 1. What that One Divinity is, which is common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and how it is common: 2. How this common Nature is in a strict and proper Sense, One In∣dividual Nature. And I think this is easily accounted for from the Doctrine of the Fathers.

1. As for the first; This 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Divinity, is the Divinity of the Father, the Natura Patris, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Nature of the Father, and the Divinity of the Father, who is the Eternal Self-originated Mind, which has no Second, and therefore there can be no other, no Se∣cond, or Third Divinity. Now this One Divine Nature, One Divinity of the Father, is common to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit: Common, I say, not merely as Human Nature is common to all Men, because it is the same in all, perfectly the same 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, though it be not the same Individual Nature in all, which is singular and incommu∣nicable in Creatures; but it is common by a perfect com∣munication, whole of whole; that it is no New Divinity, but the Divinity of the Father, which is in the Son, who is therefore so often, as I observed above, called the Nature, and Divinity, and Mind of the Father, his Image and Cha∣racter, and that which is signified by all this, his Eternal, Living, Omnipotent Word. I do not intend to prove all this over again, which I have abundantly proved already, but only to put every thing into its proper place, that we may view the Whole in a true light.

This Divine Nature then of the Father which is but One, is that One Divinity, which is by an Eternal Ineffable Ge∣neration communicated whole and perfect to the Son, and by a like Eternal and Ineffable Procession to the Holy Spi∣rit: But still the difficulty is, How this is One Nature, which is not Singular, nor subsists in Singularity, but in Three Proper, Distinct, Compleat Hypostases, or Per∣sons.

2. And therefore rightly to apprehend this, we must inquire into the Notion of One Individual Nature. Now that which is most obvious, and which the Fathers perpe∣tually alledge in justification of the Divine Unity, is, That an Individual is an undivided Nature, and therefore the One Divinity of the Father, though actually communi∣cated

to the Son, and Holy Spirit, is One Individual Divi∣nity, because it is communicated whole and perfect, with∣out Division or Separation; and that which is undivided is One.

But though to be undivided be essential to the Notion of an Individual Nature, yet there must be something else to compleat this Notion, or at least to give us a more distinct conception of it.

Could Human Nature propagate it self whole and com∣pleat to Two or Three, without any division or separation of Substance, this could not make it One Individual Na∣ture, though they were undivided; for One Individual Nature, is One whole Compleat Nature, without division; which is all that is essential to such a Being, and is this all but once, and that without division.

But how will this agree with the Notion of One Divi∣nity, or One Individual Divine Nature? For does not the One Divine Nature, which is the Divinity of the Father, subsist compleatly and distinctly, though without division and separation, in the Son and Holy Ghost; and will you call this One Individual Nature, which is not singularly in One, but subsists distinctly in Three? Yes, I will, because all these Three, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are essen∣tial to the Notion of One Divinity, and therefore are One Individual Divinity in Three; for an Individual Nature is that, which without division has all that is essential to such a Nature.

Well, But is not the Father then, in his own Person, True and Perfect God, and the Son True and Perfect God, and the Holy Ghost True and Perfect God? that is, Have not each of these Divine Persons all the Divine Perfections included in the Notion and Idea of God? And are they not Three who have all the Perfections of the Divine Na∣ture? and how then is this One Individual Nature?

I answer: When I say, That One Individual Nature is that which has all that is essential to such a Nature; by Essential I mean, not only Essential Properties, Qualities, Powers, and Perfections, (which are commonly called Na∣ture, there being no other notion of Nature in Created Be∣ings) but Essential Productions too, which (when there is any such thing) are as essential to Nature, as any other Properties or Perfections. In the first Sense of Essential, the Divine Nature is not singular, but communicated by the Eternal Father to the Eternal Son, and by Father and Son to the Eternal Spirit, and all Three are Infinite in Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, and all other Divine Per∣fections. This is but One Divinity, One Godhead; for there is not a Second and Third Divinity in the Son, and in the Holy Spirit, but the One Divinity of the Father.

But yet we must confess, that here is Number; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are Three, and how can that Divini∣ty, which is perfectly and distinctly in Three, be One In∣dividual Nature, One Numerically; One as Human Na∣ture in every particular Man is One?

Now this must be resolved into the second Notion of Es∣sential, for Essential Productions; for all Essential Pro∣ductions in the Unity of Nature, though they may be di∣stinguished and numbred among themselves, are but One Individual Nature. It will be in vain to seek for an Ex∣ample of this in Created Nature, and I believe the rea∣son of it will be evident without it.

An Eternal Self-originated Mind is True and Perfect God, the First Supreme Cause of all things, and has all the Perfections of the Divinity wholly in it self, is the One and only True God: But if it be essential to an Eternal Mind to have an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Word and Spirit, by an Eternal Generation and Procession, then this Eternal Word and Spirit are essential to an Eternal

Mind, not as Essential Perfections, or Essential Parts, but as Essential Productions or Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature. Thus the Scripture represents this Mystery, That there is One God, who has an Eternal Word, and an Eternal Spirit; and the Catholick Fathers, as I have already observed, insist on this as a natural De∣monstration of a Trinity, That the Eternal Mind must have its Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit. Now if the Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit are essential to the Eter∣nal Mind, it is certain, that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the Eternal Mind, its Word, and Spirit, are but One Indi∣vidual Divinity; every thing that is essential, is included in the Notion of an Individual Nature; for that is not a Compleat and Perfect Nature, nor an adequate notion of Nature, that wants any thing that is essential. Now though we may have a general Notion and Idea of a God, That he is an Absolutely Perfect Being, which Includes all the Divine Attributes and Perfections, without knowing any thing of the Son, or Holy Ghost; yet if we consider this Absolutely Perfect Being as Eternal Self-originated Mind, with its Eternal Word and Spirit, as essential Pro∣ductions or Processions, we can consider them no other∣wise, but as One Individual Divinity; this Eternal Word and Spirit being essential Processions of the Eternal Mind, which can never be separated from it: For such essential Processions are not only coeval and consubstantial with the Nature from whence they proceed; as the Sun, its Light and Heat, (by which Argument the Catholick Fathers proved the Coeternity and Consubstantiality of the Son and Holy Spirit with the Eternal Father) but whatever distinction there is between them, they are One Individual Nature, if all that be One Individual Nature, which is essential to such a Being; and such all essential Processions are, as well as essential Perfections. These are two very different Questions, and of a very different consideration,

What God is? and Who this God is? In an answer to the first, we form the Idea and Notion of all Divine Perfe∣ctions, or of an absolutely Perfect Being, which is the true notion of the Divinity, and whoever has all these Divine Perfections, is True and Perfect God; and this is our na∣tural notion of God, as that signifies the Divinity, which gives no notice of any distinction in the Divinity; for there can be no diversity in Absolute Perfections and there∣fore no distinction or number, according to the Philoso∣phy of the Fathers.

But when we consider who God is, or what is the Sub∣ject of all these Divine Perfections, we can form no other Idea of it, but an Eternal, Infinite, Self originated Mind; this the Wisest Philosophers, as well as Christians, are agreed in, That God is an Infinite Mind; and this right∣ly explained, may teach us some distinction in the Divini∣ty; for all Men must grant, what they feel in themselves, that every Mind has its Word and Spirit, and cannot be conceived without them; and therefore the Eternal Mind must have its Eternal word and Spirit too; and the reason why this did not lead all Mankind into the natural belief of a Trinity of Persons, Mind, Word, and Spirit, in the Unity of the Godhead, was plainly this, Because they found that their own Word and Spirit were not permanent, subsisting Persons, but were the perishing Creatures of the Mind, which were no sooner produced, but died and va∣nished as our Thoughts do, and thus they conceived it was with the Divine Mind; which is one kind of Sabellianism, as I observed above: But yet the Catholick Fathers thought this natural belief, That the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the Divinity, or Divine Mind, is not without its Word, a very proper Medium to prove a real subsisting Word in the Divinity; for an Infinite Perfect Mind, which is all Life, Being, Substance, if it begets its own Word, as every Mind does, must beget a Living, Substantial, Subsisting

Word, the perfect Image and Character of its own Life and Infinite Being.

However, thus much I think we must own, That since every Mind must have its Word and Spirit in the Indivi∣dual Unity of its own Nature; and the Holy Scripture as∣sures us, that God, who is the most perfect Mind, has his Word and Spirit, and that this Divine Word and Spirit is an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Word and Spirit, this is a very good foundation for the belief of a Real Trinity both from Reason and Scripture. The natural Notion and Idea of a Mind, teaches us this distinction in the Divinity; and Natural Reason strongly infers, from the perfect Pro∣ductions of an infinitely perfect Mind; that the Divine Word and Spirit must be an Eternal, Living, Infinite Word and Spirit; and the Holy Scripture confirms all this: And therefore Scripture and Reason are so far from contradicting each other in this Article, that the Belief of the Trinity, though it be ultimately resolved into the Au∣thority of Revelation, yet has Reason on its side, as far as it can judge of such matters: Which proves a considerable Authority, when the obscure and imperfect Conjectures of Reason, are explained and confirmed by Revelation. For though the Notion of an absolutely perfect Being, which is the Natural Idea of the Divinity, teaches no such distinction, yet the Idea of an Infinite∣ly Perfect and Self-originated Mind, which is as natural a Notion of God, does.* 1.312 Thus Damascen teaches us to distinguish be∣tween the Divinity, and in what the Divinity is, or to speak more accurately, what is the Divinity, and that which proceeds eternally from this First Cause, that is, the Hypostases of the Son and Holy Spirit; the first teaches us that there is but One Divinity; the second

shews the distinction of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature. But then (which is what I intended in all this) this very distinction proves one indivi∣dual Divinity, because it is in the indi∣vidual Unity of the same Numerical, not Specifick Nature; for all essential Processions, as the Eternal Word and Spirit are, which cannot so much as in Thought be separated from Original Mind, must continue in the Unity of the same individual Nature.

This is what the Fathers meant by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the One common Divinity, which is individually One in Three perfect Hypostases, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: The Divinity of the Father, of Eternal, Self-originated Mind, is the common Divinity, communicated to the Eternal Word and Spirit, in the individual Unity of Nature.

2. Now this will give us some Notion of the distinction of Nature and Persons in the Eternal Godhead. I say, Persons, not Person; which I take to be the fundamental Mistake which has obscured and perplex'd this Mystery. Men have rack'd their Inventions, to find out some distin∣ction between Nature and Person in every single Person in the Godhead; which it is certain these Fathers never thought of; though their Attempt to distinguish between Nature and Person in every Man, gave some occasion to this Mistake: But I have already proved both from Fathers and Schoolmen, That when they spoke distinctly of each particular Person, they made Person and Nature the same: That the Person of the Father is the Nature of the Father, and the Person of the Son the Nature of the Son. Nor indeed had they any occasion to distinguish between Nature and Person in each single Person, which could do no ser∣vice in this Mystery: For the true reason and occasion for this distinction, was to reconcile the Individual Unity of the Divine Nature, with a Trinity of real Hypostases or

Persons; how One Nature can subsist in Three distinct Hypostases, and continue One Individual Nature: Which had been no difficulty at all, were not each Divine Person by himself the Divine Nature. But how the Divine Na∣ture should subsist whole and perfect in Three distinct Per∣sons, and not be Three distinct Natures, but One Nature, and One Divinity; not specifically, but individually and numerically One; This was the difficulty they were con∣cerned to answer; which the distinction between Nature and Person in each single Person could not answer: For let us suppose such a distinction as this, whatever it be; if the Divine Nature subsist whole and perfect in each distinct Person, the difficulty still remains how the Persons are di∣stinct, and the Nature individually One: As, to put the Case in Human Nature; whatever distinction we allow between Nature and Person in every particular Man; if we allow that every Man has Human Nature as distinctly in himself, as he is a distinct Person, the distinction be∣tween Nature and Person can never prove the Individual Numerical Unity of Human Nature in Three Men.

The Question then is, Not how Nature and Person is distinguish'd in each single Person, (much less, how Three Persons in One singular Nature are distinguished from that singular Nature, which unavoidably reduces a Trinity of Persons to an unintelligible Trinity of Modes); but, How the Three Persons in the Ever-blessed Trinity, which are Three in number, and each of them the Divine Nature, are distinguished from that One Individual Divi∣nity which is in them all, or rather, which they all are. Now what I have already said, seems to me to give a very intelligible Notion of this, viz. That the Divine Nature, which is but One, is the Eternal, Self-originated Divinity, with its Eternal, Essential Processions or Productions; which, as I have already shewn, are but One, not Singular, but Individual Nature, and Individual Divinity: But then

this One Self-originated Divinity is most certainly an Infi∣nite, Eternal, Self-originated Person, if Infinite, Eternal, Self-originated Mind be a Person; and these Eternal Es∣sential Processions are Persons also, if an Eternal, Living, Subsisting Word be a Person, and an Eternal, Living, Sub∣sisting Spirit be a Person; and then it is evident, that there are Three Eternal, Subsisting Persons in the Individual Unity of Nature. These Divine Processions do not mul∣tiply nor divide the Divine Nature, because they are essen∣tial to an Infinite Mind, and are Processions ad intra in the perfect Identity (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) and Individual Unity of Na∣ture; but they are distinct Persons, as being Eternal, Sub∣sisting, Living, Intelligent Processions, which is all that we mean by Persons in this Mystery, with reference to the Eternal Word and Spirit.

For these Three Divine Persons have their different Characters and Order, whereby they are distinguished from each other, which the Fathers call the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by which they meant their different manner of subsisting in the Individual Unity of the Divine Nature, that though they have all the same Divinity, as that signi∣fies all Divine Perfections, yet they have it after a different manner that is, as they constantly explain it, Vnbegotten, Begotten, and Proceeding, as the Athanasian Creed teaches us to believe; The Father is made of none,* 1.313 neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone, not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father, and of the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but pro∣ceeding. This is the only distinction which the Catholick Fathers allow between the Three Divine Persons, and let us consider the nature of it.

Now 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies actual Existence, and that which does actually exist; and therefore the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, signify that there are Three that do actually exist, but af∣ter a different manner: That is, That the Father is Unbe∣gotten, Self-originated Divinity, is God of himself, with∣out any other cause of his Being, and this Self-originated Unbegotten Divinity is the Person of the Father, and in the highest and most absolute sense the One God. The Son is Eternally begotten of his Father's Substance, and lives and subsists in him; and so the Holy Ghost Eternally pro∣ceeds from Father and Son: That is, There is One Eter∣nal Self-originated Divinity with its two Eternal Processi∣ons in the perfect Unity and Identity of the same Nature. The Father's manner of subsistence is easily understood, and secures to him the Prerogative of the One True God; but we must shew this a little more plainly with reference to the Son and Holy Spirit, each of which is by himself True and Perfect God, but not a Second and Third God: The right understanding of which depends upon the true stating of their different manners of subsistence.

And here I need only refer to what I have already dis∣coursed concerning the difference between an Absolute Na∣ture, and Relative Subsistencies in the same Nature. An Absolute Nature is a whole Compleat Nature, with all that essentially belongs to such a Nature, as every perfect Man has all that belongs essentially to the Nature of Man, and thus a Man begets a Man in his own Nature and Like∣ness; and the Son, which is begotten, is upon all accounts as much a Man, as he who begets, and Father and Son are two Men: And to beget, and to be begotten, tho they prove their Persons to be distinct, yet are but External Re∣lations not different manners of subsistence in the same Na∣ture. And thus God does not beget a Son, which would be to beget a Second God: For to beget, and to be begotten, when he who begets, begets in an absolute sense all the same that he

is himself, makes two of the same kind. And therefore we must observe, That 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is the Personal Character and Property of the Father, does not only signi∣fy, that he has no cause of his Being and Nature, but that what he is, he is absolutely in himself, has an Absolute, not a Relative Nature and Subsistence; and so consequent∣ly the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is the Personal Property of the Son, signifies that his Being and Nature is Relative; not only, that he receives his Being and Nature from his Father, but that he so receives it, as to be a Relative Subsistence in his Father's Nature; and the like may be said of the Procession of the Holy Ghost. As to shew this more particularly.

God begets a Son, his own perfect Image and Likeness, but he does not beget his own Absolute Nature in his Son, as Man does, though he begets his Son of his own Nature and Substance; as for instance. God is Perfect, Absolute, Original Mind, not only as Original is opposed to what has a Cause, and a Beginning, but as opposed to an Image; but God does not beget an Absolute Original Mind in his Son, but only his own Eternal, Essential Word, which is the Perfect, Living Image of Eternal, Self-originated Mind, and is it self Eternal, Infinite Mind, in the Eternal Word; but is in its own proper Character, the Eternal Word of the Eternal Mind, not originally an Eternal Mind it self. It has all the Perfections of an Eter∣nal Mind, as a Perfect Word must of necessity have, which is the perfect Sameness and Identity of Nature; but it has all these Perfections, not as Original Mind, but as a Be∣gotten Word, which is a different Mode of Subsistence, and a sensible distinction between the Eternal Mind and its Word in the perfect Identity of Nature.

This I take to be a True and Intelligible Account of these different manners of Subsistence, which distinguish the Divine Persons in the perfect Unity of Nature, that they have all the same Nature, and same Perfections, but

after a different manner; which can never be understood in Absolute Natures and Persons, for three Men, though Father, Son, and Grandson, have all of them Human Na∣ture after the very same manner; but in an Absolute Na∣ture, and Relative Essential Processions, this is to be under∣stood, and proves a real distinction, and perfect Unity. It is evident to all Men, that the Mind and its Word are Two; and it is as evident, that Life, Wisdom, Know∣ledge, are in Absolute, Original Mind, after another man∣ner than they are in its Word; and yet the very Notion of a Mind, and its Word, and that Essential Relation that is between them, makes it a contradiction to say, that any other Life, Wisdom, Knowledge, can be in the Word, than what is in the Mind; which would be to say, That the Word is not the Word of the Mind, if it have any thing that is not in the Mind: For a Natural Word can have nothing but what is in the Mind, and is no farther a Word, than it is the Natural Image of the Mind: And the like may be said concerning the Holy Spirit, which hath all the same Divine Perfections, but in a different manner, from Original Mind, and its Word, as eternally proceed∣ing from both.

This is the Account which the Catholick Fathers give of the Unity of Nature, and Distinction of Persons, in the Ever Blessed Trinity, which answers the Objecti∣ons of our Sabellian, Arian and Socinian Adversaries, and vindicates those Catholick Forms of Speech, which they charge with Tritheism, Contradiction, and Nonsense: As to shew this briefly in one view, for each part of it has been sufficiently confirmed already.

The Catholick Faith teaches us, That there is but One God; and this is demonstrable from the Doctrine of these Fathers. For in this Account I have now given, there is but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, One Absolute Divinity, One Divine Na∣ture, and therefore but One God.

But, say our Adversaries, One God in Natural Religion, and according to the general Sense of Mankind, signifies One Person, who is God: And this also in some sense has always been owned by the Catholick Church; That as there is but One Absolute Divinity, so the Person of the Father, who is this One Absolute Divinity, is this One God; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, there is but One Person, who is God, in this Absolute Sense, because there is but One Fa∣ther, who, as they often speak, is the Fountain of the Deity, that is, of the Divine Processions, of the Son and Holy Spirit: He is the Whole Absolute Divinity himself, and whatever is Divine, Eternally and Essentially proceeds from him, in the Unity of his own Nature.

But at this rate, what Divinity do we leave for the Son, and the Holy Spirit? Truly, the very same by Eternal Ge∣neration and Procession, which is originally and absolutely in the Father: For it is the Nature of the Father, and the Divinity of the Father, which is in the Son and Holy Spi∣rit; as the Fathers constantly own, and as of necessity it must be, because there is no other.

This Eternal Generation and Procession has always been owned as an ineffable Mystery; which we must believe upon the Authority of the Scriptures, without pretend∣ing to know how God begets an Eternal Son, or how the Eternal Spirit proceeds from Father and Son, which we confess we have no Notion of; but we know likewise, That this is no reason to reject this Faith, no more than it is a reason to reject the belief of an Eternal, Self-originated Being; because though it be demonstrable, That there must be an Eternal First Cause of all things, which has no Cause of its own Being, but an Eternal necessary Nature, yet we can no more conceive this, than we can an Eter∣nal Generation and Procession.

Supposing therefore (without disputing that matter at present) that God has an Eternal Son; that Eternal, Self-originated

Mind has an Eternal, Subsisting Word, and an Eternal Spirit, it is evident that this Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit, must have all the same Perfections of the Eternal Mind, must be all that the Eternal Mind is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, excepting its being an Absolute, Self-origina∣ted Mind. Now if he be God, who has the whole Di∣vine Nature and Perfections, then the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, who by Eternal Generation and Pro∣cession have that same Divinity which is absolutely and originally in the Father.

Well then: Here is One Divine Person, viz. the Eter∣nal Father, who is absolutely and originally God; and Two more, the Son, and Holy Ghost, who are each of them in his own Person, true and perfect God, by having all the Divine Perfections: But are not these Three then Three Gods? the Unbegotten God, who is originally and absolutely God, the Begotten God, and the Proceeding God. No, it is the constant Doctrine of the Catholick Fathers, that the Trinity is but One Divinity, and One God, una Summa res, One Supreme Being, as St. Austin taught, and from him Peter Lombard, and was confirmed by the Council of Lateran, in the Condemnation of Ab∣bot Ioachim. For Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though they are Three true and proper Persons, are but One In∣dividual Nature; for it is Essential to the Eternal Mind to have its Eternal Word and Eternal Spirit, and the Eternal Word and Spirit live and subsist in the Mind; and though living, subsisting Persons, yet are as individually One with the Mind, as a Created Mind, its Word and Spirit are One.

Whatever is Essential to Nature, is in the Individual Unity of it; and that is but One Individual Nature which has nothing but what is Essential to it; and therefore if, as I have already observed, and as the Catholick Faith teaches, the Son and Spirit, the Eternal Word and Eter∣nal

Spirit, are Essential Processions of Eternal Original Mind, and essentially, indivisibly, and inseparably in it; Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are as essentially and inseparably One Individual Divinity, as any One Nature is One with it self.

But is not this a kind of Sabellian Composition of a God? A whole Divinity made up of Three partial and incomplete Divinities? Which St. Au∣stin calls a Triformis Deus:* 1.314 By no means! What is compounded, is made up of Parts, which make a compound Nature; but perfect Hypostases, how∣ever united, can make no Composi∣tion: However you unite Iames and Iohn, you can never make a compound Man of them, because each of them have a perfect Human Nature; and as Damascen observes, we do not say, That the Nature or Species is made up of the Hypostases, but is in the Hypo∣stases: So that each Divine Person, be∣ing a complete and perfect Hypostasis, having the whole Divine Nature in himself, as being True and Perfect God; their Union in the same Indivi∣dual Nature, though it makes them One Essential Divinity, yet it cannot make a Compound God; for however their Persons are united, the Divinity or Divine Nature is not compounded, each of them being True and Perfect God, and not One God by Composi∣tion, but by an Individual Unity of Nature in Three. For every Divine Person is not God, in the same sense,

that every Human Person is a Man, as having an Absolute Individual Nature of his own; for in this sense the Father only is God, as being Absolute Original Divinity, an Eter∣nal, Self-originated Mind; and Three such Persons must be acknowledged to be Three Gods; but as I have been forced often to repeat it, the Son and Holy Spirit are Di∣vine Persons, as they are Eternal, Living, Subsisting Pro∣cessions in the Divine Nature, which proves them to have the very same Divinity, and to be but One Individual Di∣vinity, but not One Compound God. For One Individual Nature in Three, though distinguisht into Distinct Subsist∣ing Persons, makes such a natural, inseparable Unity of Will, Energy, and Power, that they are as perfectly One Almighty Agent, as every single Person is One Agent, as I have shewn above.

It is thought by some a manifest Contradiction to say, as the Athanasian Creed teaches us, The Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet there are not Three Gods, but One God. But whoever carefully considers what I have now said, must own, that this is the only true and proper way of speaking in this Mystery. If there be but One Absolute Divinity, there can be but One God; for the Divine Processions in the Unity and Identity of the same Individual Nature, cannot multiply the Divinity, nor multiply the Name and Title of God; for the Name God does not originally, absolutely, and immediately belong to them, but only relatively: The proper immediate Cha∣racter of the Second Person in the Trinity is, not God, but the Son of God, and the Word of God; and so the Third, is the Spirit of God. And though we must neces∣sarily own, that the Son of God, and the Spirit of God, are each of them True and Perfect God, equal in all Divine Perfections to the Father, as being all the same that the Fa∣ther is, excepting his being a Father; yet they are not Three Gods, for this is not their immediate, Original Cha∣racter,

but there is One God the Father, his Eternal Son, and Eternal Spirit. This is what I have above observed from Tertullian, That there is One God with his Oecono∣my, that is, his Son and Spirit, and that Christ is called God, when he is spoken of by himself; but when he is named to∣gether with the Father, he must have his own proper Title, which is the Son of God; and the Reason is the same, as to the Holy Spirit; by which Rule, we can never say, That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, though each of them be God, are Three Gods; but there are Three, God the Father, his Son, and Holy Spirit: The Father God of him∣self, the Son and Spirit Eternal Processions, and Divine Subsisting Relations in the Unity and Identity of the Fa∣ther's Godhead. They have all the same Divinity, their Glory equal, their Majesty coeternal, but their different manner of having it, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, distinguishes their Names and Characters: The Father is God, abso∣lutely God, an Unbegotten, Self-originated Being; so God, that there is no other God besides him. The Son is not absolutely God, but the Son of God; and when he is called God in Scripture, it is in no other sense,-but as the Son of God; for the Son of God, must be God the Son: Nor is the Holy Spirit absolutely God, but the Spi∣rit of God, which is all we mean, when we call him God; for the Spirit of God must be God the Holy Ghost: This is the Catholick Faith, and let any Man try if he can find Three Gods in it: For when we number Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, we must not number them by the common Name of Nature, which is One Undivided Divinity in them all; but by their Relative Names and Characters, which do not only distinguish their Persons, but signify their Unity, Order, and Relations in the same Nature. We must not call them Three Gods, because God is not the original Name of the Son, or Spirit, and therefore they are not Three Gods; but there are Three in the Unity

of the Godhead. The One God the Father, the Son of God, and the Spirit of God; so that there is but One God in the Christian Faith, if the Son of God be the Son of this One God the Father; and the Spirit of God, be the Spirit of this same One God: And though the Son of God be God, and the Spirit of God be God, that is the Name of their Nature, not of their Persons, and therefore can no more be multiplied with the Persons, than the Divine Nature is. The Son of God is God, but it is Authoritate Paternae Na∣turae, as St. Hilary speaks, not by any Absolute Godhead of his own, but in right of his Father's Nature and Divi∣nity, which he received by an Eternal Generation. Thus it must be, where there is but One Absolute Nature, with its Internal Processions.

Let us put the Case in a Human Mind, and suppose, That its Word and Spirit were Distinct, Living, Intelli∣gent Hypostases in the Mind, Essential Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature, perfectly the same with the Mind, but distinct Hypostases; but would any one for this Reason, call these Three, Three Men, or Three Minds? And yet such a Living, Subsisting Word, and a Living Subsisting Spirit, would as perfectly have the Na∣ture of the Mind as the Mind it self, but neither of them would be an absolute Mind, but one the Word of the Mind, and the other the Spirit of the Mind; not Three Minds, but One Mind, with its Essential Word, and Spirit.

This, though an Imaginary Case, gives us a sensible representation of the difference between the Eternal Mind, and its Eternal Word and Spirit; which I freely acknow∣ledge cannot properly be called Three Infinite Minds and Spirits; for though the Eternal, Subsisting Word is an In∣finite Mind, and so the Eternal, Subsisting Spirit, yet Mind, as well as God, is the Name of their Nature, not of their Persons, which is Identically one and the same in all.

This, as I take it, is what some Learned and truly Ca∣tholick Writers mean, in distinguishing the several Accep∣tations of this Name God. That sometimes it signifies the Divine Nature and Essence in general; as when we say, The Trinity is One God, that is, One Divinity; that there is but One Divine Nature and Essence in all the Three Per∣sons of the Holy Trinity: Sometimes it signifies Personally, as when we say, The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; that is, the Person of the Father, the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Holy Ghost is God: But then they are still forced to acknowledge, that the Name God is not predicated Vnivocally of all Three Per∣sons;* 1.315 but that the Father is God in a more excellent and eminent Sense, than the Son is God, or the Holy Ghost God, as being God of himself, an Unbegotten, Self-origi∣nated God, the Fountain of the Deity to the Son and Holy Spirit: Upon which account he is so often by the Catho∣lick Fathers called the One God, and the only True God. Now all this is very True, and very Catholick, but with all submission, it seems to me to be an inconvenient way of speaking, which perplexes the Article with different Senses, and is liable to great Cavils and Misconstructions, as the Examples of Dr. Payn, and the Author of the 28 Proposi∣tions, witness; and when most dexterously managed, will sooner silence than convince an Adversary.

The Divine Essence must be considered only as in the Divine Persons; when we say, That the Trinity is One God, the true meaning is, That Three Persons are One God; and the general abstract Notion of the Unity of Es∣sence does not account for this, but the Unity of the Divine Essence in Three.

Thus to say, That the Father is God in the highest sense of that Name God; and that He alone (strictly speaking) is a Being absolutely perfect, because he alone is Self-existent, and all other Beings, even the Son and Holy Ghost are from

him; may be expounded to a very Catholick Sense, and was certainly so meant; but is liable to great Cavils, when Men take more pains to pick Quarrels with Words, than to understand an Author. An Absolutely Perfect God; and a God that wants any Perfection, sounds not only like Two Gods, but like Gods of different Kinds; for every diversity of Nature alters the Species.

All that is meant by this is certainly True and Catholick, and taught in express words by the Primitive Fathers; That the Father is not the Son, nor the Son the Father; that the Son is all that the Father is, excepting his being the Father, and unbegotten, that is, excepting Paternity, and Self-existence, or Self-origination; and that upon this Ac∣count the Father is eminently called the One God, the Son, God of God; that is, God as the Son of God.

What I have now discoursed seems to me to give the fairest Account of this Matter. I take the Name God always to signify a Person, in whom the Divine Nature is, not the Divinity in the Abstract; and then the Name God must belong to any Person after the same manner, as the Divine Nature is his; that is, he must be called God in no other sense than as he is God. Now, as I have already shewn, there is but One Absolute Divinity, with Two Internal Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature: And if we make this our Rule of Speaking, (as we must do, if this be the Catholick Faith of the Trinity, and we will fit our words to the nature of things) then it is very plain, That the Name God absolutely belongs only to him, who is this Absolute Divinity, that is, the Person of the Father, that no other Person is God in recto, absolutely and simply God, but only he; that he is the One God, the only True God, as both the Scripture and Fathers own.

But what becomes then of the Son, and Holy Ghost? Is not the Son God? and the Spirit God? Yes! the Name and Title of God belongs to them, as the Divine Nature

does; that is, not absolutely, as to the Absolute Divinity, but as to Divine Processions, to Divine Subsisting Rela∣tions in the Unity of the Godhead; that is, the Second Person in the Trinity is God, but not in recto, as God sig∣nifies that Person, who is the Divinity; but as the Son of God, as habens Deitatem, having the Divinity, not abso∣lutely and originally, but by Communication, by Eternal Generation: And so the Holy Spirit is not absolutely God, but the Spirit of God; and God only as the Spirit of God, as an Internal Procession in the Divine Nature.

But in what sense then can we say, That the Trinity is One God, or that Three Persons are One God? Must we not necessarily own, that God in these Propositions is taken Essentially for the Deity in the abstract, and not as con∣sidered in any One Person? For will we say, That the Tri∣nity, or Three Persons, are but One Person? No! and yet in this Proposition, The Trinity is One God; by One God, I understand, One, who is absolutely God, One Ab∣solute Divinity, which is the Father, who has indeed a Son and Spirit, in the Unity of his own Nature and God∣head, each of which is True and Perfect God, but not a Second, and Third God, but the Son of God, and the Spi∣rit of God; Divine Subsisting Relations in the One Abso∣lute Godhead of the Father, which does not multiply the Name nor Nature of God.

This is the Account the Catholick Fathers give of the Unity of God in a Trinity of Persons, and therefore this must be the Catholick Sense of this Proposition: And here it will be proper to observe, That in the Account they give of the Unity of God, that is, the Unity in Trinity, they indifferently assign One Divinity, and One Father, as the Reason of it: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. There is One God, because there is One Divini∣ty; and there is One God, because there is One Father, which are not two different Reasons, but one and the

same; from whence it necessarily follows, That this One Divinity is the Divinity of the Father, and that this One God in Trinity, is the Father; for One God must necessa∣rily signify One Person, when the Father is the One God.

So that the Father, who is the One Absolute Divinity, is the One God, who ceases not to be the One God, (as St. Hilary and others constantly teach) by having a Son, and Holy Spirit, who receive all from him, live and sub∣sist in him, and are eternally and inseparably One with him: Thus we are taught in the Athanasian Creed, to worship One God in Trinity, that is, the Eternal Father, who is the One God, with his Son, and Holy Spirit; and the Trinity in Vnity, that is, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, not Three Gods, but One in the Unity of the Father's Godhead. For the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, is all one, the Glory equal, the Majesty Coeternal: There is but One Godhead, One Glory, One Ma∣jesty, and that is the Godhead, Glory, and Majesty of the Father; and the Son and Spirit are in the Godhead, Glory, Majesty of the Father, as Internal Processions, Li∣ving, Subsisting Relations in the Father's Godhead.

This Account, which I confess is the only Account of this Matter that I can understand, whatever other Faults it may have, which I do not yet see, I'm sure is perfectly Orthodox; is neither Tritheism, Sabellianism, Arianism, nor Socinianism, but the True Catholick Faith, of a Tri∣nity in Unity.

Here is but One Absolute Divinity, but One Father with his Eternal Son and Spirit, in the Unity of his own Nature and Godhead, and therefore but One God: For Three Gods must be Three Absolute Divinities, without any In∣ternal Relation, or dependence on each other. Internal Relations, though Real, Subsisting Relations, can't mul∣tiply Nature, and therefore can't multiply Gods.

Here are Three Real, Proper, Living, Intelligent, Sub∣stantial, Divine Persons, and therefore no Sabellianism, not One Personal God, with three Names, Offices, Mani∣festations, Modes, Powers, Parts.

Here are Three truly Divine Persons, each of which is by himself, or in his own Person, True and Perfect God. The Father God of himself, Unbegottan, Self-originated God, the Fountain of the Deity to the Son and Holy Spirit. The Son, the Son of God, and True and Perfect God, as the Son of God. The Spirit, the Spirit of the Father, and the Son, and True and Perfect God, as the Spirit of God: So that here is neither Arianism, Macedonianism, nor Socinianism; no Made or Created Nature, no Creature in the Ever Blessed Trinity.

No, say our Arian and Socinian Adversaries, neither the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, according to this Hypothesis, are True and Perfect God, as the Father is: Neither of them have Self-existence, or a Fecundity of Nature, which are thought great Perfections in the Father; but the Son is not of himself, but begotten of his Father; nor is the Spirit of himself, but proceeds from Father and Son; and neither of them have a Son, or Spirit of their own, as the Fa∣ther has.

All this I readily grant; for it is the Catholick Faith, that the Father is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so a Father, that he never was a Son, and the Son 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so a Son, that he never was, nor can be a Father, and so of the Holy Spirit; That there is but One Father, not Three Fathers; One Son, not Three Sons; One Holy Ghost, not Three Holy Ghosts, as the Athanasian Creed teaches.

This proves indeed, as we all own, that neither the Son, nor Spirit, are absolutely God, an Absolute Divinity, as the Father is, but only Divine Processions; an Absolute Divinity has a Fecundity of Nature; Absolute, Original Mind, according to this Hypothesis must have its Word

and Spirit, in the Unity of its Nature; but the Word be∣ing no Absolute Nature, can't beget another Word, nor the Spirit another Spirit. So that this Objection only de∣livers us from the Charge of Tritheism, by proving Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost to be but One Divinity, One God: For if the Son were as absolutely God, as the Fa∣ther is, there is no account to be given, why he should not beget a Son, as his Father did him, as we see it is among Men, where the Son begets a Son, and becomes a Father, and thus there could be no possible end of Divine Genera∣tions; but these are Generations ad extra, which give as compleat and absolute a Nature, and absolute Subsistence to the Son, as the Father has; but Internal, Essential Re∣lations are in the Individual Unity of Nature, and there∣fore cannot multiply, when Nature has all that is essential to it. So that Self-existence and Generation do not belong to the Character of a Son; and with the Catholick Church, we teach, That the Son of God is God, only as the Son; and it would be Heresy to ascribe the peculiar Prerogatives of the Father to him: And then it can be no Objection against the Divinity of the Son, that he has not what is peculiar and proper only to the Person of the Father, as Self-existence and Generation is.

Self-existence, Self-origination, to have no cause of his Being, I grant, is essential to the Idea of a God: And Eter∣nal and Necessary Existence to the Notion of any Person, who is in any sense God; for he, who ever began to be, and subsists precariously, can in no sense be God. But then though Self-existence be essential to the Notion of an Ab∣solute Divinity, yet a Person, who is a Son, and therefore not Self-originated, but eternally begotten of a Self-origi∣nated Father, and subsists eternally and necessarily as an Essential Procession and Relation in a Self-originated Na∣ture, must be the Son of God, and God the Son, True and Perfect God, as the Eternal, Necessary, Essential Proces∣sion

of a Self-originated Divinity. For what is internally and essentially related to a Self-existent Nature, can be no Creature, and therefore must be True and Perfect God.

Thus to proceed: The same Rule of speaking (if Men be peaceably and charitably disposed to understand one ano∣ther) will easily reconcile that late warm Dispute, about One Substance, and Three Substances, in the Unity of the Godhead; for the Dispute is the very same, in other words, with One Nature and Three Persons.

The Nicene Fathers, who asserted the Homoousion, the One Nature and Substance of Father, and Son, did not by this mean One Singular Substance, as I have abundantly shewn; and those who assert Three Substances in opposi∣tion to Sabellianism, do not mean Three Absolute, nor Three divided and separated Substances, but One Individual Substance, as there is One Individual Nature in Three Sub∣stantial, Subsisting Persons. That is, There is but One Ab∣solute Substance, with Two Relative, Substantial Procef∣sions in the Individual Unity of the same One Substance: Which the Schools make no scruple to call Three Relative Substances. All Catholick Writers, both Ancient and Mo∣dern, own, that the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy Ghost Substance; but yet are cautious of say∣ing Three Substances; nor will they say, ter Vna, thrice One Substance, because Number does not belong to the Nature, but to the Persons; though at the same time they own,* 1.316 that Deus trinus signifies tria supposita Deitatis.

These seem to be great Niceties, and Arbitrary Distin∣ctions, without any reason and foundation in Nature; for what difference is there between Three Substances, and Three Relative Substances? For Relative Substances are Substances. What difference between Three Substances, and tria supposita? when suppositum is only another name for Substance; and so St. Hilary, as I have observed, called them, tres substantias, & tria in substantia, Three Sub∣stances,

and Three in Substance. When there are Three, each of which is in his own Person Substance, and neither of them each other, what difference is there between say∣ing, Tres in una substantia, & ter una substantia? Three in One Substance, and thrice Once Substance? Marius Victo∣rinus, as I observed before, ventures to say,* 1.317 ter ipsa Sub∣stantia, (not ter una, as it is mistaken in a late Treatise, by trusting too much to memory) thrice the very same Sub∣stance; now thrice the same One Substance, is thrice One Substance; where the Number belongs to the Essence and Substance, which is Aquinas's Objection against it.

But the whole Account of this must be resolved into the Distinction between Absolute and Relative. Substance, when it stands by it self, signifies Absolutely, and so Three Substances are Three Absolute Substances; Three Human Substances, Three Humanities; and Three Divine Sub∣stances, Three Divinities; and therefore we must not without great caution, say Three Substances in the Trini∣ty, for fear of asserting Three Gods; but yet we must own, that each Person is True and Perfect Substance; and both the Fathers and Schools own this; and Three in Sub∣stance are Three Substances, but not Three Absolute but Relative Substances, Three Subsisting Relations in the Unity of the Divine Essence and Substance: Though, as I have more than once observed, in proper speaking, we cannot say Three Relative Substances; for though the Fa∣ther speaks a Relation to the Son, and Holy Spirit, it is as he is the Fountain of the Deity, Original, Absolute, Divi∣nity, Essence, Substance, in his own Person, not a Rela∣tive Subsistence; and therefore in the Blessed Trinity, there is One Absolute Substance, Absolute Divinity, and Two Relative Substances, as there are Two Internal Substan∣tial Relations in the Unity of the same Substance. And to prevent Mistakes, I must here observe, That by Absolute we do not mean Compleat and Perfect, for so the Son is Ab∣solute

Substance, and the Holy Spirit Absolute Substance, Compleat and Perfect Substance, as each of them in his own Person is True and Perfect God; in which Sense St. Austin tells us, that persona ad se dicitur, that Person is predicated absolutely; that every Person, as considered in himself, is a Person, and not merely as related to another; but when we say, that there is but One Absolute Substance in the Godhead, by Absolute we mean Original, as I have already explained it, as distinguished from Relative Proces∣sions, as the Original is distinguished from the Image; though the Image, if a Living, Subsisting Image, is as Compleat and Perfect Nature and Substance, as the Origi∣nal is. And this is the only difference I know, between Substance, Nature, Essence, and Suppositum, Subject, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Res, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Thing, Being, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Subsistence, and the like: That the first signify Absolutely, or as the Schools speak, the Form; that is, an Original Substance, Nature, and Essence; and therefore these must not be mul∣tiplied in the Divinity, by saying Three Substances, Na∣tures, or Essences, for fear of a Diversity or Number of Divinities, and Gods. The other Terms, though they do not in common use signify Relatively, as Subject, Sup∣positum, Thing, Being, Subsistence, do not, yet they signify any thing that really is, that has a Compleat, Actual Subsistence of its own, and therefore are applicable, to all substantial relative Processions, which are compleat Subsistencies, Things, Beings, as well as to original Na∣ture and Substance: And both the Fathers and Schools for this reason owned the Three Divine Persons to be Three Things, Three Beings, Tres Entes, Tria Entia, Tres Res, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and scruple not the use of any such tran∣scendental Terms, as do not necessarily multiply the abso∣lute and original Form.

Thus the One Substance of the Godhead either signifies the absolute Divinity of the Father, and this is but One,

and can never be Ter Vna, Thrice One; or it signifies the One individual undivided Divinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that is, the absolute Divinity of the Father, with his internal essential Processions in the perfect Unity and Identity of Nature, and this it is but One Substance, for there is but One Individual Nature; not Ter Vna, but Tres in Vna; not Thrice One Substance, but Three in One Undivided Nature and Substance; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I have sometimes, not so properly, translated a Thrice subsisting Monad, but it is a Monad with Three Hypostases; which, in other words, is One Nature and Three Persons; not One singular Nature Thrice subsisting (which I cannot understand), but One individual Nature, and Three subsisting Hypostases; Vna Substantia, non Vnus Subsistens; One Substance, not One that subsists: This Individual Nature subsists but once; but in the In∣dividual Unity of the Father's Essence and Godhead, are those Eternal, Substantial, Subsisting Processions, the Hy∣postases of the Son, and Holy Spirit. And in this sense the One Individual Substance of the Divinity may proper∣ly enough be stiled Ter ipsa, or Ter Vna Substantia; Thrice the same One Substance, not Thrice One Absolute Sub∣stance, in which sense Aquinas rejected it; but Tria Sup∣posita Vnius Substantiae, or Deitatis; which is One Sub∣stance, by the individual Unity, and invariable Sameness and Identity of Nature; as I have shewn above.

Thus that warm Dispute among the Schoolmen, about one Absolute Subsistence and Existence in the Trinity, and Three Relative Subsistencies and Existences, which is ma∣naged with so much perplexing Subtilty, as far as I can un∣derstand any thing by it, may easily be composed after the same manner. For there is but One Absolute Being and Nature in the Divinity, and therefore there can be but One Absolute Subsistence and Existence, as Absolute signi∣fies, not Compleat and Perfect, but, to subsist and exist as

an Original, which in the Godhead signifies a self-origina∣ted Subsistence and Existence: But then to deny all rela∣tive Subsistencies and Existencies, is to deny the compleat Subsistence and Existence of the Son and Spirit, who are essential Relations in the Unity of the Father's Godhead, and therefore subsist not as Originals, but as Relatives, which is the meaning of a Relative Subsistence. There is but One Absolute Divinity, and Two Relative Processions, and therefore in this sense, but One Absolute, and Two, not Three, Relative Subsistencies; which seems fairly to divide the Question between them.

Thus, once more: It is a known Rule of speaking in this Mystery, That Substantives must be predicated in the Singular Number, Adjectives will admit a Plural Predica∣tion; and the same difference is made between Abstract and Concrete Terms. There are not Three Gods, but Tres Deit atem habentes, there are Three who have the Di∣vinity; not Three Omnipotencies, or Three Omniscien∣cies, but Three who are Omnipotent and Omniscient. And the approved reason for this is, That Substantives and Ab∣stract Terms, signify the Nature, Essence, and Form, and to multiply them, is to multiply Natures; but Adjectives immediately signify the Subjects, Suppositums, and Per∣sons, and only connote the Nature and Form, which mul∣tiplies the Persons, but not the Nature. Now though I understand what is meant by this, when applied to the Divi∣nity, yet I never could understand this Reason for it; for there is no such difference between Substantive and Adjective Pre∣dications in any other Case; Three men, and Three, who have Human Nature, signify the very same thing, and mul∣tiply the Form, as well as the Persons; Three, who have Human Nature, are truly and properly Three men; and then the meer difference between Substantives and Adje∣ctives cannot be a good Reason, why Three, who have the Divine Nature, are not Three Gods. But the difference

between an Absolute and Relative Predication does give an account of this. Substantives and Abstract Terms al∣ways signify the Form, as the Schools speak, that is, an Absolute and Original Nature, and in this Sense Number multiplies Nature, as well as Persons, and Three Gods are Three Absolute Original Divinities, as wellas Three Divine Persons; and thus it is as to Adjective Predicati∣ons in all Creatures, as I observed before, because there is no such distinction in Creatures between an Absolute Nature, and Internal Subsisting Processions in the Unity and Identity of Nature; and when Nature always signi∣fies the Original Form, a Substantive or Adjective Predi∣cation can make no difference: but where there is such a distinction, as there is in the Divinity, Substantives and Adjectives do most aptly represent it, because Adjectives admit of a Relative Predication, and may signify a Per∣son, who has the Divine Nature, as an Internal, Subsist∣ing Procession in the Divinity, but is not the Absolute Divinity, nor in an Absolute Sense God, but the Son of God, and the Spirit of God.

Indeed in such Forms of Speech we must have more regard to the Absolute or Relative Signification, than to the Substantive or Adjective Form of the Words. Adjectives in an Absolute Sense must no more be multiplied than Sub∣stantives, which I take to be an easier Account of the tres aeterni, and unus aeternus in the Athanasian Creed, than to turn it with Aquinas into tria aeterna, and unum aeternum. For Three Eternals, whether Substantives or Adjectives, in an Absolute Sense are Three Gods; Three Eternal, Three Intelligent, Three Omniscient Persons, in an Abso∣lute Sense, are Three Eternities, Three Omnisciences, and in this Sense there is but unus aeternus, One Eternal Self Originated Person, as there is but One God: and on the other hand, Deus or God, though a Substantive, may signify Relatively, as it does in the Nicene Creed, God

of God; and in this Sense some of the Schoolmen, thought it very Orthodox to say Three Gods, if we explained in what Sense we meant it, as I observed above, Tertullian did, Ecce duos deos, though at the same time he rejects the use of such Forms, for their ambiguous Signification which might betray men into Polytheism. And if God may have a Relative Signification, so may Mind and Spirit too, and then Three Minds and Spirits is as Or∣thodox, as Three that have an Intelligent and Spiritual Nature.

In short; as far as I can hitherto observe, all the Ca∣tholick Rules of Speaking relating to this Mystery must be resolved into this distinction of Absolute and Relative: This is the only distinction we know of in the Godhead, and this we as certainly know there is, as we know, that there is an Eternal Father, who has an Eternal Son, and an Eternal Spirit; One Absolute, Self-Originated Divinity, with its Internal, Essential Processions in the In∣dividual Unity and Identity of Nature: and if this be the Unity and Distinction of the Divinity, this must be our Rule of Speaking also, to have a due regard to the One Absolute Nature, and the Relative Processions of the Godhead; which will secure us both from a Sabellian Sin∣gularity, and a Tritheistick Trinity of Absolute Divini∣ties.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Quâ nec dicuntur ut cogitantur, nec cogitantur ut sunt. Aug. de Trinit. l. 5. c. 3.
• * 1.2

  Cùm ergo quaeritur quid tria, vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad in∣ventendum aliquod speciale vel gene∣rale nomen, quo complectamur haec tria, neque occurrit animo, quia ex∣cedit supereminentia divinitatis usi∣tati eloquii facultatem. Aug. de Trin. l. 7. c. 3.
• * 1.3

  Ad se quippe (Pater) dicitur Persona, non ad Filium, aut Spiri∣tum Sanctum. Aug. de Trin. l. 7. c. 6.
• * 1.4

  Cur ergo non haec tria simul unam Personam dicimus, sicut unam Essentiam, & Deum, sed tres dicimus Personas, cùm tres Deos, aut tres essentias non dicamus, nisi quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servire huic significationi quâ intelligitur Trinitas, ne emnino taceremus interrogati, quid tres, cùm tres esse fateremur. Ibid. Quidigitur restat, nisi ut fatcamur, loquendi necessitate partita haec vocabula, &c. l. 7. c. 4.
• * 1.5

  No•• h••c definitione eam quam Graeci 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dicunt terminavi∣mus. Boet. de Una Persona Christi.
• * 1.6

  Prima & summa vita, cui non aliud est vivere, & aliud esse, sed idem est esse & vivere. Primus & summus intellectus, cui non est aliud vivere, & aliud intelligere, sed id quod est intelligere, hoc vivere, hoc esse est, unum omnia. Aug. de Tr. l. 6. c. 10.
• * 1.7

  Si tamen dignum est, ut De•••• dicatur subsistere. — Deus autem si subsisti•• at substantia propriè dici possit, inest in co aliquod tanquam in subjecto, & non est s••••plex. — N••fas est autem dicere ut subsist••t, & subsit Deus bonitati suae.— Unde manifestum est, Deum abusiv•• substantiam vocari, ut nomine usita∣tiore intelligatur essentia, qu••d verè & proprie dicitur, ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat esse essen∣ti••m.—Ego sum qui sum, & qui est misit me ad vos. Id. l. 7. c. 4, 5.
• * 1.8

  Personam in accidentibus non posse constitui, relinquitur ergò, u•• Personam in Substantiis dici conve∣niat. Boet. de una Christi Per∣sona.
• * 1.9

  Non enim aliud est Deo esse, ali••d Personam esse, sed omnino idem.

  Neque in hàc Trinitate, cùm di∣cimus Personam Patris, aliud dici∣mus, quàm Substantiam Patris. Aug. Tr. l. 7. c. 6.
• * 1.10

  Personam in Substantiis dici con∣ve••••at — non autem in non vi∣ventibus corporibus, vel s••nsu caren∣tibus, vel intellec••••s & ratione. Boet. ibid.
• * 1.11

  In universalibus Persona dici non potest, sed in singularibus atque in∣dividuis. Boet. Ibid.
• * 1.12

  Cùm ipsae Substantiae in Univer∣salibus quidem sint, in particulari∣bus verò capiant Substantiam, jure Substantias particulariter Subsisten∣tes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (Graeci) appella∣verunt. Id.
• * 1.13

  Omnis essentia, quae relativè dici∣tur, est etiam aliquid excepto rela∣tivo, ut homo dominus, homo ser∣vus — ad se dicuntur, & substan∣tiae sunt vel essentiae: dominus vero & servus — ad aliquid relative dicuntur: sed si non esset homo, id est, aliqua substantia, non esset qui re∣lative dominus diceretur. — Qua∣propter si & Pater non est aliquid ad se ipsum, non est omnino qui relativè dicatur ad aliquid. Aug. de Tri∣nit. l. 7. c. 1.
• * 1.14

  Nos verò unicum, quidem Deum credimus, sub hác tamen dispensa∣tione, quam aeconomiam dicimus, ut umci Dei sit & filius, & sermo ip∣sius, qui ex ipso processerit, per quem omnia facta sunt, & sine quo factum est nihil. Tert. cont. Prax. c. 2. p. 501 Oxon.
• * 1.15

  Dum unicum, Deum non aliàs pu∣tat credendum, quàm si ipsum eun∣demque & Patrem, & Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum dicat, quasi non sit quoque unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiae scilicet uni∣tatem, & nihilominus custodiatur aeconomiae sacramentum, quae unita∣tem in Trinitatem disponit, tres di∣rigens Patrem, & Filium, & Spiri∣tum Sanctum. Ibid.
• * 1.16

  Iudaicae fidci ista res est, sic unum Deum credere, ut Filium ad∣numerare ei nolis, & post Filium Spiritum. Tert. c. Prax.
• * 1.17

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Sabell. Tom. 1. p. 651. Paris.
• * 1.18

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.19

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.20

  Quidam ita Evangelicae fidei cor∣rumpunt Sacramentum, ut sub unius Dei pià tantùm professione, nativi∣tatem Unigeniti Dei abnegent — Qui sub unius Dei solâ sanè utili ac religiosâ praedicatione, aut Deum natum Christum negant, aut verum Deum non esse contendunt, ut Crea∣tio potentis Creaturae intra unum Deum fidei Sacramentum relinquat, quia nativitas Dei extra unius Dei fidem religionem protrahat confiten∣tium.
• * 1.21

  Sed nos edocti divinitus, neque duos Deos praedicare, neque solum, hanc Evangelici ac Prophetici prae∣conit rationem in Confessione Dei Patris & Dei Filii afferemus, ut unum in fide nosira sit uterque, non unus; neque cundem utrumque, ne∣que inter verum & falsum aliud confitentes: quia Deo ex Deo nato, neque eundem nativitas p••rmittit esse, neque aliud. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 1.
• * 1.22

  Cùm enim unum Deum propha∣nae assertio infidelitatis ingereret, & rursum unum Deum negare fides sana non posset, tractari de eo non sine ancipitis periculi conscientiâ po∣tuit, quod non minus impiè confir∣maretur, quàm negar••tur. Hil. de Trinit. lib. 5.

  Non ignorans, quantum in eo sit, vel responsionis periculum vel silen∣tii, & e•• utraque opportunitatem impietatis expectans.

  Atque ita sapientia mundi, quae stultitia apud Deum est, specie blan∣dae & pestiferae simplicitatis illude∣ret, cum hoc fidei suae constitu••ret exordium, in quo sibi impiè assenti∣remur aut adversaremur. Et per hoc utriusque rei periculum, Dei fi∣lium Deum non esse obtineret, quia Deus unus est; aut extorqueret al∣terius haeres••os necessitatem, si & patrem Deum & filium Deum con∣fitentes, unum Deum praedicare se∣cundum Sabellii opinionem impiam existimaremur. Ibid.
• * 1.23

  Non n••gantes Deum, unum, sed— Deum & Deum—Praedicantes, & Deum unum non per unionem docen∣tes, neque rursum ad diversitatis numerum des••cantes; neque contra in nominibus tantùm confi••entes, sed Deum & Deum. Ibid.
• * 1.24

  Nemini dubium esse oportet ad di∣vinarum rerum cognitionem divinis utendum esse Doctrinis— Non sub∣eunt ingenia nostra in coelestem sci∣entiam, neque incomprehensibilem virtutem sensu aliquo infirmitas no∣stra concipiet. Hilar. l. 4. de Trin.
• * 1.25

  Ipsi de se Deo credendum est, & iis, quae cognitioni nostrae de se tri∣buit, obsequendum; aut enim more Gentilium denegandus est, si testimo∣nia ejus improbantur; aut si, ut est, Deus creditur, non potest aliter de Deo, quàm ut ipse est de se testa∣tus, intel••igi. Ibid.
• * 1.26

  Non negantes Deum unum, sed eo ipso Autore Deum & Deum, per quem Deus unus praedicatus est, prae∣dicantes. —
• * 1.27

  Atque ita non autoritati contra∣rium est, sed ex autoritate respon∣sum est, ne per id filium liceret Deum negare, quia ad Israel Deus unus est: cùm confitendi Dei filium Deum idem Autor est, qui Autor est Dei unius praedicandi. Hilar. de Trin. l. 5. prope initium.
• * 1.28

  Habes ergo Deum ex quo, habes Deum per quem; aut si id negabis, necesse est, id quod factum est, per quem factum sit, doceas.
• * 1.29

  Quod ergo dictum est, fiat firma∣mentum, in eò quod pater sit locu∣tus, ostenditur; & quod fecisse Deus dicitur, in eo persona efficientis est intelligenda, qui faciat. Hilar. de Trin. lib. 4.
• * 1.30

  Sensus com∣munis in∣telligentiae non recipiet, ut in eo quod dictum est, jussit & facta sun••▪ solitarius atque id••m significatus cre∣datur. Ibid. Caeterùm, etsi ubique teneo unam substantiam in tribus cohaerentibus, tam••n ahum dicam opor∣tet ex necessitate sensus, eum qui jubet, & eum qui facit: nam nec j••ber••t, si i••se faceret, dum juberet fieri per eum: tamen jubebat, haud sibi jussurus si unus esset; aut sine ••••ssit facturus, quia non expectasset, ut sibi juberet. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 12.
• * 1.31

  Haec aut nega Scripta, aut quis es, ut non putes accipienda qu••madmodim Scripta sunt; maxime quae non in Allegoriis & Parabolis, sed in d••fi∣nitionibus, & certis & simplicibus habent sensum. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 13.
• * 1.32

  Deus enim per Legistatorem secun∣dum intelligentiam nostram locutus est: Verbis videlicet quibus uti ipse nos voluit, cognitionem corum nobis, quae gessit, imperticus. Hilar. Ibid.
• * 1.33

  Sustulit singularis intelligentiam prof••ssione consortu: Consorti••m au∣tem esse aliquod solitario ipsi sibi non potest.
• * 1.34

  Quid enim tam alienum ab eo qui solus ••sset, ut sibi faciendum diceret, cùm voluntate tantum opus est, ut fieret.
• * 1.35

  N••one rursum recipit solitarii soli∣tudo, F••ciamus, r••que quisq•• un alieno à se Nostram loqui•••••• uterque sermo, & faciamus, & nosi 〈…〉〈…〉 silitarium ••••ndemque non patitur, ita neque divers•••••• à se alienumque significat.
• * 1.36

  Cognita per id, quòd nost••am ima∣gin••m dicit, non etiam imagines nosiras, ••mus in utroque prepietate naturae. Hil. Ibid.
• * 1.37

  Non ergo in fabricatione mundi so∣litarius Pater sibi loquitur, sapientiâ suâ secum & co operante, & consum∣mata co operatione gaudente. Ibid.
• * 1.38

  Te••t. a••v. Pra••••a••••.
• * 1.39

  Salvo enim filio recte unicum Deum potest determinasse, cujus est filius. Non enim definit esse qui habet filium ipse unicus, suo scilicet nomine, quo∣tiens sine filio n••minatur. Sine filio autem nominatur, quum principaliter determinatur ut prima p••rsona, quae ante si••i•• nomen erat proponenda; quia pater ante ••••gn••••citur, & post patrem fi••ius nominatur. Igitur unus Deus Pater, & ali••s absque ••o non est. Quod ipse infer••us non ••••lium n••gat, sed alium Deum. Cae••••rum alius à Patre filius non est. D••nique, inspice sequentia hujusmodi pronuntia∣tionum, & invenies fere ad Id••lorum factitatores atque cultores definitio∣nem carum pertinere; ut multitudi∣nem falsorum Deorum unio Divinitatis expellat, habens tamen filium quanto individuum & inseparatum a patre tanto in patre reputandum, etsi non nominatum, atquin si nominasset eum, separasset, ita dicens, alius praeter me non est, nisi filius mēus; alium enim etiam filium fecisset, quem de aliis excepisset. Puta solem dixisse, ego sol, & praeter me ••on est, nisi radius meus, nonne denotasses vanita∣tem, quasi non & ra••ius in sole deputetur. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 18.
• * 1.40

  Qui etsi De••••••••catur, quando no∣minatur sing•••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non igitur du••s Deos faciat, se•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, hoc ipso quod & Deus ex unitate patri•• vocari habeat. Ibid. c. 19.
• * 1.41

  Non alter ad eum Deus deputatur (filius) non enim ex alia substantia, sed ex Deo Deus est. Nihil itaque in eo novum, nihil extraneum, nihil recens est. Hilar. de Trin. l. 4. in fine.
• * 1.42

  Reliquus autem nunc omnis s••rmo ad id proficiet, ut qui Deus verus esse intelligitur, non in Deum alterum deputetur: Et quod in alterum non proficit, id unum intelligatur.
• * 1.43

  Non enim aliud quàm Deus sub∣sistit, quod non aliunde quàm ex Deo Deus subsistit: Nam cùm ipse Deus sit, tamen etiam per naturae virtu∣tem in eo Deus est: Et per id quod ipse Deus, & in eo Deus est, non est Deus praeter eum: Cùm non extet aliunde quod Deus est, & in eo Deus sit, habens in se & quod ipse est, & ex quo ipse subsistit. Id. l. 5.
• * 1.44

  Quoniam ego sum Dominus, & non est Deus praeter me: Est enim unigenitus Deus, neque consortem unigeniti nomen admittit, sicut non recipit innascibilis, in eo tantum quòd est innascibilis, participem. Est ergò unus ab uno, neque praeter Deum innascibilem Deus innascibilis alius est; neque praeter unigenitum Deum Deus unigenitus quisquam est. Uter∣que itaque Unus & Solus est, pro∣prictate videlicet in unoquoque & innascibilitatis & originis. Ac sic uterque Deus unus est: Cùm inter unum & unum, id est, ex uno unum, Divinitatis aeternae non sit secunda natura. Hil. l. 4.
• * 1.45

  In his ergo si unum magis quam solitarium Deum intelligis, ecclesiae religionem profiteberis, quae Patrem in Filio confitetur. Sin verò unum Deum ad solitarii significationem, sacram••nti coelestis ignarus oltendis, extra cognitionem Dei es, Deum i•• Deo esse non confitens. l. 5.
• * 1.46

  Considera∣tions, p. 1.
• * 1.47

  Consid. p. 2.
• * 1.48

  Consid. p. 3.
• * 1.49

  P. 3.
• * 1.50

  P. 5.
• * 1.51

  P. 2.
• * 1.52

  P. 9.
• * 1.53

  P. 10.
• * 1.54

  Alii qu••que Haeretici ••sque adeò Christi manifestam amplexati sunt Di∣vinitatem, ut dixerint illum fuisse sine Carne, & totum illi susceptum detraxerint hominem, ne decoquerent in illo divini nominis potestatem, si humanam illi sociassent, ut arbitra∣b••ntur, nativitatem. Novat. de T••init. c. 18.
• * 1.55

  Epiph. l. 1. Tom. 2. Haer. 4. five 24.
• * 1.56

  Tertul de praescript. Haeret.
• * 1.57

  Hoc si qui putaverit me 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 aliquam in•• roducere, id est, prolatio∣n••m rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus, alium atque ali••m Aeonem de Aeone producens; primo quid••m dicam tibi, non ideo non utitur & Veritas Vocabulo isto, & re & censu ejus, quia & haeresis potius ex veri∣tate accepit, quod ad mendacium suum strueret. Prolatus est Sermo Dei an non? Hic mecum gradum fige. Si prolatus est, Cognosce probolam Verita∣tis, & viderit Haeresis si quid de Ve∣ritate imitata est. Iam nunc quaeri∣tur, quis quomodo utatur aliqua re & vocabulo ejus? Valentinus probolas suas discernit & separat ab Auctore: Et ita longe ab eo ponit, ut Aeon Pa∣trem nesciat. Denique desiderat nosse, nec po••est; immo & pene devoratur, & dissolvitur in reliquam substanti∣am. Apud nos autem solus filius pa∣trem novit & sinum patris ipse ex∣posuit, & omnia apud patrem audi∣vit & vidit. —Sermo ergo & in patre semper, sicut dicit, Ego in patre. Et apud Deum semper, sicut scriptum est, & sermo erat apud Deum, & nunquam separatus à patre, aut alius à patre; quia, Ego & Pater unum sumus. Haec erit probola veritatis, cuflos unitatis, quâ prolatum dicimus filium à patre, s••d non separatum. Tert. adv. Praxeam. c. 8.
• * 1.58

  Firmum est genus pro∣bationis, quod etiam ab adversario sumitur, ut veritas etiam ab ipsis inimicis veritatis probetur. Nam usque adeò manifestum est in Scripturis esse Deum tradi, ut plerique haereticorum divinitatis ipsius magni∣tudine & veritate commoti, ultra modum extendentes honores ejus, ausissent non filium, sed ipsum Deum patrem promere vel putare. Quod etsi contra veritatem Scripturarum est, tamen divinitatis Christi argumentum grande atque praecipuum est: qui usque adeo Deus, sed quâ filius Dei natus ex Deo; ut plerique illum (ut diximus) haeretici, ita Deum acceperint, ut non filium, sed patrem pronunciandum putarent, &c. Novat. de Trin. c. 18.
• * 1.59

  In eo quod credit (Arius) alium esse Patrem, alium Filium, mecum est contra Sabellianos. Aug. de 5. Haeres. c. 5.
• * 1.60

  P. 9, 10.
• * 1.61

  P. 14.
• * 1.62

  P. 13.
• * 1.63

  ••. 14.
• * 1.64

  P. 14.
• * 1.65

  P. 20.
• * 1.66

  P. 24.
• * 1.67

  Persona, ut Ecclesia in hoc articulo loquitur, est substantia individua, intelligens, & incommunicabilis. Sa∣tis constat veteres Scriptores Ecclesiae solitos haec duo vocabula discernere, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & dicere unam esse 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, id est, essentiam aeterni Patris, Filii & Spiritus Sancti, sed tres 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, id est, tres verè subsistentes, non commentitios, non ca∣ducos, non confusos, sed distinctos, sin∣gulares intel••••gentes.
• * 1.68

  Lusit homo Fanaticus Servetus de vecabulo Personae, & disputat olim Latinis significasse habitum aut officti distinctionem, ut dicimus Roscium a∣lias sustin••re Personam Achillis, alias sustinere Personam Ulyssis; seu alia est Persona Consulis, alia servi: ut Cicero inquit, Magnum est in repub∣lica tueri Personam Principis. Et hanc veterem significationem veca∣buli sycophantice detorquet ad Arti∣culum de tribus Personis Divinitatis. Sed has impias pras••igias fugiamus & execremur, & sciamus in hoc Ar∣ticulo aliter loqui Ecclesiam, & Per∣sonam dici substantiam individuam, intelligentem, & incommunicabilem. Ac prodest in hac cogitatione saepe mente intueri baptismum Christi, ubi tres Personae illustri discrimine mon∣strantur. Pater sonat hanc vocem: Hic est Filius meus dilectus. Filius stans in flumine conspicitur: & Spi∣ritus Sanctus specie visibili demitti∣tur. Melanct. loci Theolog. de tribus Personis Divinitatis.
• * 1.69

  P. 20.
• * 1.70

  P. 13▪
• * 1.71

  P. 21.
• * 1.72

  P. 24.
• * 1.73

  P. 16, 20, 21.
• * 1.74

  P. 16.
• * 1.75

  P. 18.
• * 1.76

  P. 19.
• * 1.77

  P. 21.
• * 1.78

  P. 21.
• * 1.79

  P. 22.
• * 1.80

  P. 24.
• * 1.81

  P. 24, 25.
• * 1.82

  P. 2••.
• * 1.83

  P. 30.
• * 1.84

  P. 31.
• * 1.85

  P. 32.
• * 1.86

  P. 37.
• * 1.87

  P. 36.
• * 1.88

  P. 37.
• * 1.89

  P. 38.
• * 1.90

  P. 38.
• * 1.91

  P. 39.
• * 1.92

  P. 40.
• * 1.93

  P. 41.
• * 1.94

  P. 41.
• * 1.95

  P. 42.
• * 1.96

  P. 43.
• * 1.97

  Sin autem ideo dictum putant Deum, quod inspirationem divinitatis habuit, sicut & multi sancti viri—ergo non ultra homines eum praefe∣runt—Ambr. de fide, l. 5. cap. 1.
• * 1.98

  P. 44.
• * 1.99

  Sed quia duos unum volunt esse, ut i∣dem Pater & Filius habeatur, oportet & totum de filio examinari, ut sit, & qui sit, & quomodo sit. Tert. ad Prax. c. 5.

  Ipsum qu••d Pater & Filius dicun∣tur, nonne aliud ab alio est. Utique ••nim omnia quod vocantur, h••c crunt; & quod crunt, hoc vccaluntur—Ita aut pater aut filius est, & neque dies cadem & nox, neque pater idem & filius, ut sint ambo unus, & utrumque alter. Ibid. c 9, 10.

  Ipsi se, inquiunt, filium sibi faci••, atquin pater filium facit, & patrem filius. Et qui ex alterutro fiunt, à semetipsis sibi fieri nullo modo possiunt, ut pater se sibi filium faciat, & filius se sibi patrem praestet. Qu••e institut Deus, ipse custodit. Ibid.

  Habeat, necesse est, pater filium, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pater sit, & filius patrem, ut filius sit. Aliud est autem habere, aliud ••sse. Verbi gratia, ut maritus sim, h••b••a•• oportet uxorem, non ut ipse mihi ero ••xor; sic etiam, ut pater s••••n, filium habco, non ipse mihi ero filius. Ibid.

  Qu••e enim me faciunt, si ha••••••ero, tun`e ero pater, si filium habeam, filiu•• ero, si patrem, Parro, si ipse ero qui•• coruum, jam non habeo, quod ipse ero; n••c patrem, quia ipse ero pat••••, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 filium, quia ipse ero filius: in q••an∣tum vero alterum ex his hab••re m•• oportet; alterum esse, in tantum si ••∣trumque sucro, alterum non ero, dum al∣terum non habeo▪ si enim ups•• ero filius ut, q••a & pster, sum non habeo fili∣um, sed ipse sun filius. Non haben••o autem filium cum ipse sum flius, que∣m••do pater ero? habere enim filium d•• b••n, ut pater sini; non sum ergo si∣lius, quia patr••n•• non habeo, qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 filium; 〈…〉〈…〉 si ipse sum pater, qu•• & filius, &c. H••c ••rit titum ingeni∣um Diab••li, alterum ex aliero ••xelua••re, dum utrumque in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 s••b Monar••••••ae ••avore conclu••••••ns, ••en∣trum hale•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c. Ibid.
• * 1.100

  Non posse unum & eundem videri, qui loquitur, & de quo loquitur, & ad quem loquitur: quia neque per∣versit as, neque fallacia Deo congruat, ut ci••n ipse esset ad quem loquebatur, ad alium potius, & non ad semetipsum loquatur. Ibid. c. 11.
• * 1.101

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Gregales Sabellii.
• * 1.102

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Ibid.
• * 1.103

  Ipse enim ad humana semper collo∣quia descendit ab Adam usque ad Pa∣triarchas & Prophetas, in visione, in somnio, in speculo, in aenigmate, ordi∣nem suum praestruens ab initio semper, quem erat persecuturus in finem; it a semper ediscebat & Deus in terris cum hominibus conversari, non alius potuit quàm sermo, qui caro erat fu∣turus. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 16.
• * 1.104

  Quid agis Lot sancte? Angelos vi∣des, non unum, sed duos, & dicis do∣mine mi. Duos video, aequales video, unum rogo, nulli injuriam facio, quia patrem & filium non divido; Sabel∣lianus legat duos venisse, &c. Aug. de 5. Haeres.
• * 1.105

  Epiph. c. Noes. Haer. 57.
• * 1.106

  Audi tu Sabelliane, audi de coelo patrem, vide in terra filium, & noli dicere, idem pater qui silius. Aug. de quinque Haeres. cap. 6.
• * 1.107

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Gregal. Sabellij.
• * 1.108

  Ergo inquis, das aliquam substan∣tiam esse sermonem? plane. Non vis enim eum substantivum habere in re per substantae proprietatem, ut res & persona quaedam videri possit, & it a capiat secundus a Deo constitutus duos officere, patrem & filium, Deum & sermonem. Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi vox & sonus oris, & sicut Gram∣matici tradunt, aer offensus, intelli∣gibilis auditu, caeterum vacuum nescio quid, & inane & incorporale. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 7.
• * 1.109

  At ego nihil di••o de Deo mane & vacuum prodire potuisse, ut non de inani & vacuo prolatum, neo carere substantiâ, quod de tanta substantia processit, & tantas substantias fecit, feciz enim & ipse, quae facta sunt per ipsum: quale est ut nihil sit ipse, sine quo nihil factum est? ut inanis solida, & vacuus plena, & incorpo∣ralis corporalia operatus sit? Nam etsi potest aliquando quid fieri diver∣sum cjus per quod fit; nihil tameu potest fieri per id, quod vacuum & iname est. Ibid.

  Vacua & inanis res est sermo De••, qui filius dictus est, qui ipse Deus cogneminatus est? & sermo erat apud Deum, & Deus erat sermo.
• * 1.110

  Hic certè est, qui in effigie Dei con∣stitutus, non rapinam exiitimavie esse se aqualem Deo. In qua ••ffigie Dei? utique in alia, non tamen in nullâ.
• * 1.111

  Quaecunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico Personam, & illi no∣men filii vindico; & dum filium ag∣nosco, secundum a Patre defendo. Ibid.
• * 1.112

  In substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem. Nov. de Trin. c. 24.

  Sermo filius natus est, qui non in ••ono percussi aeris, aut tono coactae de visceribus vocis accipitur, sed in sub∣stantia prolatae à Deo virtutis cog∣noscitur.—

  Substantia scilicet illa divina, cu∣jus nomen est verbum. Ibid. c. 30.

  Deus utique procedens ex Deo se∣cundam personam efficiens. Ibid.
• * 1.113

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Sabellii Gregal.
• * 1.114

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.115

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.116

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Ibid. p. 658.
• * 1.117

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.118

  Est alia, quae triformem sic asserit Deum, ut quaedam pars ejus sit pater, quaedam filius, quaedam spiritus san∣ctus, hoc est, quod Dei unius partes sint, quae istam faciunt Trinitatem, velut ex his tribus partibus complea∣tur Deus, nec sit perfectus in seipso, vel pater, vel filius, vel spiritus san∣ctus. Aug. de Haeres. ad quod vult. Deum. Haeres. 74.
• * 1.119

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. —

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Athan. con. Greg. Sab. p. 661.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 662.
• * 1.120

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. Orth. Fidei. l. 1. c. 10.
• * 1.121

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Id. ib. c. 13
• * 1.122

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Ath. contr. Gregal. Sabell. p. 662.
• * 1.123

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.— Ibid. 658.
• * 1.124

  Quin etiam id adjiciunt, cum unius substantiae patrem & filium esse audiunt, ab anterioribus episco∣pis esse praedicatum, ut id subtiliter per speciem haereticae opinionis infir∣ment; dicentes eos verbi hujus sig∣nificationem, id est, unius substantiae, quod gracè dicitur homoousion, hoc sensu usurpare atque eloqui, tan∣quam ipse sit pater qui & filius, ex infinitate videlicet suà protenlus in virginem, ex quâ corpus assumens si∣bi, in to corpore quod assumpsit filii nomen addiderit; & haec quidem de Hil. de Trin. l. 4.
• * 1.125

  Secundo id quodque addidistis, quod Patres nostri, cum Paulus Sa∣mosatenus hareticus pronunciatus est, etiam homoousion repudiaverint, quia per hanc untus essentiae nuncupa∣tionem, solitarium atque unicum sibi esse Patrcem & Filium praedicabat, & hoc same nunc quoque prophanissimum Ecclesia recognoscit, Patrem & Filium in his nominum professionibus ad unio∣nis & singularis solitudinem negat•• personarum proprietate revocare. Hi∣lar. de Synod. propè finem.
• * 1.126

  Bull. De∣fens. Fidei Nicaenae. p. 52.
• * 1.127

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Basil. ep. 300.
• * 1.128

  Sequens illa est, quod affirment id enuntiationem homoousii significare, quod rei anterioris & alterius com∣munio sit duobus, & tanquam prior substantia vel usia materiae alicujus exciterit, quae participata duobus, & in utroque consumpta, utrumque il∣lam & nature anterioris, & rei esse testetur unius. Atque ideirco impro∣bare se homoousii aiunt confessio∣nem, quod enuntiatio ejus neque Fi∣lium à Patre distinguat, & posterio∣rem Patrem materia, quae sibi cum Filio sit communis, oftendat. Hil. de Trin lib. 4. initio.
• * 1.129

  De homoousio verò, quod est unius essentiae tractantes, primùm id∣circo respuendum pronuntiastis, quia per verbi hujus enunciationem sub∣stantia prior intelligeretur, quam duo inter se partiti essent — prophanus hic sensus est, & communi judicio ab ecclesiae respuendus. Hil. de Synod
• * 1.130

  Quis enim sanae mentis tertiam substantiam, que & Patri & Filio communis sit, praedicabit.
• * 1.131

  Non hic sanctissima religiosorum virorum synodus, nescio quam prio∣rem, quae in duos divisa sit, substan∣tiam introducat, sed Filium natum de substantia Patris. Ibid.
• * 1.132

  Tertio quoque hanc improbandi homoousti causam commimscuntur, quod secundum verbi hujus significa∣tionem, ex divisione Paternae sub∣stantiae esse Filius existimetur, tan∣quam desectus ex co fuerit, ita ut in duos sit res una divisa: & ideo substantiae dicantur unius, quia por∣tio desecta de toto, in natura ca sit unde desecta est. Hil. de Trin. lib 4.
• * 1.133

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—Socra∣tes H. E. lib. 1. c. 8.
• * 1.134

  Eusebii Epist. ad Caesariensis apud So∣crat. Ibid
• * 1.135

  In his igitur tot tamque gravibus fidei periculis, verborum brevitas temperanda est, ne impie dici existi∣metur, quod pic intelligitur: ne secu∣ra atque innocente conscientia, per oc∣casionem haereticorum reus sermo sit, dicturus unam substantiam Catholicus Patris & Filii, non inde incipiat; neque hoc quasi maximum teneat, tan∣quam sine hoc vera fides nulla sit. Hilar. de Synodis.
• * 1.136

  Unam substantiam dicet, cùm ante dixerit, pater ingenitus est, filius na∣tus est, subsistit ex Patre, Patri simi∣lis est, virtute, honore, natura, &c.

  Et post haec unam substantiam pa∣tris & filii decendo, non errat, at unam substantiam negando, jam peccat.

  Nemo unam substantiam brevi & nudo sermone putet praedicandam: ut possit religiose deci, una esse substantia.

  Nihil solitarium ex divinis sacra∣mentis ad suspicionem audientium, & ad occasionem blasphemantium profera∣mus. Ante nativitas filii, ante sub∣jectio, ante similitudo naturae praedi∣canda est, ut non impie unius & Pater & Filius substantiae praedicetur. Ibid.
• * 1.137

  Si ergo naturam neque aliam, ne∣que dissimilem ci, quem impassibiliter generabat, dedit, uon potest aliam dedisse, nisi propriam; ita similitudo proprietas est, proprietas aequalitas est, & aequalitas nihil differt; qui autem nihil differunt, unum sunt; non unione personae, sed aequalicate a••••urae. Hil. de Synod.
• * 1.138

  Testor Dominum coeli atque terra me cùm neutrum audissem, semper tamen utrumque sensisse, quòd per homaeusion homousion eperteret intelligi; id est, nihil simile sibi secundum naturam esse posse, nisi quod esset ex cadem naturâ.

  Fidem Nicaenam nunquam nisi exu∣laturus audivi, sed mihi homousii & homaeusii intelligentiam Evan∣gelia & Apostoli intimaverunt. Ib. in fine.

  Religiosè unam substantiam prae∣dicamus, dummodò unam substantiam proprietatis similitudinem intelliga∣mus, ut quod unum sunt, non singula∣rem significet, sed aequales. Aequali∣tatem dico, id est, indifferentiam si∣militudinis, ut similitudo habeatur aequalitas. Aequalitas verò unum idcirco dicitur esse, quod par sit, unum verò in quo par significatur, non ad unicum vindicetur.—

  Credamus & dicamus esse unam substantiam, sed per naturae proprie∣tatem, non ad significationem impiae unionis. Una sit ex similitudine non ex solitudine. Hilar. de Synod.

  Ita similitudinis aequalitas nec so∣litudinem habet, nec diversitatem, quia omnis aequalitas nec diversa nec sola sit. Idem l. 7. de Trin.
• * 1.139

  Deus qued est genuit, ejusdem sub∣stantiae, ejusdem essentiae, sine tempore, sibi coaeternum genuit—Hanc Dei Trinitatis substantiam unam homu∣sion verbo Graeci complecti breviter maluerunt. Non enim nomen est, sed res terribilis est in verbo hujusmodi sonaus. Quod verbum apertè ipse Fi∣li••s declarat, cùm dicit, ego & Pa∣ter unum sumus. In isto uno consistit substantia una.—Contra hoc pug∣netur, quod possidet, quod habet, quod docet verbum Graecum, non contra ip∣sum verbum, quod auribus retinuit syllabis articulatum. Contra divitio••s, contra aequalitatem naturae, quod pos∣sidet verbum, &c. Altercatio inter Aug. & Pascentium. To. 2.
• * 1.140

  Nec esse nomen fidei homusion, sed aequalitatem magis ipsius Trinita∣tis — Laurentius vir clarissimus dixit, sic ergo & homusion quod in dubium veniebat te proponente, & si scriptum non est, res ipsa tamen, quae latet in verbo, vera est. Credatur honorificè Unitati, ne fiat injuria Tranitati. Ibid.
• * 1.141

  Displicet cuiquam in Synodo Ni∣caena homousion esse susceptum? Hoc si cui displicet, necesse est placeat quod ab Arianis est negatum. Nega∣tum enim idcirco est homousion, ne ex substantia Dei Patris Deus Filius natus, sed secundum Creaturas ex nihilo conditus praedicaretur — Hilar. de Synod. prope finem.
• * 1.142

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Socr. H. E. l. 1. c. 8.
• * 1.143

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. de Decr. Syn. Nicaenae. p. 267.
• * 1.144

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.145

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 269.
• * 1.146

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.147

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.148

  Conc. T. 2. Col. 8 21.
• * 1.149

  — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Syn. Nic. decret. p. 274.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Ibid.
• * 1.150

  Defens. Fidei Nice∣nae. p. 66.
• * 1.151

  Basil. Hom. 27. c. Sa∣bell.
• * 1.152

  Basil. Ep. 43.
• * 1.153

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Athan. de communi Essentia. Vol. 1. p. 213.
• * 1.154

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 214.
• * 1.155

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Basil adv. Eunom. T. 1. l. 1. p. 719.
• * 1.156

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Basil adv. Eu∣nom. T. 1. l. 1.717.
• * 1.157

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.—Ibid. lib. 2. p. 734.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Basil. Ep. 78.
• * 1.158

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 734
• * 1.159

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.160

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. orth. nd. l. 1. c. 9.
• * 1.161

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.162

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.163

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — Damasc. de orth. fide. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.164

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Greg. Nyssenus cont. Eunomium. Orat. 1. p. 78. Parisiis. 1615.
• * 1.165

  Tres enim Deos dicit, qui divini∣tatem separat Trinitatis, cùm Domi∣nus dicendo; Ite, baptizate Gentes in Nomine Patris, & Filii, & Spiri∣tus Sancti, unius esse Trinitatem po∣testatis ostenderit. Ambr. de Fide. l. 1. c. 2.
• * 1.166

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.167

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ba∣sil Ep. 300.
• * 1.168

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Arianos. Orat. 2. p. 314.
• * 1.169

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 320.
• * 1.170

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Gr. Nyss. c Eun. or. 1. p. 9.

  Quasi aliud sit Homoousion quâm quod dicit, ego de Patre exivi, ego & Pater unum sumus;— Haec est autem nominis ratio, ut in Patre & Filio unitatem substantiae credas, licet rem ipsam (quae est in∣enarrabilis) definire ••on posses. Am∣br. de Fide cont. Arian. c. 5.

  Cùm autem ego Patrem & Filium statuo, unitatem generis assigno; & si illam in personis divido, discretio∣nes tamen personarum rursus cadem nomina in unitatem sui naturali legis foedere consignant, unde & tantus est Filius, quantus videbitur Pater, to∣tus de toto, integer de integro, per∣fectus de perfecta consummataque virtute. Ibid. c. 7.

  Habet utique in natura, habet in substantia, & habet non per gratiam temporalem, sed per sempiternam Di∣vinitatem; habet non ex dono quasi servus, sed ex generationis proprie∣tate, quasi Filius coaeternus. Et ha∣bet sicut Pater. Sicut enim Pater ha∣bet vitam in semetipso, ita & Filio dedit vitam habere in semetipso. Sic habet, inquit, sic dedit. Didicisti supra quemadmodum dederit, ne pu∣tares esse gratiae largitatem, ubi ge∣nerationis arcanum est. Ambr. de Fide. l. 5. c. 1.
• * 1.171

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ath. cont. Arian. or. 2. p. 321.
• * 1.172

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. 314.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 321.
• * 1.173

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 330.

  Verbi enim appellatio in Dei Filio de Sacramento Nativitatis est, sicut sapientiae & virtutis est nomen, quae cùm in Dei F••lium cum substantia ver••e Nativitatis extiterint, Deo ta∣men ut sua propria, quamvis ex Deo in Deum sint nata, non desunt. — Earum rerum unigenito Deo aptata cognomina sunt, quae cum eum sub∣sistentem ex Nativitate consumment, tamen Patri non desint exinde mu∣tabilis virtute naturae. Hilar. de Trin. l. 7.

  Non enim sicut frequenter dictum a n••bis est, divisionis in Filio, sed Nativitatis Sacramentum praedica∣mus; nec separatio fuit imperfecta sed progenies perfecta, quia Nativi∣tas non habet detrimentum generan∣di, cum profectum teneat nascendi. Ibid.
• * 1.174

  Quid est enim Filius de eo quod Pater est? alius idem.

  Et hoc est quod Graeci Homoou∣sion appellant, cum uno aliud ipsum. Ambr. de Fide cont. Arianos. c. 6, 7.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Gr. Nyss. cont. Eunom. p. 19.
• * 1.175

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. contr. Arian. O∣rat. 2. p. 322.
• * 1.176

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.177

  Unus ab uno—ac sic uterque Deus unus, cùm inter unum & unum. id est, ex uno unum Divinitatis aeter∣nae non est secunda natura. Hil. de Trin. l. 4.
• * 1.178

  Nemo ambigat naturam Autoris in Filit nativitate connasci. Id. l 5.

  Et per id unus est Deus, quia ex natura Dei Deus sit.—Unum autem illud non subsistentem natu∣ram perimat in Filio, sed in Deo & Deo naturam Dei conservet unius.
• * 1.179

  Verum & absolutum & perfectum fidet nosirae Sacramentum est, Deum ex Deo, & Deum in Deo confiteri: non corporalibus modis, sed divinis virtutibus, nec naturae in naturam transfusione, sed mysterio & potestate naturae: n••n enim per desectionem, vel protensionem, vel derivationem, ex Deo Deus est, sed ex virtute na∣turae in candem naturam nativitate subsistit▪ Eandem autem naturam inde ita, non ut natus sit ipse qui genuit, (nam quomodo erit ipse, cùm geni∣tus sit) sed in his ipsis subsistat ille qui genitus est, in quibus totus est ipse, qui genuit: quia non ex alia genitus, neque aliud quam Deus est, quia non est aliunde quod genitus est. Hil. Ibid.
• * 1.180

  Unius cujusque intelligentiam con∣sulo, quid existimet in eo quod dictum sit, ex ipso. Utrumne ex altero in∣telligendum sit, anne ex nullo, an ipse ille censendus sit. Ex altero non est, quia ex ipso est; id est, ne aliunde praeterquam ex Deo Deus sit. Ex ni∣hilo non est, quia ex ipso est; demon∣stratur enim natura unde nativitas est. Ipse non est, quia ubi ex ipso est, nativitas Filii resertur ex Patre. Hilar de Trin. l. 6.
• * 1.181

  Nescit enim in Deo portionem, se•• scit Deum totum ex Deo toto; seit ex uno unum, non desectum, sed natum: seit nativitatem Dei, nec d••minutie∣nem esse gignentis, nec infirmitatem esse nascentis. Ibid.
• * 1.182

  Quod Deus est, Deus totum est— Deus ut est Deus, quod est permanet, & permanens Deum genuit. Ibid.
• * 1.183

  Deus qui ex Deo natus est, non uti∣que natus ex nihilo est, neque de non extantibus natus est, sed nativitatis suae viventem habuit naturam, nec idem Deus, qui erat, sed Deus ex Dec qui erat natus est. Ibid.
• * 1.184

  Sed quia ex Deo Deus, neque per nativitatem suam Deo ademit, quoa Deus est, neque ipse in nativitate non Deus est, & quod Deus est non caepit esse, sed natus ex Deo Deus est, & quod nascitur, id ipsum secundum hu∣manae naturae sensum videtur esse pro∣latum, & ita ut prelatio ipsa nativi∣tas esse existimetur; idcirco tentatum est per Valentini haeresim prolationis nomen excludi, ne nativitatis veritas permaneret, quia prolationis intelli∣gentia opinione terrena non multum esset à natura terrenae nativitatis aliena. Ibid.
• * 1.185

  De quâ Pater substantia, & ipse substantia Filius, spiritusque substan∣tia, sed ter ipsa substantia. Marius Victorinus Afer. hym. 3. Bl. Patr. Vol. 4. p. 258.

  Filium non similem, sed eundem diximus, quippe ex cadem substantia. Id. adv. Arium. l. 1. p. 183.
• * 1.186

  Non itaque secundum genus & speciem ista dicimus, sed quasi secun∣dum communem eandemque mate∣riam. Aug. de Trin▪ l. 7.
• * 1.187

  Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias, unam essentiam & unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam sub∣sistant, quanqam quicquid illud est, in his tribus explicatum sit; non enim aliquid aliud ejus essentiae est prae∣ter istam Trinitatem; tamen tres personas ejusdem essentioe, vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus, tres personas ex eadem essentia non d••cimus — Cùm dicuntur tres ho∣nanes una natura, vel tres homines ejusdem naturae, possunt ctiam dici ••res homines ex eadem naturâ, quia ••n cadem naturâ & alti tres homi∣nes possunt existere. In illa verò essentia Trinitatis, nullo modo alia quaelibet persona ex eadem essentia potest existere. Aug. de Trin. l. 7. c. 6.
• * 1.188

  Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut non∣nulli sentiunt; omitto illud quod iam dixi, oportere appellare tres essentias, ut appellantur tres sub∣stantiae vel personae, sicut appellantur tres equi, eademque animalia tria, cùm sit species equus, animal genus; neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est, & genus singulariter, tanquam diceretur tres equi unum animal, sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine. Quod si dicunt substantiae vel personae nomi∣ne non speciem significari, sed aliquid singulare atque individuum, ut sub∣stantia & persona non ita dicatur, sicut dicatur homo, quod commune est omnibus hominibus, sed quomodo dici∣tur hic homo, velut Abraham, velut Isaac, velut Iacob, vel si quis alius qui etiam digito praesens demonstrar: possit; sic quoque illos eadem rati•• consequetur; sicut enim dicuntur A∣braham, Isaac, & Iacob, tria ina••∣vidua, ita tres homines. & tres ani∣mae; cur ergo & Pater & Filius & Spiritus Sanctus, si secundum genus & speciem & individuum etiam ista disserimus, non ita dicuntur tres es∣sentiae, vel tres substantiae & perso∣nae. Sed haec, ut dixi, omitto, si es∣sentia genus est, una essentia jam non habet species. Non sunt ergo tres species unius essentiae pater & filius & spiritus sanctus. Si aut••m species est essentia▪ sicut species est ho∣mo, tres vero illae quaes appellamus substantias sive personas, sic candem speciem communiter habent, quem∣admodum Abraham, Isaac, & Iacob, speciem quae homo dicitur communiter habent, non autem sicut homo sub••i∣viditur in Abraham, Isaac, & Iacob. ita unus homo & in aliquos si••gulos homines subdi vidi potest, om••••no enim non potest, quia unus homo jam singu∣lus homo est: cur ergo una essentia in tres substantias vel personas subdi∣vidiutr: Nam si essentia species est. sicut homo, sic est una essencia sicut unus homo. Aug de Tr. l. 7. c. ••
• * 1.189

  Non enim major essentia est pater & filius & spiritus sanctus simul, quam solus pater out solus filius; sed tres simul illae substantiae sive perso∣nae, si ita dicendae sunt, aequales sunt singules, quod animalis homo non per∣cipit. Ibid.
• * 1.190

  Teuenda est haec regula, quâ non minor est filius, sed de patre esse int••∣matur, quibus verbis non inaequali∣tas, sed nativitas ejus ostendatur. Aug. de Trin. l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.191

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. contr. Gregal. Sa∣bell. Vol. 1. p. 651.
• * 1.192

  Quanquam in ejusmodi nominum usu, cùm singularem & individuam Dei esse naturam dicimus, proprietas est observanda significationis: ne sic singularis credatur esse natura, ut communis esse nequeat: & sic indi∣vidua, ut in unâ tantùm existat per∣sona, vel hypostasi, qui fuit Sabellia∣norum ac similium haereticorum er∣ror, ob quem nonnulli Patres istis repudiatis vocibus, it a divinitatem unam esse docuerunt, quomodo natura quaelibet communis pluribus una dici∣tur. Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 14. sect. 11. p. 443.
• * 1.193

  Nec sit dissimilis in genere, quia diversitatem substantiae geniti ex sub∣stantiâ Patris Filii similitudo non reci∣pit, & omnem in se Divinitatis Pa∣ternae, qualis & quanta est, formam invisibilis Dei Filius & imago com∣plectitur. Et hoc verè est esse Filium, Paternae scilicet formae veritatem, co∣imaginatae in se naturae perfecta simi∣litudine retulisse. Hilar. de Syn.
• * 1.194

  Retinetur it aque in Patre & Filio naturae indifferentis similitudo per es∣sentiae nativitatem, non tamen dam∣num Personae affert, ut unus sit missus & mittens, similitudo Naturae — quia cùm gignens & genitus unus esse non possit, non tamen diversae Naturae sint natus & generans. Ibid.
• * 1.195

  In Naturâ Dei Deus unus est, it a tamen ut & Filius Deus sit, quia in so Natura non differens sit; & cùm Deus ex Deo sit, non potest non uter∣que Deus esse, quorum per generis in∣differentiam — non discernatur es∣sentia. Ibid.
• * 1.196

  Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 13.
• * 1.197

  Si ad exact am Philosophiae regulam qui de Deo habetur Sermo dirigatur, non sic ejusdem Substantiae, id est, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sunt Tres Personae, uti Pe∣trus, Pauleus, & Ioannes; quod ta∣men antiqui in omni f••rè sua dispu∣tatione ponunt, quam contra Arianos instituunt. Petav. de Trin. l. 4. s. 6. p. 425.
• * 1.198

  Neque verò culpandi ob id illi erunt▪ aut inscitiae daumandi, tanquam nu∣meralem Unitatem Divinae Essentiae funditùs ignorarint ac solam ejus, quae in natura inest humana, similem ag∣noverint. Nam & priorem illam in∣tellexerunt, ut mox ostendam; & prudenter nihi lominus hâc sunt it. exemplam usi posteriore, speci••ique pro∣priâ Etenim sic illi adversus Aria∣nos obnitendum sibi esse meminerant, ut scirent Sabellianam quoque pesiem esse vitandam; in quam ab illa fu∣gienti praeceps lapsus erat, ac lubricus. Itaque modum hunc adhibendum or a∣tioni suae putarunt; ut summam il∣lam conjunctionem, &, ut Gregorius Nyssenus loquitur, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, parcius inducerent, ne Sabellianae solitu∣dini & singularitati locus dari videre∣tur; alteram verò quae speciei conve∣nit, libentiùs usurparent: Quae cùm ad Arianorum retundendam insaniam satis illis erat, tum ab Sabelliani su∣spicione dogmatis, & calumnia longè cos abesse monstrabat. Ibid.
• * 1.199

  Petav. de Trin. l. 4. c. 13. p. 427.
• * 1.200

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Or. 4. p. 489.
• * 1.201

  Ath. or. 5
• * 1.202

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ Ath. in expos. fidei.
• * 1.203

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Greg. Naz. Orat. 37.
• * 1.204

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.205

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath Decr. Syn. N p. 269.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 272. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 273. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. C••nt. Arian. Or. 1. p. 300 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Or. 2. p. 338. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. v. 346. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 p. 365. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 p. 352. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 365. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 367.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Decr. Syn. Nic. p. 280.
• * 1.206

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Bas. ad Eunom. c. 1. p. 718. Tom. 1. Par. 1638.
• * 1.207

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — Ath. C. Ar. O. 4. p. 488.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid p. 489.
• * 1.208

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Basil. Ep. 43. Gr. Nyss. d ediffer. Essent. & Hypost.
• * 1.209

  Exclusa est assertio volentium no∣minibus tantum Patrem & Filium praedicare, cùm imago omnis ejus ad quem coimaginetur, species indifferens sit. Neque enim ipse sibi quisquam imago est, sed eum cujus imago est, necesse est ut imago demonstret. Imago est itaque rei ad rem coaequandae ima∣giuata & indiscreta similitudo. Est ergo Pater, est & Filius, quia imago Patris est Filius. Et qui imago est ut vere imago sit, speciem necesse est & naturam & essentiam, secundum quod imago est, in se habeat Autoris. Hi∣lar. de Synod.
• * 1.210

  Pet. de Tri. l. 4. c. 13, & 14.
• * 1.211

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Basil cont. Sabel∣lianos. p. 521.
• * 1.212

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.213

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 522.
• * 1.214

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.215

  Haec est verae nati∣vitatis in∣telligentia, & fidei nostrae, quae ex natura divinae unitate, unius indifferentisque divinitatis veritatem in patre & filio confitetur, absolutissimum sacramentum. Hil. de Trin. l. 7. p. 86. Bas. 1570.

  Exaequata virtus est per naturae indissimilis unitatem. P. 87.

  Omnia habere sola natura possit indifferens, neque nativitas aliquid possit habere, nisi datum sit. — Neque aliter potuit aut debuit filius à patre distingui, quàm quod natus sit, nec tamen diffe∣rens doceretur. Ibid.

  Non confunditur itaque aut aboletur natura, ne filius sit, nec tamen rursum adimitur natura, ne Deus sit, nec discernuntur diversitate, ne unum sint, neque quod unum sunt id potest praestare, ne uterque sit. P. 88.

  Ego & Pater unum sumus: Ut quod unum sunt, nec diversum nec solitarium crederetur, non alia in utroque per nativitatis & generationis proprietatem existente natura.—Confessionem unius in utroque & consimilis naturae. 89.

  Quia non differt, nec degenerat nativitas,— dum Dei filius, non aliud quàm Deus est.

  Vnum dixit, ne fiat discretio potestatis; sumus addidit, ut patrem filiumque cognoscas, quo per∣fectus pater perfectum filium genuisse credatur. Et pater & filius unum sint, non confusione, sed unitate naturae. Ambr. de fide, l. 1. initio.

  Non enim pater ipse qui filius, sed inter patrem & filium generationis expressa distinctio est; ut ex Deo Deus, ex manente manens, ex pleno plenus sit.—Est enim plenitudo divinitatis in patre, est plenitudo divinitatis in filio, sed non discrepans, sed una divinitas. Nec confusum quod unum est, nec multiplex quod indifferens. —Quanto magis pater & filius unum sunt, ubi nec substantiae nec voluntatis ulla est differentia. —In te igitur est Deus per unitatem naturae, & non est Deus praeter te per proprietatem substantiae, repulsam differentiae. Ibid.
• * 1.216

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (fortà 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Greg. Nyss. Catech. Or. Praef.
• * 1.217

  Gr. Nyss. cat. or. c. 1.
• * 1.218

  Deus est essentia Spiritualis, intel∣ligens, verax, bona, pura, justa, mi∣sericors, liberima, immensae poten∣tiae & sapientiae, Pater aeternus, qui Filium imaginem suam ab aterno ge∣nuit, & Filius imago Patris coaeter∣na, & Spiritus Sanctus procedens à Patre & Filio, &c. Melanct. loci Theol. de Deo.
• * 1.219

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Greg. Nyss. ad Ab∣labium, Vol. 2. p. 448.
• * 1.220

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.221

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 —
• * 1.222

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Gr. Nyss. Ibid.
• * 1.223

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.224

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.225

  Diversitas plures facit, unitas po∣testatis excludit numeri quantitatem, quia unitas numerus non est, sed haec omnium ipsa principium est. Ambr. de fide, c. 1.
• * 1.226

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Greg. Nyss. Catech. Or. cap. 3.
• * 1.227

  N••merus enim duplex est, unus quidem, quo numeramus, alter verò, qui in rebus numerabilibus constat; ergo in numero quo numeramus, repe∣titio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum vero numero non facit plurali∣tatem unitatum repetitio. Boet. de duabus in Christo Naturis.
• * 1.228

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Basil. Apo∣log. ad Caesar. Ep. 141. p. 164. T. 3.
• * 1.229

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ibid.
• * 1.230

  Peter Lomb. lib. 1. dist. 23.
• * 1.231

  Estius, lib. 1. dist. 2. sect. 5.
• * 1.232

  Lib. 1. dist. 23.
• * 1.233

  Damascen. de Orthod. fide l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.234

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. de Orth. Fide. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.235

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — Ibid.
• * 1.236

  Contra Eunom. l. 12.
• * 1.237

  Pet. de Tr. l. 4 c. 1, 2, 3.
• * 1.238

  Petav. de Tr. l. 4. c. 3. s. 6.
• * 1.239

  L. 1. dist. 25.
• * 1.240

  Parte pri∣ma. q. 30. Art. 1.
• * 1.241

  Sicut nos d••••in••us in divinis plura∣liter tres personas, & tres subsisten∣tias, ita Graeci dicunt tres hypostases. Sed quia nomen substantiae, quod se∣cund••m preprietatem significationis re∣spond•••• hypostasi, aequ•••• ••ocatur ••pud nos, cùm ••uandoque significet essenti∣am, quandoque hypostasin, ne pess•• esse erroris occasio, maburunt pro hyp••stasi tran ferre s••bsistentiam, quam sab∣scantiam. Ibid. q. 29. art. 2. ad secundum.
• * 1.242

  Ecce expresse dicitur, quòd Persona secundum substantiam decitur, ut cum decitur, Pater est Persona, hic sit sensut, Pater est divina essentia; simili∣ter cùm dicitur, Filius est Persona. Spiritus Sanctus est Persona, id est divina essentia. Lomb. dist. 23.
• * 1.243

  Idem, Dist. 26.
• * 1.244

  Dist. 25.
• * 1.245

  Hoc etiam modo sanè potest accipi persona in praemissis locutionibus, cùm dicitur alia est persona Patris, alia filii, id est, alia est proprietas, quâ pater est pater, alia, quâ filius est fi∣lius, alia, quâ spiritus sanctus est spi∣ritus sanctus. Ita etiam nomine per∣sonae quidam proprietates intelligere volunt, cùm dicuntur tres personae; sed melius est ut subsistentias vel hypo∣stases intelligamus, cum dicimus tres personas. Ex praedictis colligitur, quòd nomen personae in Trinitate triplicem tenet intelligentiam; est enim ubi fa∣cit intelligentiam essentiae, & est ubi facit intelligentiam hypostasis, & est ubi facit intelligentiam proprietatis▪ Dist. 25.
• * 1.246

  De Tr. l. 7. c. 6.
• * 1.247

  Basil. Ep. 349.
• * 1.248

  Ep. 391.
• * 1.249

  Quae liguendi rati••nes indicent, Personat illas, —non unum & sim∣pl••x hahere 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, neque diversas solum c••••idem individui functiones & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quibus appel a∣tiones variae comp••••ant — s••d di∣versitatem illam & mul••iplicitatem in subjecto esse revera, ac tria emnino ex se distincta, & su••sistentibus proprie∣tatibus separata consistere. Petav. l. 4. c. 2. p. 324.
• * 1.250

  De Trin. l. 6. c. 22, 23.
• * 1.251

  See Dr. Payn's Letter to the Bishop of Roche∣ster.
• * 1.252

  See the De∣fence of Dr. Sher∣lock's no∣tion of a Trinity in Unity, p. 19. &c.
• * 1.253

  Adeo prop∣ter sum∣mam uni∣tatem & simplicitatem excluditur omnis pluralitas absolutè dictorum, non autem pluralitas relationum Quae re∣lationes praedicantur de aliquo ut ad alterum, & sic compositionem in ipso de quo dicuntur non impor∣tant. Aquin. 1. q. 30. art. 1, ad 3.
• * 1.254

  Imago enim est similitudo non quae∣cunique, sed ex eo, cujus imago dicitur expressa; respondent enim sibi invicem imago & exemplar. Proinde non quae∣cunque sibi mutuò sunt multum similia, ut ovum ovo, sunt ejusmodi, ut alte∣rum sit imago alterius; non enim in his omnibus, verbi gratia in ovis, al∣terum de altero expressam gerit figu∣ram, sed quod ex re objecta resultat in speculo, & similitudo sigilli cerae impressa, & alia hujusmodi propriè imagines dicuntur. Estius dist 27. S. 8. & Aquin 1. q 35. in cor∣pore.
• * 1.255

  Has proprietates designant nomina personarum, scilicet Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus; quae relativa sunt, & ad se invicem dicuntur. Quia no∣tant relationes, quae non sunt Deo ac∣cidentales, sed in ipsis Personis ab aeter∣no sunt immutabiliter, ut non modo appellationes sunt relativae, sed etiam relationes, sive notiones in rebus ipsis, scilicet in Personis sint. Lomb. l. 1. dist. 26.
• * 1.256

  Pater non dicitur nisi à Paterni∣tate, & Filius à filiatione; si igitur paternitas & filiatio non sunt in Deo realiter, sequitur, quòd Deus non sit realiter Pater aut Filius, sed secundum rationem intelligentiae tantum, quae est haeresis Sabelliana. Aqu. 1. q. 28. art. 1.
• * 1.257

  Relationes in divinis, cùm sint se∣cundum processiones in identitate na∣turae, reales quasdam in divinis esse relationes necessarium est. Ibid.
• * 1.258

  Respectus in natura rerum sunt re∣lationes reales, cùm aliquid procedit à principio ejusdem naturae, necesse est quod ambo, scilicet procedens, & id à quo procedit in eodem ordine conveni∣ant, & sic oportet quod habeant reales respectus ad invicem. Ib.
• * 1.259

  Relatio realiter in Deo existens, idem est essentiae secundum rem. Aq 1. q. 28. art. 2.

  Relationes personales nec à Personis, nec ab essentia reip••â distingui. Estius dist. 33. S. 2. l. 1.
• * 1.260

  Aquinas & Estius, Ibid.
• * 1.261

  Aqui. 1. q. 30. Ar. 2.
• * 1.262

  Lomb. l 1. d. 3.
• * 1.263

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Nyss. Orat. Cat. cap. 1.
• * 1.264

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.265

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.266

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.267

  Leontius de sectis Act. 1. B.P. Gr. L. T. 1. p. 493.
• * 1.268

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Theod. Abuc. Op. 2. B. P. Gr. L. p. 382.
• * 1.269

  Athan. Decr. Syn. Nic. T. I. p. 269.
• * 1.270

  Sed nec sicut Hierachas lucernam dixit de lucerna, vel lampadem in duas partes. Hilar. de Tr. c. 6.
• * 1.271

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Syn. Nic. decr. p. 271.
• * 1.272

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Dionys. Alex. ap. Athan. Syn. Nicen. decr. T. I. p. 275.
• * 1.273

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Arian. Or. 4. p. 456.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 437.
• * 1.274

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Syn. Nic. decret p. 269.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Or. 4. c. Ar. p. 456.
• * 1.275

  Hil. C 7. de Tr.
• * 1.276

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Or. 4. c Ar. p. 454.
• * 1.277

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 456.
• * 1.278

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Nyss. ad Abl. Vol. 2. p. 450.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.279

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.280

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.281

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.282

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉— 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.283

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.284

  See the De¦fence of Dr. Sher∣lock's No∣tion of a Trinity in Unity.
• * 1.285

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 456.
• * 1.286

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Theo∣phyl. in locum.
• * 1.287

  Sed c••m na••ura Dei in natura Dei substi••••ss••••, id est, ex patre filius na∣tus esser, per virtutis ac naturae in se paternae conscientiam, nihil ab se, ni••i quod patrem faci••ntem vidisset, fi••••••m fac••re poss•• testatus est. Et cum unigenitus Deus pa••ern••e virtutis operationibus operaretur, tantum si••i a•• fa••iendum praesumcret, quantum in Conscientia sua esfet, inseparabil••m à se Dei Patris, quam per l••gitimam nativitatem ob••in▪ bat, posse naturam; non enim corporalibus modis via••••, sed visus ei omnis in virtute Natu∣rae est. Hil. de Trin. c. 7.

  Et demonstratio operum non igno∣rationis instructio, sed nostrae fidei, quae non silio scientiam ignoratorum, sed nobis confess••onem nativitatis in∣vexit — ut demonstratio ipsa na∣tivitatis esse substantia d••ceretur, cui per dile••••••••ne•• patris op••rum pater∣no•••••• — esset cognata cognitio. Ibid.

  Quod a••tem videt, conscia in se na••••••ae s••••nificatur aguitio, & in eo nunc. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Dei cognosce naturam. Ibid. U••••genitus igitur Deus naturae in••e 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••nscius, &c.

  Di••eun•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se per loquentem loqui, & per operantum operari, & per ju∣dicantem judica••e, & per visum vi∣••••r••, & per r••con••••••••tem reconci∣••••••ri, & manere se in ••o, qui in se ma••••ret, qu••ero quo alio a•• intelli∣g••nt•••• nostrae sensum Expositionis sit••e 〈…〉〈…〉 ap••rtio••i s••rmone, ut unum ••sse intellige••entur quam isio, quo p••r ••••••ivitatis verita••em, & naturae u••••tatem, qui••q••id filius ageret, & diceret, id in filio, pater & loque∣retur & ageret? Non est hoc itaque naturae à se alienae.— Sed per∣fecta nativitate in Deum perfectum genitae divinitatis, cujus haec natura∣lis conscientiae fi••ucia est, ut dicat, ego in Patre, & Pa••er in me, & omnia, quae Patres sant, mea sunt. Id. l. 8.

  Vide ci••m tacitus recum ipse con∣grederis, ratione hec ipsam agi intra te, e••cu••rente e••i tibi cum s••rmone, ad omnem cogitatûs tui motum, & om∣nem sensus tui pulsum. Tert. Cont. Prax. p 503. Paris.

  Tert. Contr. Prax. c. 13. p. 509.
• * 1.288

  Cyr. l. 4. in Joan.
• * 1.289

  Dion. de divin. nom.
• * 1.290

  Fulg. 3. ad Mon. c. 7.
• * 1.291

  Unigenitus qui est in gremio Pa∣tris, quod est esse Deum, in gremio enim & in 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 substantiae; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, uterque, & substantia & divinitate consistens, uterque in utro∣que, & cognoscit uterque utrumque. Vict. Afer. Bl. Patr. Vol. 4. p. 190.
• * 1.292

  Id enim quod ait, Ego & Pater Unum s••mus, tentant ad Unanimi∣tatis referre consensum, ut voluntatis in his unitas sit, non naturae; id est, ut non per id quod idem sunt, sed per id quod id••••m volunt, un••m sent. Hil. de Tr. l 8.
• * 1.293

  Et quia dixit Unum, intel••igant haeretici quod non dixit Unus. Unum enim neutral••ter positum, societatis concordiam, non unitat••m personae sonat. Novat. de Trin. c. 22.

  Quod autem dictum est, ut sint quidem per substantiam tria, per con∣sonantiam vero unum, non habet ca∣lummam, quia cognominato spiritu, id est, paracleto, consonantiae potius quam essentiae per similitudinem sub∣stantiae praedicare convenit unitatem. Hil. de Synod.
• * 1.294

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Gr. N••ss. cont Eun. O••. 12. p 345.
• * 1.295

  Nou alta natura, quàm quae sui conscia est, diceret, ego & Pater Unum sumus. Hil. de Trin. c. 7.
• * 1.296

  Uterque hostis Ecclesiae res Ecclesiae agit; dum Sabellius Deum ex natura in operibus praedicat; hi verò ex sa∣cramento fidei filium confitentur. Ibid.
• * 1.297

  Quod si de nomine substantiae aut naturae Divinae voluerint dicere, fa∣cile revincuntur, quia Usiam Gracè & Latinè Substantiam frequenter Scriptura memoravit—quod si ex aliâ substantiâ filium dicunt, ipsi se revin∣cunt, & verbum substantiae quod me∣tuunt confitendo, & filium creaturis, quibus praeferre se simulant, conferen∣do. Ambr. de Fide, C. 1. Tom. 2. Bas. 1555. p. 51.
• * 1.298

  Aut quid est Ousia, aut unde dicta, nisi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quod semper maneat; cui enim esse est semper, Deus est, & ideo maneus semper Ousia dicitur Di∣vina. Ambr. Ibid. c. 3.
• * 1.299

  Non igitur verbum, sed vim verbi fugiunt, quia nolunt, verum esse Dei filium.— sicut Autor ipsorum Eu∣sebius Nicomediensis Epistola sua prodidit, dicens, siverum, inquit, Dei filium & increatum dicimus, Homou∣sion cum patre incipimus confiteri. Haec cùm lecta esset Epistola in Conci∣lio Nicaeno, hoc verbum in Tractatu fidei posuerunt Patres, quod id vide∣runt Adversariis esse formidini, ut tanquam evaginato ab ipsis gladio ip∣sorum nefandae caput haeresis amputa∣rent. Ibid. p. 75.
• * 1.300

  Certè ne quis posset errare, sequa∣tur ea quibus scriptura sancta ut in∣telligere possimus Filium significat. Verbum dicitur, Filius dicitur, Dei virtus dicitur, dicitur Dei sapientia. Ib. c. 1. p. 40.
• * 1.301

  De substantia autem, Imperator Auguste, quid loquar unius Filium cum Patre esse substantiae, cùm imaginem Paternae substantiae Filium legerimus, ut in nullo secundum Divinitatem à Patre intelligas discrepare? Iuxta h••nc imaginem dixit, omnia quae Pater habet, mea sunt; ergo nec substantiam in Deo possumus denegare. Ambr. de Fide. c. 3. p. 74.

  Mihi enim impossibile est generatio∣nis scire secretum. Mens deficit, vox silet, non mea tantum, sed & Ange∣lorum. Id. c. 1. p. 45.
• * 1.302

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. Orth. Fid. l. 3. c. 3.
• * 1.303

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Arist. Categ. cap. 5. T. 1. p. 23.
• * 1.304

  Theor. Leg. ad Ar∣men.
• * 1.305

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. Orth. Fid. l 3. c. 6.
• * 1.306

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damas. Orth. Fid. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.307

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. O••th. Fid. l. 3. c. 6.
• * 1.308

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.309

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. D••m. Orth. Fid. l. 3. c. 6.
• * 1.310

  Damasc. Orth. Fid. l. 1. c. 9.
• * 1.311

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. Ibid. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.312

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. Damasc. Fid. Orth. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.313

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Da∣masc. Orth. Fid. l. 1. c. 10.
• * 1.314

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Da∣mas••. Orth. Fid. l. 1. c. 10. & cap. 11.
• * 1.315

  See Doctor Payn's Letter to the B of R.
• * 1.316

  Aqu. p. 1. Quaest. 31. Art. 1.
• * 1.317

  The Di∣stinction between Real and Nominal Trinitari∣ans Exam. p. 24.