Real, Substantial, Subsisting Persons. If we will allow ei∣ther the Nicene Fathers, or the Arian Bishops to be well in their wits, can we think that there would have been any such Disputes between them, as whether the Son be Co∣eternal with the Father, or had a Beginning? whether there were any time, the least conceivable moment be∣fore the Son was? whether he was made 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, crea∣ted out of nothing, as all other Creatures are, or begot∣ten of the Substance of the Father, and is the true, ge∣nuine, natural Son of God, or a Son only by Adoption? whether he be true perfect God, in opposition to the most perfect created Nature, or be only a made and Creature-God? whether he be Consubstantial with the Father, or have only a Nature like the Fathers, but not the same? and whether he be like his Father in all things, in Substance and Essence, or only in Will and Affection. I say, Could any men in their wits dispute such matters as these, un∣less both sides were agreed, that the Son is a Real, Substan∣tial Son, as human Sons are, who are begotten of the Substance of their Parents; that he has a Subsistence of his own, distinct from his Father's Subsistence; that he has a Substance of his own, eternally begotten of his Father's Substance, and therefore the same, but proper and pecu∣liar to his own Person, which makes him the Son, and not the Father. For till these things are agreed, there is no foundation for the other Disputes; for if the Son have no real Subsistence of his own, who would dispute whether he began to subsist in time, or did subsist from all Eternity? If he have no Substance of his own, is it not ludicrous to dispute whether he be of the Father, that is, have his Substance of his Father's Substance, or be a new created Substance, as like his Father's Substance as a created Sub∣stance can be, but not the same? For if he have no di∣stinct Substance of his own, neither of these can be true. To what purpose is it to dispute, whether he be a begotten