The present state of the Socinian controversy, and the doctrine of the Catholick fathers concerning a trinity in unity by William Sherlock ...

CHAP. III. A Brief Account of the Sabellian Heresy, and by what Arguments the Catholick Fathers opposed it.

THE Considerer has given us the most Compleat and Artificial Scheme of Sabellianism that I have yet met with, a••d has very fairly and openly confessed his De∣sign, to prove, That One God must signify that there is but One who is God, but One single Divine Person, in the proper Notion of a Person, as it signifies an Intelligent Being. I have endeavoured to shew him his Mistake, and what it is that has mis-led him; and how hopeless an Attempt it is to reconcile his Hypothesis with the Catholick Faith of the Trinity and Incarnation.

This is so bold an Attempt, openly to assert and defend a Heresy which has been constantly condemned by the Catholick Church, since its first appearance, that I am apt to hope he does not believe his Hypothesis to be Sabellia∣nism, or that Heresy which now is best known by that name, though Sabellius was not the first Author of it. And therefore I will shew him what Sabellianism is, and how the Fathers opposed it.

There were Two Points in dispute between them and the Catholick Christians.

First, Concerning the Personality of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

Secondly, Concerning the Unity of God, Whether it were the Unity of One Person, as they pretended.

That we may rightly understand this matter, we must distinguish between the several kinds of Sabellianism, be∣cause the Arguments and Answers of the Fathers are some∣times adapted to one, and sometimes to another Notion of it. That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were but One Per∣son, was asserted by them all, but explained very different∣ly, and that altered the state of the Question, and required different Answers.

1. As first, They made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be only Three Names, Appearances, or Offices of the same Person, as I observed before: And then the state of the Question was not, Whether the Son was a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Person, in as true and proper a sense as the Father was a Person? For this they owned by making Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three Names of the same Person; whereas it is impossible they should be the same Person, if the Son were not a Person, nor the Holy Ghost a Person. If the Son be the same Person with the Father, the Son must be a Person, for no Person can't be the same Person: Which is the same Argument to prove that these Hereticks owned Christ to be a True and Real Person, that Novatianus used (as I observed before) to prove that they owned Christ to be true and perfect God, because they made him the same with the Father, who is true and per∣fect God, and a true, and real, and substantial Person. And if he be the very same with the Father, he must be the same we acknowledge the Father to be; viz. a true and real Person, and perfect God.

The Dispute then which the Catholick Fathers had with these Hereticks, with respect to this Notion, That Father, Son▪ and Holy Ghost, were the very same Person, was not, Whether the Son was a Person, and the Holy Ghost a Per∣son? but, Whether the Son and Holy Ghost were truly and really distinct Persons from the Father, as the Catholick

Church always believed? or, Whether they were the same Person, distinguished only by Three Names.

Now when the Fathers asserted not only the Personality of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (which this Notion did not oppose), but the real distinction of Persons, That the Son was a Person, but not the same Person with the Father, they must ascribe the same kind of Personality to the Son, which they do to the Father; That the Son is as truly and really a Person as the Father is, though not the same Person; as truly a Person as God would be, were there but One Person in the Godhead, as these Hereticks affirm∣ed. For according to all the Rules of Disputation, we must take Words in the sense of those whom we oppose; for otherwise it is a mere wrangle about Words, without op∣posing one another. And therefore since the Sabellians by Person understood such a Person as every single Person is, (for they made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but Three different Names of the same single individual Person) no∣thing could oppose or confute them, but to prove, That Father, and Son, and Holy Ghost, are Three distinct Per∣sons, in the same Notion of a Person which belongs to eve∣ry single individual Person, as far as mere Personality is concerned. For to prove them Three in any other sense, whether Three Modes, or Three Powers, or Three Parts of the same One single Person, is what they would have; and allow them to be but One Person, and they will dispute no further; nay, will give you leave to call Three Modes, or Three Names, or Three Parts of the same One Person, Three Persons, if you please.

But for the clearer understanding of this matter, we must consider by what Arguments the Ancient Writers opposed this Heresy.

Tertullian, in opposition to Praxeas, reduces this to a short Question, Whether God have any Son, and who he is,

and how he is his Son.* 1.1 For if God have a Son, the Son must be as true and real a Person as the Father, and Father and Son must be Two distinct Persons; for the same Person can't be both Father and Son to himself; the very Names of Fa∣ther and Son signify, that one is of the other, and we must understand things to be what they are called, whether Fa∣ther or Son, which can no more be the same than Night and Day, with respect to these different Relations. The Father makes the Son, and the Son makes the Father; and those who receive these Relations from each other, can never be these Relations to themselves, that the Father should make himself a Son to himself, or the Son make himself a Fa∣ther to himself. This Order God has in∣stituted in all other Beings, and he ob∣serves it himself. A Father must of ne∣cessity have a Son, to be a Father; and a Son must have a Father, that he may be a Son, but to have, and to be, are two things; as for instance, for a man to be a Husband, signifies that he has a Wife, not that he is a Wife to himself; and thus to be a Father, signifies to have a Son, not to be a Son to himself; in such Relations we must be one, and have another; that to be both is to be neither, because we can have neither. If I be Father and Son to my self, I am no Father, because I have no Son, who makes a Father, but am Son my self;

and I am no Son, because I have no Father, who makes the Son, but am Son my self; and thus while they make Father and Son one and the same Person, they destroy the Notion both of Father and Son.

Now would any man have argued at this rate, who did not believe Father and Son to be real and Substantial Per∣sons, and as distinct from each other as a human Father and Son are; for if they be not, all this reasoning from the di∣stinct Relations of Father and Son, which require a real di∣stinction of Persons, is quite lost: And whether this Ar∣gument be good, or no, (which is not the present Enqui∣ry) it is certain that whoever uses it, if he understands himself, must believe, That Father and Son signify as true and real Relations, and as real and distinct Persons in the Godhead, as they do in human Nature.

The like may be said of that other Argument against the Father and the Son being One and the same Person, That then the same Person must, in order of Nature, be both before and after himself; for he who begets must al∣ways in order of Nature (though not of Time, in an Eternal Generation) be before him who is begotten by him: That as Father, he is before himself as Son; as Son, he is after himself as Father; which had been Iudicrous trifling, if they had not believed a real substantial Genera∣tion of the Person, and consequently that the Son is a real substantial Person: For this Argument will not hold in the Generation of Modes and Postures, or in one part of the Deity generating another.

Thus to prove the distinction of Per∣sons between Father and Son,* 1.2 they urge all those Texts in which the Father speaks to or of the Son, and the Son speaks to or of the Father; which are so many, and so well known, that I need not transcribe them. And Tertullian lays

it down as a certain Rule, That he who speaks, and he to whom he speaks, and he who is spoken of, cannot be one and the same Person; for this is such perverseness and deceit as does not become God; that when he himself is the Person to whom he speaks, he should speak in such a manner as if he directed his speech to another, and did not speak to himself. And therefore when the Father says, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. When Christ tells us, That God is his Fa∣ther; That he came forth from the Father, and came into the world, and again leaves the world, and goes to the Father: When he says, I and my Father; and I will pray the Father,* 1.3 and he shall send you Another Comforter: I, and He, and Ano∣ther, must signify Three as Real and Di∣stinct Persons, as these words signify in common speech.

Thus they prove the distinction of Persons between Fa∣ther and Son, from those Texts which tell us, That the Father sends the Son, and the Son is sent; That the Father anoints, and the Son is anointed; That the Father gives Commands, and the Son receives them, and doth the Will of his Father; That the Father knows the Son, and the Son the Father; That he sees all that the Father doth, and can do all that he sees the Father do: For there must be distinct Subjects for such different Acts; the same Per∣son, with respect to himself, can't with any propriety of speech be said to send, and to be sent; to anoint, and to be anointed; to command, and to obey; to come forth from himself, and to come into the world, and to leave the world, and go to himself: And therefore he who sends, and he who is sent, &c. must be Two.

Nay, it is well observed by these Fathers, That Christ himself expresly teaches us, that He and his Father, with respect to the distinction of Persons, are Two; so Two, as

to make a Legal Testimony of Two Witnesses; 8. Iohn 13,— 18. When the Pharisees objected against him,* 1.4 That he bore Record of himself, and there∣fore his Record was not true: He an∣swers, And yet if I judge, my judgment is true, for I am not alone, but I and my Father which sent me. It is also written in your law, That the testimony of two men is true; I am one that bear witness of my self and my Father that sent me beareth witness of me. This is as express as words can make it. If Father and Son were but O••e single Person, Christ could not have said, I am not alone, but I and my Father which sent me; for one single Person is in this sense alone, how many Names soever he has; and if he and his Father are not Two distinct Persons, they are not Two Legal Witnesses, as Two distinct men are.

These and such like Arguments we may find in all the Ancient Writers who have engaged in this Controversy; and from hence we learn not only what they thought of the distinction of Persons between Father and Son, but what kind of Person they believed the Son to be; such a Person as has a Personal Knowledge, and Will, and Power, who is capable of being sent, of receiving and executing Commands, and has all this as distinctly in himself, as he is a distinct Person. The Father knows the Son, and the Son knows the Father, but each of them know by their own Personal Knowledge; the Father wills, and the Son wills, and wills all the same with the Father, but each of them wills by his own Personal Will; the Father works, and the Son works, and they inseparably do the same things, but each of them work by their own Personal Power.

Knowledge, and Will, and Power of acting, is essential to the Notion of a Person, and therefore every distinct Per∣son must have a distinct Personal Knowledge, and Will, and Power; and those must acknowledge this, who prove the distinction of Persons from distinct Personal Acts, as all these Fathers did. This is all we ask, when we assert a distinction of Persons in the Trinity; and this we must in∣sist on, or deny a Trinity; for if there are not Three who have all the same distinct Personal Acts, there cannot be Three distinct compleat Persons; for Personal Acts shew a Person, and distinct Personal Acts prove distinct Persons; and in this sense (as all these Arguments prove) the An∣cient Fathers owned a distinction of Three Persons in the Unity of the Godhead.

Their distinction between Deus invisibilis, and Deus visi∣bilis, the invisible and visible God, whereby they proved the real distinction between God the Father and God the Son, is an undeniable Proof of their Opinion in this mat∣ter; for I urge it no farther.

It was the received Opinion (as far as I can find) of all the Ancient Fathers, till St. Austin, That God the Father never appeared in any visible Representation of himself; for he tells Moses, No man can see my face, and live: And St. Iohn assures us, No man hath seen God at any time, but the only-begotten Son,* 1.5 who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath de∣clared him: And yet in the Old Testa∣ment we frequently read of God's ap∣pearing to men, which they therefore expound of God the Son, and that his Appearance in a visible Form was a Pre∣ludium to his Incarnation.

This we may see largely proved by Tertullian and St. Hi∣lary, and observed by St. Athanasius; and the plain conse∣quence they draw from it, is, That this invisible and visi∣ble

God cannot be one and the same Person; and the con∣sequence is so sel••-evident, that it needs no Proof; but it evidently proves what a real, substantial, as well as di∣stinct Person they thought the Son, who could visibly ap∣pear, while the Father remained invisible; for as a visible and invisible God can't be the same Person, so a visible God must be a real substantial Person.

And though St. Austin was of opinion, That those Three Men which appeared to Abraham, were the Three Persons of the Sacred Trinity, and thereby rejected the distinction of the invisible and visible God, by attributing a visible Ap∣pearance to God the Father, which none of the Ancients had done before him; yet by these Three distinct Appear∣ances he confirmed the real distinction of the Divine Per∣sons, who were as distinct Persons as they appeared to be, and therefore as distinct as Three Human Persons, for they appeared as Three distinct men. And therefore he observes, That whereas Two of these Three went to Lot in Sodom, Lot speaks to them as to One, 19. Gen. 18. And Lot said unto them,* 1.6 Oh, not so, my Lord: And justifies Lot in this, That though they were two, yet they were equal, and he would not divide the Fa∣ther and Son; and urges this against the Sabellians, who made Father and Son One Person. I do not justify St. Austin in this, because I doubt whether the Argument be good; but by this we may understand St. Austin's Judgment of the real distincti∣on of Persons.

And to the same purpose the Voice from Heaven at our Saviour's Baptism, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; and the Descent of the Holy Spirit like a Dove, and lighting upon him, is urged by the Ancient Fathers to prove a real Trinity of Divine Persons:* 1.7 The Voice from the Father in Heaven, the Son on earth, and the Holy Ghost

descending like a Dove; which being Three distinct Manifestations,* 1.8 and all at a time, must represent the Father who spoke from Heaven, the Son who was on Earth, and the Holy Ghost who de∣scended like a Dove, to be Three distinct Persons, not One single Person, which cannot speak of himself in the Third Person, nor descend on himself in a distinct visible Appear∣ance.

The Sabellians being unable to maintain this Point, which is so manifestly absurd, and so irreconcilable with all the forms of speech used in Scripture concerning Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, found it necessary to allow some di∣stinction between them, but yet were so afraid of Tritheism, that they kept religiously to their main Point, that One God was but One Person, and therefore would admit of no other distinction but what was reconcilable with the Unity of a Person.

2. Hence, secondly, some of them taught, That the Son is distinguished from the Father, not as one Person is distinguished from another, but as a man's Word or Wisdom which is in his Heart and Soul, may be distinguished from himself; that is, That the Son is not a living, substantial, subsisting Word, no more than the Word of a Man, which is only the motion of a living subsisting heart, but does not live and subsist it self, but being spoke it vanishes, and being often repeated, never continues;* 1.9 and therefore is not another Man, nor Man of Man, nor with Man; as the

Divine Word is true and perfect God, God of God, and God with God; and therefore they make God and his Word but One Person, as Man and his Word is One Man.

In answer to this, St. Athanasius urges all those Texts which prove Christ and God the Father to be Two distinct Persons; for if they be Two Persons, then the Son is as True and Real a Person as the Father is. This I have al∣ready taken notice of, and need not now repeat it; only I cannot but observe what Athanasius tells us of these He∣reticks, That when they were convinced by the plain Evi∣dence of Scripture, that God the Father, and Christ who called himself the Son of God, were Two Persons, they then took Courage, and owned Christ to be a Person, but not a Divine Person, as the Eternal Word of God, but only a Human Person, as he was Man. But Athanasius tells them, That this was neither better nor worse than the Heresy of Paulus Samosatenus, or what we now call Socinianism, to make Christ a mere Man; for he can be no more, if the Divine Word, which St. Iohn tells us was Incarnate, be not the Person: If the Word Incarnate be the Person, then Christ is God-Man; if the Man be the Person, he can be no more than a Man.

This Athanasius confutes at large, and proves, That what Christ says of himself, cannot belong to a mere Man. But that which I would observe, is this, That both these Hereticks, who denied the Divine Word to be a Person, and Athanasius and the other Catholick Fathers who affirm∣ed him to be a Person, agreed very well in the Notion of a Person, viz. That a Person is a distinct, intelligent Being, who does really and actually subsist, and subsists distinctly from all other intelligent Beings. That the Divine Word in the Godhead is such a Person as a Man is in Human Nature: Such a Person these Hereticks would allow Christ to be, considered as a Man; and such a Person Athanasius affirms

Christ to be, considered as God, or the Divine Word; for otherwise they wrangle about words, and do not oppose each other.

The Fathers proved, That Christ was a Person, and a distinct Person from the Father, by those Texts which re∣present him as speaking to and of his Father, and which attribute many Personal Acts to him: The Sabellians could not deny but that these were Personal Acts, and did prove Christ to be a real subsisting Person; but then would not allow the Word to be the Person, but only the Man Christ Jesus to be the Person: The Fathers, on the other hand, allow their Notion of a Person, which is the only true in∣telligible Notion, but prove, That the Divine Word which was Incarnate, not merely the Man Christ Jesus, was this Person; and therefore that this Divine Word is a real, sub∣stantial, subsisting Word, not like the Word of a man, which is a transient Act, but has no subsistence of its own.

The Sabellians would have allowed a Trinity of Persons in any other Notion of a Person, than as a Person signifies a real, subsisting, intelligent Being; but the Catholick Fa∣thers would own no other Notion of Person but this; and taught that there were Three Persons in the Trinity, in the same sense in which the Sabellians denied there were Three Persons; Three such Persons as they affirmed there was but One; that the Son and Holy Ghost were Divine Persons, in the same sense that the Sabellians owned the Father to be a Person; that is, Three such Persons as they called Three Gods.

The reason of this I'm sure is not to be answered, That if the Catholick Fathers understood what they did, when they opposed the Sabellians, who made the Divine Word only to be the Word of a Divine Person, but not a Di∣vine Person himself, they must assert the Divine Word in a strict and proper sense to be a Divine Person, and not

merely the transient Word of a Person, which has no sub∣sistence; which is a more sensible Argument than all the Criticisms about Persona and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And yet they ex∣press themselves so fully and clearly in this matter, that there is no need of gu••ssing at their meaning.

Tertullian reduces this Dispute to this one single Question,* 1.10 which is the true state of it; whether the Son and Word of God, consider∣ed as distinct from God the Fa∣ther, be a Substance, and has a Sub∣sistence of his own: Which he expresly affirms, and offers his reasons for the Proof of it.

This he tells us is necessary to make the Word a real Being and Person, Res & Persona, that he have a real Substance, and a Substance of his own, proper to himself, per Substantioe proprietatem, without which he cannot be Second to God; nor the Father and the Son, God and his Word, be Two.

Now for the Son and the Word to be a substantial Being per proprietatem Substantioe, by a Substance proper to him∣self, as distinguished from God the Father, must signify, That the Personal Substance of the Son is not the same, but a distinct Substance from the Personal Substance of God the Father; so distinct, that the Father and Son are Two Persons, in the same sense and notion that the Father is One Person.

In answer to their Objection, That the Word of God was but like the Word of a Man, which was nothing else but a Voice and Sound, a Vibration of the Air, which conveyed some Notions to the Mind, but was it self Emptiness and Nothing, without any Substance of its own; he answers, That God himself is the most real and perfect Substance, and therefore whatever proceeds

from (or is begotten of) his Substance, must be a real substantial Being;* 1.11 much less can the Son and Word, who gave Being to all other Substances, be an insubstantial Nothing himself: For tho there may be equivocal Causes, which may produce things of a different na∣ture from themselves, yet nothing can produce nothing.

He argues farther, That this Word is called the Son of God, and God; The Word was with God, and the Word was God: And that Word which is the Son of God, and himself God, can't be an insubstantial Nothing, unless God him∣self be Nothing. If God begets a Son, he must be a sub∣stantial Person, as all Creature-Sons are, much more the Son of God: And such a Son who is himself God, must have all the Reality and Perfections which belong to the Notion of God.

But he argues farther, from what St. Paul tells us, That he was in the form of God, and thought it not robbery to be equal with God. In Effigie, in the Image of God. Now, says he, in what Image of God, was he? Certain∣ly in another, but not in none:* 1.12 The meaning of which is, That every Per∣son, as a Person, has his own Personal Image; but thus he was not the Perso∣nal Image of the Father, because he was not the same Person with the Father; but yet if he was the Image of God, he must be his True, Substan∣tial, though not his Personal Image; the true living Image of his Father's Person, but not his Person. He seems in∣deed in what follows, to have entertained too gross and corporeal imaginations of the Substance and Image of God;

but this was his own Mistake, and a Mistake only in Philo∣sophy, not in the Traditionary Faith of the Church; for which only we alledge his Authority. And the Conclusion of this Argument most fully acquaints us what he under∣stood by a Person: Whatever, says he, the Substance of the Word is,* 1.13 that I call a Person; and to that I give the Name of Son; and by acknowledging him the Son, I own him to be second to the Fa∣ther. Whoever reads this, must confess, That Tertullian did believe Father and Son to be Two di∣stinct substantial Persons; that though the Son be of the same Substance with the Father, as begotten of his Father's Substance, yet the Personal Substance of the Father was no more the Personal Substance of the Son, than Father and Son were One Person.

Novatianus, who was Cotemporary with St. Cyprian,* 1.14 though a Schismatick, was charged with no Heresy in this Ar∣ticle; and he opposes the Sabellians with the same Arguments, and almost in the same words that Tertullian and done be∣fore him: And tells us particularly, That this Divine Word, which is the Son of God, begotten and born of him, is not a mere Sound or Voice, like the Word of a Man, but that substantial Virtue and Power which proceeds from God: A Divine Substance, whose Name is the Word: Such a Word as is both the Son of God, and God: God proceeding from God, and making a Second Person in the Godhead.

Epiphanius, in opposition to the Heresies of Noetus and Sabellius, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, but One Substantial Person, affirms over and over, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy

Ghost Substance, that is, each of them Substance by him∣self, and as distinct in Substance as they are in Person: Three Substantial Persons, which are not one another, nor all the same. These Hereticks allowed the Father to be Substance, the Son Substance, the Holy Ghost Substance, but denied them to be Three in Substance, but taught that they were but One Substance, as they were but One and the same Person, Three Names, or Three distinct Virtues and Powers of the same One Substance or Person. And therefore when in opposition to these men Epiphanius as∣serts, That the Father is Substance, the Son Substance, and the Holy Ghost Substance, he can mean no less but that each of them is as distinctly Substance as he is a Per∣son; for to oppose One Substance, and One substantial Person, you must assert, not Three diverse or different Sub∣stances, but Three as distinct in Substance as they are in Person, or Three distinct substantial Persons.

Epiphanius asserts against these Hereticks, That the Son is not the Father, but truly and properly a Son, begotten of God the Father, as to Substance. Now a Son which is substantially begotten of the Father, and is not the Father, must in Substance be distinct from God the Father, that is, a distinct, tho not separate Substance from God the Father.

Athanasius also is very positive in this, That this Divine Word is a Perfect Son of a Perfect Father, Being of Being,* 1.15 the Image or Character of his Father's Sub∣stance, not an insubstantial Word, but a living Power, and the Author of Life to all things; not like the Power of a Man, which denominates a Man power∣ful; for the Power of Man is not his Offspring or Son, whereas this Power of God is his Son; that the Father is Perfect Power, as the Father of Power,

and the Son Perfect Power, as born of him. It were end∣less to transcribe such Sayings as these out of the Fathers; but I cannot miss Athanasius his Argument from those words of our Saviour, I am in the Father, and the Father in me. Now, says he, the Father is not the Word in the Heart of the Son,* 1.16 and therefore neither is the Son the Word in the Heart of the Father, but the Living Word, begotten eternally of the Living God the Father, and being without be∣ginning with the Father; insomuch that we cannot conceive the Father ever to have been alone: Which attributes as compleat and distinct Personal Subsistence to the Son as to the Father: That if the Father, who has the Son in him∣self, be a real, subsisting Infinite Person; the Son, who has the whole Father in himself, must be as real, subsisting, In∣finite a Person; for there is the same reason of both.

The Answer Athanasius gives to a Sabellian Objection against the substantial Generation and Subsistence of the Word and Son of God, is an unanswerable Proof what he thought of this matter.

The Objection is this, That if the Word and Son be truly and substantially begotten, this substantial Word must go out of the Father, and subsist separately from him:* 1.17 Whereas the Word which is in God must be inse∣parable from him, and not appear out of him; for how should he appear out of God, when God fills all places, even Heaven and Earth, and there∣fore there is no place for the Word to subsist in, where God is not?

In answer to this, Athanasius first ob∣serves what this Objection is levelled against, viz.* 1.18 To disprove the true and proper Generation of the Son, his Eter∣nal Procession from the Father, and Sub∣sistence with the Father; that the Fa∣ther does not compleatly and perfectly subsist by himself, nor the Son compleat∣ly and perfectly subsist by himself. This is the Faith the Sabellians opposed, and which Athanasius defended, as the Argument it self will assure us; which contradicts no other Notion of Generation or Subsistence, but a substantial Generation, and a compleat Personal Subsistence of the Word; but they could not imagine how the Word should be substantially begotten, and com∣pleatly and perfectly subsist by himself in his own Person and Substance, distinct from his Father's Subsistence and Person, without going out of the Father, and subsisting in a separate place from the Father, as all Created Births do, which opposes nothing but a real substantial Birth, and a compleat distinct subsistence of the Word; and therefore this is what the Sabellians took for the Catholick Faith, and this is what Athanasius defends: Who tells them that this is a very igno∣rant mistake,* 1.19 to think that God is cir∣cumscribed by place, and to conceive the Son in another place, and to ima∣gine that the Father and Son must be divided and separated, one in this place, and another in that, if we acknowledge that the Son is begotten of the Father, and does appear and subsist by himself, distinct from the Father: This he proves from Scripture; That there is no place that can contain God, and

therefore we must have no imagina∣tion of Place, when we think of God, the Son, and the Holy Spi∣rit; That these are false and Athe∣istical Reasonings; That the Omni∣presence of God is not a co-extension with all Creatures, which is a bodily or kind of Corporeal Omnipresence; but his Power holds and contains all things, for Power is unbodied and in∣visible, which neither encompasses o∣ther things, nor is encompassed by them; and therefore it is impious to ask for, or to conceive what is the Place of God, of the Word, or of the Holy Spirit. And if a man will deny that the Son is or was begotten, because he cannot conceive nor find out the place of his Essence or Sub∣stance, for the same reason he may de∣ny that there is a Father, or that there is a God.

So that Athanasius acknowledges the Son to be as true and substantial a Son, as the Father is a substantial Father; and that he does as perfectly and compleatly subsist by himself, as the Father does; but denies that it hence fol∣lows, as the Sabellians objected, That the Son, if he be a distinct substantial Person himself, must be divided and parted from the Substance of his Father, and that if he sub∣sist distinctly by himself, he must subsist in a separate place from his Father; that this distinction of Persons and Sub∣sistence cannot be conceived without a Local Separation.

For he tells them, All these Mistakes are owing to Cor∣poreal Imaginations; that they conceive of God after the

manner of Bodies; that because Body cannot generate another, without parting and dividing of Substance, nor subsist without being in some place, nor subsist distinctly without being in distinct and separate places, therefore if God beget a Son, and this Son subsist distinctly by himself, this Son must go out of the Divine Substance, and be lo∣cally separated from God the Father, as a human Son is from his Father; whereas the Divine Nature and Substance cannot be divided, nor does God subsist in a place; and therefore the Son may be substantially begotten of the Fa∣ther, and subsist distinctly by himself, without any division of the Divine Substance, or separation of place.

Let us now proceed to a Third sort of these Hereticks, who did allow a real and substantial difference between Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, but made God a compound Being, but one Person, as well as one God, and that Fa∣ther, Son, and Holy Ghost, were the Three Parts of this One God. This St. Austin calls Triformis Deus; and tells us,* 1.20 That these Hereticks did not allow the Father to be Perfect in himself, nor the Son Perfect in him∣self, nor the Holy Ghost Perfect in him∣self; that neither of these considered by themselves were Perfect God, but that all Three together made one Compleat and Perfect God.

This all the Catholick Fathers unanimously reject, and for the same reasons; because there can be no composition in the pure and simple Nature of God; and it was the received Doctrine of the Catholick Church, That each Person is by himself True and Perfect God, not an incompleat Part of the Deity.

Thus Athanasius warns us against this Heresy,* 1.21 which conceives the Trinity like Three Bodily Parts, inseparably united to each other; which, he says, is an ungodly reasoning, contrary to the Nature of Perfect Unbodied Beings; and therefore attributes the Perfection of the Godhead to each Person, who are a real Trinity, inseparably united in the same Form and Nature. That the Father is Perfect Essence and Being, without any defect, the Root and Foun∣tain of the Son and Spirit: That the Son in the Fulness of the Deity is the Living Word, and Perfect Offspring of the Father: That the Spirit is the Ful∣ness of the Son, not Part of another Being, but Whole and Entire in him∣self: That we must conceive them inseparably united to each other, but yet Three real subsisting Persons in the same Form and Species, which is originally in the Father, shines in the Son, and is manifested by the Holy Spirit. And therefore he adds, That he did not compound the Trinity, nor force it into a Monad or Unit (that is, One single Person) to preserve the Uni∣ty of the Godhead; nor conceive of God as of a Man, who is com∣pounded of Three Parts, Spirit, Soul, and Body; for such a compo∣sition cannot belong to a simple Na∣ture.

This is the constant language of the ancient Writers,* 1.22 That the Divine Na∣ture is not compounded of Parts, nor is God a compound Being; that each Person in the Trinity is a complete and perfect Person, and Three complete and perfect Persons cannot be One by Com∣position, as Three incomplete Parts are: that each Person by himself is perfect God and perfect Essence, though when we unite them and number Three, we acknowledge but One perfect God: for the Deity is not compounded but in Three,* 1.23 each of which is complete and perfect, there is One perfect Being, with∣out Composition, and without Parts; that is, the same One Divine Nature subsisting distinctly, not by Parts or Composition, but Whole and Entire in Three.

Let us now then consider the true state of the Question between these Sabellians, and the Catholick Fathers: These Hereticks owned at last, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be Three distinct Substances, but not Three substantial Wholes, but Three substantial Parts, which by their Union and Composition made up One whole intire God. The Catholick Fathers join with them so far, as to own these Divine Persons to be Three substantial subsisting Persons, but reject their Notion of a compounded God, or Three Parts of the Deity, with the utmost abhorrence, and affirm, that each Person is by himself entire and perfect God, per∣fect and complete Divine Essence or Substance, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Damascen speaks; and that they are not One God by Composition, or as One Person is One God, but as Three

complete and perfect Persons, each of which is perfect God, can be One God.

Now I think after this we need not dispute, what the Metaphysical Notions of Person and Personality are: for a Person in this Sacred Mystery, signifies One who is true and perfect God, and therefore is whatever God is; for the true and perfect definition of God, must belong to every Person who is true and perfect God. If then we acknow∣ledge God to be Infinite Substance, Mind, Life, Knowledge, Power, every Person who is God must be all this; and if each Person be true and perfect God, and yet no One Person is the other, nor the Motion, Affection, or perso∣nal Power, nor part of the other, then each Person is di∣stinctly and by himself complete and perfect God, and therefore has distinctly in himself all those Attributes and Perfections which belong to the perfect Notion and Idea of God; and to make any Person less than what God is, is to make him no God.

But Athanasius has another Argument against the Sabellian compounded Deity,* 1.24 which must put all Compositions of the Deity for ever out of countenance. The Scripture assures us, that God sends his Son, and that the Son sends the Holy Ghost; whereas were the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Three inseparable Parts of one com∣pounded Deity, how could this One God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, send part of himself, and one part of the same One God send another?

To send, and to be sent, necessarily supposes Persons really and substantially distinct, such as can give and re∣ceive, and execute Commands, who have distinct Under∣standings, Wills, and Powers of Action, for no other Beings are capable of sending or being sent; and Three

such distinct Persons, each of which is complete and per∣fect God, is the Trinity asserted by the Catholick Fathers, in contradiction to the Heresy of Sabellius.

But there is one very good Rule of Athanasius,* 1.25 which is worth observing in this Controversy, That we must not imagine to find the Unity of the God∣head by denying Three, but we must find this Unity, or Monade, in Three. The Sabellians took the first way to secure the Catholick Faith of One God, they denied Three real, distinct, sub∣stantial Persons in the Godhead; but the Catholick Faith owns Three real, distinct, substantial, divine Persons, and teaches that these Three are One God; not with such an U∣nity as belongs to One Person, but as Three Persons are One God: which should be a warning to some late Writers, who think they cannot sufficiently defend the Unity of God, without opposing a real and substantial Trinity, which is to oppose the ancient Catholick Faith.

To conclude this Chapter, the result of the whole in short is this, That in opposition to the Noetians, who made Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be only Three Names of the same One Divine Person, whom we call God, the Catholick Fathers asserted that they were Three distinct Persons, not the same Person under Three Names, or Three Appearances; in opposition to those Sabellians, who denied the Substantiality of the Son, and of the Ho∣ly Ghost, but made the Son like the Word in the mind or heart of man, which had no substantial, permanent Sub∣sistence of its own, and the Holy Ghost in like manner to be a transient efflux of Power from God; so that God the Father was the only subsisting Person, and the One God, but the Son, and the Holy Ghost, the insubstantial, transient Word and Power of God. These ancient Fa∣thers in like manner asserted the Substantiality of the Son,

and of the Holy Ghost, that they were real, distinct, subsisting Persons, as true and perfect Persons as the Fa∣ther himself is: in opposition to those Sabellians who as∣serted a compound Deity, and made a Trinity of Parts, instead of a Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the God∣head; they unanimously rejected all composition in the Deity, and asserted each Person distinctly by himself, not to be a part of God, but true and perfect God.

Now had these Fathers asserted nothing positively con∣cerning the Three Divine Persons, but only rejected these Noetian and Sabellian Heresies, it had been evidence enough what their Faith was concerning the Ever-blessed Trinity; for remove these Heresies, and all such as are manifestly the same, however they may differ in words, and there is nothing left for any man to believe concerning a Divine Trinity, but the true Catholick Faith of Three real, distinct, substantial, Divine Persons, each of which is distinctly, and by himself complete, entire, perfect God▪ For if Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not one and the same Person, distinguisht only by Three Names, according to their different Appearances and Operations; nor one single Person with two personal Vertues and Powers, called the Son, and the Spirit, like the word and emotion in a man's heart, which is no person, and has no subsistence of its own; nor three parts of one compounded Deity, as a man is compounded of Body, Soul, and Spirit, then of necessity Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be Three complete, substantial, subsisting Persons, Thr•••• such Persons as the Sabellians would allow but One: f•••• ••f they ••e not the same, nor affections and motions of the ••ame, nor parts of the same, there is nothing left but to own them Three completely and perfectly subsisting Person.

If God be One, not in the Sabellian ••otion of Singu∣larity, as One God signifies One single Person; but O••e in Three, without parts or composition, as the Father as∣serted

against Sabellius, then each Person must be by him∣self complete and perfect God; for God cannot be One in Three Persons, unless each Person be perfect God; for un∣less this One God be perfect God in each Person, he cannot be perfectly One in Three. If the Unity of God be not the Unity of a Person, it must be the Unity and Sameness of Nature, and the inseparable Union of Persons; and this is the Unity in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity, which the Catholick Fathers taught, and which is the only thing they could reasonably teach, when they had rejected the Sabel∣lian Unity. There is no medium that I know of in this Controversy concerning the Unity of God, between the Unity of One single Person, and that Oneness which re∣sults from the Unity, and the Consubstantiality of Nature, and inseparable Union of Persons; and therefore if the first be Heresy, the second must be the Catholick Faith; and whatever Notions men advance against this, is Sabellianism in its Principle, and last result: for if the Unity of God be not the Union of Three complete Divine Persons, each of which is distinctly by himself perfect God, it must be the Unity of One Divine Person, which is the Sabellian Unity.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Sed quia duos unum volunt esse, ut i∣dem Pater & Filius habeatur, oportet & totum de filio examinari, ut sit, & qui sit, & quomodo sit. Tert. ad Prax. c. 5.

  Ipsum qu••d Pater & Filius dicun∣tur, nonne aliud ab alio est. Utique ••nim omnia quod vocantur, h••c crunt; & quod crunt, hoc vccaluntur—Ita aut pater aut filius est, & neque dies cadem & nox, neque pater idem & filius, ut sint ambo unus, & utrumque alter. Ibid. c 9, 10.

  Ipsi se, inquiunt, filium sibi faci••, atquin pater filium facit, & patrem filius. Et qui ex alterutro fiunt, à semetipsis sibi fieri nullo modo possiunt, ut pater se sibi filium faciat, & filius se sibi patrem praestet. Qu••e institut Deus, ipse custodit. Ibid.

  Habeat, necesse est, pater filium, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pater sit, & filius patrem, ut filius sit. Aliud est autem habere, aliud ••sse. Verbi gratia, ut maritus sim, h••b••a•• oportet uxorem, non ut ipse mihi ero ••xor; sic etiam, ut pater s••••n, filium habco, non ipse mihi ero filius. Ibid.

  Qu••e enim me faciunt, si ha••••••ero, tun`e ero pater, si filium habeam, filiu•• ero, si patrem, Parro, si ipse ero qui•• coruum, jam non habeo, quod ipse ero; n••c patrem, quia ipse ero pat••••, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 filium, quia ipse ero filius: in q••an∣tum vero alterum ex his hab••re m•• oportet; alterum esse, in tantum si ••∣trumque sucro, alterum non ero, dum al∣terum non habeo▪ si enim ups•• ero filius ut, q••a & pster, sum non habeo fili∣um, sed ipse sun filius. Non haben••o autem filium cum ipse sum flius, que∣m••do pater ero? habere enim filium d•• b••n, ut pater sini; non sum ergo si∣lius, quia patr••n•• non habeo, qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 filium; 〈…〉〈…〉 si ipse sum pater, qu•• & filius, &c. H••c ••rit titum ingeni∣um Diab••li, alterum ex aliero ••xelua••re, dum utrumque in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 s••b Monar••••••ae ••avore conclu••••••ns, ••en∣trum hale•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, &c. Ibid.
• * 1.2

  Non posse unum & eundem videri, qui loquitur, & de quo loquitur, & ad quem loquitur: quia neque per∣versit as, neque fallacia Deo congruat, ut ci••n ipse esset ad quem loquebatur, ad alium potius, & non ad semetipsum loquatur. Ibid. c. 11.
• * 1.3

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Gregales Sabellii.
• * 1.4

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Ibid.
• * 1.5

  Ipse enim ad humana semper collo∣quia descendit ab Adam usque ad Pa∣triarchas & Prophetas, in visione, in somnio, in speculo, in aenigmate, ordi∣nem suum praestruens ab initio semper, quem erat persecuturus in finem; it a semper ediscebat & Deus in terris cum hominibus conversari, non alius potuit quàm sermo, qui caro erat fu∣turus. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 16.
• * 1.6

  Quid agis Lot sancte? Angelos vi∣des, non unum, sed duos, & dicis do∣mine mi. Duos video, aequales video, unum rogo, nulli injuriam facio, quia patrem & filium non divido; Sabel∣lianus legat duos venisse, &c. Aug. de 5. Haeres.
• * 1.7

  Epiph. c. Noes. Haer. 57.
• * 1.8

  Audi tu Sabelliane, audi de coelo patrem, vide in terra filium, & noli dicere, idem pater qui silius. Aug. de quinque Haeres. cap. 6.
• * 1.9

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Gregal. Sabellij.
• * 1.10

  Ergo inquis, das aliquam substan∣tiam esse sermonem? plane. Non vis enim eum substantivum habere in re per substantae proprietatem, ut res & persona quaedam videri possit, & it a capiat secundus a Deo constitutus duos officere, patrem & filium, Deum & sermonem. Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi vox & sonus oris, & sicut Gram∣matici tradunt, aer offensus, intelli∣gibilis auditu, caeterum vacuum nescio quid, & inane & incorporale. Tert. adv. Prax. c. 7.
• * 1.11

  At ego nihil di••o de Deo mane & vacuum prodire potuisse, ut non de inani & vacuo prolatum, neo carere substantiâ, quod de tanta substantia processit, & tantas substantias fecit, feciz enim & ipse, quae facta sunt per ipsum: quale est ut nihil sit ipse, sine quo nihil factum est? ut inanis solida, & vacuus plena, & incorpo∣ralis corporalia operatus sit? Nam etsi potest aliquando quid fieri diver∣sum cjus per quod fit; nihil tameu potest fieri per id, quod vacuum & iname est. Ibid.

  Vacua & inanis res est sermo De••, qui filius dictus est, qui ipse Deus cogneminatus est? & sermo erat apud Deum, & Deus erat sermo.
• * 1.12

  Hic certè est, qui in effigie Dei con∣stitutus, non rapinam exiitimavie esse se aqualem Deo. In qua ••ffigie Dei? utique in alia, non tamen in nullâ.
• * 1.13

  Quaecunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico Personam, & illi no∣men filii vindico; & dum filium ag∣nosco, secundum a Patre defendo. Ibid.
• * 1.14

  In substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem. Nov. de Trin. c. 24.

  Sermo filius natus est, qui non in ••ono percussi aeris, aut tono coactae de visceribus vocis accipitur, sed in sub∣stantia prolatae à Deo virtutis cog∣noscitur.—

  Substantia scilicet illa divina, cu∣jus nomen est verbum. Ibid. c. 30.

  Deus utique procedens ex Deo se∣cundam personam efficiens. Ibid.
• * 1.15

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. cont. Sabellii Gregal.
• * 1.16

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.
• * 1.17

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.18

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ath. Ibid. p. 658.
• * 1.19

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.20

  Est alia, quae triformem sic asserit Deum, ut quaedam pars ejus sit pater, quaedam filius, quaedam spiritus san∣ctus, hoc est, quod Dei unius partes sint, quae istam faciunt Trinitatem, velut ex his tribus partibus complea∣tur Deus, nec sit perfectus in seipso, vel pater, vel filius, vel spiritus san∣ctus. Aug. de Haeres. ad quod vult. Deum. Haeres. 74.
• * 1.21

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. —

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Athan. con. Greg. Sab. p. 661.

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Ibid. p. 662.
• * 1.22

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Damasc. Orth. Fidei. l. 1. c. 10.
• * 1.23

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Id. ib. c. 13
• * 1.24

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Ath. contr. Gregal. Sabell. p. 662.
• * 1.25

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.— Ibid. 658.