An inquiry concerning virtue in two discourses, viz., I. of virtue and the belief of a deity, II. of the obligations to virtue.

BOOK the First. OF VIRTUE, AND THE Belief of a DEITY.

SECT. I.

RELIGION and VIRTUE, as they have near relation one to another, and are ever pre∣sum'd to reside together; so they are very rarely consider'd apart, or distinguish'd from one another. How∣ever, since there have bin instances of some, who having great Zeal in Religi∣on, have yet wanted even the common affections of Humanity, and have bin ex∣tremely vitious and corrupt; and since others, even amongst those who have scarcely own'd a Deity, have bin seen to practise the rules of Morality, and have seem'd to act with good meaning and af∣fection towards Mankind: it has given occasion to several to enquire HOW FAR VIRTUE ALONE COULD GO;

AND HOW FAR RELIGION WAS EITHER NECESSARY TO SUP∣PORT IT, OR ABLE TO RAISE AND ADVANCE IT. And since by the example of others we have bin en∣gag'd in an enquiry of this kind, and are now about to enter upon a Subject where there is need of a very particu∣lar Explanation of things, and of a more than ordinary clearness in terms; we may do well first of all to consider What it is that we call ATHEISM, and what VIRTUE: and afterwards we may ex∣amin the consistency of these two together.

FIRST, then, AS TO ATHEISM. And here it cannot justly be wonder'd at, if the method of explaining this ap∣pears unusual and strange, since the Sub∣ject it self, and the Question here treated of, has, perhaps, so little enter'd into consideration, and is a matter of so nice and dangerous speculation. But to be∣gin, therefore, according to the best of our Reason; the judgment of which is submitted to others.

IN the Whole of things (or in the Universe) either every thing is according to a good order, and the most agreeable to a general interest that is possible: or every thing is not according to a good order; but there is that which might possibly have bin better, more wisely

contriv'd, and with more advantage to the general interest of Beings, or of the Whole.

IF every thing that exists be according to a good order, and for the best, by be∣ing in the wisest and justest manner; then is there of necessity no such thing as REAL ILL in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to the whole.

WHATSOEVER, then, has such an Existence or Being as that it could not have bin better, or better ordered, is perfectly Good. Whatsoever in the order of the world is call'd ILL, supposes a possibility in the nature of the thing to have bin otherwise contriv'd or order'd by some wisdom or other: for if it could not have bin better made, or any other∣wise have bin better, by any suppos'd or∣der or regulation; it is perfect, and in no wise defective or ILL.

WHATSOEVER is ILL there∣fore, must be caus'd or produc'd, either by design (that is to say, with Know∣ledg and Judgment) or through want of design, from chance.

IF the order of all things be such, that nothing can be thought of, or ima∣gined, more wise, perfect and just; then it is impossible but that there must be Wisdom, Understanding and De∣sign in the whole; and that in the per∣fectest,

and highest manner and de∣gree.

WHATSOEVER is from Design implies a Mind, Discernment, and In∣telligence.

IF there be any thing ILL in the U∣niverse from design (and it must be, if at all, either from Design, or from Chance) then that which is the cause of, or which disposes all things, is no one good designing Principle. For either there is but one designing Principle or Mind, and that corrupt; or if there be one that is good, there is another in being which o∣perates contrarily, and is ILL.

IF there be any thing of ILL in the Universe from Chance, or which was not design'd, but accidental; then a de∣signing Principle or Mind, whether good or bad, cannot be the cause or guidance of all things. And if there be a designing Principle which is the cause of good, and is good, but cannot prevent the ill which happens from Chance, or from a contra∣ry ill design; then is there no such thing as a supreme good Design or Mind but what is impotent and defective: For not to correct, or totally exclude that ill of Chance, or of a contrary ill design, must proceed either from impotency, or ill will.

WHATSOEVER has intelligence, and is a Mind, having a superior power

over us, or having any eminent place, direction, or controul in nature, is that we call God, or Deity. For, tho a People believe and worship that which they think neither perfectly good, nor per∣fectly powerful, nor yet eternal; it is a Deity or God still, tho an imperfect one, which they worship: or whether they think fit to worship or no, still they be∣lieve a God of some sort.

WHATSOEVER therefore is su∣perior in any degree over the World, or that rules in nature with discernment and a Mind, is that which we call GOD. If there are several such superior Minds, they are so many Gods. But if that single superior, or those several superiors are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take the name of DAEMON. For remove all good from either of those Beings, and we shall immediately pro∣nounce it a Devil.

TO believe therefore that every thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated accord∣ing to the best, by a designing Principle or Mind, such as is good and eternal, is to be a perfect THEIST.

TO believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any cause or mea∣sure or rule of things, but Chance; so that in nature neither the interest of the whole, nor of any particulars, can be said

to be pursu'd, design'd, or aim'd at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.

TO believe no one supreme good de∣signing Principle or Mind, but several, is to be a POLYTHEIST.

TO believe this one single Mind, or these many Minds, are not absolutely and necessarily good in their nature, but are vitious and unjust, is to be a DAEMO∣NIST. For, to believe any thing of Be∣ings, or of a Being which dos universally superintend, which governs all things by his Power and Will, but not with that obligation and necessary confinement to good, and to what is best, is to be∣lieve an infinit Devil, and not an infi∣nit God.

TO believe this supreme Mind, or these supreme Minds good, and not the cause of ILL (if real Ill be allow'd) is to allow some other cause, which is either Design or not Design. If it be De∣sign, and of consequence a malicious and ill Design (that is to say, if it proceed from the prevalency of an ill Mind or Minds) then is this in reality being a Daemonist in some degree. If it be from no design, but from chance; so that a Mind prevails but in some things, and Chance in others; then is this to be an Atheist in some degree, or in as far as Chance is thought prevalent and unsur∣mounted

by the power and wisdom of any supreme Mind or Minds.

THERE are few men who think always consistently, or according to one certain Hypothesis upon any subject so abstruse and intricate, as this concerning the Cause of all things, and the Oeconomy or Government of the Ʋniverse. For it is plain in the case of the most devout Peo∣ple, and by their own confession, that they have times when their Faith only supports them, and that they are ready to judg (that is to say, that their reason inclines them to judg) to the disadvantage of a Providence and a just Rule.

THAT alone therefore is to be called a man's Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him, and occurs up∣on the most occasions. So that it is hard to pronounce of any one, that he is an Atheist; because, unless his whole thoughts do at all times carry him against all design, or government of a Mind, he is no perfect Atheist: for, to believe any thing of design, or government of a Mind, tho limited, and not infinitly powerful, is to believe something of a God. And that this is a proper way of speaking, and a necessary one, appears from this; that otherwise if no one were to be stiled a Theist in any degree, who permitted any thing to Chance;

then likewise would no one be to be stiled a Theist who permitted any thing to a contrary ill Principle, as those do, who believe a Devil or Daemon, opposit to God; or that there is any such thing in the Universe, as real Ill, which is neither from chance nor from God. But if any one believes more of Chance and Confu∣sion than of Design; then is he more an Atheist than a Theist, from that which most reigns with him, and has the ascend∣ent. As on the other side, if he believes more of the prevalency of an ill design∣ing Principle than of a good one, he is then more a Daemonist than he is a Theist, and may be called a Daemonist from the side to which the balance most inclines.

ALL these sorts both of Daemonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be mixed: as thus.

1. THEISM with Daemonism: 2. Daemonism with Polytheism: 3. Theism with Atheism; 4. and so Daemonism with Atheism; 5. and so Polytheism with Atheism. 6. Theism (as it stands in opposition to Daemonism, and de∣notes a goodness in God) with Polythe∣ism: 7. and that part of Theism and Daemonism, together with Polytheism; 8. or with Polytheism and Atheism.

1. AS when the one chief Mind or soveraign Being is divided betwixt a good

and ill Nature, by being the cause of ill as well as good.

2. AS when there is not one, but se∣veral corrupt Minds that govern; which may be call'd Polydaemonism.

3. AS when Chance is not excluded; but that God and Chance divide: for in∣stance, JUPITER govern'd both the Gods and Men, but could not prevent the ill fate of his Son SARPEDON, nor the growth of the Titans, who sprung not from him, but from Chance, and fought against him to gain the Sovereignty.

4. AS when an evil Daemon and Chance divide.

5. AS when many Minds and Chance divide.

6. AS when there are more Minds than one, but agreeing in good, and with one and the same will and reason.

7. AS when there is 〈…〉〈…〉 good Principle, and an ill Principle; or several such Principles or Minds, both good and bad.

8. AS when the last is together with Chance.

RELIGION excludes none of these except perfect Atheism. Undoubtedly perfect Daemonists there are in Religion; because we know whole Nations that worship a Devil or Fiend, to whom they

sacrifice and pray, only to prevent the mischief he would do them. And we know that there are those of some Reli∣gions, who give no other Idea of their God, but of a Being arbitrary, violent, causing ill, and ordaining to misery; which is a Devil in the place of God.

NOW as there are all these opinions concerning a God; and that there are some who have no opinion at all, either through Scepticism, and a doubt which to assent to, or by having never thought at all, so as to be influenced by any be∣lief in Religion, or any opinion in Phi∣losophy as to this matter; the consider∣ation is, how any of these Opinions, or this of having no constant Opinion, or no Opinion at all, dos consist, or is inconsist∣ent with Virtue.

SECT. II.

BUT to examin now concerning VIRTUE. There is in every Crea∣ture a certain Interest or Good, which is as an End in that Creature; and to which End if any thing either of his Appetites, Passions or Affections be not conducing, but the contrary, this is ill to him: and

in this manner he is ill with respect to him∣self; as he is said to be ill also with re∣spect to others, when any such Appetites or Passions make him injurious to them. And if, by the natural constitution of any rational Creature, the same irregularities of Appetite which make him to be ill towards others, make him to be ill also as to himself; and that the same regula∣rity of Affections which makes him to be good in one sense, makes him to be good also in the other; then is that Goodness by which he is thus useful to others (if this perhaps be what we call Virtue) a real good to himself.

WHETHER this be so or not, is reserv'd to be consider'd afterwards. Our present design is, to examin sepa∣ratly the good of Virtue to Society.

IF any one will maintain that a Crea∣ture well constituted as to himself, may yet be contrariwise towards others; then, notwithstanding a Creature be thus good for himself, this is not e∣nough to make it be said of him that he is a good Creature; unless he could be understood to be absolute and com∣plete in himself, and without any re∣al relation to any thing in the Universe besides. For if there be any where in na∣ture a System of which this living Crea∣ture must be consider'd as a part; then,

if the Creature be to carry the name of good, he must be such a part as makes to the good of that System or Whole. Now if there be any thing in the structure of a particular Animal more than what has relation to himself, or his own privat System or Nature, and by which he has an absolute relation to some other thing, or other System or Nature without him; then is this Animal but a part of some other System: for instance, if an Ani∣mal have the parts of a Male, it is with a relation to the Female; and the parts both of the Male and Female have a re∣lation to another thing besides the System of themselves. So that they are parts of another System: which System is that of a particular species of living Creatures that have some one common Nature, or are provided for by some one order or con∣stitution of things subsisting together, and uniting to that end, of their support.

IN the same manner, if a whole spe∣cies of Animals be such as contribute to some other thing; and that their Ex∣istence has a necessary relation to some∣thing else, or to the existence of some o∣ther species of Animals; then is that whole species but a part of a System. For instance, to the existence of a Spider, the existence of such Animals as Flies is made to be necessary: so that the Fly

has a relation to the Spider, as the Web of the Spider, and the Spider it self have relation to such Animals as Flies. And thus, in the structure of one of these Ani∣mals, there is absolutely as apparent and perfect a regard and relation to the other, as in the system of our selves and in our own body there is a relation of parts one to another; as of the stomach to the limbs: or, as in the branches or leaves of a Tree, we see a relation to a root and trunk. In the same manner are Flies necessary to the existence of other Crea∣tures, both Fowls and Fishes. And thus are other species or kinds subservi∣ent to one another; which is being Parts of a certain system, according to which the nature of Animals is dis∣posed.

SO that there is a System therefore of all Animals together; an animal System, and an animal Nature, or a Nature com∣mon to all Animals.

IN the same manner if the whole sy∣stem of Animals, together with that of Vegetables, and all other things in this world of ours; that is to say, if this whole system of the Earth has a rela∣tion to, or a dependence on any thing else whatsoever (as it has, for instance, with respect to the Sun, and Planets round that Sun) then is the Earth but

a PART of some other system. And since there must be a SYSTEM OF ALL THINGS, a universal Nature, or Na∣ture common to the whole; there is no particular being or system which must not be either good or ill in that general System of the Ʋniverse: For if it be in∣significant and of no use, it is a fault or imperfection, and consequently ill in the general System. Therefore if any being be wholly and really ILL, it must be ill with respect to the universal System; and then the System of the Universe is ill or imperfect. But if the ill of one privat System be the good of other Systems, and be still the good of the general System (as when one Creature lives by the destruction of another; one thing is generated from the corruption of another; or one planetary System or Vortex may swallow up another) then is the ill of that privat System no ill in it sell; more than the pain of breeding teeth is ill in a System or Body, where without that occasion of pain, the body would suffer worse by being defective. So that we cannot say of any Being, that it is wholly and absolutely ill, un∣less we can positively shew and ascertain it, that that which we call ILL is not GOOD in some other System, nor in THE WHOLE.

BUT if any intire species of Animals be destructive to all the other Species, then is that to be call'd an ill Species, as being of ill in the animal Nature or System. And if in any species of Animals (as in Men, for example) one man is such as to be of a nature pernicious to the rest, then is he an ill Man.

BUT we do not say a man is an ill man, because he has the Plague-spots upon him, or because he has convulsive fits which make him strike and wound those that come near him. Nor do we say a man is a good man, when his hands are ty'd, which hinders him from doing the harm that he has a mind to do, or (which is near the same) when he ab∣stains from executing his ill purpose, through a fear of some impending punish∣ment, or through an allurement of some privat pleasure or advantage, which draws him from his ill intention.

SO that in a sensible Creature, that which is not done through any affection (and consequently with no knowledg, consciousness or perception at all) makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that Creature, according to the sense we speak in, when we say a Creature is a good or an ill Creature. And whatever is done either of good or ill, otherwise than as through good or ill affections in that

Creature, it is in the nature of that Creature neither good nor ill, accord∣ing to the common understood sense of a good or ill Creature, a good or ill Man.

A CREATURE in this sense is only good therefore when Good or Ill (that is to say, a Good or an Ill to his System, or to that which he has a relation to) is the immediat object of some Affection mov∣ing him: it being then only to be truly said that he has good Affections, good Inclinations or Passions, a good Nature, or a good Soul.

FOR if a Creature that is mov'd by a passion of Hatred to his own kind, be by a violent fear of something hurtful to himself, mov'd so as to do that Good which he is not inclined to, by any af∣fection to the Good it self; it is not good (that is to say, good as above) which is the object of the affection moving him: for that which moves him is no affection relating to any good of his Species, or of that which he is joined to, or is a part of: and therefore there is no Goodness there; that is, there is nothing which takes from, or abates any thing of the ill Nature or ill Disposition (which is the true illness of the Creature) altho the effects of that ill nature or ill dispo∣sition be accidentally prevented, or that

some Good come accidentally to be wrought by that Creature, without good Nature, good Disposition, or good Intention.

IF there be any affection towards privat Good, which is for the good of the Species in general that every indivi∣dual should have, this cannot be other than a good Affection; 〈…〉〈…〉 it be not for such affection as this, that a Crea∣ture is commonly called good.

IF there be any affection towards pri∣vat Good which is not really consistent with such privat Good or Happiness; this, as being hurtful to the Creature, and being superfluous, and such as must detract from, anticipate, or pre∣vent the other good affections, is vitious and ill.

IF there be any affection towards pri∣vat or self-good which is consistent altoge∣ther with real privat Good or Happiness, but is inconsistent with that of the other kind, the public Good or good of the Species (which whether a thing possible to be suppos'd or no, will be afterwards consider'd) this must be ill and vitious in the common sense of Illness and Vice; for altho profitable to the particular Creature, it is injurious to the Society or Whole. If the Affection, by being on∣ly in a moderate degree, be agreeable to the

other general Good; but by being im∣moderate, is the contrary; then is the immoderate degree of this affection viti∣ous, but not the moderate. And thus, if there be any thing which is the occasi∣on of a more than ordinary self-concern∣ment or regard to separat and privat Good, or of an over-great extension of the appetite 〈…〉〈…〉 attention of the Mind to∣wards what is merely of self-good, or reputed self-good; this, as being detract∣ing from the affections towards other Good, and inconsistent with just and equal concern for the Species, or towards public Good, must necessarily be ill and vitious: and this is what is called sel∣fishness.

NOW, if there be any affection to∣wards self-good, or towards pleasure, which is in it self contributing to the other good, that of the Species or Sy∣stem; then is that affection so far good, as that it is absolutely necessary in order to constitute a Creature good.

FOR if the want of such an affecti∣on (as for instance, of that towards Self∣preservation, or towards Generation) be of injury to the Species or System; then is it vitious in some degree to want those affections, or to have such as are con∣trary: as no body would doubt to pro∣nounce, if they saw a man who minded

not any precipices that lay in his way, or who had a disposition that rendred him averse to any commerce with Wo∣man-kind, and of consequence unfitted him through illness of Temper (and not merely through a defect of Constituti∣on) for the propagation of his Species or Kind.

SO that the affection to self-good or privat good, may be a good affection or an ill affection. For if the affection towards self-good be too strong (as for instance, the love of Life, which by be∣ing over-great, unfits a Creature for any generous Act, and hinders him in the doing his PART) then is it vitious; and if vitious, the Creature that is mov'd and acted by that, is vitiously mov'd, and can never be otherwise than vitious in some degree, whilst mov'd by that vitious affection. Therefore, if through such an over-great love of Life and Be∣ing, a Creature be accidentally induc'd or engag'd to do a good thing, or se∣veral good things (as he might be upon the same terms induc'd to do ill) he is not any more a good or a virtuous Crea∣ture for this good he dos, than a man is so much more a good man for pleading a just Cause which he is hired to, or for fighting in a good Cause against a Ty∣rant whom he happens to have a privat

quarrel with, and whom he fears or hates on that account only.

WHATSOEVER therefore is done that happens to be of good to the Species, or to the System as above, through this affection towards self-good, or separat privat Good, dos not imply any more Goodness in the Creature than as the affection is good. And if that af∣fection in it self be not to be stiled a good or virtuous Affection; whatsoever hap∣pens through it, is not Goodness nor Vir∣tue, nor the Creature any more a vir∣tuous or good Creature: but let him do whatsoever Good, if it be only that vi∣tious affection of exorbitant selfishness, or an excessively extended Appetite to∣wards Self-good, which moves him; and that there be wanting therefore to move him any good affection, such as ought of right to do it; the Creature is in it self still vitious, and will always be so in some degree, whilst the passion to∣wards Self-good, tho ever so moderate and reasonable, is in any degree his mo∣tive in the doing that which a natural affection to his kind should have mov'd him to; but, which natural Affection is wanting in him, or so weakly implanted as to be insufficient to move him without help from the other.

NOR indeed can there be any good∣ness till it comes to be a part of the na∣tural Temper of a Creature, such a one as is mov'd by affections, to be carri'd by some immediate affection, directly and not consequentially or by accident, to Good or against Ill: that is to say, till some Good or Ill (which is a Good or an Ill as above) come to be the object of his af∣fection, either as towards it, or against it; and that such affection become part of his natural Temper: for in the instance of Fear beforemention'd, where through fear a Creature hating his own Kind, is kept from hurting them, or is even in∣duced to do them good; in this case the fear of self-ill or privat ill, or love of self-good or privat good, is part of the natural Temper: but the fear or ab∣horrence of other Ill, or love of other Good (which is requisit in a good Crea∣ture) is no part of the natural Temper, but far the contrary. So, let the Crea∣ture act how it will, or whatever way it is casually mov'd by those affections which regard merely privat or separat Good or Ill; it will not have any thing more of true goodness on that account, but will be still vitious and depraved, unless the natural Temper come about, and the nature of its Affections change.

FOR instance, if a Creature natural∣ly fierce and cruel, lose that fierceness, and is made tame, gentle and treatable; then is his natural Temper chang'd. Suppose now that the Creature has in∣deed a tame, gentle and mild Carriage, but that it proceeds only from the fear of his Keeper; which if set aside, his other Passion instantly breaks out; then is that mildness not his natural Temper: but his natural Temper is what it was, and the Creature still as ill a Creature in its own nature.

SUPPOSE on the other side, that a Creature be naturally inclin'd towards the preservation of its young; but that the terror of the Hunters, or of an E∣nemy in some extraordinary case, cause it to abandon them: in this case the Temper of the Creature remains still what it was, and is not prejudic'd or impair'd, tho hindred from operating by a strong Passion suspending it for the time. But if by any operation of out∣ward things, or by any thing from within, that Passion or Affection to∣wards the young comes to grow weak∣er, so that other Passions may more easi∣ly prevail over it; then is the natural Temper chang'd in some degree, and the Creature not so good a Creature.

NOTHING therefore being pro∣perly either goodness or illness in a Crea∣ture, but what is from his natural Tem∣per (or from those Passions or Affections which constitute natural Temper) as it respects that Good or Ill of his Kind or Species; a good Creature or a good Man in such a one as by his Affections or natural Temper, is carried primarily and immediately, and not secondarily and accidentally, to Good and against Ill; and an ill Man the contrary: who is want∣ing in right Affections of force enough to carry him towards Good, and bear him out against Ill, or who is carried by his natural Affections just contrary∣wise; to Ill, and against Good.

IF the natural Temper be vitious, the man is vitious in the same degree: and so if the natural Temper be good, he is in the same degree good.

IF a man be by his natural Temper just, equitable, kind; but that his na∣tural Temper towards Ambition fights against his other Temper, but not so as to conquer it; in this case he is good still by natural Temper; the better natural Temper being that which is prevalent in him, and has the mastery.

WHEN in the general, all the Af∣fections or Passions are suted to the Good that we have spoke of (the good of the

System to which man relates) then is the natural Temper, and consequently the man, chiefly good. If any such Pas∣sion or Affection be wanting, or any Passion or Affection be redundant and over and above, or too little and weak, or repugnant, or any way such as to be unconsonant to that good, and disservice∣able and contrary to that end; then is it vitious.

I NEED not instance in Rage, Re∣vengefulness, and other such (where it is so obvious) to shew how they are ill, and constitute an ill Creature: but even in Kindness and Love, tho rightly plac'd, and towards a proper object (as when it is that sort of love of a Creature to its young) if it be immoderate and beyond a certain degree, it is vitious. On the o∣ther side, not to have it at all, or not to have it to a certain degree, is a Vice in the Temper: and not to have it at all to∣wards this object, but to some other which is improper (as when a fantasti∣cal Woman is fonder of a Toy, or of some tame Animal, than of her Child) this is a double Vice. But where the good Passion is too intense and eager, as where love to the young, or pity is in that degree; it is both hurtful to the Creature, and disserviceable to that end it carries to: for so over-fondness is de∣structive

to the young, and excessive pi∣ty uncapable of giving succor. Thus the excess of motherly Love is a vitious fondness; over great pity, effeminacy and weakness; over great concern for self-pre∣servation, meanness and cowardwise; too little, rashness; and none at all, or that which is contrary (viz. a Passion or Passions inclining to self-destruction) a very great depravity.

IN a Creature capable of forming ge∣neral Notions of things, not only the sensible things that offer themselves to the sense, are the objects of the Affecti∣on; but the very actions themselves, and the affections of Pity, Charity, Kindness, Justice, and so their contraries, being brought into the Mind by reflection, be∣come Objects; as even that very thing it self of a good and virtuous Life, or the PART of a good and virtuous Crea∣ture, having a thorow good Affection, or intire good Affections: so that, by means of this reflected sense, there arises another kind of Affection, which is to∣wards the very Affections themselves that were first felt, and are now the sub∣ject of a new feeling, when either they cause a liking or aversion. And thus the several Motions, Inclinations, Pas∣sions, Dispositions, and consequent Car∣riage and Behavior of Creatures in the

various parts of Life, being in several scenes represented to the Mind, which readily discerns the good and the ill to∣wards the Species or Public; it proves afterwards a new work for the Affecti∣on, either virtuously and soundly to in∣cline to, and affect what is just and right, and disaffect what is contrary; or, vitiously and corruptly to affect what is ill, and disregard or hate what is wor∣thy and good.

AND in this case alone it is that we call any Creature virtuous, when it can have a notion of Good, and can make Goodness and Illness an object, or have the speculation or science of what is morally good and ill, of what is admi∣rable or blameable, right or wrong: for tho we may call a Horse a vitious Horse; and so in the case of other Animals and things (as a vitious Medicin, a vitious Stomach) yet we never say of a good Horse, or even of an Idiot or Changeling, tho ever so well natur'd and good, that he is virtuous.

SO that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he dos, nor ap∣prove of what he dos or sees others do, by observing what that thing is that is generous, just, or honest; and making that idea or conception of Goodness, or

a good Action done through good Af∣fection, to be an object of his Affection, he has not the name of being virtuous: for thus, and no otherwise, he is capable of having a sense, in any kind, of what is right or wrong; that is to say, of what is done through just, equal, and good Affection, or what is not so.

IF any thing be done through an Af∣fection which is not just, equal, and uni∣versally conducing to the good of the Species or System to which man belongs; this is certainly of the nature of wrong. If the Affection be equal, sound, and good, and the subject of the Affection such as may with advantage to Society be ever in the same manner prosecuted or affected; this cannot but be right. For, Wrong is not barely such action as is the cause of harm (for thus a Son striking to kill an enemy, but killing with that blow his Father, would do wrong, which is not so) but that which is done through insufficient or unequal Affection (as when a Son has no con∣cern for the safety of a Father, or pre∣fers the safety of an indifferent person to the safety of his Father) this is of the nature of Wrong.

BY unequal Affection is meant Affecti∣on unproportionably or unequally appli∣ed, not towards the Object as it always

actually exists or is (for then the running to save a Father in distress, but taking a wrong man for him, would be unequal Affection, and consequently wrong) but towards the Objects or Object, as it ap∣pears to be, as it is the Object of the Mind, and as represented by the Senses. For in this instance last mentioned, the Affection was, according to this mean∣ing, rightly applied to the Object; so that the Affection was not unjust, but equal and right, tho the Sight perhaps were ill; and that it were a purblind man who thus mistook a Stranger for his Father.

NEITHER can any weakness or imperfection of this sort create wrong, as occasioning the unequal application, abuse or prostitution of the Affection, so long as the Object, in the manner that it is taken or apprehended, is neither ab∣surd nor improper, but sutable to, and worthy of the Affection or degree of Af∣fection applied to it: for if it be possible to suppose a rational Creature who has an intire and forcible Affection towards Right and Good, and who never fails in a just and right degree of Affection to∣wards every Object presenting it self, but that his Memory or Parts fail him; and that the Objects are through the Senses, as through ill Glasses, falsly con∣veyed

and represented to him, not as they are actually, but after a different man∣ner; the person thus failing, since his failure is not in the Affection, but else∣where, is only vitious where his defect is; that is to say, in his Senses (as in his Hearing, Seeing, &c.) or in his Memo∣ry: but it being not for ill Memory, or ill Organs of Sense that a man is called vitious, this is not Vitiousness or Wrong∣fulness in one thus defective.

BUT as the extravagance of Opinion and Belief is such, that in some Coun∣tries we have known that even Mon∣keys, Cats, Crocodiles, and such like Animals, have bin held for Deities; should it appear to any one of the Reli∣gion and Faith of that Country, that to save such a Creature as a Cat, before a Parent, was Right; and that the Cat deserved the greater affection of the two; this would be wrong, notwithstanding the appearance of the thing, or any ap∣pearance or belief in the World.

SO that whatsoever is the cause of the misconception or misapprehension of the worth or value of any Object, so as to raise an affection or degree of affection towards it, such as ought not to be; this must be the occasion of Wrong, as it is the occasion of an inequality or dis∣proportion in the affection towards the

Object represented or appearing. For thus he who affects or loves a man for the sake of something which is reputed honorable, but which is in reality viti∣ous, is himself vitious and ill: as when an ambitious Man, by the fame of his high Attempts; a Robber or a Pyrat by his boasted Enterprizes, raises in any others an esteem and admiration of him∣self, and of that immoral and inhuman Character which deserves abhorrence. But on the other side, he who loves and esteems another, as believing him to have that Virtue which he has not, but only counterfeits, is not on this account wrongful, vitious, or corrupt.

SO that a mistake in fact (where there is due advertency) being no cause of, nor any ways implying ill Affection, can be no cause of Wrong. But what∣soever is a mistake of Right (that is to say, of the worth of the Object repre∣sented) this being the cause of unequal or unproportioned Affection, is the cause of Wrong.

BUT as there are many occasions where the matter of Right (that is to say, the worth of the Object represented) may even to the most discerning part of Mankind appear difficult and of doubt∣ful decision (as when a man amongst several Relations or Friends about to pe∣rish,

doubts whom he shall first succor) it is certain that the very least mistake in this way, the least wrong preference, tho in a matter the most intricate, is in strictness of speaking an Injustice or Wrong: yet however, as to that name or appellation of a worthy or good Man, or Man of Integrity, it is not the very least error of this sort, or the slightest inequa∣lity or disproportion of the Affection, through a mistake of Judgment, which takes away that denomination, and makes a Man to be esteemed a vitious or ill Man, whilst the Aim and Intention is still good, and the Affection strong and of full force towards public Good, Justice and Equity. Tho on the other side, where this good Aim is ever so much; and where the Affection towards Right is ever so strong; yet if through Superstition or strange Custom and Vogue, or through any wildness or ex∣travagancy of Opinion, there come to be very gross mistakes in the assignment or application of the Affection (as when human Sacrifices or Bestiality are pra∣ctised as worthy and right) this cannot but be wrong and vitious; and must de∣nominate a man ill: and the same when the Mistakes are less gross; but so com∣plicated and frequent, that a Creature cannot well live in a natural state; nor

with due affections, so as to perform his part even but tolerably well towards his Society or System.

AND thus we find how far Virtue (which is Goodness or Soundness of Af∣fection in a rational Creature) depends on a right knowlege of what is right and wrong, and on such a right use of Rea∣son as may give ground to a right appli∣cation and exercise of the Affections; that nothing horrid or unnatural, no∣thing unexemplary, nothing contrary to, or destructive of that natural Affection by which the Species or Society is up∣held, may on any account or principle whatsoever, through any notion of Ho∣nor, or on any pretence of good to Mankind, or of obedience to supreme Powers, be at any time affected or pro∣secuted as a good and proper Object of inclinable Affection, Love, and Esteem. For such an Affection as this must be wholly vitious: and whatsoever is acted upon it, can be no other than Vice and Immorality. And thus if there be any thing which teaches men either Trea∣chery, Ingratitude, or Cruelty, tho un∣der the color and pretence of Religion, or of any present or future good to Man∣kind or Society; if there be any thing which teaches men (as amongst some Indians) that to torment Captives of

War in sport, and to eat their flesh, is a thing very plausible; or that to eat the flesh of Enemies; or that to cut and slash themselves in a religious Fury be∣fore their God; or to commit all sort of Bestiality, is excellent or lovely in it self, or conducing to his particular Na∣tion or Society, or to Society in general, or to the Interest or Honor of the Dei∣ties, and as such, praiseworthy and ho∣norable; be it what it will that teaches this; be it Custom that gives applause, or Religion that gives a Sanction; this is not Virtue, nor ever will be of any kind, or in any sense; but is still horrid Depravity in these men, notwithstand∣ing any Custom or Religion of their Country, which may be ill and vitious it self, but can never alter the eternal measures and true nature of Virtue.

TO conclude therefore, upon this mat∣ter, from what has bin said before. As to those Creatures who are only capable of being moved by sensible Objects; they can only be either GOOD or Vitious (for we cannot say they are VIRTUOUS or Vitious) as those sort of Affections stand. A Creature on the other hand, capable of framing in his mind those other ratio∣nal Objects of moral Good, of Justice and Right, of what is generous, worthy, and becoming; altho his other Affecti∣ons

towards the sensible Objects may, any of them, remain ill; yet if they do not prevail over him, because of his good Affections to the other sort (that is to say, to Goodness and Virtue, as they are Objects of his Reason) then is his na∣tural Temper good in the main; and the Person esteem'd-virtuous by all people, according to that natural Temper which is the Test still, and by which every thing of Goodness or Virtue is measur'd.

NOW, if by natural Temper any one is passionate, angry, fearful, amo∣rous, or the like; but that he resists these Passions, and keeps to Virtue, not∣withstanding all their impression and force, we say commonly in this case, that the Virtue is so much the greater: and we say well. Tho if that which keeps the Person virtuous, in opposition to these Dispositions, be no good Affection elsewhere in the Temper towards Good∣ness or Virtue; but that it be only some Affection towards privat good or self∣good (as hope of Reward, or dread of Punishment) then is this not so much as any Virtue at all, as has bin shewn be∣fore. But this still is evident, that if an angry Temper bears, or an amorous one refrains, so as that nothing of Severity, nor any Action immodest or irregular can be drawn or forc'd from such a one,

thus strongly tempted; we applaud the Virtue of the Person, above what we should do, if he were free of this Temp∣tation and these Propensities: tho, at the same time, there is no body will say that a propensity to Vice can be any way understood to be an addition to Virtue, or helping to complete a virtuous Cha∣racter. But thus it is. If there be any part of the natural Temper in which ill Passions or Affections are stir'd, and which is consequently vitious; but that in another part of the natural Temper the Affections are so vastly forcible to∣wards Good; and that the sentiments of Right and Wrong, of a virtuous Life, and of Integrity, are so strongly fixed, as to master these other Attempts, of a contrary vitious Temper; then is this the greatest proof imaginable, how strong the principle of Virtue is in such a person, and how much a thorow good Affection toward Good and Right (which is the true principle of Virtue) is strongly fixed in and possessed of the natural Temper. Whereas if there be no such ill Passions stirring in the natural Temper, a person may be much more cheaply virtuous; and may live virtu∣ously without▪ having so much of a vir∣tuous principle as this other. But if this other, who has the principle of Virtue

so highly and so strongly implanted, be without, or do lose these natural Impe∣diments; he certainly loses nothing in Virtue, or is wanting in any manner to Virtue; but losing that other part which is vitious in his natural Temper, is more entire to Virtue, and has it in a clearer and higher degree.

HOWEVER ill the natural Temper be with respect to the sensible Objects; as for instance, however passionate, furious, lustful or cruel any Creature naturally be; yet if there be any attractiveness or prevalency in those rational Objects of Justice, Generosity, Gratitude, or any other Image or Representation of Vir∣tue, so as that it draws an Affection to∣wards it; there is however some Virtue here. And on the other side, however vitious the Mind be; or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be any flexibleness in the Temper towards the sensible Objects of moral Good or Ill (as when there is any such thing as Mercy, Compassion, Bounty) still there is some good left in that Crea∣ture; and he is not wholly unnatural and depraved.

THUS a Ruffian who refuses to dis∣cover his Associates out of a sense of Fide∣lity and Honor of any kind whatever; and who rather than betray them is con∣tented

to endure Torments in a Dunge∣on, and there expire, has something of the principle of Virtue, and may be call'd virtuous in some degree: and so in the same manner that Malefactor who rather than do the office of Executioner to his Relations, chose to be executed with them.

IN short, therefore, it is hard to pro∣nounce of any man, that he has no Vir∣tue, or that he is entirely vitious; there being few even of the horridest Villains who have not something of Virtue, or some Goodness. Nothing being more just than what is a known saying, THAT IT IS AS HARD TO FIND A MAN WHOLLY ILL, AS WHOLLY GOOD: because wherever there is any good Affection left, there is some Goodness or some Virtue still remaining.

AND, having consider'd thus as to Virtue, what it is, we may now con∣sider how it stands with respect to the Opinions concerning a Deity, as above∣mention'd.

SECT. III.

THE nature of Virtue consisting (as has bin explain'd) in just and equal Affection, which we may here∣after call a due sense of Right and Wrong, as comprehending in one the soundness both of Judgment and Affection; no∣thing can in a Creature capable of such a sense, exclude a principle of Virtue, or can obstruct or make it ineffectual, but what

1. EITHER wholly, or in some degree, excludes or takes away the sense of Right and Wrong.

2. OR causes a wrong and disturb'd sense of what is right and wrong.

3. OR, tho there be a sense of Right and Wrong, is the means however of guiding the Affection to what is contrary. As when a man knowing any Action or. Behavior to be morally ill and deform'd, yet through some violent passion, as of Lust or Anger, or through love of some imagined good, he notwithstanding com∣mits▪ the ill or unsociable Action.

AND so, on the other side, nothing can be assistant to, or promote Virtue, but what either in some manner nourishes

and supports that sense of Right and Wrong, or preserves it from being false and imaginary, or causes it, when sound and genuin, to be obey'd and submitted to, by subduing and subjecting the other Affections to it.

UPON this account therefore, we are to consider, how it is that any of these Opinions about the subject of a Deity do affect in these cases, or cause any of these three things.

I. AS to the first case, THE TAKING AWAY THE NOTION OR SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. It will not be imagin'd, that by this is meant the taking away the notion or sense of what is good or ill for the Species, or in Society, since this is what no rational Creature can be unsensible of: but, it is then that we say it of a Creature, that he has lost the sense of Right and Wrong, when being able to discern the Good and Ill of his Species, he has at the same time no concern for either, nor any sense of excellency or baseness in what relates to one or the other. So that except mere∣ly with relation to privat or separat Good, there is nothing which gains any estimation or any good affection towards it; nothing which is thought right, or worthy in it self of admiration, love or good affection; nor any thing on the o∣ther

side which is accordingly dislik'd or hated, as morally ill, be it ever so horrid or deform'd.

THERE is in effect no rational Crea∣ture whatsoever, but knows that when he offends or dos harm to any one, he cannot fail to create an expectation or fear of like ill, and consequently a re∣sentment and animosity in any Creature looking on; and therefore must be con∣scious to himself of being liable and ex∣posed in some manner to such a treat∣ment from every one, as if he had in some degree offended all.

THUS Offence and Injury is always known as punishable, and claiming pu∣nishment from every one; and Equal Behavior, which is therefore called Me∣rit, as rewardable and well deserving from every one. This is no more than what the wickedest creature imaginable has, and cannot but have a sense of. So that if we have any farther meaning in this, of a sense of Right and Wrong; if there be any sense of Right and Wrong which an absolute wicked creature has not, it can be only the hatred and dis∣like of what is accounted morally ill; HATRED of offence and injury, as such merely, and the love of, or approbation of what is accounted morally good; LOVE of equal Behavior; equal and

kind Affection as such merely, and not because of consequent Punishment or Reward, which implies only love of privat Good, hatred of privat Ill, and not of any thing farther, as in it self amiable or detestable. So that Sense of Right and Wrong, as here treated of, is nothing but the very Affection it self of kindness or dislike to such objects of mo∣ral good or ill, as above explain'd.

IT is scarcely to be conceiv'd, that any Creature should be at the very first so ill, and of so curst a nature, as that if it be merely a sensible, not a rational Creature, it should as soon as it comes to be try'd by objects, have no one pas∣sion of Goodness towards its kind, no foundation in its Temper of either pity, love, succorableness, or the like: or if the Creature be more than sensible, and be a rational Creature, that it should as soon as it comes to be try'd by rational Objects, as of Justice, Generosity, and other Virtue, have no inclining Affecti∣on, no kind of liking towards these, or dislike towards what is on the contrary side cruel, horrid, base, villanous, or the like, but so as to be of absolute in∣difference towards any thing of this kind; this is in a manner impossible to suppose.

SENSE of Right and Wrong there∣fore being as natural to us as Na∣tural Affection it self, and being a first principle in our Constitution and Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Per∣swasion, or Belief, which is capable immediatly, and of it self to exclude or destroy it: and it being it self an Af∣fection of first rise and production in the affectionate part, the Soul or Tem∣per; nothing but contrary Affection, by frequent check and controul, can ope∣rate upon it so as to make it cease to be; since that which is of original and pure nature, nothing but contrary Habit or Custom (a second nature) is able to displace: for, where the Mind is the most earnestly bent, merely against any bodily gesture or meen, either natural or by Habit acquir'd, and would endea∣vor to break it, so as to remove it wholly out of the carriage; it is not by such an immediate and sudden disappro∣bation, or contrary bent of the Mind that this can be remov'd; neither can that Affection in the Soul, of hatred to Inhumanity, love of Mercy, or whatso∣ever else in a rational Creature implies a sense in some degree of Right and Wrong, be instantly, nor yet without much force and violence effac'd or struck out of the natural Temper, even by the

means of the most pernicious Opinion and Belief in the world. But this mis∣chief being not to be effected directly through any Opinion, but in consequence and by effect of untoward and opposit Affection (which may often be owing to, and occasion'd by Opinion) we may then speak of it more particularly when we speak of the ill operation of other Affections, set in opposition to that of a sense of Right and Wrong.

II. AS to the second case. If there be A SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG, BUT THAT IT BE MORE OR LESS MISTAKEN AND CON∣FOUNDED, as in the case of those bar∣barous Nations, as above; it often hap∣pens that it is no Opinion at all about the subject of a Deity which influences in this place: for it is frequently nothing else but the custom of some Countries, and the force of Education against Na∣ture, where such and such things are re∣peatedly view'd with Applause and Ho∣nor accompanying them. So that it is possible that a man forcing himself, may eat the flesh of his enemies, not only against his Stomach, but against his Na∣ture (if I may so speak) and yet think it very right and honorable, as being of considerable service to his Communi∣ty, and capable of advancing the name,

and spreading the terror of his Nati∣on.

BUT to speak of the Opinions re∣lating to a Deity, and what effect they have in this place, which is our business.

AS to Atheism, it dos not seem that it can directly have any effect at all here towards the setting up, or making of a false species or shew of Right or Wrong. For tho a man by ill practice, which may be occasion'd by Atheism, may come to lose, in a manner, all sense of Right and Wrong (that is to say, all sense of good or ill, amiableness or deformity in any moral Action, as above) tho Athe∣ism, thus, may be the occasion of an al∣most thorow selfishness, as when a creature has scarcely any thing that at∣tracts him but what is of a selfish kind, and what relates to a deliberat self-end, the satisfaction of some Lust, or the se∣curity of the animal State; yet it dos not seem that Atheism should of it self be the cause of any such estimation, or valuing of any thing as noble of perfor∣mance, generous, self-worthy and de∣serving, which was just the contrary: so as that it should be thought that the being able to eat man's Flesh, to commit Bestiality, or any such like Actions as have bin mention'd, were after the same manner, good and excellent in themselves.

But this is certain, that by means of ill Religion, or Superstition, many things the most horridly unnatural and inhu∣man, come to be receiv'd as most excel∣lent, good and laudable in themselves: For, where the commiting Bestiality is taught as a religious Practice, there it is generally in high esteem, and thought to be in it self a thing excellent: For if any thing that is abominable and horrid be injoin'd by Religion, as the suppos'd command of some Deity; if the thing be not taken for good and excellent, but for horrid and abominable, then must the Deity be taken for such, and be thought of as a Being odious and malig∣nant; which every Religion forbids to believe. Therefore whatever teaches the love and admiration of a Deity, that has any character of Ill, teaches at the same time a love and admiration of that Ill, and causes that to be taken for good and amiable which is horrid and detestable.

SO that if the Praise and Love of a Deity be that which is proper to every Religion, there is no Religion where God is not represented intirely good, and free of malignity, injustice and cruelty, but what must make that sort whatso∣ever it be, of malignity, injustice, or cruelty, to be applauded and taken for

Good and Right; and must be the cause therefore of mens acting against natural Affection, and of their growing malig∣nant, unjust, cruel, and the like.

FOR instance; if JUPITER be he that is ador'd and reverenc'd; and that the History of JUPITER makes him to be lustful, and to satiate his Lust in the most loose and exorbitant manner; then is it impossible but his Worshipper be∣lieving this History and Character, must be taught a greater love of lustful Acti∣ons. If there be a Religion that teach∣es the adoration and love of a God, whose Character it is to be full of jea∣lousy, captious, and of high resentment, subject to wrath and anger, furious, re∣vengeful, and revenging injuries on o∣thers than those who did injury; and if there be added in the Character of this God, a fraudulent inclination, incourag∣ing deceit and treachery, favorable to a few, and that for slight causes or no cause, and cruel to the rest; it is evi∣dent in the case of such a Religion as this, that it must of necessity raise even an approbation and respect towards the vices and imperfections of this kind, and breed accordingly that parallel disposi∣tion, that unsociable and jealous temper, partiality, selfishness, moroseness, bitter∣ness and revengefulness, as well as trea∣chery

and inhumanity: for whatever is of this nature must in many cases appear noble to him who views these things in that Being to which he gives the highest Honor and Veneration.

BUT, if it be suppos'd, that in the worship of such a God, there is nothing besides what proceeds merely from fear and aw, without the least esteem or love towards him, as to one suppos'd a∣miable or excellent; then is not any one indeed by this opinion, misled as to his notion of Right and Wrong, of what is amiable or detestable in Actions. For if in following the precepts of his God, or doing what is necessary towards the sa∣tisfying of such his Deity, he be com∣pell'd only by fear, and act against his inclination the thing which he dislikes as barbarous, unnatural, or any other way ill and odious; then has he a sense of what is ill, and of what Right and Wrong is, and is sensible of ill in the character of his God: however nice he be in pronouncing any thing concerning it, or in not daring so much as to think for∣mally about it out of a superstitious fear or shyness. For whoever pretends to be∣lieve that there is a God, and that God is just and good, must mean that there is such a thing as Justice and Injustice, Right and Wrong, according to which he pro∣nounces

that God is just: for if the Will of God, or Law of God alone, be said to be that which makes Right and Wrong, then must this be a name only for what is or is not his Will: for thus if by his will one Person were to be punish'd for anothers fault, this would be Just and Right; and so the same, if arbitrarily and without reason, some Beings were made to suffer nothing but Ill, and others only to enjoy Good; which to say is just, is to say nothing, or to speak without a meaning.

AND thus it ever is, and must be an ill consequence in false and ill Religi∣on, that where there is a real Reverence, Esteem and Worship of a supreme Be∣ing, represented not as absolutely just and perfect, it must occasion the loss of rectitude in the Creature so worshipping and adoring, and who is thus immorally Religious.

TO this I need only add, that as the character of a vitious God (or rather Daemon or Idol of the Mind) dos injury to the affections of Men, disturbs and impairs the sense of Right and Wrong; so on the other hand, it must highly con∣tribute to the fixing of right Apprehen∣sions, and a sound sense of Right and Wrong in men, to contemplate, respect, and adore a God who is ever, and on all

accounts represented to them so as to be actually a true model and example of the most exact Justice, and highest Good∣ness and Worth; and who by a constant good Affection express'd towards the Whole, must of necessity engage us to act within our Compass, or in our Sphere or System, according to a like Principle and Affection: and having once the good of the Species or Mankind in view, and as our end or aim, it must be with dif∣ficulty that we can be misguided to a wrong sense of what is Right or Wrong. Nor can any thing more pre∣vail on men, or more naturally form their Minds to a union with Virtue and Excellence, than an establish'd opinion, such as this, concerning a supreme De∣ity. But of this afterwards.

AS to this second case therefore; RE∣LIGION (according to the kind it may be of) is capable of doing great good or great harm, and ATHEISM not any positive good or harm. For, however it may be indirectly an occasion of mens losing a good and sufficient sense of Right and Wrong; yet it will not, as Atheism merely, be the occasion of setting up false Right and Wrong, which only fantastical reasoning, ill custom, or ill Religion can do.

III. AS to the last case, THE OP∣POSITION OF OTHER AFFEC∣TIONS TO THOSE VIRTUOUS ONES, WHICH CREATE A REAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG; it is to be consider'd that a Creature having this sort of sense or good Affecti∣on in any considerable degree, must ne∣cessarily act according to it; if this Affection be not oppos'd either by some interesting Affection towards a con∣trary imagin'd Self-good and privat Advantage, or by some strong and forcible passion, as of Lust or Anger, which may not only overbear the sense of Right and Wrong, but even the sense of privat Advantage too, and overrule even the most settled opinion of what is conducing to self-good.

NOTHING therefore can over∣come or suppress this sense we speak of, or injure the integrity of such a Crea∣ture, but what EITHER raises or af∣fords growth to those strong and obsti∣nat Passions; OR otherwise causes an imagination of some interest or self-ad∣vantage in opposition to this affection of Virtue; so as to cause this good dispo∣sition to be resisted and gone against de∣liberatly, and in cool judgment. What∣soever is of this kind, besides that it turns a Creature towards Vice in spite

of this other good disposition•• it must in time also even wear out that good disposition it self, and so leave the Crea∣ture in a manner totally resign'd to Vice.

NOW, in this former part of our Inquiry, our business is not to examin (as we afterwards shall) all the several ways by which this corruption is intro∣duc'd or increas'd: but we are to con∣sider how the opinions concerning a De∣ity do influence one way or another in this place, or cause this corruption where∣by we act in contradiction of good and right Affection, and which is follow'd by the loss of that right Affection, or sense of Right and Wrong.

AND this being after this manner complicated, we shall treat it more open∣ly and at large.

THAT it is possible for a Creature capable of using reflection, to have a liking or dislike of moral Actions, and consequently a sense of Right and Wrong, before such time as he may have any no∣tion or sense of GOD at all; this is what will hardly be question'd: it being a thing not expected, or any way possible, that a Creature such as Man, arising from his Childhood slowly and gradu∣ally, to several degrees of Reason and Reflection, should at the very first be

taken up with those speculations or more refin'd sort of Reflections, about the subject of God's Existence.

BUT to make this more plain; let us suppose a Creature wanting Reason, or unable to reflect at all, who notwith∣standing has many good Qualities and Affections; as considering only that one of Pity or Compassionatness: it is cer∣tain that if you give to this Creature a reflecting faculty, it will at the same instant approve of Charity and Pity, be taken with any shew or representation of Pity, and think Pity amiable and good, and Cruelty the contrary: and so the same in case of any other Passion or Affection. And this is to be capable of Virtue, and to have a sense of Right and Wrong.

BEFORE therefore that a Creature may be suppos'd to have any Notion or Opinion one way or other, concerning the subject of a God, he may be sup∣pos'd to have a sense of Right and Wrong, and to have Virtue and Vice in different degrees; as we know by experience of those who have liv'd in such places, or in such a manner as never to have en∣ter'd into any thoughts or opinion at all in that matter; who yet are very different amongst themselves, as to their Honesty, Good nature and Virtue.

BUT whether we suppose in a Crea∣ture but the least part of this good dis∣position or virtuous Principle; let us consider what it is (as to any of these Opinions concerning a Deity) that can, or is likely to raise any Affection in opposi∣tion; or on the other side, may be able to prevent and hinder any such opposit Af∣fection, subdue it, or make it less.

NOW, as to the belief of a Deity, and how men are influenc'd to yield obe∣dience, and act in conformity to such a supreme Being; it must be either in the way of his POWER, as expecting ad∣vantage or harm from him, or in the way of his EXCELLENCY and adorable Perfections, as thinking it the perfection of Nature, and highest Glory and Ho∣nor to follow and imitate him, or to be approv'd by him.

IF (as in the first case) there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is fear'd as one that will punish such or such a Behavior; and if upon this ac∣count, through the fear of such a certain Punishment, the Creature be restrain'd from doing that particular ill, which he is not otherwise in any manner averse from; this is not, nor ever can be, as has bin prov'd, any Virtue or Goodness, any more than as it may be said perhaps, that there is meekness and gentleness in

a Tyger chain'd up, or innocence and sobriety in a Monky under the disciplin of the Whip. For however orderly and well those Animals, or Man himself up∣on like terms, may be brought to act, while the Mind or Reason is not gain'd, nor the Inclinations carri'd that way; but that Aw alone is that which prevails and forces obedience; the obedience is but servil, and all that is done through it merely servil; and the greater degree of such a submission or compliance is but the greater servility towards whatsoever subject it chance to be. For, whether such a Creature have a good Master, or an ill one, he is not less servil in his own nature: and tho the Master or Superi∣or so fear'd be ever so perfect, and of so excellent a Nature, yet the greater and more prostitute submission that is caus'd in this case, and through this Prin∣ciple or Motive only, is but the lower and more abject servitude, and implies the greater wretchedness and meanness in the Creature, as having those pas∣sions of Self-love, or towards Self-good so much more strong and excessive, that is to say, more faultily and viti∣ously; as has bin explain'd. So that this belief of a God dispensing Rewards and Punishments according to such and such Actions, is not of it self directly

the cause of Virtue; tho it may be perhaps of a virtuous-like Behavior. But if it be the character of a Religion, to injoin not only the good Action, but the Affection, such as Charity and Love; and that in reality it be the effect of such a Religi∣on, to make men endeavor all they can to create in themselves such free disposi∣tions to Goodness: then is a Person by this means made to have Virtue in any particular, when he begins to act through such sincere and sound Affection. And thus the fear of Punishment and hope of Reward may be understood to be the oc∣casion of Virtue, when it gives rise to another Principle than it self, and is at length the occasion of doing good out of some other Affection than either that to∣wards Reward, or that of apprehension and dread of Punishment; there being no such thing possible as either actual Love, Charity, or Goodness, till such time.

IF (as in the second case) there be a belief or conception of a Deity, who is admir'd and ador'd, as being understood to have the most high and glorious Qua∣lities; such as of infinit Power and Wisdom, which make him conspicuous and cause him of necessity to be reve∣renc'd and held in Veneration; and if in the manner that this soveraign and

mighty Being is apprehended, or as he is related and describ'd, there appear in him a high and eminent regard to what is good and excellent, a concern for the good of all, or an affection of Kindness and Love towards the Whole; such an example as this (of the good of which we have already spoken) must certainly help to raise and increase the affection towards Virtue, and help to submit and subdue all other Affections to that. And if join'd to this, there be an opinion or apprehension of the superintendency and all-seeingness of such a supreme Be∣ing; as one who is a witness and specta∣tor of human Actions, and conscious of whatsoever is felt or acted in the Universe; so that in the perfectest re∣cess or deepest Solitude there is not want∣ing one closely join'd to us, whose Pre∣sence singly is of more moment than that of the most August Assembly on Earth, or of all Mankind overlooking, before whom as the shame of guilty Actions must be the greatest shame, so the Ho∣nor of well-doing, even under the un∣just censure of a whole World, must be the greatest Honor and Applause; in this case, it is to the commonest view appa∣rent how far conducing a perfect Theism must be to Virtue, and how much want there is in Atheism.

THEREFORE, if there be a Be∣ing conceiv'd, all-intelligent, and all-see∣ing, of infinit Power, Wisdom and Goodness; the belief of such a Being (which is barely the Theistical Belief and no more) must of necessity, thus, be highly effectual to the creating or fur∣thering of good Affections, and to the removing of contrary ones; by rendring every thing that is of Virtue more love∣ly, splendid, and attractive, and every thing that is of Vice more ignominious and deform'd.

WHAT the fear of future Punish∣ments, and hopes of certain future Re∣wards, may farther do towards the pro∣motion of Virtue; and of what Benefit this accession of Belief may be to Vir∣tue, we shall further consider as we pro∣ceed.

BUT this in the mean while is cer∣tain, that neither can this fear or hope be of the kind of those Affections which we call good Affections, as being the springs and sources of all Actions truly good. Nor yet can it, as has bin prov'd, so much as admit of a thorow good Af∣fection, where it stands as essential to any moral performance, or where it has to do, as but in part a motive to that which some other Affection ought alone to have bin a motive full and sufficient:

so that it is therefore not only not the Cause, but is exclusive in some degree, of any virtuous Action, and must withal, as it increases, strengthen the vitious Prin∣ciple, that of excessive selfishness, or habi∣tual earnest attention of the Mind, and application of the Passions towards self-good; which Principle as it is improv'd and made stronger every day, by the strong exercise of the Passions in this Subject of more extended Self-interest, must spread it self through the whole Life; and by causing a greater attention to self-good in every thing else, must of necessity take off from, and diminish the Affecti∣ons towards other Good, that is to say, public and extensive Good, or good of the System, as above; in short, must destroy more and more true Generosity and Virtue, and introduce meanness and narrowness of Soul.

THUS if true Piety be esteem'd a Love of God for his own excellency, it will follow, that as this solicitous regard to privat Good expected from him, is greater or lesser; so it will prove either more or less a diminution to the Love of God for his own excellence, and conse∣quently prove a diminution of Piety: because whilst God is belov'd only as the cause of privat Good to any one, he is belov'd but as any other instrument or

means of Pleasure by any vitious Crea∣ture: and when there is more of this sort of Passion or Affection towards pri∣vat good, there is less room, as has bin shewn, for the other towards more ge∣neral Good, or towards any deserving object worthy of Love and Admirati∣on for its own sake; such as is God.

IN the same manner, if the love and desire of Life, or prolongation of Being, be remarkably strong in any Creature; the stronger it is, the less he is able to have true submission or resig∣nation to Providence, or the Rule and Order of God, and consequently the less is his Piety. And if his Resignation de∣pends wholly on that expectation of in∣finit Reward, the meaning of his Re∣signation, whatever the appearance be, is only this, That he resigns all other things upon a condition of THAT which he him∣self confesses to be much beyond an Equiva∣lent, viz. eternal Living, and in a State of highest Pleasure and Enjoyment.

BUT, notwithstanding this, it is certain that altho the Principle of Vir∣tue cannot in its own nature but suf∣fer diminution by whatsoever is of that other Kind; as by eagerness of Reward (which by it self, and in the room of better Affection is mercenariness) and dread of Punishment (which is in the

same sense servility:) and altho as any such ardent pursuit of Pleasure, or over∣great attention of the Mind to self-con∣cernment increases, the principle of Ge∣nerosity, Magnanimity and Virtue, must suffer and decrease; yet it is certain that this Principle of fear of future Punish∣ment and hope of future Reward may in∣directly, and in particular circumstan∣ces, be the occasion of great good and advantage to Virtue; and what this may be, we shall to the full endeavor to shew.

IT has bin already consider'd how, that notwithstanding any implanted sense of Right and Wrong, or any good af∣fection towards Society, yet by violent Passion, as by Rage or Lust, this other good Affection may be frequently con∣trol'd and overcome. Where therefore there is nothing in the Mind capable to make such Passions as these the objects of its aversion, and to cause them ear∣nestly to be oppos'd and struggled a∣gainst; in this case, if there be any thing in Religion which creates a belief that Passions of this kind as well as their con∣sequent Actions, are the object of a Deitys animadversion, it is certain that such a Belief must be allow'd benefici∣al to Virtue, as it will be allow'd to tend to the calming of the Mind, and to the

disposing or fitting the Person to a better recollection and observance of that o∣ther good and virtuous Principle, which by being unobstructed must the more increase.

THIS also may be said as to the sup∣port which this Belief of a future Reward and Punishment may prove to Virtue; that as it is capable of raising men to Vir∣tue who were at first in a manner strangers to it; so where men are al∣ready in a virtuous Course, it may prove that which alone can save them from falling off from the Virtue they possess, into a licentious and vitious practise.

TO prove how this may be, we may consider the thing thus. A Person who has much of goodness and natural recti∣tude in his Temper, being sensible of Poverty, Crosses and Adversity; and being perhaps of a Nature too sensible towards some certain Pleasures, as of Fame or Reputation, Ease, Indolency or Repose; it is certain that the meeting with any of these first, or the being dis∣appointed in any of these latter, must give a sourness and distaste to the Temper, and make it averse to that which is the occasion of such ill. Now if the Person be so affected as to think his Honesty or strict Integrity to be at any time the oc∣casion of this ill; it is likely he may be

made dissatisfi'd with his good Disposi∣tion and Principles. And if his own thoughts, or the corrupt insinuations of other men still present this to his Mind, that his Honesty is the occasion of this ill to him, and that if freed from this restraint of Virtue and Honesty, he might be much happier; 'tis very obvious that his love and relish towards Virtue and Honesty, must every day diminish, as the Temper grows uneasy and quarrels with it. But if he opposes to this the consideration, that Honesty carries with it, if not a present, at least a future recompence, so as to make up that loss to privat or self∣good which he repines at; then may this injury to his good Temper and ho∣nest Principle be prevented, and his Love or Affection towards Honesty and Virtue remain the same.

IN the same manner where there is not a love, but a sort of aversion to∣wards what is Good and Virtuous, as to∣wards Lenity and Forgivingness, and that there is a love of its contrary, Revenge; it is possible and very natural, that by the consideration that Lenity is, by its rewards, made the cause of a greater self∣good; that very Affection of Lenity and Mildness may be industriously nourish'd, and the contrary depress'd; so that the good Affection may come at last to be

seated in the Temper, and the good and proper Object to be belov'd, as by a Creature well affected, when no Punish∣ment or reward is thought of.

THUS we see that in a State or Pub∣lic, a virtuous and good Administration, and an equal and just distribution of Re∣wards and Punishments is of service, not only to restrain vitious men, and to make them act usefully to the public; but, by making Virtue to be apparently the interest of every one, it removes all prejudices against it, creates a fair recep∣tion for it, and leads men into that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit. For, thus a People made virtuous by the long course of a wise and just Administration, when ever this happens to be interrupted by some sudden Ty∣ranny or Usurpation, they will on this account rather be raised to exert a stronger Virtue. And even, where by long and continued arts of a prevailing Tyranny, they are at last totally op∣press'd, the seeds of that Virtue will still remain, and for some Ages afterwards shew themselves not wholly extinct. But this withal we must here observe, that it is Example which chiefly works these Effects; for a virtuous Administra∣tion is seldom but accompanied with Virtue in the Magistrate. Nor is it so

much the reward it self, or the punish∣ment which dos this, as the natural esti∣mation of Virtue, and shame of Villany which is excited and mov'd by these ex∣pressions of the hatred of Mankind to∣wards injustice, and their approbation of Goodness and Virtue. For even in the suffering of the greatest Villains them∣selves, we see generally that the infamy of their Act, the odiousness of their Crime, and their shame towards Man∣kind, contribute more to their misery than all besides; and that it is not so much Death it self which creates their horror, as that kind of Death they undergo.

IT is the same in privat Families: and here tho the Slaves and mercenary Servants, restrain'd and made orderly by punishment, and by the severity of their Master, are not on that account made Good or Honest; yet the same master of the Family using proper Re∣wards and Punishments towards his Children, teaches them Goodness, and by this help instructs them in a Virtue which afterwards they practise upon other grounds, and without thoughts of reward.

IF by the thoughts of future Reward, or what regards another State, be under∣stood the love and desire of virtuous En∣joyment, or of the very practice and ex∣ercise

of Virtue in another Life; the ex∣pectation or hope of this, must not only be a great encouragement to Virtue; but it appears plainly, that the very fol∣lowing of Virtue in hope to obtain that supreme Happiness which consists in the perfection of it, is of it self a degree of Virtue, a proof of the sincere Love we have for it, as for its own sake; and can∣not be call'd a motive of self-interest or selfishness: for if the love of Virtue be any thing distinct from that which we mean by common and narrow self-in∣terest, then the love and desire of Life (when lov'd and desir'd for the sake of Virtue alone) must also be distinct. But if the desire of continu'd or prolong'd Life, be only through the violence of that aversion which is towards Death; if it be through the love and desire of something else in Life, than virtuous Af∣fection and Practice, and through the unwillingness of parting with something else than what is purely of this kind; then is this no longer any Virtue, or sign of Virtue.

WHOEVER therefore (from what has bin said before) is after any manner, or in any way at all perswaded or induc'd to think that Honesty and Virtue have their Rewards; such a one is capable of being led to a Virtue which he already

is not arriv'd at; tho yet his doing any thing on the consideration or foresight merely of such Reward separate from Virtue and of another nature, is no Vir∣tue; nor even that thing of setting about to make himself virtuous on that score, can be any Virtue. For tho he may intend to be virtuous, he is not become so, for having only intended, or for on∣ly intending to be so, because of the re∣wards of Virtue: but as soon as he is come to have one single good Affection, any Affection towards what is good and worthy, sociable, human, or any way morally good, as liking and affecting this for its own sake, and as good and ami∣able in it self; then is he in some de∣gree Good and Virtuous, and not till then.

UPON the whole therefore, one who has not any Reason or Belief to hinder him from thinking that Virtue is the cause of Misery, and is of self-ill, such a one must be subject to lose much of his Virtue and good Disposition. And one who has a contrary Reason and Belief, which makes him think Virtue to be his Good, or a cause of good to him, has an inducement to Virtue, and an assistance in it which the other has not.

WHOEVER thinks always con∣sistently, or according to one fix'd or settled Judgment, that Virtue causes Happiness, and Vice Misery; or who∣ever there is, who, as they say common∣ly, feels by himself, that he can never be happy, if he quits his Integrity and In∣nocency; either of these Persons carry with them that requisit security, and that assistance to Virtue abovemention'd. Or if there are such who have not such thoughts, nor can believe that Virtue is their interest in Life, except they are otherwise rewarded; yet if they believe a God dispensing Rewards and Punish∣ments in this present, or in a future State, to Virtue and Vice, they carry al∣so this security and assistance to Virtue along with them; whilst their Belief continues thus, and is not in the least either wavering or doubtful. For it must be observ'd here, that whensoever the dependence upon this is exceeding great, it very much takes off from any other dependence or encouragement; for, where high Rewards are inforc'd, and the imagination strongly turn'd towards them, the other natural Motives to Goodness are apt to lose much of their force, whilst the Mind is thus transported and taken up in the contem∣plation and pursuit of a highly elevated

Self-interest, and in a concernment of such infinit importance to our selves in particular, that on this account, all o∣ther Affections towards Friends, Rela∣tions, or Mankind (mere worldly ob∣jects) are slightly look'd upon; the in∣terest of our Soul being so far superior. And we know this by experience, that the Persons who are the most highly Devout, are, from the contemplation of the high enjoyments of another State, accustom'd to undervalue all other earth∣ly advantages of Goodness; and in the same religious Zeal are often carri'd to decry all other natural benefits of Vir∣tue: so as to declare, that except only for the sake of that supreme Reward, they would devest themselves of all Goodness at once, and should think it their greatest advantage to be vitious. So that there may be nothing more fatal to Virtue, than the weak and uncertain be∣lief of a future Reward and Punishment; for, having laid the stress wholly here, if this come to fail, or loosly to waver, it must prove a betraying of Virtue, and must prove, if not the ruin, at least of mighty prejudice to mens Morals.

BUT to return to our Argument; the belief of a God therefore may supply that defect in the Thought or Opinion concerning the want of Happiness in

Virtue, which Atheism has no remedy for. Altho it be not otherwise imply'd, but that without an absolute and clear assent to that Hypothesis of full and com∣pleat Theism; the other Opinion, or the other Thoughts as to the Happiness of a man with good Affections, and the Mi∣sery of a man with contrary ones, may possibly be establish'd in the Mind; and so Virtue be esteem'd good, or the means of Good; and Vice always the contra∣ry. Tho yet the natural tendency of Atheism be very different; since besides the unaptness and disproportion of such a belief as that of Atheism, to the ap∣prehension or imagination of any thing in such just order, and according to so admirable a disposition as that would be, were Virtue always the Good, and Vice the Ill of every Creature: it must be besides confess'd too, that there is a great deal wanting in this Belief to∣wards the promotion of that particular good Affection of love to Virtue; which Love however when at its height, and when forcibly felt, is the chiefest thing that can make the happiness of Virtue to be well credited: for it is almost im∣possible constantly and firmly to retain this opinion of the great Happiness ari∣sing from Virtue it self, without con∣ceiving high thoughts and estimation of

the Pleasure and Delight resulting from the very love of Virtue; from the con∣templation of what is worthy in it self, as well as from the mere conveniences of a virtuous Life: which sort of Pleasure and Delight is likely to gain but little opinion or credit where it is not highly experienc'd. The chief ground and sup∣port, therefore, of this Opinion, of the constant Happiness of Virtue, must be from the powerful feeling of this Affecti∣on, and the knowledg of its Power and Strength. But this is certain, that there must be but little encouragement or sup∣port of any such Affection as this, or of liking and affecting any thing as in it self good and beautiful, where there is neither goodness nor beauty allowed in the WHOLE it self; nor any perfect or wise direction for the good of any thing, nor any good Affection of a supreme Mind or Will towards the good of all in general, nor any consciousness in such an all-knowing and perfect Mind, of the Virtue and good Affection of particulars. This must tend rather to the cutting off of all love, veneration or esteem of any thing decent, just or orderly in the Uni∣verse, to the weaning of the Affections from any thing amiable or self-worthy, and to the suppressing even of that very Habit and Custom of contemplating

with satisfaction and delight the beauties that are in Nature, and whatever in the order of things is according to a har∣mony and proportion the most resulting to sense. For how little dispos'd must such a Person be, either to love or admire any thing as orderly and comly in the Uni∣verse, who thinks that the Universe it self is nothing but disorder? how unapt to reverence or respect any particular or subordinat Beauty (such as is part of the structure) when the WHOLE it self is thought to want perfection, and to be only a vast and infinit defor∣mity?

AND when we consider further concerning such an opinion of the WHOLE as this is, and the thoughts of living in such a distracted Universe, from which so many ills may be suspected, and in which there is nothing good, nothing lovely to be contemplated, or that can raise any affection towards it other than that of Hatred and Aversion; it will seem hardly possible for us to think other∣wise of such an Opinion as this, than that it must by degrees imbitter the Temper, and not only make the love of Virtue to be less felt, but help to impair and ruin natural Affection and Kindness. So that as there is nothing so exalting to Virtue, or so hightning to the pleasure deriv'd

from it, as a pure and perfect Theism; so on the other side a perfect Atheism is that which must tend exceedingly to de∣stroy all ground of delight in Virtue, and even that very Principle it self of all Virtue, viz. natural and good Affecti∣on.

BUT now on the other side; neither is it impli'd that every one whosoever that believes a God, believes to this effect, and with this advantage to Virtue; or that whoever believes both a God, and Rewards and Punishments dispens'd either in this present, or in some future State, believes to this effect. For if he believes that these Rewards and Punish∣ments are tied to, or follow something else than good or ill Affections (as they do, who believe Rewards for simple actions or performances irrational, and without account; or who believe such Rewards and Punishments as are tied to things casual and accidental, as the being born in such a place, or of such Parents) then may the Affections grow ill and vitious without hindrance, or rather with help, as has bin shewn; because of the suppos'd want of Rectitude in the ador'd sovereign Being.

WHOEVER therefore has a firm belief of a God whom he dos not merely call Good, but of whom in reality he be∣lieves

nothing but what is good, and is really sutable to the exactest character of Justice; such a Person believing Re∣wards and Punishments in another Life, must believe them Rewards and Punish∣ments of Virtue and Vice merely, and not of any other Qualities or Accidents, which make them either Rewards for ill, or for nothing; and therefore not properly Rewards, but capricious distribu∣tions of Happiness or Ʋnhappiness to Crea∣tures. And such a Person as this has the advantage spoken of, and can grow to be, or can keep himself virtuous where an Atheist cannot; in case there be a failure, as abovemention'd, in the thoughts or opinion as to the happiness of Virtue in it self, and that it come to be believ'd the contrary way, that Virtue is an ene∣my to Happiness, with respect to this Life merely: which that it is so in the main, is an opinion that only an Atheist or im∣perfect Theist can have. For whatever be decided as to that of any Life after the present one, and of Rewards and Punishments to come, he who is a per∣fect Theist, and who believes an eter∣nal universal Mind, reigning sovereign∣ly and through all things, and with the highest perfection of Goodness, as well as Wisdom and Power, cannot but be∣lieve that Virtue is made the good or

advantage of every Creature capable of having Virtue. For what could be more an unjust Ordinance and Rule, or be imagin'd more a defective Universe and ill constitution of things, than if Virtue were naturally made the ill, and Vice the good of every Creature?

THUS therefore there is an advan∣tage to Virtue necessarily suppos'd in perfect Theism, which is not in the Atheistical Belief: on the contrary it is, tho not wholly impossible, yet very rare and difficult, that through all the ill Chances to which a virtuous man may be expos'd, the certain remembrance and belief that Virtue is the best or only means of Happiness, or the consciousness of his not being able to recede from it, with∣out falling into greater Misery, and a more deplorable State, should be able to keep it self a firm principle in his Mind, if he be one who has no opinion at all of any wisdom or order in the Government of the Universe; no example above himself of any Goodness or good Affection, and whose natural reflections on this Sub∣ject cannot well be other than melan∣choly and disgustful. Now, if there be wanting in a Mind that which can more kindly dispose the Temper, and is able to raise the Affection to a greater admiration and love of Virtue; then is

there much wanting of what should make the happiness of Virtue credited; since nothing is more assistant to this Be∣lief than the full experience of those bet∣ter and kinder Affections, and of that satisfaction enjoy'd in the love of Virtue it self.

AND now in the last place, there is yet greater advantage to Virtue, in that opinion of perfect and compleat Theism, which we will endeavor to explain; tho the matter it self be of that kind which is nicely Philosophical, and may be thought, perhaps, to be so overmuch. There is no Creature, according to what has bin prov'd above, but must be ill in some degree, by having any Affection towards, or against any thing in a stronger degree than such as is sutable to his own privat good, and that of the System he is join'd to: for, in this case the Affection is an ill Affection. Now if a rational Creature has that degree of aversion which is requisit against any particular ill (as suppose that Ill of be∣ing overcome, banish'd, or ruin'd in Fortune) this is regular and well. But if after the ill happen'd, his passion of aversion proves such, that he still rages at the accident, and is in continual ab∣horrence towards his fortune or lot; then will this be acknowledg'd vitious in

it self, and further prejudicial to Temper, and to all Virtue: as on the other side, the patient endurance of the Calamity, and the support of the Mind under it, must be acknowledg'd virtuous and pre∣servative of Virtue. Now altho that which Atoms and Chance produce (sup∣posing no other Principle besides) need not give occasion to that excess of abhor∣rency, violent Rage and Anger, which is what a tolerably rational man may allay by considering, that what is done is neither meant nor design'd, but is from Atoms and Chance only; yet if there be nothing at the bottom, nor any Rule or Reason besides Chance and Atoms, there can be no satisfaction at all in thinking upon what they alone produce: for if the thing seems ill, and be ill felt, it cannot be admitted in that Hypothesis, (or in the Atheistical one whatever it be) that this Ill is a real good elsewhere, and with respect to the whole of things, as be∣ing according to the wisest and best de∣sign that is conceivable. Now that which is thought ill, and altogether un∣accountable and without reason, cannot but raise some degree of Aversion to∣wards it. But in another Hypothesis (that of perfect Theism) the affirma∣tive of this, that whatever happens is good, must necessarily (as has bin prov'd)

be the Belief. Therefore in the course of things in this world, whatsoever Ill occurring would seem to force from a rational Creature a censure and dislike, or whatsoever may happen to be his privat Lot; he may not only acquiesce in it, and have patience, which is but an abatement of the natural anger and dis∣satisfaction, but he may make the Lot or Part assign'd to him, an object of his good Affection in some sort, as having a good and kind Affection in general to∣wards all that is produc'd in the Universe, as coming from the most perfect Wis∣dom, and being perfectly Good: which Affection, since it must in a much greater degree cause a good support of whatever is endured for Virtue, or in any state of sufferance; and since it must cause a greater acquiescence and complacency with respect to ill accidents, ill men and injuries (and consequently a greater e∣quality, meekness and benignity in the Temper); so it must of necessity be a good Affection, and the Creature that has it, so much the more a virtuous and good Creature: for whatsoever is the occasion or means of more affectionatly joining or uniting a rational Creature to his PART in Society, and causes him to prosecute the public good or good of the System he is join'd to, beyond what he

would otherwise do, is undoubtedly the occasion or cause of greater Virtue in him. Now if the subject of such an Affection be not just or deserving, if no such Hypothesis is to be admitted as that of perfect Theism (so that there is real Ill continually produc'd in the course of things in the Universe, and no good in∣telligent and powerful Principle able to exclude such ILL) yet notwithstanding this, the Affection towards this false subject (if it be to be suppos'd false) must be so far good, as that the having of it will be the occasion of greater strengthning and forwarding of Virtue, as has bin shewn. But if the subject be just; that is to say, if every thing which the Universe produces be according to all reason the wisest and best of what could be imagin'd, and be therefore the most worthy of admiration, applause, and all good Affection of rational Crea∣tures, as coming from a most perfect, wise and good Principle; then dos such an Affection become due and requisit in every rational Creature, so as that it must be vitious to want it. On which it may be grounded, that the relation which Virtue has to Piety is such, as that the FIRST is not compleat but in the LAT∣TER: and that where this latter is want∣ing, there cannot be the same benignity,

perseverance, the same good composure of the Affections, nor so good a Mind.

TO conclude then: Having consider'd how any Opinion about the Existence of a God can have influence on the Manners of men, and cause either Vir∣tue or Vice; if the reasons we have of∣fered be found to be of any weight, it will appear in resolution of the questi∣on which has bin treated of: That one who has not the Opinion or Belief of an intelligent Principle or God, may, tho very difficultly, and at a great ha∣zard, be capable of Virtue, so as to have an Honesty, a Faith, a Justice perhaps of great note and worth; may have many generous and good Passions, and possibly that of love to Virtue for its own sake, as well as for being believ'd advantage∣ous: but that in the other Belief, there are not only greater securities and ad∣vantages to Virtue, but there is besides a degree of Virtue which the Opinion con∣trary to it cannot admit. So that the chiefest security, the perfection and the highest degree of Virtue, must be owing to the belief of a God.

BOOK the Second. OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO VIRTUE.

SECT. I.

WE have already consider'd WHAT VIRTUE IS, who may be allow'd in any degree virtuous. It remains now to shew, WHAT OBLI∣GATION THERE IS TO VIRTUE, and how any one may have reason to imbrace Virtue, and shun Vice.

WE have seen that to be virtuous and good, is for a rational Creature in the use of good Understanding and Judg∣ment, to have all his natural Affections▪ or better Passions, his dispositions of

Mind and Temper sutable and agreeing with the good of his Kind, or of that System (as explain'd before) where he is included, and of which he is a PART. So that to have all these Affections right and intire, by which we are kindly and naturally join'd to our PART in Soci∣ety; this is nam'd Rectitude, Integrity: and to want any of these, or to have their contraries, such as alienate from hence, is Depravity, Corruption, Nature vitiated.

THAT in the Passions and Affecti∣ons of particular Creatures there is a relation to the interest of a Species or common Nature (as that there is an Af∣fection towards the propagation of the kind, towards the nurture of the young, towards mutual Support and Succor) this is not deniable, neither will it be denied; therefore, that such an Affecti∣on as this of a Creature towards the good of that common Nature, is as proper an Affection, and as natural to him, as to any member of a Body to work in its own way, as to a Stomach to digest, as to other Intrails to perform their other offices, or as to any other Part in an animal Body to be so affected, and to operate so as is appointed to it in its System.

IT is certain also, that a Creature having such Affections as these towards the common Nature, or System of the Kind, at the same time that he has those other Affections toward the privat Nature or Self-system, (as in the case of self-pre∣servation, self-support and maintenance) it must happen that in following the first of these Affections, the Creature must often contradict and go against these latter; as in the instance so often before us'd, where the love to the young makes every other Affection towards privat good give way, and causes a to∣tal neglect of self-interest or concern∣ment▪

IT may seem therefore in this place, that there is a perfect opposition between these two; as if the pursuing or being carried towards the common Interest or Good, by such Affections as are suted to that common Interest, were a hinderance to the attainment of privat Good, as be∣ing a hinderance and check to those Pas∣sions which aim thither. And it being found that hazards and hardships make but ill for the animal State, in the pri∣vat System; these other Affections to∣wards another Good (that of the Kind, or public System) being such as do of∣ten expose to hardships and hazards, by overruling their opposites, the self-pre∣servative

passions, and by necessitating the Creature thus to self-denial, and, as it were, self-desertion; it may be con∣cluded, perhaps, from hence, that it is best for the Animal to be without any such Affections at all. So that that Love which joins us to others of the same Kind; that reconciling Affection towards a Species or fellowship of Crea∣tures with whom we are bred, and live; that social Kindness, or whatever else, be it what Affection soever that goes a∣gainst that other Principle, takes the place of the self-interesting Passions, and draws us as it were out of our selves, so as to make us disregardful of our own convenience and safety; whatever is of this kind should be abolish'd; love to the young, tenderness and pity abolish∣ed; in short, all natural Affections should thus be extinguish'd and rooted out, as dangerous, tormenting and de∣structive.

ACCORDING to this it would seem to follow, that in the constitution of that Order or System of a Kind or Species, the PART is ill affected, and in an ill state as to it self, which is natu∣rally and well affected towards the WHOLE: and the only natural and good state of the privat nature or single PART, as to it self, is to be in an unna∣tural

and ill state towards the common Nature or WHOLE. A strange Con∣stitution indeed! in which it must be confess'd that there is much disorder and untowardness; but which in Nature is no where observ'd besides: that in a System, as in a Tree or animal Body, any Part or Member should be in a good and prosperous state as to it self, which was under a contrary Affection, and in an unnatural operation as to its Whole.

THAT this is otherwise, I shall en∣deavor to demonstrate, so as to make it appear, that what seems thus to be an ill Order and Constitution in the Uni∣verse, (and which, if true, would neces∣sarily make natural rectitude the Ill, and depravity the Good of every Creature) is in reality according to a wise and excel∣lent Order in the Universe; insomuch that for every particular in its System, to work to the good of that System or Public, and to its own good, is all one, and not to be divided. By which means natural Rectitude or Virtue must be the advantage, and Vice the injury and dis∣advantage of every Creature.

IT has bin shewn before, that no Animal can, as an Animal, be said to act in any manner but through Affecti∣ons or Passions, such as are proper to an Animal: for in convulsive fits▪ where

a Creature strikes either himself or o∣thers, it is a simple Mechanism, an En∣gine, or piece of Clock-work that acts, and not the Animal.

WHATSOEVER therefore is done or acted by any Animal as such, is done and can be done only through some Affection or Passion, as of Fear, Love or Hatred, moving him.

AND as it is impossible that the weakest Affections should overcome the strongest (as that a lesser love should overcome a greater love, a lesser fear a greater fear) so it is impossible but that where the Affections or Passions are strongest, or where they make the strong∣est side, either by their number or force, thither the Animal must incline, and by that be govern'd and led to action.

THE Affections or Passions which must influence and govern the Animal are either,

1. THE natural ones towards the Kind, or which carry to the good of something beyond the privat System.

2. OR the self-ones, which carry to the good of the privat System, as to∣wards self-preservation, self-nourishment or support, self-defence, or repelling of Injury.

3. OR such as are neither of these, and neither tend to any good of the pub∣lic

or privat System. And it is through these several Affections or Motions that a Creature must be Good or Ill, Virtu∣ous or Vitious. But, before we come to speak of these separatly, it may be convenient to premise some few things in general, in order to clear some mat∣ters which may create a doubt and di∣sturbance.

WHEN in a rational Creature, any thing is done with real and full intention towards public Good, and with that just and excellent natural Affection which leads towards the good of Society; if there be any failure in the Judgment, which notwithstanding guides and di∣rects amiss; how far this may be viti∣ous, has bin before mention'd, so as not to need any thing farther in this place, nor is this worth insisting on: it having little to do with the essential part of Vice, and that which is with most rea∣son complain'd of in the world, as cre∣ating those disorders we see. For where there is in a rational Creature an inclina∣tion and strong affection towards Virtue, superior to all other Affections, preva∣lent over all Obstructions, and freed from the ill influence of any unnatural Passi∣ons, such as those raised from Superstiti∣on, and horrid Custom before spoken of; there is little fear of failure through

wrong choice or preference in moral acti∣ons, or through want of a right know∣ledg of Duty when rightly and sincere∣ly sought: but if notwithstanding such a search, it be however miss'd in any small degree, the misfortune or self-in∣jury is, as the Vice it self, very slight and of little moment.

THE natural Affections separatly con∣sider'd, as either Pity or Compassion, love to the young, and such like, however excellent they are, they may notwith∣standing be in a too great, and there∣fore vitious degree: as when Pity is so overcoming as to destroy its own end, and prevent the succor and relief re∣quir'd; or as when love to the young is such a fondness as disables from right∣ly taking care of the young, or such as destroys the Parent, and consequently the young too. And tho it seems harsh to call that vitious which is but an ex∣treme of some natural and kind Affecti∣on; yet the thing being rightly con∣sider'd, it is apparent, that wherever any single Affection of that kind is over great, it must be worst for the rest, and take off from their operation: for a Creature possest with such an immode∣rat and excessive Passion, must of neces∣sity allow too much to that Passion, and too little to others of the same note or

character, and equally natural and ex∣cellent as to their end; so as that this must be the occasion of partiality and injustice, whilst only one duty or natu∣ral PART is earnestly follow'd, and o∣ther duties neglected, which should ac∣company, or perhaps take place and be prefer'd.

NOW as natural Affection of this sort may be too high, so may the Affection to∣wards the privat System, or SELF, be too weak. For if a Creature were self-neg∣ligent▪ insensible to danger, or wanted such a degree of Passion in any kind, as was necessary to preserve, sustain, or defend it self, this would be a vice or imperfection in the natural temper, with respect to the privat System, and the de∣sign of Nature in the animal Constitu∣tion; in the same manner as it would be a vice or imperfection in that single part an Eye not to shut of its own accord and unknowingly to us, by a natural cauti∣on and timidity; which, were it, want∣ing, however we might design the pre∣servation of our Eye, we should not preserve it by any observation or steady intention of our own ever so good to∣wards the preserving it. And thus tho the Passions of this kind do not im∣mediatly regard, nor have for their ob∣ject the good of the Kind, but a self∣good;

and altho no Creature be (ac∣cording to the common way of speak∣ing) called good and virtuous for hav∣ing any of these: yet since it is impos∣sible that the public Good, or Good of the System, can be preserved without these; or that it should be well with the Particulars, if these were wanting, which are for the good of the PARTS, and of the Whole together; it follows that a Creature wanting any of these, and being wanting to it self and to the Whole, is in reality wanting in some degree to Goodness and natural Recti∣tude; and may thus be said to be de∣fective or vicious, tho this be not what is commonly call'd so.

'TIS thus that we say of a Creature that he is too good; when he either has his affection of any sort towards the Kind so violent, as to carry him even beyond his Part; or that it happens that he is really carried beyond his Part, not by a too highly kindled passion of that sort, but through want of some self∣passion to restrain him in some bounds.

IT may be objected here, That this of having the natural Affections too strong, (where the self ones are over∣much so) or of having the self ones thus defective or weak (where the natural ones are weak) may often prove upon oc∣casion

the only reason of a Creature's act∣ing honestly and well. For, thus possibly, a Creature insensible to some self-interest∣ing passion (as suppose he were altogether indifferent to life) may even with the smallest degree of some one natural Af∣fection, do what the highest Affection of that kind should or can perform: and thus a Creature excessively timorous may by as exceeding a degree of some one na∣tural Affection, do that which requires the perfectest Courage to perform.

TO this I answer; That when we say of any Passion that it is too strong, or that it is too weak, we must speak with respect to a certain Constitution or Oe∣conomy of a particular Creature, or Spe∣cies of Creatures. For if a Passion car∣rying to any right end, be only so much the more serviceable and effectual, for being strong; if the violence of it be no way the cause of any disturbance or distraction within, or of any dispropor∣tionableness between it self and other Af∣fections; then consequently the Passion, however strong and forcible, cannot be blam'd as vitious. But if to have all the Passions in equal proportion with it, be what the constitution of the Creature cannot bear or support; so that one or more Passions are perhaps rais'd to this height, but that the others are not, nor

can be in the same proportion; then is it to be said of those more than ordinary forcible Passions, that they are excessive: for, notwithstanding that they may be such as the Creature can well bear, that they agree with his frame and constitu∣tion, and that they are no ways an ob∣struction to their own end; yet these Passions being in unequal proportion to the others, and causing an ill balance in the Affection, must be the occasion of inequality in the Conduct, and must in∣cline to a wrong moral practice.

BUT to explain a little further this of the Oeconomy of the Passions, by what we may observe in other Species or Kinds. As to those Creatures that have no manner of power or means given them by nature for their defence against Vio∣lence, nor any thing by which they can make themselves terrible to such as in∣jure or offend them; it is necessary that they should have very great and extra∣ordinary Fear, but little or no Animosity or Passion, such as should cause them to make resistance, or should delay their flight, which is their only sasety, and to which the passion of Fear is useful and of help. It is thus that Timorousness, and an habitual and strong passion of Fear may be according to the Oeconomy of a particular Creature, both with respect

to himself and his Species: and that on the other side, Courage may be vitious. Even in one and the same Species this is by Nature differently order'd, with respect to different Sexes, Ages, Growths. At a time when the whole Herd flies, the Bull alone makes head against the Lion, or whatever other invading Beast, and shews himself conscious of his part; for so nature has made him to be: and should he lose this generous Passion and Ani∣mosity, he would be degenerate. Even the Female of this Kind is, we see, arm'd by nature in some degree to resist Violence, so as not to fly a common danger. As for a Hind, a Doe, or any other inoffending and defenceless Crea∣ture; it is no way unnatural or vitious in such a one to desert the young and fly for safety: for to do otherwise would be contrary to the Oeconomy of the Crea∣ture and Species. But for those Crea∣tures that are able to make resistance, and are by nature arm'd (as those Sa∣vages of the Wood) with that which can mortally offend; it is natural in one of these to be rouz'd with fury, and to oppose it self to death against its Enemy or Invader; by which known passion in the Creature its Species is secur'd: since such a one can hardly on this account be assaulted, or injur'd with impunity, and

that a Creature, such as this, sells his own and offspring's Life at so dear a rate. To do less therefore than this, is in such a one unnatural and degenerate, and is a betraying of his Species. And of all other Creatures Man is in this sense the most terrible: since if he thinks it just and exemplary, he may in his own, or in his Countrys cause, revenge an injury on any one living; and by throwing away his own life (if reso∣lute to that degree) is almost certain Master of another's, tho ever so strong∣ly guarded: of which several examples given, have served to deter those in power, and restrain them from using the utmost outrages, and urging men to extremity.

BUT to come to what was said: No Passion therefore, which carries to a right end, and which is such as a Crea∣ture in his constitution can bear, with∣out the desorder or sufferance of his Body or Mind, and which is no other than proportionable with respect to other Passions, such as are suted likewise to the Oeconomy of the Creature, and of the Species in which he is included; no Pas∣sion such as this can be too strong or too forcible a Passion. But whatever Pas∣sion (tho of the sort of those we call the natural Affections, or Affections to∣wards

the kind) is overstrong in pro∣portion to any other Affection, this is immoderate Passion, and in too high a degree. And in answer therefore to the Objection made: tho it be true that this of having a self-passion too weak, or a natural affection too strong, may occasi∣on Virtue in one place, and cause one virtuous action; yet, with respect to the whole of Life, it is what must create confusion and disorder, and must occa∣sion too (as has bin shewn before) par∣tiality and injustice.

BUT, to express this all at once, under an easy and very familiar Comparison. It is the same with the Passions in an animal Constitution, as with the Cords or Strings of a musical Instrument. If these, tho in ever so just proportion one to another, are strained however beyond a certain degree, it is more than the In∣strument will bear; and by this the In∣strument is abused, and its effect lost: On the other side, if while some of the Cords are duly strained, others are not wound up to their due proportion; then is the Instrument still in disorder, and its part ill performed. The several Spe∣cies of Creatures are as different sorts of Instruments: And even in the same Species of Creatures (as in the same sort of Instrument) one is not intirely

like the other; nor will the same Cords fit each: the same degree of strength which winds up the Cords of one, and fits them to a Harmony and Consort, may in another burst both the Cords and Instrument it self. Thus men who have the liveliest and exquisitest sense, and who are in the highest degree af∣fected with Pleasure or Pain, have need of the strongest ground and foundation of other Passion, as that of natural Af∣fection, sensibleness to Friendship, Love, Pity, and the like, in order to keep a right Balance within, and to preserve them in their duty, and the performance of their part; whilst others, who are more flegmatic, heavier, and of a lower Key, need not, nor are made for the feeling those other Passions in al∣together so high a degree.

IT would be agreeable enough to in∣quire thus into the different tunings (if one may speak so) the different structures and proportions of different men, with respect to their passions, and the vari∣ous mixtures, temperatures and allays, which make that which we call Temper, according to which the goodness and worth of any Creature is esteemed. But here we should have too large a Field: Tho however we may, in passing by, observe, that whilst we see in all

other Creatures around us so great a proportionableness, constancy and regu∣larity in all their passions and affections; so great a harmony, and such an adhe∣rence to Nature; no failure in the care of the Offspring, or of the Society (if living in Society); no prostitution of themselves, nor no excess in any kind; whilst we see those Creatures who live as it were in Cities (as Bees and Ants) never to go out of that constant Train and Harmony, nor contradict those Af∣fections which carry them on to operate to the public Good, the Good of their WHOLE; and that even those Beasts that live the farthest out of Society of that sort, maintain however a conduct one towards another, such as is exactly well fitted for the good of their own Species; Man in the mean time, vicious and unconsonant man, lives out of all rule and proportion, contradicts his Principles, breaks the Order and Oecono∣my of all his Passions, and lives at odds with his whole Species, and with Na∣ture: so that it is next to a Prodigy to see a Man in the world who lives NA∣TURALLY, and as A MAN.

THUS having clear'd this Part, and having explain'd what is meant by having any passion in too high or too low a degree; and how that to have any

natural Affection too high, or any self Affection too low, is (tho not so cal∣led) a Vice and moral Imperfection, and is prejudicial both to the privat and public System; we come now to that which is the chiefest and most consider∣able part of Vice, that which alone is call'd Vice and Illness.

THE several senses in which a Creature may be said to be ill or viti∣ous, are, first, when the Affections are all orderly and right; but that through want of judgment, any error is committed in the choice of moral Objects. Of this there is no need to speak more than we have done. All other Vice or Illness besides, must be through the immediat disorder of the Affections themselves; as when the natural Affections are too strong, or the self Affections too weak: Tho nothing of this hitherto be what we ordinarily call Illness or Vice. That which remains of any way or sense, in which a Creature may be ill, or can possibly act ill, is either through the want of natural and good Affections, and the having no such thing at all to move him, or that is sufficient to move him; or, through contrary Passions or Affections moving him to what is wrong, and over∣coming those others, whensoever there are any of those to make opposition.

THAT is to say, either by having the natural Affections weak or deficient: or by having the self Passions too strong: or by having such as are neither natural Af∣fections, nor self ones; and of which the smallest and moderatest degree is not tending to the support or welfare of ei∣ther the Species or privat System.

OTHER WISE than thus it is im∣possible any Creature can be ill or vitious. And if it may be proved that it is the interest of the Creature to have his Pas∣sions or Affections never thus, but con∣trariwise; it will then be proved, that it is the interest of a Creature to be, and keep in that state in which he cannot but be good or virtuous: so that Virtue, then, can never be but his Good, and the contrary his Ill.

OUR business therefore will be to prove,

1. THAT to have those excellent Affections (the kind and natural ones, such as have bin mentioned) is to have the chief enjoyment of Life; and that to want them, is, and must be, besides the loss of that Good, the occasion of farther and greater Ill.

2. THAT to have the self Passions excessive or beyond such a degree in which they cannot but of necessity yield, as is fitting, to the natural ones,

whenever they meet or are opposed to each other, is also injurious to the Crea∣ture, and is of self-ill.

3. AND that to have the other sort of Passions, those which are neither na∣tural Affections towards the kind, nor self ones, of which the least degree is essential or requisit in the Constitution or Oeconomy of the Creature, is preju∣dicial to the Creature.

SECT. II.

THERE are few, who when they think of such a Creature as is void of all natural Affection, all social Inclination, Friendliness, Complacency or Love, but think of it as in a condi∣tion miserable enough as to it self, with∣out regard to the ill terms upon which such a Creature must live with those that are his fellow Creatures: 'Tis generally thought, I believe, that such a Crea∣ture as this feels but a little part of the satisfaction of Life, and relishes but lit∣tle those few Enjoyments which are left with him, those of eating, drinking, and the like; when those others of sociable∣ness, kindness and love, are substracted. It is well known, that to such a Creature as this, it is not only incident, to be morose,

rancorous and malignant; but that of ne∣cessity a Mind or Temper thus destitue of all mildness and benignity, of all kind and indulgent inclination, sense or feeling, must turn to that which is con∣trary, must be agitated and wrought by Passions of a different kind, and be a continual seat and lodgment of those bitter, hateful and perverse ones, made from a constant ill humor, frowardness, and disquiet, in an uncalm, unaffable, and unloving Temper; and that the consciousness of such a Mind or Nature, thus dissociable, obnoxious, and averse to all humanity, hating and hated of Mankind, must overcloud the Mind with dark suspicion and continual jealou∣sy, alarm it with fears and horror, and raise in it a continual disturbance and disease, in the most appearing fair and secure state of Fortune, and in the high∣est outward Prosperity.

THIS, as to the perfect immoral or inhuman state, is generally notic'd: and where there is this absolute degeneracy, and a total deprivation of all humanity, love, or natural affection, there are few who do not see and acknowledge the mi∣sery of such a State, when at worst as here suppos'd. The misfortune is, that this escapes us, and is not perceiv'd in less degrees: as if to be fully and per∣fectly

horrid, unsociable and inhuman, were indeed the greatest misfortune and misery that could be; but that to be it in a little degree should be no misery nor harm at all: which is as reasonable as it would be, to allow that it is the greatest ill of a Body to be in the utmost manner distorted, maim'd, and in an absolute disuse or perversion of all its Organs; but that to lose the use of one Limb, or to be impair'd in some one single Mem∣ber, is no inconvenience or ill at all.

THE parts and proportions of the Mind, their relation to, and dependency on one another, the connexion and frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper; in short, the whole Order or Symmetry of this inward Part being no less real and exact than that of the Body, yet by not being obvious to sense as that other is, it comes not into consideration. So that tho the greatest misery and ill is allow'd to be from the Mind or Temper, which it is own'd may suffer by abuse and injury, as the Body dos; yet it is not known by what means this former suffers, how it receives abuse or injury, or at what rate and in what degrees it comes to be impair'd; it is not known nor though of, what it is that should maim or offend any particu∣lar part; or how it should happen to a

Temper or Mind, that▪ being wounded or hurt in any one particular part, the whole should be the worse for it. On the contrary, we think that a man may violate his Faith, commit any wicked∣ness unfamiliar to him before, engage in any Vice or Villany by which a breach is made on good Affection, to the fur∣therance and promotion of what is con∣trariwise malignant, horrid and enor∣mous, and all this without the least prejudice to himself, or any misery fol∣lowing from the ill action merely. 'Tis thus that it is often said, such a one has done ill; but what is he the worse for it? And yet we say of any nature savage, curst, and throughly inveterate, that such a one is a plague and torment to himself. And we allow that by certain Passions, and merely by Temper alone, a man may be fully miserable, let his circumstan∣ces, as to other respects, be what they will.

NOW did it appear that this fabric of the Mind were such, that it was im∣possible to remove from thence, or out of the natural Temper, any one good or orderly Affection, or introduce any ill or disorderly one, without danger of ruin and fatal destruction, without drawing on in some degree that horrid and detestable state, and making in part

that havock and confusion, which at its height, or but in some particular occasi∣on, is observ'd and justly confess'd to be so miserable; were this made appear from the oeconomy of the Mind, or of those Passions which constitute the na∣tural Temper or Soul, it would then be confess'd, that since no ill, immoral, im∣pious, or unjust action could be com∣mitted, without a violence committed here, without either a new inroad and breach on the Temper and Passions, or a farther advancing of that execution al∣ready begun; whoever did ill, or acted in prejudice of his Virtue, Integrity, good Nature, or Worth, acted in the same manner towards himself, but with less mercy, than he who with his own hands should wound or any way destroy or ruin his own Body.

I. BUT to begin now in the first place with this proof, THAT TO HAVE THE NATURAL AFFECTI∣ONS (such as are founded in Love, Com∣placency, Goodwill, and in a sympathy with the Kind or Species) IS TO HAVE THE CHIEF ENJOYMENT OF LIFE; and THAT TO WANT THE SAME AFFECTIONS IS TO BE ON THE OTHER HAND AS MI∣SERABLE. We may consider, first,

what those are which we call Pleasures or Satisfactions, from whence Happiness is reckon'd and esteem'd. They are sa∣tisfactions or pleasures (according to the common distinction) either of the Body, or of the Mind.

THAT the pleasures of the Mind are greater than those of the Body, is allow'd by most people, and may be prov'd by this; that whensoever the Mind having a high opinion or feeling of some ex∣cellence (be it in what subject it will, either where worth or excellence is, or is not) has receiv'd the strongest im∣pression, and is wrought up to the high∣est pitch or degree of Passion towards the Subject; at such time it sets it self above all bodily pain, contemns Tor∣ture and Racks: for thus we see Indi∣ans, Barbarians, Malefactors, and the very horridst and most execrable Vil∣lains in the world, oftimes, for the sake of a particular Gang or Society, or out of some cherish'd notion or principle of Honor, of Revenge, of Gratitude, or something of that kind with which they are taken, embrace any manner of Hardship, and defy Torments and Death. Whereas on the other hand, a man be∣ing plac'd in all circumstances of outward enjoyments, surrounded with every thing that can allure or charm the Sense, and

being then actually in the very moment of such an indulgence; yet no sooner is there any thing amiss within, no sooner has he conceiv'd any internal ail or disorder, any thing inwardly vexatious or distem∣per'd, but instantly his enjoyment ceases, the pleasure of sense is at an end; and every thing that is a means of that sort becomes ineffectual, and is plainly re∣jected as uneasy, and giving distast when offer'd.

THE pleasures of the Mind being allow'd, therefore, superior to those of the Body, it follows, that whatever can create to any intelligent Being a constant flowing, a series or train of mental Enjoy∣ments, is more considerable to his Happi∣ness, than that which can create to him the same constant course or train of sensual ones of the Body.

THE mental Enjoyments in a great measure are actually the very natural Af∣fections themselves, in their immediat ope∣ration.

OR, they proceed from, and are caused by natural and good Affections.

HOW much the natural Affections themselves are really Pleasures and Enjoy∣ments, cannot but be own'd by any one who knows the condition and feeling of the Mind under a lively and forcible af∣fection of Kindness, Love, Gratitude,

Bounty, Succor, or whatever else is of a generous, sociable, or friendly kind; and who is sensible of what pleasure the Mind perceives when it is imploy'd in acts of that nature, and is touch'd and mov'd in that sort. The difference we find between a Solitude and Com∣pany; between a common Company, and the Company or merely the sight of those we love; the reference of almost all our Pleasures to Society, and the de∣pendence which they have either on So∣ciety it self immediatly, or on the ima∣gination and supposal of it, as present; all these are sufficient proofs, or rather experiences and inward convictions of the truth of this. That the Pleasures of this sort are thus forcibly felt, and are even superior to those of any bodily kind, may be known too from effects; not only from this (tho this withal may be remark'd) that the very outward fea∣tures, the marks and signs which attend this sort of Joy, are expressive of a more intense, clear, and undisturb'd Pleasure, than those which attend the satisfaction of Thirst, Hunger, Lust, and the like; but it may be known with certainty from the prevalence and ascendency of this sort of joy over any other; from the silencing and appeasing of every other motion of Pleasure where this presents

it self; and from the preference which is apparently given by every Nature al∣most, at some time or other, to this feel∣ing or affection, which has the power of drawing from every other (as in the case of love to the young, and a thou∣sand other instances) or of so engrossing the whole Temper, as to render it, in the midst of all other Pleasures, sensible in a manner only to this alone, which remains as master of, and superior to the rest. There is not any one who, by the least progress in Science or Learning, has come to know barely the principles of Mathematics, but has found that in the exercise of his Mind, or the disco∣veries he there makes, tho merely of speculative Truths, he receives a pleasure and delight superior to that of Sense. But this again, how great soever the Plea∣sure may be, must of necessity be infi∣nitly surpass'd by virtuous Motion or Exercise, where, together with the strongest delightful affection of the Soul, there is an approbation given by the Mind to what is acted in consequence of that Motion or Affection; and where there is the fairest matter of Speculati∣on, the goodliest view and contempla∣tion on Earth, which is that of a beau∣tiful, proportionable, and becoming Acti∣on, self applicable, and of which the

memory and consciousness is of any o∣ther thing the most solidly and lastingly pleasing. In the passion of Love (we mean of that sort which is between the Sexes) in which there is a mixture of the strongest sensual Affection together with natural Affection, or affection of Kindness (such as is in that case towards the object belov'd) it so far appears that the sense or feeling of the former, and the Pleasure enjoy'd in it, is outdone in this latter, that it is commonly known how that often, through that affection of Kindness, and for the sake of the Per∣son belov'd, when in any danger, or any ways expos'd, the greatest things in the world have bin done, and are so every day; the greatest Hardships sub∣mitted to, and even Death it self volun∣tarily embrac'd, without any desired or expected compensation; not here in this World surely, for Death puts an end to all; nor hardly, I suppose, hereafter, for there are few who have ever thought yet of providing a Heaven or future Re∣compence for the suffering Virtue of Lovers. But what is more yet, as to the excellence of these natural Affecti∣ons, and their agreeableness to our na∣tures; not only the natural Affections of this kind, when Joy, Sprightliness and Gaity are mixt with them, have real en∣joyment

and happiness above Sensuali∣ty, or the gratification merely of Sense; but even that natural Affection which is clouded and under the worst appearance, the very Sorrow and Grief (if one may say so) which belongs to natural Af∣fection, to a generous, humane and kind Concern; tho it may be thought con∣trary to Pleasure, is yet for contentment and satisfaction far above those other pleasures of indulg'd Sense. And where a series or continu'd succession of these Motions or Affections can be carried on, even through fears, apprehensions, a∣larms, doubts (the object Virtue being still kept in sight, and its Beauty appear∣ing still in the midst of the surrounding Calamities) there is inseparably join'd to this a contentment and satisfaction of the highest sort; insomuch that when by mere illusion, as in a Tragedy, the Passions of this mournful kind are art∣fully excited in us, we prefer the Enjoy∣ment and Pleasure to any other enter∣tainment of equal duration, and find by our selves that the moving our Passions in this sort, the engaging them in the behalf of Merit and Worth, and the exerting of that Goodness that is in us, tho there be nothing more remote from sensual or bodily Pleasure, is yet of ex∣quisit sensation, and to such as are re∣fin'd

enough to feel it, more moving, and of greater enjoyment than any thing of the other kind abstracted intirely from this. And after this manner it may ap∣pear how much the mental Enjoyments are actually the very natural Affections them∣selves.

HOW much they proceed from, and are caused by natural Affection, we have now to consider.

THAT the affection of Love, Kind∣ness, and Bounty, is it self of the high∣est degree of mental Pleasure, has bin shewn. The EFFECTS of Love or kind Affection in a way of mental Plea∣sure are, a delight in, and enjoyment of the Good of others; a receiving it, as it were, by reflection, so as to participate in the Joy, Pleasure, or Prosperity of whom we love or kindly affect; And a pleasing consciousness of love or approbation from others, or of our meriting it from o∣thers.

THERE is nothing plainer than that both these Satisfactions and De∣lights, viz. Joy in, and participation of the Good of others; and pleasing consci∣ousness or sense of merited Love from o∣thers, can possibly be nothing else but the EFFECTS of Love in us; and that they increase and decrease, as their CAUSE diminishes or grows. So that

where no Love or natural Affection is, or where it is but weak or unsound, there the consequent Pleasures cannot be at all, or at least must be but weak and un∣sound. Now the Pleasures of sharing Good with others; of receiving it in fel∣lowship and company; of gathering it from the pleased and happy States of those around us, from accounts and re∣lations of such Happinesses, Joys, De∣liverances; from the very Countenances and pleased Looks even of Creatures foreign to our Nature and Kind, whose signs of Joy and Contentment we can discern or understand; the Pleasures or Delights of this sort are so infinitly spreading and diffusive through our whole lives, that there is hardly such a thing as Pleasure or Contentment, of which this is not a part, and which, if this were taken away, would not totally sink and be corrupted, or at least lose its chiefest vigor, that which made its refinement, and without which it would be dross. And thus in the same man∣ner, as to the other Pleasure, that of Sen∣sibleness to the love of others, and consci∣ousness of merited Esteem and Love; which in as far as it is a pleasure, must be wholly the EFFECT of Love, and cannot be felt where natural Affection is not felt. How familiar and natural it is

to us, continually to be drawing some sort of satisfaction from hence! How frequent and habitual it is with us, and how great a part of our enjoyment of Life, to be in joy and delight, as either well satisfied in the consciousness of me∣rited Esteem and Kindness from others; or as flattered by the imagination of it! What Wretch is there, what open vio∣lator of the Laws of Society, destroyer or ravager so great, who has not a Com∣panion, or some particular Set, either of his own Kindred, or of such as he calls Friends, with whom he shares his Good, in whose Welfare he delights, and whose Joy he makes his Joy? Who are there amongst these that are not flattered by the kindness of some that are near them, and sensibly moved by the Af∣fection which they apprehend is bore to them, even by such as are no way capable of assisting them, or serving their Interest? It is to this that almost all their actions have reference; and without this there are few even of these ununiform and inconsistent livers, who would not find themselves in an unsupportable so∣litude and desertion, and think Life it self a torment to them. It is this that goes through our whole lives, and mixes it self even with most of our Vices. Of this, Vanity, Ambition, Luxury, have

a share, and many other disorders of our Life partake. So that were Pleasure to be computed in the way that other things commonly are, it might be said, that out of these two Branches would a∣rise more than nine tenths of all that is enjoyed in Life. Now there is not, nor can be any thing of this kind which dos not immediatly depend on the having natural and kind Affection. And as na∣tural Affection is narrow, broken, or imperfect, so must be the Content and Joy arising hence.

FOR, first, PARTIAL AFFEC∣TION, or natural Affection in part, and only to some particulars, is an in∣consistency and contradiction: And as it has no foundation or establishment in reason, so it must be easily removable and subject to alteration without reason. Now the variableness of such sort of Passion, which depends solely on capri∣ciousness and humor, and must under∣go the changeable successions of alter∣nate Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination towards the same Object, must not only in the end diminish natu∣ral Affection, and together with it the pleasures enjoyed from reflected Good, or Good of Participation, as above; but must create continual disturbance with∣in, unquietness, disgust, and give an

allay to whatsoever is actually enjoy'd in the way of natural and social Af∣fection. Whereas on the other hand INTIRE AFFECTION (which is throughout, and equal towards the So∣ciety, or Whole, wheresoever any rela∣tion lies) as it is answerable to it self, duly proportion'd, rational, and ac∣countable; so it is irrefragable, solid, and lasting. And as in the other, every deficiency elsewhere, and every exorbi∣tancy in the Affection, dos in some man∣ner resist and disturb the present and immediat feeling of social and friendly Affection; so in this, every other good Affection, and the consciousness of inte∣grity and soundness, casts a good re∣flection, and an addition of contentment on every particular Affection felt, and makes it of more inward pleasant feel∣ing in the Soul, and more satisfactory and rejoicing in the Mind. Thus he who is least selfish, and can, according as there is merit, love another with most sincerity and strongest Affection, dos not only enjoy most by division or shar∣ing of Good, and by communicating and imparting of it; but through the con∣sciousness of the Justice, Beauty and Excellence of that Love, of its propor∣tionableness to all his other Affections,

and of the sutableness of those Affec∣tions to Nature, and to the whole, he en∣joys a satisfaction vastly above what is re∣ceiv'd from that limited, entangled, and much corrupted pleasure of imperfect, partial, and unintire Affection.

AND in the last place, as PARTI∣AL AFFECTION is fitted but to a small enjoyment of those Pleasures of communicative and reflected Good above∣mention'd; so neither is it capable of extracting any thing considerable from that other principal Branch of human Happiness and Delight, The being sensi∣ble to the love and esteem of others, and the being conscious of that which merits it. For in the same manner as the Affection it self is narrowly limited, infirm and changable; so accordingly is the merit arising hence very imperfect, and of lit∣tle account. And, as the Merit is but low and inferior, whilst only towards some mean and inconsiderable part of Mankind, and not towards Society and the Whole; so, accordingly, the conse∣quent pleasure of the mind must below and defective. And as it is not possible that any who esteem not, nor love ac∣cording to Virtue, should in the num∣ber of their so beloved and esteemed Friends find either those in whom they

can so constantly and throughly rejoice, and have satisfaction in meriting from, or whose reciprocal love, esteem, or me∣rited approbation, they can equally and constantly prize and enjoy; so, they of necessity must fall short in this other part of mental Enjoyment. Nor can the Pleasures gather'd from self-flattery in that unsound esteem and love of those who are neither rightly nor constantly esteemed or loved, be any other than un∣sound, disorderly and disturbed. Where∣as on the other hand, INTIRE AF∣FECTION has all the opposit advan∣tages; it has Applause and Love from the best; and, in disinterested cases, from the very worst of men: and of this we may say, that it has a consciousness of merited love and approbation from all Society, from all intelligent Creatures, and from that which is the highest and supreme of all Intelligences. And the satisfaction which attends this Intire Af∣fection, is full and noble in proportion to its ultimate and final Object, which carries all in it self, and contains all Per∣fection, according to that sense of The∣ism above establish'd. This is the re∣sult of Virtue: and to have this IN∣TIRE AFFECTION, or INTEGRI∣TY, is to live according to Nature, and the Dictates and Rules of supreme

Wisdom; this is Morality, Justice, Pie∣ty, and natural Religion.

THUS therefore it is evident that by reason of the EFFECTS of natural Affection in reflected good from the joy and good of others, and in that of sensi∣bleness to kindness and love from others, the chiefest of mental Pleasures (which are the chiefest of all Pleasures) are de∣riv'd from, and owing to natural Af∣fection.

AND to shew by farther instance yet, how much the mental Pleasures pro∣ceed from, and are caus'd by natural Af∣fection; let any one consider, that all those Pleasures which a man can have in any other besides a merely sensual way, all those Pleasures receiv'd from Converse, Familiarity, Society, in privat Contem∣plation, Thought and Retirement, in Mirth and Entertainment, or whatso∣ever they be of that Species and Kind of mental Pleasures; they are wholly in a manner founded in the having as well dispos'd and easy Temper or Spirit, free of harshness, distast, sowerness, turbulence; and in having a Mind or Reason in good order, reconcilable to it self, such as creates it self no unpleasant views, nor is of ill re∣flection. Now such a MIND and such a TEMPER as this, which must fit and qualify for the enjoying of the Plea∣sures

mention'd, is, and must be owing to the natural and good Affections.

AS to what relates to TEMPER (which we will consider first) and how a Temper of that happy sort comes to be really owing to natural Affection; it may be consider'd thus.

THERE is no state of Health or Prosperity so great, where Inclination and Will are always answer'd, Fancy and Humor pleas'd; where there are not hourly almost some stops, impedi∣ments or crosses to the Intention, Appe∣tite or Liking; some Accidents or other from without to check the licentious course of the Desire; or something from within, from the disposition of the Bo∣dy, the Humors, or what else is com∣mon in the ordinary course of a Consti∣tution, which must occasion distast and vexation, and cause a habit of that kind, where there is nothing to oppose it, so as to stop the progress of it, and hinder its gaining upon a Temper. Now the only thing that can be oppos'd to this, is some natural and kind Affection: for if the Mind by reflection resolves to sup∣press this ill at any time when risen in the Temper, and that it thinks fit to do it in good earnest on any account, it can no otherwise effectually and really do it but by introducing into the Soul, or pas∣sionat

Part, some affection of Love, some motion of Kindness, Affectionat∣ness or Candor, to allay and convert that motion of Impatience and Discon∣tent. For, if it be not done this way, the Countenance may indeed be counter∣feited, but the Heart not chang'd: and if it be done only by the power of im∣mediat Fear or Apprehension, or by the power of any other Affection than such as is by nature opposit and contrary; the ill Passion is suspended only during the time which that fear lasts, but is not subdu'd or in the least debilitated a∣gainst the next occasion, nor hindred therefore as to its progress or gaining over the Temper. So that where an affable, benign, and kind disposition reigns not; where there is not a mild∣ness and serenity spread through the whole Temper, so as to render it of easy acceptation, and fair construction, com∣pliant, easily conceding, charitable and good; there can be but little of an easy and free Spirit long remaining, and consequently but few and slender Enjoy∣ments of a mental kind: for in a Tem∣per where the slightest thing diseases and provokes, where displeasure and of∣fence are always ready to arise, and no∣thing kind and reconciling to allay and turn those Motions; but where bitter∣ness

and choler in a manner swim at the top and over all, and where something of a froward and malignant kind is ever stirring and active; in such a Temper as this there can be but little reception for any of those mental Pleasures, which in this case can be but very rarely experi∣enc'd, must be very faint, and of small continuance.

BUT, to press this further yet: It is most certain that by what proportion the natural and good Affections are lost or want∣ing in any Creature, by that proportion the ill and unnatural ones must prevail. It is the nature of every Passion by use and ex∣ercise to grow stronger and more con∣firm'd. There are in every Life, even in the most prosperous (as has bin said already) continual sources of displea∣sure and uneasiness, either from inward bodily constitution, variety of dispositi∣on, or the unconformity of things with∣out to fancy, humor and will: and if those who are in the highest circumstan∣ces of Fortune seem to come off the easiest, it is to be consider'd that the most humor'd and indulg'd State is what receives the most disturbance from every disappointment or smallest ail. Now since besides what is of the kind of na∣tural Affection, there is nothing of any kind else which can hinder the course

and growing habit of impatience, dis∣content and vexation; much less can any thing else besides natural and kind Af∣fection, resist the more violent motions of Anger, Rage, Revengefulness; and, where provocations, offences and en∣mities arise, (as there are subjects infi∣nit) be able to correct the virulence and malignity of those Passions once kind∣led, and to expel that which is infec∣tive in them, and poisonous to the Tem∣per: so that the forward, prone and sudden passions of Resentment, Pique, Vexation and Frowardness, which are sure to be mov'd on a thousand occasi∣ons, and which arise in a manner of themselves, without any apparent sub∣ject, having no check or controul; but, being left masters and possessors of the Soul (when there is nothing there either of human or good Affection to resist or make a stand) and growing thus by use and exercise into greater strength and prevalence, they cannot but cause a settled inveteracy and rancor, and make this the ground and bottom of the whole Temper. But, of the misery of this we shall speak when we come to consider of the unnatural State. In the mean time it seems to have bin prov'd, that all those mental pleasures of Con∣verse, Mirth, Familiarity, and the rest,

depend upon a Mind and Temper pro∣perly dispos'd; and that the TEMPER which produces these is and must be ow∣ing to the natural and good Affections.

NOW as to the other part, a MIND or Reason thus dispos'd and in good order, reconcilable to it self, and of good re∣flection; and upon what account this is, and must be owing to natural Affection, we may consider it after this manner. What∣ever Creature has Intelligence and Rea∣son in the manner that we have it, and who from several degrees of reflection has risen to that Capacity which we call Sense and Understanding; such a Crea∣ture as this, in the very use of his con∣templative or reasoning Faculty, is forc'd to receive reflections back into his Mind of that which passes in it self, of the actions of his Will, and of his forego∣ing Behavior in the common course of his natural Temper towards his fellow Creatures, as well as in all occasions be∣sides. And tho we say of some giddy and heedless people, that they live with∣out reflection, it is not that they are ex∣empt from this sort of feeling, or have not this consciousness with them as o∣thers have (for their Memory is as good, and the necessary occasions are as many of remembring and calling to mind what they did or felt before) but they

are said to have no reflection, because they do not designedly, or with any ser∣vice or help to themselves in their Con∣duct, call to mind any number of cir∣cumstances to draw Inference from thence to what is present or future. Now to such a reasoning or reflecting Creature as this, who is forc'd of necessity to en∣dure the review of his own Mind and Actions, and to have representations of himself and his own Affairs constantly before him, obvious to him, and passing in his Mind; to such a Creature as this there are TWO things which must be horridly offensive and agrieving; to have the reflection in his Mind of any past Acti∣on or Behavior which he likes not should be imputed to him, which he knows odious, and feels to be of ill merit: or, to have the reflection in his Mind of any thing foolish∣ly done (either as supinely and negligent∣ly, or as rashly and extravagantly) in the prejudice of his own Interest and Good. CONSCIENCE is one or other, or both of these. For the fear of future Evils or of eternal Ill inflicted at the will of some superior and supernatural Pow∣er, is to have aw and terror of the De∣ity, but dos not imply Conscience, any more than the fear of those evils which are apprehended from Spirits, Enchant∣ments, and such like, dos imply Consci∣ence:

for to fear the Devil and to fear God would (as to Conscience) be then all one; and to fear God in any other manner than as in consequence of some justly blameable and imputable act, is to fear a devilish Nature, or Devil in the stead of God: so that Conscience may even be where sense of future divine Punishment is not. Nor dos the terror of Hell, or a thousand other terrors of the Deity imply Conscience except in this case, viz. where there is ill reflecti∣on in the Mind of what is wrong, odious, morally deform'd, and ill deserving; or of what was committed contrary to wisdom, and unaccountably: and wheresoever this is (whether join'd or not join'd with any positive fear of future divine Punish∣ment to be inflicted) there Conscience is, there Conscience accuses. And thus there is besides a religious Conscience that which we may call moral or natural Con∣science: altho that also may be call'd re∣ligious Conscience which regards the odi∣ousness of any act with respect to the all▪ seeingness of the Deity; who being so highly thought of as to all Excellence and Greatness, it cannot otherwise be, but that in the conceiv'd presence of such a Being, the shame of Villany or Vice must with great forcibleness be felt, even independently of that apprehension or

sense of any future Punishment of posi∣tive infliction.

AS for a rational Creature therefore, such as Man, who whilst he continues to be Rational and to have a Mind, must of necessity through the course of his Life be conscious of, and have before him still, the results of that Mind, the determinations and actions of his Will, and the effects of his natural Temper and Affections in his foregoing Life: if there be any action which, having pro∣ceeded hence, is odious of imputation, and of ill reflection, it must be discom∣posing and afflicting to him, as being acted against natural Conscience. There is no sensible Creature who maliciously and intentionally dos ill, who is not sen∣sible likewise that he deserves ill: and in this sense every Creature has Conscience. For, with all Mankind, and all intelli∣gent Creatures this must ever hold, that WHAT they know they deserve from every one, THAT they necessarily must fear and expect from every one: and thus suspici∣ons and ill apprehensions must grow, and terrors arise both of Men and of the Deity. But besides this, and over and above the very Return and Punishment which is fear'd, there must, in almost every rational Creature, be yet farther Conscience, from sense of deformity in

what is thus ill-deserving and unnatural, and from the consequent regret and hate∣fulness of incurring what is odious, and moves aversion. There scarcely is, or can be any Creature whom conscious∣ness of Villany as such merely dos not at all offend; nor any thing opprobrious or hainously imputable, move or affect: or if there be such a one, it follows then, that with such a Creature as this all things that are of a moral kind, or relate to either the good or ill of the Spe∣cies, must be equal and indifferent in the Affection (for if it were not so, but that any thing of that kind were odious, it must be most of all odious of imputati∣on or self▪ application.) If this be so, then neither can there be any natural Affecti∣on: if not that, then neither any plea∣sure of Society, or mental Enjoyment, as above; but instead of that, all man∣ner of horrid, unnatural and ill Affecti∣on; of the misery of which we are to speak distinctly under our last head. So that not to be sensible to the odiousness or mere deformity of Crime and Injustice (which is to have no sense of the good∣ness or illness of any act, nor any natu∣ral Affection at all) and to be so far without Conscience, is to be most of all miserable in Life: but where Conscience or sense of this sort remains, there it

follows, that whatever carriage, action or deed, is contrary to the sense of good∣ness and deservingness, and is therefore odious of imputation, unbecoming, and of ill consciousness, this must of neces∣sity, by means of Reflection, be conti∣nually grievous and offensive. A man who in the height of Anger and Fury happens to kill another, dos, as we of∣ten see, relent immediatly at the very sight of what he has done, and only by beholding the miserable state of a dying Creature, in that spectacle of Death which he himself has caus'd: for this he suffers Agony; the subject of this conti∣nually occurs to him in his mind; and of this he must have ill memory and consciousness. If on the other side, he dos not relent nor suffer any concern at all, then, either he is such a one as has no sense of Deformity, of Crime and In∣justice, no natural Affection, and con∣sequently no Happiness or Peace with∣in: or if he have sense of moral Good∣ness or Illness, but that in this or any particular, he affects THAT as noble, gallant or worthy, which is the contra∣ry; it must follow, that as there is no proportion, aptness or fitness but in Vir∣tue alone to Esteem, Approbation, or good Consciousness; he must either through the inconsistency, contradicto∣riness

and absurdity of such an unlasting and unaccountable Esteem and Approba∣tion, and through the ill influence it must have in time upon his Temper, come to lose at last even this remaining imper∣fect Conscience; or, if he still retains it in any degree, it must follow that through the same unsutableness of Ap∣probation or Esteem to any thing of a contrary nature to Virtue, there must be great confusion and disagreement in Life, and continual disturbance and dis∣satisfaction in the service of such a Prin∣ciple. For it is impossible that a Mur∣derer, or one of the Banditi, a Pirat, or any confederate Cheat or Ruffian, or in short, any one who is false to the so∣ciety of Mankind in general, and con∣tradicts natural Affection, should have any Principle that holds throughout, any fix'd Standard or Measure upon which he can regulate his Approbation or E∣steem, any Reason or Rule for his appro∣bation of any one action moral; if any thing morally good or ill, amiable or detestable has place with him: so that the more he engages in the love or admiration of any thing as morally worthy, which is morally ill and de∣testable; the more self-contradiction he must meet with, the more dissatisfacti∣on and self-disapprobation in the main,

through the perpetual variableness and instability of that Rule by which he ap∣proves and disapproves, and through the irreconcilableness of his Mind and Rea∣son to it self. And there being nothing more certain than this, that no natural Affection can be contradicted, nor no ill one advanced (as by false applause it is) with∣out a prejudice in some degree to all the other natural Affections; it must fol∣low that natural Deformity growing greater by the incouragement of unna∣tural Affection in any particular, if at the same time there remains a sense of moral Good or Ill; there must be of ne∣cessity more work created for ill Consci∣ence, more subject of ill consciousness; and the matter or ground of self-disap∣probation or self-dissatisfaction in Life, must be more increas'd, as irregular and ill Affection increases.

IN short, there is no transgression, loss or violation of natural Affection in any degree, without ill Conscience of the first sort, viz. of ill merit or ill de∣servingness, such as loses us that supreme happiness of Rest, and security of Mind in a freedom from ill Apprehensions and Suspicions; and such as must draw on, necessarily, that contrary habit of Mind which causes us to live in terrors of Mankind, and of all credited, or but

suspected superior Powers: from which fears we are by innocence and good consciousness so much deliver'd, and by that means plac'd in such security and ease. If there be no farther Conscience than this, if there be no Conscience at all from sense of deformity in moral Ill, and consequently no natural Affection; then is the Mind farthest of all from be∣ing at ease, by being (as it must neces∣sarily be, when natural Affection is lost) in the horridest state of Savageness, Im∣manity and unnatural Passion. If there be indeed farther Conscience, as from a sense of moral Deformity and Excellence, then there being certainly no durable or consistent self-approbation from any thing besides what is of Virtue; there is ground of constant self-accusation or dislike from whatsoever is contrary to, or is a defect in natural Affection: as on the other side, there is ground of thorow self-approbation, joy and contentment, wheresoever there is integrity of Life, and adherence to natural and sound Af∣fection.

THIS also is to be consider'd, that when any one by an immorality or in∣justice offends his Conscience, and goes against natural Affection, or sense of Right and Wrong; he cannot possibly see a reason in himself, why he should

not be carried further into all manner of Villany, or why he should not esteem himself as a person liable and open to all Crime and Wickedness, even that which is as yet unknown to him. And this is a reproach which a Mind must of neces∣sity make to it self upon the least of∣fence of Conscience, and where any thing is committed in contradiction to a sense of Right and Wrong, that is, of an amiableness or deformity in moral Actions.

AS for that other part of Conscience, viz. the ill remembrance or ill reflecti∣on of what is unreasonably done, and in prejudice of Interest or Happiness: This must follow still and have effect, where∣soever any action has given occasion to sense of Deformity contracted by Crime and Injustice: or where there is not the ground of any such sense; yet there must follow still an ill Conscience from sense of ill Merit with respect to Men, and to the Deity. Or tho there be a possibility (which is hard to suppose) of excluding for ever all thoughts or suspi∣cions of any superior Powers, yet it is impossible but that an almost total defect in natural Affection, which no dissimu∣lation can long conceal, must occasion a sensible loss to us in the confidence and trust of men, and consequently in In∣terest

and Happiness. And the sense of this great disadvantage is what can ne∣ver fail to occur to us, when we see (as we must be forc'd to do with envy) the better and more grateful terms of Friend∣ship, Trust, Love and Esteem, on which those who have not renounc'd their good and natural Affection, live with the rest of Mankind. Where natural Affection therefore is not; yet by Immorality, happening through want of such Affecti∣on, there must be disturbance from Con∣science of this sort, viz. from sense of what is committed unwisely, and contrary to Interest and Safety: and this too, not∣withstanding any security in which men may live against the apprehensions of a superior and animadverting Power.

FROM all this we may conclude, that a MIND and Reason, well at ease, orderly, reconcilable with it self, and of good retrospect or reflection (on which, and on a TEMPER such as we have spoken of, all those mental Pleasures be∣fore enumerated do in a great degree depend, and are founded) is owing to na∣tural and good Affection.

SO that if the chiefest Happiness be from the mental Pleasures, and from the constantest succession or series of such in Life; and that the chiefest mental Plea∣sures are such as we have treated of, and

are founded in natural Affection; it fol∣lows, that To have the natural Affections, is to have the chiefest enjoyment, possession, and happiness of Life.

NOW as to the pleasures of the Bo∣dy, and the satisfactions belonging to Sense; it is evident, that they cannot possibly have their effect, or be of any valuable or delightful enjoyment, but by the means of natural and social Af∣fection.

IF from the highest voluptuousness in eating or in drinking, the circumstances of a Table and Companions were with∣drawn; so that all possible means of en∣joying these delights in fellowship, all occasion for social feeling or Affection were deny'd; there would be hardly any Pleasure remaining that were worth acceptance, even in the opinion of the most debauch'd themselves: and if there are any of those Sensualists who can be sensual by themselves, who can be con∣tented to take these satisfactions when perfectly alone, and can indulge them∣selves in the same manner, and eat and drink with the same relish then as at ano∣ther season; there is no body who thinks the Pleasure of these persons to be very refin'd, or that they are so much as ca∣pable of enjoying it, so as to be reckon'd upon as men of Pleasure. The very

notion of a Debauch (which is a sally in∣to all that can be imagin'd of Pleasure and Voluptuousness) carries with it an apprehension of reference to Society, or to a Gang, or something of Fellowship: it may be call'd a Surfeit or Excess of eat∣ing and drinking, but hardly a Debauch of that kind, when the excess was taken separately, out of Society or reach of People: and one that uses himself in this way, is often call'd a Sot, but never a Debauchee. The Courtezans, and even the commonest of Women, who live by prostitution, know very well how necessary it is, that every one whom they entertain with their Beauty, should believe that there are satisfactions re∣ciprocal, and that Pleasures are as well given as receiv'd: and were the imagination of this to be wholly taken away, there are hardly any of the gros∣ser sort of Mankind who would not think the remaining Pleasure to be gross and sordid, and of very imperfect in∣joyment. Who is there that can well, or long enjoy any thing when alone, and abstracted perfectly even in his very Mind and Thought, from any thing of Society? Who is there that on those terms is not soon cloy'd by any sensual In∣dulgence, and that is not uneasy with his Pleasure, however exquisit it be, of Sen∣sation,

till such time as he has found a way to impart it, and make it truly plea∣sant to him, by communicating his Joy, and sharing it at least with some one single person? Let men imagin what they please; let them suppose or believe themselves ever so selfish; or desire ever so much to follow the dictates of such a Principle, and to bring Nature under restraint; Nature will break out, and in agonies, disquiets, and a distemper'd state, demonstrate evidently the ill con∣sequence of such violence, the absurdity of such a device, and the punishment which belongs to such a monstrous and horrid endeavor.

THUS, therefore, not only the plea∣sures of the Mind depend on natural Affection; but even the pleasures too of the Body do in so far depend, that where natural Affection is not, they not only lose their force, but are in a manner con∣verted into disturbance, uneasiness and disgust: so as that the matter which should feed joy, contentment and de∣light, feeds rather discontent and sower∣ness, and breeds a nauseating, weari∣som and restless disposition, by reason of the absolute incapacity in any thing sensual to please, or give any lasting or thorow contentment, where it is not mixt with any thing of affable, kind, or social Affection.

AND thus both with respect to Men∣tal enjoyment, and to the enjoyments of Sense also; TO HAVE THE NATU∣RAL AFFECTIONS, IS TO HAVE THE CHIEFEST SATISFACTION AND HAPPINESS OF LIFE.

NOW on the other side, THAT TO WANT THE SAME NATURAL AFFECTIONS IS TO BE CHIEF∣LY MISERABLE, appears first from the loss it implies both of the mental and bodily Pleasures; and also from its carrying with it the horridest of pains, those of the Mind: of which sort if (by what shall further be prov'd) those deriv'd from unnatural and horrid Af∣fections appear to be the very worst; it will follow that since (according to what has bin prov'd already) unnatural and horrid Affection is and must ever be con∣sequent to the loss of natural and good; that therefore to want natural and good Affection, is certainly to incar the greatest of Torments and Diseases.

BUT, before we conclude as to this of natural Affection, we may add some∣thing in general, of the BALANCE of the Affection (of which we gave some hint before) and by this endeavor to demonstrate how that for want of a due proportion or balance in natural Affection, a Creature is at a loss and uneasy, dis∣turb'd,

and ill affected in his other Pas∣sions.

THERE is no body who has con∣sider'd ever so little the nature of the sensible part, the Soul or Mind, but knows that in the same manner as with∣out action, motion and employment, the Body languishes and is oppress'd, its Nourishment grows the matter and food of Disease, the Spirits unconsum'd help to consume the Body, and Nature as it were preys upon it self; so also that sen∣sible and living part, the Soul or Mind, wanting its proper and natural exercise, is burden'd, and diseas'd; and its Thoughts and Passions being unnaturally witheld from their due Objects, turn against it self, and create the highest impatience. For the Mind or Soul, which more than the Body requires a∣gitation and exercise, cannot be but in a state of Feeling or Passion, of some kind, and under some certain Affection or other: if not under such Affection as may fitly employ it in proportionable and fit subject; yet however under such as will make it a burden, disease and tor∣ment to it self.

IN BRUTES, and such as have not the use of Reason or Reflection (at least not after the manner which Mankind has) it is so order'd in Nature, that be∣tween

their daily search after Food, their application and intention towards the bu∣siness of their own immediate support, or towards the affairs of their Kind, almost their whole time is taken up, and they fail not to find full imployment for their Passion, according to that degree of agitation and vigor to which they are fitted, and which their Nature re∣quires. If it happens that any one of these be taken out of a natural and la∣borious state, to be plac'd in the midst of Ease, and of a Plenty furnishing abundantly to all his Appetites and Wants; it proves, that as his Circum∣stances are luxuriant, his Temper and Passions grow so too; and that coming to have these accommodations at a cheap∣er rate, with respect to Labor and Im∣ployment, than was intended him by Nature, he is made to pay dearer for it in another sense, by losing the good dis∣position of his Temper and Passions, and the orderliness of his Kind or Species.

IT happens with Mankind, that some by necessity are ty'd to Labor, whilst others are provided for in an abundance of all things at the expence of the La∣bors of the rest. Now, if amongst those of this easy sort, there be not some∣thing of fit and proper Imployment rais'd in the room of what is wanting

by such a vacancy from common Labor and Toil; if there be not an applicati∣on to some sort of work, such as has a good and honest end in Society, as Let∣ters, Sciences, Arts, Husbandry, pub∣lic or privat Oeconomy, or the like; but that there be a settled Idleness, Supiness, and a relax'd and dissolute State; it must needs produce (as is always seen) a total disorder of the Passions, and must break out in the strangest irregularities imaginable. It is not thus with those who are taken up in honest and due Imployment, and have bin well inur'd to it, as amongst the industrious sort of common People; where it is rare to meet with any instances of those irregularities of Affection that are known in Courts and where Idleness reigns. Neither may it be improper here, to remark what many have done in advantage of Imploy∣ment and Application; that where a Person necessitated from his youth to a Life of the most laborious sort, has on a sudden chang'd his circumstances and be∣come rich, he has found in himself the uneasiness and ill operation of that Ease and Rest he so much wish'd for, and hav∣ing no other proper imployment to turn himself to, he has again betaken himself to that Life out of choice, to which before be was only driven and necessitated.

THERE is no need of going about by farther Instances, and Argument, to prove, that as motion and exercise is of absolute necessity to the good state and welfare of the BODY; so it is to that of THE MIND AND AFFECTIONATE PART.

NOW Nature having (as we see evi∣dently in Creatures) made it so great a part of the natural imployment and ex∣ercise of the Mind and Passion, to be applied and bent towards the Species: and having suted and fram'd the rest of the Passions, the whole Constitution and Oeconomy of the Creature to this; it cannot but follow of consequence, that where this social Bent and Affection is wanting, the Mind and passionat Part must suffer much by the want of it; be∣ing sure to create to themselves unusual and unnatural exercise, where they are cut off from such as is natural and good. And thus in the room of social and natu∣ral Affection, new and unnatural ones must be rais'd, and all Order and Oeco∣nomy be thus destroy'd.

IT is to have a very imperfect idea of the Order of Nature in the formati∣on and structure of Animals, to think that so great a Principle, so fundamental a Part as that of natural Affection in the Soul, should be possibly lost or im∣pair'd without mighty disorder, cala∣mity

and injury to the Creature. In the structure of the Body, where all is so aptly adjusted, there is not any of all those which are call'd the noble or principal Parts, that can be wounded or hurt without the immediat disorder and sufferance of the whole Body. Nor is this otherwise in the structure of the Passions and Affections, which are with equal art and exactness suted and fram'd to one another, to every different Crea∣ture and different Sex; since we see the Whole so nicely built, that the barely extending of one Passion but a little too far, or the continuance of it too long, is able to overturn all, and bring irreco∣verable ruin and misery, by Distraction. How is it possible, therefore, that in a System such as this, a principle of Life and Motion so great as that of natural Affection, so interwove with all the other Faculties, and suted to the other Motions within, should possibly be injur'd or lost, without the sufferance and ruin of the inward Part, and a total intanglement, torture, and perplexity of inward Dispo∣sition? We see in the example of Cas∣tration, how a small bodily alteration has an effect upon the Passions, so as to take away those Appetites and Affecti∣ons that are the proper ones of the Sex, and how great a disorder this breeds;

how Man himself no less than other creatures, is render'd by it unsound, imperfect, deform'd, and miserably dis∣posed in his Passions and Affections as well as in outward figure; how impo∣tent of mind, and how weak, untoward and wretched in his whole state. It is the same thing when without any change in the bodily Organs, and only by the force of unnatural Education, Practice, or Use, any natural Passions are remov'd which are of the Oeconomy and Order of the Creature. A man effeminatly bred and us'd, tho not an Eunuch, nor by any Metamorphosis chang'd into Woman, yet becomes a kind of Wo∣man in part, and is the same disfigur'd creature as to his Passions and inward Composure, as that other sort of mon∣ster and creature of neither Sex. Who is there that can think of any creature that becomes degenerate, and loses any principal Feeling or Passion which is of the character of his Species (as of a Lion that should lose his Courage, a Bee his Industry, a Turtle his tender, and as it were conjugal Affection) without having the idea of an untoward imperfect Be∣ing, and of a Creature that for his own sake had better not be? Can any one think either of a Male that passes into any of the Passions or Affections proper

only to the Female; or of a Female that loses the proper and peculiar softness be∣longing to the Sex, and becomes Mas∣culine, without being offended, and without judging very readily, that as there is a different order of Life, a dif∣ferent oeconomy, different capacities of Pleasure, and enjoyments of Life; so there is a different order set, and oeco∣nomy of Passions assign'd in the same manner to the one, different from the other? For, where the Faculties, the Habitudes or Affections belonging to the Male, are join'd to other Affections which are proper only to the Female; this being disagreeable, preposterous, and of disturbance to the smooth and regular course of the Passions, must be of necessity a torment and disease.

NOW if for any Animal, even of the brutish kind, to lose any one of those Affections proper to his Species and to the character of his Kind, or of his Sex only, be of so great an injury to him; what must it be for Man to lose that sense and feeling which is proper to him as a man; which is his proper Character, his Make and Genius? What must it be for Man (whose dependence on, and re∣lation to Society is yet greater than in any of those other Creatures) to lose any thing of that natural Affection by

which he is carried on to the good of his Species and Society, and of which passion he has naturally so much more than other creatures, that he, of any other, can least bear Solitude or an inter∣mission of social Enjoyment which he is still seeking after, and if long depriv'd of, is hardly able to endure his Being? Nor is any thing more apparent than that there is naturally in every one such a degree of social Affection as necessitates and drives him to seek the Familiarity and Friendship of others, amongst whom he may let loose a Passion which wants to be employ'd, and which when it is suppress'd, creates a sadness, dejection and melancholy in the Mind, as great as is on the contrary that healing and enliven∣ing Joy it brings when acting at its li∣berty and with full scope; as at that time we may see particularly when the Heart is open'd, and the secrets of the Breast unfolded to a Bosom-friend. This we see confirm'd in persons of the most elevated Stations, in Princes, Monarchs, and those who seem by their condition to be above ordinary human Com∣merce, and to affect a strangeness and distance with Mankind. For altho the wiser and better sort are perhaps out of a jealousy rejected by them, as not fitted for their intimacy or secret converse;

yet there are those substituted in the room, who tho they may have the least merit of any, and are perhaps the most vile and contemptible of men; yet serve however to that end of Friendship, and are so much the subjects of a Kindness and social Affection in these great ones, that for these we can see them often in pain and in concern; in these they easily confide; to these they can with pleasure be open, free, kind, succorable and bountiful, as rejoycing and taking de∣light in it, having no intention or aim beyond it, and their interest (in respect of Policy) often standing contrary to it. In Persons of but an ordinary good Dis∣position, no better than what is com∣mon to the generality of Mankind, it is discernable how much they are press'd with this necessity of entertaining Friend∣ship and familiar Commerce, and how much these social Affections want (if I may say so) their daily exercise and dis∣charge. How heavy dos Life grow when without it? And how plain is it, that after a long absence, and a sort of ab∣stinence in this way, after a banishment from the company of near Friends, and a disuse of Society but for a small time, the Mind is in distress, the Temper dis∣compos'd; and that no sooner is the man restor'd to the means of his former En∣joyment,

but he takes new Pleasure, re∣ceives additional Delight, and enjoys more than before the freedom, intima∣cy, and all those circumstances of friend∣ly Commerce, and of an inward Society from which he was separated?

AND thus it may appear how much natural Affection is predominant in us; how it is inwardly joined to us, and im∣planted in our Natures; how interwove with our other Passions, and how essen∣tial to the regular motion and course of all our Affections, on which our happi∣ness and self-enjoyment so immediatly depends.

THUS much as to the System and Constitution of the inward part, and as to that natural BALANCE of the Af∣fections; which may not be thought (we hope) so odd or unjustifiable a way of speaking, after what has bin said.

AS to both those Ills which follow the ill balance and defect of natural Affection, viz. the enlargement and ex∣tention of the selfish Passions; and the growth of the unnatural and horrid ones; how and in what degree these Conse∣quences are miserable, we come to speak in what follows upon each of those heads, which make the second and third part of this Examination.

AND thus it appears, that As TO HAVE THE NATURAL AND GOOD AFFECTIONS IS OF THE CHIEF∣EST ENJOYMENT OF LIFE; So TO WANT THEM IS OF THE HIGHEST DISORDER AND MI∣SERY.

II. WE are now to prove, THAT BY HAVING THE SELF-PASSIONS TOO INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREATURE IS MISERABLE.

WE have already consider'd in some measure of the Passions and Affections of this kind, as they are good and useful for the Creature, with respect to his privat Interest and self-Oeconomy. Now these, if they are moderate and in a natural degree, are no ways inconsistent with the effects or right operation of natural Affection; which will prevail still where it ought, and in every fit occasion take place of any of those other Affections whilst thus moderate, and make them to be no obstructions: For thus in a Creature who has a natural affection towards its young, the Affections towards privat good or safety, tho abiding still in the Creature, are yet no hindrance to his operation towards public Good, or good of his Kind, even where Sufferings and Violences are to be undergon, and Life

it self comes in question: And this is ac∣cording to a right Balance and Proportion. But if the Passions of this kind toward privat Good, or the Regards to privat Good are excessive and beyond a cer∣tain degree; then is this Operation hindred, and the effects of natural Af∣fection towards public Good prevented: and thus is the Balance broken, and Oeco∣nomy destroy'd. Therefore if it be sup∣pos'd conducing to the Interest of any Creature, to have these self-Passions thus violently strong, and the Balance to be after this manner; then it must be ac∣cording to his Interest resolutely to go against those natural Affections. But if (as we think it will appear) it can ne∣ver be for the interest of a Creature to have his self-Passions thus strong or vio∣lent, so as to make this ill Balance; then it must be always at his own disadvan∣tage, and not according to his interest, to go contrary to natural Affection, through that which we call self-Love.

IF there were any of these self-Pas∣sions, which for the good and happiness of the Creature might be set in opposi∣tion to natural Affection, and deserv'd a degree of strength able to over-balance it; THE DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE would be the most likely. But it may be found perhaps that there is

no Passion which (by having so much allow'd to it) is the occasion of more Disorder and Misery.

THERE is nothing more certain, or that is more universally consented to and confess'd by every one, than this; That Life may sometimes be even a mis∣fortune and misery; and that nothing can be more desirable than to lay it down and withdraw from under the heavy burden. To cause, or any way inforce the continuance of Life in Creatures re∣duc'd to a certain extremity, is esteem'd the greatest Cruelty: and even there where any religious Faith forbids, as a thing heinous and sinful, that any one should be his own reliever; still, if by any fortunat accident Death offers of it self, it is embrac'd as highly welcom, and as a Blessing. And on this account the nearest Friends and Relations often rejoice at the release of one entirely be∣lov'd. even tho he himself may have bin of so weak a mind as to have de∣clin'd Death, and endeavor'd earnestly the prolongment of his own uneligible and wretched State.

SINCE Life therefore may frequent∣ly prove a Misfortune and Misery, and that even naturally it becomes so by be∣ing only prolong'd till it reaches the infir∣mities of old Age; and since there is no∣thing

more commonly known than the instances of Life overvalu'd, where, out of an eager desire of Life, men purchase it at an overrate, and at such a cost as hardly any Life can be thought worth; it follows evidently, that that Passion or Affection of love of Life, and abhorrence or dread of Death, if it be over great and exceedingly prevalent, and over balancing in the Temper of any Creature, must be the means of carrying him directly against his own interest and good, and must make him in occasions, such as are of the last importance, to become the greatest enemy to himself that can be, and necessitate him to act as such.

BUT in the next place: tho it were always the interest and good of a Crea∣ture, by all courses and means whatso∣ever, at any price or at any rate, to pre∣serve Life; yet according to this, it is not for the interest of a Creature to have this Passion over great: for thus it will be ineffectual, and not conducing to its end. Various instances need not be given: for what is there better known, than that at all times an excessive fear betrays to danger, instead of saving from it; and that it is impossible for any one to do the least thing serviceably or well for his own preservation, or in his own defence, when strongly press'd with such

a Passion: insomuch, that on all extra∣ordinary Emergences, Courage is that which chiefly saves, whilst Cowardice robs us of the means of safety, and not only deprives us of our defensive Faculties, and hinders us from acting as we should do to that end of our defence; but even runs us into the mouth of Ruin, and makes us meet that evil which we scarce needed to have shun'd?

AND now tho in neither of these senses it could be call'd an Ill, to have the Affection of this sort thus strong and prevalent; yet the Affection it self, when in this degree predominant in any one, must be the cause of Misery, if it be mi∣sery to have a thorow Cowardice, and to feel those horrors that are proper to the character of one who lives under a con∣stant dread of Death. For, in a rational and reflecting Creature (to whom the thoughts and imagination of Death are continually in some manner or another presented) an inherent Passion of this sort must be the occasion of the greatest Agonies and Torments, such as must enter at all times into the pleasantest parts of Life, so as to corrupt and poison all Enjoyment and Consent. And thus by reason of this Passion alone, such a Life as this, if inwardly and closely view'd, would be found to be one of

the most miserable, tho attended with all other Circumstances that should in all appearance make it happy. But when we add to this the meannesses and base condescensions occasion'd by such a fear of Death, and which necessarily follow from such an eager desire of retaining Life; when we consider how we are de∣bas'd and sham'd by it, when driven to actions which we cannot view but with dislike; when the Life we thus cherish, is by this means grown to be of so un∣pleasing reflection, sulli'd, deform'd, and forc'd by degrees into still greater crook∣edness and perplexity; in this case I think there is no body ever so little ingenuous but feels that Life sits heavily upon us, and is worn uneasily: whilst all that is kind and social, the chief pleasure and good of Life, is for the sake of Life a∣bandon'd and given up, and things sub∣mitted to, for which nothing in Life be∣sides can make amends.

IN short, Is there any thing more mi∣serable than the condition of a thorow timorous Nature, where the terror of dying is always a close and pressing Pas∣sion? And what Fortune, what outward State ever so secure, can deliver from this? To what is not such a one necessita∣ted and driven, who lives under a more than ordinary fear of this sort? What

torturing and endless work is still grow∣ing upon his hands, who out of an ear∣nestness to retain Life at any rate, renders it so much the more expos'd, as he is forc'd more and more into those indirect courses upon which such a Passion runs him? On the other 〈…〉〈…〉, is there any one who will not esteem the life of a Person more easy towards this subject, to be a Life capable infinitly of greater Happiness and Enjoyment? Is not the very consciousness and feeling it self of such an Ease and Indifference as this, an infinit satisfaction in a world of occasi∣ons? And is not the effect of it an aug∣menting and heightning to our pleasures, and to the enjoyments we take in Life; as the contrary Passion is by its effect de∣structive to the pleasures of Life, and an allay and bitterness amidst all that is in∣joy'd of that sort?

AND thus therefore, upon the whole, it seems evident, That to have that Affecti∣on of DESIRE AND LOVE OF LIFE, or ABHORRENCE OF DEATH, too intense and beyond a certain degree, is a∣gainst the interest, good and safety of a Creature, and is opposit to the Happiness he injoys in Life.

IN the same manner as this passion of Fear (under a certain degree) is neces∣sary to self-preservation, and to the avoid∣ing

of what is destructive; so is there another Passion as preservative to us, and as useful to our safety, by assisting us not to fly, but to repel Injury, and re∣sist Violence when offer'd. It is by this that a Creature offering an injury, is de∣ter'd from it, as knowing by the very signs which accompany this Passion whilst it is rising and gathering strength, that the Injury will not go with impu∣nity. And it is this Passion which, when violence is actually us'd, assists us more effectually to struggle against it, and adds a force to us, both in supporting it, and in returning it on the Inflicter. For thus, as Rage and Despair increase, a Creature grows still more and more ter∣rible; and being urg'd to the greatest extremity, finds a degree of strength and boldness unknown till then, and which had not risen but through the height of Provocation. As to this Pas∣sion therefore of ANGER (for I know no other word for it) tho its immediat aim be indeed the Ill or Punishment only of another, and not the good of self; yet it is plainly one of those Passions (of which we are now discoursing) that tend to the advantage and interest of the self-System, the Animal himself: since a cer∣tain degree of that Passion (whether that degree be properly call'd Anger or no,

it matters not) is most certainly requisit in the Creature for his performance even of the better sort of moral Actions, whe∣ther tending to the good of Society, or to his own preservation and defence. For, who can resolutely enough divide from, or resist ill and detestable men; or who can fight either singly against a privat enemy, or for the public against a public one, without feeling in some measure, and being arm'd as it were with a certain degree of this Passion? But, on the other side, there is hardly any need that we should explain how mischievous and destructive Anger is, if it be what we commonly mean by that word; if it be such as denominates an angry Temper, and be either hasty, rash, and violent in the instant of provocation only; or if it be of that kind which imprints it self deeply, and for a long season, and causes Revenge, and a vindicative Bent and Resolution. What can be a sorer or deeper wound, a closer grief, or more sensible misery, than to be agitated by this fierce Passion, and carry this sting within? And what wonder is it that so much is done out of Revenge, and in the fury of Anger, when the relief and satisfaction found in that indulgence is really the asswaging of the most tortu∣rous Grief and pressing sensation of

Misery; which being remov'd, or for a while alleviated or abated, by the ac∣complishment of the Desire in the ill of another, leaves behind it (as a rack new∣ly quitted) the perception of the great∣est Comfort, and an overflowing of soft and pleasing Sensation? From hence are those untoward delights of perversness, and of an habitual froward, envenom'd and malignant Disposition acting at its liberty: for this is a perpetual asswaging of Anger perpetually kindled, and always renewing; which is the same as to be per∣petually stung, and still curing of the Sore. Thus a thorow home Revenge being rais'd once to a high pitch, rests not till it attains its end; and that attain'd, is easy and reposes: making the succeeding Ease and Relief to be by so much more enjoy'd as the preceding Anguish and incumbent Pain was of long duration, and of bitterest impatience. And certainly if amongst Lovers, and in the language of Gallantry, the success of ardent Love is call'd the asswaging of a Pain; this must be by far yet, more justly term'd so. And surely, however pleasing that other pain may be said to be, this can be no pleasing one, nor can be any other than sound and thorow wretch∣edness, a grating and disgustful feeling, without the least mixture of any thing soft or flattering.

TO speak any further of this Passion of Anger; to shew the ill effects of it as to our Selves, our Minds and Bodies, our Condition, and Circumstances of Life with those around us; or to shew on the other side, the good effects as well as happy feeling of a mild condescending Temper, easy of contentment, such as not easily takes offence, and easily for∣gives; to shew how much this is sutable to Interest, to Health and Contentment, to easy and pleasant Living; and how much the contrary is embroiling, dan∣gerous, exposing, and of perpetual dis∣turbance, inconvenience and misfortune, would be I imagin needless. What has bin said, may be enough to make this be understood, That to be subject to such af∣fection of Anger of any kind, as we have bin mentioning, is to suffer under a worse sort of Disease, and to be subject to no small Misery.

WE are now to speak concerning o∣ther self-Passions that are of the Oecono∣my of the Creature, as love or appe∣tite to Nourishment; love of, and con∣cern for those Conveniences by which we are well provided for and maintain'd; love and desire of Reputation, Authori∣ty, and Power of some kind, which ad∣vance our Welfare, good Establishment and Condition of living. Now these

affections of Desire or Appetite towards what is self-advantageous, and of self∣good, if they are moderate and in cer∣tain bounds, are such as are not blam∣able, by being any ways injurious to so∣cial Life, or a hinderance to Virtue: but being in an extreme degree, they become Luxury, Avarice, Ambition, and are known vitious and ill with respect to So∣ciety. How it is that they are ill also with respect to the privat Person, and are his loss and injury as well as the So∣ciety's, we may thus consider. As first in that of LUXURY.

WERE it true (as has bin prov'd the contrary) that the most considerable Pleasures were such as came in by the sense; and were it true also that these Pleasures of the sense lay in such certain outward things capable and sure to yield always a due and certain portion of Plea∣sure according to their degree and quali∣ty; it would then follow, that the cer∣tain way to procure Happiness would be barely to procure largely of these Sub∣jects to which Happiness and Pleasure were thus annexed; and by using or consuming the most of these, make sure of most enjoyment. But in what sense soever it be that this is call'd to live, and to live fast, as if this were to make the most of Life; it will hardly be found

that the inward Faculties (such as are the cause that any thing of pleasure is conceiv'd) are able to keep pace with these outward supplies. And if the na∣tural disposition and aptness from with∣in be not concurring, it will be in vain that these Subjects are thus heap'd on, and multiply'd with eager intention and desire. Now if those inward dispositi∣ons (such as of a Stomach towards nou∣rishment) be disorder'd, overturn'd, and ruin'd by excess, then is there no longer the same enjoyment to be receiv'd from any thing; but all is in a manner ruin'd, and the capacity of real Pleasure lost, whilst that which remains is rather a sore and a disease: as may be observ'd in those who have gain'd a constant nau∣seating, tho with a cravingness of sto∣mach; or who have contracted a conti∣nual, eager, and insatiable thirst. But how much better dos Nature, that has so well and easily provided for our Plea∣sure, dictate also and prescribe to us for the enjoyment of it? and who by quitting Nature e'er made advancement or im∣prov'd in Pleasure? Was it ever known of any one, long us'd and accustom'd to an active Life, and to Exercise beget∣ting Health, and a kindly vigorous Ap∣petite, that having then experienc'd the gratefulness of Food, even of the plain∣est

kind; it ever came into his thought, upon a following change of Life and Di∣et, to compare or bring in competition the Pleasures receiv'd from all those de∣licacies of Luxury, and of a continual solicited and forc'd Appetite, with those former remember'd satisfactions of a homely and common Diet, prepar'd by chearful and wholsom Labor, and pre∣ceded by due Abstinence, and a sutable kind and natural Appetite? On the o∣ther side, Has any thing bin more known, than the instances of People bred to a Life and Diet just the contrary, us'd ne∣ver to wait, but to prevent Appetite, and accustom'd to contend with an almost perpetual Society; who when by acci∣dent or choice they came to fall into that other more natural course of Life, or but for a while (as on a journey, or a day of hunting) came to experience once the satisfaction had from the plain∣est Food, have afterwards with freedom own'd, that it was then that they re∣ceiv'd the greatest contentment and de∣light of that sort, and such as was infi∣nitly above what arose from all those studi'd Pleasures of variety and excess? It is plain, that by pressing on and urg∣ing Nature thus, and by forcing continu∣ally the Appetite and Sense, the keeness and edg of those natural Sensations are

by degrees lost: and tho by vice and ha∣bit the same things may be sought after with equal violence as before; tho the impatience of being without them may be greater and greater; yet the joy in having them is lessen'd and brought al∣most to nothing. The accompanying Palls and Nauseautings which continu∣ally intervene, are of the worst and most hateful sensation that can be; and hard∣ly is there at last any thing tasted whol∣ly free from something of this ill relish and untoward feeling: So that instead of a constant and flowing delight to be reckon'd upon as belonging to this State; the State it self is a perpetual Sickness or Infirmity, a corruption of Pleasure, and cannot so much as admit of any thorow kind, natural, and agreeable sensation, even of the very sort of those it so ear∣nestly seeks and aspires to with such ea∣gerness.

AS to the Consequences of such a pernicious greediness, and excessive de∣sire towards Indulgence of this sort; how fatal to the Body, and to the health and vigor of the manly Frame; how ru∣inous by Diseases, such as are the most tormenting, and of the acutest pain and longest duration; all this needs scarce to be repeated: Nor how on the other side, the reverse of this, a temperate

Life, and Desires moderated, afford every thing so happily contrary, by making Life so much more lasting, vigorous, and so infinitly more delightful, and of more pleasing inward sensation and live∣ly feeling, proper always to that full healthiness of a temperate State; as a contrary Torpor and heavy wearydness is proper to a debauch'd State, and is spread still through the Senses of one used to continual excess.

AS to the Consequences with respect to the Mind, the difference here between Temperance and Intemperance; which of the two is the most thriving state for the Mind, and which injurious and de∣structive, is superfluous to mention. Nor needs it be told, that as there is a vigor and alacrity gain'd to the Mind by tem∣perance, so in the very practice of what is thus beneficial both to the Body and Mind, and advantageous so many other ways besides, there is a peculiar Joy and Satisfaction.

THE Consequences as to Interest are plain enough. The misery of such a state of impotence and unforbearance, whilst it subjects us to the lowest and meanest carriage and dependence, as well as to all profusion, to all irregulari∣ty and extravagance of Conduct; the Injuries too, which even knowingly they

do themselves, who out of an impotence of this sort, and an impossibility of re∣straint, forbear not what even they themselves declare they know to be de∣structive to them; all this, and more of this nature is obvious enough. And from less than what has bin said, it would be easy to conclude, That to have this vio∣lent love, this luxurious and high desire towards the sort of pleasure mention'd, is to be highly inconvenienc'd and preju∣dic'd as to Interest, happiness of Life, and enjoyment of real Pleasure.

NOW as to those other excesses of the self-Passions, such as mention'd, as of regard towards the outward conve∣niences of Life (which in an extreme degree is Covetousness or Avarice) and that of inclination and good liking to∣wards what is of Reputation and Au∣thority (of which the extreme is Ambi∣tion and Vanity) how far the first of these A COVETING OR AVARITIOUS TEMPER is miserable, needs not that one should go about to explain. Who is there that knows not how little a Porti∣on that is, which is agreed by all to be sufficient for a man's single use and con∣venience? And how much may even this be reduc'd still, and brought into a nar∣rower compass, if all superfluity being cut off, Temperance and a natural Life

were follow'd with near that applicati∣on and earnestness that Sumptuousness and Luxury is practis'd by some, and stu∣di'd as an Art or Science? Now where Temperance is found thus advantageous, and the Practice as well as the Conse∣quences of it so pleasing and happy, there is little need to mention any thing of the miseries attending those covetous and eager desires after things that have no bounds or rule, as being out of Nature, beyond which there can be no limits or moderation set to Desire. For where shall we once stop when we are over this, when we are no longer contain'd within the bounds of Nature? How shall we any way fix or ascertain a thing wholly unnatural and unreasonable? Or what method or regulation shall we set to Excess or exorbitant Fancy, in adding Expence to Expence, or Possession to Possession? Hence that natural restles∣ness of coveting and eager Minds, in whatever state or degree of Fortune they are plac'd; there being no thorow or real satisfaction, but a kind of natural insatiableness belonging to this condition, whence it comes that Injoyment is hin∣der'd: since it is impossible that there should be any real enjoyment but of what is in consequence of natural and just Ap∣petite. Nor do we readily call that an

Enjoyment of Wealth or of Honor, when through Covetousness or Ambition, the Desire is still forwards, and rests not as satisfi'd with its gains. But of this vice of Covetousness, and the misery of it (especially of that sort which is mere A∣varice) there is enough said in the world; and in our common way of speaking, a covetous and a miserable Temper has often but one and the same meaning.

NEITHER is there less known or said as to the ills of that other aspiring Temper, and the self-torments of a swoln PRIDE and AMBITION; which would be indeed but little felt in the World, if those Passions were as much fought against and controul'd within, as they are condemn'd abroad, and own'd by every body to be unfortunat and tor∣menting. But when one considers the ease, happiness, and the thousand ad∣vantages and securities which attend a satisfied Temper, a free and easy Spirit, such as can be accommodated on easy terms, is fitted to Society and Fellow∣ship, and can sute it self with any reaso∣nable circumstances; it will not be ne∣cessary any further to suggest the excel∣lence and good of Moderation, and the mischief and self-injury of immoderat Desires, and of a Mind that covets ea∣gerly Fame, Honor, Superiority, or Power.

THIS too is obvious in this place, that as the Desires of this kind are rais'd and become impatient, so the aversions and fears of the contrary side grow in proportion strong and violent, and the Temper more subject to apprehensions from all events, and more uncapable of bearing the least repulse or ordinary loss or disappointment. And thus all quiet, rest and security as to what is future, and all peace, contentedness and ease as to what is present, is forfeited by having Desires of this kind, and by having Ap∣petites thus swelling and immoderat.

THERE is a Temper which is oft∣times consider'd as in opposition to these eager and aspiring Aims of which we have been speaking; not that it excludes the Passions either of Covetousness or Am∣bition, but that it is the hindrance of their Effects; and that by soothing of the Mind, and softning it into an EXCES∣SIVE LOVE OF REST AND IN∣DOLENCE, it makes the attempts of those Passions to be impracticable, and renders the difficulties of their painful and laborious course towards Wealth and Honors to be insuperable. Now tho an inclination towards Ease, a love of mo∣derate repose and rest from Action, be as natural and useful to us as that inclinati∣on we have towards Sleep; and that to

want such an inclination would be in the same manner an Ill, as if we had not at proper times a strong and pressing incli∣nation to sleep; yet notwithstanding this, an excessive love of Rest, and a con∣tracted hatred and aversion towards Action or Employment, must be great∣ly injurious, and be a disease in the Mind equal to that of a Lethargy in the Body, and no less destructive of it by keeping it in a perpetual dulness and in-action, than the other, by keeping it in a perpe∣tual slumber. How much this of Acti∣on or Exercise is necessary for the Body, let it be judg'd by the difference we find in the Constitutions that are accustom'd, and those that are wholly strangers to it; and by the different Health and Com∣plexion which Labor and due Exercise create, in comparison with that habit of Body which we see consequent to an in∣dulg'd state of Indolence and Rest. It is pleasing to observe what eager and impatient appetite towards Exercise Na∣ture has given to Youth of all kinds, in that desire of Play, which is no other than the instigation or incitement of Nature to such an extraordinary motion of the Body as is at that time chiefly requisit. Afterwards, when grown up, and no longer in their Parents but their own care; when the subjects of labor increase,

and self-defence, self-maintenance, search of Food, and Venery, the consequent charge of the young, and other Affairs begin to give them Imployment in a∣bundance; then is Ease and Quiet more injoy'd, and love of Rest increas'd, as Toil and Business increase, and the vi∣gor and eagerness of Youth abates. But where through a corruption of Nature, Sloth and Laziness is ingendred: where it is contracted as a Habit that slackens and enervates the Mind, and infeebles, and as it were dissolves the Body; it is not only ruinous of the body's Health, and destructive in the end, or by its con∣sequences; but the immediate feeling of it, and the sensation it self becomes no other than a lingring, drooping Pain and hea∣vy Oppression: it being impossible this way ever to feel (as those who live naturally) either the sprightly joy of vi∣gorous and manly Exercise, or the suc∣ceding Refreshment, and the Pleasures of a natural and wholsom Rest after due Labor and Imployment. So that in the room of the Pleasures of a double kind that are thus parted with, there is no∣thing gain'd but a dull and heavy feeling more weighty and tiresom than any La∣bor whatsoever; a sort of languishing Disease prejudicial to all other enjoy∣ments of a vigorous and healthy Sense,

and injurious both to the Body and to the Mind: in which latter it is the oc∣casion of worse disturbance, and of a more immediate spreading Corruption; for however the Body may hold out, it is impossible that the Mind in which the Distemper is seated, can escape without an immediate Affliction and Disorder. The Habit begets a tediousness and anxi∣ety which infects the whole Temper, and is the occasion of converting this un∣natural Rest into an unhappy sort of activity, such as that of vexatiousness, ill humor, and a preying active Spleen. And in the same manner as in the Body, where no Labor or natural Exercise be∣ing us'd, the Spirits that want their due imployment prey upon the Body, and find work for themselves in a destructive way; so in a Mind unexercis'd, and which languishes and faints for want of due action, the Passions which should have an equal and apt Imployment, and be taken up in a settled Application to some sit work and business in Life, being thus cut off from their course of action, find work themselves, and turning in∣wards, raise disquiet in the Mind, and an eagerness and irritation in the Temper, which becomes loosen'd towards Passion, is render'd more impotent, more inca∣pable of Moderation, and like prepar'd

fuel, is made apt to take fire by the least spark. Thus therefore by reason of the injuries that this Habit brings both to the Body and to the Mind, and to the Plea∣sure and real Ease of both; it is plain, That to have this overgreat inclination to∣wards Rest, this slothful, soft or effemi∣nate Temper, averse to Labor and Imploy∣ment, is to have an unavoidable mischief and attendent plague.

AS to Interest, how far it is here con∣cern'd, how wretched that state is, which by this habit a man is placed in towards all the circumstances and affairs of Life, when at any time he is call'd to action; how subjected he must be to all incon∣veniences wanting to himself, and de∣priv'd of the assistance of others; whilst being unfit for all offices and duties of Society, he yet of any other person most needs the help of Society, as being least able to assist or support himself; all this is obvious, and need not to be explained.

THERE remains still one Passion more to speak of, which yet we can scarcely call a self-passion, since the sole end of it is the good and advantage of the Kind. But whereas all other social or natural Affections are join'd only with a mental Pleasure, and sounded in a Kind∣ness and Love only; this has more added to it, and is join'd with a pleasure of

Sense, and a necessity in some degree of indulging the Appetite which is towards it, for the ease and welfare of the Crea∣ture. And tho the necessity be not ab∣solute here, as in the cases of eating, drinking, rest and sleep; yet to abstain wholly from the use of VENERY (which is that we are speaking of) can hardly be without the sufferance of the Body in some degree: nor can the pre∣judice to the Constitution be absolutely avoided, without the assistance of Art, and a method and rule of Living, as is observable even in the Female Sex; where notwithstanding the toil and suf∣ferance of breeding and bearing the young, the natural consequences are ra∣ther worse to the Constitution from be∣ing totally witheld, and never serving to that use and design of Nature, tho through so much Labor and Fatigue. Such concern, therefore, and care has Na∣ture shewn for the support and mainte∣nance of the several Species, that by an Indigence and a kind of Necessity which we are thus cast in, it is made an imme∣diate Self-interest to us, with respect to our bodily state, to work towards the pro∣pagation of our Kind. The Passion there∣fore which carries us to this service and good to our Species, is made as it were a Self-passion, and is accompanied not on∣ly

with an affection of kindness and love towards the Female, but with a desire of self-ease, and towards what is of use to the privat animal Nature, and a sa∣tisfaction and indulgence of Sense.

NOW whether or no it be the inte∣rest and good of the Animal to have this indigence and need beyond a natural and ordinary degree, and to have this Appe∣tite towards Venery more eager, impa∣tient, and more extended than of course it usually is in Nature, where no addi∣tional incitement or provocation is used; this is what we may consider.

HAVING said already so much concerning natural and unnatural Appe∣tite above, there needs less to be said in this place. If it be allow'd that to all other Pleasures there is a measure of Ap∣petite belonging, which cannot be ex∣ceeded but with prejudice to the Crea∣ture, even in his very capacity of enjoying Pleasure: and if to have either a ravenous Appetite, such as is a Disease, and has a peculiar name; or to have that other sort of exorbitant Appetite (no less pro∣perly call'd a Disease) which we see in the Luxurious, be both of them unfor∣tunate, and of prejudice even to the ve∣ry right enjoyment of the Pleasures de∣riv'd from those Senses, it will hardly be thought that there is no limit, bound,

or certain measure of this other Appe∣tite towards Venery: as if this were in∣dependent of Nature, and might extend to Infinite, and still be the occasion of greater and greater Pleasure; which is too great an absurdity to go about to confute. There are other sorts of ar∣dent Sensations and eager Incitements of Flesh, which we accidentally sometimes experience in our selves, and which are acceptable perhaps whilst in a certain de∣gree; but which as they increase, grow intolerable. Even Laughter provok'd by Titillation, grows an excessive pain, tho it retains still in a great degree the same features of delight and pleasure. And al∣tho in the case of that particular kind of Itch which belongs to a Distemper that has its name from that effect, there are some found so sensually inclin'd, that they esteem the continual allaying of that Ardor, however eager and fierce, to be acceptable and delightful, yet it would hardly be reputed so amongst the more refin'd sort, even of those who make sensual Pleasure a study. Now if there be a certain height, a certain pitch or degree of the other Ardor, which by being further advanc'd, is so much less consistent with the pleasure of that Sen∣sation, and is rather a sort of rage and sury (like that which is rais'd by cer∣tain

poisonous Medicaments and Incen∣tives to Lust;) and since there is a ne∣cessity of stopping somewhere, and fix∣ing some Boundary, where can that pos∣sibly be done but where regard is had to Nature, beyond which there is no mea∣sure or rule of things? Now Nature may be known from that which we see of the natural state of Creatures, and of Man, when unprejudiced by unnatural provocation and youthful incitements of a vicious Education. Where it happens that we see any one bred to a natural Life, inured to honest industry and so∣briety, and unaccustom'd to any thing immoderate or intemperate; it appears al∣ways that such a one as this, when at full age, has his desires and inclinations of this sort at command, and no ways enflam'd, till by force upon himself, and by giving into debauch and excess, he strains and widens his Appetite to a new and unnatural degree. But if such ex∣cesses are never us'd, the Desires con∣tain themselves in their just limits. But when we reflect upon what is customa∣ry to almost all the Youth of human kind, especially of those who are above the laboring sort, and at what early years they are familiariz'd to the licen∣tiousness of this Passion; when we con∣sider to what Obscenities the ears of our

Youth are accustom'd; how their In∣clinations are vitiated, and every day fed; and what practices are us'd to urge and precipitate Nature; we need not find it strange that men are so corrupt∣ed, and their Appetites so exasperated and enflam'd to such a degree beyond all natural temperature. All other Crea∣tures in the world are for their orderli∣ness in this, a reproach to Man; since they, of what kind soever they are, have regular and proportion'd Appetites, and have the use of Venery according to fit and proper Seasons and Subjects; whilst Man alone knows neither season, nor bound, nor fitness of Subject, but breaks into all horridness of unnatural and mon∣strous Lusts, regarding neither Sex nor Species (tho of this latter the Instances are less common:) and all this through that inflammation of the Desire and Ap∣petite, which, being swell'd beyond a natural size, cannot be answer'd by plain and natural means. So that neither ought it to be thought strange, if what has bin said in relation to that of Meats and Drinks, be said to hold good, and be the same in this: and that altho such an abandon'd indulgence as this is sure to bring a greater indigence and need on the Body, and fix a greater lust and craving∣ness in the mind; yet this is so far from

resembling natural Appetite (which by being greater, is the occasion still of greater Pleasure) that the more these excessive Desires are thus encreas'd, and the unnatural Appetite fomented, the less is there of a real pleasant Sensati∣on, and the more mixture there is of Al∣lay. For thus, as we have shewn already, a Sensation which seems to hold all of Pleasure, often by a small and almost im∣perceptible extension runs into Pain, and grows insufferable. So nearly bordering and related are these two things, even so as to be almost confounded with one a∣nother, which yet are really so distinct, and in appearance so very contrary. But on the other side therefore, by due absti∣nence, and more moderate use, the Plea∣sure spoken of is much clearer, and more enjoy'd. So that were both these Sensa∣tions to be compar'd, that of a virtuous Course which belong'd to one who liv'd a natural and regular Life, and that of a vicious Course which belong'd to one who was relax'd and dissolute; there is no question but it would be pronounc'd in favor of the former, without regard to Consequences, and with respect only to the very pleasure of Sense perceiv'd from hence: For it would be found, that a Man thus superior to his Appetites of this kind, had yet no less a share of sa∣tisfaction

from them in that more spar∣ing use, nor less pleasurable enjoyment in the whole, than he who liv'd in a manner only in the service of these Ap∣petites, and who indulging the most that could be to this Sense, and seeking a per∣petual support in it, had nothing else to do but to force and solicit Nature to the highest degree, and struggle against a perpetual Satiety, and against the heavy and dull intervals of a surfeited Sense, and of a Mind and Body unnaturally held, and as it were benum'd, and droop∣ing in this imprisonment and restraint from other natural Action. As for the other Sex; altho there be less of this sa∣tiated feeling experienc'd perhaps in them, yet they having once abandon'd themselves, are capable of the same in∣constancy and desire of change, as being weari'd of the present. But it is enough to say of this Sex, that having once for∣saken modesty, and given scope to their Desire and Appetite, beyond a duly re∣strain'd temperat and honest way, they grow insatiable and monstrous, and fall into a state which even they themselves, till grown into it, detest and think horrid.

AS to the Consequences of this Vice with respect to the Body (the health and constitution of which is so much im∣pair'd, and so often wholly destroy'd

by it) there is no need to mention any thing.

THE Injuries it dos to the Mind, tho less notic'd, are yet in proportion much greater than those which the Body suf∣fers. The prejudice to the Parts and In∣tellect, the wretched wast of time, the effeminacy, sloth, supiness engender'd; the disorder, loosness, and impotence of a thousand Passions, through such a re∣laxation and enervating of the Mind; all these are the effects of this Vice, and are apparent when but reflected on.

NOR is it less apparent how much is suffer'd as to Interest, and to what mul∣tipli'd Inconveniences he is subject, who is under the power of such a Passion as this. What irregularity of Life, and disturbance of Affairs; what Animosi∣ty, War, and Contention must he un∣dergo, who is thus addicted, and who has this temper to such excess, as to be a Rage possessing him, and ruling his Con∣duct? What trust or dependence is there on one of such a Character and Fame? And how must such a Person stand with respect to Friends, Relations, the public and general Society of Mankind, in an ordinary way of living and conversing? On the other side; how fair and recom∣mending is the contrary character and habit of Virtue and Continence? How

advantageous to all Oeconomy, and ma∣nagement of privat and public Affairs, in all the duties and offices of Friendship, and of a civil Life? How promotive of Society, and conducing to all ease, pros∣perity, commodious and happy living?

THUS have we consider'd of those which we may call self-Passions; and what the effect is of having them beyond a mo∣derat degree; which when they once exceed, when once grown imperious and high, are the occasion that a Crea∣ture is mean and low, are the ground of that which we call selfishness, so much detested in Creatures. Tho yet it be the misfortune of some men, in their way of reasoning upon these Subjects, not to reckon upon such Selfishness as a real ill, or a misfortune, except only so far as it happens to be known and mark'd, as a just object of peoples aver∣sion, and of the contemt and hatred of mankind; not as if in it self it did im∣ply any misery or disease: whereas there can be nothing so miserable in it self, and so wretched in its Consequence, as to be thus impotent in temper, thus master'd by passion, and to serve such a slavery to things of such mean and wretched de∣pendence, and from the contemt of which the greatest satisfaction and self∣enjoyment arises, and all generosity and

magnanimity depends. It is by such a slavery as this that we lose at last all true Esteem both with our selves and others; that we lose all Character, Authority and Respect; that we disagree and are at perpetual variance with our selves as we alternatly serve and submit to these opposit Affections, so inconsistent with one another, and so utterly irreconcila∣ble: and it is by this that we lose even the faculties of our Minds, which can never be so inlarg'd, and in such a way of improvement towards Knowledg, as in conjunction with Temperance, where there is a constant attention and obedi∣ence to Reason practised and esta∣blish'd; and where, in the same manner as the Body by good use is fitted to its proper exercise, so the Mind is render'd apt and dispos'd by right Disciplin and Rule to its proper Exercises and Im∣ployment.

BUT besides what we have menti∣on'd of the privat Ill and self-Injury of every such self-Passion in particular; all these irregular and vitious Affections have this necessary effect in general, that they are ruinous also of the natural Affections, and by making them give place, by long suppressing and controling them, must at length sink and destroy them. As in∣deed who is there that knows not, and

is not ready to own, that a Creature who is in a way of growing every day more selfish, and of having those Passions still in a higher degree, is in a certain and un∣failing way of growing more and more unnatural, unkind, unaffectionate, and more out of all friendly and social Feel∣ing? Who knows not that by the in∣crease of selfishness, and of that subtilty and feignedness of carriage which it brings along with it, the candor and in∣genuity of our Natures, the ease and freedom of our Minds must be forfeit∣ed; all trust and confidence in others, familiarity, inwardness, and heartiness with others must be in a manner lost; and suspicions, jealousies, hatred and en∣mity succeed, and be in the room? Be∣sides, a Creature us'd to Reflection, who by an ill use of Reason confirms himself in selfishness, and who in a settled man∣ner is come to think it to be his good not to allay or correct, but to indulge and satisfy such Appetites as these, must by certain consequence industriously strive to silence and check his natural and good Affections, those that would carry him to the good of his Kind, and of Society, against the interest which he conceives he has elsewhere and in a contrary way. And this must work to the subversion of all good Affection in him, and to the

forming of a profligate, inhuman and savage Nature. Now if these Passions, besides what other ill they are the occa∣sion of, are withal the occasion and means of destroying and loosening the natural Affections; then, by what has bin prov'd before, they must be the cer∣tain means of losing us the chief and best enjoyment of Life, and consequently too (as has bin prov'd) of making us to in∣cur those horrid and unnatural Passions, and that savageness of Temper which makes the greatest of Miseries and the most wretched State, as we are going in this next place to make appear.

SO that we have seen thus, how that by a wrong balance in the Affecti∣ons of this sort, and BY HAVING THESE SELF-AFFECTIONS TOO INTENSE OR STRONG, A CREA∣TURE IS MISERABLE.

III. THE Passions that are now left to speak of, are those that carry nei∣ther to a public nor a privat good, and are founded neither in any advantage to the Species nor to the Self-system: for were there no such Passions as these, what then could be the meaning of THAT UNNATURAL AND BAR∣BAROUS DELIGHT IN BEHOLD∣ING TORMENTS, and in viewing those

spectacles of Horror with that satisfacti∣on and joy which is sometimes known, and which has bin the reigning Passion of many Tyrants, and barbarous Nations? To see the sufferance of an Enemy with cruel delight, may be from the height of Anger, Revenge, Fear, and other ex∣tended Self-passions: but to delight in the torture and pain of other Creatures indifferently, of Slaves, of such as are unknown; to feed upon Death and dying Agonies; this has nothing in it account∣able in the way we have bin speaking, but is wholly unnatural, as being of a kind of which not the least degree can be said to aim at, or tend to the good or interest of the particular Creature, and much less of the Species, or of Society.

THERE is another Affection near∣ly related to this, which is a gay and frolicsom Delight in what is injurious to others; a sort of WANTON MIS∣CHIEVOUSNESS and Pleasure in what is destructive; a Passion which instead of being restrain'd, is usually incourag'd in Children: so that it is no wonder if the effects of it are very unfortunatly felt in the World. For I think it will be hard for any one to give a reason why the same Temper that was wont to delight in disorder and ravage when in a Nur∣sery, should not afterwards find delight

in other disturbances and imbroils, and be the author of as much mischief in privat Families, amongst Friends, and in the Public. But of this Passion there is no foundation in Nature according to that sense above explain'd.

MALICE or ILL-WILL, such as is grounded on no self-consideration, and where there is no subject of Anger or Jealousy, nor nothing to provoke or cause such a desire of doing ill to ano∣ther; this also is of that kind of Passion.

ENVY too, when it is such as arises from the Prosperity or Happiness of ano∣ther Creature no ways interfering with ours, is also of this kind of Passion.

THERE is also amongst these, a sort of HATRED OF MANKIND AND SOCIETY; a Passion which has bin known perfectly reigning in some men, and has had a peculiar * 1.1 name given it.

WE may add likewise to the number of these, all those Passions which are rais'd from SUPERSTITION (as men∣tion'd before) and from the custom and usage of barbarous Countries; all which are too horrid and odious in themselves to need any proof of their being mise∣rable.

THERE might be other Passions nam'd, as that of BESTIALITY, and

of another sort of perversion of the ve∣nereal Appetite within our own Species; which are both of them in the same man∣ner unnatural: of the misfortune of which depravity of Appetite we need not speak, after what has bin already said on that subject.

SUCH as these are the only Passions we can strictly call unnatural, tho there are others which are indeed so much be∣yond the common bent of any Self-pas∣sion, that tho they may have their foun∣dation thence, and be deriv'd from seve∣ral of those combin'd; yet they so ex∣ceed all ordinary Appetite of that kind, and are so directly opposit to all natural Affection, that they are called and may be reckon'd unnatural and monstrous: for instance, such an ENORMOUS PRIDE or AMBITION, as that which would willingly leave nothing eminent, nothing free, nothing prosperous in the World besides; such an ANGER as would sacrifice every thing to it self; such a REVENGE as is never to be ex∣tinguish'd, nor ever satisfied but with the greatest Cruelties; such an INVE∣TERACY and RANCOR as seeks, as it were, occasion to exert it self, and lays hold of the least subject, so as often to make the weight of that malevolent Pas∣sion fall even upon those who are mere

objects of Pity and Compassion. These are in that other sense unnatural: and of these therefore we may speak in con∣junction with those others, since they are such as join with those to make up that horrid and monstrous State above describ'd.

IT may be said here, that these Pas∣sions, unnatural as they are, carry still a sort of pleasure with them; and that however barbarous a Pleasure it be, yet still it is a pleasure and satisfaction which is found in that of Pride, of Tyranny, of Revenge, of Malice, or of Cruelty exerted. Now if it be possible in na∣ture, that any one can feel a barbarous or malitious Joy of this sort but as in con∣sequence of the perfectest of Tortures (that of a rancorous and malignant Dis∣position) then may this perhaps be call'd Pleasure and Enjoyment, like those plea∣sures of the Body which depend still up∣on some preceding uneasiness. But if to love, and to be kind, to have natural Affection, Complacency, Good-will, be in its own nature Happiness; and be as it were original Joy and Delight, as de∣pending on no preceding pain or uneasi∣ness perceptible, and as operating to Plea∣sure and Joy only; and that on the o∣ther side, Hatred, Animosity and Bitter∣ness, be always original Misery and An∣guish,

always operating to Ill, and never producing any satisfaction, but as that Torture and Inflammation is as it were cool'd and respited by something that looks like success in the fulfilling of the horrid desire and monstrous Appetite at∣tending this Affection; then is the bar∣barous Delight improperly call'd Satis∣faction or Pleasure; or if it must be call'd so, it is of the same nature in the Mind, as that pleasure in the Body which (as we had occasion to say before) is owing to Racks, Wheels, and other engins of Torture, or to the acutest Diseases which admit of sudden intervals. How∣ever strong therefore these Pleasures may be said to be, they do but the more imply the misery of that State which produces them. For as the cruellest bo∣dily pains do by intervals of Asswage∣ment, produce the highest of that sort of bodily Pleasure thence rais'd; so the fiercest and most raging torments of this sort in a Mind, are those which by cer∣tain moments of Relief, afford the great∣est of those seeming mental Injoyments. If those who know but little of this un∣toward disposition, and who are most easy in their Temper, find themselves however but too sensible of what hap∣pens to them in a way of Disgrace or Injury; if even these better Tempers

are acquainted with the heavy distur∣bances which small occasions are apt to give; if they know the weighty pres∣sure of an ill Humor (tho such as comes but seldom) and the ill moments that are passed when the Temper is thus un∣quiet, fretted, or ever so little gall'd or diseas'd; if this be in reality so great a sore, and so great a part of thorow Mi∣sery; after what rate then must they be miserable who hardly know any better hours in Life, and who for the most part are agitated by a more active Spleen, a closer, bitterer Malignancy and passion of Hatred? How lively must be the sense of every thwarting and controling Accident? How great must be the shocks of Disappointment, the stings of Affront, the gripes and gnawings of a working Antipathy and strong Hatred, at either the real or fancied presence of the Objects that give offence? Nor can it therefore be wondred at, if to such Persons as these who are thus oppressed, thus agi∣tated and wrought, it seems a high and exquisit Delight to appease and allay for the while these furious and rough Motions, by an indulgence of their pas∣sion in Mischief and Revenge.

BUT now are we come to that which is easiest of proof, that which indeed scarce needs an Explanation; for who is

there but knows that to hate, to be en∣vious, to be enrag'd, to carry Bitterness and Malice, is to suffer? This it is which we properly call Displeasure; and to conceive Hatred or Displeasure, is all one as to conceive Pain, Anxiety, Mise∣ry. Whosoever has ill meaning, and an inclination or appetite to do hurt, it is through hatred thus conceiv'd, and through brooding passions of this ranco∣rous kind. Now whoever hates, who∣ever is angry, or feels rancor, is wound∣ed, distress'd, aggriev'd; this cannot be otherwise in its own nature. So that whoever has ill will, and is carried to the injury, harm or sufferance of others, suffers within himself, and carries a wound within: and where the Passions of this horrid kind are deeply infixt, there the Heart is ulcerated, the Wound kept open and not cured; and the hor∣ridest of Tortures are thus made perpe∣tual.

NOW as to one who has in this man∣ner lost all what we call Nature, and who has these horrid Affections; how such a one as this must stand towards the Society of Mankind, and how he feels himself in it, as conscious of his Affections towards others, and of what the Affections of others must be towards him, this is easily conceiv'd. What en∣joyment,

or what rest is there for him who is not conscious of the merited Af∣fection or Love of any human Soul; but on the contrary is conscious of merited Hatred, not only from every fellow-Creature, but from every thing in the universal Nature? What ground of hor∣ror and despair? what foundation of fear and continual apprehension from Man∣kind, and from superior Powers, when ever any such are credited, or but sus∣pected? How thorow and deep must that Melancholy be, where there is no∣thing softning or pleasing from the side of Friendship to allay or divert it when once risen; no flattering view or pros∣pect of that chearful and reviving sort, not so much as from the fancy or imagi∣nation of kindness or affection from any part; but where every thing around is gastly and horrid, every thing in ap∣pearance hostile, and, as it were, bent a∣gainst a privat and single being, who is divided from, and at war with the rest of Nature, in a disagreement and irre∣conciliation with every thing, and with the Order and Government of the Uni∣verse? 'Tis thus at last that a Mind be∣comes a Wilderness where all is laid waste, every thing fair and goodly re∣mov'd, and nothing extant but what is dismal and horrid. Now if any thing

that but looks like desert, or that feels like banishment or expulsion from human Commerce, be so heavy to bear; what must it be to be thus estranged from Mankind, and to be after this manner in a Desert, and in the horridest of Soli∣tudes, even when in the midst of Socie∣ty; and to live with Mankind as with a foren Species, and as with those Crea∣tures that are most remote from Man, and such as he has the most cause to fear? Were we to form a Hell in our Imaginations, we could by nothing so well represent it, as by those Terrors, Despondences, and Horrors which at∣tend this dark state of a Mind revolted from Nature, in no concord or unity with any thing, but every way despe∣rate; viewing its own deformity and disagreement; and as conscious of uni∣versal ill merit, so conscious of univer∣sally merited hatred, and punishment accordingly due, and ever to be expected from every hand.

AND thus therefore it appears that the greatest of Miseries is that State which is consequent to the loss of natu∣ral Affection; and THAT TO HAVE THOSE HORRID, MONSTROUS, AND UNNATURAL AFFECTI∣ONS, IS TO BE MISERABLE IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE.

CONCLƲSION.

THUS have we endeavour'd to prove what was propos'd in the beginning. And since in the common understood sense of Vice and Illness, no one can be vicious or ill, but either,

1. BY the deficiency or weakness of natural Affections;

2. OR by the violence of selfish ones;

3. OR by having those unnatural ones that carry to no end either in the privat or public System:

IT must follow that if each of these are pernicious and destructive to the Creature, insomuch that his completest state of Misery is made from hence; TO BE ILL OR VITIOUS, IS, AND MUST BE EVER, TO BE MISERA∣BLE AND UNHAPPY.

AND since every vitious Action must more or less in proportion help towards this Mischief and Self-ill, it must follow, THAT EVERY VITIOUS ACTI∣ON MUST BE OF SELF-ILL, AND NEVER BUT BE TO THE INJURY AND SUFFERANCE OF THE CREA∣TURE.

FOR, whatsoever is committed or done, that either goes immediatly to the

impairing of the unnatural Affections; or to the promoting of the unnatural ones; or to the widening and extending of the self-Passions, by an encouragement of those Lusts which overturn all order of Life, and are as much enemies to the ease and pleasure of the Body, as to that of the Mind; this must ever be esteemed inju∣rious, and against the greatest Interest which a Creature can possibly have. For how can there be an indulgence of those irregular Appetites, without a greater inflammation of them? And how can such an Inflammation work, but to the disorder of the Soul, and to the corrupt∣ing of sound and natural Enjoyment, even in a way of Sense, as well as to the corruption of the Affections, the dissoluti∣on of the Temper, and the distortion, rack and misery of the Mind? Which way therefore can it be said, that any one thorow self-Interest can act either viti∣ously or unsociably; since to do any thing through an imagination of self-Interest or Pleasure, that is contrary to natural or social Affection, or out of the just li∣mits of natural Appetite and self-Inclina∣tion, is and must be of self-Injury, to that degree as has bin shewn?

THUS have we computed, in the best manner we were able, the Good and Interest of Mankind, by enumerating

and casting up all those Particulars from whence, as by way of Addition or Sub∣traction, that Sum or general Account of Man's Interest or Happiness in Life, is either swell'd or diminish'd: so that the method here taken may perhaps for this reason be call'd a sort of Moral A∣rithmetic, and be said to have an evidence as great as may be found in Numbers, and equal to Mathematical Demonstration. For it seems to us, that there has not bin any degree of certainty wanting in what has bin said concerning the preferable∣ness of the mental Pleasures to sensual; and even of the sensual ones accompani'd with good Affection, and under a tem∣perate and right use, to those sensual ones that are no ways restrain'd, and are supported by nothing social or affectio∣nat. Nor is that (as we conceive) less just and real, which has bin said of the united Structure and Fabric of the Mind, and of those Passions which con∣stitute the Temper or Soul, and on which its happiness or misery so immediatly de∣pends. It has bin shewn, that in this Constitution the impairing of any one part must go to the disorder and ruin of other parts, and of the whole, through the necessary connexion and balance of the Affections; that those very Passions through which men are vitious, are of

themselves a Torment and Disease; and that whatsoever is done that is know∣ingly ill, must be of ill consciousness, and must in proportion, as the Act is ill, im∣pair and corrupt social Affection and En∣joyment, and destroy both the capacity of kind Affection, and the consciousness of meriting any such: so that neither can we in a manner participate thus in Joy or Happiness with others, or receive satisfaction from the expressed kindness and love of others; on which however the greatest of all our Pleasures are found∣ed. If this be so, and that the state which is consequent to this defection, and which immediatly succeeds to the loss or ruin of natural Affection and In∣tegrity, be a state of all others the most horrid, oppressive, and miserable; then it will appear, that to yield or consent to any thing ill or immoral, is a breach of In∣terest, and leads to the greatest Ills: And that on the other side, Every thing that is an improvement of Virtue, and that is establishing to right Affection and Integri∣ty, is an advancement of Interest, and leads to the greatest and most solid happiness and enjoyment of Life.

THUS the Wisdom of what rules, and is FIRST and CHIEF in Nature, has made it to be according to the privat Interest and Good of every Creature, to work to∣wards

the general Good; which if that Creature ceases to promote, and to be useful to, he in so far ceases to be kind and useful to himself, and is his own E∣nemy, as being no longer good to him∣self than whilst he is such as to be good also to Society, and to that whole of which he is a part. So that VIRTUE, which of all Excellences and Beauties is the chiefest and most amiable; that which is the Prop and Ornament of human Affairs, which upholds Societies, maintains Union, Friendship and Correspondence amongst men; that by which Countries, as well as privat Families, flourish and are hap∣py; and for want of which every thing comly, conspicuous, great, and worthy a∣mongst Mankind, must perish and go to ruin; that single Quality, thus glorious in its effects, and of this good to all Society, and to Mankind in general, is, after this manner, equally a Happiness and a Bles∣sing to each Creature in particular pos∣sessing it, and is that by which alone Man can be happy, and without which he can never but be miserable.

AND THUS VIRTUE IS THE GOOD, AND VICE THE ILL OF EVERY ONE.

THE END.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Misan∣thropia.