DISCOURSE II.

THe great Architect of the Universe knew in Himself, or saw clearly and distinctly in his own Divine Understanding, what he intended to make, and this to the least thing in Nature, as is granted by all who hold such a Soveraign Be∣ing: Also, there being nothing able to check or cross his omnipotent Efficiency, we cannot doubt but they flow'd from that First Source of all Es∣sence and Being without any Errour, Mistake, or (as we may say) monstrous Abortion, but perfect∣ly adjusted and proportion'd according to their se∣veral degrees of Being, to the Idea's in the Divine Understanding of their Creator. Hence each of them gain an Establishment in their Peculiar Na∣tures or the respective Portions of Being assign'd them, (or rather which they essentially are) and a kind of participated Immutability and Eternity by their Conformity, Proportion or Essential Rela∣tion to those Divine Ideas. Wherefore since all our Knowledge is either taken from the Things, or else proportion'd to them; also since there nei∣ther is nor can be any consideration in things so primary, so fundamental or immoveably grounded as is this, 'tis manifest that the First, most firm and Page  8 most deeply grounded Truth which can be con∣ceived or spoken of any thing, is, that 'tis esta∣blisht thus immutably in its proper Nature by this Soveraign Relation to what's essentially Immuta∣ble. Wherefore, if the First Principles of all, must be the most Primary, most Fundamental, and most immoveably-grounded Truths of all other, 'tis most evidently concluded that the very First Principles can be no other but those Propositions which express the establishment of Things in their very natures, or their being what they are, which can no other way be exprest but by Identical Propositions.

§. 2. Also, a Definition being granted by all the learned world a chief Instrument to Science; if any thing could maintain a competition with Identical Propositions to be •he very first Princi∣ples, certainly Definitions, of all other, seem to have the best claim. But what I contend is, that there is some consideration taken from things an∣tecedent to their Definitions, viz. their Capable∣ness or Possibility of being defin'd; Common sence teaching us that the Power to be such, natu∣rally goes before Actually being such. To declare this, I desire the nature of a Definition may be look'd into, which is to assign by way of expres∣sion the certain bounds and limits of such a Nature, that so way may be made to Science: But in case the Thing could bear two disparate Definitions, first a Contradiction would follow, for neither of these two imagin'd Definitions would be in reality any at all, since neither of them would describe the certain limits of that nature; Next if the Thing Page  9 could bear more Definitions than one, the Dis∣courser about it would be never the nearer to Sci∣ence, but in a perfect Confusion; now consider∣ing it thus, now not thus, but otherwise; so that no Discourse could proceed for want of a steady Ba∣sis to ground it, and make its several parts center in one point, or tend to one end. Wherefore the Thing must be antecedently establish'd to be in∣capable to bear more Definitions than one, else no right Definition could be made of it, nor any thing be known concerning it: Now that which establishes the Thing in an Impossibility to bear but one true Definition, is its Metaphysical Verity and Vnity, or its being what it is; which frees its nature from Chimericalness and Division in its self, whence it becomes intelligible, or capable to be known, exprest, defin'd, and discours'd of. Where∣fore the Things being what it is, is that which not onely Grounds all Definitions, but even all Possibi∣lity of defining; and this it participates (as was said) from its Essential Relation and Dependance on the Immutable Ideas or Forms in his Divine Understanding who is Unchangeable Truth it self. 'Tis concluded therefore that Identical Pro∣positions, which express a Things being what it is, are antecedent in priority of nature to Defini∣tions, and consequently the very bottom Principles of all Science. Nay Definitions themselves, which all the world admits for Principles of our Discourses about the thing defined, are in reality nothing else, setting apart the manner of expres∣sion, but Identical Propositions; for 'tis the self-same Page  10 sence to say, A Man is a Rational Creature, as to say, A Man is a Man; nor were the Definition as it should be, if it were not Identical in sence. So that, if he quarrel with First Principles for be∣ing Identical, or for having a Subject and Predicate which are of the same notion, and not for being worded alike (the reason of which shall be given anon) he must deny the use of Definitions too, and by so doing oppose all the learned men in the world.

§. 3. Thus far Metaphysicks. Let us see next what Logick says to the Point. To Conclude, is to show evidently that two notions we call the Sub∣ject and Predicate are identify'd or truly conne∣cted in that Proposition we call the Conclusion. To do this, we find a Third notion call'd a Middle Term, to be identify'd with those two in the Pre∣misses, whence we infer them to be the same with one another, and consequently assert the Truth of the Conclusion. But, how shall we know that third notion to be t•uly connected with those two others; that is, how shall we know the Major and Minor Propositions to be true? By finding (if they need proof) another Medium connected with the two Terms found in each of Them. And how far must this go on? Endlesly, or no? If endlesly, then, since every following Connexion is proved by some foregoing ones, in case we can∣not come to see some First Connexion (or First Principle) we could conclude or evidence nothing. And how must we evidence the Connexion of the Terms (or of the Subject and Predicate) in these Page  11 First Principles? By another Antecedent Conne∣xion of their Terms with a Third? No: for these are suppos'd the First Connexions: Where∣fore since they cannot be evidenc'd by any thing out of themselves, and yet must be evident, else no∣thing could be evidenc'd by them, it follows that they must be evident of themselves, or self-evident. And in what consists this self-evidence? Manifest∣ly in this, that no Middle Term can come between the notions of their Subject and Predicate; which devolves finally into this, that the Subject and Pre∣dicate are the self-same notion, or that the Propo∣sition is Identical: and this not onely materially, or found in the same Thing, for so are the Terms of every Remote Conclusion if it be True; but Formally; and this either simply in notion onely, as are the Definition and the Thing defin'd; or else most formally and in expression also, as in those I alledg'd.

§. 4. Again, we experience that the most im∣mediate notions, if they in the least differ, (such are, Proper Causes and Effects) can be connected with the Subject to which they belong in a Con∣clusion of a Syllogism, that is, they can be con∣cluded, or admit of Proof: Wherefore▪ since 'tis a contradiction to say that the Prime Verities can admit Proof, their Terms must be farthest from having any Middle Term coming between them that is imaginable, that is, must be of the self-same notion; and so they must be Identical Propositions. The former of these Discourses was put down by me (Letter of Thanks p. 10, 11, 12.) which one Page  12 would think it became a Logician to speak to. But my Adversary is of another metal, not the very same but near akin to aes sonans aut cymbalum tin∣niens: He never meddles willingly with Premisses or Proofs, but denies the Conclusion stoutly, ne∣ver acknowledging what was said in its behalf, and tinkles a little Rhetorick against it; which done, (who would think it?) immediately, as with some Charm, the Terms unconnect of themselves, and miraculously fly asunder; and though before it look'd like good honest Reason, yet by his giving it a Disguise instead of a Confute, 'tis turn'd perfect Nonsence. But to return to our Argument.

§. 5. Logick tells us moreover, that (whatever accidental considerations may enhance Opposi∣tion) 'tis agreed by all that a Contradiction is for∣mally and intrinsecally the greatest or First of Falshoods; also that a Contradiction is An affirming and denying the same of the same according to all the same respects; wherefore the very First Principles being the First of Truths, ought to be diametri∣cally opposite to Those, that is, an Affirming (or denying) the same of the same according to all the same respects, which is impossible to be exprest but by an Identical Proposition.

§. 6. Add that, since Contradiction is Faulty, and all Fault is a Privation of the opposite Good which it violates, it follows that a Contradiction were innocent did it not violate some opposite Truth: Since then the Light of Nature teaches every Reflecter that 'tis impossible to assign any Truth Opposite to a Contradiction but an Identical Page  13 Proposition, it follows that First Truths or First Principles must be Identical Propositions.

§. 7. To explain this better, we shall find by reflexion that two Contradictory Propositions are comprisable into One equivalent to both, whose Subject and Predicate contradict one another, as [Peter here and now runs, Peter here and now runs not] are necessarily equivalent to this, [What here and now runs, here and now runs not.] So likewise [Scripture's Letter is a Rule, Scripture's Letter is not a Rule] is equivalent to this [Something which is a Rule, is not a Rule] and so of the rest. By which 'tis easie to discern how clear a Truth it is, that Identical Propositions are the proper oppo∣sites to Contradictions, or the Truths they direct∣ly and immediately violate, and consequently. First Principles: Since 'tis impossible mans wit rack'd to its utmost can invent any Opposite to [What runs, runs not] but [What runs, runs] or to [What is a Rule, is not a Rule] but [What is a Rule, is a Rule.] Lastly, The nature of Contradiction in common puts a thing to be and not be at once, and consequently puts this Proposition, [What is not, is] to which the onely opposite Truth is, [What is, is] which is therefore the First Standard of all Truth, and all other First Principles, as [A Rule is a Rule, A Man a Man, &c.] are but particulars subsuming under it, and partaking in the most per∣fect manner of its clearest Light.

§. 8. Farther, 'tis observable that the more re∣mote the Terms of a Proposition are from For∣mal Identity, the less evident they are, and the Page  14 more proof they require; as also that they still grow nearer and nearer to evidence, according to the degree of their approach toward the said Iden∣tity. Wherefore, since all Approach of distant things, if pursu'd, ends in a conjoyning and cen∣tering in the same; 'tis manifest that all distance in notion amongst Terms, ends in their being the same in notion, that is, in an Identical Propo∣sition; as also that such Propositions are for the reason given the most evident that may be; and so in both regards the very First Principles.

§. 9. Farther, All Propositions which are ca∣pable of proof, or all Conclusions, must have their Terms materially Identical; that is, what corre∣sponds to both their notions must be found in the same Thing, else they could not be True, nor ca∣pable to be proved: wherefore the Terms in First Principles must be formally such, nay the most for∣mally that is possible; but nothing is or can be more formally Identical than to have the Predicate and Subject every way the same; such therefore the very First Principles ought necessarily to be.

§. 10. There is also in Logick a way of arguing by bringing one to an Absurdity or Contradiction. And this is performed two manner of ways. One, by forcing the Defendant to contradict himself; The other, by obliging him to contradict the na∣ture of the Subject in question. The former of these is available as an Argument ad hominem; but the latter attempt, if brought to effect, is a perfect Conquest: And why, but because it puts Page  15 the Defendant to violate the nature of the Thing under debate; that is, to thwart this First Princi∣ple, The same is the same with it self: for example, to make Quantity not to be Quantity, a Rule not to be a Rule, Faith not to be Faith, as shall be shewn hereafter more clearly, when we come to see the use of the First Principles in particular In∣stances.

§. 11. Moreover, if it be well examin'd, 'twill be found that all Efficiency and Passiveness, that is, all kind of Operation, is nothing but the existence of such a Nature exerting or (as it were) imprinting it self upon the Subject in which it works its Effect: For example, when a Brass Seal makes an Impression upon soft Wax, no account can be given of this Effect (abstracting from Mo∣tion which is caus'd by a Nature superiour to Bo∣dy) but onely this, that the Agent is of such a degree of Density or Hardness, as, if mov'd or apply'd to that matter, is apt to alter the figure of its parts according to its own mould; and the Pa∣tient of such a yielding nature in comparison of the other, as to receive its Impression; and yet not to that degree Rare, as to lose it again by the Action of the common Causes in Nature, till some more particular Agent comes to efface it. 'Tis manifest then, that all Causality essentially depends on, and is finally resolv'd into this Truth, that Things are such as they are, which is their being (in part) what they are. All knowledge then of Cause and Effect, and consequently all Demonstration is ultimately refunded, that is, primarily built on Page  16 those Propositions which express Things being what they are, that is, into Identical Ones.

§. 12. Lastly, He who is Essential Wisdom and Truth it self, has propos'd to us an Identical Proposition in those words [I am what I am] which is the First Increated Truth, as 'tis the first Created one, or the First Principle in discoursing about Creatures as to their Natures or Ess•nces, that Every Thing is what it is; which is therefore True because God is what He is, or because Self-existence is Self-existence, as was explicated above, §. 1. & 2. which I hope Dr. T's Goodness will so much prevail above his Ignorance as not to judge ridiculous, whatever he thinks of the first Created Truths which immediately depend on the Other.

§. 13. But why must First Principles be neces∣sarily exprest with that most perfectly-formal Identity? Or the Subject and Predicate be put in the self-same words? Is it not enough the Sence be the same, as is found in Definitions, but the Words must be the same also? Which bears a show of ridiculousness, and seems to admit of no possi∣bility of advance towards new Knowledges? Why cannot then the Definition serve to principle all our Discourses about the Thing defin'd, without recurring to such Propositions as appear little bet∣ter than fl•t and insignificant as to that pur∣pose?

I answer: The Objection, in great part, de∣mands what Use can be made of First Principles; which shall be spoken to in the next Discourse. But that Definitions are not the very Prime Ve∣rities Page  17 of all, appears evidently already; because those Propositions which express the Things Pos∣sibility to be defin'd, must necessarily antecede the Definition.

And the same will be farther clear'd by these following Considerations.

1. That Definitions are often liable to dispute, but Identical Propositions never. I have heard a certain learned and ingenuous person disallow [A Rational Creature] to be a right definition of a Man, and discourse very soberly how proud a thing Mankind was, to arrogate all the Reason to himself, whereas diverse Birds and Beasts in their several spheres have as much or more Reason than He. And yet I dare say the same Gentleman would heartily allow the Truth of this Proposi∣tion [A man is a man.] Nay, indeed all the Sce∣pticks in the world admit Identical Propositions to be True, yet the same men quarrel every Defini∣tion extant. Since then 'tis directly against the nature of the very first Principles to be dlsputable, 'tis evident that Definitions cannot be the very First Principles of all.

2. First Principles ought to be Principia Intel∣lectus and naturally ingrafted in us, that so they may oblige all under forfeiture of their nature to ac∣quiesce to their verity; whereas Definitions are not such, but acquir'd by Practical self-evidence▪ For example; by a long course of observation heedfu•ly attending to the actions of men as men, and thence (by means of some First Principle evi∣dencing so constant a hitting in so many particu∣lars Page  18 to be beyond Chance or Accident) gathering his primary and proper Operation, we come to know the Definition of Man, none of which needs to know the Truth of this nature-taught Proposition, [A Man is a Man] or [A Rational Creature is a Rational Creature.] Moreover, De∣finitions generally need some skill of Art to make them, and all Art presupposes some First Princi∣ples; whence 'tis impossible Definitions should be the First Principles of all.

3. Experience teaches us that words being lia∣ble to Equivocation, where there are fewer words there is less room for Equivocating; wherefore since First Principles ought to be the c•earest, and consequently the most unequivocal that can be imagin'd, Definitions, which explicate the notion in more words, afford more room for Equivocati∣on, and consequently are even in this regard, less fit to be First Principles.

4. Lastly, Logical tricks of nicely distinguish∣ing, sometimes elude the Truth of a Proposition, at least darken it; from which Inconveniences First Principles ought to be the most Free that may be: Now Definitions yielding more room for Equivoca•ness, do by consequence give more occa∣sion of distinguishing: whereas Identical Proposi∣tions afford not the least: For example, this Pro∣position, [A Man is a Rational Creature] bears this distinction, A man is rational in some things, as in discoursing those notions that concern Quan∣tity, but not in others, e. g. those which concern Being; or, Rational, that is capable to discourse Page  19 right the nature of some Bodies, but not of Spirits: Is it not evident hence that this Definition of Man, is by this means render'd in show ambiguous? And I wish there were not too many in the world who out of their ignorance of the true Method to Sci∣ence, think this distinction both well-grounded and very pertinent. Now this being so, who sees not that the true limits of the definition of Man, become doubtful by such kind of distinctions, and consequently the sence of the Definition it self unknown; whereas nothing of this can possibly happen in that Identical Proposition [A Man is a Man] since whatever distinction affects the Predi∣cate must also affect the Subject, and so the Propo∣sition remains still intirely Identical, and perfectly true, and not in part onely, as it happens in the other.

'Tis concluded then from all imaginable consi∣derations that can belong to this peculiar matter, that the very First Principles neither are nor can be any thing else but Identical Propositions.

§ 14. As for their seeming ridiculous to some persons, the reason is, because those men of mirth being led much by Fancy, and inur'd all their lives to pretty plausibilities, and seldom or never reflect∣ing on or discoursing orderly from such Grounds, are hence apt to imagine that First Principles a•e Certain great Rarities or Productions of some ex∣traordinary height of Wit; when therefore they come to hear Identical Propositions alledged for First Principles, seeing their high expectations so strangely disappointed, they hereupon grow Page  20 pleasant at the defeat of their Fancy; never con∣sidering that, because First Principles ground all possible discourse of what nature soever, and there∣fore are common to all Mankind, even the rudest in the world, and inbred in them, they must there∣fore be the farthest from being the effect of Wit, and the most plain down right sayings that can be conceiv'd: Whence they are better learn'd from the Vulgar, than they are from great Scholars; and therefore the most learned men that are, if they would go to work solidly, ought, in such things as are the Results of pure Natural Know∣ledge, attend to such as speak meer nature, rather than to those who mingle and perhaps corrupt it with airy speculations which have not that firm Ba∣sis to ground their Discourses. Now 'tis obvious to observe that the nature-instructed Vulgar are apt to deliver themselves in such kind of plain Speeches, in due occasions, and make use of them as Truths which fix their Judgments in an Unal∣terableness. For example, if a man would force one of them to forgo what's very evident, he will stick firmly to the point, and tell you soberly, that Truth is Truth, or that he's sure a Spade is a Spade, or that he knows what he knows; or, if it be in a point belonging to Justice, that, Right is Right; and brings in these as Evidences from which he can never be driven: which signifies that such Truths as these are the Principles which naturally determin and fix him in an immovable adherence to the Point, as the ultimate resort and reason of his persuasion; that is, they are to him First Princi∣ples. Page  21 'Tis observable also that they are never more serious than when they are put to express themselves in this positive kind of blunt manner; nor would any By-stander (perhaps not Dr. T. himself, though he be the merriest man living when any talk is of Principles and Demonstrati∣ons) fall a laughing at them as ridiculous for their adhering finally to Identical Propositions: Which evidences that he has a conceit that First Principles are some fine elaborate Inventions of Wit, and that they are to tell a man something he knew not before; whereas they are such Truths as no man can possibly be ignorant of; as appears in those in Euclid, and other such-like, which seem at first blush full as ridiculous as those he so laughs at.

Lastly, 'Tis observable that those witty half-Speculaters who scorn to follow Nature in their Grounds, when they come to lay any themselves, propose meer Whimsies for First Principles; of which Dr. T. is a pleasant Instance, as shall be seen hereafter.