The method to science by J.S.

APPENDIX.

THE Grand Controversy Concerning Formal Mutation Decided In favour of the Peripatetick School.

* 1.11. THE main Hinge on which the greatest Contests between the Peripateticks and Anti-Peripateticks turn, is, Whether or no there be that Composition and Division in Natural Bodies, call'd Formal; and, consequently, FORMAL MUTATION. The Corpuscu∣larian Philosophers and Atomists deny there is any Mutation in the Thing it self, either in the Whole or any Part of it; and they affirm that

there is only an Extrinsecal Application of Par∣ticles Figur'd, Mov'd and Plac'd in various man∣ners; and, consequently, that the whole Con∣texture of Natural Bodies is a meer Mechanism. On the contrary, the Peripateticks (by which word I do not mean the Common School-men, but those who take pains to understand Aristo∣tle, either by his own Books, or by his First Inter∣preters) do grant some kind of Particles and Minima Naturalia; that is, some Least Size of Bodies, which are (generally) no farther Di∣visible because there want Natural Causes little enough to pass between their parts and divide them; but they say, moreover, that there is not only Local or Situal (which are Extrinsecal) but also Intrinsecal or Formal Composition and Division, and, consequently Formal Mutation in them, either in Whole or in Part; that is, a Change in them according to the Form, and not according to the Matter or Subject; and they deny that any Solid Discourse or Explica∣tion either of Nature or Transnaturals (which we call Metaphysicks) can possibly be made, unless this be admitted.

2. The Parts of which they affirm all the Essences or Natures,* 1.2 of all those Entities we converse with, are Compounded, they call Act and Power, or Form and Matter; whe∣ther those be Essential or Accidental. And, they put the Matter and Essential Form to be necessarily found in every Body, and in each of the most minute and insensible A∣tomes and Particles that can be imagin'd.

The reason they give for this Assertion is, be∣cause each of them is a Distinct Ens from the Others, in regard it can subsist alone, and so, is Capable of a Distinct Being: whence they con∣ceive there must be Somewhat in every Body and every Atome, by which it is Distinguisht from all Others, and somewhat in which it Agrees with them. That which Distinguishes them they call the Form, and that in which they Agree, the Matter. And they think that, how∣ever their Adversaries may quarrel the Words, yet they must allow the Sense: Nature and daily Experience teaching us that One Thing is made of Another; which cannot be, unless Somewhat of it remains, and Somewhat be lost. For, other∣wise, one Thing could not truly be said to be made of another; but the Former Ens, of which Nothing remains, would be Annihilated; and the Ens or Body, newly produced, would be made of Nothing; that is, Created.

* 1.33. Now, when the Peripateticks speak of Matter and Form, and that each thing is Compounded of these; and consequently, that there is some kind of Divisibility or Diffe∣rence between them; the Corpuscularians, who fancy nothing but Particles commo∣diously laid together, are presently apt to con∣ceit that those Parts (as it were) that Com∣pound a Body, are meant to be two certain kinds of Things joyn'd together into One; and, if this be deny'd, they are ready to conclude, that they are either two Nothings, or at least that they leave us in the dark, and at a loss

how to distinguish Things from Nothings: and thence object that this doctrin of Matter and Form cannot explicate any thing, or make a man one Jot the wiser. And, indeed, in case the Asserters of them did stay in these Common Expressions, and not draw many Clear Conse∣quences from them, giving a farther account of them, the bare Saying there are such Part•• so named, would be as Insignificant as to talk of Occult Qualities.

4. To rectify this Misconceit of theirs,* 1.4 sprung from a just Prejudice against meer School-terms, the Aristotelians defend themselves, by decla∣ring their Meaning to be that One and the same Thing does ground those diverse Notion•• of it self in us. That the Faecundity (as it were) of the Thing, not being Comprehensible at one view by our short Sighted Understanding, which knows nothing here but by Impressions on our Senses, which are Distinct and of many sorts, forces us to frame Inadequate or Partial Con∣ceptions of it. And, because we cannot Speak of a thing otherwise than as we Conceive it, hence we can truly say, One of those Notions or Conceptions of the Thing is not the other; which yet means no more, but that that Thing as thus Conceiv'd, is not the same Thing as otherwise Conceiv'd; or that the Thing, as working by my Sense upon my Understanding thus, is not the Thing as working by the same or another Sense upon my Understanding otherwise. Whence, because what corresponds to both these Concep∣tions or Notions is found in the same Thing, hence they affirm that there is a certain kind

of Composition of them both, in the Thing it self; which is no more, in reality, but that there is found in that Thing what corresponds to, and grounds, both these Conceptions.

* 1.55. Farther, they declare, that, since Nature shows us that the Thing may be Changed accor∣ding to somewhat in it that answers to One of these Conceptions, Notions, or Natures, and not Chang'd according to what answers to the Other; hence, we must be forced to grant that there is a kind of Divisibility between them in the Thing, answering to the foresaid Composi∣tion; and consequently, a Capacity of Formal Mutation, by which the Thing may be Chang'd accord••ng to one of them, viz. the Form, and not Chang'd according to the Matter. Whe∣ther that Form remains or no after such a Change is Another Point, and Extrinsical to our present business.

6. For Instance; We experience that that Thing we call (Wood) is Chang'd into Another Thing call'd (Fire;* 1.6) and, therefore, unless we will say that Wood is Annihilated and Fire Crea∣ted in its room (which we are forbid to do by the very Notion of its being Chang'd into ano∣ther) there must have been Somewhat in Wood by which it was Actually Such a Thing before the Change was made, and which is Lost by its being Chang'd into Fire; and also Somewhat in it which remains in the Fire into which 'tis Chang'd. The Former they call the Form, the Later the Matter; and thence conclude there must have been a Composition of Matter and Form in the Wood. And, since all Mankind a∣grees

that Wood is One Thing and Fire Another Thing; hence, (Essence being the Form that constitutes an Ens, or makes it Formally a Thing) they do farther affirm, that that which was in Fire, and made us denominate it such a Thing or Ens, is an Essential Form. And, because the Matter of the Wood had, (or rather was) a Power to have such a Form as made it now to be Wood, (and also a Power to be afterwards Fire) hence they say that that Thing, Ens or Sub∣stance we call'd Wood, did consist of Matter and Form, or was Compounded of them; that is, Wood had truly in it what corresponded to both these Natures or Notions. Lastly, be∣cause Wood was Chang'd according to One of them only, viz. the Form, hence they conclude there was Formal Mutation made in the Wood; which, therefore, was a Change according to somewhat that was most Intrinsecal to it; be∣cause it chang'd it's Essence by making it become Another Thing; and, consequently, that Change was an Essential one. Thus much of the Do∣ctrin of the Peripateticks concerning Formal Composition and Mutation which is Essential.* 1.7

7. But, besides this Formal Composition, and the Divisibility of that Essential part call'd the Form from the Matter, which we have now spoken of, there is moreover, (say the Peripa∣teticks) another sort of Formal Composition and Mutation, which is Accidental. For even the Intire Thing, consisting of Matt••r and the Essen∣tial Form, has many Ac••idental Forms or Mo∣difications in it, which are also truly Intrinsecal to the Thing, tho' not Essential to it. Which

Forms are Compounded with the Intire Thing as with the Matter or Subject of them. For example; We say a piece of Wood is Round, Hard, Long, Green, and such like; and, there∣fore, since Wood has in it, besides it's Essential Form, these Accidental Forms of Hardness, Length, &c. there is therefore a Real Compo∣sition of Wood (which is a Complete Ens, and their Subject) with these supervening Forms; be∣cause the Thing has really in it what grounds and answers to all these several Conceptions. Farther (say they) there is, consequently, a Real Divisibility between the Wood and these Additional Forms; in regard the Causes in Na∣ture can work upon and Change the Wood accor∣ding to it's Length, Roundness, Hardness, &c. and yet not change the Nature or Essence of Wood. Therefore (say the Peripateticks) the Wood, which is the Subject, can be Chang'd according to these Accidental Forms; that is, there may be Formal Mutation in it according to those Accidental Notions or Natures, tho' it remains Substantially and Essentially the same. And, since the Form, of what nature soever it be,* 1.8 is conceiv'd to be in the Subject, hence (say they) both these sorts of Formal Mutation are also Intrinsecal; or a Change of the Thing according to somewhat that is truly conceiv'd to be in it.

8. I expect that all this Discourse will look like Gibberish to the Corpuscularians, whose thoughts beat upon nothing but upon Particles thus Figur'd, Moved and Situated; and all the while they read this, they will be conceiting

how dextrously all this may be explicated to be perform'd by their Hypothesis; and therefore how needless it is to have recourse to such ab∣struse Speculations as are those about Matter and Essential Forms that are Intrinsecal; and, especially, to such unintelligible points as For∣mal Composition and Mutation. But I must beg their Patience to suspend their thoughts till we come to the Proof of Formal Mutation, which we are not yet got to. What we are now about, is barely to declare and lay open the Scheme of the Aristotelian Doctrin; resting confident that in the sequel of this Discourse, the main point we have undertaken will be for∣ced upon them with such Evidence, that it will be unavoidably necessary to admit it. In the mean time the Aristotelians, with so less Assurance than they use Confidence, do peremptorily chal∣lenge their thoughts, and bring them as Wit∣nesses against themselves, if ever they reflected on the Common Rudiments of True Logick, and they set upon them thus.

9. It must be granted that we cannot have Science of any thing but by means of Discourse;* 1.9 That the most Exact, and most Evident Dis∣courses are those we call Syllogisms: That Syl∣logisms are resolved into Propositions; and Pro∣positions into Two Terms, and a Copula that connects them: That all that we can say of those Parts of a Proposition is, that they are Notions, or Meanings of the Words that express them: That, therefore, all Discourse is built on the right putting together of these Notions, and can be built on nothing else, nor made on any

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other fashion: That no Discourse can be Solid but what is grounded on the Natures of the Things themselves: without which they must necessarily be Aiery and Chimerical, and im∣possible to beget Knowledge: That, for this reason, our Notions, which ground all our Dis∣course and Knowledge, are the very Natures of the Things without us, existing Spiritually in our Understanding; That our Operations of Appre∣hending, Iudging, and Discoursing of the Natures of Things being Immanent, or Perform'd and Perfected within us, the Objects of those Opera∣tions, or the very Natures of the Things, must be likewise within us: That 'tis Evident by Expe∣rience that we do make Diverse Conceptions or Notions of the same Thing; that is, all the Ope∣rations of our Mind are built on those Partial and Inadequate Notions of the Thing about which we are to Discourse: That we can frame a great Num∣ber of these Abstracted or Partial Notions of the same Thing, and many of them Intrinsecal ones: That, therefore, that Thing must have in it what corresponds to all those several Notions; which we call Formal Composition: That, hence, there is a Divisibility in the Thing as grounding one of those Notions from the same thing as grounding Another of them, by reason that Natural Causes are apt to work upon the Thing according to that in it (or that part of it, as it were) which is thus conceiv'd, and yet not work upon it accor∣ding to what in it is otherwise conceiv'd, or, to what grounds a different Notion. Whence they make account is inferr••d this Grand Conclusion, that therefore There is FORMAL MUTATION,

in regard it can be wrought upon according to that in it which corresponds to the Notion of FORM, and not to that in it which answers to the Notion of Matter: Whence follows unavoida∣bly that there is Formal Composition, Divisibility and Mutation in it, as is above explained. Which Conclusion must necessarily follow, if they allow (as they must) this Method of Discoursing; each part of which has been made good in the fore∣going Treatise. And the Aristotelians presume it is altogether Impossible for them to assign any other that can bear the least show of Sense or Co∣herence.

9. The Peripatetick School has yet another great Exception against the Corpuscularians;* 1.10 which is, that, because their Schemes do not take their rise from our solid Natural Notions, made by Impressions of the Things upon our Senses, and thence convey'd to the Mind; they come by this means to have little regard to the Nature of the Things, or to their Metaphysical Ve∣rity, the only Firm and Deep-laid Ground of all Knowledge. Through which neglect having ren∣der'd themselves Incapable of laying any First on Self-evident Principles, (taken from our most Firm and most Radical Conceptions of the Thing, and Predicated of it accordingly) to which they may finally reduce their Discou••ses; hence, they are forced to coin to themselves Princi∣ples from their own Wit and Fancy: Out of which they contrive certain Hypotheses; which granted, they hope they can make some con∣gruous Explication of Nature. By which man∣ner of proceeding, their Systems of Natural

Philosophy, being Grounded on such Supposed Principles, is meerly Conditional or Hypothetical. Whence, they not only disable themselves from Concluding any thing, or Advancing Science; but, instead of doing this, which is the Duty of a Philosopher, they breed an utter Despair of it, and introduce meer Scepticism. To pursue the Truth of which is not our Task at present, nor sutes it with our intended Brevity.

* 1.1110. Yet to show the Justice of this Objection, it may suffice to remark at present, that nei∣ther does Epicurus regard the Intrinsecal Nature of his Plenum or Atomes, or go about to show why they must be so Infractil, nor in what their more than Adamantin Hardness consists; nor how the Potential parts of these Atomes do come to have such an insuperably-Firm Coherence. Nor yet does Cartesius explicate to us of what Na∣ture his First Mass of Matter is; what Degree of Consistency or Density it has; and, if any (as it must have some or o••her) why it was to be of that Density, or in what that Density consists. Which shows that neither of them regarded or minded the Intrinsecal Nature of their First Mat∣ter; tho' this must needs have had great Influ∣ence on the Oeconomy of the World, and have afforded us much Light to know the Constitu∣tion and Temper of Natural Bodies, and con∣sequently of their Proper Causes and Effects; as also of many Intrinsecal Modifications of them, highly conducing to give account of, and expli∣cate the Operations of Natural Agents. The only thing they seem to have regarded was the Extension of their First Matter, and the Motion,

Figure and Situation of it's parts; which are Extrinsical or Common Considerations; but to give any account of what Intrinsecal or Essential Nature that Matter was, they are perfectly silent. They suppose it to be, but they do not so much as Suppose it to be of such or such an Intrinsical Nature; which yet they must be bound to do, since all Extrinsical respects came by Motion, which was not yet begun. Or, if Epicurus does, by making his Atomes Infractil, 'tis both said gra∣tis; and, besides, he gives us no Account in what that Quality of Indissoluble Hardness con∣sists, or how it is to be Explicated.

11. Hence the Peripateticks alledge that, however the Authors of those Sects are men of Great Wits and strong Brains, (for 'tis not a Task for Ordinary Capacities to undertake a Design that fathoms and comprehends all Nature) yet they can never begin with Evi∣dent Categorical Propositions and First Princi∣ples, or carry on their Discourses so as to bear the Test of True Logick; but, either their Principles must be far from Self-evident, and must need Proof, which is against the nature of First Principles; or else their Consequences must be Loose and Slack. And the only way to re∣fute this Objection is, for some of their School to put it to the Trial by laying their Princi∣ples, and, proceeding forwards, to draw all along Evident Conclusions without interming∣ling their own Suppositions. But the Peripa∣teticks are very Confident they neither can do this, nor will ever Attempt it. I mean so as to carry it along with Connexion and Evi∣dence; in which Spinoza, tho' perhaps the best

Writer of the Cartesian School falls, very short, and pieces out his Discourse with many un∣prov'd Suppositions; as is hinted above in my Preface.

12. And hence it is that the Corpuscularians, being forced by their Cause to decline such a severe Method,* 1.12 strive to avail themselves and uphold their Cause by Witty Discourses, Smooth Language, Clear Expressions, Apt Similitudes, Ingenious Experiments that bear a Semblance of Agreeing with their Doctrin, and such like Stratagems, to make a Plausible Show of Science. But their Chief Reliance is on the Facil and Familiar Appearances to Fancy; with which they court that Delusive and ea∣sily Deluded Faculty: And, to this end, they gratifie it with such Proposals as are apt to sink into it most pleasingly; such as are Par∣ticles of Matter, whose Variety of Imagina∣ry Figures, and the Diverse Positions of them, they, without Study, quickly apprehend. And conceiting that all is done when they have thus Fancy'd or Apprehended them, they argue thus; If these Pores and Parts will do the business, what need is there of those Abstruse and Me∣taphysical Speculations of Formal Composition and Mutation, and those many Intrinsical Chan∣ges, of which Fancy, can frame no Idea's or Shapes. And, indeed, such high Points seem to that Superficial Faculty Mysterious Whim∣sies; they disgust it with the Laboriousness of comprehending them; and persuade men of Fancy 'tis Impossible to explicate Nature by such Principles, because they are rais'd beyond it's

reach. And, indeed, if Nature could be solidly explicated by a kind of Contessellation of Par∣ticles, Fancy would have (as it never has) Some Reason: But, if, upon Examination, we come to find that such Schemes go no dee∣per than the Surface of the Essences of Things, that they can never reach to the Bottom-Prin∣ciples of Nature, nor give Solid Satisfaction of the true Intrinsical Natures of any thing, to the Judgment attending to Maxims of Evi∣dent Reason, and to true Logick; then we must be forc'd to follow the Aristotelian Doctrin, and have Recourse to Intrinsical and Formal Muta∣tion; especially, if the Necessi••y of Allowing it shall happen to be Demonstated.

13. To do which being our present Work, we will begin with Epicurus,* 1.13 a Scholar of the First Class in the School of Democritus. This Philosopher (if we may call him so) puts In∣numerable Atomes, or rather (contrary to a Clear Demonstration) an Actually Infinit Num∣ber of them, and of an Infinit Number of Fi∣gures, descending in an Infinit Imaginary Space or Vacuity; some of them downwards, some of them overthwart (according as his Hypothe∣sis had occasion) that so they might overtake their fellow-Atomes. With which, clinging to∣gether by virtue of their meer Figures, they compound several Worlds, and every particular Body in each of those Worlds. That Natural Bo∣dies become Rare or Dense, according as they have in them more or fewer of those Atomes, or (as they call it) Plenum, in proportion to the Vacuum. Thus much in common of his Hy∣pothesis;

which, were the circumstance proper, it were easie to show, (besides it being Vn∣prov'd) be a Hotch-potch of the most Refined Nonsense, in every particular Sentence, and almost in every word; notwithstanding the Explications and Patronage which Gassendus, Lucretius, and our Dr. Charleton have lent him. While I am speaking of his Tenet, I note here by the way, that by the Indivisibility of his Atomes, he means Insuperable Hardness or Ab∣solute Infractilness; and not that they consist in a Point, or want Extension; as he is under∣stood by Mr. Le Grand in his Entire Body of Phy∣losophy, Part 4. c. 4. §. 6. For, to think that, since he makes them of several Figures, there should want room or space to admit Division, could not be meant by such men as Epicurus or Gassendus. But, to return to our business, what concerns us at present is this, that let him contrive his Scheme as he pleases (for, in such Fantastick Philosophy, all is as pleases Fan∣cy, the Painter) yet he must be forced to grant Intrinsecal and FORMAL MUTATION, even while he most industriously strives to avoid it. At least, tho', perhaps, his Followers will not own the Conclusion, yet they must allow the Grounds of it, or the Principles that ought to inferr it.

14. To show which we ask, Are all his Atomes of the same Matter?* 1.14 He must grant it; for he allows no difference between them, but that of Figure. Again, each of those Atomes must be granted to be an Ens or Thing, because it can and does Exist alone; and, to be a Distinct Ens from all the Other Atomes; for, otherwise, all

his several Atomes might be but One Ens or One Atome; which is both a flat Contradiction, and, besides, quite destroys his own Hypothesis. Where∣fore, each Atome must have something in it, that makes it a Distinct Ens, or distinguishes it from all the rest; which cannot be the Matter of the Atome; for That is Common to them All; and what is Common to all, cannot distinguish One from Another. And, if there be Somewhat in each Atome that makes it a Distinct Ens, then (Essence being that which formally constitutes an Ens,) it gives it a Distinct Essence, or di∣stinguishes it Essentially; which is what the Ari∣stotelians mean by an Essential Form. So that they are at unawares, in despite of their own Do∣ctrine, become (thus far) Aristotelians.

15. To proceed; Therefore it is not Impossible but each Atome may be Chang'd according to the Form, and not according to the Matter; that is, each Atome is Capable of Formal Mutation. Which I thus demonstrate,

• Whatever does not imply a Contradiction is not Impossible; but
• The putting each Atome to be Chang'd another to the Form, and not ac∣cording to the Matter, does not im∣ply a Contradiction; therefore
• The putting each Atome to be thus Chang'd is not Impossible.

The Minor, only which can need Proof, is thus Evidenc'd. For, since a Contradiction is no where but in our Vnderstanding, there can

be no Contradiction unless the Same be Af∣firm'd and Deny'd Secundum Idem, or accor∣ding to the same Notion or Respect, in our Understanding. But, this cannot be in our case: For the Notions of the Matter and Form of each Atome (as has been in the last §. Metaphysically demonstrated from the natures of Idem and Diversum) are Di∣stinct Notions that is, Distinct Considera∣tions, Regards or Respects of the same Thing; and therefore, to Affirm that the Atome is Chang'd according to One of those Different Regards or Notions, viz. the Form, and Not-chang'd according to the Other, viz. the Mat∣ter, has not the least show of Affirming and Denying secundum idem; nor, consequently, the least show of a Contradiction. Wherefore it is evidently Demonstrable from plain Logick, acknowledg'd by all Mankind, that it is Possi∣ble each Atom should be Chang'd according to the Form or Formally Chang'd; whence, if there be Causes in Nature sufficient to change it, it will be Actually Chang'd or Broken; that is, it will undergo such a Mutation as is not only Formal, but Essential; because the former Ens is no more when Two Entities are made of it. It remains then only to examin whether there be sufficient Causes in Nature to work this Change, supposing each Atom of it's own Nature Changeable, as has been demonstra∣ted.* 1.15

16. In order to which we are to reflect that Epicurus puts those Atomes of his to be of

all imaginable Figures: Wherefore, there must be some of them like Needles, ending in the smallest Point that can be conceiv'd. Others full of Pores or very small holes, into which some of these sharpest Points will light; and the more bulky part of the Atome not being a∣ble to enter it, that Point will remain Wedg'd in that Pore or Cavity. Now this Point of the Atome may be so almost infinitely Slender, that the least Impulse of other Atomes, crouding and pressing upon it, may be able to break it; much more, when it happens (as it needs must) that the vast weight of Mountains or a great Part of the Body of the Earth do press with a Transverse or Side-motion upon that Atome. In which case, it will be impossible to conceive how that smallest Point, perhaps a million of times less than a Hair can be able to resist such a stupen∣dious Pressure. The same may be said of those Atomes made like our Hooks, clasping with another Hooked one, when a very strong Divul∣sive force, able to rend Rocks asunder, tears the Compound several ways; as when Mines of Gun-powder blow up Castles or Mountains. Wherefore, since (as has been shown) the A∣tome is Capable of being Broken, that is, Capa∣ble to be Intrinsecally or Formally Chang'd, and there are Causes sufficient to break it; it follows that (whatever Epicurus does extravagantly, and against the Sense of Mankind, suppose) his Atomes would be de facto Broken; that is Two Entities would be made anew, and the Vnity (that is the Entity) of the Former Ens or Atome would be destroy'd; and, consequently, there

must be not only Intrinsecal, but Essential, that is, the Greatest of Formal Mutations, made in his Atomes.

17. The same is Demonstrated from the No∣tion of Mutation it self,* 1.16 and the Effects it cau∣ses in our Understanding. I discourse thus, Our Words express our Notions, and our Notions (unless they be Fictitious) are taken from the Thing. Wherefore, unless there be some Change or other in the Thing, our Notions, and, con∣sequently, our Expressions and Denominations, must still be the same. But, when Local Mo∣tion of the Atom is made in the Vacuum, we must be forced to speak of it or Denominate it diversly, and to say it is now Here, now There, or in another place than it was before; for, otherwise, it could not be said truly to be mov'd Locally if it did not change Place. There must then be some Novelty or some Change in some Thing or other to ground this New Notion, which causes this New Denomination. Themselves will not say 'tis in the Vacuum; and, should they say so, it would be perfect Non∣sense; for the Vacuum, being nothing, cannot be Capable of Change; Therefore this Novelty or Change must be in the Atome. Otherwise, did all the Causes whatever remain the Same, the same Effect, viz. the same Notion and the same Denomination, and not a Different one, must ensue; or else there would be an Effect (viz. this New Notion and Denomination) without any Cause, which is Impossible. Wherefore 'tis Lo∣gically Demonstrated that there must be Formal Mutation made in the Atome.

17. Perhaps they will say (for such Discour∣sers think they have given a sufficient Answer if they can but give us a New Word) there is on∣ly an Extrinsical Change made by the Applica∣tion of the parts in the Atom to Different parts of the Vacuum.* 1.17 But first a Vacuum can have no parts, much less any Difference of Parts. Next, an Extrinsical Change is a most Improper Expression, and signifies a Thing may be Chang'd, and yet no Change in it. But, suppose we should admit those Words, yet themselves must say an Extrinsical Change means or implies a Change in some Extrinsical Thing which is rea∣ly and Intrinsically Changed: and which, by being thus Changed, give an Extrinsical Deno∣mination to Another Thing; which is all they can mean by these words [Extrinsical Change] As when the Wall is Extrinsically denominated [Seen] from the Act of my Seeing Power, my Eye is Intrinsically Chang'd by having that Act, and thence gives that Extrinsical Denomination to the Wall: And if the words [Extrinsically Chang'd] have not this meaning, they can have no Sense, but are altogether Inexplicable. To be Cloath'd, is an Extrinsical Denomination to the man on whom Cloaths are put: But then the Cloaths suffer an Intrinsical Change of their Figure, and perhaps their Quantity, by being fitted and acomodated to the Body of that man, and the Air suffers the same while the Action or Motion of Cloathing is perform'd. To be Mov'd Locally is an Extrinsical Denomination to the Body that is Moved: but then, Local Motion being a Division of the Medium through which that

Motion is made, there is an Intrinsical Change in the Medium Divided, and a New Continuity of the parts of the thing Moved, to New parts of the Medium, is acquir'd; which is a Quanti∣tative, and therefore an Intrinsical Mutation; whence the Extrinsical Denomination of [Moved] accrues to the Moved Body. Besides, it is scarce possible in Nature, where there can be no Action without some Degree of Reaction, but the Body it self that is Moved must undergo some small Change. But now, in the Scheme of Epicurus his Philosophy, all things are quite otherwise; since neither the Vacuum, nor the Atoms (and he puts nothing else) even according to his own Doctrin, are in the least degree Ca∣pable of Change: Wherefore he is convinced to Deny this Self-evident Maxim [Idem, manens idem, semper facit idem,] while he must affirm that there can be a New Effect, (viz. that New Notion and Denomination) without any Novelty or Change in the Cause, or the Thing; that is, he must put a New Effect without any New Cause; or (which is the same) an Effect without a Cause.

* 1.1818. But, leaving him, and turning our Dis∣course to our Modern Corpuscularians, the Car∣tesians: These Philosophers tell us the Particles of their Ma••ter are Crumbled or Shattered by Rubbing against one another. Wherefore their Matter, and each Part of it was One Thing be∣fore it was Moved, and now is by Motion be∣come Many Things. Nor can it be deny'd, but that All of them were Entities before their Mo∣tion; since both that Whole Mass of Matter,

and each of the first Divided Parts, were (ante∣cedently to the Division) Capable of Existing a∣part, and pre-suppos'd to the Division as the Subject of it. Wherefore, both that Whole Bulk of Matter, and each of those Parts, by losing their Vnity did eo ipso lose their Entity too; and, consequently, the respective Forms that consti∣tuted them such Entities; which is the Greatest Formal and Intrinsical Mutation that can be; and far Greater, even by their own Doctrin, than could be made afterwards, according to any Accident or Modification of those foresaid Entities.

19. Again, since Motion cannot be made in an Instant, that Mass of Matter must be gran∣ted to have been Created, that is, to have had Being, antecedently, in Priority of Nature, to Motion. Wherefore, it had in that Instant some kind of Intrinsecal Nature; and somewhat in it which made it to be of that Nature: Hence I argue thus; that Nature and the Form that con∣stituted it, is either Lost when it came to be Divided, and then it was Intrinsecally and For∣mally Chang'd: Or else it retain'd that Nature after it was Divided; and then 'tis Manifest that that Mass was Diminisht, that is Chang'd accor∣ding to its Extension (in regard the Greater Ex∣tension of that Original Mass was now made Less) and yet was Vnchang'd according to its Nature. Let them take which of these they please, they must unavoidably yield there was Formal Mutation; in the former case, of its Es∣sence; in the Later of its Extension; and a Formal Divisibil••ty in it, either of its Form from

its Matter; or of its Extension from its Nature or Essence; in regard it was by Motion, Chang'd according to the One, and not according to the Other. But, now, in case they make (as they do) Extension to be the Essential Form of that Matter, Formal Mutation is made more Una∣voidable, and must be granted even by them∣selves.

* 1.1920. To understand the force of this Demon∣stration more Clearly, it is to be noted that the Cartesians do not make their First Mat∣ter to be only an Abstracted Conception of an Ens or Body, as it has in it a Power to have a Form and so to be a Thing, as the Aristotelians do; for which reason they rightly, and acute∣ly Define, or rather Describe it, as thus Abstracted by our consideration, to be Ne{que} Quid, ne{que} Quantum, ne{que} Quale, ne{que} aliquod aliud eorum quibus Ens determinatur; in regard that, as thus consider'd, 'tis a meer Power to be any of them, or all of them, that is, none of them Actually. But they put their first Matter to be Inform'd; otherwise they could not put it to have Extension in it, which must necessarily be gran∣ted to be a Form either Essentially Constituting it, or some Accident or Modification of some Thing that has a Substantial Form. Whence, they must hold that their First Matter is an Ens or Compleat Thing, that is, Compleatly Capable of Existing; which appears farther by its Terminating the Action of Creation; the pecu∣liar Effect of which is to give Actual Being; which concludes it to have been Compleat un∣der the Notion of Ens; since it is Self-evident

that that cannot Actually be, which is not Capa∣ble to be; that is, which is not an Ens. This Note reflected on, it is manifest it must have a Nature of its own, and Somewhat in it to constitute that Nature, or some Essential Form; and so is Formally Mutable (whether Extension be that Form or no) as is deduced by our Argument. §. 19.

21. To come up closer to them, and enforce the Evidence of our Argument to a Nonplu∣sage of their Cause, we ask▪ Of what kind of Consistency was that Original Matter, into which GOD (according to them) did infuse the first Motion, and so Divided it. The very Terms tells us that it must have been of it's own Na∣ture either Easie or Hard to be Divided, nor do we ask the precise Degree; Let them say 'tis either One or the Other, or a Middle De∣gree between both, we are so reasonable it shall serve the turn. It being then indifferent to our Question, in this perfect silence of theirs we will g••ess as well as we can at what they should say as most congruous to their Doctrin; and so we will suppose it to be Dense. We enquire next in what consists this Modification or Affection of it call'd Density? or how they will explicate it? Motion had not yet begun in that Instant in which it first was, by the Means of which they put all Qualities (and this amongst the rest) to be Produced. If they should say) which yet I do not read they do, nor so much as speak of it as 'tis found in their First Matter) that it consists in the Rest of it's Parts. 'Tis reply'd first that that Matter has

as yet no Parts, for these are made by Motion, which was not in that Instant begun. Or, if they mean only it's Potential parts, or (which is the same) that One Actual Whole; not to pose them by what virtue those Potential parts do formally cohere, which without making Di∣visibility (which is Quantitative Vnity or Con∣tinuity) the Essence of Quantity is impossible to explicate; the Question returns and we de∣mand how Firmly those parts do cling together; that is, how Dense that Whole was, and in what it's Density consisted! which we affirm must have been either in it's Intrinsical Nature or such a degree of Consistency (which is in it's be∣ing to such a degree more or less Divisible by Natural Causes) or in Nothing. Again, if Den∣sity consisted in the Rest of it's Parts, and there was most perfect Rest before there was any Mo∣tion, then the Density of it must have surpas∣sed all Degrees; and, therefore it must have been of the Nature of Epicurus his Atomes; that is, Insuperably and Essentially Incapable of being Divided; which they must not say who make their Elements made by the Rubbing of some parts of the Matter against the others. Be∣sides, in tha•• supposition GOD, as the Author of Nature, had offer'd Violence to his own Creation, by Dividing it immediately at first. Lastly, that Matter was of it's own nature Indifferent to be Mov'd or not-Mov'd, that is, Indifferent to Rest or Motion; for Being and Extension abstract from both; whereas in our case, Density (and the same may be said had it been Rare) being Natural to it, and not Ad∣ventitious

or Accidental by the Operation of External Causes; it could not have been In∣different to it; since every thing necessarily Re∣quires what is Natural to it self. Nor is a Thing, meerly by it's being in Rest, of another Nature. To understand this more clearly, let us consi∣der this Proposition [That Thing call'd the First Matter is in Rest] 'tis about the Essence or Nature or Intrinsecal Quality of the Subject of this Proposition we are Enquiring; to which supervenes that Accidental Predicate of being in Rest. Wherefore, to be in Rest does not alter the Intrinsecals of their First Matter, but presup∣poses them; and, therefore, all it's Intrinsecals must have belong'd to it of it's own nature, whether it had happen'd to be in Rest, or in Motion.

22. Density then in their First Matter can∣not be explicated by Rest, nor, consequently,* 1.20 Ra∣rity by Motion. Let us search then farther in what we can conceive it to consist, or how it may be Explicated. Now, we are to note, that all Particular Natures or Notions, are to be Explicated by more Common and General ones, if we go to work like Philosophers; for all Grounds and Principles are made up of such Notions as are Common or Vniversal ones; and, to Explicate Particulars by other Particu∣lars, is the way of Proceeding by Similitudes; which may serve sometimes to Elucidate, but never to Prove or to Resolve any thing or No∣tion into its Formal Cause, which belongs pro∣perly to Philosophers. We find then, abstra∣cting f••om Rest and Motion, which are Acci∣dental

to that Matter, no Notion or Nature in it that can be Superiour to Density and Ra∣rity, but the Essence of it, that is, that Thing it Self call'd the First Matter, and its Quantity: And Quantity may be consider'd two ways; Either as affecting the Body meerly in order to its Self; or else in order to the Causes that may work upon it; The Former we call Extension, the latter, Divisibility (physically consider'd.) Now, Density cannot any way be Explicated by Extension as that in which it consists, as is most Evident; in regard a Body may be Equal∣ly Extended, whether it be Rare or Dense; nor is any thing therefore Rarer or Denser because it is Longer or Shorter. Let us apply then our Consideration to Divisibility, taken in the sense spoken off lately, viz. as making its Subject apt to be wrought upon or Divided by Natu∣ral Causes; and the Proper and Intrinsecal Differences of every Common Notion being More and Less, and it being also Evident from the very Notions, and from the Consent of Mankind, that we call those Bodies [Dense] which are Less Easy to be Divided, or Less D••visible; and those [Rare] which are more Di∣visible or more Easy to be Divided, we are in a fair way to find out clearly what Rarity and Density do consist in; viz. Rarity in an Excess or greater Proportion of Quantity (thus con∣sider'd) to the Matter or Subject of it; and Density in a Lesser Proportion of the same Quan∣tity to the Matter; that is, to the Subject of it according to the Notion of it as Matter. Nor, does this more strain our Rea∣son

to conceive this various participation of the same Accident [Quantity] than it does to conceive a Thing to partake the Quality of Whiteness Vnequally, and be More or Less White. For that Maxim of [Quantitas non suscipit ma∣gis & minus] is meant Evidently of Extension; in regard that the least imaginable Extension being Added or Abstracted from the former, must necessarily vary the Species.

23. That we may bear up more directly to our main Thesis: Since Rarity,* 1.21 or else Den∣sity must necessarily be in their First Matter, (for it is impossible to conceive it to be at all Divisible by Natural Causes but it must be ei∣ther Easily or Hardly Divisible by them) if we joyn to this that Contraria (according to the Maxim) sunt circa idem subjectum, it will and must follow that the same Matter (whether theirs or ours) that had a Power in it to be Less Divisible or Dense, had also a Power in it to be More Divisible or Rare; and this not on∣ly in the First Matter it self, but also in every particular Body in Nature made of it, and which has the nature of that Matter in it: whence re∣sults this Conclusion, that Rare Bodies are Trans∣mutable into Dense, and Dense into Rare; and that, therefore, there is Formal Mutation in Bodies according to these two Primary Quali∣ties; and, consequently, according to all Se∣condary Qualities too; which (as will be demon∣strated in Physicks) are made up of those Pri∣mary ones. So that most of the Effects in Na∣ture are carry'd on by Formal Mutation; nor consequently, can Nature be ever rightly Ex∣plicated

by the Deniers of such a Formal Change.

24. Let it be well noted that I speak not in this last Discourse of Contradictories, which have no Middle between them, and therefore cannot have the same Matter or Subject, or make it Changeable from one to the other; as, because Body is Divisible, it does not follow that the same Subject can be Chang'd to Indi∣visible. What I discourse of, and from whence, in part, I drew my Argument was, from the nature of Contraries, which are two Extremes under the same kind of Quality, and therefore have Middling Qualities between both; by pas∣sing through which, as by Degrees or Steps, the Body is Transmutable from one of them into the other. And the reason is, because nei∣ther Extreme is Infinitely such, and therefore has necessarily some Mixture of the Opposit Quality an•• is (as it were) Allay'd by it; so that it comes to be Finite under that No∣tion. Whence the Subject which has one of those Extreme Qualities, becomes a Capacity of Admitting the other Extreme. And there∣fore Epicurus seems to go to work more like a Philosopher, in this point, than the Cartesians, by supposing his Atoms Essentially that is Infi∣nitely Dense or Incapable to be Broken or Di∣vided; tho' in most other things he falls very much short of Cartesius his Clear Wit, by his building in a manner wholly on Suppositions;* 1.22 and, those too, the most Extravagant ones an ill-grounded Judgment could stumble into.

25. They will ask how or by what means

can a Dense body be chang'd into a Rare one, or a Rare into a Dense; or, what Causes do we find in Nature Proper to produce such an Effect? And, it must be confest the Question is very Pertinent. For to put the Operations of Rarefaction and Condensation without any Proper Agents to cause those Operations, is a thing unbecoming a Philosopher. We answer then, that all Compressive and Divulsive Agents, which we experience are Frequent and almost continually working in Nature, are as Proper to work upon Quantity as such, and to make the Subject of it Rarer or Denser, as Dealba∣tion is to work upon a Subject as 'tis Colou∣rable, or Combustion upon a thing as 'tis Com∣bustible, or any other Action to produce or in∣ferr it's Proper Effects, or, to cause the Pas∣sions that correspond to it. Nor can there be any Notion or Consideration found in a Body on which those two Actions of Compression and Divulsion, can be conceiv'd to work pro∣perly and precisely but on it's Quantity or Di∣visibility, in order to make the same Matter have more or less Quantity in it; or to make a Body that is Compressed or Drawn several wayes to be Formally Chang'd in those re∣spects. So that we must either say that those two Common Words, importing Natural A∣ctions, and us'd by all Mankind, to have no sense in them, or they must allow them their Proper Effects, which are to Shrink or Dilate the Quantity of the thing, which is to make it Rarer or Denser. Granting them that some∣times and even very often those Effects are

perform'd by the Intromission and Extrusion of subtil particles of other Bodies, (which as the very Terms show, are improperly call'd Ra∣refaction and Condensation;) whenever any Natural Body is Prest or Stretched on all sides by other Bodies closely besieging it, if Quan∣tity be capable of those Effects as is demon∣strated above §. 15. it is, the Proper Effects of such kinds of Operations must ensue, and the Body enclos'd, will be to some degree Condens'd or Rarefy'd.

26. Now, had Cartesius put these two First Qualities in the Matter Created by God in the Beginning,* 1.23 so that some parts of it had been Created Dense, some Rare, Nature had been furnisht with Immediate Causes to made Di∣vision or Motion connaturally, (supposing them set on work, or mov'd first by some Superiour Agent) in regard Dense Bodies are naturally apt to Divide Rare ones, and Rare ones natu∣rally apt to be Divided by those which are Dense. Nor had he then needed to assign to Essential Being whose Nature is Unchangeable, and in which there is no Transmutatio aut Vi∣cissitudinis obumbratio,* 1.24 that is, neither Change nor Shadow of Change, a Drudgery so Mis-be∣coming his Essence, as to be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change. Hence I argue: Since neither to be Easily nor Hardly Divisible, is the Essence of that First Matter, in regard it was Compleat in the line of Ens, and ter∣minated the Action of Creation, and so could have subsisted whether it had been Rare or Dense, or, tho' it had not been Divided at all,

there is manifestly a Divisibility between the Essence of that Matter and its Rarity or Den∣sity; and therefore, by the same argument we brought formerly against Epicurus, that Matter might have been Chang'd according to either of those Qualities, and not according to its Essence, and yet no Contradiction ensue; which demonstrates it to be Possible. Again, that Matter being Indifferent to either Rarity or Density, had GOD Created some part of it Rare, some Dense, the course of Nature (as was lately shown) had gone on more con∣naturally: Wherefore, since GOD, as the Au∣thor of Nature, and abstracting from Miracle, does always act most connaturally or agreea∣bly to the Nature of Things; it follows that he did actually order that some parts of the First Matter, of which the World was to be Form'd, should be Rarer, and some Denser than Others, and not of an Uniform or homogeneous Nature. And, accordingly, we are taught by Holy Writt, that in the Beginning there was Earth, Water, and Air. And, if the Cartesians will needs make their First Matter Uniform, and that GOD must move it immediately, 'tis justly Requir'd of them to show this Tenet of theirs, most Agreeable to the Natures of the Things: I mean to the nature of GOD whom they put to be the Immediate Cause of the First Moti∣tion; and to the Nature of Matter, the Pati∣ent; and not overleap and slide over the Proof of both these main Points and suppose them; and this, not because they can even pretend that those suppositions do suit best with the Natures of

the Things themselves; but, meerly, because it best serves to introduce and carry on the Scheme of Doctrin they had resolv'd on.

27. From Essential Mutation of Things in Nature, or their losing their Substantial Form, we come now to demonstrate that there is more∣over Mutation in them according to those Forms which are Accid••nt••l.* 1.25 In order to which we will premise this Consideration taught us by daily Experience, that No Body becomes Ano∣ther Thing in an Instant, but is Alter'd or Dis∣pos'd before hand ere it comes to Suffer an Essen∣tial Change. For example; A piece of Wood ere it comes, by perfect Division, to be made two Things of One, is first Alter'd according to its Figure, that is, Cleft or Nick'd. Before the same Wood is turn'd into Fire, it is first Heated; that is, it has that Accidental Form call'd the Quality of Heat first introduced into it; and so in all the rest respectively. Which Changes not being Essential ones, in regard they antecede the Change of the E••tity as Dispositions to it, they must be Accidental ones; and this, according to Quantity, Quality or Relation, which are all the Accidental Notions we have of the Thing that are Intrinsecal to it. Now, if we admit those Previous Alterations and Disposi∣tions, we cannot avoid the admitting Mutation of the Subject according to those Forms. Wax, by melting is Rarifi'd, that is, Chang'd as to its former Density. A Man or Horse loses a Limb, and consequently their former Quantity and Figure too; and yet they are the same Indivi∣dual Man and Horse. A Husband loses that

Relation when his Wife dies, and yet is the same Man he was. So that here is most manifestly a Divisibility between the Natures of Essences of those Things, and these Intrinsecal Accidents or Accidental Forms; and the Subjects are evi∣dently Chang'd by Natural Causes according to These, and not according to its Essence or Na∣ture; that is, the Subject undergoes so many Formal Mutations that are Accidental. And, let them explicate these Terms as they please after their own odd manner, they shall never avoid the Conclusion, if they do put the Sub∣ject or Body to be truly an Ens, and that it may be otherwise than it was, and yet not Imme∣diately cease to be that Ens; either of which to deny were to bid defiance to Mankind and to Common Sense.

28. I know it will be repli'd, that all Natu∣ral Bodies are Compound Entities, or made up of many little Particles; which, put together, Mov'd and Plac'd Commodiously, do enable them to perform those several Operations pe∣culiar to each; and that these do occasion our saying in our common Speech, it is such an Ens. And that, therefore, all our Discourse concerning Formal Mutation falls to the Ground; since all may be Explicated by the Taking away, Adding. Ordering and Moving those Particles after such or such a manner. But, this comes not up to the Point, nor can serve them to escape our Argument, but rather plunges them into a more manifest and Direct Contradiction. For, admit that each Compound Ens (as they are pleas'd to call those Many Entities) or at

least a great part of it, be made up of those little Particles; I am still to ask them whether those Particles do really conspire to make it One Thing or no, after the Composition? that is, whether after the Composition there remains only One Actual Thing, or Many Actual Things or Entities? If the First, then our Discourse proceeds with the same Force; for then, since this One Ens or Body is Dissolvable or Cor∣ruptible, it must (as was prov'd above) have somewhat in it that remains in the Compound w^ch is to be made out of it, which we call Matter, and Somewhat which Formally Constituted the Former Body to be what it was, and conse∣quently, which does not remain in the New One; which is what we call the Form. And, because it did not cease to be or was Corrupted in an Instant, the Former Subject or Body ad∣mitted of Alterations first; and, consequently, there was Mutation in it, both according to those Substantial and those Accidental Forms. But, if they say, (as I fear they will, because they must) that after Composition there is no Ens which is truly One but Many; or, if they say that, after Composition, there is One and Many which are properly and Formally Entities; then they must say that the same Thing is both One according to the Notion of Ens, and yet not One according to the Notion of Ens, which is a plain Contradiction; for it Affirms and Denies Contradictories of the Thing acording to the same respect. Whereas in the Aristotelian Doctrin, there is but One Ens Actually, tho' made up of Potential Parts which have a Formal Di∣visibility

between them; or (which is the same) One Thing apt to verify different Concepti∣ons and Notions; which (as was said above) partly because we cannot comprehend it all at once, partly because Natural Causes do change it according to One Respect and not according to Another, we are naturally forced to make of it. Now, to make the Subject consist of Po∣tential parts, Destroys not the Vnity of the Compounded Ens but Establishes it; for, to say it is Potentially Many, is the same as to say it is Actually One; and, to Compound an Ens of Potential Parts proper to the Notion of Ens, neither of which were One Actual Part before, is to make that Ens truly One tho' it had no other Titl•• to be One of its own nature: For, to compound an Ens of Entitatine parts neither of which is of its Self an Ens, is as plainly to make One Ens as words can express.

29. But, to put them past this Evasion and all hopes of eluding the force of our Discourse by alledging that Natural Bodies are Compounds, I have purposely drawn my Chief Arguments from the Atomes or Molicellae (as Gassendus calls them) of Epicurus, and from that Original Mass of Matter, of which the Cartesians affirm their Elements were made, which the Antiperipate∣ticks must be forced to confess are perfectly Vn∣compounded. And, I farther alledge, that as Many Quantums cannot compound One Quan∣tum unless they be Vnited Quantitatively; so neither can Many Entities (such those Distinct Atomes and Particles must be) compound One Ens, unless they be United Entitavely. Where∣fore

those parts can be only Potentially in the Compound (as our Matter and its Essential and Accidental Forms are) for, were they Actu∣ally there, they would be Entitatively Many. Whence the Ens, made up of those Many Actu∣al Entities, could not be Entitatively Vnum or one Ens; but it would be an Vnum which is Divisum in se; and which is worst, (to com∣pleat the Nonsence and make it a perfect Con∣tradiction) it would be in the same respect Divisum in se in which it is Vnum or Indivisum in se, viz. in ratione Entis; which is to be perfectly Chimerical.

30. Thus they come off, and so must every one, who guides himself by the sound of Words without looking attentively into their Sense. For, the Word [Compounded] is in reality a kind of Transcendent, and therefore in the highest manner Equivocal; whence, while out of slightness of Reasoning and not heeding where the Question pinches, they take the word in an Vnivocal signification, they come to apprehend that the compounding many En∣tities together according to some Extrinsecal respects (such as are Situation, Motion, joynt-Action and such like,) is the same as to com∣pound them according to that most Intrinse∣cal respect call'd Substance; and is sufficient to make them One Entitatively, or One Ens.

31. And let it be noted that this Discourse equally confutes their Position of the Soul's being a Distinct Thing from the Body, which leads them into Innumerable Errours. And, the absurdity in making These Two to be One Compound Thing, is far greater than to make

One Body compounded of those Particles; in regard the Ranging of Particles may at least, make One Artificial Compound, (v. g. a House) tho' not a Natural one; whereas a Spirit and a Body are forbid by their natures to have any such Artificial or Mechanical Contexture; but must unavoidably, when the Asserters of this Tenet have shifted and explicated all they can, remain Two Actual Things; and, moreover, such Two, as are toto genere Distinct; nor, con∣sequently, can they, either by the Natural or Artificial Names us'd by Mankind, be sig∣nify'd by One Word; or be called A Man; as the former Compounds could be called a House, or a Clock. And I defy all the wit of Man to invent any way how Two such Actual Things can have any Coalition into One Natu∣ral thing, or have an Entitative Union, but by being join'd together as Act and Power, that is, as Matter and Form; which are the Potential Parts of an Ens, and therefore are apt to com∣pound One Ens, in regard neither of them is a Thing Actually.

32. And indeed if we look more narrowly into the Doctrin of the Deniers of Formal Mutation (the Antiperipateticks) we shall find that they have Perplex't and render'd Obscure the most Common, Easie, Obvious, Useful and Necessary Notion which Mankind has or can have, viz. the Notion of a Thing. For I can∣not discern that they make their First Mass of Matter to be One Natural Thing, unless they fancy it to be a kind of Idea Platonica of Bo∣dy, existing Indeterminately or in Common: For

they put the Form of it to be Extension, and they make this Extension to be Indeterminate, that is not-Particular; that is, to be Extension in Common. Nor can we learn of them what kind of Thing it is, more than that it is bare∣ly thus Extended: Which tells us, indeed that it has Quantity, but gives us no light of it's Intrinsecal Nature or Entity; that is, they never explicate to us of what nature that thing is which is Extended. And what man living can conceive a Body which has nei∣ther Figure, or Colour, Density or Rarity, Heat or Cold, Hardness or Softness in it, but meerly Extension? Again, I cannot see that they put those little Particles, made by Motion out of that Matter, to be Natural Things, tho' they do Actually and Distinctly exist in Nature; because they make them Principia or Elementa Rerum Naturalium; and the Elements of which Things are made can no more, with good Sense, be called Things, than Letters, which are the Elements of Words, can be said to be Words. The Compound, made up of those Particles, they do, indeed, expresly own to be a Thing; but, by making it consist of Many Things, (I mean those Particles) each of which has a pe∣culiar Actual Existence of its own, and which are not United or made One according to the Notion of Ens, but only according to the No∣tion of some Accident which is Extrinsecal to the Notion of Ens and differs from it toto ge∣nere, they cannot with any show of Rea∣son, call such a Compound A Thing, or One Thing. Whence, according to their Hypothesis; we can have no Clear Light what is to be

called a Thing, or what the word [Thing] means. As for our Four Elements (which perhaps they will object) they either are found Pure, and out of the Compound; and then having an Actual Existence of their own, they are truly Things. Or they do not, and then they are Potential parts of the Compound in which they are; which, and only which, Exists by One Actual Existence, which shows it to be One Thing; and not by Many, as their Compound does, which makes it Many Things; at least such Things as they will allow those Elements or Particles to be.

33. But to give them what Satisfaction we may without Injury to Truth, and withal to Clear the true Aristotelian doctrin from the prejudices taken from the bad speculations of those School-men, who make Accidents so many little Entities distinct from Substances, we will confess that many of those Forms we call Qualities, are Effluiums or Particles sent out from other Bodies; which, while they tran∣siently affect that Body on which they light, they retain their own Distinct Entities, and are call'd the Particles or Vertue of the Emit∣tent Body affecting another Body that is Passive from them. But, when they gain a Perma∣nency there, and, by Continuity of Quantity, or Similitude of Nature, or any other Cause, they come to be naturally Vnited to it, and assist it in its Proper Operation, they lose their Actual Entity and Unity which they had for∣merly, and become a Potential Part of the Subject that was Passive from them, and Exist and Subsist in it. And; because the Notion of

[Form] is to be Receiv'd in the Subject or Matter, and those Particles advene to it already Existing, they are hence call'd Accidental Forms of it; and either give it such an Alterableness as is agreeable to their nature, as is seen in Passible Qualities; or, sometimes, if they suit with the Primogenial Constitution of that Body, they strengthen and belong to some Habit, Dispo∣sition, Power or Property of it; and piece out (as it were) those Qualities, and, in some de∣gree or other denominate the Subject thus or thus Qualify'd.

34. But to make it yet more manifest how industriously the Cartesians do wave the giving any account of their First Matter, of which not∣withstanding they hold all their three Elements, and consequently all Nature, was made, we will take notice of one prevarication of theirs more; which does evidently bewray at what a plunge they are about it; by omitting that Consideration, which, even by their own Do∣ctrin, was the Chiefest and most Necessary. They affirm that Matter of theirs to have been Divided first by God into greater parts, which again being moved or jumbled one against ano∣ther, did shave or wear off every small particles of several sorts of which their First Element was made: Division then was the first and Princi∣pal Physical Action, and that which most con∣duced to frame all Nature: Nay, in case there be no Vacuum, (as they grant there is not) it is manifest that the First Motion, and which was exercis'd Immediately upon their Matter, as al∣so all the following Motions exercis'd upon the

said Matter, was Division. Now, Divisibility of the Matter being the Proper Power that answers to the Act of Division, or (which is the same) to Motion, and withal directly spea∣king the nature of their Matter as apt to be wrought upon by those Causes: how was it possible they should slip over that, and regard only the Extension of it? Divisibility is a Natu∣ral Notion, and imports an Order to Natu∣ral Action; whereas Extension is a dull slug∣gish Notion, and meerly Mathematical; that is, it does Abstract from Action and Motion both; For an Extended thing is never the more or less Extended whether it Moves or stands still; but its whole Nature and Notion is taken up in affecting its own Subject, or Extending it, equally and all one whether it Acts or not acts. But, the reason of this willful neglect is this, that, tho' they grant it to have been Divided, yet, should they tell us it was thus Divisible, Common Reason would lead us to pose them with asking whether it were Easily or Hardly Divisible, that is Rare or Dense; of which Qualities in their Matter, antecedently to Motion, and the Contexture of the particles made by that Motion, their Principles can give no kind of account, nor possibly explicate them.

35. I am apt to think that they foresaw this Rub in their way, which hindred the Cur∣rency of all their Doctrin of Physicks; and, seeing they could not remove it, they very fair∣ly let it alone; Yet, for a show they take no∣tice of the Word, but they turn it to a quite

different Sense: For Mr. Le Graud * 1.26 coming to give us account of the Divisibility of this Matter, where it was the Proper place to ac∣quaint us to what degree it was Divisible into particles by Natural Causes, he starts aside to tell us that, being Quantitative, 'tis Divi∣sible in Infinitum; which is quite besides our purpose. This is a Mathematical Divisibility; whereas a Physical Divisibility, or a disposition to be divided by the Motion of the first-made parts, is only that which can concern his Scheme or do it any service. For had it been insu∣perably Dense or Hard (as Epicurus fancies his Atomes) they could not have been Divi∣ded at all, nor consequently, his Three Ele∣ments have been made. Or, had it been Rare or Soft, one part would have stuck to another, and could not have been shatter'd and crum∣bled into those most subtil parts which make his First Element. To declare then how and of what nature it was, in this respect, should have been one of the First Principles in his Physicks, his whole Hypothesis depending on it; whereas it was not a straw's matter whether it were Divisible in Infinitum or no, so it were but Divisible into parts little enough to make their First Element and the rest. I must then, in behalf of Truth, declare that their Avoiding this point, so necessary to their own Scheme, and to the explication of Nature, is a most manifest prevarication, arising hence that they cannot, notwithstanding they are Men of great Wit, make any sense of it according to their Principles.

36. But tho' they do not treat of the Divisi∣bility of their Matter de professo and purposely, as they ought, yet it is scarce possible but they must, against their Wills, be forc'd to say some∣thing at unawares of the Intrinsecal Nature of their Matter as either Easily or Hardly Di∣visible, while they go about to explicate them∣selves. Errour then being the best Confuter of it self, let us see what they say of it. The Ingenious Gentleman, now mention'd, * 1.27 tells us that their First Element is made of Particles, which, like shavings▪ are rubb••d off by Motion from Bodies. Now, since their Matter is held by them to be Homogeneous or Uniform, a man would verily think by those expressions, that the Nature of their Matter is Dense, Hard or (in a Manner) Friable or Crumbling. For what is Rare, Soft and Tenacious, cannot be conceiv'd Proper or Fit to be Crumbl'd or Shat∣ter'd into such very small dust by Rubbing. Yet the same Author * 1.28 tells us the particles of their First Elements are slender and Flexible ac∣comodate themselves to the Figures of the Bodies they are contiguous to. By which expressions one would verily imagine them to be Fluid, Soft, Moist or Yielding, rather than of a Solid or Hard Nature, for only such can accomodate themselves to other Bodies on all occasions. So that he makes it at once to be both Hard and Soft; as being very apt to break, and yet at the same time very apt to ply and bow too; that is, he puts Contra∣ry qualities in the same Uniform Matter: Which shews manifestly that they know not what to

make of it, nor how to speak coherently con∣cerning it; and, withal, that, (which is the true Genius of Hypothetical Philosophers) they blow and sup at once; and say any thing that suites with their present occasion. It was for their turn to make them very Flexible, for o∣therwise it had been impossible to avoid Vacu∣um, whenas Millions of those Atomes were jumbled together; which, had they been So∣lid, had retain'd their Figure, and then Vacu∣um must have fill'd the little Interstices: And, it was very fitting too they should be Hard and Friable; otherwise they could never have been Shatter'd by Rubbing into such minute dust, as they had design'd to make their First Element of. So that they play fast and loose with their Reader; and, no wonder we know not where to have them, when they do not know where they are themselves.

36. The same untoward way they take in ex∣pressing themselves, sometimes as if they and we did perfectly agree in our sentiments. And because the Goodness of our common Reason teaches us that the Nature of a Thing is in it, they do therefore allow our well-meant words, and talk of Intrinsecal Forms both Es∣sential and Accidental; which granted they cannot deny Formal Mutation. Mr. Le Grand Part 6. cap. 24. § 9, 10, 11. gives us all these good words, tho' he chuses sometimes rather to use the word [Modification] than [Form] and in his § 10, 11. he discourses al∣together as if he were an Aristotelian. But,

alas! what trust is to be given to meer Words! For, coming to the § 12. he tells us plainly his true Meaning, which is as opposit to ours (tho' using the same Words) as the two Poles are to one another, viz. that in the Generati∣on of Plants and Beasts a new Substance is no more produced, than in the Framing a Statue, or buil∣ding a House: which he there exemplifies in some particulars, and then concludes that Ge∣neration is nothing but the Translation or new Ranging of the parts of the Matter, and that This is alike in Natural and Artifieial Composi∣tions. But, by his leave, if he that builds a House does not know the Intrinsecal tempera∣ment or Consistency of his materials, viz. that Stones are Dense or Hard, and therefore most fit to be the Foundation; that Wood is Dense, and Lighter, and so more fit for the Super∣structures: Lastly, that Mortar is Soft at first, but Hard when it comes to be dry, and so is most fit to bind the Stones together; I am afraid that if he be ignorant of these and such like particulars, he will make but a ruinous and bungling piece of work of it, tho' he be never so well verst in the Act of ranging the parts of the several Materials artificially or mathe∣matically. And, as has been shown, no man living, no not themselves, can give any ac∣count of the Consistency of their Matter, which is the only Material of which they build (par∣don the Bull they force us to) their Natural-Artificial Structures.

37. This then being his true sense, and, conse∣quently, the true doctrin (if we may believe him)

of the Cartesian School; and the word [Form] bearing in its notion that it is in the Matter, and therefore is Intrinsecal to the Thing, and makes it either Another if it be an Essential Form; or Intrinsecally otherwise or Alter'd, if it be an Accidental one; and, it being likewise Evident that the Ranging the parts of Matter, is only an Outward Application of them to one another, which is meerly an Extrinsecal Notion; we may hence clearly discover, that they do not use the words [Form] and [Intrinsecal] in a pro∣per and Natural sense, but utterly pervert and abuse them.

38. By these expressions of his lately mention'd, and their putting nothing but Extension in their Matter, which abstracts from Motion and Natural Action, one would think they inten∣ded, in stead of Physicks to give us a piece of meer Mathematicks, for bare Extension fits it for no other Science. Nor are we mistaken in thinking so; for he tells us expresly * 1.29 that Natural Philosophy is one part of the Mathema∣ticks. Tho' the Abstraction which, in the place now mention'd, he assigns to Quantity as a Genus, is very odd and Illogical; For the Ab∣straction of Quantity from the Thing or from Motion, is an Abstraction of the Accident from the Subject, or from Another Accident; and therefore is quite another kind of Abstraction than that of the Genus from the species; and it looks as if they hanker'd after Plato's ex∣ploded conceit of a Subsistent Vniversal; and that they would have their First Matter, con∣trary to all Logick and good sense, to be a

Body in Common; and therefore the Genus to all particular Bodies: Nor can any thing sound more awkwardly then to make a Mathemati∣cal Treatise of Physicks. But Cartesius was a Greater Master of Mathematicks than he was of Physicks; and therefore had a vast Design to reduce all Nature and all Philosophy within the Purlew of his own Art; in which it must be confest he was very Excellent.

39. But, to lay yet a Greater Force upon their backwardness to admit a Formal Change in Bodies, we come now to more Palpable and Plain Instances, not fetch'd from Metaphysicks but from obvious Effects in Nature; which every man sees, and themselves cannot but acknowledg. Let us then take into our con∣sideration a young lately-planted Oak growing in a Nursery; which in the space of a hun∣dred years, spreads it self into a vast Tree; di∣lating it's large and massy Branches on all sides, and over-shadowing a spacious Extent of Ground. Can any man deny but that this is the same Thing, or the same Tree it was at first? And yet 'tis most evidently not the same in Quantity, it being now a thousand times Grea∣ter than it was formerly. 'Tis manifest then that here is a Real Divisibility between it's Quantity and it's Entity or Substance; and a Real Mutation according to the Form of the Quantity, and not according to the Notions of Ens or Thing. The same may be said of an Infant grown up to be a Man; which, when 'tis now Bigger in Quantity, should they deny to be

the same Thing or the same Man, it would make mad work in the World by taking away Titles of Inheritances, and altering the Right of Succession. The Infant might, perhaps, re∣tain his Title for some very small time; but the Identity of it being lost by the accruing of new Matter and new Quantity, he has for∣feited his Estate, e'er he comes at age to un∣derstand or manage it, by losing his Essenee.

41. I know that our late Philosophers will hope to evade this last Instance by alledging that the Numerical Identity of a Man springs from his having the same Soul. Which Tenet, (were it proper to confute it here) would prove as Unreasonable and ill-grounded as any of the rest. I only note, on the by, that, as it be∣comes God's Wisdom, as he is Author of Na∣ture, to carry on the Course of Causes by fit∣ting Dispositions to the Production of farther and more Noble Effects; and consequently, to sute and proportion what Supervenes to what Prae-exists; and the Embryo in our case Praeexists, and, by having such Dispositions in it as made it fit to concur (on it's part) to work Rationally to such a Degree, made it re∣quire to have for it's Form such a Rational Soul joyn'd with it, and, thence, determin'd the Author of Nature to infuse it; it follows that the thing is quite contrary to what they imagin; viz. that the Soul was to be adjusted and pro∣portion'd to the Exigency of the Bodily part; and that, therefore the Soul is Determinately such, or of such a Determinate Degree of Ra∣tionality

(which Essentially and Numerically distinguishes Souls, and Men, from one another) as was fit to be infus'd into and work with such a Body. And were not this so, it would be impossible to explicate how Original Sin is connaturally transfus'd from Adam, or how the Soul becomes tainted by being united to a Body made * 1.30 ex immundo semine. But, this is not the only ill Consequence that springs from this Extravagant Tenet of the Soul's being a Distinct Thing from the Body, or that Man is in reality compounded of Two Actual Things, and therefore not to be placed in any one Line of the Predicament of Ens or Substance. For, that odd Opinion does, besides, very much favour (at least, very well consist with) the Praeexistence of Souls: Because, if the Soul be not proportion'd to the Disposition of the Corporeal part of Man, and so, be truly the Form of it, but a kind of Assistant Spirit, on∣ly apt to joyn with it, and promote it in it's Operations, it might as well Exist before the Body as after it. Whence it will be very hard for them to assign any solid Reason from the Nature of such a Spirit, (since it might in∣differently fit other Bodies or assist more of them) why there might not be also a Transmigration of Souls from one Man to another; for it would be, in that case, no more but shifting their Office and assisting now one of them then Ano∣ther. Not to mention how this Doctrin (as is discourst in the Preface) tends to introduce a kind of Fanaticism into the Philosophy Schools,

by making all their thoughts run upon nothing but Spiritual Conceits and Innate Ideas, and ha∣ving a Spiritual communication with God, when they know any Natural Truth, after an unintelligible manner. Not considering that Man, in this Mortal State here, is truly one part or piece of Nature; and subject to the Impressions of Natural Causes affecting him, both as to his Corporeal and Spiritual Capa∣city, according to the Different Natures of those Different Recipients.

41. But, to return whence we diverted; Letting Man and his Individuality alone, what can they say to the former Instance of a young Oak (or of any other Vegetable or A∣nimal) increast to it's Full Growth, which all Mankind agrees to be still the same Thing, and yet not the same in Quantity? It is not hence unanswerably Evident, that there is a Formal Mutation according to it's Quantity and not according to it's Entity, and there∣fore a Formal Composition and Divisibility in it according to those two Respects? They cannot say they are the same Physically, or the same Physical Compound: For, since all Natu∣ral Bodies, according to their Doctrin, are made solely of their First Matter, or of the Particles made of it; where there is incomparably more Matter, there must be a New-Compound or a New Body; in regard more and less must be the Differences of every Notion in the same Line, as has been demonstrated: Wherefore more or less of the Matter (it being inform'd, and, so tru∣ly an Ens or a Body) ought to outweigh, in con∣stituting

Particular Bodies or Entities, all consi∣deration of Accidental Notions or Modifications of it, which are not properly Entities but only Modes of Ens. 'Tis a Folly to alledg the Figure or Extension of those Particles; for, if the Subjects, (I mean the Particles) be not the same, all the Ac∣cidents which belong to those Numerically diffe∣rent Subjects, must be Numerically different like∣wise; and, so, cannot constitute a Thing to be Numerically One, but only add more Numerical Things to it to make it Numerically Many Ex∣tension is held by them to be the only Essential Form of their Matter; they so, ought, if they go to work Logically and consequentially, to say that Par∣ticular Extensions of that Matter which come a∣long with those Particles, does give a particular Essence to each of those compounds which are made of that Matter; and so make the Generical Notion hold in every Species and Individuum of that common Body; as Entity which is the Form of Ens is found in every Individual Thing in the whole world; and not to make the Essential Dif∣ference of those Bodies consist in such respects as are not Essential. They will tell us of many Mo∣difications of each Compound: But they should consider that Modifications of the Thing or Sub∣ject do supervene to it; and therefore the Thing must first be supposed to be, e'er it can be capa∣ble to be Modify'd; and it looks odd to talk of Modifying what is not, or of modifying a No∣thing. Yet tho' it strains good sense, they tell us of other Essential Modifications of the Matter in each Compound; as if Res were not, by all Mankind and by the Light of Nature, presuppos'd

to Modus rei. But this Catachesis they are forced to by their pique against Essential Forms; the Sense of which the Goodness of Rational Nature forces them to admit; tho' out of Aversion to the Word, they generally change it into a worse.

42. Their last Evasion then is to say that those Vegetables and Animals are the same Morally. And, indeed, they cannot in all hu∣mane Language pick out a blinder Word, and of a more ambiguous Signification; and there∣fore, 'tis most Proper to make use of for a sub∣terfuge against Clear Reason. I never yet could hear of any man that could define it; and it is as easy for the Taylor in the Fable to fit the Moon with a Coat, as to fit it with a Defini∣tion. But, we will do what we can to show the different senses it may have in our circum∣stances; and that none of them can serve their purpose. Either then [to be Morally the same] Signifies that the Thing does seem to us to be the same, tho' it it be not so Really. But, this comes over to us instead of opposing us; for, our Question is what is, and not what seems; nor is such an Expression to be Tolerated amongst Philosophers, whose Duty 'tis to consider what passes Really in Nature, and not what only Appears so. Or else, these words must mean that the Thing is not considerably Chang'd; and therefore, 'tis, morally speaking, the Same. But, this is most evidently False; for, the over-grown Oak has a thousand times more Quantity in it, and, consequently, according to them, more Mat∣ter added to it than it had while it was but a S••yon- Wherefore, it must be more than Mo∣rally,

that is, Considerably Chang'd according to its Quantity, and yet, not at all Chang'd as it is an Ens or Thing. And this is all I can imagin the Antiperipateticks can any way plead to escape the force of our Argument for For∣mal Mutation. * 1.31 Our ingenious Country-man, Mr. Locke, goes more solidly to work, by making it to be the same Plant as long as it partakes of the same Life, in a like continuing Organization, conformable to that sort of Plants. For, Life speaks something Intrinsecal and Essen∣tial, (which the meer Ranging of Particles thus or thus, does not) unless we will say that a Watch or Clock lives; And therefore it argues some Formal Mutation of the Matter, while it is disposed, fitted and (as it were) digested so as to continue that Life by Nourishing the Vegetable. For, it will seem incredible to any Considerer, that Particles of all sorts should be found, in such vast Quantities, in every little spot of Ground where so many several Plants and Trees do grow, as are Proper to each, and Sufficient to nourish them up, t••ll they increase to such a Prodigious Bigness. yet, this must be asserted, if Formal Mutation be deny'd. But, I can by no means allow what he sayes there that the Principium Individuationis is Existence. For, since Created Entities have not Existence from their being Entia or Things, or (which is the same) Individuums: all we can say of them is that they are Capable of Existing; and this they must have antecedently, in priority of Nature, to their Actual Existence. Wherefore their Individuation must be presuppos'd to Exi∣stence;

and, so, cannot depend on it as on its Principle. Again, since Plato's Flash of Ideas existing in common, is now hist out of all Schools (if indeed that Excellent Man meant them as his Opposers apprehend him,) and that neither Man nor Horse in Common can Exist, but it must be determinately, and particularly This or That Man, Horse, &c. It must be suppos'd to be constituted Determinately This or That In∣dividuum ere it can be Capable of Existing. Wherefore Existence is an Accidental Formality, supervening to the Individuum already Deter∣min'd and made fit to Exist, that is, to the In∣dividuum already Constituted; and therefore Exi∣stence cannot cause nor constitute it. Had I leasure, and were the place Proper, I would show my respects to the Learned Author by giving him my thoughts of his Chapter concer∣ding Identity and Diversity; for it is an Impor∣tant Subject, and I see it is treated by him more elaborately than are some other parts of that worthy Book.

43. Lastly, to say no more of Formal Mu∣tation in Bodies, let us cast a short view upon what passes in Spiritual Natures. When a Soul that before was Ignorant becomes Knowing, or a Wicked Soul Virtuous, can it be deny'd that those Souls are Chang'd according to that Form call'd Quality, and yet remain the same according to their Essence? Surely, they cannot say that this is done by New Atomes aggrega∣ted to that Soul, or by any other of those odd Requisites they put to induce a new Acciden∣tal Form. And, if not, they must see and con∣fess

that Formal Mutation is, beyond all Dis∣pute, found in Spiritual Natures. Much more then may it have place in Bodies; which, being Subject to Motion, which is Essentially Change, are, consequently, of a nature far more Change∣able than Spiritual Beings are. What can be answer'd to those pressing Arguments I cannot in their behalf imagine; nor, I am confident, can themselves give any Reply that is Solid, or taken from the known and acknowledg'd Natures of Things; however they may shuffle it off wittily, by throwing in some Unprov'd Supposition, plainly exprest; and endeavouring to make that pass upon their Readers. But 'tis Impossible they should even attempt to perform this by bearing up to any Evident Principles, or by Deductions connected by such Principles, or Reducible to them: only which can satisfy the Judgments of Learned Conside∣rers and true Philosophers.

From what is said hitherto is Establisht this Grand Conclusion, that FORMAL MUTATION must unavoidably be granted. Which evinc't, all the Corpuscularian and Atomical Hypotheses fall to the ground, and can need no farther Confutation.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Question be••ween the Peri••••••e∣ticks and Antiperipa∣tetick••, sta∣ted in com∣mon.
• * 1.2

  The Grounds of the Peri∣patetick Do∣ctrin concer∣ning Matter and Form.
• * 1.3

  The mistake of the Anti∣peripate∣ticks concer∣ning Matter and Form.
• * 1.4

  The true Do∣ctrin of the Peripate∣ticks concer∣ning Formal Composition
• * 1.5

  The true Do∣ctrine of the Peripate∣ticks concer∣ning Formal Divisibility and Formal Mutation, which are Essential.
• * 1.6

  The same Doctrin de∣clar'd by an Instance.
• * 1.7

  Of that o∣ther Formal Composition and Muta∣tion which is Accidental.
• * 1.8

  That all Formal Mu∣tations are Intrinsecal.
• * 1.9

  The Peripa∣tetical Do∣ctrin prov'd from Logick and the known Me∣thod of Dis∣coursing.
• * 1.10

  The Doctrin of the Ant••••peripatetick•• is Unprinci∣pled.
• * 1.11

  This last Charge made good.
• * 1.12

  The Indirect Methods us'd by the Antiperipa∣teticks.
• * 1.13

  The summ of Epicurus his Doctrin.
• * 1.14

  That the E∣p••curean Atomes are ••ormally Changeable
• * 1.15

  That those Atoms de fa∣cto are For∣mally 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.16

  The same de∣monstrated from this in∣fallible Ma••xim, that all our Notions are taken from the Things.
• * 1.17

  The alledg∣ing Extrin∣secal Muta∣tion is both Nonsense, and Incom∣petent.
• * 1.18

  The Cartesi∣ans are forced by their own Doctrine to admit For∣mal Muta∣tion.
• * 1.19

  The Carte∣sians can give no ac∣count of their First Matter.
• * 1.20

  Th••t 'tis impossible the Car••esi∣ans should explicate Density in their First Ma••ter, be∣cause they deny Formal Mutat••on.
• * 1.21

  Formal Mutation demonstra∣ted from th•• Transmuta∣tion of Rare and Dense things into one another.
• * 1.22

  That there are Proper Agents in Nature to Condense and 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.23

  The Car∣tesians Hypo∣thesis is Prae∣ternatural.
• * 1.24

  James c. 1. v. 17.
• * 1.25

  That th••re is also Mu••ation a••c••rding to 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.26

  Entire Body of Philosophy Part 4. ch. 4 §. 11.
• * 1.27

  Ib. ch. 6. §. 6.
• * 1.28

  Ib. §, 6.
• * 1.29

  Part 4. chap. 3. §. 24.
• * 1.30

  Job. 14.4
• * 1.31

  An Essay concerning Humane Understan∣ding. B. 2. Ch. 27.