The method to science by J.S.

BOOK III. Of the Third Operation of our Vnderstanding, Discourse; and of the Effects and Defects of it. (Book 3)

LESSON I. Of Artificial Discourse, the Force of Consequence, and of the only Right Figure of a Syllogism.

1. DIscourse may either mean Common Rea∣soning us'd by all Mankind in their Or∣dinary Conversation, or by some in Rhetorical Speeches; which may fitly be call'd Loose Dis∣course: Or, it may mean that Artificial way of Reasoning, which consists in such a Connexion of Terms in two Propositions, call'd the Major

and Minor (or the Premisses) as that a Third Proposition, call'd the Conclusion, must natural∣ly and necessarily follow from them; which may be properly nam'd Contracted or Strict Discourse, and by Logicians is call'd a Syllogism.

2. This following or Consequence of such a Proposition out of two others, is call'd Infe∣rence, Deduction, Concluding, Argumentation and Proving. So that the Essence of a Syllo∣gism consists as formally in the Consequence of that Proposition, which is Concluded from the Premisses, (exprest by the Illative Particle [ergo] as the Essence of a Proposition does in the Co∣pula that connects its Terms, and Predicates or says something of another.

3. Wherefore, since, if the Consequence, in which consists the Essence and all the Force and Nerves of Discourse, be not Clear and Evident, there could be no Certainty or Evidence of any thing that needs to be made known or concluded; and, so, our Faculty of Exact Reasoning would have been given us to no purpose: hence 'tis manifest that, however one Proposition may be made known by others that are Connected and Consequential to one another; yet, the Conse∣quence it self cannot be prov'd or made clear by another Consequence; for the Question would still return how, and in virtue of what, that Consequence which made the other Evident is Evident it self; and so in infinitum. Whence it follows, that the Evidence of all Consequences whatever, must be built on something in a higher manner Evident than any Consequence or Proof

can make it; that is, on a Self-evident or Iden∣tical Proposition, as will be shown hereafter.

4. Hence we may gather manifestly, that a Syllogism can have but Three Terms in it; Two of which are given us in the Proposition to be Concluded; and the Third is that Middle Term, by finding which to be Identify'd with the other Two in the Premisses, we come to be assur'd, by virtue of the self-evident Proposition hinted a∣bove, that they are Identify••d in the Conclu∣sion; or, which is the same, that the Conclu∣sion is True.

5. From what's said it appears that a Syllo∣gism is the T••st of all other Discourses; by re∣ducing them to which their Truth is to be try'd. For, since whatever is most Perfect in its Kind, ought to be the Standard or Test by which to Measure and try the Perfection of all others of the same Kind; and a Syllogism is the best and most firmly grounded Act of our Natural Rea∣son, made exact by Art which is to perfect Nature; and therefore absolutely the very Best that can be in its Kind, or the best Discourse; it follows that 'tis to be the true Test and Stan∣dard of all other Discourses; to which the Ve∣rity, Sense or Coherence of all the rest are to be reduc'd, and to be try'd by it.

Corol. I. Hence, 'tis of very Excellent Use for Young Wits to exercise themselves in Re∣ducing loose Discourses to strict ones, or Syllo∣gisms; For, by endeavouring this, they will, to their Admiration, find how Shallow and far from Evident the Grounds; how precarious▪

unprov'd, and oft-times contradictious the par∣ticular Assertions; and how Open and Incohe∣rent the Contexture and Consequences are in many Rhetorical Discourses and Speeches; which, drest up in fine Language and embel∣l••sht with little Tropes and Figures, and other pretty Tricks of Wit and Fancy, did before look very plausible, and made a gay Appearance of most Excellent Sense. Perhaps scarce any one Expedient can be invented that is more useful to advance Truth, beat down Error, and keep the Generality of Mankind from being de∣luded, than thus to divest such empty Discour∣ses of their Glossy Out-side; and to let them see how deformed a Hag Errour will appear to the Eye of Reason, when expos'd stark-naked. Whereas, on the other side, 'tis the Glory of Truth to be stript of these Ornamental Tri∣••••es; for by this means her Native Beauty and the Symmetry of all her parts will appear more Amiable in the Eye of those who do sincerely affect her.

6. From the third §. it manifestly follows, that, the Consequence of a Syllogism having a self-evident Proposition for its Basis, if upon se∣vere examination, we find that any Discourse does indeed bear that Test, and can be Reduc'd to a rigorous Syllogism; and the Premisses (which the Consequence supposes to be True) be really so, or can be by this Method prov'd True; it follows, I say, that we may be as per∣fectly assur'd as that we are that the Conclu∣sion is Consequent, and True; and, that sooner, may all the Material World crumble into In∣coherent

Atoms, or relapse into the Abyss of Nothingness, than that any Conclusion, thus deduced, can be False; since, if it could, then that Identical Proposition, on which the Con∣sequence is grounded, would be False; and, so a Contradiction would be True; which falsifies the Metaphysical Verity of Creatures, and of the Ideas of them in the Divine Understanding; which would consequently shock the Wisdom, and even the Essence of the Godhead it self: For self-existence might not be self-existence if a Contradiction might be True.

Corol. II. Were that which is said here, and some other main Hinges of Science, which oc∣cur in this Treatise, duely consider'd and well penetrated, it might be hoped, that they would to a fair degree cure the Disease of Scepticism, so Epidemical among our late Wits. For, even the worst of Scepticks will grant that an Iden∣tical Proposition must be True; and he may see here, that by this Doctrin both First Principles must be such, and that all force of Consequence also (which two are the main Pillars of Sci∣ence) must be grounded on such.

This last §. requires and supposes that none of the Words which are to signifie any of the three Terms be taken there Equivocally. For, if any of them be taken now in one sense, now in another, that is, if any of these words have, in the same Syllogism, two Meanings or No∣tions; then, however the Sound or Character o•• that Word may seem the same in a Verbal

Syllogism, and make a show of its having on∣ly Three Terms; yet, in a Mental Syllogism, (which only is Formally and Essentially such) there are Four Notions of the Extremes, that is, four Terms. Wherefore such a Discourse (if it be indeed at all such, and not a meer Blun∣der) is a Paralogism, or a Fal••e and Deceitful Argumentation, and not a Syllogism; because a Syllogism ought to be apt to prove the Con∣nexion of Two Terms by their joint-Connexion with a Third, and therefore can consist but of Three Terms.

8. It is most requisite also that a Syllogism be fram'd after the best Manner; which is done by disposing all its parts in such a Figure as may make the Connexion of the Middle Term with the other Two most Clear; For, we ex∣perience that the placing the Words aptly, ren∣ders every Common Discourse clearer; much more is it requisite in so Nice and Exact a Dis∣course as a Syllogism is, where there are but Three Terms to be placed.

9. To place the Parts of a Syllogism right, no more is requisit but to place rightly the Middle Term in the Premisses. For, the Propo∣sition that is to be Concluded or Prov'd, and consequently the order of its Terms, is given us to our hands, and already determin••d; and the C••pula must of necessity still keep its own place. So that nothing more can be requir'd but to place rightly the Middle Term in the Pre∣misses; for, that done, the Place of the other two Terms, conjoyn'd with it there, must (as will appear presently) be likewise necessarily

determin'd; and, so, all the parts of the Syllo∣gism will be placed and ordered as they ought to be.

10. The Middle Term is then placed rightly, when 'tis placed in the Middle, or between those other two Terms which it is to conjoyn with one another. This is evident by the Light of Nature; for, were it not joyn'd to both, it could not be the Means of conjoyning them; nor could it be joyn'd to both, unless its Notion were in the middle or between both:

11. Hence the Middle Term must be Inferiour in Notion to one of those Terms, and Superiour to the other. For, since (as has been shown a∣bove) Notions do arise orderly from the Infe∣riour to the Superiour ones; it follows, that that Notion is in the Middle between other two which is Inferiour to one of those Notions and Superiour to the other.

12. Wherefore the middle Term must, in the two Propositions which are the Premisses, be the Subject to one of the Terms, and the Predicate to the other. For, since the middle Term must be Inferiour in Notion to one of those Terms, and Superiour to the other; and the Inferiour or Narrower Notion, by virtue of its place,† 1.1 is to be the Subject, and the Superiour and Lar∣ger Notion the Predicate; it follows that the Middle Term must be the Subject in one of the Premisses, and the Predicate in the other.

For Example, in this Syllogism.

• Virtue is Laudable,
• Courtesy is a Virtue, therefore
• Courtesy is Laudable.

The Proposition (Courtesy is Laudable) is the Conclusion, and to be Proved; and so, the placing of it's Terms is already determin'd: The middle Term [Virtue] is plac'd in the middle, being subject to, or under Laudable in the Major, and above or Superiour to Courtesy in the Minor.

13. Tho' the place of the Terms of the Conclusion were not determin'd, yet the reason lately given would determin it. For if Laud∣ble be above Virtue, and Virtue above Courtesy, it must follow à fortiori tht Laudable must be above Courtesie, which is the lowest of the Three; or, that Laudable must be the Predicate in the Conclusion.

14. Wherefore the other two Figures are Unnatural and Monstrous; For, since Nature has shown us that what conjoyns two No∣tions ought to be placed in the middle be∣tween them, it is against Nature and Reason to place it either above them both, as is done in that they call the Second Figure, or under them both, as is done in that Figure they call the Third.

15. Hence no determinate Conclusion can follow in either of the last Figures from the disposal of the parts in the Syllogism: For, since

as appears § 13. the Extreme which is pre∣dicated of the middle Term in the Major, has thence a title to be the Predicate in the Con∣clusion, because it is above the Middle Term, which is the Predicate or above the other Ex∣treme in the Minor; it follows that, if the Middle Term be twice above or twice below the other two Terms in the Premisses, that Reason ceases; and, so, it is left indifferent which of the other two Terms is to be the Sub∣ject or Predicate in the Conclusion; and the Indeterminate Conclusion follows not from the Artificial Form of the Syllogism, but meerly from the material Identity of all the three Terms; or from this, that their Notions are found in the same Ens. Wherefore from these Pre∣misses,

• Some Laudable thing is Virtue,
• Courtesy is a Virtue,

Or from these,

• Virtue is Laudable,
• Some Virtue is Courtesy,

The Conclusion might either be, Therefore

• Courtesy is Laudable, or
• Some Laudable thing is Courtesy.

So that to argue on that fashion, or to make use of these aukward Figures, is not to know certainly the End or Conclusion we aim at, but to shoot our bolt at no determinate Mark, since no determinate Conclusion can in that case follow.

16. From these eight last §§. it is manifest that nothing can be more Unnatural and more Inartificial, than to invent two other Figures, and then to study how to lay many Elaborate Rules how to reduce them again to the First. For, it will appear by our last Discourse, that this is no better than to use our Wits to contrive how to Erre and goe out of the way▪ and, when that's done, to take twice as much pains in shew∣ing how we may get into it again; whenas we might easily have stay'd in the right way when we were in it, and have sav'd all that Mis-spent Labour.

17. Wherefore, if an Adversary puts a Syl∣logism in Baroco or Bocardo, or in any Mood of the two last mishapen Figures, the Res∣pondent ought, by the Reason here given, to shew him plainly, and then tell him round∣ly, that his Syllogism is Illogical and Inartifi∣cial, and require of him to mend it. And, if the Opponent, to justifie his proceeding, alledges Universal Custom of the Schools, then to tell him smartly that no Authority, Cu∣stome or Prescription ought to be allow'd as a Iust Plea against Reason in Matters subject to Reason; And that Art ought to perfect, and not to per∣vert Nature. Nor can the Arguer have any Just Reason to make use of those two last Fi∣gures, since (as will shortly be shown) all Questions what ever may be prov'd in the First Figure. Nay, he will be convicted of seeking to blunder and obscure Truth, and not to clear it; since he leaves a plain and easie path of Rea∣soning for an Intricate and Perplext one.

LESSON II. Of the several Manners or Moods of a Syllogism; and of the Laws of Concluding.

1. THE Right Figure or Position of the Lesser Parts of a Syllogism, (viz. it's Terms) being shown to be but one, and the force of it's Consequence, in which consists it's Essence, being still the same; the Variety of Syllogisms, or the several sorts or Moods of them can only be taken from its greater Parts, the Propositions, or from something belonging to them. This is manifest, because there is nothing, besides these, from which the Distinction of those Moods can be taken.

2. The Moods of Syllogisms may be in part taken from the Quantity of the several Proposi∣tions. For, since the Essence of a Syllogism, or the force of Consequence does consist in the Connexion or Identification of Two Terms with a Third; and, to be universally or particularly Identify'd, are evidently divers Manners of be∣ing Identify'd; 'Tis manifest that the variety of Syllogisms may be in part taken from the Quantity of the Propositions.

3. The Moods, or several manners of Syllo∣gisms must be taken also in part from the Pro∣positions being Affirmative or Negative: For,

since Affirmative Propositions do express the Agreement of the two Extremes with the Mid∣dle Term, and those which are Negative their Disagreement with it; and this Agreement or Disagreement with it have equal Influence up∣on the Consequence, and diversifie it, or make it follow after a diverse manner; it follows that the Moods or Manners of a Syllogism must also be taken from those Propositions being Affirma∣tive or Negative.

4. As it is self-evident that the same is the same with it self; so it is equally self-evident that what is Different or Diverse from another is not the same with it, or different from it. This is Evident both by the Rule of Contraries, as also because this Proposition is Identical as well as the other.

5. The Quantity and Quality which ought to be in the several Propositions of the Syllogisms of each Mood, are by a kind of Art of Memory, signifi'd by these four words, Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Fe••i•• in which the three Syllables corre∣spond to the three Propositions found in a Syllogism; and the Vowels in each Syllable tell us the Quantity and Quality of each Proposi∣tion. A and E signifying an Universal Affirma∣tive and Negative; I and O a Particular Affirmative and Negative.

6. We are also to reflect on what was shown above, that, in the way of Predication, an Uni∣versal is consider'd as a kind of Whole in respect of the Particulars contain'd under it, and the Particulars are conceiv'd to be Parts of that Whole; whence an Universal Proposition expres∣ses

the Identity of its Terms in the Whole or Totally, and a Particular one but in part.

7. The distinction of Moods may also in some part be taken from the Conclusions in the several Syllogisms. For, since those Conclusions are all of them Propositions, and all Propositions (Sin∣gular ones excepted, as not belonging to Science) must be either Universal Affirmatives or Univer∣sal Negatives, Particular Affirmatives, or Parti∣cular Negatives; and the Vowels in the last Syllable of those four Words do answer to all these several Conclusions, and the two Vowels in the two former Syllables of each word do tell us of what Nature the Premisses must be, if we would conclude such Propositions: it follows that the number of those several Moods, or several manners of Concluding, may, in some sort, be taken from the Propositions that are to be prov'd or Concluded, as from the End we aim at, and by which we are to contrive or cast our Premisses.

8. Hence, as we shew'd before there ought to be but one Figure, so 'tis shown here, that there can be no more Moods of that Figure Neces∣sary but these Four now mentioned; because these do fully direct us (as far as concerns the Form of a Syllogism) how to Conclude or Prove all the several Questions or Theses that can be ask'd, or propos••d to be Prov'd. And, since all these Moods do belong to that which they call the First Figure, hence also, by the way, is farther confirmed what we prov'd above, that there cannot need, and therefore ought not to be, any more than that one Figure.

9. But, because in treating of the Method to Science, we ought not to deviate from that Me∣thod our selves while we are shewing it to others; hence, we become oblig'd not barely to tell the Reader, as it were by rote, how the Syllogisms in each Mood do conclude, or by pretty Inven∣tions to help their Memory how to do this; but we are bound to inform their Understan∣ding, and to shew them why such Premisses must necessarily inferr such Conclusions as those four Words do hint to us; or, which is in a manner the same, why or for what reason such Conclusions must follow from such Premisses.

10. As the substance of the Connexion of the Terms in the Conclusion depends wholly on the Connexion of them with the Middle Term in the Premisses, so the Degree of their Connexion in the Conclusion must depend on the Degree of their Connexion with it in the said Premisses. This is evident, because all the Connexions those Extremes have, is from their Connexion with the Medium; wherefore, if they be more Con∣nected with the Middle Term in the Premisses, they must be more Connected with one another in the Conclusion; if less, less Connected.

11. Hence, from two Premisses which are both of them Universal Affirmatives must follow a Conclusion Vniversally Affirmative; because the Middle Term in the Premisses was Totally or Universally the same with one of the Extremes, and the other Extreme Totally or Vniversally the same with it; whence follows, that those Extremes must be Totally or Vniversally the same with one another in the Conclusion. For example.

• Bar-Every Body is Divisible,
• ba-Every Atome is a Body, therefore
• ra-Every Atome is Divisible.

12. When one of the Extremes is Universally deny'd of the Medium in the Major, and the Medium Universally Affirm'd of the other in the Minor, the Conclusion must be an Vniversal Negative. For, were the Extremes to any de∣gree the same in the Conclusion, when one of them is Totally the same with the Medium in the Minor, and Totally not the same with it in the Major, it would follow that the Middle Term would be (in part at least) not the same with it's self, as being in part Identify'd with two Extremes, which are not Identify'd at all. For Example.

• Ce—no Indivisible thing is Corruptible,
• la—Every Spirit is an Indivisible thing, therefore
• rent—No Spirit is Corruptible

13. When one of the Premisses affirms Univer∣sally, the other Particularly, the Conclusion must be a particular Affirmative. For tho' one of the Extremes be Universally or Totally con∣nected with the Medium, yet the other Ex∣treme is but Particularly or in part Connected with it: and so, it can never infer the Total Connexion of them, nor can the Conclusion be an Universal Affirmative * 1.2 because they were not to that degree Connected with the Medi∣um in the Premisses. For Example,

• Da—Every Good Man is Charitable,
• ri— Some Rich Man is a Good Man; Therefore
• i— Some Rich Man is Charitable.

14. When one of the Extremes is Univer∣sally deny'd of the Medium, and the Medium particularly affirm'd of the other Extreme, the Conclusion must be a particular Negative. For, were the Terms Totally the same in the Minor, as it was in Celarent, then the Terms of the Conclusion had been not at all the same, but Vniversally deny'd of one another as it was there; wherefore, being but in part the same in the Minor, they can only be in part not the same in the Conclusion. For Example,

• Fe-No harmful thing is to be used,
• ri—Some Mirth is a harmful thing, therefore
• o—Some Mirth is not to be used.

From these Grounds, the Reason may be given for diverse Maxims or Axioms, com∣monly used by Logicians, concerning this pre∣sent matter; telling us when and how the Con∣clusions follow or not follow; such as are,

15. From two Vniversal Negatives nothing follows. Because neither Extreme is Connected with the Medium, either in whole or in part; nor, from this that two Notions are different from a Third, is it consequent that they are or are not the same thing with one another. Wherefore, a Syllogism being such an Artifi∣cial and perfectly order'd Discourse, that, put∣ting the Premisses to be True, the Conclusion must be True also, such as this (and the same

may be said in part of those other that fol∣low) wanting that due Connexion of the Terms which is Essential to a Syllogism; are not Syllogisms, but Paralogisms, v. g.

• No Brute is Rational
• No Man is a Brute; Therefore
• No Man is Rational

16. From two particular Propositions nothing follows. For a Particular Proposition expressing but some part of the whole Notion of the Middle Term with which it is joyn'd, and there being more parts in that whole Notion, one of the Extremes may be united with it according to one part or Consideration of it, and the o∣ther according to another part; in which case it cannot follow they are united at all with one another in the Conclusion: v. g.

• Some Man is a Fool.
• Some Wise Man is a Man, Therefore
• Some Wise Man is a Fool

Where some Man, the Medium, is taken for a diverse Part as it were, of Man in common; and so the Medium, as considered according to it's Parts which are Diverse, is not One it self: nor, consequently, can it unite others by it's being one or the same with it's self, which is the Fundamental Ground of all Consequence.

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Corol. Hence follows immediatly that one of the Premisses must be an Vniversal, else nothing is Concluded. Which deserves Remarking, this being useful to confute some Wrong Methods to Science.

17. A Negative Conclusion cannot be deduced from Affirmative Premisses. Because, if the Ex∣tremes were the same with the Medium in the Premisses, and not the same with one another in the Conclusion, it would follow that the Middle Term is the same and not the same with it self; or else, that the Connexion or Incon∣nexion of the Terms in the Conclusion is not to be taken from the Connexion or Inconnexion with the Middle Term in the Premisses, which utterly subverts all Ground of Discoursing.

18. The Conclusion cannot be Vniversal, unless the Medium be once taken Vniversally in the Pre∣misses. Because, otherwise, both the Premisses would be Particulars; from which (as was pro∣ved §. 16.) no Conclusion can follow.

19. The Conclusion always follows the worser part; that is, it must be Negative or Particular, if either of the Premisses be such. The reason of the former is, because, if either of the Pre∣misses be Negative, then the Medium is not the same with one of the Terms of the Conclusion; and, therefore, it can never be the cause of I∣dentifying them both, which is done by inferring an Affirmative Conclusion. The reason of the latter is, because if it be only in part the same with one of the Extremes, it cannot prove those

Extremes to be wholly the same, which can on∣ly be done by their being united with it univer∣sally; for it can give no greater degree of Con∣nexion to the two Extremes than it self has with them, as was shown §. 10.

These Maxims or Positions being shown to be Rational, and necessarily Consequent to the Grounds of Rigorous or Syllogistical Discour∣sing, we proceed in our intended Method.

20. A Singular Proposition may supply the Place of a Particular one in the Minor of Darii and Ferio. For a Singular or Individual Notion is, in reality, some part of the Common Notion; and the words [Some Man] or [Some Men] do signify some Individual Man, or Men; where∣fore, abating the manner of the Indeterminate Expression, the sense is the same in both. Hence these are right Syllogisms and Conclusive.

• Da-Every Philosopher resolves Effects into their Proper Causes,
• ri — Aristotle is a Philosopher; therefore
• i — Aristotle resolves Effects into their Pro∣per Causes.
• Fe-No Man who supposes his Grounds gratis is a Philosopher,
• ri — Epicurus supposes his Grounds gratis; therefore,
• o — Epicurus is not a Philosopher.

21. Expository Syllogisms, that consist of Sin∣gular Propositions are true and perfect Syllo∣gisms. For, since a Syllogism is such a Discourse

as from the Clear Connexion of a Middle No∣tion with the two Extremes inferrs the Conne∣xion of those Extremes with one another, and Singulars have their Notions as well as Univer∣sals, and may be connected with one another; it follows that (in case these Discourses be not Faulty in other respects) they cannot, from the regard of their consisting wholly of Singulars, be degraded from being true and perfect Syllo∣gisms. v. g.

• Tom Long brought me a Letter
• This Man is Tom Long; Therefore
• This Man brought me a Letter.

22. Such Syllogisms do not advance Science. For, since we experience that our Soul is not only Capable of having Universal Notions, but that 'tis her peculiar Nature to Abstract, that is, to draw Singular Notions to Universal ones; and, since Notions are the Ground of all Know∣ledge, and, consequently, Universal Notions of Universal Knowledges; and Science is a Perfe∣ction of our Mind according to her Nature; and, therefore, does dilate and enlarge her Na∣tural Capacity by Extending it to the Know∣ledge of Vniversal Truths: Wherefore, since, on the other side, an Expository Syllogism, as consisting of Singulars; can Conclude, or gain the Soul knowledge of no more but some one Singular, it Cramps, Contracts or makes Nar∣row her Natural Capacity; whence it follows, that such Syllogisms are far from Perfecting the

Soul, or from generating Science, which is her Natural Perfection.

23. Hence follows, that such Syllogisms are good for Vse and Practise, and only for That: For, since such Syllogisms are True Discourses, and, therefore, are not wholly in vain, but must be good for something; Wherefore, since they conduce not at all to Speculation or generating Science; it follows that they must be good for Vse or Practise, and for that only. Again, since all Outward Action, Use and Practise is wholly employ'd about such Subjects as Exist, and no∣thing Exists but Suppositums, Individuums, or Sin∣gulars; it follows, that Singulars are the Pro∣per Subjects of Artificers, or such as work Out∣wardly upon Determinate Matters; and the Knowledge of the Nature of those Singulars is Useful and Necessary for such men; for, by this, they know how to work upon those Subjects and Manage them accordingly. For example, an Architect by knowing the certain Quantities and Proportions of his Materials (Wood, Brick, or Stone,) may build a House; but he cannot, without the Science of Mathematicks, have a Clear knowledge (out of the Natures of those Quantities) why it must be so always, though it hit to do so once, or hic est nunc.

Note that Practical Self evidence may oftentimes (as was shown formerly) in a great Mea∣sure supply here the place of Science, and Operate like it; though it can never ar∣rive to that Clear and Grounded Penetra∣tion into the reasons of such, Actions as is found in Scientifical Men.

24. Hence, the way of arguing by Induction can never breed Science. First, because out of pure Particulars nothing follows. Next, because to Argue from some Part or Parts to the Whole, is Inconsequent. Wherefore, we cannot thence Inferr an Vniversal Proposition or gain Science of any Nature, unless we could enumerate all the Singulars in the World, that is, all the Parts so to make up an Equivalent to the Whole, which is Impossible.

25. Hence follows immediatly that some Vni∣versal Proposition must be taken in if we would Conclude any thing from a Singular one. This has been amply Show'd above; and, according∣ly, in Mathematicks Vniversal Maxims and A∣xioms use to be first laid, without which nothing in any Subject can be known scientifically.

26. Further, 'tis collected from our former Discourse that Hypotheticall or Conditional Syllogisms are, in proper Speech, no Legi∣timate Syllogisms; nor, consequently, can they generate Science, but by seeing, in com∣mon and confusedly, they are the same in sense with Categorical ones. For, since we cannot see Evidently the Truth of any Con∣clusion or have Science of it, but by seeing Evi∣dently the Connexion of the Two Extremes with the Middle Term; and, this cannot be seen Evidently unless all the Terms be posturd in their right place, as is done in the First Figure; therefore, since neither this Clear Position of the Terms, nor any thing like it, is found in Hypothetical Syllogisms, they are not in proper

Speech, Syllogisms; any more than are some sort of more concise Rhetorical Discourses, which have oftentimes virtually the sense of a Catego∣rical Syllogism in them, though the parts of it be disjoynted and out of that due Order that ought to be in a Syllogism.

27. Wherefore all Hypothetical Syllogisms ought in Disputes to be reduced to Categori∣cal ones. For, the Major neither absolutely affirms nor denies; and therefore cannot be ab∣solutely either affirm'd or deny'd. Next, the same Major proposition has a kind of Conse∣quence in its single self; and so is a kind of imperfect Syllogism even taken alone. 3ly. It does not identifie it's Terms; and, lastly, un∣less they be reduced to Categorical ones, the Figure of its parts cannot clearly appear.

28. The way to reduce them is to vary the phrase or tenour of the Words, still keeping the same sense.

For example this Hypothetical,

• (If Science be a perfection of the mind it ought to sought after.
• But Science is a perfection of the Mind;
• Therefore Science ought to be sought after.)

May easily be reduced to a Categorical Syl∣logism in Barbara thus.

• What ever is a perfection of the Mind ought to be look'd after.
• But all Science is a perfection of the mind, therefore
• ...

• All Science ought to be look'd after.

29. For some of the same reasons Disjunctive Syllogisms ought to be reduced to Categorical ones, as

• It is either Day or Night.
• But it is not day;
• Therefore 'Tis Night.

Which may be reduced to a Catego∣rical in Darii thus.

• Da-What ever time is not Day is Night
• ri — This present time is not Day, therefore
• i — This present time is Night.

LESSON III. Of the Matter of a Conclusive Syllo∣gism; or, what Middle▪ Term is proper for Demonstration.

THE right Manner of framing a Conclusive Syllogism, or of drawing a Consequence right, which is the Form of it, being thus laid open from its Grounds; there remains no more to be done as to the Attainment of Science, but to shew what is the proper Matter of such a rigorous Discourse: For, since the Matter and Form do constitute the whole Essence or Nature of every thing; if both these be made known, there can nothing more be wanting for us to conclude or prove Evidently; which is the sole

end and aim of the whole Art of Logick. Where∣fore, all the elaborate Rules that occurr in com∣mon Logicians, which conduce not to this end, are Frivolous, and meerly invented for vain Show and Ostentation; and are so far from ad∣vancing Science, that they pester the way to it by making in more Perplext and Intricate, which obstructs the attainment of it.

2. Such a Middle Term as is Proper to con∣joyn the other two is the only Matter of a Con∣clusive Syllogism. For; since there can be in a Lawful Syllogism but Three Terms, and Two of them are given to our hands in the Thesis to be proved, and the right Placing of those Terms belongs to the Form of it; there is no Considera∣tion left that can be conceiv'd to be the Matter of it, or which, joyn'd with the Former, makes it Evidently Conclude, but such a Middle Term which is apt to conjoyn the other Two in the Conclusion.

3. Wherefore, such a Term being found and order'd in the right Form, nothing more can be requir'd to gain Science of any Proposition what∣ever. For, this done, the Conclusion so neces∣sarily follows, that it is as Impossible it should not be True as it is that an Identical Proposition should be False; or (which is the same) that a Contradiction should be True, which are the highest Impossibilities. Wherefore, since to have Science of any thing, is to know evidently the thing is so and cannot but be so, and this is known by the means now mentioned; it follows that no thing more can be requir'd to gain Science of any Proposition whatever.

4. Hence such a Syllogism is Demonstrative, and to produce or frame such a Syllogism is to Demonstrate: For, since a Demonstration bears in its Notion that it must be the most Certain and most Evident Proof than can be; and no Proof can be more Certain than that which renders it absolutely Impossible the Conclusion should not be True; nor more Evident than that which engages immediately the highest Evidence of an Identical Proposition; and all this (as has been prov'd) is found in a Syllogism consisting of such a Matter and such a Form, it follows that such a Syllogism is a Demonstrative one, and that to Prove by such a Syllogism is to Demonstrate.

5. All Middle Terms that are Proper for De∣monstration must be taken Originally from the Nature of the Thlng or from it's Meta∣physical Verity, For, since all Inferiour Truths are therefore such because they are finally resolvable into Identical Propositions which are the First Truths; that is, because those First Truths are virtually in them; and Identical propositions are therefore true (because the thing is what it is, in which consists its Me∣taphysical verity; it follows that the Verity of all Inferiour Truths (such as are the Pre∣misses) on whose Truth all Demonstration and Truth of the Conclusion necessarily depends, is taken originally from the Metaphysical ve∣rity of the Subject and Predicate. Again, since (as has been shown) the force of all Consequence is grounded on this that the Middle Term is the same with it's self, or what

it is; It follows that the Force of all Middle Terms that any way conduce to Demonstra∣tion must be taken originally from the Na∣ture of the Thing, or from it's Metaphysi∣cal Verity.

6. We can have no Demonstration of the Whole Thing taken in gross. For, the Whole Thing, as was said, may be consider'd di∣verse wayes, and so ground many Notions, and contains in it confusedly what corresponds to all those Notions we can frame of it; since then we cannot have at once a Distinct and Clear knowledg of what corresponds for∣mally to any two Notions, it follows that we can have no Demonstration (or Distinct and Clear Knowledg) of the whole thing taken in Gross.

7. Wherefore, if we would demonstrate the Nature of the Thing according to what's Es∣sential to it, we must take in pieces, Unfold, Explicate, and, as it were, Detail the Thing into it's Essential Parts, that so we may look more clearly thro' it's Nature or Essence; which is done by Definitions of the Whole first, and then of it's several Essential Parts, till we come to those Parts of it which are most known, or to the Common Head. For, we experience that we have but a Confused No∣tion of a Thing while it is exprest but in One Word; but, when Many Words are used to tell the Nature of it, our knowledg of it grows Clearer, and still more Clear and Distinct after each of those Words also has It's Meaning told, or is Defind. For Ex∣ample,

ask what such a Thing is, it is an∣swer'd a Man; which gives us, indeed, a True but a Confused Knowledg of it. Whence we may have occasion to ask farther what is a Man? and the Answer is a Rational Ani∣mal; which clears the Notion of Man to a fair degree. But, the word Animal is also Confused, tho' less than Homo was; wherefore, to gain a more Distinct Knowledg of it, we set our selves to define It, and we find it to be a Living or Self-moving Thing that is Sen∣sitive, or which is mov'd by Impression on the Senses. And thus still to gain Clearer Light of more and more Essential Notions or Considerations of Man, we may drive on far∣ther the Definitions of the ascending Genus till we come to Ens or Substantia, which is the Supreme in that Line, (and the Clearest of any except Existence) which stints our quest. By which way of defining still upwards, we gain many Distinct Notions of Man's Essence, which were before confusedly blended in the single word [Man]. And, were the Collateral Differences, which constitute the Inferiour no∣tions to Ens, Defin'd too as well as each Genus, descending in a right Line from it, we should gain a most Distinct and clear Essential No∣tion of Man.

8. It remains to define the Difference [Ra∣tional] which is the other Essential Notion that compounds the Entire Notion of Man. If we ask then what Reason is, it will be answer'd that it is a Faculty of Deducing some new knowledg out of foregoing ones; or (to ex∣press

it in the Language of Art) to draw a Proposition call'd the Conclusion from two o∣ther true ones call'd the Premisses. To know more distinctly what this Definition means, we may ask what a Proposition is, and what True means, and it will be answered that a Proposition is defin'd, A Speech by which one Notion is Affirm'd (or Deny'd) of another. Next, ask what a Notion is and we are an∣swer'd by the Definition of it, that a Notion is the very Thing as conceiv'd by us, or, the Thing as existing in our Understanding. Ask what True is, it is answer'd, it is the Confor∣mity of what is in our Mind to the Thing with∣out us. Ask what Affirming is, it is answer∣ed, it is the Comparing one of the Terms of ••he Proposition to the other, or seeing they both ••gree in the same Ens. Ask what Deducing is, ••nd 'tis answer'd 'tis a Comparing two Terms ••o a Third, and seeing them to be the same with it, and thence the same with one another; All which being known, we shall have gain'd ••he Distinct and Clear Notion of Reasoning or Exact Discoursing, and consequently of Rationa∣••ity, the Power which produces that Act.

9. Hence Proper Middle Terms may be ta∣ken from the Line of Ens (and the same may be said of any other Common Head) for De∣monstrations of any Truth that belongs Essen∣••ially to any Notion or Nature in those ••espective Lines. For they are taken from the Definitions, afforded us by the Genus and Dif∣••erence in each Line, both parts of which De∣••initions are Essential.

10. Tho' when it happens otherwise it wrongs not the Demonstration, yet this is best done when the Superiour Notion is predicated of that which is the Immediate Inferiour, and that Inferiour of the Notion immediately under it. For then the Middle Term is not by our Choice or Ordering, but ex naturâ rei placed in the middle between them. as

• Every Animal is a Living thing,
• Every Man is an Animal, therefore
• Every Man is a Living thing.
• Every Man is an Animal.
• Peter is a Man, therefore
• Peter is an Animal.

10. The same may be said when any of the Intrinsecal Differences is used for the Middle Term; even tho' it be Remote, in the same Line, from one of the Extremes; as

• Every Sensitive thing is an Animal,
• Every Worm is a Sensitive thing; Therefore
• Every Worm is an Animal.

The same holds in all the rest, whether they be Generical or Differential Notions; whether Immediate or Mediate. For, the same Reason concludes for one as for the other. viz. because all such are Essential Predicates; and, being found in the same Essence, are not only Identify'd in the same Thing materially, as is done when in a true Proposition the Sub∣jects

and Predicates are in Distinct Lines as Aethiops est niger; but being, either expresly, or by consequence, Included in some part of the Definition, the Formality of one is, in some part, the Formality of the others; as the No∣tions of Ens, Corpus, Mixtum, Vivens, Sensi∣tuum, are found in part to be Formally in the Entire Notion of Homo.

The Art of Dividing right is requisit to make exact Definitions. Because the Genus and one of the Proper Differences that divide that Common Notion do constitute and inte∣grate the Definition.

Note that the Genus must be Immediate; because, otherwise, it confounds the Interme∣mediate Notions with the Species; and, so, gives a less-distinct Conception of the Notion to be defin'd. Hence, Ens or Vivens Rationale is not a good Definition of Homo; because Ens and Vivens do but Confusedly, or in part, speak the Notion or Nature of Animal. Nor is Rationale the Proper and Immediate Diffe∣rence of Ens and Vivens.

12. Hence Dichotomy, or a Division made by two Members, is the best. For, in such a Division, the Parts, if rightly exprest, may be most easily seen to be Equivalent to the Whole.

That Dichotomy in which the Members are Contradictory is the very best Division that can be imagin'd. As that of Ens into Divisible and Indivisible; (that is not-Divisible) of A∣nimal into Rational and Irrational; (that is not-Rational) of Number, into Odd and Even

(or not-Odd) For, since there can be no Middle between Contradictories, it is Evi∣dent there can be no more Members than Two; and, consequently, that those Two parts are Equivalent to the Whole.

13. The Whole Definition, and All the Mem∣bers of a Division that is rightly made, (if ta∣ken together,) may be a proper Medium for a Demonstration. For both of these, taken together, are Equivalent to the Whole Noti∣on Defin'd and Divided; and may as well be a Middle Term as that Whole Notion exprest by one word, as by Man. Animal, &c. v. g.

• Every Rational Animal is capable of Science,
• Every Clown is a Rational Animal, therefore
• Every Clown is Capable of Science.

• What-ever is either Even or Odd is capable of Proportion,
• All Number is either Even or Odd, therefore
• All Number is capable of Proportion.

14. Out of what has been proved 'tis seen that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain Science. For, since all Knowledg is taken from the Nature of the Thing; and, therefore all Distinct and Clear Knowledg (such as Science ought to be) from the nature of the Thing distinctly and clearly represented; and this (as has been shown) is done by Definitions; it follows that Definitions are one of the Best Instruments or Best Means to attain to Science.

15. Another use to be made of Definitions in order to Demonstration is this; when two Notions, by being Remote, seem in a manner Disparate, and, so, the Proposition is Obscure; we are to pursue home the Definitions of each of the Terms till something that is Formally I∣dentical appears in both of them, Which done, all farther disquisition ceases, and the Point is demonstrated. For example; If we would prove that Virtue is Laudable, we shall find that the word [Laudable] signifies [deserving to be spoke well of] and Practical Self-Evidence, as well as Reason, telling us, that, our Speech being nothing but Signes agreed on by Man∣kind to express their thoughts, that thing de∣serves to be spoken well of which deserves to be thought well of; and that what's according to the true Nature of him that speaks or thinks, or to true Reason, deserves to be judg'd by him Right and Good, that is, thought well of, To which add that Virtue is nothing but a Dis∣position to Act according to True Reason, it comes to appear that [Virtuo] and [Laudable] have something couch't in their notions that is Formally Identical; and that this Proposition, [Virtue is Laudable] is full as Certain as that What's according to right Reason is according to right Reason, or what's Laudable is Laudable; which seen, perfect Knowledg is had of the Truth of [Virtue is Laudable] that is, 'tis the Proposition; Evidently Concluded or Demonstrated.

Note hence that, in Resolving Truths thus into first Principles, Rigorous Defini∣tions

do not alwayes need, but Expli∣cations of the two Notions (or of the Meaning of the Words that express the two Terms) may serve, so they be True and Solid; since no more is neces∣sary in this case but to resolve the In∣feriour Truths, and the Notions that compound them, into Superiour ones. For which reason also Practical Self-evidence, or a Knowledg agreed on by all Mankind in their Natural Thoughts, through Con∣verse with those Natural Objects, is suf∣ficient: For this is a Solid Knowledg, tho' it be not lick't into Artificial shape. Whence it may Suffice oftentimes with∣out Framing the Demonstration, coucht in these Discourses, into a Syllogistick Method; unless the Form of the Dis∣course be Deny'd.

16. Hence follows, that All Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions, and are Groun∣ded on them. For, since all Truths are there∣fore such, because they are Conformable to the Nature of the Thing, or to its being what it is, which is express'd by an Identical Proposition; it follows that all Truths have at the bottom Identical Propositions and are Grounded on them.

17. Hence every Errour has at the bottom a fect Contradiction, and is grounded on it. For, since all Truths, as being Conformable to the Nature of the Thing, are grounded on the things being what it is, and so have an Identical Propo∣sition for their Bases; therefore, for the same

reason, every Error, being a Dis-conformity to the Thing, or a Deviation from its being what it is, must be Grounded on this, as its first Principle, that the Thing is not what it is, which is a perfect Contradiction.

18. Hence follows necessarily, that, if Art and Industry be not wanting, Every Truth is Reducible to a Self evid••nt or an Identical Propo∣sition, and every Errour to a Contradiction. For, since these (as has been prov'd) are the Bas••s or bottom-Principles of all Truths and Fal∣shoods; and all Inferiour Propositions derìve all their Truth or Falshood from the First Truths or Falshoods, that is, from Identical Propositions or Contradictions; it follows that, either no Truth or Falshood can be finally known, or be Knowable or Provable to be such; or else they must be Reducible either to Identical Proposi∣tions or to Contradictions, as the Tests of their Truth or Falsity.

Corol. I. Hence follows that, all Learning be∣ing Knowledge, those Men only ought to be ac∣counted, Absolutely speaking, True Schollars or perfectly Learned, who can thus settle Truth and confute Errour; that is, thus Demonstrate the Conformity of the Position he maintains to the Nature of the Thing, or the Disconformity of his Adversaries Thesis to the Essence of the Subject under Dispute. By which it will ap∣pear how Unjustly many Men are esteem'd Learned, by the Generality, meerly for their having read a Multitude of Authors: Since the Former know the Truth of the Things, or of the

Subjects discours'd of; These only know it to be True, that such and such Authors, say thus or thus. Those are such Schollars as have God and Nature for their Masters. These are only the Schollars of meer Men; who, if they take not this way, speak out of Fancy, which is Un∣grounded, and therefore Various and Incon∣stant: Whence, such Men of Reading use to fill their Heads with a gallimowfry of thrums ends of Sayings glean'd from diverse Logicians or Philosophers discoursing thus or thus; but if you put them to Demonstrate any point, or to Re∣duce it to its First Principles, they are utterly at a Loss. A certain Sign they do not, in true speech, know any thing.

Corol. II. Were the Method of Reducing Truths, as is abovesaid, well settled, Probability in Spe∣culatives (which is the bane of Science) would be quite dash'd out of countenance, and sham'd out of the Schools. To do which, how highly it conduces to the Advancement of Science, is ••••∣sily discernible by the dimmest Eye.

LESSON IV. How every Truth is to be Reduced to an Identical Proposition; and consequently, every Errour to a Con∣tradiction; What Consequences fol∣low thence of one Truth being in another; and of the Science of Pure Spirits.

1. TO Reduce any Truth to an Identical Pro∣position is nothing but to show clearly that, if you deny such a Truth, you must, by consequence, deny the Identical one which is proper to that Subject, and expresses its being what it is. For, since the Reducing Inferiour Truths in any Subject to those which are Su∣preme or Identical is perform'd by way of Dis∣course or drawing Consequences; and, it is Evi∣dent that those Propositions which are Inferiour Truths, and the Supreme ones cannot be the same Formally and Expresly; it follows that they can only be the same Virtually, or as one Truth is Included in another. Wherefore as Deducing is nothing but Deriving downwards the verity which was in some Higher Truths to the Infe∣riour ones; so Reducing is the carrying upwards or Resolving those Inferiour Truths into those

Higher ones on which they Depend, and the showing them to be by consequence the Same; or that the Inferiour Thesis must needs be True, if the Identical or Supreme one be so; and that the Supreme one cannot be True, unless the In∣feriour one be such also: So that the verity of the Supreme Truth does by consequence stand en∣gag'd in the Patronage of the Inferiour one.

L••mma. All Essences consist in an Indivisible. For, since Essence is the Form of the Ens, and Ens that which is Capable of Existing, and no∣thing can Exist but that which is Ultimately de∣termin'd in the line of Ens, and distinguisht from all others in that Line; and, any Essential Pre∣dicate taken away, it wants Part of its Essence, that is, Part of that which was to Constitute it such an Ens, and distinguish it from all others, that is, which Determin it to be This; it follows that the Notion of Ens or Essence requires a To∣tality of all its Essential parts: But a Totality (since the least part defalkt from it makes it to be no Totum) consists in an Indivisibility; there∣fore All Essences consist in an Indivisible.

2. Hence an easie way is chalkt out how to Reduce any Truth to an Identical Proposition or any Errour to a Contradiction. For, let but the Subject of the Discourse (Homo for example) be Defin'd, and the two parts of its Definition be Defind likewise, and so forwards; we shall have gain'd a clear and distinct Notion of the Subject, and of all its Essential parts. If, then, the Discourse be about the Nature or Essence of Homo; all the Divisions of the parts of that Es∣sence, which are Common Notions, being (as

they ought) made by Contradictory Differences, and this from the Notion of Ens to the very Notion Discours'd of; consequently, that Discourse must either evidently clash with and Contradict some one of those Essential Parts, or Agree to them All. If it contradicts any one of them, then, since Essences consist in an Indivisible, it does, by consequence, destroy the whole Essence of the Subject, and make homo not to be homo; and, if it Agrees with All its parts, then, since, All the parts are evidently the whole, 'tis by consequence as Certain as it is that Homo is Ho∣mo; since to say that Homo is an Ens, and such an Ens as is Corpus, and such a Corpus as is Compounded, and such a Compound Body as is Vivens, and such a Vivens, as is Sensitive or an Animal, and such an Animal as can have No∣tions in it, and can Compare one Notion to ano∣ther, and two to a Third, is evidently to say in Equivalent Terms Homo est Homo:

3. Another Method of Resolving all Truths in∣to Identical Propositions is to Define both the Subject and Predicate, and to pursue their De∣finitions till some Notion that is perfectly Iden∣tical appears in both; as is Instanced in this proposition [Virtue is Laudable] in the last Les∣son §. 15.

4. Moreover, all Conclusions formally as such, that is, considering them as Inferr'd or Conclu∣ded, are resolv'd finally into this Identical Pro∣position, [The same is the same with its self] as has been demonstrated above B. 2. L. 3. §. 10.

5. Wherefore, the Method being settled of Reducing to Identical Propositions both Inferiour

Truths, which are the Premisses; and, also the Necessity of the Following of the Conclusions from their respective Premisses, which is the Con∣sequence; it is hard to conceive what can be far∣ther wanting to the Method to Science; so these Rules be thorowly penetrated, and industriously put in Practice.

6. All Truths whatever that concern the Es∣sences of things, if we have but Notions of the Terms of the Propositions which express them, do come within the Compass of this Method, and are Demonstrable. For, since all Truths, whose Terms we understand, do consist of Notions; and, its not hard to know to what Common Head those Notions do belong, nor insuperably hard to Divide by Proper Differences that Com∣mon Head; nor the less General Notions under that Head, till we come to the very Notions whose Connexion is in question; it follows, that all Propositions belonging to any Head, are, for the same reason, equally Reducible to their Pro∣per Identicals; since all the Predicates in the nine last Common Heads, which are Analogi∣cally Entia, have also their Analogical Essences; of which we can have as clear and distinct No∣tions as we have of the First Common Head which is properly Ens; and, so we can as easi∣ly define their Abstract Notions as we can the other, (or rather much more easily) and conse∣quently Reduce them to their Identicals.

7. Hence we can Discourse Scientifically, or have true Science, not only of Quantities, which are the Subject of Mathematicks; but, with equal reason, of Virtues and Vices, which are

the Subject of Ethicks. For, we can equally Abstract the Notions of the several Virtues, have a Distinct Conception of them, equally define them, and by that means equally Reduce them to their Identicals. And the same may be said of other Qualities that affect our Senses very di∣stinctly, as Heat, Cold, Moist, Dry: &c.

Note, that in such as these, if it be too labo∣rious to arrive at their Definitions by dividing the Common Genus, as it often happens when the Dividing Members are more than Two, and are not Contradictory to one another; then we may frame our Definitions of them by observing the carriage of the Vulgar towards them, or their Sayings concerning them, For such Qua∣lities, being sensible ones, are the Objects of the Senses of Mankind, and do imprint Lively and Distinct Notions of themselves in all men. Where∣fore their Sayings being the Effect of the true No∣tions they have of them, they (if enow of them be collected) must give us the true No∣tion of them; or which is all one, of what they mean by the Word that expresses them, which is equivalent in Sense to a perfect Definition. For example, when they speak of those Qualities we call Dry and Moist, we shall observe that they are sollicitous lest Moist things should squander and run about, and therefore they are careful themselves to put such things in some Receptacle or Vessel that may keep them from doing so; or they bid their Servants do it. On the Con∣trary, they bid them set Dry things on the Cup∣board, or on a Shelf; and never put them in a Vessel, or be at the needless labour of pounding

them into a Pot or Tub, out of fear they should squander about. Which sayings and behaviour of theirs gives us the Definitions of both those Qualities; viz. that Moist is that which difficult∣ly keeps its own bounds or Figure, and is easily ac∣commodated to the bounds of another thing; and Dry is that which easily retains its own bounds or Figure, and is Difficulty accommodated to the bounds of another; which are the very Defini∣tions, which that great Observer of Nature, A∣ristotle, gives us of those two Qualities.

Note II. Whence we may, with a humble Ac∣knowledgment and Thanks, reflect on the Infinite Goodness of the God of Truth, who unenviously bestows knowledge on all, who will dispose themselves to receive it; that, where-ever Art, by reason of our Shortness, is at a plunge, he supplies it by Practical Self-evidence, or the naturally instill'd Knowledge of the Vulgar: whence it is a high Pride in the greatest Men of Art, to conceit that they are above being still the Children of Nature; whereas 'tis the best Title they have to True and Solid Lear∣ning. — Sus Minervam —

8. All Conclusions are virtually in the Premis∣ses; For, since the Premisses, by Means of the Middle Term and the right Placing of it, have in them the whole force of the Consequence; and the Consequence cannot be of nothing but must be of some Determinate Proposition, which can be nothing but the Conclusion; it follows that all

Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses. Again, since, before we Conclude Determinately and Ex∣presly we must know what to Conclude, and we know what to Conclude by knowing the Premis∣ses, and the Conclusion is that Proposition which is to be Concluded; it follows evidently that, since we know the Conclusion, e'er we Actually In∣ferr and Express it, to be in the Premisses, it is there virtually.

9. All Deduced Truths are virtually in one a∣nother. For, since all Deduced Truths are Con∣clusions, and the Conclusions are virtually in the Premisses; and the same reason holds for all the following Conclusions as for the first, or for one single one; it follows that, let there be never so many orderly-succeeding Syllogisms necessary to prove any point, the Conclusions are still in the Premisses and the following ones in those that went before them.

10. All Truths are virtually in the Identical Propositions; and, consequently, in the Defini∣tions. For since all Truths are taken from the Na∣ture of the Things, and from their Metaphysi∣cal verity, and consequently are in the Nature of the Thing fundamentally; and This is Con∣tain'd and Exprest in the whole by Identical Pro∣positions, and in all its parts by the Definitions; it follows that all Truths are Virtually contain'd in Identical Propositions, and, consequently, in the Definitions.

11. From what's lately said, 'tis evinced that, if a Middle Term be taken which is a Proper Cause or Proper Effect, the Conclusion is seen to be in the Premisses. For, though the Proper

Causes and Effects be not the very Essence of the Thing; yet, since an Effect is a Participation of the Cause, and so is apt to manifest the Nature of the Proper Cause that produced it; and, the Operation of a Proper Cause is nothing but the * 1.3 Existence of such a Cause (which is sutable to its Essence) imprinted upon the Patient; hence, such Mediums do Demonstrably and Mutually inferr one another; and therefore nothing hin∣ders, but that the Conclusions may be seen to be in the Premisses as well in such Syllogisms as in those which have an Essential Notion for their Middle Term.

12. Hence all Natural Truths, and this throughout the whole Course of Nature, from the very Creation, are virtually in one another, For, since, as will be more clearly seen hereaf∣ter, all those Natural Effects were Demon∣strative of their Proper Causes, and those Causes Demonstrative of their proper Effects; and this from the First starting of Nature into Motion; and so were apt to Inferr one another all along; that is, new Conclusions were still apt to spring from such Middle Terms Conne∣cted with the two Extremes in the Premisses; and, consequently, the Truth of those Conclu∣sions were all along Virtually in those several Premisses; it follows that all Natural Truths are in one another, and this throughout the whole Series or Course of Nature from the very Crea∣tion.

13. Hence, had we liv'd in every Place, and in every part of Time, where and when those se∣veral

Causes wrought those several Effects, and had been endowed with Capacity Sufficient for such a performance, and not been diverted with other thoughts from Application to that work; we might have actually Demonstrated those Ef∣fects by their Proper Causes or those Causes by their Proper Effects, through the whole Series or Course of the World, from the beginning to the end; except Miracle had alter'd that Natu∣ral Course. For, in that case, all those Subjects had afforded us Matter or fit Mediums for De∣monstration, as well as any single Subject does now; Wherefore, if we had had wit enough to demonstrate as aforesaid, and that wit suffici∣ently apply'd in every circumstance, it had been done.

14. Hence every Soul separated from the Bo∣dy that knows any one Natural Truth knows all Nature, and this all at once, at the first In∣stant of her Separation. For, since all Nature is carry'd on by Proper Causes, and Proper Ef∣fects, and those Mutually inferr one another; that is, the Truth grounded on the one is seen to be in the Truth grounded on the other, as being Virtually in one another, and we experience that the Capacity of the Soul to know Truths is not fill'd by knowing many Truths, but is Enlarged and Enabled to know still more; and, being clear of the Body, she is not distracted by Objects working upon the Senses and the Fan∣cy, but intimately and necessarily present to her self, and, consequently, to what is in her self; and so is Addicted, Apply'd and Naturally Ne∣cessitated to know the Nature of her Body, and,

consequently of her self, as being the Form of that Body, and fitted for it; and, by her self to know all the Truths Connected with the Know∣ledge of her self, that is (as was shown) all Nature; and this, not Successively, one Truth after another, as she did when she was in the Body and needed the Fancy, and so accom∣modated her manner of working to its slow pace, but, being now a Pure Spirit and Indivisible▪ and so not commensurable to Time, or to be∣fore and after, which are the Differences of Time, she is to know all she could know in the first instant she was a Pure Spirit, that is, at the Instant of her Separation. These things be∣ing evidently so, it follows that every Soul se∣parated from the Body, that knew any one Na∣tural Truth, knows all Nature, and this, all at once, in the first instant of her Separation. But of this more hereafter.

Corol. I. Hence we may frame some imper∣fect Conception how our Science differs from that of Angels, and how Angels must know things Intuitively. For, since they have no Sen∣ses, they can have no Abstracted Notions by different Impressions from the Objects on the Senses; nor, consequently, can they Compound any two Notions to frame a Proposition; much less can they Discourse, or Compare Two No∣tions to a Third, and so deduce thence New Knowledges, call'd Conclusions: It is left there∣fore, that they must a tone view, comprehend entirely the Metaphysical verity of the whole Thing, and all that is in it, which we express

by an Identical Proposition. Whence this Know∣ledge or Intuition of theirs, abating the Compo∣sition found in an Identical Proposition (which too is the least that is Imaginable) is the near∣est a-kin to that which we have of these Iden∣ticals. By which we see that the Supremum Infi∣mi, in respect of an Angel's and Man's manner of Knowledge, is (as the Order of Entities re∣quires) contiguous as it were, to that which is Superiour to it.

Corol. II. Hence also is seen how a Separa∣ted Soul knows all things after a different man∣ner than Angels do. For, though the Substance of a Separated Soul's Operation be Intuitive, as is the Angels; yet, because her natural Ge∣nius led and forced her here to d••scourse and ga∣ther one Truth by another, that is, to see one Truth in another; hence, she retains a modifi∣cation or a kind of tang of the Discoursiveness she had here, though she cannot in that State exercise it; and that, though she cannot then actually deduce new Truths, yet she sees all Truths as Deducible from one another, or fol∣lowing one another by Consequence.

We may frame some imperfect conception how this passes by this course Similitude. When we look upon a Picture call'd a Prospective, all the parts of it are equally near our Eye in them∣selves, and we see them too all at once; yet, they appear to us as if one of them were far∣ther of than another, even to a vast distance; observing still a perfect Order and decorum in their greater Propinquity or Remoteness, accor∣ding as those parts are more or less Shadowed

or Luminous. So the Soul knows all at once whatever is Knowable by her, and they are equally near the Eye of her understanding; yet, because of her acquiring them here by way of Discourse, that is, by proceeding from more-Clear to less Clear Truths, she sees them as fol∣lowing one another, or, as it were, beyond one another; because they were not to her in this state so clear as the other in themselves, but de∣pending on the others for their Evidence.

LESSON V. Of other Mediums for Demonstration taken from the Four Causes.

1. THere must necessarily be † 1.4 Four Causes concurring to every Effect in Nature. For, since Nothing can do Nothing, it follows that Nothing can be Done, unless there be something that Does or Acts, that is unless there be an Efficient Cause. Which Efficient must act upon something or some Patient, which is the Matter on which it works, or the Material Cause. And it must work something in that Matter, which, being Received in it, must be some Form (either Substantial or Accidental) which must consequently concurr to that Action

Formally, or be the Formal Cause of it. And, since the Orderer of all Nature, or the First Cause, is an Intelligent Being and not Blind Chance, (for whàt's Blind can Order nothing) and this First Cause is the Adequate Gover∣nour of the World, and, being an Intelligent Being acts Seeingly or with design, that is, with prospect of some End in every thing that is done, how great or minute soever; and e••ery Intelligent Creature that administers the World, in their several Stations, under him▪ (wh••••her they be Angels or Men) do, for the same rea∣son, act Designingly too; that is, do propose to themselves some end, Good, Reason or Mo••ive for which they Act, and without ••hich 'tis against their Nature to Act; and since Me∣taphysicks do clearly Demonstrate that the Im∣mediate action of the First Cause is only to give Being, and * the Oeconomy of the World is administred Immediately by other Intelligent Beings under him; hence, there must be a Final cause too for every Effect that is done in the World, how small and inconsiderable so∣ever it may seem. Wherefore, there must necessarily be Four Causes concurring to ev••ry Effect in Nature, viz. The Efficient, Ma••••rial, Formal, and Final. For Example, in my Action of Writing a Letter, the Efficient Cause is my self: the Material Cause, is the Paper; the Formal, the Characters drawn in the Paper; and the Final, to gratify my friend, acquaint him with News, &c.

2. Hence we can demonstrate the An est of those Four Causes in the whole Mass of Cor∣poreal

Nature, how Remote soever it is from us; and that they must concur to every Ef∣fect, tho' we do not know the Quid est of them. The first part of our Thesis is proved; For, since the An est of all those Causes, or that there must be such four Causes necessarily concurring to every Effect, follows out of the nature of Action, from the Subject••s being Quantitative and consequently variable Sub∣stantially or Accidentally, and from the Su∣preme Agent's being Intelligent; and these are equally found in all parts of the Universe, how Remote soever they be, or in the whole Mass of Bodies; it follows that the same Causes do concur to every Effect all over the World, as they do in those Bodies near us, and with whose Operations we are acquainted. The Second part is evident, since the knowledg of the An est or [that there is something] may it be known by Experience, tho' we know not what that thing is; as we experience when we hit casually upon something in the dark, or run against it, tho' we neither see or know what that thing is; or, when we see a thing a far off, we know that that thing is, tho' as yet we know not what it is.

The Course of Nature is carry'd on by Efficient Cau••es and Effects; For since a First Cause be∣ing suppos'd who is Infinitely Wise, he Admini∣st••rs his workmanship, the World, after the wisest and best manner; which is, that the contexture of the whole be not loose and slack, but perfectly Coherent; nor can this be done, among an infinit variety of Bodies, by any o∣ther

means (so as to make up the Course of Nature) but by making Effects necessarily fol∣low from their Causes; since, if that were not, the Course of Nature would be at a stand, and need the Artificers hand at every turn to make it go on, which argues an Imperfection in the Workmanship it self: it follows, that the Course of Nature must be carry'd on by Effi∣cient Causes and Effects.

4. The Course of Nature must be c••••ry'd on by such Efficient Causes and Effects as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ro∣per to one another. For, were ••ot ••••ese ••au∣ses and Effects Proper to one anothe••▪ any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 might do any thing, or suff••r from any thing: v. g. Fire might both heat, and cool, and m••i••ten; and Water might be as combustible as dry Wood, and so of all the rest. In whi••h case no man could tell how to Order his Actions, or what Efficient Cause, or what Matter, ra∣ther than another, he is to make use of to pro∣duce any Effect; nor, consequentl••, sin••e ••uch Essences are ordain'd for such and such Ends, could the Essences or Natures of things be Known or Distinguisht more than in Outward Appearance.

5. Hence follows immediately that every such Proper Efficient Cause put to be Actually Cau∣sing, must most necessarily produce 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pro∣per Effect. For since to Caus•• is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 do and to do nothing is not to do, what 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Actually cau∣sing must cause something or pro••uce some Ef∣fect. An•• this Effect must be a Proper one as has been prov'd. §. 4.

6. All the Efficient Causes in Nature are

Actually causing. For, since the Virtue or Pow∣er of working is in the Efficient Cause it self, as being nothing but it's Existence, and the Matter to be wrought upon is Quantitative, that is, of it's own nature either Perfectly or Imperfectly Divisible, and Variable innumera∣ble Manners of ways according to it's Quali∣ties; nor can it have an Infinite Power of re∣sisting the Efficiency of the least Cause, hence, it is apt to have an Impression made upon it to some degree by any Quantitative Agent, provided there be but Immediate Application of the Agent to the Patient, and that it is pr••st upon it: But, there being no vacuum, immediate Application of one Natural Body to another must needs be throughout all Na∣ture; and the Course of Nature consisting in Mo••ion, one Body must necessarily press upon that which is next it. From all which it fol∣lows evidently that all the Efficient Causes in Nature are Actually Causing.

7. From these Discourses 'tis evident that we can Demonstrate Proper Effects from Proper Efficient Causes, which we call Demonstrating â priori; and Proper Efficient Causes from Proper Effects, which is call'd Demonstrating à posteriori. For, since a Cause and a Reason do onely differ in this, that the word [Cause] speaks the thing as it is in Nature, and [Rea∣son] the same thing as 'tis in our understanding; and Proper Causes and Effects in Nature are necessarily connected to one another, and, con∣sequently, do Infer one another naturally; it follows, that those Causes (and, for the same reason

Effects) as they are in our Vnderstanding must be the Reason why one infers the other in our Understanding: Whence follows, that tho••e Causes and Effects can be u••'d as Proper Mid∣dle Terms to Infer or Conclude one another. And, that Proofs made by such Mediums are Demonstrative is clear; for no Proof can be more Clear than that which is Grounded on those Notions or Natures being connected Na∣turally and, so Connected that it is Impossible it should be otherwise; as 'tis shown these are §. §. 5. and 6.

8. This is farther confirm'd, because, Two Bodies that are Immediate, do Act and Re-act, or are (in some respect) mutually Causes and Effects to one another: For since their Ex∣istences (which is their Power of Acting) are immediately Apply'd; and by the Course of Nature, consisting in Motion, prest upon one another; and no Natural Agent is of Infinite Power, nor consequently can it subdue all the Resistence of the Patient in an Instant; it fol∣lows that, till one of them be, by degrees, totally subdu'd, the Resisting Body must ne∣cessarily, for the reason given, Re-act upon it; whence they will be, to some degree or in some respect, Mutual Causes and Effects in regard of each other.

Corol. I. The carrying on this Connected Course of Natural Causes is called Providence; and, as joyn'd with a Course of Supernatural ones (Interiour and Exteriour) perfecting and stre••gthening the Will all along to the very

end, and ripening Souls for Bliss (which we call Grace) is that which is truly meant by Predestinatio••; which sounds so terribly and is such •• ••ugbea•• to those that mis-understand it.

Cor••••. ••I. Every Step of this Order of Cau∣ses has Entity or Goodness in it. For it is ma∣nifestly the Causing of Something by Some∣thing.

Corol. ••••I. Therefore 'tis directly against the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of ••••e First Cause to cause, or lay any 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for Sin. For, Sin (formally as such) has no kind of Entity or Goodness in it, either ••etaphysical, Physical or Moral; but is for∣mally a meer Privation of some Entity or Good∣ness which ought to be in an Intelligent Crea∣ture; whence it comes that, by falling-short here in using the Means, that Creature falls short hereafter of attaining the End, which is only attainable by such Means. To explicate which high Points fully is left to Solid Divines. I mean such as do not guide themselves by meer Words, but by Reason and Good Sense.

Corol. IV. Hence follows also that, were all the Efficient Causes that produce any Ef∣fect, known to us, we could have no Acciden∣tal Predications, nor consequently any Opi∣nions; but the Effect would still be equally Demonst••able from the Complexion of those Cau∣ses, as it is now from some one single Efficient, as was hinted formerly.

Corol. V. Hence, to one that comprehends the Complexion of all Causes, there could be no Chance; nor could such a Man have any Ground for such a Notion; For, Chance (as

the common use of the word tells us) signi∣fies an Vnseen or Vnforeseen Cause; whereas no Cause is Vnseen to him who sees Demon∣stratively how all Natural Effects follow all along from the Causes, and that they cannot but follow from such Causes.

Corol. VI. Hence, tho' we know not par∣ticularly the Quid est of this Exact Order of the World, or the Course of Nature, because we Comprehend not all Causes, nor know what Cause or Causes did all a long produce such Effects; yet, since we know and can de∣monstrate the An est of this Order, or that the Course of Nature is still carry'd on by Proper Causes and Effects; hence, we can de∣monstrate there is no such thing as that Chi∣merical Cause, call'd Chance, governing the World; which Fantastick whimsy is imputed to the Epicureans.

Corol. 7. Hence we can Demonstrate that every the least motion of a Fly or an Insect, the Figure of every leaf of a Tree, or grain of Sand on the Sea Shore, do come within the Compass of this Course of Nature, or Gods Pro∣vidence; which neglects not the least of his Creatures, but has a Superintendency over all. Which Considerations, tho' they may at first sight seem Incredible and paradoxical, and Stun our Reason; yet, after that, by recourse to our Principles, we have recover'd our daz∣led sight, and clearly see they must be True, will exceedingly conduce to raise our Souls conna∣turally to deep Contemplations of Gods Infi∣nit Wisdom, Goodness and Providence and

ground in us a perfect Resignation to his Will in all occurrences; and let us see and be asham'd of our froward, proud, peevish and selfish humour, which nothing will content but the having the Whole Course of Nature alter'd for our sakes; as if the World were made meer∣ly for us, or that Causes should not have their Proper Effects. Which being a Contradiction, is therefore, as Unreasonable and Foolish as it is in a Man, that wants Money, to be angry that Two and Three Shillings do not make Forty.

Corol. VIII. Hence, none can have just occa∣sion to grumble at God's Providence for Ill Suc∣cesses. For, since we know à priori that God, he being Infinitely wise, casts the whole Frame of the World, or the Course of Causes, in the most perfect and best Order; to wish we should be otherwise, after we see that no Causes can bring our endeavouring it to Effect, is to wish the Whole World should be worse for the In∣terest of one Inconsiderable piece of it: which is against Common sense and the Light of Na∣ture to expect from a Common Governour, who is to provide in the first place for the Common Good; and is even against the Judgment and Generous Practice of diverse Heathens, who for the Common Good of a Small part of the World, (their own Country) have not car'd to ruine their Private Concerns, nay to Sacrifice their Lives.

Corol. IX. On this Doctrine is grounded the Duty of Gratitude we owe to God for all the Good we have, of what nature soever. For,

it is hence seen demonstratively, that God is as much the Giver of that Good, by laying such a steady Course of innumerable Causes to con∣vey it to us, as if he had given it by his own hand Immediately; nay, it ought more to in∣crease our Gratitude, to see that he has Or∣dered such an Infinity of Causes, from the be∣ginning of the World, to be Instrumental to our Good.

Corol. X. Hence, lastly, is shewn the Wis∣dome of Christianity; which instructs all its Followers to express in their Common Lan∣guage, and to put in practise all the Substance of those Truths, which we have, with so much labour, Speculatively Demonstrated. As when they say that, Every thing that happens is Gods Will; pray his Will may be done; Re∣sign to it; Acknowledg that all the Good they have comes from God, thank him for it, free him from all Imputation of Injustice when any Harm lights to them, and bear it with a Humble Patience, &c.

9. There is a certain Order, or priority of Nature, in our Notions taken from the same subject, by which one of them (or which is the same, the Subject as grounding one of those Notions) is conceiv'd to be kind of Ef∣ficient Cause of Another of them. For it is Evident that the First Efficiency of Fire is the making that smart Impression on our Feeling Sense which we call Heating; out of which, if continu'd, it follows that it dissipates or shat∣ters asunder all the parts of the mixt Body on

which it works. To which 'tis Consequent, that it Disgregates the Heterogeneous parts of it, and Congregates the Homogeneous ones; from which latter Effects of Heating, as being most obvious and discernible to Mankind, Aristotle takes his Definition of Hot things. Thus, out of Ratio∣nality springs a Solid and Serious Content in Discovering new Truths, which are the Natu∣ral Perfection of a Soul; and, from this Con∣tent a greater degree of the Love of seeing still more Truths. Thus Risibility springs from Ra∣tionality; the Object of which is not a Solid Food, nourishing and dilating the Soul as is this later, which causes some increase of Science in her; but as it were a kind of Light Repast and Recreation to her, sprung from the Observing some trifling particulars which were Odd, Auk∣ward, and Sudden or Unexpected, and withal not Harmful or Contristating.

10. In those Subjects which have many Ac∣cidents in them, we must Separate those Acci∣dents from the Subject, and consider attentively according to which of them it produces such an Effect; which found, we shall discover a Proper Cause and its Proper Effect. For example, put case we experience Aloes purges Choler, we must separate its Colour, Smell, Hardness, Bit∣ter Tast, and the rest of its Accidents, and en∣deavour to find out, according to which of them it produces that Effect; and if we can find it does this precisely as Bitter, we shall discover that Bitterness is the proper Medicine against Choler; and thence we can gain this Certain Knowledge, and establish this Universal Con∣clusion,

that Every Bitter Thing is good against Choler; according to that Solid Maxim in Lo∣gick, A Quatenus ad Omne valet consequentia.

Note, That Induction in such cases gives great light to a Man already well vers'd in Na∣tural Principles. But, this former Maxim must be Understood with this Provis•• that it be meant to hold per se loquendo, as the Schools phrase it; that is, if nothing hin∣ders; as it does often in the Practise of Physick. For, in Mixt Bodies there is a Strange Variety and Medly of Accidents or Qualities; divers of which are of a Disparate and sometimes of a Sub-contrary or Contrary nature to one another; so that it requires a great Sagacity to add to them such other Mixts as may obviate their Interfering, and make the intended Effect follow.

Thus much of Demonstration from the thing as it is Active, or from the Efficient; which is the first of the Four Causes.

11. Demonstrations may be taken also from the Matter or Material Cause, that is from the Thing or Subject, as it is Passive. For, from the Divisibility of a Thing (whether that Divi∣sibility be Metaphysical, or Physical) we may demonstrate the Corruptibility of it; which, ne∣cessarily following out of the Thing as 'tis Di∣visible, is therefore a Property of it. Thus, ca∣pable of Admiring is a Property necessarily In∣ferring Rationality in it's Subject: Admiration

being nothing but a Suspension of the Rational Faculty at a stand, or non-plust, to find a Rea∣son for the thing it admires; whence it inferrs demonstratively a Power of Reasoning, capable to act or exercise it self in other things. Of this kind are all Passive Properties, which are quarto modo (as the Schools Phrase is) or pro∣perly such: For, these springing necessarily or immediatly out of the Essence, are, by conse∣quence, Naturally Connected with it, and the Essence with them; whence they are Proper Me∣diums to inferr demonstratively such an Essence à Posteriori, and the Essence a fit Medium to de∣monstrate them à priori.

12. That Demonstrations may be taken from the Formal Cause or from the Subject as 'tis For∣mally and Essentially such, has been shewn a∣bove Lesson. 3. §§. 7. and 8. where it was ma∣nifested that the Middle Notions in the Gradual Line, giving us the parts that were included in the Definition, are Proper Middle Terms to con∣nect demonstratively the Inferiour and Superiour Notions.

13. The Causality of the Final cause consist∣sting in this, that it moves the Efficient to act, this Cause can have no place but in Intelligent Beings. This is Evident, because only such can know an End or consequently aim at it, or work for it.

Corol. II. Wherefore, when 'tis said that such an Effect (v. g. the following of water in a Pump) happens in Nature ne detur vacuum, that Na∣ture flies from or abhors vacuum; that (as Ari∣stotle

acutely speculated) Entia nolunt malè gu∣bernari; and such like; the true Meaning of those Sayings can only be this, that 'tis highly against the Nature of the First Intelligent Be∣ing who created the World, and of the Inferi∣or ones (Angels) who manage it under him, that Ground should be laid in Nature for a Con∣tradiction to be True, or that the Course of Na∣ture should be contriv'd in a bad method or car∣ry'd on after an absurd manner.

Corol. XII. Hence, these sayings, thus right∣ly understood, have in them the force of a No∣bler and more Solid Demonstration from the Fi∣nal Cause, than can be taken from any Corpo∣real Efficients and Effects, though they be ne∣ver so Proper to one another. For, these Say∣ings engage the Nature of the Supreme Cause, and of the Noblest causes under him; and which, had they not Rectitude in their Understandings, Wills and Operations, all Nature would be wrong, and ground or beget in us nothing but Error. The Demonstration stands thus. The Immediate End of those Causes is that the World should be Order'd Wisely, that is, so as that th•• Things should be a Ground for Truth; therefore 'tis most highly Impossible there can be any Ground for a Contradiction, in Things which the First Cause did make, and the others do manage: But, were there a vacuum there would be Ground for a Contradiction. Ergo, &c.

Corol. XIII. Hence, we may with pity re∣mark the Ignorance, Folly or rather Phrenzy of those gross Speculators, who, by allowing no∣thing but the Course of Nature, are forc••d by

their Impious and Foolish Tenet to speak of In∣sensible things, as if they were Intelligent. 'Tis something pardonable in Lovers, when they speak to Trees, Rivers, and Mountains to vent the Passion that be-mads them; but 'tis shame∣ful in Pretenders to Philosophy, who are to re∣duce Natural Effects to their Causes, and to speak of both literally as they are. Yet, such and so apply'd, must be the Common language of meer Naturalists, who look no higher than Matter, and talk of Great Nature, or the Soul of the World, and such windy whimsies, Orde∣ring things thus and thus, that is Designing an End; Hating and Abhorring this thing, Affe∣cting another. Which yet, all the while, they deny to be Intelligent things, lest they should grant a First Being making Nature, and Spiri∣tual Second Causes carrying on the Course of it, and Moving it regularly. Nor Matters it that we had now and than to use the same Lan∣guage; for we do acknowledge it to be Impro∣per, and can reduce it to a Litteral Sense agree∣ing to the Natures of those things manag'd by such Governors, which these Men cannot.

14. There can be no Final Cause in respect to GOD. For End and Good being the same, and GOD being Infinitely Perfect and Infinitely Hap∣py in Himself, there can no Good accrue to him from any thing out of himself, or from Crea∣tures, and so they cannot have the Notion of an End in respect to him. Wherefore, when it is said that GOD aims at the Good of his Crea∣tures, or that to Govern the World wisely is his

End; the meaning of these words is only this, that he acts as becomes his Wisdom, or (his Wisdom being his Essence) he acts as he is.

15. Speaking of Mankind, we can demon∣strate some Acts of his Will from the Final Cause supposed, and a Final Cause from the supposed Acts of his Will. For, since the Will is a Power, and all Powers are specify'd or have their particular Essence from the respect they have to such or such Objects; and the Object of the Will is an Appearing Good, it follows that it is Essential to the Will to act for an Appearing Good, Wherefore, if we can demonstrate (as we may often) that such a particular Object must (all things consider'd) appear a Good to a Man in such circumstances; it will both follow â pri∣ori that, if his Will acts, it is for an Appear∣ing Good; and also â posteriori, that, if there be an Appearing Good, there will follow an Act of his Will. The Proof of both is plain, For, since the Will is a Power to Act for an Appearing Good, if it did not (in due circum∣stance) act for it, it would follow that the Will is not a Will; or else it must follow, that an Appearing Good is not the Object of the Will. Whence, since it can have no other Object Ima∣ginable, it would follow again that the Will is no Power; and consequently, no Will. Nor does this take away the Liberty of the Will, which is exercis'd in Chusing one out of many, but esta∣blisheth the Essence of it.

Corol. 14. Hence the most easie and most connaturall way to manage or treat with

Mankind, is, to make that, which you would bring them to do, appear to be their Good; for then they will be sure to obey. And if, ei∣ther thro' Perversness or Delusion by others, they will not be brought to see that which is for the Common Good to be their own, there is no way left but to Over-awe them with fear; that so, at least, it may appear to them a Good to avoid Punishment.

LESSON VI. Several Instances of Demonstration.

1. THE Method of Demonstrating is two-fold; the One Is perform'd by Exact Syllogisms in right Mood and Figure. The other by laying first certain Maxims, Axioms, or Pestulatums. and then proving the Theses by the Concatenation of many Propo∣sitions orderly succeeding one another, which is the way Euclid takes. For this later way may be full as solid as the other, tho' it looks not so Artificially; provided it's several Consequen∣ces be Immediate, and nothing be assum'd which is not some way Evident. This way also is Shorter, and more fit to comprize much Truth, or many Syllogisms, in a little room. The other way is Clearer at first sight. This is more fit for Writers, whose Productions may

be scann'd leasurely by multitudes of Readers and Examiners. That, is proper for Disputants in the Schools, who are to Argue or Answer upon the Spot: and ought to be so well verst in the Rules of Art as to be ready to act the part of Opponent or Respondent ex tempore, and without Studying. Amongst the other differences between them this is one, that if an obstinate Adversary denies any Link, in the Demonstration of the Second kind, to be con∣nected to the Other part of the Chain, re∣course must be forcibly had to the Syllogistick Method, to convince him by plain Self-evident Principles of our Understanding, on which all Force of Consequence is built, We shall give here some few Examples, of either Method. The first of which is purely Logical; the Second, Arithmetical: The Third and Fourth, Physical: The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh, Metaphysical.

Thesis I. Infinit Number is Impossible.

Demonstration First.

• Bar-Whatever involves a Contradiction is Impossible; but
• ba-All Infinit Number involves a Contra∣diction; therefore
• ra-All Infinit Number is Impossible.

The Minor is thus prov'd.

• Bar-Whatever Notion compriz'd under any of the Common heads is neither

• the Genus of it's Particular Kind, nor any Species under that Genus, involves a Contradiction, but
• ba-All Infinit Number (it being Discrete Quantity) is Compriz'd under one of the Common Heads, and yet is neither the Generical Notion of Discrete Quantity, nor any Species of it; therefore
• ra-All Infinit Number involves a Contra∣diction.

2. The Major is evident. For all the No∣tions of any Common Head, till we come to the bottom of that Scale, are either Gene∣rical or Specifical. Whence, such a Notion as In∣finit Number would be under that Common Head (as 'tis evident Discrete Quantity is un∣der Quantity) and yet it would not be under it, because Infinit Number is neither the Genus of Discrete Quantity, nor any Species of it.

The Minor likewise as to it's First part is most Evident, because Infinit Number is a Num∣ber; nor is it less a Number for it's being Infi∣nit, but more.

The same Minor, as to it's Second part, viz. that Infinit Number cannot be the Genus, or the whole Notion of Discrete Quantity, is thus prov'd.

• Ce-No Notion that is not Comprehended in each of it's Species can be a Generi∣cal Notion or a Genus; but
• la-Every Infinit Number is a Notion that is not comprehended in each of the

• Species of Discrete Quantity therefore
• rent-No infinit Number can be the Ge∣nerical Notion of Discrete Quantity.

3. The Major is Evident. For the Genus or Superiour Notion is but a Part of the In∣feriour or the Species, and a Part must neces∣sarily be Comprehended in the Whole. And, accordingly, we find the whole Notion and Definition of Animal to be in Homo, of Corpus in Vivens, and of Ens in all under it.

4. This last Minor is likewise most evident: For Ten and Twenty are Species of Discrete Quantity, being both of them Numbers; and yet 'tis impossible that the Notion of Infinit Discrete Quantity or Infinit Number, should be found in each of these; which yet it must be, if Infinite Quantity be their Genus.

5. The Former Minor, according to it's Third part, viz. that Infinit Number can be no Species of Number or Discrete Quantity, is thus prov'd.

• Ce-No Species comprehends all that is in it's fellow-Species, but leaves it some∣what which it self has not; but
• la-Every Infinit Number comprehends all that is in it's fellow-Species, and does not leave it somewhat which it self had not; therefore
• rent. No Infinit Number can be a Spe∣cies of Discrete Quantity.

6. The Minor is prov'd: For, Essential Dif∣ferences

that constitute the Species, are more and less of the Genus, and not All and None. And, as for the Formal part of the several Spe∣cies of Number, they are Constituted formally by some one Unity shutting up the rest; otherwise those Species had had no Distinct Notion, being Indeterminate: v. g. Ten and Twenty are For∣mally such Species of Number, because there is a Tenth Unity and a Twentieth in them, shutting up or Determining (that is Termi∣nating) those Unities which were presupposed. Wherefore, for the same reason, if Infinit Num∣ber be a Distinct Species, it must have, besides It's other Material Constituents, something be∣longing to it's own Intrinsical and Particular nature, constituting it formally of such a Spe∣cies; which can be nothing but an Infinitth one, Determining or Terminating it in the Line of Number; which is a clear contradiction and makes an Infinit to be Finite.

The same Thesis Infinit Number is impossible.

Demonstration Second.

• Axiom. Units are the Elements of which all Number consists, v. g. The Num∣ber of Twenty is Twenty Ones, The Number of a Hundred is a Hundred Ones; and for the same reason, an In∣finit Number consists of Infinit Ones.
• Da-Whatever Tenet puts some One to be Infinitely distant in the Line of Num∣ber

• from Another One assignable, or puts an Infinitth One, puts a Contra∣diction; but
• ri-The Tenet of an Infinit Number puts some One to be Infinitly distant in the Line of Number from Another One as∣signable, or an Infinitth One; therefore
• i-The Tenet of an Infinit Number puts a Contradiction.

7. The Major is self-evident, for it clearly puts àn Infinit or Endless Number, to have Two Ends; viz. this One assignable, and that other One Suppos'd Infinitely distant from it, or the Infinitth One.

8. The Minor is also Evident. For, since, by the Axiom, all Number, even tho' Infinit, con∣sists of One's as it's constituent parts, if no One be an Infinitth, then every one is a Finitth; and so (all the parts being the whole) that Whole, or the Infinit Number it self, must be Finite which is a Contradiction.

Thesis II. All Continu'd Quantity is one Whole consi∣sting of Potential, or still Divisible, Parts.

Demonstration III.

Axiom I. Quantity is Divisible without end, This is suppos'd prov'd by Euclid, Element. Lib. 6. Prop. 10th.

Axiom II. What is Actually distinct in any Line, is determinate in that Line. All Act

coming from the Form; which being Determinate it self, makes those Sub∣jects in which it is Determinate like∣wise.

Axiom III. A Quatenus ad omne valet con∣sequentia.

Proposition I. Quantity cannot be compounded of a Finite Number of Indivisibles.

• Co-Nothing that is Infinitly Divisible can consist of a Finite Number of Indivi∣bles; but
• la-All Quantity is Infinitly Divisible, there∣fore
• * 1.5rent-No Quantity can consist of a Finite Number of Indivisibles.

9. The Major is evident, For, putting it to consist of a Finite Number of Indivisibles, (Ten for example,) when 'tis Divided into those Ten, it can be no longer Divisible, and so no Quantity, by the Ax. I.

Proposition II. Quantity cannot be compounded of an In∣finit Number of Indivisibles.

• Ce-No One Indivisible added to Ano∣ther can make Quantity; but
• la-* 1.6 All Infinit Number of Indivisibles

• ... Consists of, or is One Indivisible added to Another: Therefore
• rent-No Infinit Number of Indivisibles can make Quantity.

10. The Minor is Evident; for all Number (tho' Infinit) consists of Ones; that is, of One added to another. Add that 'tis demonstrated above that all Infinit Number is Impossible.

Proposition III. If any two parts of Quantity be Actually distinct, All the parts must be Actually distinct also.

• Bar-What ever springs out of the pre∣cise nature of Quantity must be equal∣ly found where ever there is Quantity, or throughout all the parts of Quan∣tity, by Axiom 3d. But
• ba-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity (if put in any two) springs out of the precise Notion of Quan∣tity, therefore
• ra-All Actual Distinction of the parts of Quantity (if put in any two) must be equally found wherever there is Quantity, or throughout all the parts of Quantity.

11. The Minor is proved; for, all Unity and Distinction in any Line follows out of the En∣tity to which it is peculiar, that is, in our case, out of the Entity or Essence of Quantity. Again,

this Actual Distinction of Quantitative parts cannot spring from Substance; for this has no Distinction of parts, but that of Matter and Form. Nor out of any other Line; for all those do presuppose Quantity, and spring from it as the Primary Affection of Body; therefore, if any two parts of Quantity be actually Distinct, that Distinction must proceed from the Nature of Quantity it self.

12. Now, that all the parts of Quantity should be Actually Distinct, destroys the Na∣ture of Quantity, and is Contradictory; is thus proved.

• * 1.7Da-Whatever makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisibles contradicts the Nature of Quantity. But
• ri-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity Actually Distinct, makes Quantity consist of Infinit Indivisi∣bles, therefore
• i-That Position which makes all the parts of Quantity, actually Distinct, con∣tradicts the nature of Quantity.

13. The Minor is Evident; For, those things which are Actually Distinct quantitatively may be Divided quantitatively; or rather are already so; as those which are Actually Distinct in the Line of Substance, are Distinct Substances or Di∣stinct things in that Line, Wherefore, since the Nature of such a Subject, as they put Quantity

to be, does bear it, let us suppose Quantity divided into all it's Actual parts it can be divi∣ded into; that is, into All, they being all of them suppos'd Actually Distinct; it is manifest there could remain only Infinit Indivisibles. They must be Indivisible, because it is supposed to be Divided into all it could be Divided into; and they must be Infinit, for Divisibility that is but Finite, would contradict Euclid's Clear and most Approved Demonstration. Besides, it would follow hence, that if all the parts of Quan∣tity were Actually Distinct, each of them must be Determinate in the line of Quantity; Where∣fore, they being also Infinit in Number (for a Finite Number of parts makes Quantity not to be Divisible Infinitly against Euclid's Demon∣stration) it would follow that each least Quan∣tity would be of Infinit Extension; for the least Determinate Quantity, Infinit times repeated, makes an Infinit Extension.

14. Hence is evinced our Main Demonstra∣tion, that, since Continu'd Quantity is neither compounded of a Finit, nor of an Infinit Num∣ber of Indivisibles, nor of Actual parts, it is made up of Potential parts: that is, there is but One Actual Whole in the Line of Quantity; and this Whole is Divisible without end.

Corol. I. Hence is farther demonstrated the Unity of the whole World as to it's Quantity; or which is the same, the Continuity of the whole imaginable Mass of Body.

Corol. II. Hence is demonstrated likewise that all Vacuum, and Epicurus's Scheme of Plenum and Vacuum are Contradictory: As likewise that there cannot possibly be more Worlds than One; the very Nature of Quantity being but One whole, Divisible still into its Potential parts, or parts still farther Divisible.

Thesis III. 15. Successive Quantity or Motion, and, con∣sequently, the Course of Nature, could not have been ab Aeterno, but must have had a Beginning.

Demonstration IV.

• Bar-All Infinit Motion or Time is Impossi∣ble, but
• ba-All Duration of Motion ab Aeterno must have been for an Infinit Time, therefore
• ra-All Duration of Motion ab aeterno is Impossible.

The Minor is Self-evident; The Major is thus prov'd.

• Bar-All Infinit Time must be an Infinit Number of Determinate Parts of Time, v. g. Infinit Hours; but
• ba-All Infinit Number of the Determi∣nate parts of Time is Impossible; Therefore
• ra-All Infinit Time is Impossible.

16. The Major is clearly Evident; for, were the Number of the Determinate parts of Time Finite, then all the Parts (which are equivalent to the Whole) being Finite, the Whole must like∣wise be Finite,

The Minor is prov'd above Demonstration 1. and 2. where it was demonstrated that all Infinit Number is Impossible.

17. Whence is Demonstrated our main The∣sis, that Time, Motion, or the Course of Nature had a beginning. Whence many useful Con∣clusions may be drawn against Heathens and Atheists. Note, that 'tis the same as to our Ar∣gument, whether there be an Infinit Number of parts of Time, which are Actually Determin'd and Measur'd, or no; 'tis sufficient the Subject [Infinit Motion, or Infinit Time] bears the ha∣ving such a Determination made, by having that in it which corresponds to all those Infi∣nit Determinate parts; for this necessarily in∣duces and enforces a Contradiction.

Thesis IV. There are Spiritual Beings, which we call Angels.

Demonstration V.

Axiom. 1. What acts, is.

2. Every thing acts as it is; and, à fortiori, cannot act directly contrary to what it is, espe∣cially as an Immediate Agent.

3. Motion is Change

4. There are no Created Beings, but either

Divisible or Indivisible ones, that is Body or Spirit.

5. The First Being is Essentially Vnchangeable.

• * 1.8Da-Whatever must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect acts, and, consequent∣ly, is: but
• ri-An Angel must be the Immediate Cause of some Effect; viz. of the First Motion in Nature, therefore
• i-An Angel acts; and, consequently is,

The Minor is thus prov'd.

• * 1.9Da-Every Effect that can neither be caused Immediat••ly by the First Cause no•• by a Body: must have been caus'd immediatly by a Created Spirit or an Angel; But
• ri-The First Motion in Nature is an Ef∣fect which could not have been caus'd Immediatly by the First Cause nor by a Body; Therefore
• i-The first Motion in Nature must have been caus'd Immediatly by an Angel; and, consequently, an Angel acts & is.

The former part of th•• Minor, viz. that the first Motion could not be caus'd immediately by the First Cause, is thus demonstrated.

• 19. Fe-No * 1.10 being that is Essentially Vnchange∣able, and whose Nature is directly contrary to the Nature of Change,

• can be the Immediate Cause o † 1.11 Change or Motion; nor, conse∣quently, of the First Motion in Na∣ture, but
• ri-The First Being is * 1.12 Essentially Vnchange∣able, and his Nature is directly con∣trary to the Nature of Change or Motion; therefore
• i-The First Being cannot be the Immediate Cause of Motion or Change; nor, consequently, of the First Motion in Nature.

20. The latter part of the former Minor, viz. that a Body could not have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature, is thus prov'd.

• Ce-Nothing that, antecedently to the First Motion, was not-Moving, or in Rest, † 1.13 could have been the Immediate Cause of the First Motion in Nature, but
• la-Every Body antecedently to the First Motion in Nature was not-Moving, or in Rest; therefore
• rent-No Body could have been the Imme∣diate Cause of the First Motion in Nature.

Note that this Demonstration supposes a First Motion in Nature, which was prov'd. Demon∣stration 4.

LESSON VII. Other Instances of Demonstration.

Thesis V. THere is a First Self-Existent Being; or a Deity.

Demonstration VI.

Proposition I. The Notion or Nature of Ens and of Existent in Creatures, (and consequently of Essence and Existence) are Distinct.

• Da-Every Notion of which [Existent] and [not-existent] may be truly predi∣cated is Different from the Notion of Existent; But
• ri-The Notion of Ens (in its First and Pro∣per Signification, taken for an In∣dividual Substance) is a Notion of which Existent and not-existent may be predicated; therefore
• i — The Notion of Ens (thus understood) is d••fferent from the Notion of Ex∣istent; and, consequently, the No∣tions of Essence and Existence are also Distinct.

2. The Minor is Evident. For we can truly say that [Petrus est] while he is Living; and as truly say of the same Peter, that [Fuit] or [non-est] when he is Dead.

3. The Major is no less Evident; For, when we say [Petrus est] or [Peter is Existent] were the notion of the Predicate [Existent] the same with [Peter] the Subject, the Proposition would be (in sense) formally Identical, and the same as 'tis to say, [what's Existent is Existent] Where∣fore, when we say [Petrus non est] or Peter is not-Existent, Peter Signifying the same as Exi∣stent, it would be the same as if we said, what's Existent is not Existent, which is a Contradiction.

Proposition II. 4. The Notion of Ens Abstracts from Exi∣stence, or is Indifferent to it and to Non-existence.

This needs no farther Proof? For, in the two Propositions lately mention'd, Existent and not Existent are truly predicated of the same Ens viz. Peter; which could not be, unless the Subject [Peter] did Abstract from both, or were Indifferent to both. Besides, all the Words which we use to express the Notions or Na∣tures of any Created Ens whatever, do so per∣fectly Abstract from Existence, that it is nei∣ther Exprest, Imply'd, nor in the least Hint∣ed in them; as appears in the words, Lapis, Quercus, Bucephalus, Petrus, Raphael; which

give us not the least light or intimation that they are Existent or not-Existent.

Proposition III. 5. Were there any Inclination in Created Entities to one more than to the other, it seems to be rather to Not-being; than to Being.

For, since Peter, even tho' possest of Actual Being, is still no less capable of Not-being; it seems as if he had a particular Natural Ten∣dency to Not-being; because, tho' supported Formally (as it were) by it's Opposit [Actual Existence] he is notwithstanding, no less a Ca∣pacity of Not-existing; his Original nothing∣ness being so radicated in his Nature as he is a Creature, that it sticks to it, and inclines him to it, even while he is.

Proposition IV. 6. Existence is no ways Intrinsical to any Created Ens; either Essentially, or as an Affection springing out of it's Essence.

This has been demonstrated Prop. 2d. and 3d. Because Every nature requires all it's Intrinsi∣cals, and what follows out of them, or is Con∣nected with them; and is not Indifferent to have them or not have them, as Ens is to have or not have Existence.

Proposition V. 7. All Created things have their Existence from something that is Extrinsical to them.

For, whatever has any thing and not from it's self, or from it's own Intrinsical Nature, must have it from Another, or from something that is Extrinsical to it; there being no Third sort of Cause imaginable, which is neither In∣trinsical nor Extrinsical; that is, which is nei∣ther it's self nor Another.

Proposition VI.

8. No Created Ens can give Existence to a∣nother, For tho' (as was shown formerly) the virtue by which the Ens operates be the Exi∣stence of that Ens; yet it can work no other∣wise than as the Thing it self is, or according to the Nature of the Thing, which has that Existence; whose Nature it actually Imprints (as it were) on the Subject, as we find in Fire heating, in Water moistning, and in the whole Line of Universal Causality. Again, since the whole Line of Causality also bears that no Cause can act unless it be first Determin'd, and, as it were Appropriated to work such an Ef∣fect, (whence come those establisht Maxims that the Course of Nature is carry'd on by Proper Cau∣ses to Proper Effects, and Ex indifferente nihil sequi∣tur.) Therefore, seeing (Prop. 2.) The Created Ens to

which such an Existence belongs, and, conse∣quently, the Nature or Essence of that Ens, Abstracts from all Existence; and is perfectly Indifferent even to it's own, and much more to the Existence of any other Ens; it follows de∣monstratively that no Created Ens can give Existence to another, or be the Proper Cause of it. Therefore

Proposition VII. 9. There must be some Vncreated Cause that gives Existence to all Created Entities.

This is already † 1.14 Evident; since no Created Entity can have it's Existence either from it's own Intrinsical Nature, or from any other Crea∣ture.

Proposition VIII. 10. This Vncreated Cause of all Existence must be Self-Existent; that is, his Es∣sence must be his Existence.

For, were his Essence Indifferent to Existence, or Existence Accidental to him and not Essen∣tial, he would need Another Cause to give him Existence, for the same reason Creatures do, and, so He would not be Vncreated.

Therefore there is a First Self-existent Being or a DEITY.

Corol. III. Hence it is seen that all that Created Causes operate upon Entities, grown to matu∣rity is to dispose to the not being of the things they work upon; by Altering the Matter so that, out of those Alterations brought to such a point, the Body ceases to be any longer of such a Nature or Kind; and consequently lo∣ses it's Existence. At which Instant the Provi∣dence of the First Being so Orders his World, that those Determinations of Matter, which were Inconsistent with the Former Ens, should be Proper for the New Ens that is to succeed; to which in the very First Instant the other ceases to be, and this new one is Ultimately Determin'd to be this, He, by his Bountiful and Steady Emanation of Being, gives it such a peculiar Existence as is Commensurated and Proper to it's Essence.

Thesis VI. An Angel cannot undergo any Change after the First Instant of it's Being.

Demonstration VII.

Axiom 1. If Agent and Patient be perfect∣ly fitted as to the nature of Agent and Patient, there needs no more to be∣gin the Effect, actually but Application.

2. If Agent and Patient be perfectly fit∣ted as to the nature of Agent and Pa∣tient, and the Effect be Indivisible, there needs no more to begin and end, that is to Compleat the Effect at once, but Application.

3. An Indivisible Effect cannot be per∣form'd by piecemeal or by parts.

4. Every thing operates as it is.

5. No Change can be made without the Operation of some Cause.

6. A Pure Spirit is not Quantitative, a Bo∣dy is.

Proposition I. No Corporeal Operation is without Local Motion.

For, since Ax. 4. Every thing operates as it is, what is Quantitative operates Quantitative∣ly; but, nothing can operate Quantitatively, or exercise 'tis Quantity, when it perfectly rests according to it's Quantity, that is, moves not according to it's Quantity: It follows, then, that to Operate Quantitatively is to move ac∣cording to Quantity. Wherefore, since nothing can move according to it's Quantity, but ei∣ther Intrinsically, by having it's Quantity made greater or less; or Extrinsically, that is, by ha∣ving it's Quantity (unmov'd as to it's own parts or it's self) mov'd towards Another; and both these do evidently require some kind of Local

Motion; 'tis Evident likewise, that No C••••∣poreal Operation is without Local Motion.

Proposition II. 13. That an Angel is not susceptible of Lo∣cal Motion.

For, since Motion is Mutation; and, conse∣quently, Local Motion, Mutation or Change according to Place; and Change of Place does necessarily require some Space, and Space is Quantity; it follows, that Local Motion cannot be made in a Subject which has no Quantity. But Angels (they being Pure Spirits) * 1.15 are not Quan∣titative; therefore they are not Susceptible of Local Motion, or capable of having Local Motion made in them.

Proposition III. 15. That no Body can cause a Change in an Angel.

For, since no † 1.16 Operation of Body is with∣out Local Motion; and † 1.17 an Angel (it being a Pure Spirit) is not susceptible of Local Motion; it follows, that neither is it Susceptible of the Operation of Body. But † 1.18 No Cause can change any thing unless that Cause operates upon it; Therefore no Body can cause any Change in an Angel.

Proposition IV. 16. That an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant.

For, since a Cause, the self same in all respects, if the Patient be likewise the self same, and the Application also the self same, produces the self-same Effect equally in any time assignable that is sufficient for such an Effect; and an Angel, put to act upon it self or change it self after the first Instant, is put to be the self-same, as to its being a Cause in every Instant before it acts; as likewise to be the self-same Patient in all respects, and the Application of it self to its self cannot but be Equal; it follows that in any time suffi∣cient for the same Effect it will produce the same Effect, that is, act upon it self or change it self. Wherefore, since an Effect in an Indivi∣sible subject is Indivisible, that is, Impossible not to be all at once, or in one Instant; and an Angel, being a Pure Spirit, is * 1.19 * 1.20 an Indivisible Subject; tis Evident that this Effect, or the Action of that Spirit upon it self, would be equally made in every Instant in case it were not already made; that is, can only be made in the First Instant. Wherefore an Angel cannot change it self after the First Instant.

Proposition V.

17. If there were only Two Angels Existent,

one of them could not act upon the other after the very First Instant of their Being.

Let there be only Two Angels, the one where∣of can work upon the other; and let the Agent be A: the Patient B: and, because they are sup∣pos'd not to act in the First Instant, but after some Duration, let the Duration assign'd be C; the Instant at the end of that Duration in which they first work D. Since neither A. nor B. are able to work upon themselves except in the First Instant,† 1.21 and (as is suppos'd) one works not up∣on the other till the Instant D: they must neces∣sarily remain in all respects the same they were in the First Instant till the Instant D; that is, for the whole Intermediat Duration C: There∣fore they are equally fitted in point of Agent and Patient in each (nay in the very First) In∣stant of the Duration C: as they are in the Instant D; But in the Instant D, in which they acted, they were in all points fitted to act; therefore, they were also in all points perfect∣ly fitted to act in the very first Instant of the Duration C: Wherefore † 1.22 the Effect Begun, and, the Subject being Indivisible, * 1.23 Ended in the very First Instant, in case their wanted not Appli∣cation of the perfectly-ready Agent to the perfectly-dispos'd Patient. But there wanted not Application in the very First Instant; For, since Quantitative Application, or Propinquity, is not competent to Pure Spirits; all the Ap∣plication they can be imagin'd to have to one another is by Knowledg and Will. But they had the same Knowledg and Will for the Whole Duration antecedent, because they are suppos'd Vnchang'd

and perfectly the same for that whole Dura∣tion. And, tho' they had not had it former∣ly, the Argument returns with the same force; that they could not have had this new Know∣ledg and Will from Themselves in any part of that Duration, nor from a Body, and therefore they must have had it from an••ther Spirit; and this in the First Instant, because * 1.24 that Other was then perfectly apt to give it, This perfect∣ly apt to receive it. And, consequently, If there were only Two Angels Existent one of them could not act upon rhe other after the very First Instant of their Being.

Proposition VI. 18. Put any multitude of Angels, how great soever, all that they can work upon one another will be perform'd in the First Instant of their Being.

For, since, where there are only Two, † 1.25 one must therefore act upon the other in the First Instant or not at all, because all the imagina∣ble Concurrents to that Action were then ade∣quately put; the rest also, where there are more, will for the same reason be wrought upon in the same Instant, in case the Causes of that Action be then adequately put. But they are all Adequately put in the same First Instant; For the second Angel that acts either is a perfect Agent, and perfectly apply'd by what it has of it self, or by what it has from another; where∣fore, since it can never want what it has of it

self, or by it's self, it cannot want any thing to work upon the Third, unless it be to be wrought upon by the First, and so be fitted to work upon the Third, but this is done in the very † 1.26 first Instant, wherefore also the Third will, for the same reason, be wrought upon in the self-same Instant. Again, since the Third cannot be imagin'd to want any thing to ena∣ble it to work upon the Fourth, but to be chang'd by the Second, and this was done as was now shown, in the First Instant; the Causes of changing the Fourth were adequate∣ly put in the same Instant too, and † 1.27 consequent∣ly the Effect. And, since how far soever we pro∣ceed, the same reason holds, viz. that the Effects are still Indivisible, and all the Causes of each immediately succeeding Effect, still ade∣quately put in the first Instant, it will follow, that the Effects will still be put in the same Instant, by the same necessity that the Effect of the First up on the Second was put in the First Instant of their Being; Therefore, all whatever any Multi∣tude of Angels, how great soever, can work upon one another is perform'd in the First In∣stant of their Being.

Proposition VII. 19. That 'tis Infinitly more Impossible an An∣gel should be chang'd by God after the first In∣stant, than by any other Spirit.

For, since the Angel is in the same manner capable of Change, as far as concerns it's self or it's own power to be changed, whether God or any other Spirit be to change it, on that side

precisely there is a perfect Equality. Where∣fore seeing, on the other side, 'tis infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not have Power to change her in the First Instant, than that any other Spirit should not have such a Power; and Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should not, of himself, be ultimately dispos'd to act where the nature of the thing is capable of it, his Nature being Pure Actuality. Also, since 'tis Infinitly more Impossible that GOD should, after some Duration, receive any Change in himself, fitting him to produce that Effect, than that any other Spirit should; And, lastly, since 'tis Infinitly more Impossible his Active Power should not be Apply'd to the Patient; both in regard he most necessarily and com∣prehensively knows it, and most intimately, by himself, conserves it in Being. Wherefore, since from these Considerations or Reasons, howe∣ver Infinitly short in Creatures, it is concluded to be Impossible that even any Other Spirit, if it should change an Angel at all, should not change it in the First Instant, and these Con∣siderations or Reasons are found to be in GOD with Infinitly greater Advantage; it is Evi∣dent that 'tis Infinitly more Impossible that GOD, if he change an Angel at all, should not change it in the first Instant, that is, should change it in the Intermediate Duration; than that any other Spirit should.

Proposition IX. 20. That 'tis absolutely Impossible an Angel

should be Changed after the First In∣stant of it's Being.

For, since * 1.28 no Change can be made without ••he working of Some Cause; and no † 1.29 Body can work upon an Angel, and all that it self or a∣ny other Created Spirit can work upon it, must necessarily be in the very First Instant of it's Being;† 1.30 and * 1.31 'tis much more Impossible GOD should work upon it, unless in the First Instant, than that any Created Spirit should; and there can be no Cause possible or Imaginable be∣sides GOD, Created Spirits, or Bodies; it follows that there can be no Cause at all to work up∣on an Angel, or to Change it after the First Instant of it's Being; and, therefore, it can undergo no Change after that First Instant.

ADVERTISEMENT.

1. THIS last Conclusion may seem a strange Paradox to some Readers, whose Reason and Principles have not rais'd them above Fancy. But not to insist farther on the Evidence of our Consequences from Undeniable Principles, which have forced the Necessity of our Conclusion, such men are desir••d to reflect that [Ens] being divided as by it's Proper Differences, by [Divisible] and [Indivisible] and these Differences being Con∣tradictory to one another; it follows that [Body] and [Spirit] which are the Species con∣stituted by those Differences, do agree in no∣thing at all but in the Common and Generical notion of Ens; or in this that they are, both of them, Capable of Being. Whence, 'tis Logi∣cally demonstrated that they must Differ, nay contradictorily disagree, in every thing else; so that whatever else is Affirm'd literally of the one must be deny'd of the other. Wherefore, since we can truly and literally Affirm that Body is Quantitative, Corruptible, in Place mov'd Locally, Chang'd by Time or Subject to it, Capable of Succession, or of Before and After which are the Differences of time &c. we must be forced with equal Truth Literally to Deny all these of Pure Spirits or Angels, be∣cause

none of these do belong to the Common Generical Notion of Ens, but to that Diffe∣rence which constitutes that Species call'd Body; and, therefore, the Contradictory to all these, and amongst them to be Vnsuccessive in it's Ope∣rations, must be predicated of the other Spe∣cies, call'd Spirit.

It will, I doubt not, be much wonder'd at too, that the Devils should be Damn'd in the First Instant of their being; which looks as if they were Created in the state of Damnation; A thing certainly, most Unworthy GOD, who is Essentially and Infinitly Good. But, their wonder will cease if they reflect that those Bad Angels had far more Knowledg, and con∣sequently more perfect Deliberation (such as they can have) in that one Single Instant than We could have had tho' we have been a thousand years Considering and Deliberating e'er we had made our Choice of our last End, and fix our Resolution to adhere to it Final∣ly. So that it never lay in the power of any Man to have so Clear a Knowledg of his Duty, and so perfect and full sight of all the Motives to continue in that Duty, as the Devil and his Angels had in that one Instant. Whence, the Crime of Lucifer, and his Adherents, was a Sin of pure Malice, and not mere Frailty, or mixt with Frailty; much less of Inadvertence, Speculative Ignorance, or suggested by the Soul's deprav'd Companion, the Body; as are the Sins of the Generality of Mankind, some Inconsiderable number of them excepted, whose Souls are thorowly poison'd with Spiritual Sin's

peculiar to the Devil; such as are Spiritual Pride, Malice, Envy or such like; which wicked Sinners are therefore, even while here, so many Limbs (as it were) of the Devil, and very difficult to be brought to any Repentance. And this is the reason why GOD's Wisdom, Goodness and Justice laid so many Miracles of Mercy to save poor weak Mankind; and left the Faln Angels in the sad condition, in which they had so wilfully and desperately engulft themselves. Wisely and Justly placing it in the Order of Causes, that that Sin, which was so perfectly, and (in despite of all Motives to the contrary) so Wilfully Resolute, should be Ir∣retractable; whereas, on the other side, Sins of mere Frailty are not hard to be repented of, when the alluring circumstance is past and gone; The same Faculty which permitted them to fall, leaving them likewise in a Plia∣bleness to reform and retract what their Rea∣son, abus'd by Passion, had; perhaps either by surprize or after much struggling, (that is half unwillingly) yielded to.

Corol. I. Hence, abstracting from Faith and Theology) 'tis Demonstrated against the Ori∣ginists, by Reason reflecting on the nature of Things, that the Devils are to be Eternally Damn'd; and how, and why 'tis Impossible their Hell should have an End. For, they cannot be saved without Repentance, nor repent without having some new Motive which they either knew not of before, or did not well consider of it. Neither of which can have place

here; for, since they acquire no New Know∣ledg either by the Senses, or by Discourse, it follows that they have all in the first Instant that is due to their Natures; that is they know all they could possibly know, and out of that Knowledg made their Full and Final Choice. Nor can there be Consideration in a Knower that sees all things by Simple Intuition. For, Consideration is the Comparing one Motive with another, and therefore 'tis an Operation Pro∣per to that Knower that works by Abstracted Notions or Considerations of the Thing. Whence it is most Improper and Incompetent to such an Intelligent Being as knows all as once by way of Simple Intuition.

Corol. II. Tho' all that can concern the In∣ternal Operations of Angels was finished in an Instant, yet we may, for all that, conceive certain Priorities of Nature, in the Course or Process (as it were) of what belongs to them in that First Instant. v. g. We can conceive them to be; and to be Good according to th••ir Essence and Existence, as coming Immediately out of God's hand, ere we conceive their own Depraved Will made them Bad. We can conceive them to know Themselves ere they knew in and by Themselves the whole Angeli∣cal Order, and the whole Course of Nature. We can conceive them to know Themselves as most fit (under God) to preside over Humane Nature, ere they knew that a Man, by the Incarnation of the Word was to be their Head, and (as it were) take their office out

of their hands, and be Lord of themselves too; We can conceive them to know This (which was the cause of their Aversion from GOD) ere we can conceive them to have had that Aversion from him, for his thus Ordering things. We can conceive Lucifer, their Ring-leader, to have had that Aversion ere he propos'd his Seditious thoughts to other Angels, to debauch them from their Allegiance. We can conceive him to have Debaucht them, ere we conceive the Contrast and Battle was between Michael and his Loyal Angels, and Lucifer with his Rebellious Troops. Lastly, we can conceive this Battel fought, ere the latter black Squa∣drons were cast down from their Sublime Height into Hell. All these, I say, may be Conceiv'd to have had certain Priorities of Na∣ture to one another, such as those Causes and Effects use to have which are in the same Instant: So that this Single Instant of theirs is, (tho not Formally, yet) virtually, and in order to the many Indivisible Effects producible in it, Equivalent or (as we use to say) as good as a Long Series of our Time: Not by way of Quantitative Commensuration of one to the other, but by the Eminency of the Angelical Duration or Aeviternity, which is of a Superiour Nature to Body, and consequently Bodily Motion or Time; and Comprehending it all Indivisibly and Instantaneously.

Corol. III. Hence it follows, that the Several Instants which Divines put in Angelical Actions, and particularly in Lucifer and his Fiends, be∣fore

their Fall, can be no way Solidly explica∣ted and conformably to the nature of Pure Spirits, but by those Priorities of Nature: For since Comparisons can only be made of those Natures which are ejusdem generis we cannot Compare, or Commensurate those Actions which are Spi∣ritual to the Succession found in the Actions of Bodies, which are Measurable by Time, any more than we can their Essence to the Nature of a Body; and it would be an odd Comparison to say, an Angel is as Knowing as a Horse is Strong, or as a Wall is Hard: Wherefore, [Before] and [After] which are Differences of Time or Suc∣cessive Motion, can never be with good Sense apply'd to the Operations of Pure Spirits. Again, should we allow such Instants Succee∣ding one another, it would avail nothing: † 1.32 For, since one Indivisible added to another cannot make a thing Greater, nor, consequently, a Du∣ration Longer; the putting many of them advan∣ces no farther than the First Indivisible or the First Instant. Add, that even those Divines who put diverse Instants, do all owe our Principles, that Angels are Indivisible Substances (for did they hold them Corporeal, as some of the Fathers did, I should not wonder at their Inconsistency) but they are frightned from the Conclusions that Naturally and Necessarily follow thence; either because they vainly fear Scripture-Texts, ex∣pressing things humano more, or in Accomodation to our low Conceptions, cannot otherwise be verified; or else, because those Conclusions too much shock their Fancy by their seeming Extra∣vagancy; or lastly, because they are willing

to gratifie and please the Fancy of the Vulgar which is startled at such uncouth propositions: And this is one mane Hindrance to the Advance∣ment of Science, when men are afraid of their own Conclusions; because the herd of vulgar Philosophers will dislike and decry them: A Fault which, I hope, I have not been Guilty of in this former Treatise; but have both avoided it my self, and have Indeavour'd to prevent it in others; by holding firmly, and directing others to hold to the right Notions or Natures of the things, and to pursue steadily the Consequences that do naturally Issue from them; how Auk∣ward soever the Conclusions may seem, to those who take their Measures from Fancy how to frame their Rules of Logick, which are to direct their Reason.

LESSON VIII. Of Opinion and Faith.

1. SCience being grounded on Intrinsical Medi∣ums, and on such as are Proper or Immediate∣ly Connected with the Extrems, whence it has to be Evident; it follows, that those Mediums which are either Extrinsical to the thing, or Common ones cannot beget Science, but some Inevident or Obscure kinds of Light, call'd Faith and Opinion: The former of which is grounded on an Extrinsical Medium call'd Witnessing Au∣thority

or Testimony; the Later, on Remote or Common Mediums; which seem to bend or lean towards the Conclusion, but do not by any Ma∣xim of true Logick reach it, or inferr it; Exam∣ples of both may be these.

2. That which is Attested unanimously by such a Multitude of Witnesses, and so Circum∣stanc'd, that they can neither be Mistaken in it Themselves, nor Conspire to deceive others is true; But

That there is such a City as Rome is attested by such a multitude of Witnesses, and so Circumstanc'd, that they can neither be Mistaken in it Themselves, nor Conspire to deceive others; therefore

That there is such a City as Rome is True.

What's Promis'd will be; but

That my Debtor will pay me money to morrow is what's promis'd; therefore

That my Debtor will pay me money to morrow will be;

Where Omitting the Former at present, the Medium [what's Promis'd] is a Com∣mon Notion in respect of Paying; whence we use to say, All Promises are either Broken or Kept: Besides, 'tis far from being Proper or Im∣mediate to the Effect of Paying; in regard that multitudes of Cross-causes may intervene, hin∣dering that Effect from following, tho' never so really intended; whereas taking a Proper Effect [viz. my Chambers being Enlightn'd] prov'd by it's Proper Cause [the Suns darting it's Rayes in through my Window] at which rate all the Course of Nature, and all the Demonstrations

that might be fram'd of it all along, do hang together, nothing can intervene to hinder it; the Efficiency of the Cause being still the Putting the Effect.

3. Common Mediums not being immediate but Remote, are not in true Speech Mediums apt to Connect the Extremes. For, since what Connects two others must it self be Connected with them both; and what is Connected to two things must be Immediate to them both; it fol∣lows, that a Common Notion, not being Immedi∣ate to the Two Extremes, cannot Connect them; and, so, cannot be in proper Speech, or Univocal∣ly, a Middle Term with that which is Immediate.

4. Wherefore, all Assent to a Conclusion from a Common Medium is a Deviation from Humane Nature; and, consequently, Opprobrious. Whence comes the Proverb Turpe est opinari, 'tis Shame∣ful to Assent upon Uncertain and Inconclusive Mediums, such as are Common ones. To which agrees that saying of Holy Writ, Qui credit citò levis est corde; He that assents hastily is light of heart; that is Inconstant or Unsteady in his Thoughts and Actions. Whence also he that ad∣heres stiffly upon Opinionative Grounds incurrs the Note of being an Opiniatre. The reason is, becau••e, Reason being Man's Nature, so that as Brutes are led by Sense so he is led by some Reason (good or bad) in all his Actions, and True Reason being a Power to draw True Con∣clusions out of True Premisses; hence, every Assent Involves (as it were practically) that the thing is True for such a Reason; which Proposi∣tion is False if that Reason, for which he as∣sents,

does not Conclude it True, as Common Mediums do not. Wherefore, Reason being the true Nature given us by GOD; and Truth the Perfection of that Nature, all Assents upon In∣competent or Inconclusive Grounds do doubly injure our Nature; First, as to its Essence, by Concluding unduely; next, as to it's Perfection, in making it embrace a Falsho••d; and, such a Falshood as makes it liable to fall into many others, by imbuing the understanding with a wrong Method of Reasoning; whence he lies ex∣pos'd, by leaving the paths of Right Reason, to the Disrepute of being either Passionate or Ignorant.

5. They who do Assent upon such an Incon∣clusive Medium, notwithstanding that they see it is Inconclusive, are convinc'd to be Deserters of Humane Nature, and led blindly by Passion. For, since all Reasoning is built upon First Prin∣ciples, they who come nearest the Deny••ng First Principles, do radically (as it were) put off and abdicate their Whole Nature; But such Assenters come as near as is possible to the Denying First Principles; for they Assent, that is, they Judge or say interiourly, the Conclusion is True, or that the thing is; and yet they see at the same time, that the Reason, on which only they re∣lie for that Assent, does not Con••lude it to be; that is, they see it may not be, notwithstanding that Reason: which is to Assent or Judge that to be, which yet, at the same time, they Judge may not be: which is in Substance, though not in Direct Terms, (Nature not permitting such a palpable Contradiction to settle in a Subject made to see Truth) as 'tis to Deny the First

Principle [what it is] or, It is Impossible a Thing should be and not be at once.

Corol. I. Hence, such Men are convinc'd to bely their own knowledge, to be False to them∣selves, Self-condemn'd, highly Passionate, Pre∣judic'd and Govern'd by meer Will; that is, to be blindly Willful; which is the Greatest and most Unnatural Depravation, that a Spiritual or Know∣ing Nature is capable of. Wherefore, they are Justly held to be disposed for any Ill that a De∣praved Soul can desire. Which ought to make every prudent Man wary in his Conversing or Negotiating with them, if he cannot well avoid them totally; since, having renounced the Con∣duct of Evident Reason, no Reason can manage them, nor the wisest Man give any guess at what they will do, or whether the blind Impulse of Ungovernable Passion will hurry them.

6. Whatever Allowance may be made for Weak or Ignorant People, there can be no Excuse for a Learned Man if he Assents upon a Common or Inconclusive Medium. Because there can be no Necessity Imaginable that can compel him to Interiour Assent, as (perhaps) there may be to force him to Outward Actions; in regard God has given us a Faculty of Suspending our Assent till we see Evidence; lest our Weakness or Care∣lessness should at every turn precipitate us into Error.

7. From what has been said, 'tis seen that Common Mediums can, at most, but prove a thing Probable or likely to be; which may consist

with it's not-being or being False. The Former part is prov'd, because Proper Mediums only make the Conclusion Certain; and therefore such as these can only render it Probable or Likely. The Se∣cond part is prov'd by every days Experience, which shows us how often we are Deceiv'd in Likelihoods or Probabilities, even though Great ones; and that the Contrary frequently happens to what such slight Grounds made us expect.

8. When those who are Invincibly Ignorant do assent upon such Common Mediums, it leaves no Note upon them more than that of Weakness and Ignorance; For, since such Men do, as is suppos'd, use the best of their Understanding, their Erring does not spring from the Obliquity or Byass of their Wills perverting their Light of Reason, which secures their Morality Untain∣ted.

9. Tho' we ought not to Act thus Interi∣ourly, or Assent, upon Inconclusive Mediums; yet Probability is very often enough to make us act Exteriourly when those Actions are Necessary to be done; even though they be subject to great hazard. Thus Merchants venture their Effects to Sea, even in the time of War, because their State of life requires it; yet, even then, they must have Evidence that 'tis best to venture; otherwise their Reason is some way Defective. So that Humane Nature still Obliges all Men to Act upon some Evidence.

10. In Cases of Conscience, and Law-suits, which are only Probable, and in which Interest is concern'd; the safest way is first to purge our Affections from Coveting that which is perhaps

our Neighbours; next, not to trust to Casuists whom we apprehend to have Large Cases fa∣vourable to our Interest; nor to make choice of a Lawyer who is a Crafty Knave; but rather one who is reputed Honest, so he be Intelligent. For, while we proceed thus, the Will and Con∣science is kept Clear; however the Decision of the matter may hap to be Vnjust.

11. Thus far of Opinion: FAITH or Belief (speaking of Human Faith to which our Cir∣cumstances determin our Discourse) is built on Human Testimony or Witnessing Authority. To which ere we ought to yield Assent, two things are Prerequisit, viz. That we be Certain it could certainly know the things it Attests, and that it speaks truly when it does Attest them: that is, there are requisit Knowlèdg and Vera∣city in the Attesters.

12. If we certainly know that the Atte∣sters knew the thing, and did not only fancy they knew it, it is most Certain the thing is so as they knew it to be; For, since to know a thing is to have the thing in our Under∣standing as it is in it self, and none can know what is not Knowable, or is not: it follows, that all Knowledg of the Thing's Being, or of it's being thus or thus, does most certainly In∣fer that thing to be as the Asserters knew it to be.

13. Care is to be had that the Attesters did truly Know the Thing and not only fancy they knew it when they knew it not. For, since Man∣kind is often deceiv'd in thinking they know, and only True Knowledg in the Attesters can

ground our Second-hand Knowledg that it is, grounded on their Knowing it to be; it follows, that we must be sure those Attesters could not err in knowing that thing, ere we can Ratio∣nally beleive them.

14. Wherefore no Testimony built on their Knowing Speculative Points can have any force upon our Understanding or Oblige it to Belief. For, since we experience that even Learned Men do often err in their Speculations, either thro' Inadvertency, the Obscurity or Perplexed∣ness of the Object, Ambiguity of Words, Dread of some Authority which over-aws their Rea∣son, or, lastly, thro' want of Logick or a Right Method how to manage their Thoughts: It follows, that we cannot be Sure that they do not err, or that they do truly know Speculative Points; nor, consequently, can we be Certain that the thing is truly so as they pretend to know it is. All the power they have over us is, to make us prudently wary not to oppose such Speculaters, but upon Evident Reason: especially if they be many and of Repute; but much more if they pretend to go upon In∣trinsical Mediums; in which the Mistake is both seldom, and quickly discover'd if brought to the Test.

Corol. II. Hence no Credit at all is to be gi∣ven to such Reasoners who do not so much as pretend to Demonstrate, tho never so many. For such men do not so much as affirm themselves to be Knowers, or that the thing is Certainly so as they deem it to be; and, so, they can have no kind of

Authority, even tho' their Speculative thoughts were a thing Attestable. Whence we may establish this Maxim, viz. That No Reasoner (precisely as such) has any kind of Authority but by virtue of the Reason he produces; that is, the Reason, which he alledges, and not his Say∣ing or Word ought to have any force at all upon our Understanding.

15. Wherefore Testimony has for it's Object either Particular things, or Matters of Fact ne∣cessarily knowable by Mankind, using their Com∣mon and Frequent Sensations, or relying on Vner∣rable Experience. For since Vniversal Notions are the Object of Speculation, and men † 1.33 may err in their Speculations; Vniversals cannot be the Objects of Witnessing Authority or Testimony, but Particulars only. Again, since every Parti∣cular is not obvious to Sense, but many of them are so Circumstanc'd, Insensible, or Remote, that we can have no Certain Experience of them; it follows that only su••h Particular Objects or Matters of Fact, as make a lively and Certain Impression on the Senses, are those which can be Attested or be the Object of Testimony.

16. Experience may be so Circumstanced, that it is Impossible the thing Experienced should be otherwise. For, since the Senses of Mankind, in due circumstances, are as apt to convey sincere Impressions of Sensible Objects into our Minds, as other Natural Causes to produce their Effects, they being design'd and fitted by God and Nature for that end: it fol∣lows, that (if other Circumstances be agreea∣able) it is Impossible but they should give us

such Experiential Knowledg of Sensible Matters of Fact, or Particulars, as may assure us of the things being as we Experience it. The Cir∣cumstances requir'd to this Absolute Assurance is, that the Object propos'd be of a thing Sub∣ject to Sense; that it be within a Convenient Distance; and, that the I••pression be not hin∣dred or perverted by an Inconvenient Medium. Hence, we can be absolutely Certain what House or Street we live in, of our Acquain∣tance, or Employment, who reigns in such a year; and of Notable Actions, Universally Knowable, that happen'd in such or such a time; lastly, of Multitudes of Private Actions, familiarly known to our selves only.

17. Besides Knowledg in the Attester, there is also requisit Veracity in him to ground Hu∣man Faith. For, let the Attester know the Ob∣ject never so well, if we cannot be Certain he tells us True when he sayes he knows it, his Original Knowledg cannot have any Effect on us, or beget a Second-hand Knowledg in us, derivable from his Pretended Knowledg of that Object.

18. No Authority deserves Assent farther then Reason gives it to deserve. For, let us take two Authorities, one that of a whole Town, the other of a Knight of the Post; and (since our Nature allows us that Privilege) let it be ask'd why the Latter is not to be credited as much as the Former? and the answer will be, For such a Reason. So that Reason, in Com∣mon, is the Ground of our Believing at all, as well as of our believing one Autho∣rity

rather than Another. And, this because Reason is our Nature given us by GOD; and, therefore, every Act of our Soul that is not for some Reason and according to Reason, is to∣tally without Reason; that is Unnatural, that is Irrational, that is Brutal or Unbecoming a Man.

19. Wherefore no Man can be oblig'd to be∣lieve beyond the Motive he has to believe. For, that degree of Belief that is beyond the Motive or the Reason, as far as it is beyond the Rea∣son is Evidently without Reason, or Irrational. Whence follows that our Reason is to give us our Grounds of Belief, both as to the Know∣ledg and the Veracity of the Attesters. For otherwise our Belief would have no Reason at all for the Grounds it is to rely upon, and so would be perfectly Irrational.

Corol. III. Wherefore, since God governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has gi∣ven them; he does not Command us to Assent absolutely upon any Authority which may either be Deceiv'd or Deceive us. For, other∣wise, men may be led into Errour by obeying GOD's Command; that is, since GOD laid that Command, by GOD Himself.

20. Wherefore both the Knowledg and Ve∣racity of the Attesters must be Knowable by Intrinsical Mediums taken from the Nature of the Thing; and those must be also Conclusive ones. For, their Knowledg and Veracity must either be made known by Intrinsical Mediums, or by Extrinsical ones; that is by Another Au∣thority; and the same question recurrs, How

we are Certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of that other Authority, and so in infinitum. Whence we must come to be certain of the Knowledg and Veracity of Authority by In∣trinsical Mediums, or we can have no Ground at all to believe any Authority. Moreover, the proper work of Reason is to Demonstrate, which is done by Intrinsical Mediums; and, unless they be Conclusive, they prove nothing, and so are good for nothing.

21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain'd by what has been prov'd. §. §. 15.16. Their Veracity must be prov'd by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us; and the best proof (omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Univer∣sal Conspiracy to deceive, the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact &c.) is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End, which was to Deceive. Which reason is grounded on this, that no one man, who is not perfectly Frantick, acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed. For example, to fly to the Moon, or to swim over Thames up∣on a Pig of Lead. Thus it is Demonstrable that all England could not Conspire to deceive those born since, in asserting to them that there was a King Charles the First, or a Long Parliament which rais'd a Civil War here; because they must see it is impossible to gain Belief of it, which was their Immediate End; (whatever far∣ther End they might propose to themselves) So many Records, Practices, Laws, and other

Consequences Issuing thence, giving them the Lie; besides the Histories of our own and other Countries; and the Concatenation of Causes and Effects in the Political part of our Neigh∣bouring Nations, all conspiring unanimously and appositly to detect the Cheat. Wherefore, the End being Evidently Impossible to be at∣chiev'd; it could never be an Apparent good to them in such a case to act for such an End, or to attempt to deceive us by Attesting it; and, therefore, they could not tell such a Lie in such a Case; therefore they were Veracious while they Attested it.

22. Tho' both the Knowledg and Veracity of the Attesters be Demonstrated, and, Con∣sequently, the thing Attested by them be most Certainly and necessarily True; yet our Assent to the Truth of that thing is neither Science no•• Opinion. It cannot be Opinion, because the Medium that begets Opinion is not Necessarily Connected with the Extremes, as is found here. Nor can it be Science, because our Knowledg of the thing is not taken from the Thing it self that is attested, causing such a Notion or Im∣pression in us directly by it's self, or by Reflex Knowledges upon those Direct ones (on which kind of Impressions all Science is built) but it is a Knowledg Reflected to us from Anothers Knowledg of it, or a kind of Second-hand Knowledg. Nor is the Knowledg which even the Attesters had of the Object at First-hand, a Proper Effect of the Ens or Thing which is the Object of that Knowledg. Nor is the Thing, as an Object, the Proper Cause of that Knowledg; only which can beget Science. For,

a Proper Cause has a Real Order or Relation, to it's Proper Effect; whereas the Objects have no Real Relation at all to the Senses or our Knowing Power, as was shown above where we treated of Relation; By which we may far∣ther more clearly discover the Essential Diffe∣rences between Science, Faith, and Opinion.

It may be objected that Intelligibility is a Property of Ens; therefore every Ens is a Pro∣per Cause of Knowledg. 'Tis answer'd that it is only a Property of Ens Negatively (as it were) in regard nothing can be understood but Ens; Non Ens not being able to cause any knowledg in us. Or, it may mean that 'tis on∣ly a Property of Ens in order to an Extrinsi∣cal thing, not a true Property, Perfecting it In∣trinsically; as Properties due to a thing by Nature, and Springing from their Essences, do. It may be objected farther that all Na∣tural Powers are true Properties tho' they re∣spect Extrinsical things on which they are to work. 'Tis answer'd, that they perfect those Entities Intrinsically, or give them some per∣fection in their Intrinsical Nature, which, In∣telligibility does not; for nothing is Intrinsically better, or otherwise than it would be, for being Known or Vnderstood. To explicate this better, we may consider that every Entity, being a Part of the World, has some Office or Place there, and some part which it is to act on the Stage of Nature. And, accordingly, Metaphysicks teach us that every Body is constituted such by it's having some Primary Operation, which 'tis fit∣ted to produce; as Fire to heat, Water to

Cool, &c. Whence, what ever fits it for such an Operation is either Essential to it, or a Pro∣perty immediately Connected with it's Essence; such as are those Natural Powers objected. Now 'tis Evident that those Powers do perfect each Nature Intrinsically; since without them it would be Imperfect and Impotent to perform that which it was Essentially Ordain'd for; and so the whole course of Nature, carry'd on by such Proper Causes to Proper Effects, would be quite out of frame and Order; whereas, 'tis manifest it would suffer no detriment at all in it self, whether those Proper Causes or Ef∣fects were Vnderstood or no. Which shows that their being Known by the First Attesters, or made known to us by their Knowing them, is not a Proper Effect of those Causes, nor Intrinsical to them as they are parts of Corporeal Nature, but Accidental to them as such; but yet so Accidental that it is Inseparable from them; and, so, does Necessarily infer the Conclusion.

23. Testimony on which Human Faith relies, is adequately divided into Living and Dead; that is into such Attesters as speak vivâ voce, and those that speak by Writing. Because there is no Common or Ordinary way but Speech and Written or Printed Characters by which Men can relate Matters of Fact to others, or testify to them their Knowledg of such things.

24. Matters of fact done long a go, if very Concerning to have the Knowledg of them Continu'd, and that they were known at first by the Experience of a great portion of Man∣kind, may be made known to us who live now,

by a Delivery of them down from the fore∣going Age to the succeeding One. Which Con∣tinued Testimony or Delivery of them is call'd Tradition. For, since the Generality of First Attesters, who liv'd in the same time when they happen'd, could not but know them; and the Continual Concern of them could not but still prompt and provoke Foregoers to speak of them to their Descendents; it follows, that the Conti∣nuance of those Causes may still continue the same Effect, and bring the Knowledge of them down to our times.

25. Practise, if Frequent, and Obligatory to be Continu'd, will most certainly bring down the Tradition of Former Matters of Fact. This is Evident; for it is Impossible that the Martyr∣dom of King Charles the First, or the horrid Powder Treason should ever be forgotten, if the Anniversary of them have a Continu'd Obliga∣tion of celebrating such Matters of Fact but once a Year; much more, were such Practises often repeated.

26. Such a Tradition of such Matters of Fact is Equally Certain tho' the thing Attested had hap∣pen'd some Thousands of Years ago, as if it had happen'd but an Hundred Years since. For, since it is equally Easie for the succeeding Age to understand the Attesters, Witnessing still all along that they had been told it, as it was to understand the First Attesters relating they had seen it; Their Testimony, as far as concerns their Knowledge of what was transmitted, has equal force as had the First Attestation: And, since the Wills of the Intermediate Attesters

had the same Object (viz. an Apparent Good) which they could not desert or go against, or act without it, and an Evident Impossibility could not be an Apparent Good; and it was e∣qually acting for an Evident Impossibility, to conspire to say they had such a thing Univer∣sally Testify'd to them by their Fore-fathers, or to hope to gain Belief of it, if it had not been so Attested; their Veracity, in Attesting they thus received it, was no less Assur'd. Where∣fore, the same Causes being put all along in each succeeding Age as were at the first, the same Effect of Delivering it down with the same Cer∣tainty, must still be Continu'd, though for some thousands of Years.

27. No Dead Testimony or History has any Authority, but by virtue of Living Testimony or Tradition. For, since Falshoods may be Writ∣ten or Printed as well as Truths, it follows that nothing is therefore of any Authority, because 'tis Written or Printed. Wherefore, no Book or History can Authenticate another Book; whence follows that, if it have any Authority, it must have it from Living Authority or Tradition, con∣tinuing down to us the Consent of the World, from the time that Author Writ, or the matters of Fact it relates were done, that the things it relates are True in the main; and, consequent∣ly, that the Book that relates them deserves Credit, or is (as we use to say) an Authentick History. For example, had a Romance, (sober∣ly penn'd,) and Curtius's History been found in a Trunk for many Hundreds of Years after they were writ; and the Tradition of the former Ages

had been perfectly Silent concerning them both, and the Matters they relate; we must either have taken both of them for a Romance, or both for a True History; being destitute of any Light to make the least difference between them.

28. Tradition not only authenticates Books in the bulk, but it gives moreover the d••stinct de∣grees of Credibility to divers passages in the same Book already authenticated in gross. For no wise Man can give the same degree of Credibi∣lity to Alexander's cutting the Gordian Knot, or to his speaking such and such words to Hephae∣stion or Parmenio, as he is forc'd to give to his Conquest of Asia: And why? all of them being Equally in the Books? Certainly, because the latter being Visible, Remarkable, and of great Concern to Innumerable Attesters of it at first, so vast a source of Original Attesters did, con∣sequently, carry down a Matter of fact so huge∣ly Notorious with a vast sway; whereas the o∣thers, being particulars, of small Concern or Note, and seen or heard but by a few at first, wanted a strong Tradition to recommend them for Certain Truths. Whence, (for ought we know,) they were grounded and writ upon Hear∣say, as our News and many particular Actions and Sayings of Great Men are now adays, which oftentimes prove False.

29. Hence appears, that Historical Faith, meerly as Historical, that is, in passages Vna∣betted by Tradition, is not Absolutely Certain, but is liable to be False or Erroneous, and so is not without some Degree of Levity to be abso∣lutely Assented to; tho' we cannot generally with

prudence Contradict them, but let them pass as if they were Truths, till some good occasion a∣wakens our Doubt of them: The reason is gi∣ven, in our last Paragraph, from this, that all Particulars are of slight Credit that were not Abetted by a Large and well-grounded Tradi∣tion.

30. Tradition thus qualify'd as is above-said, viz. So that the Matters of Fact were Certain∣ly Experienced by very great Multitudes of the First Attesters; that they were of great or uni∣versal Concern, and so prompting them still to relate them to the next Age; that they were Abetted by some obligatory Practise; and, lastly Impossible to gain a Belief, if they had not been; and thence, Obliging the Attesters to Ve∣racity: Such a Tradition, I say, is more than Morally, that is, Absolutely Certain. To omit the foregoing reasons, which have evinc'd the force of each of these particulars. This will be Evidently seen, or rather Experientially felt; by Reflecting on our own Interiour; and by observing how Nature works in Mankind and forces them to Assent firmly to the points which such a Tradition recommends, and to Suspend as to the other. For Instance; Let us take some Particular that is only Morally Certain; as, that I shall not dye this Night; or, that when I walk abroad a Tile shall not fall from a House, and kill me; or, that the House I live in shall not fall down and crush me; or such like. I find at first sight, that these are highly Vnlikely, because it very seldom happens; and many rea∣sons may occurr why I think it will not be;

Yet if I severely call to account my most Se∣rious and Deliberate thoughts to find any Ab∣solutely Certain Reason, why that may not hap∣pen to me which has happen'd to others; I shall perceive that I can find none such. Whence, I can entertain some Degree of Suspence, whether it may not possibly happen to me or no; which restrains me from Assenting absolutely that it will not. This duely reflected on, let us propose to our selves Another Particular, to be scann'd likewise by our most strictly-examining Thoughts: viz. whether there was a Henry the 8th. a Julius Caesar, or that Alexander conquer'd Asia. Which being propos'd to our Examina∣tion, let us again consult our Thoughts, and put on the most Sceptical Disquisitiveness we are able, to find out some reason, why these may not possibly be False, as well as the others might. And, in despight of all our most Exact search, and our utmost endeavours to put our selves upon doubting of these said particulars, we shall still find the Affirmative of each of them writ in our Breast in such Inde∣lible Characters, and so Solidly Imprinted there by Nature (I say, by Nature, for that Certainty was not Acquir'd by Study and Specu∣lation) that we can never be able to invent any kind of Reason that can breed in us the least degree of Suspense, as to the Verity of these, and such like Matters of Fact; or unfix us from our most stedfast Adherence to them as most Certain Truths. Which shows Evidently that the for∣mer were only Morally Certain, that is, had some Contingency in them, and so, might pos∣sibly

be otherwise than we, till we came to re∣flect, deem'd them; whereas those Latter were more than Morally, that is Absolutely Certain; because, after the most accurate Reflexion, we could not invent, and heartily embrace, any Ground or Reason to admit the least Suspence as to their Truth; nor how or why they might possibly be False, or (which is the same) that the Testimony or Tradition for them could be Fallacious.

Corol. IV. Hence we may make a farther Discovery of the force of Practical Self-evidence instill'd by Nature without Study: and, that it is a solid Knowledge of the An est of the thing Attested, and, consequently, of the Conclusive Force of Tradition, as also of many other Truths; the Quid est of which (or the Grounds on which our Rational Nature Unreflectingly, and as it were, at unawares proceeded,) is to be Demon∣strated by Learned Men, looking exactly into Intrinsecal Mediums; and thence discovering how this Effect, viz. such a Firm Adhesion, was wrought in us Connaturally; or why such an Authority could not deceive us in Attesting such Particulars.

Note, That some of these Matters of Fact now mention'd, do fall short as to some of the best Qualifications found in di∣verse other Traditions; viz. as to that of their being Practical. Which gives us farther light to discern the Incom∣parable Strength of Tradition, and how

every way Impossible it is it should de∣ceive us, were it furnisht with all the Advantages it might have.

13. Hence is seen that Opinionative Faith is as much Irrational as Opinion was shown to be, taking it as Oppos'd to Science; for ex∣ample.

• What an Old Wife said is True
• That she saw a Spright is what an Old Wife said; therefore
• That she saw a Spright is True.

LESSON IX. Of Assent, Suspence, Certainty and Uncertainty.

1. THE Notion of Potentiality, Indifferen∣cy, Indetermination, and Uncertainty, as conceiv'd to be in the Thing, are one and the same; For, if the Thing be consider'd meerly as a Power to be This or That, or to be thus or thus, 'tis evident from the Terms that it is not (as thus conceiv'd,) Actually, Particularly, De∣terminately or Certainly this, or thus; since all Difference, Determination, and, consequently, Certainty in the thing (which, if well refle∣cted on, are no more but it's being what it is) do spring from the Act or Form; as all Poten∣tiality, Indifferency, Indetermination and Un∣certainty of being this, or being thus, does from the Matter.

2. Existence, as being the Last Actuality, takes away all Potentiality, Indifferency, and Uncertainty of being this, or thus that can pos∣sibly be in the Thing. This is as Evident as 'tis that Perfect Light takes away Darkness, or, that any Opposit is Inconsistent with the other Opposit in the same kind; or, to come nearer our point, that what is, has, while it is, lost all Potentiality or Power of not being while it is.

3. Wherefore, considering the Thing as it is in our Vnderstanding, it remains Indeterminate and Vncertain to us; that is, our Understanding, which is Inform'd by it, is Potential or Inde∣terminate it self; and consequently, we are Vn∣certain Intellectually till we see it is. The rea∣son is, because all our Knowledg is Intirely and Adequately taken from the Thing, which makes the Understanding Conformable to it according to the degree of Clearness or Obscurity where∣by it is represented to us, or affects us: Whence follows, that, when we see the Existence of the Thing, or that it is, our Understanding is ultimately Determinate, that is, we are Abso∣lutely Certain.

4. Wherefore, on the contrary, while we see the Thing may not be for ought we know, our Understanding is Indeterminate as to it's Being; that is, we must remain Vncertain that it is. For, 'tis against a First Principle of our Under∣standing, that the Thing may not be and be at once.

5. Wherefore, [Assent] being the Judging that a thing is, all that passes in us (if we act Ra∣tionally) is Suspence till we come to a Proof that Concludes it is. This is manifest from the Terms; For the Words [Suspending of Assent] do show that, take away all Suspence, Assent succeeds: and, consequently, that (unless it so happens that we see a thing to be clearly False) all is Suspence till we come at Assent.

6. Wherefore all Common and Remote Me∣diums, which are only apt to ground Opinion, being unable to conclude the Thing is; they

are, consequently, unable to Determin the Un∣derstanding that the Thing is, and, therefore, they must leave it (if it works rationally) in some degree of Suspence; Indetermination or (which is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 same) in Vncertainty. This is Evident; because such Proofs do reach only to show the thing Likely to be, which falls short of it's Being really and Indeed; for Like∣lihood to be is not the Notion of Being, since [what is, most Certainly is] which goes beyond all Likelihoods, how great soever they may be imagin'd to be.

7. Suspence may be consider'd as Indiffe∣rently hovering between the Things being or not being, or without Inclining to either of them. For, sometimes we have no kind of Reason inclining us to the Likelihood of the one more than of the other. As we experience it hap∣pens to us as to our Determining whether the Number of the Stars be Even or Odd.

8. Hence Assent consists in an Indivisible (as does also Dissent, or a Judgment that the thing is not) but all Suspense is Divisible or Capable of Different Degrees. The former part is Evi∣dent, because it's proper Object, [is] or [being] is Indivisible, as is also the Object of Dissent [is not,] whereas the Objects of Suspence are seeming Distances from the things being so Actually, or Approaches towards it; or in Dissent, Approaches towards it's seeming not to be so; that is, Removes from it's be∣ing so.

9. The Differences of this perfectly Indiffe∣rent Suspense are more and Less seemingly Di∣stant

from, or Approaching to, the Actual Be∣ing of the Thing. For this Indifferent Suspense, by it's being Indifferent, is a kind of Genus to the others, and abstracts from them both; and therefore, the Differences of it must be more and less in that kind.

Corol. I. The Disinclining towards Assent or Inclining towards Dissent that the thing is, is call'd Doubt; and, if the Being of that Thing is our Good, it grounds that Passion call'd Fear of loosing it. And, the Inclining towards Assent in such a Case, or Disinclining to Dissent, causes a disposition in the Understanding oppo∣sit to Doubt; which, (tho we want a name for it) is a certain chearing Glimpse in the Un∣derstanding, which was in perfect Darkness be∣fore, and grounds that Passion which we call Hope. Both which Passions are Rational or Ir∣rational, according as the Likelihoods on which they are built are Great or Slight.

10. Those Different Inclinations or Propen∣sions of the Understanding towards the Things being or not being may be taken from Innume∣rable Heads: viz. From the meer Frequency or Seldomness of the things Happening; from Hi∣storical Relations unabetted by Tradition; from Rumour and Common Talk; from Writers of Uncertain Authority, or proceeding upon Spe∣culation or Opinion; from the Multitude of such Authors as do not so much as pretend to know, yet are of great Name or Authority; from the bare Sentiments of Antiquity; from relying on our Nurses, Parents or Tutors; from Me∣dals,

Monuments, Inscriptions, Fables, &c. From Misconceits deluding our Fancy; from Equivocation of words; from Interest and Pre∣judice; from ill-agreeing Observations made by our selves of the same happening in a like case; from Mistakes of Proper Causes, &c. All which agree in this that they are Common or Remote Mediums.

11. Some Degrees of Suspense are so small and Indiscernable, that they are not easie to be discover'd, so that they counterfeit an Assent even in the Wisest, and cause a Real Assent in Weak People. Such as are the Instances of Moral Cer∣tainty mention'd * 1.34 above.

12. The way to discover whether they be As∣sents or Suspences is to Reflect on our own Interi∣our, and to study better our careless thoughts, by asking our selves what Certain Ground we had for them. For, 'tis Evident that we have many Effects wrought in us by Nature, which, for want of Reflexion, we are not aware of; in regard our Thoughts, and the several natures of them, can∣not possibly be known but by Reflexion. For, to use our former Example, we seem to Assent Ab∣solutely that we shall not dye this Night; and even the Wisest Men, if they be now in per∣fect health, do seem to take it to be altoge∣ther Certain, or (to speak more properly) that themselves are Absolutely Certain of it; yet, upon recourse to their Grounds, finding themselves un∣able to fathom the Series of Hidden Causes and the multitude of Casualties that may occur, which they habitually knew before-hand that they did not certainly know; we shall find

that, notwithstanding this seeming Assent of theirs, they yet retain'd some small Degree of Suspence whether it might happen or no, which hinder'd them from truly Assenting.

13. From what's said it appears that Cer∣tainty is a Qualification of Assent, giving it it's best perfection by Securing it from Errour; and making it, at the same time, Incapable of ever admitting the least Degree of Suspence. For, since our Assent may hap to be, and oft-times is, upon Irrational and Inconclusive Grounds; which expose it, when discover'd, to the shame of a future Retractation; but Certain Assent, cannot be liable to that Hazard and Inconve∣nience, because what's Certain to us, is True beyond all Peradventure; it is evident that Cer∣tainty superadds to Assent the highest Perfection that can be.

14. Certainty may either be consider'd as it is in the Object or the Thing; or else, as it is in the Subject or Person who is Ascertain'd by by that Object.

15. Certainty on the Objects side is nothing but the Things being Determinately what it is, or as it is. This is in a manner Self-evident; For every thing that is, is Determinate; and it's being Fixt to be such, is to be Certainly such of it's own Nature; independently on any thing but on the First Cause Establishing that Nature to be what it is; or ordering it, by Se∣cond Causes, to be as it is.

16. Certainty on the Subject's side is the Con∣formity of our Understanding to this Objective Certainty. For, we can neither be Certain nor

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Uncertain without Reasons or Motives; and those must either be taken from the Establish'd or Certain Nature of the Things, or they can be no Reasons.

17. Wherefore, when we discourse or dispute about the Certainty of any Point, it can only be meant of Certainty in the Subject, or of Cer∣tainty to us: for, of Certainty on the Object's side, or that the Thing is Certainly or Deter∣minately what it is, there can be no Dispute.

Corol. II. Hence, Certainty being the Deter∣mination of the Vnderstanding, which is to be led by Reason; all Determination of our Un∣derstanding which springs from the Will, and not from Reason, is not to be call'd Certainty, but Resolvedness or Wiliful Adhesion.

18. Wherefore 'tis most Irrational, and a most senseless Abuse of the word [Certainty] to ground it on the Subjects or the Person's own Perswasion that the thing is so, and not on the Thing it self. For, since our Soul is of her self Tabula rasa, all our Knowledg, and the Firm∣ness or Solidity of our Knowledg, that is our Certainty, must either be taken from the Things that are without us, or (since Nature can have no other Method but tha••;) it must be inspir'd Supernaturally. Wherefore, such a Fantastick and Catachrestical Certainty, is convinc'd to be nothing in those men that are capable of weighing Rea∣sons, but a Self-conceited Resolution to hold or think thus, and to Stick to it, out of meer Wil∣fulness (its true and only Ground) in defiance

of all Reason, and of the Natures of Things which do ground all our Reason.

19. Hence follows, that that Certainty they Nick-name [Moral] is in reality, Vncertainty. For, since all Certainty has for it's Object or Cause the Existence of the Thing on which all true Assent is grounded; and this, consisting in an Indivisible has no Degrees; it follows that as when you step never so little out of the No∣tion of [is] which is its Object, you plunge into [is not] so you no sooner relinguish (tho' never so little) the true Notion of Certainty but you fall into Vncertainty, in regard the Object of it permits no degrees of passing from one to the other, or Approaching to it nearer by little and little. Wherefore, since Moral Certainty imports some Diminution of True Certainty, it must ne∣cessarily be some kind, or some degree of Uncer∣tainty, Whence to say [I am morally certain of a Thing] is, in rigour, the same Nonsense as it is to say I am Vncertainly Certain, or (which is con∣sequent to it) I ignorantly know, I suspendingly or hoveringly Assent, I diffidently believe or can pro∣bably demonstrate. Wherefore, when in common speech men use to say they are morally certain, 'tis a Catachrestical phrase, and signifies only that the thing is highly likely, or that they In∣cline strongly to think 'tis True.

20. Hence follows, that Certainty and Infal∣libility are all one, or the self-same Notion. For, since Nothing sounds more contrary to the Com∣mon Sense of Mankind than to say, we are Certain of any thing peradventure, Certainty must be such a Fixure of the Mind, as to the Existence

of the Thing, as is beyond all Peradventures of being Deceiv'd in that thing, or beyond all Contingency that it may happen to be other∣wise than we are Certain it is. Again, since Certainty is the Immediate Effect of our Know∣ledge of the Thing, and the thing is Infallibly, what it self is; and our knowledg of a Thing (it being Essentially a Conformity to that thing) is Infallibly as the Thing is: it follows demonstra∣tively that Certainty, which determins and fixes our Understanding by such a Knowledg, or a Knowledg so grounded, must be likewise Infal∣lible. Lastly, (to omit many other Conclusive Proofs) If Infallibility and Certainty be not the same Notion, then they are different Notions; that is, [Infallible] is one of the Differences of Certainty, distinguishing it from other sorts or Species of Certainty; wherefore there must (in that supposition) be another species of Certainty which is not Infallible; that is, (since what is not Infallible must be Fallible) there must be a∣nother Species of Certainty which is Fallible Certainty; But this is against the Common Sense and Language of Mankind; nor can there be greater Nonsense than to say, I am Fallibly Certain of such a Thing; nor, (though there could not want occasions to use such words) was it ever heard or read since the Creation that any man did ever joyn these two words [Fallibly and Cer∣tain] together in their Discourses and Writings. Therefore, [Infallible] is not a Difference of Cer∣tainty as its Genus or (which the same) a Notion Different from it; whence 'tis Logically demon∣strated

that it is the same Notion with it, or that Certainty and Infallibility are all one.

Quaere. Why is [Infallible] then added to [Certainty] if it have no Different Signification from it, or do not add some degree of Certainty to it? Or why does Mankind use such a needless Tautology? 'Tis answer'd; We may observe that though to say I am Infallibly Certain of such a Thing, sutes very well with the Notions and the Sense and Language of Mankind, yet men never use it but when some Circumstance re∣quires it to put others out of all possible Doubt of the Thing in question: And then Nature puts them upon Redoubling, as it were, their Words or Expressions to assure them of their Certainty of that Thing. Thus in such Cases, they use to say, I know it, I tell you once again, I know it to be so; or, they think it not enough to say bare∣ly I saw it, or I heard it, but they express them∣selves thus, I saw it with my own eyes; or I heard it with my own ears; which, were it not on such an occasion, would seem foolish and Tautolo∣gical; since no man can see but with his own Eyes, nor hear but with his own Ears: Or, it may be answer'd that some men use in such oc∣casions to joyn [Infallible] to [Certainty] to signifie True Certainty, and to distinguish it from that Mock-Certainty call'd Moral; which must be a Fallible Certainty if it be any Certainty at all, that is, an Vncertain Certainty. Whence, since Mankind never us'd such a phrase as Fal∣libly Certain, though they might have had many occasions to do so, had it not been Chimerical and Nonsense, and against their Natural Notion

of Certainty; we may hence farther demon∣strate (in confirmation of our 19th. Sect.) that Moral Certainty, being (if any) a Fallible Cer∣tainty, is no kind of Certainty at all; and that 'tis as great Non-sense to say Morally Certain (meaning by those words such a Certainty as we may be Deceiv'd in) as to say Fallibly Cer∣tain; and it would be as much abhorr'd by Mankind, were not the Phrase cloak'd, and the sense of it clouded by the Unintelligible Notion of the word [Moral] which, as they use it, has no determinate Bounds; and so it cannot be Defin'd, nor Consequently distinctly Vnderstood. Nor (as far as I have observ'd) do we read such an Expression in the Antient Latin Authors, either Heathens or Christians, but the word Ve∣risimilitude or Likelihood only; which is not so apt to impose upon Learners or Readers; till some late Speculaters being most of them Scep∣tical, and blundering between Certainty and Uncertainty, invented this odd Mixture call'd Moral Certainty, which should be partly the one, partly the other. To which they were forced by their bad Speculation, and the Care of their Credit: For, it was highly opprobrious to say they had No Certainty at all in their Writings; and it was Impossible for such Super∣ficial Discoursers to show any thing truly Cer∣tain, because they durst not undertake to De∣monstrate any thing; and, therefore, to uphold their Repute on some fashion, they were ob∣lig'd to advance this Ambidextrous Notion of Moral Certainty, which might be either Certain or Vncertain as occasion serv'd. Whereas, (as

has been shown above) they might with full as much reason have invented a Compound of [is] and [is not] which would have done a great kindness to Scepticism, and have been a most excellent ground to verifie Contradictions. Nor is this spoken in the air; Diverse of them have made many great steps towards this He∣roick Exploit to un-man Mankind by their put∣ting Vacuum, Imaginary Space, Subsistent Di∣mensions, Negative Entities and such Chimae∣ras to have a being; tho', either directly or by consequence, they have been manifested to be Pure Nothings. And as they dealt with the Notion of Ens by confounding it with Non En∣tities, so they labour hard to do the same with the Notion of Existence too, as is seen above. For they are utterly destroying the Notion of [is] and the Truth of this Proposition [what is, is] while all their Sceptical Discourses would have those best Perfections of our Understanding (I mean Certainties) that are Immediately grounded on, and correspond to, the being of the Thing, to be possible not to be as the thing is, or possible to be False; which they must be, if the Notion of Certainty may be compounded with Moral.

21. No Testimony that is Fallible in what it attests, can prove the thing Attested by it to be True. For, since Knowledge in the Attester is ne∣cessary to ground all Attestation, and give it any Weight; and a Testimony that is Fallible in what it attests, may be Deceiv'd in what it attests; it cannot be said to Know that thing it Attests, be∣cause all knowledge consists in this that the Un∣derstanding

be Formally, that is Infallibly, as the Thing is. Whence follows that, how firmly so∣ever such Attesters may deem or opine that the Thing is highly Likely to be True; yet they can∣not be said to know, really and indeed, that the Thing is True. Whence 'tis Concluded that such Attesters can never prove the Truth of that thing: Truth, Fundamentally consider'd, consisting in an Indivisible, as being the Existence of the thing Known; and Formal Truth (or Truth in us) be∣ing the Conformity of our Understanding to the Thing thus Existing; and, therefore, consisting likewise in an Indivisible. Which sets it above all Gradual Approaches of Likelihood, or Probabili∣ty of being so; nay, above all Possibility of no•• being so, that is, of being False. Again, they who are Fallible in the thing they Attest may be de∣ceiv'd in that thing; that is, may be in an Er∣ror; and so what is built on their Testimony may be Erronious or False: But what's True cannot be False; therefore a Fallible Testimony cannot be a Ground or Reason to prove a Thing, no better Attested, to be True.

Note that this Proposition [what is True can∣not be False] does hold in all Truths, but those which are in materia contingenti; as, when we say to day [it Rains] this Proposition may be False to morrow, when it is Fair; because the Matter or Subject, viz. the Temper of the Air on which it is built, is Alter'd. But, this Ex∣ception has no place in Speculative Truths; which Abstract from such Contingency, and are grounded on our Natural Notions, or the Na∣tures

of things and their Metaphysical Verity, which cannot Alter.

22. Therefore no Fallible Testimony can de∣serve Assent to what it Attests or says. For, since a Fallible Testimony may attest a Falshood, and Falshoods do deprave the Understanding, and to Assent to a Falshood is a certain and Actual De∣pravation of it; and, therefore, to Assent to a thing that may be false is to hazard to deprave it; and none ought to hazard such an Injury to his Soul, especially when there is no necessity of doing himself that harm, or of Assenting in such a Case; both because GOD and Nature have furnish'd us with a Faculty of Suspending till we have Evidence; as also, because no Outward Force can impel us to Assent; nor any Interiour Force, but that of Clear Evidence; and a Mo∣tive that may be False (as Fallible Testimony may) cannot lay Claim to Clear Evidence, either of it's self, or of its Grounds. It follows that such a Testimony cannot deserve our hazarding to embrace an Error; nor, consequently, to make us Assent upon its Attestation.

LESSON X. Of Disputation, and Paralogisms.

DIsputation must be fitted to the Occasions, and to the Ends, we aim at; which may be either to clear Truth by combating our Ad∣versary with down-right Reason; or only to gain a Victory over the Defendant by Stratagem. The manners of Disputing may be shown by putting Four Cases or Circumstances which va∣ry the Method of it.

1. When the Defendent holds a False Thesis, the way to convince him will not be Difficult, if the Doctrin deliver'd above be well consider'd and dexterously made use of. For, if a fit Middle Term be taken and rightly placed, the Conclusion will necessarily follow against him; so that he will be certainly overthrown, and his Cause lost. But, if the Disputant be so Skilful as to Reduce his Discourse to Identical Propo∣sitions, he will not have the face to own his Position any longer; the First Lights of Nature standing so Evidently against him.

2. To know in what Mood we are to frame our Syllogism, we must take the Proposition which is Contradictory to the Defendents Te∣net; and, by the Certain Rules given as * 1.35 a∣bove, it will be easie to know in which of the Four Moods such a Conclusion is to be prov'd.

For Example, suppose the Defendent holds that [Some Body is Unchangeable] you must take and prove the Contradictory to it, viz. [No Body is Unchangeable] which being an Uni∣versal Negative, and withal the Proposition which is to be the Conclusion, it can only be prov'd in Celarent; as

• Ce-No Divisible thing is Unchangeable; but
• la-Every Body is a Divisible thing; there∣fore
• rent-No Body is Unchangeable.

3. The same Method must be taken if the Defendent absolutely denies any of the Premis∣ses of the First Syllogism, or any of the Suc∣ceeding ones; or, if, by Distinguishing, he alters the more Universal or Ambiguous Proposition, to a more Determinate one; Only you must not now take the Contradictory to it, as you did at first, for then it was your Adversary's Proposition which you were to disprove, now 'tis your own which you are to prove; and, therefore, you must take your Measures now from it self. For example; if he Denies the Minor, which was an Universal Affirmative, you must prove it in Barbara, thus.

• Every Quantitative thing is Divisible, but
• Every Body is a Quantitative thing; therefore
• Every Body is Divisible.

4. Besides the having a Middle Term, and knowing in what Form to argue, some other Rules must be Observ'd.

1. Get an Exact Notion of the Terms of the Proposition under debate; that is, consider well in what Common Head they are, and how de∣fin'd; which is the same as to look attentively into the Nature of the Thing. For this will best furnish you with Proper Mediums.

2. Agree before-hand with the Defendent about the Meaning of the Words which express those Terms; which is the most Solid way of Sta∣ting the Question, and of avoiding Wordish Di∣stinctions.

3. See the Mediums be Proper or Immediate; otherwise, not being well connected, they can∣not Conclude certainly, although the Form be right.

4. Take heed of Equivocation of Words; For, otherwise, you will hazard to be carry'd aside from the True State of the Question, and lose sight of the true Nature of the Thing by mistaking one Notion for another; and, so, you will be certainly non-plust. And, the longer you dispute, the farther still you will err.

5. Observe well the Doctrin of Dividing right, and be sure that each Member of the Distin∣ction he brings, has in it the true Notion of the Term Divided or Distinguisht. Otherwise he will baffle and confound you with impertinent Distinctions, introduce a new Question, and put you besides your Argument. For example, if he distinguishes Space into Real and Imaginary, and obtains of you to admit Imaginary Space

for one kind of Space (which is in reality No∣thing) he will defeat your Argument, and put you to fight against the Air; while, by getting you to admit Non ens for Ens, he may answer or say any thing. You have lost all your strength when you forego Nature, and suffer your Natural Notions to be perverted. The same may be said of the Distinction of Ens into Positivum and Negativum which is plainly to di∣stinguish Ens, into Ens and Non Ens.

6. When the Defendent grants any thing, then to lay up in careful memory his own Con∣cessions, and make use of them against him to force him to admit Truth or retract. For, other∣wise, he may perhaps in the beginning of the Dispute yield candidly to diverse things; which, afterwards, when he finds himself pincht and reduced to streights, he will flatly deny.

7. To be true to your Cause, and to seek the Victory of Truth over Error, rather than your own over your Adversary; that is, to hold him still to the Point, and to pursue the Eviction of that; and not, leaving that pursuit, to catch the Adversary at advantages, and follow on that game to show him Weak and Self-contra∣dictory; (tho' it is not amiss to hint, and then wave it) as is the less-laudable way of those who fall to argue ad hominem. Yet, if the re∣pute of the Person happens to weigh more with his Followers than the Strength of his Reasons, and that he is held Obstinate and to want Can∣dour; it may be a Duty to Truth, and to the Cause, to Expose him to Contempt by Baffling him.

8. To reflect that, tho' the Words in Com∣mon have the same Sence; yet, as standing in the Context, it may have diverse Constructions, and so cause that Fallacy we call Amphibo∣logy.

9. That not only Single words and Sentences may be Ambiguous, but there may lurk an E∣quivocation even in the Connexion it self; as when the Middle Term is Accidentally joyn'd to one Extreme by [is] and Essentially to ano∣ther.

Thus far of Disputation when the Defendent holds a False Tenet; which is the only Method an Honest Man, whose sole End is to evince Truth and beat down Error, ought to take. The following ways are more becoming vain Sophi∣sters, whose aim it is to combat Truth on any Fashion. Yet, 'tis fit that Honest Men should know them, that they may know how to avoid the Ambushes and Snares of Truth's Enemy.

5. The second Case then is when the Defen∣dent holds a True point. v. g. [that there are Angels] and yet holds a False one Inconsistent with it. v. g. that [That which is no where (or in no place) is not.] The Disputant, if craf∣ty, may make use of this False Thesis to over∣throw the True one, Thus

• Nothing that is in no where (or in no place) is; but
• All Angels are no where; therefore
• No Angels are.

6. The Third Case is, when the Defendent does not hold an Inconsistent Thesis, yet he is Ignorant of the Antecedents and Consequents of his Tenet. In which case, if the Defendent can be brought to deny some Truth necessarily Connected with his Thesis, he will be forc'd to deny the Thesis it self. As, put case the Defen∣dent holds that GOD, our Creator, is Infinitly Perfect in himself; yet, through want of Lo∣gick, is Ignorant that GOD has no Real Rela∣tion to Creatures; and therefore that the word [Creator] apply'd to him is meerly an Extrinse∣cal Denomination, and no ways Intrinsecally perfecting Him or affecting him; such a Man may be in danger of foregoing his Christian Te∣net by this Argument.

• Fe-Nothing that depends on another for some Perfection is Infinitly perfect in it self: but
• ri-GOD depends on Creatures for his be∣ing a Creator, which is some Perfe∣ction in him; therefore
• a-GOD is not Infinitly Perfect in Him∣self.

7. The Fourth is, when the Defendent Un∣derstands only his own Thesis, and is in a manner Ignorant of all others. For example; Let us suppose that some Defendent by the Language of Christianity, with which he is imbu'd, or by some Solid Discourse he has accidently heard, and (though not Learned yet) having a good Mother-wit is made well Understand, does

hold that GOD is Vnchangeable; but yet, being not us'd to Disputes or Speculative Reflexions, he is little verst in other points; as in the Na∣ture of Christian Language in Spiritual Points, of which, consequently, we have no Natural Notions; and therefore is not aware that all our Words we use when we speak of them are Equivocal and Improper; and, especially, when we speak of GOD, highly Metaphorical: Such a man, no better qualify'd, may be stumbled and perhaps made forego that Evident and True Tenet by a Contentious alledging things very Forrein which he not skilful in, and then backing them with Authority, on this manner. What is not GOD Pleas'd when we do well, and when we Sin becomes displeas'd; that is, changes from being Pleas'd to be Angry; and, when we repent, is he not Pleas'd again? Will or dare you deny that which Scripture, Fathers, Catechisms, Prayer-books, and Sermons do so often incul∣cate, and the Consent of all good Christians does Unanimously and Constantly avow? Why are we afraid of Sinning, but for fear of losing GOD's Favour, and of a Friend making him become our Enemy? Will any but a Heretick deny this? Again; is not GOD Omnipotent? cannot he do all things? 'Tis an Article of our Creed he both is and can; since then to change Himself is to do Something; will you stint GOD's Omnipotence, and say there is Something he cannot do? Such Insulting Talk as this, tho' there be never a wise word in it, working upon the Weakness of half-witted People, may hap to make them forego their True Tenet; and even fright them

to renounce their Faith out of Fear of renoun∣cing it.

Corol. I. These three last Cases inform us how dangerous it is that any man be allowed to be Truth's Champion, and to undertake her cause, unless he be thorow-pac'd in Logick, and such other knowledges as are requisit to defend her; lest Truth it self Suffer for the Confident Weakness of the Unable Undertaker.

Corol. II. This last Case belongs to such Disputants, who, to maintain Absurd and Im∣possible things, do use to argue from Divine Omnipotence; by alledging and magnifying which, they hope to fright the Piety of a well-meaning, but weak, Defendent to admit any thing though never so Senseless or Ridiculous. The way to answer these men, is to show the Effect to be contrary to our Natural Notions, and, consequently, to the Wise Conduct of the World, which was the Cause of those Notions; And, therefore, what GOD can do, or cannot do, is nothing to the purpose, unless the thing in question be Agreeable to his Wisdom and Good∣ness, which determin his Power to act; and without which it cannot be that he should act. Whence it is generally more Safe, more Edi∣fying, and more Proper, to say in such Cases; that it cannot be that GOD should will to do such a thing, than bluntly to say GOD cannot do it. For, This flatly limits Omnipotency; That only restrains its exerting it self hic & nunc because of some Attribute of the Divine Nature to which 'tis Disagreeable. I say Generally; For

oft times such Discourses would hav•• GOD's Power to do perfect Contradictions; that is, to undo the Natures of things Establisht by himself; which is not to do. As in the Instance of his Changing Himself; which is the same in Effect as not being Himself. Or, when they say, GOD has a Power to Annihilate; For, since Powers are specify'd by their Objects, and Non-ens (which can do nothing in any kind, nor consequently spe∣cify a Power) is the Object of Annihilation; a Power to Annihilate is to be no Power. And 'tis as ill to say GOD can suspend his Action of Con∣serving; for this takes away from GOD his Good∣ness, or the Redundancy, Exuberancy or Com∣municativeness of Being; which is Essential to him, and was the Sole Cause of the Creation.

Thus far of Disputation it self or True Syllo∣gisms. The Faults of it come next to be consi∣der'd, which are call'd Fallacies, or Paralo∣gisms.

8. Fallacies are of two sorts. Those which arise out of Words; which happens when the Ambiguity of some Single word, or of some Words put together, do lead us into a Mistake of the Thing. And those which are not in the Words, but arise out of the Thing or the Sense; and thence, make us mistake the Thing and the Words too.

9. Those of the Former sort are, almost all, little Gramarical Quibbles; and it would do too much honour to them, to spend labour to name them, being too open of themselves to need

Exposing. Those which are less discernable and worth Remark are such as this.

• He that says you are an Animal says true, but
• He that says you are an Ass says you are an Animal: Therefore
• He that says you are an Ass says true.

Where,* 1.36 as has been particularly shown a∣bove, the word [Animal] is taken in diverse Senses; for in this Proposition [Peter is an Ani∣mal] it is restrain'd by the Subject to signify one Individual Animal and of such a kind, viz. Ra∣tional; But, in the Proposition [An Ass is an Animal] it is restrain'd to signify an Animal of Another kind, viz. Irrational. whence 'tis no Syllogism, because it has Four Terms.

10. Of these Fallacies which are not groun∣ded on the Ambiguity of the Words, but are built on the Thing or the Sense; the First worth remarking is that call'd the Fallacy ex Acciden∣te; which happens when the Middle Term is only Accidentally connected with the Extremes, and not per se, or out of its own Nature, As,

• Bar-Whatever breeds stirs in a Common-Wealth is bad; but
• ba-All Religion breeds stirs in a Com∣mon-Wealth; therefore
• ra-All Religion is bad.

The Common answer is to distinguish the Major and Minor both; and to say, that what

breeds Stirs out of its own Nature, is Bad; but not that which breeds them Accidentally; for, otherwise a Sword and Wine must be bad, be∣cause the one sometimes helps to commit Mur∣ther, and the other causes Drunkenness. But, the more Solid way, and which bears up best to Logical Grounds; is to deny it to be a Syllogism; because, though the Form of it be Legitimate, yet the Matter or the Middle Term, is not so. For, a Syllogism being a Speech con∣triv'd by True Logicians to Conclude a Third Proposition out of the Premises, so as by Con∣nexion of the Medium with the Extremes, we may know it to be Certainly True (for that which leaves us Vncertain leaves us Ignorant) it follows, that the Middle Term must be either a Notion Essentially Connected with the Ex∣tremes, or else as a Proper Cause or Effect of it; neither of which it can be if it be but Acci∣dentally belonging to them. We may Note here how Accidental Mediums are Common and Re∣mote ones, or such as beget Opinion: For, be∣tween Religion and Commotions, intervene Per∣versity of will, Disregard of Virtue, Irrational Assents upon Opinionative Ground, Pride, and Faction against Church Governours, who would bind them to good Principles and Religious Duties, Interest &c. All which, or some (if not most) of them, are the Proper and Immediate Causes of Dissention; at least, nearer and more Proper Causes of it than Religion it self; the Principles of which do Oblige men to the pre∣servation of Peace and Unity.

11. The Second is called Ignoratio Elenchi,

which, in easier Language, is the attempting to prove what's not in question; or, putting upon our Adversary to hold a Tenet he never own'd nor held; as it usually passes among Passionate Discourses and Scolds, when they object to others what they neither held nor thought, that they may the more easily confute them or render them Odious. This is avoided in disputes by Stating the Question right, and by Agreeing be∣fore-hand in the Signification of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd; as was recom∣mended in the second and third Rule. Or, if this be not done before the Dispute begins, it is answer'd by saying Transeat totum, and for∣cing the Adversary, weary with aiming his blows amiss, to recur to the true point, and to Conclude the Contradictory to the Defendents Tenet; which was his only Duty, and ought to have been done at first.

12. The Third is, Begging the Question, or Supposing that which should have been Prov'd. Which is manifestly faulty: For the Premisses must be Clearer than the Conclusion; which they cannot be if the Proof, in whole or in part, is as Unknown and Obscure as is the Conclusi∣on it self; as it must be if it is barely Sup∣pos'd; and begg'd gratis. Of which Fallacy there∣fore all the whole Body of Hypothetical Philoso∣phy is Guilty, as also that Fallacy call'd An Ill Enumeration of the Parts, as follows here.

13. The Fourth is that of an Imperfect or Incomplete Division, which happens w••en 'tis falsly pretended that the thing in Question must be one of those which are Nominated; or, that

it must be perform'd one of the ways Assign'd; when, perhaps, there is Another way how that thing may be done, which was never assign'd, but either Unthought of or Neglected. As, if it should be asserted that Motion must either happen by Atoms descending in an Immense Vacuum, or by the Impression of so much Mo∣tion in the Mass of Matter at First by GOD, and his Continuing it ever since; when as a third way may be assign'd, viz. that a Created Intelligent Being Causes, and all along, Conti∣nues, the Motion of the first-moved Bodies, which move the rest. This Fallacy is defeated by Denying the Proposition, which contains the Enumeration of all those Causes or Manners of Action; and, by Obliging the Disputant to show his Division to be Adequate.

14. The Fifth is called non causa pro causa. That is, in plain terms, the bringing a Me∣dium that does not Conclude; or the preten∣ding the Conclusion follows from a Medium that cannot necessarily inferr it. This Fallacy, if it must be call'd so, happens chiefly to Ex∣perimental Philosophers; who, going by meer Induction, and laying no Evident or Certain Principles of Nature, a priori, to guide their Thoughts by, but Hypothetical ones only; do, hence, refund all the Effects of Nature into false-pretended Causes; whence every man who sets up a new Scheme, does still assign new Reasons or Causes, according to which he strives to Explicate Nature, and into which he endea∣vours to Resolve all the several Productions and Effects of it. But, why this should be call'd

a Fallacy, I cannot comprehend. At this rate every Argument that does not Conclude may be call'd a Fallacy. For, since the Premisses in a Demonstrative Syllogism are the Cause of the Conclusion; whoever argues ill, argues Falla∣ciously; and assigns a wrong Cause, by produ∣cing an Incompetent Medium. But, in case the Disputant puts it upon the Defendent to have made use of such a Ground as he never meant, it is then enough to deny it; and put him to prove that that was indeed his Ground, as was pretended.

15. The Fifth is the Arguing from what's ta∣ken in a Divided sense, as if it were taken in a Compound sense or conjoyntly; or from what's ta∣ken in a compound sense or conjoyntly to infer the same thing in a Divided sense; Example of the Former is this,

• He that is actually sitting may Walk,
• Peter is actually sitting; therefore
• Peter actually sitting (or while he sits) may walk.

Where the Major is False, unless Sitting and Walking be taken Divisively; and mean that he who sits now, may Walk hereafter. An Exam∣ple of the later may be this.

• Two and Three are Even and Odd.
• Five is Two and Three: Therefore
• Five is Even and Odd.

Where the Major is False, unless Two and Three be taken Divisively, whereas in the Mi∣nor they are taken Conjoyntly. Or, it may be said that Five are † 1.37 not Two and Three for∣mally, but only materially: In which sense Ari∣stotle said that Bis tria non sunt sex.

16. The Seventh Fallacy is when the Oppo∣nent argues à dicto secundum quid ad dictum sim∣pliciter. Which kind of Fallacy is the Errone∣ous Principle that begets the Vice of Pride, and therefore is peculiar to all Proud People. For the sin of Pride does not consist in Knowing what Endowments any one truly has, or Estee∣ming himself as having such Endowments; for this is a Truth; and did he not know it, and what degree of Perfection it adds to him, he would neither strive to perfect himself, nor know how much he is particularly bound to Love and Thank GOD, who bestow'd on him those Accomplishments or Advantages above o∣thers. But Pride, (as all other Vices have) has a Lye for it's Principle; and consists in this, that a Proud Person over values himself, and Preferrs himself Absolutely before all others; that is, Concludes himself to be the very Best, or Bet∣ter than others, and to deserve more Esteem than they, because he is Good or Estimable se∣cundum quid, or in some particular which is far short of rendring him so highly Estimable. Thus, some self-conceited Lady Esteems or Con∣cludes her self to be the Best Woman in all the Country, because she has a New-fashion'd Gown, or is Finer, Handsomer, or Richer than others. Thus a King or Lord preferrs himself absolutely

before all others, because he has more Power, or can reckon up more Titles than others can. Thus a Great Scholar who is Proud, values himself absolutely to be Better than those who are Unlearned. Whereas a Poor, Ignorant, Ragged Beggar, who has more Virtue or Love of GOD in him, has more Intrinsick Worth in him, and is, absolutely speaking, more Valuable than any or all of them; notwithstanding their Gayness, Beauty, Riches, Knowledge, Honour and Power. All the rest are but only Good secundum quid, and he is for his Sanctity, Good and Valuable simpliciter.

17. Thus much concerning those Fallacies that are worth noting; if, indeed, any of them do much deserve it. For, I cannot discern but that, if the Rules for Distinguishing our Notions, of Predicating one of them of another, and last∣ly the Right Methods of Arguing, both as to the Matter and Form of Syllogisms, were ob∣serv'd Exactly; there is nothing in them that can require the treating of them so elaborately, or making such a pother about them as Au∣thors do. The Agreeing with our Adversary about the Meaning of the Words in which the Question is conceiv'd, forestalls those Fallacies of Ignoratio Elenchi, and that of Begging the Question. * 1.38 The Doctrin given above how to detect the Equivocation of Single Words, will prevent any advantage that can be taken from the Ambiguity of the Terms; and the Rules of Predicating, by shewing how a word that is Univocal, taken single, may become Equivo∣cal by being joyn'd to Different Subjects, will

defeat all Stratagems that lurk secretly in such Propositions,* 1.39 as is seen in the First Fallacy §. 9. The Doctrin of using only such Middle Terms as are either Essential, or Proper Causes and Ef∣fects, renders Ineffectual the Fallacy ex Acciden∣ti; as also those of Non causa pro causâ, and à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. The Common Doctrin concerning Division, viz. that it's Members be Adequate to the Notion Divi∣ded, makes void and insignificant, that Fallacy call'd mala Enumeratio partium. In a word, let but the Rules given here be warily observ'd, and it will scarce be possible the Defender of Truth should be circumvented by any Fallacious manner of Arguing; but it will either be seen that the Terms are Ambiguous, or (which ge∣nerally happens) it will be found that the Syllogism has Four Terms; and, so, is no Legi∣timate Syllogism. The subtlest of them seems to be the First. For the single word [Animal] seems to be taken in the same sense, both in the Major and Minor, and has the same Definition in both places; and yet, by reason of the Dif∣ferent Subjects, it is not Predicated in the same sense, but according to Different Parts of it's In∣tire Notion or Signification; whence the Syllo∣gism has Four Terms in sense; that is, in reali∣ty, or in our Mind, where Syllogisms are only Properly and Formally; however the Word [A∣nimal] be the same materially.

18. The Syllogism which is imply'd in every Practical Judgment of a Sinner, has Four Terms, or else one of the Premisses which he grants to himself is False; and therefore both It and the

Action that proceeds from it, is a Deviation from Right Reason, and a Perversion of Hu∣man Nature. v. g.

• Justice is to be done,
• That Satisfaction be taken of my Enemy who injur'd me, is Justice; Therefore
• That Satisfaction is to be taken by my self of my Enemy, is to be done, or I may revenge my self.

Where the Major is True, so is the Minor; but when the injur'd person comes to conclude, instead of the true Conclusion [Therefore that Satisfaction be taken of him that injur'd me is to be done] which abstracts from Who is to take that Satisfaction or Revenge, whether Himself or the Magistrate, who is the Overseer of the Laws and the Proper Revenger of Injuries, his Passion, and not Right Reason, coggs in a Fourth Term, not found in the Premisses, viz. Satisfa∣ction is to be taken [by my self.] And the same may be observ'd in the Practical Judgment of any other Sinner, whether their Sin be Theft, Incontinency, Rebellion, &c.

Corol. III. Hence, all Right Reasoning, which causes Science and Truth, is also, of its own na∣ture, the Parent of Virtue; and can dictate no∣thing but what tends to True Morality. As, on the contrary, all False Reasoning, does naturally and necessarily beget Error; and, by means of Error, leads to Vice.

Notes

• † 1.1

  B. 2. l. ••. ••. 14.
• * 1.2

  See §. 10
• * 1.3

  B. 1. L. 8. §. 7.
• † 1.4

  See B. 1. L. 8. §▪ 8.
• * 1.5

  Axl 1.
• * 1.6

  Prop. 1.
• * 1.7

  Prop. 2▪
• * 1.8

  Ax. 1.
• * 1.9

  Ax. 4.
• * 1.10

  Ax. 2.
• † 1.11

  Ax. 3.
• * 1.12

  Ax. 5.
• † 1.13

  Ax. 2.
• † 1.14

  Prop. 5.6.
• * 1.15

  Ax. 6.
• † 1.16

  Prop. 1.
• † 1.17

  Prop. 2.
• † 1.18

  Ax. 5.
• * 1.19

  Ax. 3.
• * 1.20

  Ax. 6.
• † 1.21

  Prop. 4.
• † 1.22

  Ax. 1.
• * 1.23

  Ax 2.
• * 1.24

  Ax. 1.2.
• † 1.25

  Prop. 5.
• † 1.26

  Prop. 5.
• † 1.27

  Ax. 3.
• * 1.28

  Ax. 5.
• † 1.29

  Prop. 2.3.
• † 1.30

  Prop. 8·
• * 1.31

  Prop. 4.5.6.7.
• † 1.32

  B. 8. L. 6. §§. 8.9.10.
• † 1.33

  ••. 14.
• * 1.34

  L. 3. §. 30.
• * 1.35

  B. 2. L. 2.
• * 1.36

  B. 2 L. 2. § ••5
• † 1.37

  See B. 3. L. 6. §. 6.
• * 1.38

  B. 1. Les∣son last.
• * 1.39

  See B. 2. L. 1. §. 15.