Objection III.
The Meanings of Words are indeed to be taken from the Vulgar, but the Truth of Propositions is to be taken onely from the Judgments of Learned Men: though then that be indeed the meaning of the word [Faith] which the Generality of Christians mean by it, yet the Truth of this Proposition [Faith is possible to be False] must be judg'd of by the Senti∣ments of the most Learned Divines; the Generality (at least the Best) of which, and Catholicks amongst the rest, grant the Grounds of Faith as to our Knowledg, and consequently Faith it self, to be Possible to be False.
Answer. That Maxim is to be under∣stood of those Propositions which re∣quire some Speculation to infer them; in which case also even the Unlearned are not bound to Assent upon the Authority of Learned men, taken precisely as men of Skill, because generally 'tis Practical∣ly-self-evident to them, that such Specu∣lative men differ oft times in their Senti∣ments, Page 128 and they are unfurnisht of due means to discern which is in the right: yet, if they are to act in such affairs, they are bound in Prudence to proceed upon the Judgments of that part which is ge∣nerally reputed most and ablest; and then their proceedure is laudable, because they do the best secundum ultimum potentiae, or that lies in the power. Whence Learned men who have ability to judg of the Reasons those Speculaters give, behave themselves imprudently and blameably if they even proceed to out∣ward action, meerly upon their Judg∣ments without examining the Reasons they alleadge, in case they have leasure and opportunity to do so. But now the Maxim holds not all for those Propositi∣ons in which 'tis either self-evident, or evident to common and uncultivated Reason that the Predicate is to be con∣nected with the Subject: as 'tis, for ex∣ample, in this, [Man is a rational Crea∣ture] or this, which is palpably conse∣quent from the former, [Man is capable of gaining Knowledg] for in such as these the natural Sentiments of the Vulgar are full as Certain as those of Speculaters; perhaps Certainer. And with the same Page 129 Evidence the Predicate [Possible to be False] must necessarily be seen to be con∣nected with [Faith] by all those who e∣steem themselves oblig'd by Gods Com∣mand to profess and dye for the Truth of those Points they believe. Besides, they hold that Faith makes them know God and his Will, that their Assent of Faith is to be Immoveable, or adher'd to all their lives; that is, such as cannot be over∣thrown or shown False by any Reasons brought against it; both which equiva∣lently imply Impossibility of Falshood.
Again, 'tis deny'd that Catholick Di∣vines, even as Speculaters, hold Faith Pos∣sible to be False; since they all, to a man, (whatever they hold besides) hold the Catholick Church Infallible; and that we ought to receive our Faith from her Living Voice and Practice: Now the Tenet of Infallibility in the Proposer ne∣cessarily draws after it the Tenet of Im∣possibility of Falshood in what is propos'd, that is, in Faith, But, because it may be said this is their Sentiment as Catho∣licks, not as Schoolmen, let the Angel of the Schools speak for the Schools them∣selves; his Expressions are common, and so reach all. Scientia (saith he, Sum. Page 130 Theol. 2â 2e q. 1â a. 50 ad 4m.) cum opi∣nione simul esse non potest simpliciter de eo∣dem; quia de ratione scientiae est, quòd id quod scitur ex •stimetur Impossibile esse ali∣ter se habere; de ratione autem opinionis est quod id quod est opinatum existimetur possibile aliter se habere: sed id quod fide ten•tur, propter fidei certitudinem, existi∣matur etiam Impossibile aliter se habere. And again in the same Question, a o. 4o. ad 2o. Ea quae subsunt Fidei dupliciter con∣siderari possunt: uno modo in speciali, & sic non possunt esse simul visa & credita; alio modo in generali, scilicet sub communi ratione credibilis; et sic sunt VISA ab eo qui credit; non enim crederet nisi VIDERET ea esse credenda, vel propter EVIDENTI∣AM▪ signorum, vel propter aliquid hu∣jusmodi. It were easie for me to avail my self by these Testimonies to con∣firm the main of my Doctrine; but, what method will permit me, and leads me to at present, is only this, to show that this Great Father of the Church, and Doctour of all Schools, declares the common Sentiment, drawn out of the conceit of Faith's Certainty, to be this, that 'tis Impossible that Points of Faith should be otherwise, or false; and that we Page 131 must, e're we believe, have Evidence of the Grounds of our Belief, which a∣mounts to the same. All then that can be objected from some of our Divines is this, that they explicate their Tenet so, as by consequence Faith is left possible to be false; but, what is this to the pur∣pose; since 'tis one thing to hold a Te∣net, and another thing to make it out. In the former they all agree, in the later (as is the Genius of Humane Understand∣ings where our heavenly Teacher has not settled them) they disagree with one another, sometimes with themselves. Nor, can it bear any Objection, nor breed scandal, that the Ground of Faith should be more particularly and distinct∣ly explicated now than formerly; for, since Controversie is a Skill, why should it be admir'd, nay, why should it not be expected that it should receive Improve∣ment, that is, better explain its proper ob∣ject the Rule of Faith, than formerly▪ since we experience a progress in all o∣ther Arts and Sciences which are fre∣quent in use, as this has been of late dayes:
