Errour non-plust, or, Dr. Stillingfleet shown to be the man of no principles with an essay how discourses concerning Catholick grounds bear the highest evidence.

PREFACE TO THE Learned of this Nation.

IS it possible then that Errour can admit Principles? Or (which is equivalent) that Truth cannot admit any, but must be quite destitute of such firm Supports? Or is it even possible that Falshood dare so much as pretend to such Evident Grounds, and offer to make good her Pretence, and not sink in deepest Disgrace for laying Claim to a thing to which it must needs be Evident she has not the least Shadow of a Title? Certainly, whoe∣ver considers attentively that Principles are (properly speaking) First Truths, either Ab∣solutely, or with Restriction to such a matter, and withall that these must be most perfectly Self-evident, and other Principles con••ining upon the former, must needs partake a very high degree of Conspicuousness by their near approach to those great Luminary Truths, will, upon the joyning these two Consider••tions, easily conclude such a Pretence Unmain••ainable, if

things be rightly stated and propos'd. Besides, since all True Judgments are built on the Things being such as we judg'd it to be, and what••s True is Impossible to be False, it must needs follow that (all Circumstances taken in) it was Impossible, and so, a Contradi∣ction, the Thing, at what time we fram'd that right Judgment of it, should have been otherwise then it was. A Contradiction I say; for that which is in the Thing or Object an Impossibility, is a Contradiction in our Minds inform'd by that Object. Whence re∣sults this Great and Clear Truth, that Every Error necessarily involves a Contradiction, and every Truth a First Principle; and that, though not in Formality of Expression, yet in Reality of Sense they are both of them such.

And is it possible that these Best Evidences now spoken of should be held Obscure or False; or that Contradictions (their Opposits) which Principle all Falshoods, should gain the repute of Clearest Truths? Surely, there must needs be a strange perversion of Nature somewhere, when such Monsters in Rationality can obtain the Esteem of being Legitimate Production•• of Reason: And, this must be either in the mindes of the Persons to be inform'd, who are violently sway'd by Passion or Interest to those of their own Party, so as not to consider at all What Evidence there is in what they say, but

to accept themselves and cry up to others any piece of Empty Rhetorick, Plausible Talk, or pretty Irony for solid Conviction: or else in the Discoursers who are to inform those Readers; and the Chief Engin with which they work upon their want of Skill is to talk indeed of Principles, because 'tis the highest Credit that can be to be thought to have such Invincible Grounds: But they never look into the Nature of Principles and thence make out to their Readers what kind of Sayings those must be which can deserve that Excellent Name, lest they should disgrace themselves and shame their Cause; while the whole strength of their Discourse is built on this, that those Propositions they rely on are indeed Right Prin∣ciples; and yet, when look't into, are no more like what they are pretended to be then so many old Wives Tales.

It seems then to me both most Conducive to the Clearing of Truth, as also the most Can∣did and Equal way of proceeding to look first into the Nature of Principles, and by laying it open to determin thence what Propositions deserve that name, what not. For, if I right∣ly perform this, and it appear thence that Dr. St. has indeed produc't such Grounds as have in them the true Nature of Principles and proceeded upon them, all his Discourse thus built, must necessarily be Convictive, and the Result of it a Certain Truth. But, in

case he has not produc't any such, his whole Dis∣course is convinc't to be meer Trifling and Folly.

A Principle then, taken as distinguish't from other Propositions or Sayings, involves two Perfections in it's notion: Evidence and In∣fluence upo•• some other Truths that partake their Evidence from It. For, were it never so Evident in it self, yet, if it deriv'd none of that Evidence to another, nor had Relation to any thing besides it self, it might be indeed in that case a Great Truth, but it would no more be a Principle, then that can be said to be a Beginning which has neither Middle nor End, nor any thing following it. Evidence is twofold, Self-Evidence and Evidence by way of Proof. The former belongs to First Principles as hath been at large prov'd in Reason again••t Raillery, Disc. 2. & 3d. E∣vidence by Proof, belongs to Subordinate Principles, which are Conclusions in respect of those above them, and yet themselves Influ∣ential to prove other things. And the Evi∣dence of these must be resolvable finally into Self-evident ones, otherwise it would follow that all Proof must proceed higher and higher in Infinitum, and so nothing could ever be prov'd at all. Now other kindes of Evidence besides these two (speaking of Speculative Evidence) are unimaginable; since 'tis most ma∣nifest, that what is neither Self-Evident, nor

made-Evident is not Evident at all.

Hence is seen, that 'tis Impossible, the nature of Principles once rightly understood, Errour (on whose side soever it be) should maintain it's Pretence to Principles; Since 'tis Impossible that any thing should either be Self-Evident or Made-Evident which is not a Real Truth; as also Impossible that what's Evident any way (or, which is all one, a Truth) should patronize or abett Errour. This way then of managing Controversies is perfectly Decisive; For which reason I have frequently prest his Party to it in my Letter to my Answerer and other places, and have been seconded therein by the Learned and worthy Author of Protestancy without Principles; but none was ever found so hardy to attempt it, till this man of Mettle, hoping his tinkling expression and gingling wit would baffle even Truth it self, took the Confidence to talk of what he never understood. However he is to be thank't by us both and acknowledg'd a Generous Adversary, that, laying aside at present those frivolous Inconclusive ways of quoting Authorities which himself holds may deceive us in all they say, as also those Insigni∣ficant Devices of Pretty Jests and other Rhe∣torical Dexterities, he accepts our Challenge to such a manner of Fight, as must necessarily be Fatal to one side and Victorious to the other. Had he stated also the nature of Principles exactly, and shown his to be such, how formi∣dable

a Goliah had he appear'd, and how ter∣rible a man of his hands? whereas now, if it comes to be discover'd that what he call'd a Sword, or a Canon, is indeed but a Bul-rush, or Pot-gun (a Pygmy's proper weapons,) that is, if it be prov'd that those things he bragg'd of and rely'd on as Principles, are in Reality but so many Paradoxes or Impertinences, I hope we may s••••cease our Fears, and turn them into a more pleasant humour.

Though the Prognostick be very obvious what he can do in this case, yet who knows but for once he may work an Impossibility, who (as will appear in the ensuing Treatise) has told us so many Contradictions. In the mean time, if he thinks fit to attempt any Reply, 'tis Evi∣dent from the former Discourse what he is to do, unless he will strangely Prevaricate from his Duty; viz. either to disallow my settling here the nature of Principles, and state them better, that is either to deny that they are to have any Evidence or Influence at all; or else, if he allows it, to make out that his pretended Principles have those Qualifications; which is best done by resolving them into First Principles and connecting them distinctly with their respective Consequences. And let him remember that, till he does this, he nei∣ther defends Himself against my present An∣swer, nor gives a home Reply to Protestancy without Principles (whatever gay things or

things he sayes to particular passages in it) since himself acknowledges these Principles of his were intended an Answer to that Book▪ and out of the nature of both Treatises they appear to be the proper Return to it.

I have no occasion, nor is it my intent here to write against the Church of England or any of her Legitimate Sons: rather I must declare that, in case they all hold as M. Thorndike (a Man of Eminent Learning & Esteem amongst them) declares himself to do (Just weights, p. 159.) that the Scripture interpreted by the perpetual Practice of God's Church is the Ground of Faith, which implies, that Practical Tradition is that which gives them Christs Sense or Faith, and so is their Rule I must heartily applaud their joyning with Ca∣tholicks in the main Point of all, and which settled is apt to unite us in all the rest. What I impugn then here is a pestilent Tenet, destru∣ctive to all Episcopacy, and the very Essence of Church; making Church-Governors Use∣less in their main Duty of Teaching Faith to their Flock, and Lame in that of Govern∣ment: For, if every private man is to rely on his own Interpretation, he ought neither be∣lieve nor Obey the Church when the contrary seems to his Fancy to be grounded in Scripture; and, if that man do but alledge he judges in clear in Scripture, and consequently that the Church is corrupt and errs: I see not with what

Iustice, according to these Principles, the Church can either excommunicate him or bind him to his Duty.

I expect Dr. St. will object, that I deny di∣vers of his Principles which some of ours have granted; for his Friend Dr. T. and he abound in such sleight Topicks; To which, though I could answer, that unusquisque in sensu suo abundat in productions of Human Reason, yet I need only alledge Dr. St's ambi-dextrous and ambigu••us way of contriving his Princi∣ples to look so with different faces that even the same man may sometimes apprehend them to mean thus, sometimes otherwise. Be∣sides, all his Confuters aym n••t at one End: Mr. E. W. intending only to shew they conclude not the Point they pretend, and which is su∣perscribed to them: Mr. N. O. to shew their De∣structiveness to Government; while I take for my task to discover their Oppositness to all Lo∣gick; True Learning, and Common Rationa∣lity, and that there is nothing at all in him of what was pretended, neither Principles, Conse∣quences, Connexion, Conclusions, Reduction, Influence nor End: Nor must he think that every thing that is granted by any for dispute s••ke is allowed for good by the Respondent; 'tis frequent to express we grant things which we only pass as nothing to the main Point which is to be concluded; nor can Dr. St. pretend with any reason that others have yeelded them

to be Principles whereas I deny it: The Au∣thour of Reason and Religion, p. 650. has pi∣thily declared his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of them and their true merit, in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 words:—Whether the fore-mentioned Principles be True, False, Controverted, or Obscure, no Verity pe∣culiar to 〈…〉〈…〉 be deduc't from them,—which expresses their want of Clear Evidence, and so quite degrades them from the Dignity of Principles.

If any think the Title prefixt to this Book forestals immodestly the Readers Iudgment; my Reply usust be, that I hope for Readers of more Prudence then to receive Prejudice from so easie an Occasion. A Counterfeit Mo∣desty sprung from Sceptical Despair or Dis∣regard of Truth will naturally dislike such Ex∣pressions; but those who heartily hold there is such a thing as Truth and intirely love It, will esteem the open avowing her compleat victo∣riousness both Fitting and Necessary: and that she conquers at present, I have all the best Maxims of Rational Nature engag'd for my Security.