Seneca's morals abstracted in three parts : I. of benefits, II. of a happy life, anger, and clemency, III. a miscellany of epistles / by Roger L'Estrange.

EPIST. III. Against all sorts of Affectation in Dis∣course. Phantastical Studies; Im∣pertinent, and Unprofitable Subtil∣ties. Mans Business is Virtue, not Words. (Book 3)

THere are many men, (and some of great Sence too) that lose both the Profit, and the Reputation of good Thoughts, by the Uncouth manner of Expressing them: They love to talk in mystery, and take it for a marque of wis∣dome, not to be Understood. They are so fond of making themselves Publique, that they will rather be Ridiculous, than not taken Notice of. When the Mind grows Squeamish, and comes to a Loath∣ing of things that are Common as if they were Sordid, That Sickness betrays it self in our way of Speaking too: for we must have New Words, New Compositions, and it passes for an Ornament, to bor∣row from other Tongues, where we may be better furnished in our Own.

One Man Prizes himself upon being Con∣cise, and talking in Parables: Another runs himself out in Words; and that which He takes only for Copious, renders him to Others both Ridiculous, and Tedi∣ous. Others there are, that Like the Er∣ror well enough, but cannot come Up to't. But, take this for a Rule; Where∣soever the Speech is Corrupted, so is the Mind. Some are only for Words Anti∣quated, and long since out of Date; O∣thers only for that which is Popular, and Course; and they are Both in the Wrong; for the One takes too Little Care, and the Other too Much. Some are for a Rough, broken Stile; as if it were a thing Unmanly to please the Ear; Others are too Nice upon the Matter of Number, and make it rather Singing, than Speak∣ing. Some affect not to be understood till the end of the Period, and hardly then neither. 'Tis not good; a Stile that is either too Bold, or too Florid; the One wants Modesty, and the Other, Effect. Some are too Starch'd, and For∣mal; Others take a Pride in being Rug∣ged; and if they chance to let fall any thing that is Smooth, they'll transpose,

and mangle it on purpose, only to maim the Period, and Disappoint a Bodies Ex∣pectation. These Errors are Commonly introduc'd by some person that is fa∣mous for his Eloquence; Others follow him, and so it passes into a Fashion. And we are as much out in the Choice of the Matter, as in That of our Words.

There are some Studies which are on∣ly Matter of Curiosity, and Trial of Skill; Others of Pleasure, and of Use: but still there are many things worth the Knowing perhaps, that were not worth the Learning. It is a huge deal of time that is spent in Cavilling about Words, and Captious Disputations, that work us up to an Edge, and then Nothing comes on't. There are some Tricks of Wit, like slight of hand, which amount to no more than the Tying of Knots on∣ly to Loosen them again; And it is the very Fallacy that pleases us; for, so soon as ever we know how they are done, the Satisfaction is at an End. He that does not understand these Sophismes, is never the worse, and he that does, is never the better. If a Man tells me that

I have Hornes, I can tell him again, That I have None, without Feeling on my Forehead. Bion's Dilemma makes All Men to be Sacrilegious, and yet, at the same time, maintains, That there is no such thing as Sacrilege. He that takes to himself, (sayes he) what belongs to God, Commits Sacrilege; but all things belong to God, Therefore he that applies any thing to his own Use, is Sacrilegious. On the other side, the very Rifling of a Temple he makes to be No Sacrilege: for 'tis (says he) but the taking of something out of One place, that belongs to God, and removing of it to Another that belongs to him too. The Fallacy lies in This, that though all things Belong to him, all things are not yet Dedicated to him. There is no greater Enemy of Truth, than over∣much Subtilty of Speculation. Protago∣ras will have every thing Disputable, and as much to be said for the One side, as for the Other. Nay, he makes it a∣nother Question, Whether every thing be Disputable, or no. There are Others that make it a Science, to prove, That Man knows Nothing: But, the Former is the more Tolerable Error; for the Other

takes away the very Hope of Know∣ledge; and it is better to know that which is Superfluous, than nothing at all. And yet it is a kind of Intempe∣rance to desire to Know more than Enough; for it makes Men Trouble∣some, Talkative, Impertinent, Conceipt∣ed, &c. There is a Certain Hankering after Learning, which, if it be not put into a right way, hinders, and falls foul upon it self. Wherefore the Burthen must be fitted to the Shoulders, and no more than we are Able to Bear. It is, in a great Measure, the Fault of our Tu∣tors, that teach their Disciples rather how to Dispute, than how to Live: And the Learner himself is also to blame, for applying himself to the Emprovement, rather of his Wit, than of his Mind: By which means, Philosophy is now turn'd to Philology. Put a Grammarian to Vir∣gil; he never heeds the Philosophy, but the Verse: Every Man takes Notes for his own Study. In the same Meadow the Cow finds Grass, the Dog starts a Hare, and the Stork snaps a Lizzard. Tully's de Republicâ finds work both for the Philosopher, the Philologer, and the

Grammarian. The Philosopher wonders how it was Possible to Speak so much against Iustice. The Philologer makes This Observation, that Rome had Two Kings, the One without a Father, and the Other without a Mother; for 'tis a Question who was Servius his Mother, and of Ancus his Father, there is not so much as any Mention. The Grammari∣an takes notice, that Reapse is used for Reipsa; and Sepse for Seipse: And so every Man makes his Notes for his own Purpose. These Fooleries apart, let us learn to do good to Mankind, and put our Knowledge into Action. Our Dan∣ger is the being Mistaken in Things, not in Words; and in the Confounding of Good, and Evil. So that our whole Life is but one continued Error, and we live in Dependency upon to morrow. There are a World of things to be Stu∣dy'd, and Learn'd, and therefore we should Discharge the Mind of things Unnecessary, to make way for Greater Matters. The Business of the Schools is rather a Play, than a Study; and only to be done when we can do nothing else.

There are many People that frequent them, only to Hear, and not to Learn; and they take Notes too, not to reform their Manners, but to pick up words, which they Vent, with as little Benefit to Others, as they heard them, to Them∣selves. It costs us a great deal of time, and other Mens Ears a great deal of trou∣ble, to purchase the Character of a Lear∣ned Man: Wherefore I shall e'en con∣tent my self with the Courser Title of an Honest Man. The worst of it is, that there is a Vain, and Idle Pleasure in't, which tempts us to squander away many a pre∣cious hour to very little Purpose. We spend our selves upon Subtiltics, which may perchance make us to be thought Learned, but not Good Wisdom delights in openness and Simplicity; in the Form∣ing of our Lives, rather than in the Ni∣ceties of the Schools, which, at best, do but bring us Pleasure without Profit. And, in short, the things which the Phi∣losophers impose upon us with so much Pride, and Vanity, are little more than the same Lessons over again, which they learn'd at School. But some Au∣thors

have their Names up, though their Discourses be mean enough; they Dis∣pute, and Wrangle, but they do not E∣difie, any farther, than as they keep us from Ill doings, or perhaps stop us in our speed to wickedness. And there ought to be a Difference betwixt the Applau∣ses of the Schools, and of the Theatre; the One being mov'd with every Popu∣lar Conceipt, which does not at all Con∣sist with the Dignity of the Other. Whereas there are some Writings that Stir up generous Resolutions, and do, as it were, inspire a Man with a new Soul. They display the Blessings of a Happy Life, and possess me at the same time with Admiration, and with Hope. They give me a Veneration for the Oracles of Antiquity; and a Claim to them, as to a Common Inheritance; for they are the Treasure of Mankind, and it must be my Duty to emprove the Stock, and transmit it to Posterity. And yet I do not love to hear a Man scite Zeno, Clean∣ther, Epicurus, without some thing of his Own too. What do I care for the bare Hearing of That which I may

Read? Not but that word of mouth makes a great Impression, especially when they are the Speakers own Words: But he that only recites Another Mans Words, is no more to me than a No∣tary. Beside that there's an end of In∣vention, if we rest upon what's Invent∣ed already; and he that only Fol∣lows Another, is so far from finding out any thing New, that he does not so much as look for't. I do not pre∣tend all this while to be the Master of Truth, but I am yet a most Obstinate Inquisitor after it. I am no Mans Slave; but as I ascribe much to Great Men, I challenge something to my self. Our Fore-Fathers have left us, not only their Invention, but Matter also for farther Enquiry; and perhaps they might have found out more things that are Neces∣sary, if they had not bent their thoughts too much upon Superfluities.

Is not This a fine time for us to be fid∣ling, and fooling about Words? How ma∣ny Useful, and Necessary things are there, that we are First to Learn, and Second∣ly,

to Imprint in our Minds? For 'tis not enough to Remember, and to Understand, unless we Do what we Know.