The use of passions written in French by J.F. Senault ; and put into English by Henry, Earl of Monmouth.

The THIRD DISCOURSE. That there are no Passions which may not be changed into Virtues.

VVE have said in our former discourses, that Passions are the seeds of Virtues, & that by having a care of husbanding them well,

their effects were very advantageous to us. But proceeding on further, my intention is in this discourse, to teach Christians the se∣cret, how they may change them into Vir∣tues, and to take from them whatsoever they have of savage or monstrous. This Metamorphosis is certainly very hard, but not impossible; and if we advise with nature, she will furnish us with inventions; for this wise Mother is continually working of strange alterations.

Her power never appears to be greater, than when she alters the Elements, or Me∣tals; and when she takes from them their former qualities, that she may give them others more excellent, and more noble. But she observes therein an admirable me∣thod, which well deserves consideration; for though she be all-powerful, and that holding the place of God, she may act as a Soveraign, and do what she pleaseth with the Elements or Metals, yet doth she never use violence; and she seemeth rather to ac∣commodate her self to their interests, than to her own inclinations; she observeth their sympathies, and worketh no alteration which is not agreeable unto them.

Thus we see she ratifies air, to change it into fire, and conduceth water to turn

it into earth; thus we observe she purifies silver, to give it the tincture of Gold, and labours whole ages to finish without vio∣lence this useful Metamorphosis.

Now as Morality is an imitation of Na∣ture, her chief care ought to be employed in observing the proprieties of our Passions, and in converting them into virtues which are not contrary unto them; for he that would go about to change Choler into Mildness, or fear into generousness, would endeavour an impossibility, and would have ill success in all his labours; but that his designes may succeed well, he must study the nature of every Passion, and use all his means to turn each passion into such a virtue as it hath least aversion unto; and this ought not to seem strange, since the most rational of all men hath been of opi∣nion, that in the opposition which Nature hath placed between vice and virtue, they had notwithstanding somewhat of resem∣blance one with the other; for all men will confess, that prodigality hath more relati∣on to liberality than avarice; and that it is not hard to reduce a prodigal man to be a liberal man; every one is bound to con∣fess that Rashness sides more with Courage than with Cowardice, and that it is

easier to make a rash man, than a Coward, couragious.

Therefore do Philosophers agree, that of the two extreams which do environ vir∣tue, one of them is alwaies more favoura∣ble unto her; and a little care being had will easily take her part, and defend her interest.

Following the same Maxime, we must confess that there are some passions which have more of affinity with some virtues, than with some others, and which by the help of Morality, may easily become vir∣tues.

That fear which foresees dangers,* 1.1 which laboureth how to shun them, which looks far into what is to come, that it may find a remedy, may easily be changed into wis∣dom, provided the distraction which ac∣companieth it, and which doth most commonly abuse us in our deliberations, be taken away. That hope which makes us taste a good which we do not yet enjoy, which comforteth us in our misfortunes, and which through our present evils shews us a future happiness, may easily be con∣verted into that virtue which we call Assu∣rance. That Choler which punisheth faults, and arms us to revenge our friends

injuries, differs not far from Justice; for provided it be not too violent, and that the self interests thereof leave it light enough to guide it self, it will wage war with all the wicked, and take all that are innocent into its protection.

That boldness which encourageth us to the combate, which gives assurance in dan∣ger, and which makes us prefer a glorious death before a shameful retreat, will be∣come exact Valour; if we suppress its incli∣nation to fury, and if we mingle a little light with the too much heat thereof. Love and Hatred, Desire and Eschewing, are ra∣ther Virtues, than Passions, when governed by Reason. Provided they love nothing but what is lovely, and hate nothing but what is hateful, they deserve praise rather than reproach.

Sadness and Despair, Jealousie and Envy, are indeed more cried down; they seem to be enemies to our quiet, that the Heavens have made them Ministers of their Justice, and that they supply the places of those revengeful Furies which Poets feign to punish the faulty. Yet may they be useful to Reason, if well managed, and under those hideous faces wherein they appear, they hide good meanings, which

are of use to virtue. A good emulation may be framed out of a well-regulated En∣vy. Discreet zeal may be shaped out of moderated Jealousie; without which nei∣ther prophane nor sacred yet love under∣takes any thing of Generous. Sorrow hath so many praises given her in the holy Scrip∣ture, as it is easie to judge, that if she be not amongst the number of the virtues, she may be advantageously made use of to their service. * 1.2 She loosens us from the earth; and by a despising all the contentments of the world, she makes us thirst after eternal delights; she appeaseth Gods anger; she furnisheth us with tears, wherewithal to wash away our sins and to water his Altars; She is always a faithful companion to Re∣pentance; and no sin in Christian Religion was ever forgiven, before Sorrow and Repentance had obtained pardon. Despair hath but the name of terrible; but who shall well consider her effects,* 1.3 will avow 'tis a wise invention of nature which cures the greatest part of our maladies, by ta∣king away from us the hope of remedy; for then we make virtue of necessity, we draw force from our weakness; we turn our fear into fury, and our desires into con∣tempt; we set upon enemies whose approach

we dare not expect; and we misprize ob∣jects which we cannot abandon. Thus shall we find many men who owe their quiet more to Despair, than to hope; and who shall well examine the humour of these two Affections, will be forced to acknowledge, that the one makes us miserable by her pro∣mises, the other happy by her refusals; that the one nourisheth our desires, the other causeth them to die; that the one cozeneth us, and the other disabuseth us; that we are lost by the flatteries of the one, and saved by the others affliction. This is the Reason why the greatest Poet in the world hath af∣firmed, that Despair is that which raiseth up the Courage of the conquered, and which restores unto them the Victory which Hope and Rashness had berest them of.

But whatever advantage I attribute to these Passions, I confess they have their errors, and that to make them virtuous, they must be carefully cleansed. And be∣cause so profitable an affair cannot be too often treated of, I shall willingly observe their chiefest enormities; to the end that di∣scerning them, as in a Looking-glass, every one may be careful how to eface them. Take blindness from love, and he will be no more faulty; for it is permitted to love such

subjects as deserve love,* 1.4 and there is no less injustice in denying it to personages of ex∣cellency, than to grant it to deformed per∣sons. Exempt errour from hatred, and ha∣tred will become consonant to Reason; for it is not just to confound the sinner with his sin; and who can make this distinguish∣ment, may boast to hate with justice; desire and eschewing are innocent, provided they be moderated; joy and sorrow are only blameable in their excess; and the same Reason which permits us to taste with plea∣sure a good which we wish for, doth not forbid us sorrowing for an evil which we apprehend. Hope is only then unjust, when she measureth not her forces; and despair is only then faulty, when it takes its rise ra∣ther from our remissness, than from our weakness. Boldness is then praise-worthy, when it grapples with a danger which it may overcome; and fear is wisdom, when it shuns a danger it cannot overcome. Choler is an act of justice, when born against sin, and provided it be not judge in its own cause, it pronounceth none but lawful de∣crees. Envy is generous, provided it excite us unto virtue, and that it lay before us the good qualities of our neighbour, only so far forth as that we may imitate

them. Jealousie is only hateful, because it hath in it too much of love; yet this fault is pardonable when not accompanied with suspition, and if the beloved cannot cure it, they are bound to endure it. But to put an end to this discourse with S. Augustine; Christians make good use of their Passions,* 1.5 if they employ them for the glory of Iesus Christ, and for the salvation of their own soules. Their fears correspond with Reason, when they consider Gods judgments, and the punishment of the damned; their desire is just when they aim at the happiness of the blessed. Their sorrow is harmless when they afflict themselves for all the evils which our first Father hath left us to inherit, and when opprest with grief, they sigh after the liberty of the children of God. Their joy is a holy joy when they expect the fruition of the good which is prepared for them, and when by a firm hope they already taste the effects of their Masters promises. * 1.6 Brief∣ly, if they fear unbelief, if they desire per∣severance, if they sorrow for their evil acti∣ons, and rejoyce when they do well, they turn all their Passions into holy and glori∣ous Virtues.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Metuamus er∣go ut non me∣tuamus, hoc est prudenter me∣tuamus, ne in∣amter metua∣mus, Aug. Ser. 15. De Mar∣tyribus.
• * 1.2

  Melior est tri∣stitia iniqua parientis, quam laetitia iniqua facientis. Aug. lib. De vera In∣nocentia.
• * 1.3

  Ratio terro∣rem prudenti∣bus excutit: In peritis fit magna ex de∣speratione se∣curitas. Senec. quaest. nat. l. 6. c. 2.
• * 1.4

  Amor est mo∣tus cordis, qui cum se inordi∣nate mov t, id est, ad ea quae non debet, cu∣piditas dicitur; cum vero or∣dinatus est, charitas appel∣latur. Aug. lib. De Substantia Electionis, c. ••.
• * 1.5

  Metuunt enim poenam aeter∣nam, cupiunt vitam aeter∣nam, dolent in re quia adhuc ingemescunt adoptionem fi∣liorum Dei, ex∣pectantes re∣demptionem corporis sui; gaudent in spe, quia mors ab∣sorbebitur in victoriam. Aug. l. 14. De Civ. Dei. c. 3.
• * 1.6

  Metuunt pec∣care, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in pec∣catis, gaudent in operibus bo∣n••. Idem ibid.