The royal politician represented in one hundred emblems written in Spanish by Don Diego Saavedra Faxardo ... ; with a large preface, containing an account of the author, his works, and the usefulness thereof ; done into English from the original, by Sir Ja. Astry.

OF THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. (Book 2)

EMBLEM LI.

[illustration]

THERE is nothing better or more advantageous to Mankind than prudent Diffidence; 'tis the Guard and Preservation of our Lives and Fortunes, our own Security obliges us to it; without it there would be no Caution, without which no Safety; that Prince governs best

who trusts fewest, there is but one Confidence safe, which is not to depend upon the Will of another. For who can se∣cure himself of Man's heart, hid in the privatest corner of the Breast, whose Secrets the Tongue dissembles, the Eyes and all the Motions of the Body contradict1 1.1. 'Tis a Gulf rowling with the Tempests of different Affections, a Sea full of hidden Rocks which no Chart can discover. What Prudence must the Needle be touched with for a Prince to sail by, through such dangerous and difficult Seas2 1.2. How well should he know the Winds? when to furl and loose the Sails of Confidence? In this consists the chiefest Art of Government; 'tis in this that a Prin∣ces danger chiefly consists, either through want of Experi∣ence in Affairs, or Knowledge of his Subjects, none of them appearing ill to him. For in his Presence all compose their Actions, and adjust their Looks: Their set Speeches sound nothing but Love, Zeal and Fidelity, and their At∣tendance nothing but Respect and Obedience; Discontent, Hatred and Ambition being hid in the heart; which made one say, a Prince should trust no Body; but both extreams are equally to be avoided3 1.3. To trust none is the Suspicion of a Tyrant, to trust all the easiness of an imprudent Prince. Confidence is not less important to a Prince than Distrust: The one is worthy a sincere and Royal Breast, the other is very necessary in the Art of Government, as an Instrument by which Policy works its Ends. The Difficulty consists in knowing how rightly to use one and t' other, so that neither a too credulous Confidence expose you to Infidelity and Dangers, or a too suspicious Distrust provoke Hatred, or make the Prince by reason of this Diffidence incapble o•• treating with any one: He should not measure all thing•• by Confidence, nor all by Distrust. If a Prince will trus•• none, who can serve him without evident Dangers? 'Tis a•• great a misfortune to lose a faithful Minister upon vain and groundless Suspicions, as by a too easie Credulity to trus••

those who are not so. Let a Prince confide, but at the same time suspect that he may be cheated; this Suspicion ought not to retard the Course of his Actions, but only to be a Caution to him: if he was without Suspicion he would be too careless. Suspicion is a cautionary Security, a due weighing of Matters; he who doubts nothing can never know the Truth. Let him give Credit as if he be∣liev'd, and distrust as if he believ'd not. Confidence and Diffidence being thus governed by Prudence and Reason, work Miracles. Let the Prince therefore be well advised in the Affairs which he treats of, in the Alliances which he ratifies, in the Peaces which he concludes, and in all other Treaties in general which concern the Government; and when he Signs them let his hand be full of Eyes, (as in the prefent Emblem) that he may see what he does. The Bawd in Plautus valued not the Promises of the Lover when she said, Our hands are full of eyes, what they see they believe; and elsewhere she calls the Day quick sighted, in which she never traded but for the Ready. Blind are Resolves made by Confidence: Pythagoras's Motto was, Not to shake hands with every Body. Credulity to all is very dange∣rous; let a Prince therefore consider well before he inga∣ges himself, thinking always that his Friends as well as his Enemies design to cheat him, one more, the other less; one to rob him of his Territories and Riches, the other only to reconcile himself to his Favour and Good-will. This Pre-supposition should not be deriv'd from Fraud, and Vil∣lainy giving him the Liberty to forfeit his Word and Pro∣mise, which would utterly confound the publick Faith, and be a great Blot in his Reputation; this Caution should be nothing but a prudent Circumspection and piece of Po∣licy. That Diffidence the Daughter of Suspicion is then blameable in a Prince, when 'tis frivolous and vicious, which immediately discovers its Effects and proceeds to Ex∣ecution, not that Circumspect and general Distrust, which equally regards all, without particularizing upon any one, until the Circumstances well examined shall dictate other∣wise, and perhaps you may not sufficiently confide in any one, whom you may nevertheless have a good Opinion of, for

this is not a particular distrusting of him, but a general Caution of Prudence; there are Forts in the very middle of Kingdoms, in which there are Garrisons kept, as if on the E∣nemies Frontiers. This Caution is convenient, and reflects not upon the Subjects Fidelity. A Prince may confide in his Relations, Allies, Subjects and Ministers, yet this Confidence should not be so remiss, as to lull him asleep, and make him careless of all Accidents, by which Ambiti∣on, Interest, or Hatred usually pervert Fidelity; breaking the strongest Bars of the Law of Nature and Nations; when a Prince had rather chuse to suffer, than live in the con∣tinual Alarms of so many Cautions; and rather let things run on, than remedy the Inconveniencies which may hap∣pen. He makes his Ministers wicked and sometimes trea∣cherous, for they imputing his Indulgence to Incapability despise and slight him, and each Reigns absolutely in that part of the Government which is allotted him. But when the Prince is vigilant, and if he does confide in any does it not without Caution; when he is always so prepar'd, that Treachery shall never find him unprovided; when he con∣demns not without hearing; and reprehends not but to pre∣serve Fidelity, when 'tis in danger, he may wear his Crown in safety. King Ferdinand the Catholick had no reason to suspect the Fidelity of the great Captain† 1.4; nevertheless he kept those people near him who should diligently pry into his Actions, that he knowing how narrowly he was watch'd, might Act with the more Caution. This was not properly an Action of distrust but prudence. For all this he must take care that this Suspicion be not groundless and frivolous, as was that of the same King Fer∣dinand to the same great Captain; for though after the loss of the Battel of Ravenna, he wanted him for the manage∣ment of Affairs in Italy, he would not make use of him when he saw with what eagerness all the people strove to serve and fight under him; and so endeavoured by al•• the means he could to assure himself of Duke Valentine, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that suspecting an experimented Fidelity, he exposed him∣self

to one suspected: So over jealous Spirits to avoid one Danger fall into a greater; though sometimes the refusal of the Services of such great Men, may be rather a Princes Envy or Ingratitude, than Jealousie or Suspicion. It may be also that this wise Prince, thought it not convenient to make use of a Man whom he knew to be discontented; a Prince must expect little Fidelity from a person of whom he has once shewn a Distrust. The more ingenious and generous a Spi∣rit is, the more it resents the Suspicion of its Fidelity, and so more easily quits it, which made Getulius make bold to write to Tiberius, That he was Loyal, and unless suspected, would remain so4 1.5. A Prince ought to learn by the experience of his own Accidents as well as others, how far he ought to con∣fide in his Subjects. Amongst the Cautions which King Henry the II. left his Son Don John, there was this, That he should continue the Rewards given to those, who had follow'd his party against King Peter their natural Lord, but that he should not put so much Confidence in them, as not to have an Eye upon 'em, that in Offices and Places of Trust he should make use of those, who adher'd to their Master King Peter like true and faithful Subjects, and oblige 'em to make amends for past Offences by future Services; but that he should not put any Confidence in the Neuters, who had shewn themselves more addicted to self Interest than the publick Good. Traytors are odious even to those whom they serve by their Treason5 1.6, and the Loyal are esteem'd by those against whom they are so; upon this ground Otho trusted Celsus, who had faithfully served Galba6 1.7.

'Tis not good to raise a Minister all at once to great Places, for it makes other envy him and hate the Prince, they taking this sudden Promotion as an Argument of his Levity. There is no Minister so modest, as not to be affron∣ted, nor so zealous as to continue in his Devoir, when he sees

another so unjustly preferred. For one that's satisfied many are discontented; and when the Ministers are disgusted 'tis impossible the Government should go well: Such Elections are nothing else but abortive Births; and Fidelity takes deeper root, when it sees that Offices and Imployments are the reward of faithful Services: the Prince has in the mean while time to make Tryal of his Minister, first in places of small Trust least it should cost him too dear, afterwards in places of greater Importance7 1.8, let him examine before he employs him in Affairs of Peace or War, what is the most likely to shake his Fidelity, what his Birth is, what his Reputation and Fortune; this Circumspection is parti∣cularly necessary in places of Trust, which are as 'twere the Keys and Security of Governments.

Augustus would not permit any Senator or Roman Knight to enter Egypt without his special Order, because that Pro∣vince was the Grainary of the Empire, and that he who made himself Master of that had the other at Command: for the same reason Tiberius sharply reprehended Germanicus for going into Alexandria without his leave8 1.9, but for the greater Security, and the better to keep the Minister in obedience, 'twould be convenient to allow a little more Au∣thority to the Magistracy of the Province, for there are no Curbs stronger than that, nor more ready to oppose the Faults of the Governor.

Mean and abject Spirits, such as have no Ambition of Glo∣ry, or thirst for Preferments, are fit for no Employ. The chief Quality which God found in Ioshuah, to introduce him in∣to the management of Affairs, was that he had a great Spi∣rit 9 1.10. But yet the Courage should not be so great, as to repine at his being born a Subject, and not be contented with his Condition; for the Loyalty of such is in great Danger, because they aspire always to the highest step, which if they attain not, 'tis either for want of Power, or

Wit, besides they soon flag in their Zeal for the Publick, and Obedience to their Prince.

Great Spirits are not less dangerous at least, if they are not docile and modest for being very positive and conceited of their own Opinions, they are apt to slight Commands, and believe that all should be governed at their Pleasure. A person is as troublesome for his good Qualifications, as for his having none at all; for there is no satisfying him, who presumes too much upon his Merit: Tiberius never desired great Vertues in Offices of Trust, and hated Vices too; for from one he feared Danger to himself, from t' other Scandal to the Government10 1.11.

Nor are those fit for Ministers who are rich and of great Families, for having no need of the Prince, and flowing in plenty of all things, they won't expose themselves to Perils and Toils, nor can, nor will they be under Command11 1.12. Whence Sosibius Britannicus us'd to say, Princes can't endure Riches in the Commons12 1.13.

When a Prince shall have made Choice of a Minister with all due Circumspection, let him seemingly put an en∣tire Confidence in him, but always keep an Eye upon his Actions and Intelligences, and if they are any ways suspici∣ous, let him be removed to another Post, where he will want opportunity to make a party to execute his ill De∣signs; for there is more prudence and kindness in preven∣ting a Crime, than in forgiving it when committed; if Ger∣manicus's Victory, and the Soldiers Applause pleas'd Tibe∣rius on one hand, on t' other they made him jealous and uneasie13 1.14. And understanding the Commotions in the East, he was glad of a Pretence ea expose him to Dan∣gers, by making him Governour of those Provinces14 1.15.

Now if any Minister is to be removed, it should be done under the pretence of Honour, and before the Reasons are known, with such prudence as mayn't give him Reason to mistrust the Princes disgust: for as fear of being cheated is the way to be cheated; so Suspicion of Loyalty makes Traytors; for which Reason Tiberius having a mind to re∣call Germanicus to Rome, did it under a pretence of a Tri∣umph which he design'd him15 1.16; offering him other Preferments, of which Princes are very liberal, when they would free themselves from their Jealousies.

If a Subject once loses the Respect he owes his Prince, after Confidence will never secure him. Sancbo the first King of Leon pardoned Count Gonzalo, for having taken up Arms against him, endeavouring to reconcile him by his Favours, but those by which he thought to have oblig'd him, only gave him opportunity to poyson him.

When Princes are concerned with one another, there is no Obligation of Friendship or Affinity, a sufficient Reason for their trusting each other; Don Ferdinand the great King of Castile, and his Brother Garcias of Navarre were at difference; he as he lay sick at Nacar had a design to seize his Brother who came to pay him a Visit; but his Design not succeeding, he had a mind to dissemble his Intent by visiting his Bro∣ther, who caused him to be apprehended* 1.17. Revenge and State-Policy is of greater Force than Friendship, or Consan∣guinity. The same befel Don Garcias King of Galicia, for having trusted his Brother Alonso King of Castile: the most irreconcileable falling out, is that between Relations and dearest Friends16 1.18, and perfect Hatred is the result of per∣fect Love; from all which we may infer, how difficult a thing 'tis for a Prince to trust himself in the hands of his Enemies, it cost the King of Granada his Life for going, though with a Pass port to ask assistance from King Peter the Cruel. Lewis Forza Duke of Milan, was more cauti∣ous, refusing an Interview with the King of France, unless

in the midst of a River, or upon a broken Bridge. A true piece of Italian Policy, not to trust where they have once shew'd a Jealousie, for which Reason the Italians were much admir'd at the Interview between the great Captain and King Ferdinand the Catholick, as also at that between the same King, and the King of France his Enemy. In some Cases Confidence is more safe and necessary to gain peo∣ples Affections than Distrust. Don Alonso VI. having lost his Kingdom of Leon, liv'd retir'd at the Court of the King of Toledo, who was a Moor, when upon the Death of Don San∣cho his Sates recalled him to his Throne, with the greatest privacy imaginable, fearing lest if it should come to be known by the Moors, they might retain him by force; he like a prudent and grateful Prince discovered the whole Affair; this Confidence so oblig'd the Barbarian King, who before understood the Intrigue and design'd to seize him, that he not only let him go free, but also furnished him with Mo∣ney for his Voyage: See the power of Gratitude which disarms even the most savage Spirits.* 1.19.

Distrusts between Princes can't be cur'd by Satisfactions or Excuses, but by their contrary; if time won't heal them, diligence never will: these are a kind of wounds which the Probe and the Hand does but more exulcerate; and a sort of apparent Jealousies, which are an Introduction to In∣fidelity.

EMBLEM LII.

[illustration]

THE Scorpion translated to the Skyes, and plac'd among the Constellations loses not its Malignity, which is greater, by how much more its Power and venomous Influences are extended over things below. Let Princes therefore well consider the Qualifications of those Subjects, whom they raise to places of Trust, for there Vices always thrive; nay, Vertue it self is often in danger, for the Will being arm'd with Power, bids defiance to Reason, and often gets the better; if Vertue have not resolution enough without being dazl'd with the splendour of Riches and Prosperity to resist it. If Promotion makes the good bad, 'twill make the bad worse. And if Vice notwithstanding the Punishments and Infamy that attend it find so many fol∣lowers, what will it do when back'd with Favour and Pre∣ferments. And if Vice be the ready way to Preferment, who will seek it through the rugged Road of Vertue? That

is inherent to our Natures, but this must be acquir'd by In∣dustry. The first forces Rewards, the other expects 'em with Patience, and we find the Appetite much better pleas'd by its own Violence than Merit; and being impatient had ra∣ther depend upon its own Industry, than attend the Pleasure and Will of another; to reward the bad, by promoting them to places of Authority, is, to check the vertuous and incourage the vicious. A private Knave while he is private can do no great matter of mischief, 'tis but an inconsidera∣ble number of private Men, on whom he can exercise his Villainy; but promoted to places of Trust, his Villainy rea∣ches all, being himself Minister of Justice, and having the whole Body of Government at his disposal1 1.20; Villains ought not to be put into places where they have power to exercise their Villainy, Nature foreseeing this inconvenience, has given venomous Animals neither feet nor wings, that they may do less mischief? He who furnished Villains with either designs it should either run or fly. But Princes ne∣vertheless usually make use of the bad rather than the good, the former seeming generally more cunning2 1.21; but they are mistaken, for Vice is not Wisdom, and he can have no true Judgment who has no Vertue; for which reason Don Alonso King of Arragon and Naples, commended the pru∣dence of the Romaus, in building the Temple of Honour within that of Vertue, that to go into that you must ne∣cessarily pass through this, esteeming him not worthy of Honour, who was not a follower of Vertue; and that he should not arrive to Offices and Preferment, who enter'd not at the Porch of Vertue: Without this how can a Mi∣nister be serviceable to the Government? Among a crowd of Vices what room is there for Prudence, Justice, Clemency, Valour, and other Vertues absolutely necessary for a Com∣mander? How will the Subject observe those proper to him, if he wants the example of the Minister, whose Acti∣ons

he observes carefully, and imitates through Flatte∣ry? The people have a respect for a just Minister, and imagine that he cannot err; on the contrary, they never approve and commend the Actions of one who is not so. Demosthenes spoke very well one day in the Spartan Se∣nate, but because the people look'd upon him as a vicious person, they rejected his Counsel. Whereupon it was or∣dered by the Ephori, that a person whom they had a better Opinion of should propose the same thing, that it might be received and executed: this good Opinion of the peo∣ple is so necessary, that though the Minister be a person of Integrity, the Government is not safe in his hands, if the people mis-inform'd think him otherwise. Henry the Vth. King of England, for this reason at his coming to the Crown, removed from him all those who had been his Com∣panions in his younger days, and turn'd out all Ministers, putting in their places Men of worth, and such as were a∣greeable to the people; one can impute the Success and Vi∣ctories of Theodorick, to nothing but his good Choice of Ministers, having no other for his Councellors than Pre∣lates of the strictest Vertues. Ministers are as it were the Picture of Majesty, which since it can't appear every where is represented by them; who ought therefore to be as like him as possible in Life and Conversation, since the Prince cannot of himself exercise in all places, the Authority which he has received by common Consent, he ought to take great Care how he shares it amongst his Ministers. For he who is not born a Prince, when he sees himself deck'd with Majesty, will take Pride in shewing it, by exer∣cising his Authority and Passions3 1.22. And here may the Question be decided; which Nation is in the better Con∣dition, that where the Prince is good, and the Ministers bad, or that where the Prince is bad, and the Ministers good [for that may happen according to Tacitus]4 1.23 for

necessity obliging a Prince to substitute his Power to several Ministers, if they are bad they will do more Damage to a Nation, than the Prince be he never so good can advantage it; for they will abuse his Goodness, and under pretence of publick Good, will turn it to their own private interest and advantage. A bad Prince may be reformed by many good Ministers, but not many bad Ministers by a good Prince.

Some imagine a Princes hands are bound, and his Liber∣ty infring'd, when he has good Ministers, and that the more vicious the Subjects are, the safer he lives among 'em; a ri∣diculous and senseless Phancy, for Vertue is the only thing that keeps Nations in obedience and quiet, and Nations are never more quiet and firm than when at home, private people live justly and innocently, and Justice and Clemency flourish abroad; 'tis easie to govern the good. Without Vertue the Laws lose their force; the love of Liberty reigns, and the aversion to Government increases, whence proceed the change of States, and fall of Princes. 'Tis necessary then that they have vertuous Ministers, who should advise them with Zeal and Affection, and introduce Vertue into the Nation by their Example, and by the integrity of their Lives. Tiberius held the extreams of both Vertue and Vice equally dangerous to a Minister, and chose one between both, as we said elsewhere, but this is properly the fear of a Tyrant; if a vertuous Minister be good, one more vertuous is better.

But 'tis not sufficient for his Ministers to be endued with excellent Vertues, if those necessary Endowments, and Or∣naments of experience, which the management of Affairs requires are not eminently visible in him: Africk still mourns and shews upon the sooty Faces of its Inhabitants, the rashness of Phoebus [if we may use the Philosophy and Mo∣rality of the Ancients] in lending his Chariot to his Son Phaeton, an unexperienced Youth, and one who did not in the least merit such Promotion; and this is the Danger all Elections carry with 'em which are made at a jump, and not gradually, by which Experience teaches 'em to know the people, and to rise by degrees.

Tiberius though a Tyrant never advanc'd his Nephews without this Caution, and particularly Drusus, whom he would not make a Tribune till after eight years Experi∣ence 5 1.24. Preferment to an unexperienc'd person is Favour, but to one of Experience a just Reward. Yet is not Experi∣ence in all things, as neither all Vertues requisite for every Office; but only those who regard each in particular, for that which is proper and requisite for one is not always for others: Experience of the Sea is useless in Affairs at Land, and it does not follow, that he who knows how to manage a House or ride a Horse, can also marshal an Army6 1.25. In this Lewis Forza Duke of Milan was mistaken, when he committed the Conduct of his Army against the King of France to Galeaze St. Severin, who was very dexterous in managing Horses, but understood little of Affairs of War. Mottathias made a more prudent Choice when seeing himself near his End, he chose for General Iudas Macchabee, a ro∣bust Man, and well vers'd in Arms, and for his Counsellor his Brother Simeon a Man of Judgment and Experience7 1.26. In this we have seen great Errors, in changing the reins and administration of Governments. These are different in Kingdoms and Common-wealths. Some respect Justice, others Plenty, some War, others Peace; yet though they are so different in themselves, there is nevertheless a certain Faculty or civil Vertue, which unites 'em, and makes them all tend one way, to the Preservation of the State: each aiming at this by means proportion'd to the Office he is in. This civil Vertue is different according to the several Forms of Government, which differ according to the means, and methods of governing, for which reason a Man may be a good Citizen, but not a good Minister, for 'tis not sufficient that he be endu'd with several moral Vertues, un∣less he has also civil ones, and this natural Disposition so proper to Administration and Government.

'Tis therefore necessary for a Prince to know the Na∣ture and Inclinations of his Subjects, that he may better know how to employ 'em, for upon this good Choice all the Actions of his Government depend. The Genius of Herman Cortez, was particularly proper for the Conquest of India; that of Gonzalez Fernandez of Cordova for the War of Noples; and if they had been exchang'd, and the first sent against the French, and the latter against the Indians, doubtless they had not been so successful. Nature has not given Man a like Qualifications for all things; but only one excellence for one Office, whether it be Frugality, or Pru∣dence, and 'tis certain, Instruments do most Service when they are made use of by one, not by many. For this reason, Aristotle blam'd the Carthagians, for that among them one person officiated in many places, there being no Man fit for all8 1.27. Nor is it possible [as the Emperour Iustinian remark'd]9 1.28 to mind two, without forgetting one or t' other. A Nation is much better govern'd, when in that as in a Ship every Man knows his Birth; for though perhaps a Man may be found capable of all Affairs, it do's not follow, that they shall be all assign'd him. That great Copper Ves∣sel for Sacrifices called for its largeness a Sea, and supported by 12 Oxen before the Altar of the Temple of Solomon10 1.29 contain'd 3000 measures, yet they never put in above 200011 1.30. 'Tis by no means convenient to accumulate all Offices and Preferments upon one person, to the Envy and Dissatisfaction of all; but whether for want of Knowledge of persons, or for that they won't take the pains to look for fit Men, it usually happens that Princes imploy one, or at most a very few of those who are about them: In all Affairs, whence Promotions and Rewards are scarce, and so Emulation grows cold, and all things move slowly.

For the same Reason 'tis not good for two persons to be

employed about the same Affair, for that makes it confus'd like a Picture drawn by two hands, the methods of Pain∣ters being always different, one is quick, the t' other slow, one loves Lights, the t' other is more for Shades. Besides this, 'tis impossible two should agree in the same Conditi∣ons, Counsels and Methods, or that they should not disa∣gree to the great Detriment of the Negotiation and Prince too. These second Causes have each their distinct Office and separate Operations. For my part I think it more ad∣viseable to commit an Office to one person less capable, than to two though more sufficient; since therefore the good Election is a thing so necessary, and its Success so difficult, 'tis not adviseable for Princes to relie too much upon their own Judgments. Pope Paul the III. and King Ferdinand the Catholick first consulted the people, suffering it as if carelesly to be published before they made their Choice; the Emperour Alexander Severus, proposed his Choice to all, that each person as if he were interested in it, might freely declare his thoughts of his Capacity, or Incapaci∣ty 12 1.31. Though the peoples Approbation is not always to be depended on: Sometimes 'tis in the right, sometimes 'tis in the wrong13 1.32; 'tis oft deceived in Mens Natures and hidden Vices. Moreover Industry, Self-interest, or Malice, and Emulation spread this Report among the Mob, either in their Favour or otherwise. Nor is a Ministers behaving himself well in small Offices sufficient to recom∣mend him to greater, for Preferment makes some more vigorous and active, others careless and lazy14 1.33: much sa∣fer was the Diligence of King Philip the II. who carefully observed his Nurseries, and took particular notice what Plants were like to bear, when transpanted into the civil or Ecclesiastical Government, and had private Informations

of their Behaviour in their Youth, before Ambition could disguise their Vices, whether they grew streight and up∣right, or crooked; and had certain Characters of the Ver∣tues and Vices of the chief of his Subjects; whence he ne∣ver made an ill Choice, and in his time flourished Persons truly valuable; especially in Ecclesiastical Preferments, for he thought it better to make Choice of such as he knew would not deserve Punishment, than to punish them after∣ward 15 1.34. Happy is that Kingdom where there is no room for Ambition, Petitions, Prayers, nor Attendance, and where even concealed Vertue has no need of a Petition, or Recommendation to be known to the Prince, who of him∣self knows the Merits of his Subjects; this was formerly spoken in Tiberius's Commendation16 1.35. An auricular Commendation depends upon others, but an ocular one not; that may be deceived, this rot; that only informs the mind, this both informs and moves too; nay, as 'twere forces to Punishment or Rewards.

Some Countreys have chosen their Ministers by Lots, which in some Cases is not improper, to decline Envy, and avoid Contention and Emulation, often the grounds of Tu∣mults and Seditions. But when a fit person is to be chosen for the Administration of Justice, or Command of the Army, upon whom the Government and publick Safety is to de∣pend, a matter of that Concern, ought not to be decided by the uncertainty of Chance, but to pass the Tryal of a due Election For the Lot or Dye weigh's not Qualifica∣tions, Desert, and Reputation, as Counsels do, where all things are examined by weight and measure17 1.36, and though all Counsels are usually guided by Interest, a Prince may make a good Choice, if he takes Care privately to in∣form himself of the Parties Qualifications and Vertues, as also the ends which his Councellors propose in promo∣ting

them. For when a Prince blindly approves all Propo∣sals, these above-mentioned Inconveniencies will attend; but when his Counsellors see that he examines them, and that he does not always admit the Persons propos'd, but chooses others more sufficient, they will advise with greater Care and Deliberation.

EMBLEM LIII.

[illustration]

THE Thebans represented the Integrity of Mini∣sters, especially those of Justice, by a Statue with∣out hands: for when they are shut they are the Emblem of Avarice, when open its Instruments. This Gar∣den represents the same thing, by these Statues without Arms, which are at the corners of each Walk, like those in the Walks at Rome; nor are there any better Guards

than these; for they have eyes to watch the Flowers, but want Arms to gather them; if all Ministers were like these Statues, the Exchequer would be more secure, and Nati∣ons better governed, especially Commonwealths, whose Re∣venues are looked upon as common, every Magistrate be∣lieving it no Crime to make his fortune out of them; one accuses t'other to excuse himself, and all wink at one another, and this Vice being like Fire, which with the same matter that should quench it is nourished and burns fierce1 1.37, so they the more they get, the more they de∣sire 2 1.38, and Avarice once glutted with the publick Trea∣sure, then Attacks private persons, whence they wholly confound the principal end of Society which is common Perservation. Where Avarice reigns, Peace and Quiet is ba∣nished; all things are in disorder and confusion; nothing but Jars, Seditions and Civil Wars, the Forms of Govern∣ment are changed, and Empires run to Ruine, as most have been lost upon this account. Avarice drove the Phoe∣nicians out of Spain* 1.39▪ that made the Oracle of Apollo fore∣tell the downfall of the Common-wealth of Sparta. God warn'd Moses to choose persons into places of Trust who hated Covetousness3 1.40. 'Tis impossible that State should be govern'd well whose Ministers are covetous; for how can he who Plunders every Body rightly administer Justice? How will he procure Plenty, whose whole Gain is starving others? How can he love the Kingdom, who thinks of no∣think but robbing on't? How can he whose mind runs upon nothing but filling his Chests, mind Affairs of State? How will he indeavour to merit Rewards, who is his own Pay-Master? Nothing succeeds well when Self-interest ma∣nages. For Interest is preferr'd before Duty or Honour. Nothing great or glorious is enterpriz'd without a desire of Glory, which a mean, abject, covetous Spirit has no value for. There is scarce any Crime but proceeds from Avarice or Ambition4 1.41. Nothing makes Rebels sooner than the fraud

and corruption of the Ministers. They are first moved by their particular Damages, then by the common Injustice, then by Envy against those who commit it, and so by Hatred to the Prince that suffers it; if he knows it not, they accuse him of Incapacity; if he tolerates it, they say he's remiss and negligent; if he permits it, he's an Accomplice; if he wishes it to the end, that the Authors being glutted like Spunges, he may take occasion to squeeze 'em after∣wards, he is a Tyrant. O unhappy Prince and State, wherein the Ministers don't thrive but by their Ruine. Nor would I have Ministers so nice, as to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••e••sents in general; 'tis incivility to receive none; many, S••••••dness; all, Covetousness.

Avarice in Princes is the ruin of States5 1.42, for the people can't bear to see their Estates in danger, in the hands of him whom they choose to preserve 'em; so that seeing this pretended Defender of his Countrey, the first that Arms himself against it, they streight look out for ano∣ther: In short, what can a Subject hope for from a cove∣tous Prince? For this Vice even Children hate their Pa∣rents. Where there is no Prospect of Interest, there is no Love nor Obedience; that Government is Tyrannick which respects Self-interest, more than the publick Good. King Al∣phonso, the Wise, for this Reason said:

That a King ought not to covet abundance of Riches only to fill his Treasury, and not do good with them; for 'tis impossible but he who does so, must use indirect means to gain 'em, which is beneath the Dignity of a Prince

* 1.43; the Holy Writ com∣pares a covetous Prince who unjustly usurps his Subjects Estates to a roaring Lyon, and a hungry Bear6 1.44, and his Actions to a Spiders Web which perishes with it, or to a Vineyard-Keeper's Arbour, which lasts but a little while7 1.45; that which is ill got is soon spent How like Spiders are some Princes, who spin their Web from their own Bowels, gri∣ping and draining their Subjects to make their own fortune from the Rock, and weave Nets which soon break and de∣ceive their hopes8 1.46.

There are several Remedies against this Vice, the best are those which prevent it; for if once Nature is tainted with it, 'tis very Difficulty cured; 'tis our last shift. If Princes are naturally Lovers of Money, they should be kept from seeing or feeling it, as much as possible, for Avarice like Love enters at the Eyes, and 'tis more easie to order a Payment than to make it ones self. The Ministers of the Treasury too should be generous, and not prompt the Prince to enrich himself by sordid and unworthy Methods; to pre∣vent also Avarice in the Ministers, Care should be taken that Offices and Places be not bought and sold, as the Em∣perour Commodus observ'd, for he who buys 'em sells 'em too; this the Emperour Severus knew, as also Lewis XII. of France, who used this Remedy, but has been since ill observ'd by his Successours. It seems to be the Law of Nations, that a Province, the Command of which is bought, should be plunder'd, and that Judgment should be given to the highest bidder at the Court of Justice, which is not to be approached but by Golden steps9 1.47. Castile to this Day finds the misfortune of these Methods in the Governments of their Cities, because they are all sold, against a Statute made by common Consent, in the time of Don John II. that they should be for Life, and given to none but whom the Kings should nominate.

'Tis necessary besides to settle a competent Salary upon each Office, such as the incumbent may live handsomely upon; this was the Method of Don Alonso IX▪ giving suf∣ficient Salaries to his Judges, and severely punishing those whom he found guilty of Bribery. The same was pra∣ctis'd by their Catholick Majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella, who reduced Lawyers Fees to a certainty* 1.48.

Magistrates should not be suffer'd to Traffick or Merchan∣dize 10 1.49, for they'll never give good Counsel, which they

see is against their Gain. Besides the people is better satis∣fied with the Honour and Preferment which are conferr'd on others, provided they have the Gain and Profit, but they are incens'd and apt to rebel when they see themselves rob'd of both11 1.50. And to this Cause the Feuds between the Nobility and Commonalty of Genoua may be attributed. Offices ought not to be given to poor and needy Persons, for their Poverty exposes 'em too much to Corruption and Bri∣bery. In an Election in the Roman Senate for a Governour of Spain, the Dispute lay between Sulpicius Galba and Aure∣lius Cotta, Scipio being asked his Opinion reply'd, He lik'd neither, one for having nothing, and t'other for that he had never enough.

The Athenians always Elected rich Magistrates, and Ari∣stotle gives this Reason for it, that 'tis impossible for a poor one to govern justly or peaceably12 1.51? 'Tis true, in Spain we have had several able States-men, who came poor into Office and went poor out.

Ministers who have a great Family are very burthen∣some to their Provinces; for though they are Men of In∣tegrity themselves, yet their Retinue mayn't be so, the Ro∣man Senate for this Reason would not suffer them to carry their Wives into their Governments13 1.52; and the Kings of Persia generally prefer'd Eunuchs to the greatest places of Trust14 1.53, because being free from the trouble of Wives, and Cares of providing▪ for Children, they might be more careful of, and less chargeable to the Publick. Those who are too much addicted to Self-interest, and a desire of rai∣sing their Fortunes, are very dangerous in publick Offices. For though some do strive to raise themselves by Merit and Renown, yet they generally think it the surest way to do it by Riches, without waiting Rewards and Gratuities from the Prince, who is usually most sparing to him, who de∣serves most. Lucullus the Consul whom Want made cove∣tous,

and Avarice cruel, brought an unjust War upon Spain only to enrich himself.

Residents in Courts after Imployments are over, is a very effectual Remedy, because of the fear not only of losing this ill gotten Wealth, but also of Punishment, in the Severity of which there should be no Favour, nor should it be bought off by resounding; as Sergius Galba the Praetor did at Rome, when he was accused of Treachery to the Portu∣gueze. If all the Chairs of Justice were cover'd with the Skins of corrupt Judges, as Cambyses King of Persia order'd, and since him Roger of Sicily, certainly Justice and Integri∣ty would be more strictly observed.

EMBLEM LIV.

[illustration]

LIBERTY is natural to Men; obedience forced; that is Arbitrary, this guided by Reason, these are Contraries, and continually jarring against one ano∣ther;

whence proceed Rebellions and Treasons against the Prince, and as no Government can consist, unless some commanded and others obeyed1 1.54; every one would be Head, and depend on none but himself, which being im∣possible, he imagines his Liberty consists in changing the form of Government: and this is the greatest misfortune that can befall States, and is often the chief Cause of their Ruine, wherefore 'tis highly necessary to use such methods, as that this Lust after Liberty, and this humane Ambition being removed far from the immediate Administration, should be kept under by reason, and the force of Govern∣ment; so that this supream Authority which is the Princes Property should be granted to none else, for he exposes Loyalty to evident Danger; who grants any one a Power too absolute. The Royal Crown put upon a Subjects Head, tho' but in jest, will make him proud and think himself above what he is. The mind of a Subject should not experience this Royal Grandeur and Glory of reigning, for afterwards abu∣sing it he usurps it, and that it mayn't return to him from whom he had it, he Plots and contrives his Ruine; the Di∣vine Writ in one Chapter gives us Examples of Kings put to Death by the hands of their Subjects, for having raised them too high. Solomon for all his Wisdom fell into this misfortune and ran the same Risque, for having made Iero∣boam President of all the Customs of the House of Ioseph2 1.55, and we read that he had the Impudence to lift up his hand against his King3 1.56. Let Princes then take it for a Maxim of State, not to promote one too much above others, or if they are oblig'd to it, let it not be one but several, that they may Balance one another and mutually keep each other in their Devoir, by a reciprocal Examination of one anothers Actions and Designs4 1.57. The Emperour Ferdinand II. did not sufficiently observe this piece of Policy, when he

gave the absolute Command of his Armies, and Provinces to the Duke of Fridland, whence sprang so many misfor∣tunes, and amongst the rest the loss of that great Man, which was meerly the effect of too much Power. Let not Princes be deceived by the Example of Pharaoh, who com∣mitted all his Power into the hands of Ioseph, who pre∣serv'd his Kingdom5 1.58; for Ioseph was the Emblem of Christ, and there are very few Ioseph's to be found now adays. Each would depend upon himself, and not upon the Body; which this present Emblem represents, by a Branch encircled with a wicker Basket filled with Earth, such as Gardiners use, where it by degrees takes root, and so being cut off insensibly, becomes a Tree independant of the Stock, without the least respect to its Greatness. This Example shews the Danger in making Governments of Pro∣vinces perpetual, for Ambition having once taken root, claims 'em as its Property, he who is so accustom'd to com∣mand, will afterwards scarce be brought to obey. France shews us many Examples of this written in its own Blood. Even God's Ministers in the Kingdom of Heaven are liable to slip6 1.59, the Perpetuity of great Offices is an Alienati∣on from the Crown; the Scepter will be useless and of no force, and will stand in awe of that very Power it has been so prodigal of: Liberality will want a Dowry, and Vertue a Reward. The Minister becomes a Tyrant in the Govern∣ment which he is sure of for Life; that Prince whom he sees preserves his Authority, he respects as his Master, but him who does not he despises, and at last rebells against him. Therefore Iulius Caesar limited the Pretorship to one Year, and the Consulship to two.

And the Emperour Charles V. advised his Son Philip II. not to continue Ministers in Office too long, especially in places Military, to give the greatest to persons of mean Fortune, and Embassy's to the rich, thereby to weaken 'em. The Bravery of the great Captain in Italy, made King Fer∣dinand the Catholick suspect him, so that he recall'd him, and if he did not then wholly mistrust him, at least he

would no longer hazard his Loyalty, by the Continuation of the Vice-Royship of Naples. And though that great Politician Tiberius continued Ministers in Posts all their Life-time, but this was upon such Tyrannick Considerati∣ons, as ought not to enter into the Thoughts of a prudent and just Prince7 1.60. Princes ought therefore to take advice from Nature, the Mistress of true Politicks; who does not allow its Celestial Ministers of light a perpetual Authority, and Government of the World, but certain fixt Seasons, as we may see in the Motion and Reigns of the Planets, that they mayn't lose the right of disposing of 'em, and to pre∣vent, the usurping her Authority and Power; besides she considers, that the Earth would be ruined, if it should al∣ways be governed by the Melancholy of Saturn, or the heat and fury of Mars, or the severity of Iupiter, or the sub∣tilty of Mercury, or the levity of Venus, or the inconstan∣cy of the Moon.

In removals of this Nature great Care ought to be taken, that Ministers should not take it to be a slur upon their Reputation, to be removed from greater to lesser Places, for since there are not many, that Minister would be of no use, who when he has been employ'd in the highest, would refuse to Officiate in lower Places; and though Rea∣son requires that Rewards should be equal to Deserts; yet in this Point the Subjects reason should be guided by the Princes interest, when his Service, or the publick Advan∣tage is in the Case; [not that he ought to be put into any inferior Post, out of Contempt or Disgrace] for so the im∣portance of the Negotiation makes amends for the meannes•• of the Office.

If any Offices may be continued long, they are Embassies•• for their Business is only to intercede, not Command; not to give Orders, but to negotiate; at their Departure all Acquaintance with their native Countrey dies, and all Intimacy with the Prince with whom they negotiate and

his Ministers cease. Forts and Garrisons, which are as it were the Keys of the Kingdom, should be at the imme∣diate Power and Disposal of the Prince; King Sancho was ill advised, when by reason of the Minority of his Son Don Alonso III. he order'd those of the Nobility, who were Go∣vernours of Cities to remain till his Son was fifteen years old, which occasioned many grievous Calamities to that Kingdom. As for other Offices let 'em be but for a time, for their too long continuance makes the Ministers proud, and endangers their Loyalty: This Tiberius knew though he did not practise8 1.61. Vertue is tired by Industry and Expectation; yet should not Offices be of too short conti∣nuance, so as the Minister can reap no benefit or experience in 'em, or so as to make him too ravenous like Hawks in Norway, because of the shortness of the day; but in trou∣blesome and dangerous times, publick Offices and places of Trust ought to be continu'd longer, least they should upon removal be conferr'd upon raw, unexperienced Persons. So Augustus did upon the defeat of Quintilius Varus. But this Doctrine of Ministers being continued in Offices but for a time, must not be understood of those supream Offices of the Princes Counsel, or of Justice. But on the contrary, they ought to be fixt and continued, because of the advan∣tage of their Experience and Knowledge of Affairs depending.

These kinds of Offices are in Governments like the Poles in the Heavens, about which the lesser Orbs move, so that if they should be chang'd or removed, the whole Universe would be endanger'd by the disorder of its natural Moti∣ons. Solon knew this Inconveniency in the four hundred Senatours, which were yearly Elected by Lot at Athens, and therefore he established a Senate of Sixty worthy Men who were called Areopagites, and while this continu'd the Republick flourished. 'Tis moreover very dangerous to commit the Government of Kingdoms during the Minori∣ty, to persons who have any Pretentio••s thereto, though

never so unjust; so it fell out in Arragon, by the Impru∣dence of those who committed the Government to Sancho Duke of Roussillon, until King Iames I. came to age. Those Persons who have no manner of Preten∣tion to the Crown, either by Birth, or any other Cause, often thirst after it; how much more then those, who in Pictures and Images see their Ancestours brows incircled with it?

This Age as well as the pass'd gives us many deplorable Examples of Relations, who have treacherously usurped Kingdoms which they were entrusted with. Those of the Royal Blood are more prone to Tyranny, in that they never want means to accomplish their Designs. Few can be per∣swad'd of the Justice of that Law, which prefers Birth to Vertue; and every one thinks he better deserves a Crown, than another, and if this Reason should be of force in any one, he is in danger from his Favourites, who hoping to participate of his Grandeur, strive to procure it by violent means, and to raise Jealousies amongst his Relations. If King Philip had any Jealousie of Don John of Austria they flow'd from this Spring. A glorious Example of this Policy we find in the Infant Ferdinand refusing the Crown, which was the Right of his Nephew Don John II. by which generous Recusance of that Crown on Earth he merited many more in Heaven. The generous Loyalty which the Infants of that Name have paid the Kings of their Race, is of an an∣cient Date. Nor do we find less in this present Infant to∣wards the present King, whose Respect and Obedience is more like that of a Subject than of a Brother. The hea∣venly Spheres pay not a more ready Obedience to the first mover, than his Highness does to his Majestys Will. O truly Noble Prince, whose glorious Birth, though the great∣est in the World, is yet the least of his Excellencies, the Effect of Divine Providence, that in a time of such trou∣blesome and tedious Wars, which strain'd the very Axle-tree and Poles of the Government, to raise us up an Atlas to support it by his Valour, Conduct and Prudence.

EMBLEM LV.

[illustration]

ARISTOTLE the better to instruct Alexander the Great, in the Qualities of Counsellours com∣pared them to Eyes; which comparison Don A∣lonso the Wise makes use of in his Books of Laws. Nor is this thought new, for the Kings of Persia and Babylon call'd 'em their Eyes, their Ears and their Hands, according to the Offices in which they officiated: The seven Spirits God's Ministers sent all over the Earth, were the Eyes of a Lamb without spot or blemish1 1.62. A Prince who ought to see and comprehend so many Affairs, should be all Eyes and all Ears2 1.63, and because he can't be so, he must make use of the Eyes and Ears of other. Whence there is no

Prince, though never so prudent and intelligent, but ha•• occasion for Ministers and to make use of them as his Eyes, Ears and Hands3 1.64. This is not of small advantage to him▪ if he knows how to make a right use on't, for by thi•• means he sees with every Body's eyes, hears with their Ears▪ and takes advise from them all4 1.65. The Aegyptians mean•• this by the Eye which they placed upon their Scepter▪ for Counsels are the Eyes by which we inspect Futurity5 1.66. This Ieremiah seem'd to allude to, when he said, Virga•• vigilantem ego video6 1.67. For this Reason, in this present Emblem you see a Scepter full of Eyes, to give the Prince to understand, that he ought to inspect all Affairs of the Government by his Ministers; nor is it to be wonder'd at, that we place the Ministers in the Scepter, for formerly their Names were engrave on the Crowns of the Empe∣rours and Kings of Spain, nor without Reason, for they shine brighter than the Diadems themselves.

This Emblem of Eyes sufficiently shews the Qualifications that a Minister ought to be endued with. For as the Sight extends to all things far and near, so should the active Spirit of the Counsellour inspect all things present, past and future, that he may make a right Judgment of things, and give a true Opinion of all Affairs, which can't be done without much Reading, great Experience, and a continual Com∣merce with foreign Countries: For if the Counsellours ben't perfectly versed in the Princes Nature, and the Man∣ners and Genius of the people, they'll ruine both themselves and the Government7 1.68. And to know this requires use; for the Eyes don't know things which they have never seen; he who has had Experience and Knowledge of things, will rea∣dily find Expedients and Remedies8 1.69.

There is such a correspondence between the Eyes and Heart, that the Affections of the one immediately strikes the other, when this is sad they weep, when this glad they smile; if the Counsellour has not a particular Esteem for his Prince, he will take but little care of his Affairs, and is therefore very little to be trusted, so said King Alphonso the Wise:

* 1.70 That Councellours ought to be the Princes true Friends, otherwise he would be in great Danger, for those who hate a Person will never advise him cordially.

The Eye won't suffer the Finger to touch its inside, but upon its approach immediately sculks within the Lids; how wise and learn'd soever the Minister is in his Counsels, if he is easie and free of his Secerts, if he suffers his Finger to probe his Heart, he'll be more prejudicial to the Prin∣cers Affairs than one who understands nothing, Counsels are worth nothing when revealed, and there is more danger in good Resolves unseasonably discover'd, than in ill ones executed with Secrecy; let a Minister therefore avoid Dis∣course with those who are not entrusted with the same Se∣cret. Let him shut his Heart against those who would dive into it: for in discoursing of Affairs the Design is easily discovered, with the Maxims by which the Prince governs. The Lips are the windows of the Heart, the opening of which discovers all within.

The Eyes are so pure and free from Avarice; that they won't admit the least Atom, and if by chance any thing, though never so little gets in, it obstructs their Sight, or at least makes them see things double, and different from what they are; the Minister who receives Presents will be blind∣ed with the dust of them, so as not to be able to discern things rightly, but only as Self-interest shall represent 'em.

Though the Eyes are two, yet they see but one and the same thing, they both agree in the truth of the Species which they receive, and in transmitting them to the sence by the Optick Nerves which are united, that they mayn't enter severally and deceive it. If the Ministers don't unani∣mously agree in advising for the best, without being divided

in their Sentiments by love and hate, or any other reason▪ the Prince will be always in doubt or confusion, without knowing which Counsel is best. And this inconvenience falls out when one Minister thinks he sees and understands more than another, or when he has not Judgment enough to distinguish which is best9 1.71. or when he is byass'd by his own Passions or desire of Revenge. But a Minister should be free from all these, so as to have no other Purpose or Design than the Service of his Prince:

Such a Minister [says Alphonso the Wise] is called in Latine Patrici∣us, being as it were a Father to the Prince, which Title is taken from the resemblance it bears to the natu∣ral Father, for every Father is naturally inclined to ad∣vise his Son in all things for his advantage and Honour; so he who governs the Prince by his Counsels, ought to love him and advise him with Sincerity, preferring his Honour and Interest above all things, not respecting the Love or Hatred, Interest or Prejudice, that may ensue, and all this without Flattery, not minding whether he be good or bad; like a Father in instructing his Child

† 1.72. Nature has divided the Jurisdiction of the Eyes by a Line interpos'd, not but that they both agree in Operation, as∣sisting one another with a Zeal so mutual, that if one turns to one side, the t'other does so too, that they may have a more certain Cognizance of things, neither regarding whe∣ther they be within their Sphere or not, the same Agree∣ment is absolutely necessary amongst Ministers, whose Zeal should be so universal, that they should not only regard those things which their Office obliges 'em to, but also those that belong to others; there is no Member, but for the preservation of the whole Body, sends its Blood and Spirits to the assistance of that which is out of order. For a Mi∣nister to be an idle Spectator of anothers Calamities shews malice, envy and want of respect to the Prince. This pro∣ceeds often from a love of Self-interest and Glory; or least he should by assisting his Friend endanger his own Reputa∣tion, or else that he may flourish more upon his Friends

misfortune. Such Ministers only serve themselves not the Prince. Whence proceed Divisions in the State, Army and Revenue, by which many good opportunities are lost, many Towns, Castles and Provinces ruined; Ministers should mutually communicate their Designs and Actions, as the Cherubims did their wings in the Temple of Solomon10 1.73.

As u••eful as Eyes are to the Body, Nature has given it but two, because more would breed confusion and obstruct the Susception of things: 'Tis the same in Counsellours, for when there are too many, Consultations are retarded, Se∣crets revealed, and Truth confounded, for their Votes are only counted not duly weighed, and the greater number carries it; and thence proceed generally all misfortunes in Common-wealths. The multitude is always blind and thoughtless; and the wisest Senate, if composed of too ma∣ny, will have a mixture of the Ignorance of the vulgar. A few Planets give more light than many Stars, and the mul∣titude thereof in the Via Lactea darken one another by the refraction of their own Light, so that 'tis darker there than in any other part of the Sky. Two great a number makes Liberty sawcy and stubborn, and difficult to be reduced to the Princes Will11 1.74. As it often happens in Parliaments and general Assemblies; let therefore the Prince have just so many Ministers as are sufficient to govern his State, carrying himself indifferently to them all, not being ruled wholly by one, for he can't see so well with one as with all; thus Xenophon said when using the same comparison, he called the Ministers of the Kings of Persia their Eyes and Ears12 1.75; such a Minister would usurp all the Dignity and Majesty of the Prince to himself, for that the Prince is oblig'd to see with his Eyes13 1.76 Princes

are generally so taken with some one Minister, that with him they negotiate all manner of Affairs, though he be ne∣ver so great a Stranger to them; hence proceed so many Er∣rours in their Resolutions, for neither can Men of Learn∣ing give proper advise in Military Affairs, nor Souldiers in those which relate to Peace; upon which Consideration the Emperour Severus advised with every one in those matters which particularly belonged to them14 1.77.

By all these Qualities of the Eyes the Body is govern'd, without 'em it can't move one step securely; 'twill be the same in the Government which wants good Ministers. Without these Eyes the Scepter would be blind, for there is no Prince so wise as to be able to decide all Affairs himself:

† 1.78 Since Royalty [says K. Alphonsus] admits of no Companion, nor has occasion for any, 'tis necessary for the Prince to have about him Persons of Integrity and Wisdom, who may up∣on all Emergencies advise and assist him.

But if any Prince imagines his own Eyes so good as to believe he can see all things without the assistance of others, he is more vain than prudent, and will stumble each step of his Ad∣ministration 15 1.79. Ioshua though he communicated with 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ received Instructions from him; and particular∣ly for the taking the City Nai, he advised with his old Captains about it16 1.80. King Assuerus's Ministers never departed from his side, and he maturely advised with them about all Affairs, a Custom which Kings always obser∣ved 17 1.81. Only by Pride cometh Contention, but with the well advised is Wisdom18 1.82 Nature has qualified no Man sufficiently to manage a Government though never 〈◊〉〈◊〉 little by himself, it being impossible for one to know so much as many19 1.83. And though one quick-sighted can see fur∣ther than many others, for they are not like number••▪ which are multiplyed by themselves, and make one great

Summ, it must be understood of things at a distance, not of those in a near Circumference, for then many Eyes disco∣ver more than one20 1.84, provided the number be not so great as to create Confusion; one person has but one Argument, for he can't have many at the same time, and being fond with that will go no further. In Counsels the Prince hears all, and following the best renounces his own Opinion, and perceives the Inconveniencies of those, which proceed from Passion or Interest. For this Reason Don John II. of Ar∣ragon writing to his Sons their Catholick Majesties, upon his Death bed, he advised them to do nothing without the Counsel of vertuous and discreet Ministers. 'Tis necessary, that these Eyes of Ministers should preceed each step of the Administration, and mark out the way21 1.85. The Emperour Antoninus Sirnam'd the Philosopher the wisest Prince of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time, had for his Counsellours Scaev••la, Mutlanus, Ulpia∣nus and Marcellus, all persons of exquisite Merit, and when their Counsel seem'd better than his own, he with ease ••quitted it and sided with them; 'tis fitter says he, for me to follow the advice of so many worthy Friends, than for them to follow mine. A wise Man hearkeneth unto Coun∣sel 22 1.86. An ignorant Prince who will be advised, will suc∣ceed better in his Affairs, than an understanding one who de∣pends too much upon his own Opinions. Let not a Prince's Pride suggest•• to him, that he divides the Honour of the Suc∣cess, in taking the advise of his Ministers; for 'tis as com∣mendable to submit himself to be advised by others, as to succeed in any thing of his own management.

* 1.87 Be advised, O King, and govern'd in your turn. This taking advice, is a particular mark of a Prince's Authori∣ty; 'tis the Inferiours Duty to give advice, and the Superi∣ours to receive it. There is nothing more becoming Roy∣alty, nothing more necessary than Consultation and Execu∣tion.

'Tis an Action [said King Alphonsus XI. in the Parliament of Madrid] worthy the Royal Grandeur, to have always, according to his commendable Custom, worthy Counsellours about him, and to take advice of them in all

things; for if every private Man's Duty be to have good Counsellours, how much more is it incumbent up∣on a Prince?

Every Fool can give advice, but he must be a Man of Prudence who resolves well23 1.88. And there is no Diminution of the Honour of a Prince, who knows how to take advice and make a good Choice: whatever shall be well Enacted by

the assistance of your Counsels, said the Emperour Theodosius in one of his Laws, will redound to the Honour of the Empire and my own Glory24 1.89.

The Victories of Scipio Africanus proceed∣ed from the Counsels of Laelius, whence they said in Rome, Laelius wrote the Play, and Scipio Acted it. Yet did not this obscure the Lustre of his Glory, nor was the Honour of Scipio's Exploits attributed to Laelius, 'tis necessary that the Prince should know how to Act the Play himself, and that the Minister should not be both Poet and Actor too. For though a Prince's Ministers are his Eyes, yet he should not be so stark blind, as not to see at all without them, for this would be to govern by Guess, and he would incur the contempt and disrespect of his Subjects; Lucius Torquatus being chosen Consul the third time, desired to be excused for the weakness of his Eyes, saying, 'Twas a shame that the Government, and the Estates of the Citizens should be committed to one, who must be forced to see with other Men Eyes25 1.90. King Ferdinand the Catholick us'd to say, That Ambassadours were a Prince's Eyes; but that he would be very unfortunate who should see with no other: That great Politician did not wholly rely upon his Ministers; see with them indeed he did, but as we do with Spectacles, by applying 'em to his own Eyes. When the Ministers find that the Ad∣ministration of Affairs is wholly in their Power, they wil•• wrest it to their own private Ends, and their Ambition in∣creasing they divide into Factions, every one arrogates 〈◊〉〈◊〉

himself that share of power and authority, that the Prince thro' his Laziness and Insufficiency has granted him. All things are in disorder and confusion; if the Ministers aim to be any thing more than Perspectives, by which the Prince discovers the Horizon of Affairs, and takes those Resolutions and Counsels which he likes best, Nature has given him Eyes, and if God governs his Heart26 1.91, he directs also his Sight, and makes it more clear and quick than his Ministers. King Philip II. retir'd sometimes into himself, to meditate upon the Af∣fairs of his Government, and after having fervently recom∣mended himself to God; he resolv'd upon the first method that offer'd it self, though against the Opinion of all his Ministers, and this generally succeeded. Counsellours can't always be at the Princes Elbow, for the state of Affairs and the urgency of Opportunity requires sometimes, that their Resolutions be quick and ready27 1.92. Orders are not re∣spected and obey'd, when it appears that he gives them not, but receives them himself: 'Tis a presumptuous Rashness to conclude all without ever taking Advice, and a stupid Slavery to Act nothing without it. He who Commands should have the Liberty of changing, mending, and rejecting whatever his Ministers propose to him. 'Tis sometimes convenient to hide from 'em certain Mysteries, and to deceive them, as the same Philip, did who differently reported to his Council the Negotiations of his Ambassadours, when he had a mind to draw 'em to his own Resolutions, or thought it convenient to conceal certain Circumstances from them. A Council of State should be like a Colossus, that the Prince standing upon its Shoulders may see farther than it. The Thebans did not desire Princes so foresighted, as one may guess by the manner of Painting them with their E••rs open, and their Eyes shut, signifying that they ought blindly to exe∣cute all the Resolutions of the Senate: but this was not the Emblem of an absolute Prince, but only of a Prince of a Common-wealth, whose Power is so circumscrib'd that 'tis sufficient for him to hear, for the Power of seeing what is

to be done, it reserved for the Senate. This is nothing but a dark shadow of Majesty, and an empty appearance of Authority. His Power is nothing but a reflection of that of the Senate, and so he has no need of Eyes, who can't go where he pleases.

But though 'tis convenient for a Prince to preserve this Liberty in Counsels, yet he ought not to be so vain as for fear of being thought to want their Advice, to reject what∣ever they pro••••••e; for so he would incur very great Incon∣veni••ncies: As Pettus did according to Tacitus28 1.93.

If 'twere possible Kings should have Kings for their Counsellours, that 〈…〉〈…〉 Counsels might not deviate from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 A••thority and Honour of 〈◊〉〈◊〉; a Prince sometimes 〈…〉〈…〉 beneath himself 〈…〉〈…〉 Instigation of an abject 〈…〉〈…〉. But since this is impossible they 〈◊〉〈◊〉 chuse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••unsellours, as though they are not Princes by Birth, are so in grea••ness of Mind and Gene∣rosity.

In Spain there are several Councils instituted, with a great deal of Prudence; for the Government of Kingdoms and Provinces, and for all the most important Affairs of the Kingdom▪ yet ought not all Care to be rejected, by confi∣dently relying upon this happy Constitution, for no Go∣vernment is so strongly fenced, but that its Foundations in time wear away, or are unsens••bly undermin'd by Malice or Abuse. 'Tis not sufficient for each distinct part to be well govern'd, if they don't sometimes all unite, to treat as well of themselves in particular, as of the whole Body in general. For this Reason we have in Convents or religious Orders, Provincial and general Chapters, and in the Govern∣ment of the Church, Councils. For the same Reason every ten years there is held at Madrid a General Council consisting of two Counsellours, of each particular Council, and of two Deputies of each Province, to consult for the Preservation not only of each part, but of the whole Kingdom. For if these Kingdoms were not so renewed, they would grow old

and at last die. This Assembly will unite the parts of the Monarchy, and make 'em agree among themselves, to the mutual assistance of each other. For this Reason the Councils of Toledo were assembled, where not only Matters of Religion, but also those of State were treated of.

All these Qualities of Eyes ought also to be found in Confessors to Princes, who are their Counsellours, Judges, and spiritual Physicians: these Offices require Men of Zeal and intire Affection for the Service of God, and their Prince; Persons who have Sence to judge well, prudence to advise, Liberty to reprehend, and Courage to undeceive, by setting before his Eyes, though at the hazard of his Favour, the Disgusts of his Subjects, and the Danger of his Kingdom, without smearing over the craz'd and falling Wall with untempered Mortar29 1.94. Some Princes use Confessors only for Conscience sake, others make use of them as Coun∣cellors of State: I shall not pretend to examine into the Reason of these two Methods; I only say, 'tis thought con∣venient in Spain, to admit the King's Confessor into his Council, as well to give his assistance in matters of Con∣science, as also that being as it were a sharer in the manage∣ment of Affairs, he may correct the Prince, if in any thing he is deficient in his Devoir. For some know the Faults that they are guilty of as Men, but not those which they commit as Princes, though those are greater which belong to their Office than those which respect only their person. No•• only the Confessors ought to assist in Council, but al∣so Bishops, or other Ecclesiasticks, who by their Autho∣rity and Learning may be very serviceable, and so the two Arms, the Temporalty and Spiritualty will more firmly unite, for the Defence and Preservation of the Body of the Government. The Gothick Kings used to advise about all weighty Affairs, with Prelates who were to that purpose assembled in the Councils of Toledo.

What we have said about Confessors should be un∣derstood also of Preachers, who are the Trumpets of

Truth30 1.95, the Interpreters between God and Men31 1.96, in whose mouth God has put his word32 1.97, the Prince ought to carry himself with great Circumspection towards them, they being the Channels by which wholesome or poysonous Doctrines are delivered to the people; the Mobb wholly depends upon 'em, they being the most proper In∣struments either to raise or appease them, as has been seen in the Revolts of Catal••nia and Portugal. Their Zeal for declaim¦ing against Vice, often gives 'em occasion to reflect upon those in Authority, which the people eagerly swallow, thro' their natural Aversion to the Ministers; whence proceeds Contempt of Authority, and the Peoples disgust, which is the occasion of Seditions and Tumults; especially when the Princes faults are reflected on, 'tis necessary therefore, that these Reprimands should be general, without pointing at persons when the Scandal is not publick, or Holy Admo∣nitions, or other Circumstances have been ineffectual. God so modestly in the Apocalypse reprehended the Bishops, that he seems almost to ••latter them33 1.98; Christ never re∣flected upon any person from the Pulpit, his Reprehensions were general, and if at any time he descended to particulars 'twas not as Preacher, but as King. That should by no means be heard from the Pulpit, which is dissolute and pu∣nishable in the Streets, in which Zeal is often mistaken, ei∣ther because 'tis extravagant, or blinded with the Applause of the Giddy Mobb, which eagerly crowds to hear the Prince or Magistracy reflected upon.

EMBLEM LVI.

[illustration]

THE Office of a Secretary depends upon the under∣standing, not the Pen; if it all lay in neatly cutting a Letter Printers would be the best Secretaries. His Duty is to consult, propose and bring matters to Perfecti∣on, he is the right hand of the Princes Will, his Instru∣ment of Government, the Finger by which he points out his Resolutions; and as King Alphonsus says,

The second Officer of the Houshold, at least of those who are of the Cabinet; for as the Confessor is Mediator between God and the King, so is the Secretary between the King his Subjects† 1.99

. Discreet and prudent Consultations in Councils will be of small Effect, if he who should metho∣dize

them should fail in his part; the Ministers give their Opinions, and the Prince declares his Sentiments by his Secretary, and a word now and then aptly apply'd, changes the Face of Affairs, as in a Picture, a small shade or a stroke of the Pencil, either spoils it, or gives more Life to it; the Council forms the Idea of the Building, the Secretary draws the Plan thereof, which if it be irregular, the Su∣per-structure must of necessity be so too. The better to re∣present this, you see in the present Emblem his Pen is a pair of Compasses, because his Business is not only to write, but also to measure the Resolves, and to set out fit times and opportunities for the Execution of 'em, that they may nei∣ther be too soon nor too late: this Office is so united to that of the Prince, that if the trouble of Affairs would per∣mit, it should by no means be committed to another, for if it is not a part of Majesty, 'tis at least a certain Reflection of it; this I believe Cicero meant, when he advised the then Pro-consul of Asia thus,

Let your Ring [which you must construe Secretary] be not as any other piece of Goods, but as your own self, not a Minister of another's Will, but a Witness of your own; each other Minister is the Kings Representative but in one Office, but the Secretary in all1 1.100

. It suffices others to know what belongs to their particular Places, but he must have a perfect Knowledge, a general and particular Intelligence of Practices, and Arts, as well of Peace as War. If they erre 'tis but in some one particular; but this reaches all in general, yet so privately, that the mis-carriage is imputed to the Council; as the ig∣norance of the Physician is to the Malignity of the Distem∣per; some Affairs may be negotiated with bad Ministers, but not with an ignorant Secretary. He is the Stomach, in which Affairs are digested, and if they come thence crude and ill concocted, the Life of the Government will be sick∣ly and short; cast your Eyes back upon Pastimes, and you will find that never any Government has been well manag'd

without good Secretaries. What signifies the Princes care∣ful Resolves, if the Secretary knows not how to apply them, by judiciously considering, and prudently observing certain Circumstances on which Affairs always depend. If he wants Discretion and Judgment, his written Rules and Instructions are of small use, for there is scarce any Affair for which you can find an exact Precedent. For time and o∣ther accidents alter the very Nature and Form of all things. Apothecaries have different Medicines prescribed by seve∣ral Physicians, for several Diseases; but they'd be notori∣ously mistaken, if they should ignorantly apply them with∣out a due Knowledge of the Causes whence they proceed, as also of the Constitution of the sick Person, the time, and other Circumstances; which Experience, Reason, and Spe∣culation shall dictate. The same Affair should be differently prescrib'd to a Phlegmatick and Cholerick Minister, diffe∣rently to a timorous and bold one. The Secretary ought to instruct each how he should behave himself. What are Secretaries Offices, but certain Schools for the Education of able Statesmen? From what Practice and Experience teaches them, they learn the true Art of Government. There they observe what Counsels have succeeded, what mis-carried. From all which appears the necessity of choo∣sing such for Secretaries, as are endu'd with good natural parts. Those great Ministers or Secretaries of God, which we call Evangelists, were represented in the Apocalypse, by four wing'd Animals, full of Eyes both within and with∣out, signifying by their Wings, their Expedition and Exe∣cution, their Knowledge of all things by their external Eyes, and their Contemplation by their internal ones2 1.101. Being so busie that they never rested night or day3 1.102, so intent upon their Duty, that their wings were always stretch'd upwards4 1.103, so conformed and united to the Holy Spirit in all things, that they never parted from it5 1.104.

To make a good Choice of a Secretary, 'twould be convenient for Princes to train up such persons as by their natural Qualifications and perfect Knowledge of the Latine Tongue seem fit for it, under their Ambassadours, or chief Ministers, making Tryal of them in several Posts beyond Sea; and afterwards let them call 'em to the Secretaries Office at Court, where they may serve, and capacitate themselves for Secretaries of State, High Treasurer, and the like, upon whose Knowledge and Experience, the Suc∣cess and good management of Affairs very much depend. By this means the ill Choice which Ministers of State usu∣ally make of their Secretaries would be avoided, for they employ only them, who have served 'em formerly, and who are usually most unfit for that Office, being chosen com∣monly more from the neatness of their Hand-writing than their Understanding. Whence it falls out, that a good Mi∣nister who has a careless ignorant Secretary, is more preju∣dicial to the Princes Affairs, than a bad Minister whose Secretary is discreet and careful; besides the Secretary be∣ing chosen by the Prince himself, on whom he solely de∣pends, will make the Minister more vigilant and attentive in the performance of his Office; King Alphonso well know∣ing of what importance it was to have a good Secretary, said,

That a King ought to make Choice of for that Charge, a person well born and well bred, of good Sence, good Temper, and good Manners; who can read and write Latine, as well as his vulgar Tongue† 1.105.

King Al∣phonso seems to thing it not sufficient that he can read it, but that he must readily speak it too; for this is absolutely necessary for him, who is to treat with all Nations. Espe∣cially at present, now the Spanish Monarchy is extended over so many foreign Kingdoms, and Provinces, because o•• the frequent Correspondence in Latine.

The most essential thing in a Secretary is Secrecy, whence his Name is derived, that he may upon hearing it be put in mind of his Duty. The Tongue and the Pen are the

most dangerous Instruments of the heart, by these 'tis usu∣ally expos'd, either through Levity, or Vanity, to be thought the Repositories of very important Secrets, by disco∣vering them, either by discourse or writing, to those from whom they should conceal 'em: So that he is not fit for the Charge of a Secretary, who can't modestly hear others, ra∣ther than talk himself, without changing the Air of his Face at any thing; for oft-times the Secrets of the heart are discovered thereby.

EMBLEM LVII.

[illustration]

THE wheels of a Clock perform their Office with such silence, that their Motions can neither be heard nor perceived, and though the whole Con∣trivance depends upon them, yet do they not attribute to themselves the Honour of it, but lend to the hand its Mo∣tion,

which alone distinguishes and points out the hours, and is esteem'd by all, the only Rule and Measure of time. This mutual Correspondence and Agreement should be between the Prince and his Counsellours; for 'tis highly convenient to have them: for [as King Alphonsus the Wise said]

Though Emperours and Kings are great persons, yet can neither of them by themselves do more than a single Man;‖ 1.106 and the Government of a Nation requires ma∣ny

, but them so modest as not to attribute their success∣ful Resolutions to their own Counsel, but to the Princes; let 'em share the Trouble but not the Power; let 'em be Ministers not Companions; let 'em know that the Prince can govern without them, but not they without him. Where a Prince can shew his Authority and Greatness without the assistance of others, let him do it. In Aegypt where the heat of the Sun is more powerful than in other parts, it breeds Animals without any assistance; if a Prince does nothing without Advice, he's more like a Client than a Prince. The force of Government is lost, unless the Summ of Affairs be reduced to one1 1.107; Monarchy is distinguished from other methods of Government in that one only Commands, and the rest obey, and if the Prince shall permit several to rule, 'twill not be a Monarchy but an Aristocracy, there is no Command where all are Masters. The Holy Spirit takes this for a punishment of the Sins of the people2 1.108, and on the contrary a Blessing when only one Commands3 1.109, when the Ministers shall find a Prince so careless as to let others Reign, they usurp to themselves what Authority they can. Pride and Emulation grows among them, every one tears a slip from the Royal Robe, so that at last it remains a mere Ragg. The people confounded between so many Masters, no longer acknowledge their true and lawful one, and so be∣gin to despise and contemn the Government. For they believe

nothing can be well done, but what they think the Prince does of himself, whence they prepare a Remedy by force. Histories furnish us with deplorable Examples of this, in the Deposition and Death of Garcias King of Galaecia, who would not be so much as the Index to point out the Motion of the Government; but left all to the manage∣ment of a particular Favourite of his, who was afterwards kill'd with him. We find Sancho King of Portugal depos'd, because his Queen, and a few other Scoundrel Servants had the whole management of Affairs; the same thing be••el King Henry IV. for being so easie as to Sign all Dispatches which his Ministers brought him▪ without ever reading or knowing the Contents of 'em. The Prince exposes himself to all manner of Inconveniencies, who without perusal or consideration, agrees to whatever others desire him: for upon him as upon soft Wax every one makes what impres∣sion he pleases; so it was with the Emperour Claudius4 1.110. God plac'd the Government upon the Princes own Shoul∣ders, not upon his Ministers5 1.111; as Samuel intimated to Saul, at the Entertainment when he anointed him King, when he on purpose ordered the Cook to set by for him a shoulder of Meat6 1.112. Yet would I not have a Prince like a Camel merely to bear Burthens; but his Shoulders should be full of Eyes, like the Animals in Ezekiel's Vision,7 1.113 that they may see and know what they bear: Elisha call'd Elias the Chariot and Horsemen of Israel, because he sustain'd and manag'd the Government† 1.114. He does not deserve the name of Prince, who cannot of himself give Orders and contradict 'em, as is visible in Vitellius, who not being ca∣pable of commanding nor punishing, was no longer Empe∣rour, but only the cause of War8 1.115; wherefore a P••ince should not only perform the part of the hand in the Clock of the Government, but that also of the Pe••dulum, which

regulates the Motions of the Wheels: In short, upon that depends the whole Art of Government? Not that I would have a Prince perform the Office of a Judge, Counsellour or President, for his Dignity is far above it9 1.116, if he ap∣ply'd himself so to all Business, he would want time for Af∣fairs of greater moment.

He ought, says King Alphon∣so, to have Understanding, Loyal, and Trusty Persons to assist him, and serve him faithfully in all things, as well to advise him as to administer Justice to his People; for he can't of himself duely weigh and examine all things, so that he has need of some in whom he can confide.

He should use them as the Instruments of Government, and let them operate; yet so as he may inspect what they do, with a superiour Direction, more or less immediate or assi∣stant, as the importance of Affairs requires. Those things which properly belong to the Ministers, let the Ministers perform. Those which are peculiar to the Princes Office, let him only manage. For which Reason Tiberius check'd the Senate for leaving the whole Burthen of Affairs to him10 1.117, the weighty thoughts of Princes, ought not to be disturb'd by ••rivolous Consultations, when without any offence to their Majesty, they may be decided by the Mini∣sters. Wherefore Sanguinius advised the Roman Senate, not to trouble the Emperour with such Matters, as without mo∣lesting him were in their Power to remedy11 1.118. But if a Prince relying upon the Prudence and Integrity of a Mini∣ster, shall intrust him with the management of any Affair, let him leave it wholly to him. After God had made Adam Lord of the whole Earth, he brings all the Animals which he had created, that he might give 'em names12 1.119, God would not so much as reserve that to himself. For the like Reason a Prince ought to leave ordinary Cares and Trou∣bles

to others: for the Head intermeddles not with the bu∣siness of the Hands and Feet, nor does the Pilot intermed∣dle with the common Sailers Duty, but sitting in the Stern does more with the gentle Motion of his hand, in guiding the Boat, than all the other with their Toil and Labour.

But if a Prince either by reason of his Minority or old Age, or any other natural defect, be incapable of attending the direction of Affairs, let him choose an Assistant. For 'tis much better to govern well by another, than ill by himself. The first years of Nero's Reign were happy, because he took Advice from good Councellours; but when he took the ma∣nagement of all into his own hands he ruin'd himself. King Philip II. finding that Age and Infirmities had render'd him unfit to govern, chose certain trusty and experienced Ministers for his Assistants. Yet even when necessity urges, a Prince ought not wholly to omit the Care of Affairs, be his Ministers never so prudent and faithful, for the Body politick resembles the natural, in which if the Heat be de∣ficient, no Remedy, no Art, nor Industry can preserve its Life. The Prince is the Soul of the Government where∣fore to keep that alive, 'tis necessary that this should assist the Members and Organs; if he can't absolutely do this, let him seem to see and hear all things, with such Assiduity, that they may be attributed to his Disposal and Judgment; the Princes Presence though it has no other Effect, at least influences the Ministers, and makes 'em more careful and Assiduous. To know only that all Orders come through his hands, gives them Authority, though he never alter nor see 'em; what will it do then if he shall particularly exa∣mine, and being privately instructed, shall correct and re∣prehend his Ministers faults? If he do this but once, they will be ever after fearful and cautious, they will imagine that he actually sees, or inspects all things. Let them treat in Councils not only of Affairs of State, but also of what worthy Persons, they should promote to Offices and Pre∣ferments; but let his hand confirm their Resolutions, let it be that which bestows all Rewards and Gratuities, not suffering as in a Sun-Dial his shadow, I mean his Ministers and Favourites▪ to point 'em out, and publish them, and

••o cause them to be ascrib'd to them; for by this he woul•• lose his Esteem, Affairs their Authority, Rewards their Ac∣ceptance; and the Prince is slighted by those whom he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 most oblig'd; for which Reason Tiberius when he saw the Senate inclin'd to reward M. Hortalus, vigorously oppos•• it13 1.120. And sharply check'd Iunius Gallio, for proposing Gra∣tuities to the Praetorian Souldiers, giving him to understand that it was only the Emperours Prerogative14 1.121; so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Prince is not respected because he is a Prince, but becaus•• as such he Commands, Rewards, and Punishes. If any piece of Severity is to be committed, or any rigorous Pu∣nishment to be inflicted, let it be done by the hands of hi•• Ministers, but let the Prince conceal his own as much 〈◊〉〈◊〉 possible. Let the Peoples Indignation, and the Odium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Severity, and Punishment fall upon them, not him15 1.122▪ The Ancients said of Iupiter, that of himself he darte•• forth none but benign Rays, without hurting any one, bu•• only to shew his Power, but that malign ones were by th•• Council of the Gods; let the Ministers be thought sever•• and cruel, the Prince tender and merciful; 'tis their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to accuse and condemn, his to forgive and pardon. Em••∣nuel King of Portugal thank'd a certain person, who fou•••• an Argument to sa••e a Criminal. Also Iohn III. King 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Portugal being present at the Tryal of a Criminal, whe•••• the Judges were equally divided, and his Opinion ask'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 decide the matter spoke to this Effect,

You, says he, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 having condemn'd this Man have done Justice, and could wish you had been all of the same Opinion; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 I am for acquitting him, least any should say, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Kings Vote alone took away a Subjects Life.

The Princ•• is made for the Subjects preservation, and he ought to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no one to Death, but for the sake of that.

The hand of a Clock has no effect upon the Wheels, but permits them to do their Duty, and only denotes their Motion, so the Emperour Charles V. was of Opinion, a Prince ought to behave himself towards his Council, to let them alone in their Debates without intermeddling with 'em; this Precept he left to his Son Philip the II. A Princes Presence obstructs their Freedom, and gives opportunity for Flattery, and though in Matters of greater moment, the Prince's Presence seems very convenient, in that he can't be so throughly inform'd by reading, as by hearing their Debates, for by this he will learn much, and begin to love Business, and be instructed in the Qualifications, and De∣signs of his Councellours, a Prince ought to be extremely cautious in declaring his Opinion, least either Flattery, Re∣spect, or Fear should make it received. For this Reason Piso, when Marcellus was accus'd for taking down the Head of Augustus's Statue, and putting his own up; being ask'd his Opinion by Tiberius, What's your Sentiment, Sir, said he, if you speak first I know what to follow, but if last I am afraid least I should imprudently think otherwise16 1.123 For the same Rea∣son 'twas a prudent Order of the same Emperour, that his Son Drusus should not Vote first in the Senate, least o∣thers should think themselves oblig'd to follow his Opi∣nion 17 1.124. This is a thing of ill Consequence; is it less inconvenient not to declare his mind at all, for so that Counsel which seems best may with more Secrecy be exe∣cuted. Henry King of Portugal proposed matters with so much Discretion in his Council, that it could not be dis∣cover'd, either by his Words or Looks, which way he in∣clined; whence came the Custom of Presidents and Vice-Roys, not giving their Votes in Council, which is an anci∣••nt Practice, and was used by the Etolians.

But in a matter in which the Prince desires rather their Ap∣probation than Advice, he may open his mind and declare his

Opinion, for he will find they will generally ••ide with him either through a desire to please, or because we naturally in∣cline to follow our Superior.

In Affairs of War, especially when the Prince is involv'•• therein, his Presence in Council is of more importance, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 well for the above-mentioned Reasons, as that he thereby animates them, and that their prudent Resolves may be pu•• in speedy Execution, and least while they are brought to him the opportunity be slipt. He must know that some Mini∣s••ers desire to be thought vigorous and active, rathe•• than discreet, and so in the Princes Presence o••t••n are the Authors of rash Counsel, not that they would be th•• per∣sons that should execute them, nay they have a particular aversion to all Danger, as it was with those who advis'd Vitellius to take up Arms18 1.125.

'Tis a common Question among Politicians, whether 〈◊〉〈◊〉 no a Prince himself should not assist in the Courts of Ju∣stice; 'tis a too weighty Employ, and would take up 〈◊〉〈◊〉 much of that time which is necessary for Affairs of State and the Administration of the Government. Though Ti∣b••rius after he had assisted in the Senate, went to the Court•• of Judicature19 1.126. King Ferdinand the Holy was ofte•• present in those Courts, where he heard and defended the Poor, and protected the weak from the strong. K. Alphon•••• the Wise ordain'd, that the King himself should under∣take the Causes of Widows and Orphans,

For tho', says he, he is oblig'd in general to defend his Subjects, yet ought he particularly to assist them, because they are more helpless than others* 1.127.

Solomon's great Judgment in the Decision of Causes got him the general Esteem of all20 1.128; the Israelites desired a King, who as in other Na∣tions might be Judge over them21 1.129; the Presence of the

King makes Judges just, and his Power only can defend the poor22 1.130; the chief Reason why God chose David King was, because he who had freed his Flocks from the jaws of the Lion23 1.131, best knew how to protect the Impotent from the powerful24 1.132: so grateful and acceptable is this Care to God, that for that only he promises to blot out all the rest of his Sins, and make them as white as Snow25 1.133. Wherefore I can't deny that this is the main part of a Prin∣ce's Duty, yet I think he fulfils it, if he chooses Persons of Integrity for his Ministers of Justice, and takes Care that they justly and uprightly perform their Offices. 'Twill suffice some∣times in the most important Cases, I mean such as may be oppress'd by Power, to be present at their giving their O∣pinions, so as to make the Judges always in fear, least he should be in some corner of the Court and hear all that is said and done. For which Reason all the Judges live in the Royal Palace at Madrid; and in the Courts where they sit, there are windows, from whence his Majesty uses to hear all that passes. The same is usual in the Turks Divan, where when the Bassa's meet to treat about Affairs, he hears them when he pleases, from a window cover'd with Sar∣cenet.

And this Harmony of the Clock, and the mutual Agree∣ment between the Wheels, and the Hand which points the hours is evidentl•• visible in the Government of the Kingdom of Spain, which is so well constituted, that those Kingdoms and Provinces which Nature has dis-joyn'd, she unites by the pru∣dence of her Government Each has its particular Court at Madrid, C••stile, Arragon, P••rtugal, Italy, the Nether∣lands and the Indies, to which there is but one President, they take Cognizance of all Affairs, whether of Justice or Rewards belonging to any of these Kingdoms or Pro∣vinces. And their Debates are brought to the King who orders what he thinks fit, so that the Councils are as 'twere the Wheels, and his Majesty the Index; or they the Op∣tick

Nerves, by which visible Species are transmitted to the Prince, and the King the common Sense which discerns and Judges them. The Affairs of the Kingdom being so dis∣pos'd and presented to his Majesty, all's manag'd with that ease and prudence, that for above a hundred years since it began to flourish; there has happened no considerable mis-carriage, which is almost incredible, in such a dis-united Body.

The Roman Empire was more succinct, and yet it al∣most continually felt Convulsions and Disorders, an unde∣niable Proof that ours is better founded than their's, and govern'd by Men of greater Judgment, Prudence and In∣tegrity. Since then the Summ of all Affairs should be re∣duc'd to the Prince, he should not only be a Father to the Republick in Love, but Economy too, nor should he think it sufficient to have Counsellours, and Ministers to manage his Affairs, but he should also keep by him a certain private Memoir of them, by which he should be guided in all things; as Merchants keep their Accounts in a particular Book for that purpose, such a Book as this the Emperour August••s kept. In which he took an account of the Revenue, of the number of the Citizens and Auxiliaries in his Service, also o•• the Fleets, Kingdoms, Provinces, Tributes, Taxes, and Gra∣tuities, all which he wrote with his own hand26 1.134; the Memory is the Treasury of Experience, but is very short and weak without the assistance of the Pen to strengthen and perpetuate it upon Paper. He'll find a great advan∣tage, who for Memory's sake takes an account of all Actions good or ill, in his Book; which Diligence if your Royal Highness when setled upon the Throne shall neglect, and think it beneath your Grandeur to stoop to, and that your Presence is sufficient without this troublesome Assiduity, leaving that to your Ministers, I dare aver•• from the excel∣lent Constitution, and order of this Government, both in

its Courts and Counsels, your Highness might finish your Course without any considerable Danger; but you would be no more than the hand to the Clock, wholly govern'd by the Wh••els, nor would there appear any thing conspi∣cuous or glorious in your whole Reign; as there will, if [which God grant] your Highness imitating Augustus, shall make your Remarks upon each Kingdom distinctly, with an Addition of all Garrison'd Towns, also of all persons famous for War or Peace, with their Qualifications, Characters, Services and the like; particularly inserting all A••fairs of great Concern, what has been their Issue, in what they succeeded, in what fail'd, and several other Observations, which are instructive in the Art of Government. Hence proceeds the Harmony in the Order of the Jesuits, which all so much admire, for every three years the General has a particular Account of all things that have pass'd, toge∣ther with a private List of those of the Order; who be∣cause they may in time alter their Nature and Manners these Catalogues are renewed every Year; besides, he has particular Informations every Year of what ever in necessary for him to know. By which they always succeed in their E∣lections, by suiting the Capacity of the Person to the Office, not the Office to the Person. And if Princes had such Characters of things and persons, they would not be so often deceived in their Resolves and Counsels; they would be better instructed in the Art of Government, and need not depend wholly upon their Ministers; and these would serve the Prince with more Care and Circumspection, when they knew that he understood and took notice of all things; and so these gross Faults which we see at present, I mean, in not timely providing Necessaries for Peace and War, would never be committed; in a word, the fear of this Catalogue would make Vertue flourish, and Vice perish; nor would these short Memoirs breed any confusion, especially if some were made by the Princes own hands, and others by his chief Ministers, who are persons of Understanding, and whom he can trust to do it sincerely and carefully; where∣fore if as Cicero says, this Knowledge is necessary for a Sena∣tour

27 1.135, who is but a small Member of the Government, how much more is it for a Prince on whom depends the universal welfare of his State? And if Philip King of Ma∣cedon, caus'd the Articles of the Roman League to be read over to him twice every day, why should a Prince disdain to read in one Book, an Epitome of the whole Body of his Empire, viewing in that as in a Map, all the parts of which it consists?

EMBLEM LVIII.

[illustration]

HONOUR is one of the chiefest Instruments in the Art of Government; if it were not the Off-spring of Glory, I should think it a politick Invention; it is the Prop of Empires; without it none could stand long; a Prince without it wants a Guard for his Vertues, the Spur of Renown, and Bond, which makes him to be loved and respected; a Thirst for Riches is Tyrannick, but for Honour Royal1 1.136; nor is Honour less requisite in the Subject than the Prince; for without that the Laws would not be able to keep the people in their Devoir, it being cer∣tain, that they are more restrain'd by the fear of Infamy than punishment. The Economy of Government would

soon be ruined, were not Obedience, Loyalty, Integrity and such like Vertues in esteem. Ambition for Honour preserves the Authority of the Laws, to attain it we inure our selves to Labour and Vertue. That Government is in as much danger where all would be Slaves, as that in which a••l would be Masters. A Nation too abject and base, is a prey to every Invader, and soon forgets its Duty to its lawful Prince; but that which is of a more lofty Spirit, and which sets a value upon Honour, slights all Toils and Perils; nay, even despises its own Ruine, to remain firm in its Obedience and Loyalty; what Wars, Calamities and Devastations by Fire and Sword, has not the Dutchy of Burgundy felt for preserving their Faith and Allegiance to his Catholick Maje∣sty, neither the Tyranny and Barbarity of their Enemies, nor the infection of the Elements, though all seem'd to conspire against them, could shake their Constancy. They might indeed take from those Loyal Subjects, their Estates, their Countrey, and their Lives, but not their sincere Faith, and generous Loyalty to their lawful Prince.

The usual Remedies against intestine Disorders, is to make the People strangers to Honour and Reputation, which piece of Policy is us'd in China, which is in no danger but from its own Subjects: but in other Kingdoms which are exposed to Invasions, Glory and Renown is absolutely ne∣cessary for the Subjects, that they may have Courage to re∣pulse an Enemy; ••or where there is no Honour, there is no Valour. That Prince is not truly Great, who does not command great Spirits, nor can he ever without such make himself formidable, or enlarge his Territories. The Sub∣ject's Honour obliges them to procure the Prince's, for upon his Grandeur depends their's. The very sha∣dow and empty appearance of Honour, makes 'em assi∣duous in Labours, and valiant in Dangers. What Trea∣sures could make sufficient Compensation for the Estates, and Blood which Subjects squander away for the Prince's Will and Fancy; were it not for this publick Coin of Ho∣nour, wherewith every one pays himself in his own Opi∣nion? 'Tis the best Price of worthy and brave Exploits, the cheapest Reward that Princes could have found, so that if

not for their own Grandeur, they ought at least for their Conveniency and Interest, maintain it among their Sub∣jects; by either taking no notice of, or lightly punish∣ing the Faults which they commit to defend it, and on the contrary, by encouraging with Rewards and publick Ac∣knowledgments, such Actions as are generous and honoura∣ble. But they should beware of giving the least Incourage∣ment to that vain fantastical Honour so much in Vogue, which depends upon peoples Fancies, not true Vertue, thence proceed Disputes among the Ministers about Prece∣dence, to the prejudice of the Publick, and the Prince's Service: Hence Duels, Affronts, and Murthers; and from these come Tumults and Seditions. This makes Obedience stagger, and defiles it with the Prince's blood; for if once the Subject shall be perswaded in his own Opinion, or by the common Cry, that he is a Tyrant and not fit to live, he soon contrives his Death, to obtain the Honour of Assertor of his Countrey's Liberty2 1.137. It should therefore be the Princes Care to abolish this Superstition of false Honour, and to promote the Worship of the true.

Let not a Prince disdain to honour Merit, either in Sub∣jects or Strangers, for this does not derogate from the Prin∣ce's Honour, no more than the light of a Torch is dimi∣nished by the lighting of another by it; for which Rea∣son Ennius compares the Charity of a person, who instructs a wandring Traveller in his way, to a Flame.

He who t' a wandring Man his way has shewn, Lights t'others Torch and never hurts his own* 1.138

From whence proceeds Cicero's Advice, that whatever kindness can be done another without Detriment to ones self, let it be done even to a Stranger3 1.139. From both these Sentences the present Emblem is taken; a lighted Candle

in a Candlestick, the Emblem of Divinity, and supream Authority, at which two others are lighted, to signifie that a Prince may bestow Honour upon those who deserve it without Detriment to his own. His Honour, is borrowed, not his own, who is afraid of wanting it, when he con∣fers it on others. Springs continually flow, and are never empty. The Fund of Honour in Princes is inexhaustible, be they never so profuse: All respect them as the only Ma∣gazines of Honours, from whence every one expects his share; so the Earth with its Vapours refreshes the Air, which returns them in Dew upon the Earth again. And this mutual Correspondence between the Prince and his Subjects, King Alphonso the Wise knew, when he said, that

these in Honouring him, honour'd themselves, because from him they expect Honour and Preferment; where this mutual Honour is, there Affairs flourish in Peace and War, and the Government is established.

Nor does a Prince shew his Majesty more in any thing, than in the Ho∣nours he confers. All natural Bodies the more noble they are, are the more generous and free of their Vertues and Gifts. To give Riches is humane, but the distribution of Honour belongs to God or his Vicegerents. In these Maxims I would perfectly instruct your Highness, especially in that of honouring the Nobility, who are the main support of Monarchy.

Let your Highness hearken to your glorious Predecessor, King Alphonso the Wise, who in laying down Maxims for his Successors, speaks to this Effect:

Furthermore he ought to respect and honour the Nobility for their Riches, and for that they are an Honour to his State; and he should respect and honour the Gentry, as being his Guard and the Bulwark of his Kingdom.

Without Rewards Services flag, but rewarded they flou∣rish, and make the Kingdom glorious Under an ungrate∣ful King never any great Action was a••chieved, nor any glorious Example transmitted to Posterity. Those three brave Souldiers, who broke through the Enemies Squa∣drons and fetch'd water from the Cistern, scarce did any thing else remarkable, because David did not gratifie

them. A Prince by once rewarding the Merits of a Fa∣mily, binds them to his Service for ever. The Nobili∣ty is as much urg'd to Glory, by the noble Exploits of their Ancestors, and by Honours with which they were reward∣ed, as by those which they themselves expect; 'twas upon this Account that your Royal Highnesses Predecessors be∣stowed eternal marks of Honour upon the Services of some great Families of Spain. So King Iohn II. rewarded those of the Counts Ribadeo, by permitting them to eat at the King's Table upon Tw••lfth-day, and to have the same Coat which his Majesty wore that day; his Catholick Majesty granted the same Honour to the Marquess of Cadiz. And order'd, that they should have the Coat which he wore upon the Feast of the Blessed Virgin: to the Marquesses of Moya, he gave the Cup which the Kings should drink out of upon St. Lu∣cia's Day; to the Earls of Roca, of the Family of Vera, and to all of that House a Grant for each, to exempt thirty per∣sons from all Taxes; the same King Ferdinand, when he met the King of France at Savona, invited the great Cap∣tain Gonsalvo to Table with him, at whose house also he staid at his Entry into Naples; and what wonder since he ow'd him his Kingdom and all Spain, its Glory and Suc∣cess † 1.140? Of him might well be said, what Tacitus says of another brave and valiant General. In his Body was all the beauty of the Cherus••i; and whatever was done with Suc∣cess was the result of his Counsel4 1.141. The Valour and Conduct of one Minister is often the Foundation and Rise of a Kingdom That which is founded in America is owing to Herman Cortez, and the Pizarrs. The single Valour and Industry of the Marquess of Aytona, kept the Netherlands from revolting upon the Death of the Infanta Isabella, and some of our present Ministers have been the chief Instruments in preserving the Empire in the House of Austria, and of the Tranquility which Italy has so long enjoyed, whose great Re∣wards have been a spark to kindle a glorious Emulation in others. By recompencing one Service you purchase many

more; 'tis a noble Usury which enriches Princes, and en∣larges and secures their Estates; the Ottoman Empire flou∣rishes, because it encourages and prefers Valour in whom∣soever it is conspicuous. The Fabrick of the Spanish Mo∣narchy arrived at this Perfection, because King Ferdinand the Catholick, and after him Charles V. and Philip II. knew how to hew out, and proportion the Stones to its bigness. Princes complain of this Age of being barren, and not productive of such great Spirits, not considering that the Reason is that they don't look for them, or if they do find them, that they don't give them sufficient Encourage∣ment, but only promote those who are about them, which depends more upon Chance than Choice. Nature always produces some great Genius's, but Princes don't always make use of them. How many excellent Genius's and great Spirits are born and die in Obscurity, who if they had been imployed and exercis'd in Business, had been the Ad∣miration of Mankind: Ossat had died Chaplain of St. Lewis in Rome, without the Glory of having done so many signal Services to France, had not Henry IV. of France observing his great Abilities procur'd him a Cardinals Hat. If a Prince suffers a great Soul to herd with the common Rout, he will live and die like one of them, without performing any thing remarkable or glorious. Christ went up to the Mountain Tabur with three of his Disciples only, leaving the rest with the multitude, upon which their Faith im∣mediately cool'd5 1.142, so that they could not cure a posses•• person6 1.143. Great Spirits do not flourish nor Blossom, un∣less they are water'd by the Dew of Favour. That Prince therefore, who shall sow Honours shall reap able Statesmen. But he ought to sow them in Season, and to have them al∣ways ready upon all Occasions; for then they are rarely t•• be found. In this Princes are usually careless while they li•••• in Peace and Quiet, thinking they shall never have need o•• them.

Nor should a Prince honour and prefer only his Nobility and Ministers, but also all others of his Subjects, whose Acti∣ons shall be meritorious. As King Alphonso prudently ad∣vises in his Laws, where he says, that a Prince ought to honour Vertue wheresoever he finds it, though it be in the very meanest of his Subjects.

A Prince ought to be very cautious in the Distribu∣tion of Honours, considering the time and weighing the Qualifications of the persons, that they may be exactly ad∣apted to their Merit. For that distinguishes Dignities, as the intrinsick worth of a Diamond makes it more valuable; if Honours were all equal, they would be less valued; 'tis a kind of Tyranny not to reward Desert, and nothing more incenses the People than it; a whole Government is disor∣dered by the unequal Distribution of Preferments, Rewards above Desert are a Scandal to the receiver, and an Affront to those who deserve better. One is gratified; many offended. To gratifie all alike is ••o reward none. Vertue thrives not by equality, nor will Valour ever attempt any considerable Action, without the hopes of some particular Reward. A Sta∣tue erected for one, affects many with a glorious Desire of obtaining the same Honour. In a word, Honour suited to a persons Merit, is a Spur to him, an Encouragement to o∣thers, and a means to preserve Obedience in the people.

But though nothing more firmly settles, or more glori∣ously adorns a Prince's Throne than Distribution of Ho∣nours, yet ought he diligently to take Care, not to Grant away those which are proper to his own Dignity, and di∣stinguish him from others: For they are not like Flames which passing to another Subject, still remains entire in its own; but all such which he shall confer on others, will no more shine in him, so that Majesty will be obscur'd, nor will any make their Applications to him, but to them to whom he has granted such Honours; Tiberius would not permit even his Mother Livia to receive those particular Honours which the Senate design'd because he thought 'twould diminish his Authority7 1.144. Even Ceremonies which were

introduced either by Chance or Flattery, and are now pe∣culiar to the Prince, he ought not to make common to o∣thers. For though they are vain and empty, they mark out the Borders of Majesty to Respect and Veneration. Ti∣berius was disgusted, that the same publick Prayers were made for Nero and Drusus which were made for him, tho' they were his Sons and Successours in the Empire8 1.145; the Honour of Princes vanishes, when made common by promiscuous Flattery9 1.146; sometimes though, as when Mi∣nisters do personate the Prince in his absence, the same Ho∣nours and Ceremonies are to be paid them, as are due to the Prince if present; as we fee in Vice-Roys and Courts of Supream Authority, which like Stars shine in the Suns ab∣sence; but not in his Presence, for then those marks of Honour are paid to the Royal Dignity represented in the Ministers, who are as it were the Pictures of Majesty, and the reflection of Supream Authority.

EMBLEM LIX.

[illustration]

NATURE, the provident Disposer of all things, has divided Countries from one another, and hedg'd 'em in sometimes with Mountains like ••ast Walls, sometimes entrenched 'em about with deep Rivers, and sometimes with the Ocean it self, that she ••ight put a stop to the Designs of humane Ambition; for ••he same Reason she has constituted different Climates, Na∣••ures, Languages, and Customs, that in this great Diversity of Nations, each might live amicably, and in Unity among themselves, not easily giving way to the Power and Tyran∣••y of Invaders. Yet are not all these bars and fences of Nature, able to check this insatiable Desire of Rule; for Ambition is so great and so deeply rooted in Man's heart, ••hat it thinks the five Zones too narrow for it. Alexander, ••hey say wept, that he had no more Worlds to Conquer.

All the Blessings of Life, nay Life it self, for all our natu∣ral Inclinations to preserve it, are all slighted for a mo∣ments Reign. Humaya going to invade the Kingdom o•• Cordova, some of his Friends di••swaded him from it, urging the danger of the Attempt:

Call me King to day, say•• he, and to morrow kill me;

there is no Passion in Ma•• more blind and dangerous than this. This has cost many their Lives, as well as Estates, which they would have there by enlarged. A certain Prince of Tartary usually drank ou•• of a Cup on which was engraven the Head of a Prince o•• Muscovy, who in invading his Kingdom lost his own, wit•• his Life; about the edge of which was this Inscription:

This Prince by coveting mine, lost his own.

Almost the same thing befell King Sancho, who woul•• have rob'd his Brothers of the Kingdoms, which their Fa∣ther King Ferdinand had divided between 'em. Ambitio•• is in danger, when it but puts its Arm out of its Territories like the Snail which runs a Risque whenever it peeps out o•• its shell1 1.147. And though Tyridates said, That 'tis for pri∣vate Men to maintain their own, but for Kings to invad•• others2 1.148; yet this is only then; when reason and pruden•••• advise it, and when Power has no other Tribunal than that o•• Arms; for whoever unjustly robs another of his Kingdom gives others opportunity and right to do the same to him first let a Prince consider the Danger of his own, before 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thinks of invading another's Kingdom3 1.149: for which Re••∣son the Emperour Rodolphus I. us'd to say,

'Twas bett•••• to govern well than to enlarge a Kingdom;

if King ••phonso the Wise had took this Advice, he had never pursu•• his Pretentions to the Empire, to the so evident peril his own Kingdom; so that the comparison of Alphonso Ki•••• of Naples was very applicable to him: That such ambit••ous

Princes were like Gamesters, who cheated by a vain hope of winning, lose even what they had. To defend ••his State is a Prince's Duty, but to invade another's is ••erely Arbitrary. Ambition hurries Men to new and dan∣gerous Attempts4 1.150; and the more it has the more it co∣••ets. It encreases with Empire5 1.151. Opportunities, and the easiness of the means charm Princes Eyes and Hearts, and hinder them from understanding, that they ought not to covet all that they can obtain; a generous mind should be regulated by Reason and Prudence; he is not safest who ••ossesses most, but he who possesses most lawfully. Too great an extent of Power, creates Emulation and Envy, and ••ncreases Danger. For they arm and unite against the ••trongest, as the Kings of Spain did against Alphonso III. whose Greatness and Prosperity they suspected. For which Reason 'tis more desirable to have Power well grounded and ••stablish'd, than to exercise it; for there is as much Danger ••n maintaining as in procuring it. Were there no foreign Enemies, affluence of Plenty would sufficiently enervate it; ••s the Grandeur of old Rome found6 1.152, which Augustus ••oreseeing, proposed to Remedy it by prescribing Bounds to ••7 1.153, which the Emperour Adrian afterwards effected. Let a Prince bridle his Felicity and he will Reign well8 1.154. Tis no difficult matter for Injustice and Tyranny, if arm'd with Power, to raise and extend Kingdoms; the Difficulty •• in the preservation thereof, it being a harder matter to Govern well than to Conquer9 1.155.

For in Arms usually Fortune takes place, but Govern∣••ent depends on Prudence10 1.156. Success enters the gate ••ithout being called, by Merit or Industry, but 'tis Pru∣••ence only that keeps her there. Alphonso the Wise gave

this Reason, why 'twas less difficult to get, than to ma••••tain when got;

Because the preservation depends upo•• Judgment;

but the Acquisition upon Chance. Ho•• Fortune with both hands, or she'll slip from you11 1.157 A Hedge-hog [from whence I took this Emblem] is fou•• with ease, but to hold it requires Prudence; that is, yo•• must apply your hand so as gradually to smooth down 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thorny Bristles, which when erected resemble a Squadr•• of Pikes.

Claud.Arm'd with her self she does securely go, Her self, the Quiver, Arrow, and the Bow.

Scarce were the Arms of Spain retir'd from the Netherland•• in the time of Don John of Austria, when those of the R••bels enter'd. 'Twas an easie matter for the King of Fr•••• against the Laws of God and Man to seize upon the Dutch•• of Lorrain, but to maintain it now, he finds it expensive a•• dangerous; so he is oblig'd always to keep an arm'd ha•• upon it, and the Causes which occur in the Acquisition do•• always in the Preservation.

But if 'tis once setled, time will help to fix it; whence happens, that sometimes one person may easily maintain Government which was not rais'd, but by the great To•• and Perils of many.

Wherefore since 'tis a Prince's chief Duty to preserve 〈◊〉〈◊〉 States, I will here subjoyn the means which it may be do•• by, whether they descend by Succession, or are acquir'd•• Conquest or Election. I first premise the general Caus•• which usually concur in attaining and maintaining the and those are God; that is, when he assists us with Religi•• and Justice; Opportunity, when a concurrence of Causes pen the way to Grandeur; and Prudence, either in maki•••• these Opportunities, or in using them when offer'd. The are other Instruments common to the Art of Governme•••• as Valour, the Prince's Assiduity and Prudence, the Peop•••• Esteem, Respect and Love for him; the Reputation of ••

Crown, the force of Arms, Unity in Religion, a due Ad∣ministration of Justice, the Authority of the Laws, the Di∣stribution of Rewards; the Severity of Punishments; the Integrity of the Magistracy; the good Election of Mini∣sters; the Preservation of Privileges and Customs; the Edu∣cation of Youth; the Modesty of the Nobility; the Purity of the Coin; the Encrease of Trade and Arts; the Peoples Obedience; Concord, Plenty, and publick Riches.

By these means all States are maintain'd, and though the Government of each requires great Care and Attention, yet do those which descend lineally from Father to Son require ••east; for Sovereign Power and Obedience being become habitual, and as it were natural to the Subjects, they forget that it was of their own Institution, not an original Pro∣••riety. No one dares deny him Respect and Veneration, whom he has own'd for his Lord from his Birth; all are ••w'd by fear of Punishment from the Successour, for Crimes which they shall commit in the present Reign: The Sub∣••ects easily bear and wink at his Failures. The very Tide of Affairs, which long Custom and Experience has con∣••in'd to a Channel, secures him, though he be incapacitated for Government, provided he be of an easie docile Nature, ••nd one that will Act for the best in all things, and can ••ake Choice of good Ministers, or should happen on them ••y Chance.

But those States which descend by an indirect Line, or ••y Marriage; a Prince ought to manage with particular Care and Circumspection, especially at the beginning of is Reign; in this those Princes run great Risques, who thro' ••o much Zeal, or too fond a Desire of Glory, reverse the ••ctions and Institutions of their Predecessours, introducing ••ovelties of their own, without that due Moderation and ••rudence which is necessary even in changing 'em into bet∣••er; for Plato's Opinion that all change is dangerous except ••om bad, must not be understood of Governments, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 great Risques unless remedied by degrees, according to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Order of Nature, which does not leap from one ex∣••eam to the other; but interposes the Temperature of the ••ring and Autumn, between the Extremities of the Win∣ters

cold, and Summers heat:

A sudden and violent chang•• is troublesome and doubtful; that which is slow and gr••∣dual is always more easie12 1.158.

'Tis dangerous in sailing to shift the Sails upon a contrary mind, because they mu•• on a sudden be changed from one side of the Ship to th•• other. Wherefore 'tis requisite for a Prince at the begi••∣ning of his Reign, to observe the methods of the last, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 king Care to reform it by Degrees with that easiness a•• moderation, that the People shall find themselves on t'othe•• side without knowing how they got over. Tiberius du•• not at the beginning of his Reign abolish the publick Sport•• introduc'd by Augustus13 1.159. Galba reigned but a f•••• Months, because immediately upon coming to the Thron•• he began to punish past Crimes, to moderate extravaga•• Donatives, and to curb the Licentiousness and Insole•• which the People had been so us'd to in Nero's time14 1.160 that they as much loved their Princes Vices, as former they esteem'd their Vertues. The same befel the Empero•• Pertin••x, for designing to reform the Militia, enerva•••• under the Luxurious Reign of Commodus. Lewis XI▪ Ki•••• of France fell into the same Errour, for that he began 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Reign with the severe Punishment of some of his princip•• Nobility. The Excellence of a new Government ought 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be Benignity; since too much Rigour and Severity is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Vice of an old one.

What dare not old Kings do? The softest Chai••, Of Kingdoms is in a new Princes Reign.

To settle a Government is a work of time, for 'tis troublesome to reform, as to new model one15 1.161; for 〈◊〉〈◊〉

reason David excus'd himself from punishing Ioab for the Murther of Abner, as being weak and newly anointed King16 1.162; that is, he fear'd by too much Severity, he should make his new gotten Government odious. Rehoboam had never ruined himself had he considered this, when by the Counsel of the young Men, he answer'd the People of Israel, who desir'd he would treat 'em with less Severity than his Father had done;

My Father made your Yoke heavy, and I will add to your Yoke; my Father also cha∣stised you with Whips, but I will chastise you with Scor∣pions

17 1.163. There is nothing more serviceable to a Prince at his entrance upon the Government, than to signalize him∣self by some glorious Exploits, for Reputation once got is not immediately lost; for which Reason Domitius Corbulo, when he was sent into Armenia took particular Care to raise his Reputation18 1.164. The same Agricola did in his Government of Britain, knowing that the Reputation of his first Actions would byass all the rest19 1.165

The comparison which the People make between the past and present Administration is always of ill consequence, when they don't find in this the same Felicity they did in t'other, or don't perceive the same Parts and Qualifications in the present Prince, as in his Predecessor; let him ther∣fore take Care as much can be, that there be no difference; but that the same hand may seem to hold the Reins. But if the Prince, either cannot, or knows not how to adjust his Actions to the Peoples humour as his Predecessour did, let him more particularly avoid occasion, which may breed Comparisons. Which was the reason that Tiberius was ne∣ver present at publick Shews, fearing that his rough melan∣choly Temper, compar'd to the complaisant Gaiety of Augu∣stus, would be offensive to the People20 1.166. Wherefore as

soon as a Prince comes to the Helm of Affairs he should di∣ligently enquire, what things were distasteful in the past Reign, that he may avoid them; this was Nero's Maxim at his Accession to the Throne, prescribing it as a Plan of his future Government, sedulously declining those things which had lately bred Disgust21 1.167.

Let a Prince also adjust his Actions to the Customs of the Countrey, and methods of his Predecessor, for even the Vertues of the Successour which are new, and such a•• the Predecessour and the Nation in general were unacquain∣ted with, the People look upon as Vices and loath 'em. The Parthians demanded Vono for their King, a Person en∣du'd with the Gentile Accomplishments of Rome (where he had been as Hostage) but those Vertues lost him the Affe∣ctions of his People, who regarded them as nothing but new Vices22 1.168; they were disgusted, that he did not give his mind to Horses and Hunting, as his Predecessors did; and on the contrary they all loved Nero, because he accom∣modated himself to their Customs23 1.169. And if this diffe∣rence of Manners in the Princes Person produces these Ef∣fects, how much greater will the Alteration of the Cu∣stoms and Ways of the People create? But if Correction be necessary, it must be apply'd with such Moderation, as may neither make the Prince seem severe nor remiss, but when the negligence of the Predecessour was very great, and the People require a Remedy, then the Activity and Diligence of the Successour is very opportune; as was visible in the first Years of your Royal Highnesses renown'd Father

'Tis a generous piece of Justice, for a Prince to begin his Reign with pardoning all offences against himself, and punishing those committed against others; nothing gai•••• People's esteem and respect more than this24 1.170. As the Emperours Vesp••si•• and Titus found, as also Charles VII.

King of France. Upon this Consideration Witiza remitted the Banishment of those whom his Father had condemned, and caused their Tryals to be burnt, by this great means the better to secure the Crown upon his Head.

Though these Acts are highly requisite, yet the main Point is the gaining the Love and Obedience of the Sub∣jects; which two Kings of Arragon were absolute Masters of† 1.171: One was King Alphonso I who going to take Posses∣sion of the Kingdom of Castile for his Wife Terraca, be∣haved himself with great Complaisance and Affability to all; he heard Causes, and administer'd Justi••e himself; he protected Widows and Orphans, reliev'd the Poor, ho∣nour'd and reward'd the Nobility according to their Desert, prefer'd Vertue, and made the Kingdom plentiful and po∣pulous, which acquir'd him the Affections of all. The o∣ther was Alphonso V. King of Naples, who made himself extreamly beloved by the People, by his care and prudence in Affairs, by a due Disposal of Rewards and Punishments, by Liberality, Complaisance and Easiness of Access, by his Love for the publick Well-fare, and by so exact a Conforma∣tion to the Manners and Customs of the Kingdom, that he seem'd a natural, not a foreign Prince. Those Kings who have their Residence among their Subjects, may gain their hearts more easily, than those who reside in distant Provinces, for if their Loyalty does not grow quite cold, 'tis at most but Luke-warm, and nothing but the Excel∣lence of the Constitution can preserve its heat; that is by providing able Ministers, and by severely punishing their Faults, especially those which they commit against Justice, and the Reputation and Estates of others, all the Comfort absent Subjects have is that if the Prince be good, they shall feel the Effect of it as well as if present, but if otherwise, they should be least under the Lash of his Tyranny25 1.172. But because such Kingdoms love Novelty and Change and re∣quire the Presence of the Prince himself to govern them;

the Confidence which he puts in them, should be arm'd and senced from all Accidents, using the same means which we prescrib'd for the preservation of a Conquer'd Kingdom? Elective Kingdoms which are obtain'd by Favour are also maintain'd by the same, though this very rarely continues long. And though all new Empires begin with Applause, yet in this 'tis but short and soon over; amidst the very Acclamations, when Saul was anointed King, the People began to distrust and slight him, though he was chosen by God himself26 1.173. But there are Ways by which the per∣son Elected, may preserve the Peoples good Opinion of him, that is to say, by maintaining those Vertues and Qua∣lifications, which made him at first thought worthy of the Crown; for Men usually change their Manners with their Fortunes. Tiberius had a very good Character and Reputa∣tion, while he was a private Person and liv'd under Augu∣stus 27 1.174; as also had Galba; let him be Courteous and obliging to all28 1.175. Grateful and Liberal to those who E∣lected him; civil to those who gave their Votes against him; let him be a zealous Lover of his Countrey. And a vigorous Assertor of its Laws and Privileges; let his Council be compos'd of the Natives of the Countrey, imploying them alone in Offices and places of Trust, not admitting Foreigners and Relations; let him maintain his Family with modesty; let him temper Majesty with Consi∣deration, and Justice with Clemency; let him so govern as if his Kingdom came by Descent, which he should transmit to his Posterity, not as if it were Elective, fleecing it of what he can during his Reign; according to the Poet.

A short Reign never spares the People29 1.176:

For 'tis very difficult to be moderate in Grandeur which must die with us30 1.177.

The Prince ought moreover to be peaceable, not an In∣vader of others: for Elective Kingdoms fear such a Master, whose mind is bent upon Conquering others; but they love him who is only careful in preserving his own, as we see in Po∣land, for 'tis evident that all Kingdoms were at first Elective, and that 'twas only Ambition of enlarging them by inva∣ding their Neighbours, by which so many have lost that Li∣berty, which they would have taken from others. Nor is it possible, that among so many Casualties and Dangers of Election, this Enlargement of States should be lasting, for those very Arms which make those additional Conquests, will reduce them to Hereditary Kingdoms; which was31 1.178 Galba's excuse for not converting the Empire into a Com∣monwealth. Elective Monarchies love Liberty, and so ought not to be governed without it, and since Election is the Scale in which they weight it, the Prince should always stand on that side, for if he gives the least Suspicion that he intends to make the Crown Hereditary, he will certainly lose it.

In States acquir'd by Conquest, there is more difficulty in attaining than preserving them, for they are like wild Colts, in which the main Trouble is backing them, for after∣wards they willingly take the Bitt, and submit to the bur∣then. Fear and Flattery open the way to Dominion; the first Asc••nt of which is steep and difficult32 1.179, but once setled you want neither Partizans nor Ministers; yet since these Services are generally forced and counterfeit, they ea∣sily revolt when they have opportunity, and are therefore to be entertain'd and cherish'd with great Care, especially at first, since from the first Actions we easily Judge of the future Government; as Vitellius experienced, who grew hateful and odious to all, for the Death of Dolabella33 1.180. And though Piso said, that a Kingdom acquir'd by ill Pra∣ctices

could never be maintain'd by good ones34 1.181, yet King Sancho did this way establish his doubtful Title to the Kingdom, which he got by Conquest. Princes are soon ruin'd by striving to preserve that by Force which they got so. This pernicious piece of Policy has been the ruin of all Tyrants, and if any one has preserved himself; 'tis be∣cause he chang'd his Tyranny into Benevolence, and his Cruelty into Clemency: Vice cannot subsist long unless Vertue be its substitute; Ambition unjust in acquiring at first, must change into Zeal for the publick Good to main∣tain it self. Subjects love their Prince for the publick, and their private Interests, and when they succeed in both, their Fear soon changes into Reverence, and their Hatred into Respect: but Care must be taken that this Reformation of Vices, which are now publickly known, be not so sudden nor affected, as to proceed from Design not Nature, whose Operations are slow and methodical, so Otho thought; that a sudden Modesty, or affected Gravity could not preserve the Empire which he had attain'd by Villany35 1.182. The People are more apprehensive of such Changes than of Vices them∣selves; for they suspect greater mischief at the Bottom. Feign'd Vertue is worse than Vice; for this is executed un∣der the shape of the other.

Augustus was an admirable Pattern of Prudence and Va∣lour, in raising and supporting his Empire, which all Prin∣ces ought to Copy. At nineteen years of Age he shew'd himself worthy of the Empire, by sustaining the Civil36 1.183 Wars. From which time he began to raise his Fortunes. Empires are not obtain'd by deserving, but by having merited them. One Victory proclaim'd him Emperour37 1.184, be∣cause he knew how to make use of Opportunity and Pru∣dence; of Opportunity in triumphing over Anthony and Lepidus38 1.185, of Prudence in not entering by open Force,

every one was weary of Civil Wars39 1.186, the Empire was naked and defenceless40 1.187, all the most Couragious being taken off, by the Wars or Proscriptions41 1.188. The Pro∣vinces were disgusted at the Government of the Senate, and shew'd their Inclination to change it42 1.189; Dissentions and civil Discords, oblig'd 'em to apply the usual Re∣medy of turning Aristocracy into Monarchy43 1.190. All these Concurrents manag'd by Prudence, facilitated his Ac∣cess to the Empire; which by the same Conduct he main∣tain'd, he oblig'd the Mobb, by defending them by the Authority of a Tribune44 1.191; and to avoid giving Disgust, he neither took upon him the name of a King, nor Dicta∣tor, but only that of Prince45 1.192. He continued the Ti∣tles of the Magistrates, he engag'd the Souldiery by Gratuities; the People by Plenty, and all in general by the sweets of Peace, by Affability, Civility and Cle∣mency 46 1.193. He was courteous even to his Rivals, An∣thony and Lepidus47 1.194, and reward••d those with Honours and Riches, who had been zealous in his Service48 1.195. He very rarely was severe, and then not through Passion, but to procure the publick Quiet49 1.196. He captivat'd the minds of all, by a ready and copious Eloquence, very becoming his Dignity50 1.197; he us'd Justice among his Subjects, and Mo∣desty to his Allies51 1.198; he shew'd his Integrity, in punish∣ing the Debauching of his Daughter and Neice52 1.199.

He took Care to preserve noble Families, as is visible in his Bounty to Marcus Hortalus53 1.200. He severely punish'd the Authors of Libels upon any of the Nobili∣ty 54 1.201, and slighted, those upon himself and Govern∣ment 55 1.202. He very much adorn'd and beautified the City of Rome56 1.203. He fix'd the Bounds of the Empire, keep∣ing a Book of his Revenues and Expences57 1.204 He erect∣ed a Military Treasury, and so dispos'd his Forces, that his Armies, Fleets and Provinces might as it were take hands58 1.205: These good Qualities made the Romans chose the present Government which was secure and safe, rather than run the Risque and uncertainty of the Past59 1.206; Hence they first became fond with Tyranny. I don't re∣late all these Arts with a Design to instruct Tyranny, but that Tyrants may be these ways reform, by joyning these to the Fear, which Force and Oppression have created. For that which is gain'd by the Sword must be preserved by it. For which Reason in such States, 'tis requisite to erect Ca∣stles and Forts, but so contriv'd as they mayn't seem a curb to the Peoples Liberty, but a Protection against foreign In∣vasions, Garrisons appointed for their Safety not to keep 'em in awe, for this always makes 'em desperate. The Spaniards were so offended, that the Emperour Constans should commit the Guard of the Pyrenaean Hills to Fo∣reigners, that they invited (though to their great Detri∣ment) the Vandals, Alans, Swedes, and other Nations in∣to Spain. Confidence makes Subjects Loyal, which made the Scipio's give the Celtiberi••ns leave to march under the same Colours, and lodge in the same Tents with the Ro∣mans. Also Augustus's Life Guard were Spaniards of the Colaguritan Legion. Let a Prince endeavour gradually to

transplant into his conquer'd Provinces, the Customs, Ge∣nius and Language of the conquering Nation, as they did in Spain, in those Colonies which were founded in the time of Augustus, this they are easily brought to, being inclin'd to imitate their Conquerours, flattering them by accommo∣dating themselves, to their Manners and Genius, and esteem∣ing their Privileges, and Honours more than their own. For which Reason the Romans gave their Friends and Con∣federates the Title of Citizens, thereby to preserve their Fidelity. The Emperour Vespasian to oblige the Spaniards granted them all the Privileges of Italy. Acquir'd Provinces if they are used like Strangers, never forget their Enmity; this was the Reason, why the Emperour Claudius gave the Dig∣nity of Roman Citizens to Galli•• Comata, saying, that the Laced aemonians and Athenians were ruin'd by nothing, but by using their conquer'd Nations as Foreigners, but that their Founder Romulus acted with more Prudence, who in the same day saw his Enemies, his Fellow-Citizens60 1.207. By these and such like means, foreign Government becomes natural, after continuance of time has fix'd and setled it, and blotted out the Memory of former Liberty. Spain in its Restauration slighted this Policy. Esteeming more the Preservation of its Nobility, than to debase it with the Blood of Africk, and so would not share any of its Privi∣leges, and Honours with this conquer'd People, whence though united in one Body, they kept their own Customs, and Language, together with such an indelible Hatred, and Treachery that they were forced, that they might free themselves from them, to drive 'em quite out, and to deprive themselves of so many Subjects, so useful in Agriculture; which made all the world wonder at their Policy, in pre∣ferring the Splendour of their Nobility, to their advan∣tage and interest, and their Religion to humane Pru∣dence.

In changing one form of Government into another, such Skill should be us'd that the People mayn't perceive the change, and regret the loss of the former. It was at the Expulsion of Kings at Rome, where all things, as well Sa∣cred and Profane were manag'd with that Prudence, that the People did not perceive the want of those Kings, who had before the Care and management of both, and afterwards when the Commonwealth was turn'd into an Empire, the Magistrates retain'd the same Titles61 1.208, and the same order of the Senate remain'd, with a shew of their ancient Liberty62 1.209, and 'twas this established the Empire. The Dukes of Tuscany did the same in the Dukedom of Florence. The Emperour Augustus was a great Master of this Policy: Disposing things by Degrees, executing some out of hand, and remitting others to another opportunity, fearing he should not succeed in endeavouring to do all together63 1.210. But Samuel was more worthy of admiration, in changing as he did the Government and Policy of the people of God, without giving any one occasion of Complaint64 1.211. The very shadows of Liberty should be so dissipated, that they should insensibly disappear as Dominion takes Root; this Agricola judg'd the best way to manage Britain65 1.212.

There is no Force more mild and effectual in maintaining and preserving acquir'd Provinces than Liberality. Men have worshipped and attributed Divinity, even to things Inani∣mate, which they have received any benefit from; they are easily gain'd by Interest; nor do they much care what hand holds the Scepter, whether Foreign or Natural, pro∣vided it be Liberal; they who suffer themselves to be oblig'd by Benefits received, and afterwards prove false, can never do the Prince any great damage by their Designs against him, for no Body will take the part of an ungrateful Per∣son.

For this Reason Scipio upon the taking of Carthage, order'd all their Goods to be restor'd to the Inhabitants; and Sertorius gain'd the Affections of the Spaniards by mo∣derating their Taxes, and constituting a Senate in Spain like that at Rome, and King Ervigius the better to secure his Throne, lessen'd the Imposts which were laid upon his Sub∣jects, and forgave all that was due to his Treasury. The Romans in their conquer'd Provinces lessen'd their Taxes, to make their Dominion seem the more easie66 1.213; for Sub∣jects can better brook Slavery it self, than Avarice in their Commanders, as the Romans found in the Rebellion of the Frisians67 1.214. A Prince ought therefore to be very cau∣tious of oppressing his new acquir'd Provinces with Taxes, but especially of introducing those which are us'd in other parts; for such an Introduction is odious: The Cappadoci∣ans revolted, because Archelaus would have introduced Taxes among them, after the Roman Fashion68 1.215.

Modesty is also necessary to the preservation of acquir'd Kingdoms; the Senators were more disgusted at Caesar's not rising up when they entred the Senate, than at the loss of their Liberty. Which Tiberius observing, carried him∣self reservedly and modestly toward them69 1.216; the Peo∣ple take more notice of Accidents than the substance of Things, and sometimes for frivolous empty Punctilio's of Ho∣nour Princes lose their Esteem, and become odious to 'em. Sejanus thought 'twas better to slight the empty shadows of Grandeur, and to augment real Prower70 1.217. The Romans valu'd not vain Ceremonies, but were intent upon the in∣crease and preservation of their Empire71 1.218: For which Reason Tiberius like a prudent Politician, was a vigorous contemner of Honour72 1.219. Nor would he ever permit

the farther Spain to erect Temples to him, nor admit of the Title of Father of his Countrey73 1.220, well knowing the Danger of inordinate Ambition, when expos'd to the View of every one74 1.221. For the same Reason of State the Dukes of Florence, demean themselves with great Civility to their Subjects not permitting them to stop, to pay their Respects when they pass by, as is usual at Rome. After that Castile had refus'd Obedience to Kings, they banish'd those high sounding Titles, calling their Governours only Judges, that they might be the better received by the Peo∣ple. By the same Prudence and Moderation; Don Ferdi∣nand the Catholick refus'd the name of King [after the Death of the Queen] and would be call'd only Governour of Castile. Some States in Italy which aspire to Royal Dignity, will I believe at last (pray God I may be mista∣ken) find the ill Consequences of their having left their former Modesty, for Italy will not be able to support it∣self, when she shall see so many Crown'd Heads within her Territories. 'Tis less inconvenient to extend the limits of any State, than to alter the Form of its interiour Greatness; either through the jealousie of the Nobility, or the Con∣tempt of the Commons, for about those they are both mighty Captious; from the inequality of Communities proceeded common Government; in which not to admit Sovereign∣ty is the means to preserve their Freedom; but if the Seeds of Royalty are once sown, they will produce the Desire of Monarchy, which puts an end to their Liberty In a word, 'tis Peace alone (as we shall shew elsewhere) that preserves a••quir'd Kingdoms; provided that Peace be cautious and arm'd. For so it gives opportunity to Possession, to settle its Government, and justifie its Title, without the trouble of War which confounds all Right, and gives opportunit•• to turbulent uneasie Spirits, and robs the Commander o•• his Authority. Wherefore a Prince ought not only to en∣deavour to procure Peace, to his new Kingdoms, but also

to the neighbouring Provinces; for the same sparks of Fire easily catch, and the fury of Arms soon embroils those that are near them. This was the Reason that King Phi∣lip III. took up Arms against Emanuel▪ Duke of Savoy, when he would have taken Monferrat from the Duke of Mantua, his Majesty endeavouring to decide those Preten∣tions by Justice, not Force, nor would he suffer the Am∣bition of one person to disturb the Quiet of all Italy. The same Danger is at present to be fear'd, unless these Animo∣sities which have put so many Princes in Arms, be accom∣modated; for the Sword once drawn, either revenge thinks of satisfaction for Affronts received, or Justice of recover∣ing her Right, or Ambition of extending its Dominions, or Mars himself of trying his Strength. I conclude this Discourse with four Verses of Tasso, in which he very judi∣ciously, and concisely comprehends the true Grounds, up∣on which any new Kingdom should be established.

EMBLEM LX.

[illustration]

AN Arrow sent from a Bow, either mounts or falls, without suspending in the Air; like time present, which is so imperceptible, that it no sooner is, but is past: Or like Angles in a Circle, where the acut•• becomes obtuse, without ever forming a right Angle. The first point of the Arrows consistence is the first of its Decli∣nation; the higher it mounts, the nearer 'tis to its fall. All things when they arrive at their highest Pitch, mu•••• necessarily decline: Hippocrates observ'd this in human•• Bodies, that when they are past thriving, they immediately begin to decay1 1.222. Nothing in Nature is Permanent; the Heavens themselves never rest, no more do their Effect••

which they imprint on things below; for which Reason Socrates attributed all changes of Government to them2 1.223. Monarchies differ not from Animals and Vegetables, they are born, live and die like them, nor have they any time of Consistence, so that their falls are natural3 1.224. In not in∣creasing they decrease. There is no interval in the fall of the highest Fortune; when it once begins to fall 'tis impos∣sible to stop it; 'tis more difficult for the Majesty of Princes to fall from the highest Pitch to the middlemost, than from thence to the lowest Degree4 1.225. But all Kingdoms don't rise and fall by the same Degrees; when they are got up to the highest Point, they fall with more speed than they rose5 1.226. Alexander was twelve years in raising his King∣dom, which decay'd in a very small time, being rent and divided at first into four, and afterwards into more Prin∣cipalities. The Causes of the Rise and Fall of States are many; those who attribute them to Motion, or the power of the Stars, or the number of Plato, or Climacterick years, deny Providence the care of Sublunary things. He who has design'd to make the World, will not disdain to govern it: Nay to create, and not take care of the World, would be disapproving his own work. If God vouchsafed himself to paint the Peacocks Tail, and the Butterflies Wings, shall we think he will commit to Chance the management of Empires and Monarchies, upon which depend the Happi∣ness or Ruin of Mankind, for whom all things were crea∣ted? 'Twould be impious to believe it, and to attribute the Success of things to our own Counsels, the highest Arro∣gance. By him Kings Reign, and with his own Hands he disposes of Scepters, and though in their Preservation he give their free Course to those natural Inclinations, which were either born with us, or imprinted in us by some other

influence, without giving any check or restraint to Free-Will; yet does God himself order and dispose them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that no Government was ever ruin'd, without the interv••∣ning of some humane Folly and Bindness6 1.227. I cannot for••bear thinking that Empires would be pepetual, if Prince•• would accommodate their Will to their Pow••••, their Power to their Reason, and their Reason to Accidents.

Since then Prudence and humane Counsel have their 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the falls of Empires, we may easily find the Causes ther•• of; which are either general or particular; general which comprehend all Kingdoms, whether acquir'd by Successio•• Election or Conquest, and are many, but may be redu•••• to four Principal ones, from whence proceed the rest; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Horizon of the World, from the four Cardi•••• Winds proceed many collateral ones. These Causes are R••••ligion, Honour, Life and Estate; for the Conservation 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which Civil Society was first instituted, and the People ••••••came subject to the Government of one, a few, or many and whenever they find themselves oppres'd in any one 〈◊〉〈◊〉 these four, they rebel and change the Form of the Govern••ment. We will therefore touch upon these, with as mu•••• brevity as the Subject will admit.

Though Religion, as we said before, be the strong•• Bond of Governments, yet is it that which disunites th•••• most, and reduces them into many Forms, when it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 universal, for those who are of different Opinions 〈◊〉〈◊〉 God, never live in Unity among themselves. If they ••••••gree and quarrel about trivial Customs and Manners, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 much more will they about their Affection and Loya•• due to the Creator of all things, and furious Zeal of ••••••derstanding things of such importance. Liberty of C••••••science is the ruin of any State. Those who disagree matters of Religion, are to one another (as the Holy S••••rit says) Pricks in their Eyes, and Thorns in their Sides7 1.228

The Duty of Subjects, and the greater Ties of Friendship, and Relation are loos'd, and broken upon account of Re∣ligion. King Witeric was put to Death by his own Sub∣jects, for endeavouring to introduce Arianism, the same be∣fel Witiza for altering the Rites and Ceremonies of Divine Worship. Galicia rebelled against King Froilus for the a∣buse of the Marriage of the Clergy: As soon as Dive sity of Religions was introduced among the Dutch, they re∣bell'd against their lawful King and Master.

So Honour, as it is the Defence and Preservation of States, and the chief Spur to Loyalty, so it also disturbs them to clear it self from Affronts, Contempt and Injuries, the People preferring Honour before Life and Fortune8 1.229. Count Iulian invited the Moors into Spain, because he sus∣pected that King Roderick had violated the Honour of his Daughter Cava; the Nobles of Castile took up Arms against Alphonsus III. for that he would infringe their Privileges, and oblige 'em to pay Taxes; as did the Subjects of Ra∣mires III. King of Leon, for his severe and servile usage of them. For Affronts received by the People always pro∣voke to Revenge upon the Prince9 1.230; and Contempt creates Seditions10 1.231. And this either, when the Prince contemns the People, or the People the Prince, which is when they don't find him fitly qualified, thinking it base to obey one who knows not to Command, and make himself respected, and takes no Care of the Government. So the People of Arragon served their King Iohn I. the same thing befel Iohn II. of ••astile for his insufficiency, Henry IV. for his Vices, and Alphonso V. of Portugal, for suffering him∣self to be govern'd by others Nor do Subjects take it as •• less Injury and Contempt, for the Prince to make Fo∣reigners his chief Ministers, and to dispose of all Dignities and Preferment among them: for (as King Henry said)

That is declaring plainly, that his own native Subjects are insufficient and unworthy* 1.232.

This was the cause of the Commotions of Castile, in the time of the Emperour Charles V. The same thing happens upon an unequal Di∣stribution of Honours, for that Men of great Spirits can't brook11 1.233; and take it as an Affront, that Men of le•••• Desert are preferr'd before them12 1.234.

The greatest Disease of a Government is Incontinence and Lust in the Governours; hence proceed Seditions and Revolutions of States, for that violates the Honour of ma∣ny, and is severely punished by God. One such Action buried Spain in ashes for many Ages; the same call'd down great Plagues upon Egypt13 1.235. And David suffered great Troubles, both in his own Person, and in his Poste∣rity 14 1.236, who were continually persecuted and destroy'd by the Sword.

There is danger in those States, where many are exclud∣ed from Offices; for they are all so many Enemies15 1.237▪ no Man is so stupid as not to desire Honour▪ and take it ill to be deprived of it16 1.238. Those States also are subject to the same Inconveniency, in which the Magistracy is divid∣ed among a set number of the Nobility, all the rest being excluded.

The third Cause of the Revolutions and Troubles of States is the desire of preserving Life, that is, when the Subjects think the Prince so Lazy, and Cowardly as that he can't preserve and defend them; or else when they hate him for his Severity, as they did King Alphonso III. or for his Cruelty, as they did King Peter; or for his Injustice and Ty∣ranny, which endangers all their Lives, as they did King Ordonius, for the ill usage and Murther of the Counts of

Castile, whence proceeded the Change of his State* 1.239.

The last is, Estates, that is when a Prince idlely squan∣ders away his Subjects Fortunes; which occasion'd Garcias King of Galicia, to lose both Kingdom and Life too; or when he extravagantly spends his Revenues, which was Ra∣mon's Pretence for killing •• his Brother-in-Law, Sancho King of Navarre; or when he is very covetous, as was King Alphonso; or when through his ill management, the State suffers by Scarcity, or when the Price of things rises, or Trade fails, which render'd the same Alphonso so odious; or when the Coin is bad, as 'twas in the time of Peter II. King o•• Arragon, and in many other Kings Reigns; or when Places of Profit, or Riches are unequally despos'd of. For Envy and Necessity take up Arms against the Rich and so raise Commotions17 1.240. This also happens from the Male-administration of Justice, from the quartering of Souldiers, and from other Burthens, which oppress the Subjects E∣states and Goods.

Besides these general Causes, there are others particular to the three Distinctions which I made of Kingdoms, in the last Emblem, which may be inferr'd from what I propos'd for their Preservation; for the Knowledge of preserving a State, implys the Knowledge of what will ruin it, and so on the contrary18 1.241; for all this I cannot but enlarge a little, though I run a Risque of repeating what has been alrea∣dy said.

Hereditary States are usually ruined, for want of Care and Diligence in the Successour, especially when they are considerable; for then their Greatness makes him secure and negligent, careless of all Danger, and dubious in his Councels. In Execution timorous, least he should disturb the Quiet he injoys; he takes no Care to prevent misfor∣tunes, but thinks it sufficient if he can remedy them; not considering that this latter is more chargeable and less

effectual19 1.242. He thinks Bravery too dangerous; and in procuring Peace by certain idle and uncertain means, he brings a War upon himself, and so ruins himself by the very means he us'd for his Preservation. This is the mis∣fortune of Monarchies, that in taking Repose they find ruin, endeavouring to stop they fall, and ceasing to labour they grow feeble. Ezekiel aptly represents all this in his Vision of the four wing'd Animals, which are the Em∣blems of Princes and Monarchies:

Which when they went I heard the noise of their Wings, like the noise of great Waters, as the Voice of the Almighty, the Voice Speech as the noise of an Host20 1.243; when they stood they let down their Wings.

But 'tis not necessary to a Prince's Preservation to be always making new Conquests, for this would be endless, and run into Tyranny and In∣justice; a State may easily maint••in it self within the Cir∣cumference of its own Circle, provided it preserves its Activity and Vigour, and those Arts by which it at first ac∣quir'd its Gra••deur; running water preserve their Purity, but once standing they taint; yet is it not necessary, that they should be always running; it suffices that they keep a Motion within themselves, like Lakes mov'd only by the Winds; so Monarchies in which Discipline flourishes, and which are fenced against all Accidents, are of long conti∣nuance, though they make no Excursions; for without War Arts Military may be exercised; so Cassius in time of Peace caus'd all the old Military Discipline to be obser∣ved 21 1.244. A Prince for want of Exercise of his Arms, should not grow wholly enervate by the Sloth and Laziness of Peace; but should then enterpize some glorious Action, that may preserve his Reputation. Augustus during the Repose of his Empire, suffer'd not his fiery Soul to be ex∣tinguish'd by the ashes of Idleness, for when he wanted what to do as Man, he employ'd himself as God, studying

the Motion of the Spheres, correcting the Months, and prescribing Laws to time. To this end Philip II. Erected that admirable Fabrick of the Escurial; in which he aim'd to outdo Nature her self in Art, and to shew the whole World the greatness of his Soul, and of his Piety.

But Hereditary Kingdoms are also in Danger, when the Successour forgetting the Laws and Institutions of his Ance∣••••ors, thinks that the Subjects Duty, and Subjection is from Nature, and not remembring that his Grandeur is deriv'd from them, he looks upon 'em as Slaves, and is more bent upon his own Interest, than the publick Good, his Admi∣nistration being turn'd into Tyranny22 1.245. Whence the Peo∣ple conceive a disrespect to the Prince, and an Odium and abhorrence of his Person and Action, by which the recipro∣cal Union between the King and People is broken23 1.246; since one obeys, and t'other commands by the mutual Be∣nefit they receive, one in the Splendour and Grandeur of his Government, t'other in the Happiness of being well govern'd; without this reciprocal Bond, Heredi••ary King∣doms would go to ruin, or at least suffer a Change; for the Prince seeing himsel•• despised and slighted by all, is in per∣petual Fear, from which fear proceeds Cruelty, and from that Tyranny; which the Nobles not being able to bear, conspire against him, and by the assistance of the People dethrone him: Whence it comes that the People looking upon them as the Restorers of their Liberty, offer them the Government, and thus Aristocracy is introduc'd; but even this soon falls into the Inconveniences of Monarchy; for as their Children succeed, the Magistracy and Government becomes Hereditary, and they abuse them, and convert them to their own Interest, whence the People finding them∣selves oppress'd by them, wrest their Power from 'em, and will set up for Governours themselves, as if their Liberty was greater in a Democracy, in which it being impossible to preserve Equality, Insolence, and Injustice rule, from whence

proceed Seditions and Tumults, and thence Confusion, which obliges 'em to choose some one Person to command 'em, and so the Government becomes once again Monarchical. This Circle usually States run, in which they very often wholly lose their Liberty, when some Potent Neighbour makes use of the opportunity of their Commotions, to con∣quer and enslave them.

Elective Kingdoms, or at least the Peoples Affections for the Prince are lost; when the Actions of the Elected Prince correspond not to the Opinion which had been once concei∣ved of him; for many appear capable of Government, be∣fore they come to it, as Galba did24 1.247; those who voted not for the Election are in continual Danger and Fear, which makes them desire and contrive a Change. Those who assisted him with their Votes, promise themselves such a share of his Favour, that finding themselves disappointed in their Hopes, they fall into disgust and complaint; it be∣ing impossible for the Prince to satisfie all. Or whether it be that humane Gratitude is tir'd with the coutinual sight of its Benefactors, and looks upon them as so many Creditors. Subjects us'd to frequent Elections are always fond of them, and still fanc•• the new Prince will be better; those who have the Privilege of voting take it to heart, that their Power in which their Honour consists should lie so long dormant and useless. The Prince Elected on t'other hand, proud of his Power endeavours to extend it, and so break the Oaths and Covenants of his Election, and despising the Na∣tives of the Countrey, if he be a Foreigner, admits only his own Countreymen into Offices, and endeavours only the Preferment of his own Family, by which he incurs the ha∣tred of his Subjects and his own ruin: For few Nations can endure the Command of Strangers. Ieremiah told this as sad Tidings to Ierusalem25 1.248.

Kingdoms acquir'd by Conquest are also soon lost, for Luxury enervates the Strength and Vigour of the mind; Felicity disturbs Counsels, and misleads Princes from those

ways by which they attain'd their Grandeur; they obtain'd it by Valour, Clemency and Reputation, and they lose it by Laziness, Severity and Contempt. Which changing the Government, changes also the Affection and Obedience of the Subject26 1.249; the Reason why the Carthagenians were expell'd Spain was, that they did not know that States should be maintain'd by the same Arts they were acquir'd by; which usually the Conquerours of Provinces are more observant, than their Successours, for they imploy all their Courage and Wit, in attaining and preserving them, but Succession makes these negligent and careless. Whence 'tis an Observation, that those who acquire Kingdoms usually keep 'em, and those who receive them lose them27 1.250. The Holy Spirit says, that Kingdoms pass from one Nati∣on to another, because of Injustice, Injuries and Deceit28 1.251.

I conclude the present Discourse with two Cautions, first that the Preservation of States does not always depend on their being far from the Causes of their Ruin, but some∣times on their being near them29 1.252▪ for Fear creates Care and Diligence; the other is, that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the Person of the Prince, or in the Body of the State, the least ill should be taken most Care of, for they increase insensibly, without be∣ing perceived till they are past Remedy30 1.253. A small Worm destroys the tallest Cedar; the little Remora stops the Course of a Ship under sail; frivolous Losses caus'd the Ruin of the Roman Empire. A slight disorder of Body is often more dangerous than a real Sickness, for that is not minded, this diligently taken Care of: We immediately apply Medi∣cines to a Fever, but never heed a Cold, from which the greatest Distempers proceed.

EMBLEM LXI.

[illustration]

AN Harp Forms a compleat Aristocracy, compos'd of Monarchy and Democracy; understanding Pre∣sides, several Fingers govern, and many Strings o∣bey, not with a particular, but general and common Har∣mony, so that the Disproportion between the great and lit∣tle ones don't spoil the Tune. One may justly compare to a a Harp every Republick, in which long Practice and Ex∣perience, have appointed who shall command, and who obey; in which they have establish'd Laws, elected Magistrates, distinguished Offices, prescribed set Rules and Methods of Government, and instituted in each part of the Republick, such Customs and Laws as are most conformable and con∣sentaneous to its Nature. This makes the first Institutions durable, and not easie to be chang'd. This Harp of King∣doms and Commonwealths being thus fitted up, and all the

Strings tun'd and dispos'd in Order, though any one should ••ansie he could better tune any one of them, he ought to have a better opinion of the Prudence and Judgment of his Ancestors, whom long Practice, and dear bought Experi∣ence had instructed: for some Ways and Methods of Go∣vernment, though they have some Inconveniences are yet better born with than alter'd. A prudent Prince tunes the strings in the same Order they stand in, not changing them without time or other accidents have so discompos'd them, that they can't perform the Office they were first de∣sign'd for, wherefore a Prince should perfectly understand this Harp of his Empire, and the Grace and Majesty that attends it, and be throughly vers'd in the Nature, Qualities, and Genius's of the Nobility and Commons, which are its main Strings. For as King Alphonso says in one of his Laws:

A King's greatest Care should be to know Men, for since tis them he has to do with, an exact Knowledge of them is absolutely necessary* 1.254.

In this consists the principal Art of Government.

To know his Subjects is a King's best Art† 1.255.

Those who have most apply'd themselves to this Study have govern'd with most Success. Many take this Harp in their hand, but few can finger it with Judgment, few under∣stand its Nature, and can touch it agreeably. Let therefore a Prince know, that a Kingdom is nothing but an Union of many Cities and People; and a joynt Consent to the Com∣mand of some one, and the Obedience of the rest, which Consent, Ambition and Force introduc'd. Concord at first rais'd, and Concord preserves it. Justice and Clemency keep it alive; 'tis the Care of others Safety; its Sp••rit consists in Unity of Religion; its Increase, Preservation or Ruin depends upon the Parts of which it is compos'd. It admits of no Companion; is expos'd to all Dangers. In it more than any thing▪ Fortune shews her Inconstancy. 'Tis liable to Envy and Emulation; 'tis in more danger in Pro∣sperity

than Adversity; for then it lives in Security, which creates Pride, from whence proceeds its Ruin; when young 'tis weak, and when old decrepid; 'tis as much in danger in continual Peace as in War. It falls of its self, when not exercis'd by foreign Arms, and when it once begins to fall it cannot stop it self; there is no Interval between its high∣est Elevation, and its Ruin. Emulation sometimes raises it, and sometimes oppresses it. If it be small it can't de∣fend it self, if great it can't govern it self, it is better go∣vern'd by Art than Force; 'tis fond of Novelties though they are its bane, Vertue is its Health, and Vice its Sickness. Labour raises it, and Idleness is its Ruin; 'tis fortified by Forts and Alliances, and establish'd by Laws, the Magistracy is its Heart, Counsel its Eyes, Arms its Hands, and Riches its Feet.

This Harp is attended with a certain Majesty, which is a Harmony springing from the strings of the People, and approv'd by Heaven1 1.256. An Emblem of Power, and Splendour of supream Jurisdiction; a certain Force which draws Authority and Obedience to it; the Safeguard and Preservation of the Government. Opinion and Fame give it Life; Love, Security; Fear, Authority; Ostentation, Greatness; Ceremony, Reverence; Severity, Respect; Pomp, Esteem; in Retirement the more venerable; 'tis in danger of Contempt and Hate. It neither bears Equality nor Di∣vision, for it consists in Admiration and Unity; 'tis constant in either Fortune; Respect strengthens it; Arms and the Laws maintain it; it lasts not in Pride, nor falls in Humi∣lity▪ It lives by Prudence and Beneficence, and dies by Force and Vice.

The strings of a Harp are the People, which are natu∣rally monstrous, different from themselves, inconstant and various; govern'd by outward appearances, without search∣ing to the bottom of things; they take Counsel of Report, so void of means and reason, that they cannot distinguish Truth from Falshood, always prone to mischief. The same minute of two contrary Affections, by which they are al∣ways

guided not by Reason; by Violence not Prudence, by the shadow not the reality. Only to be tam'd by Punish∣ment. Their Flatteries are an aukward medly of Truth and Falsity; they know no Medium; they love or hate to Excess; are extreamly Complaisant, or extreamly Insolent; either fear or frighten; and when they fear, are most con∣temptible. Small Dangers at hand terrifie them strangely, but great ones at a distance, they are unconcern'd at. If a Servant slavish, if a Master haughty; know not what Liber∣ty is themselves, and will not suffer it in others. Bold and courageous in Words, but cowardly and base in Action. They rise upon the least occasion, and are soon compos'd. Do not lead, but follow; bear themselves the same to all; are sooner forc'd than perswaded. In Success arrogant and impious, in Adversity timorous and superstitious; as prone to Cruelty as Mercy. Equally blind in their Favours as their Perse∣cutions; they abuse Clemency by Licenciousness, and rebel against strict Discipline; if they once shall attack the Rich, neither Reason nor Shame will reclaim them. They raise and are fond of Stories, and by their own Credulity enlarge them; they follow the Advice of the many, not the wise few▪ they attribute ill Success to the Malice of the Magistracy, and common Calamities to the Prince's f••ult. Nothing makes them more supple and obedient than Plenty of Provi∣sions, for upon that their Care and Thoughts are fixt. In∣terest and Dishonour soon put them in Commotion. Loaden they fall, lighten'd they kick back; they love hot and rash Spirits, and an ambitious and turbulent way of Govern∣ment; they are never content with the present State of Af∣fairs, but are always greedy of Change. A servile Imita∣tor of the Vertues and Vices of those in Authority. They Envy the Rich and Wealthy, and plot against them; are mighty fond of Plays and Shews, nor is there any other way, than that to gain their Favour. Superstitious in Re∣ligion, paying more respect to the Priests than their Princi∣ples. These are the chief Qualities and Affections of the Mob. But a Prince may be satisfied that there is no Com∣munity, or Councel, though never so great and grave, and of Select Persons, in which there is not something of the vul∣gar,

and which does not in many things resemble the Popu∣larity? The Court makes another part of the strings of this Harp; which if a Prince can't touch with great Prudence and Dexterity, the whole Harmony of Government is spoil'd; wherefore that he many know to tune them well, 'tis necessary he should know their Nature.

The Court is presumptuous and inconstant, changing its Colour, Camelion like, each moment according as the Wind of Prosperity or Adversity blows; though it all speaks one Language, yet all don't alike understand it; it Worships and Adores ••he rising Prince, but slights him when declin∣ing towards his West; it censures and carps at his Actions, and yet imitates them; it hawks after his Favour, with the Nets of Flattery; ever bent upon Ambition and Self∣interest; it lives by Lyes and hates Truth. Easily swallow•• Vice, but Vertue not without Difficulty; loves Change and Novelty; fears every thing, and distrusts all. Haughty and arrogant in Authority, servile and cringing in Obedience. Envys even it self as well as others; wonderful cunning and dissembling, in concealing its Designs; it veils its Ha∣tred with Smile and Ceremony. Praises, and commends in publick, and defames privately. Is its own Enemy, fan∣tastical in its Appearance, and unperforming in its Pro∣mises.

This Instrument of Government being known, and the Qualities and Sound of each string, the Prince ought to touch 'em with that Dexterity, that they may all sound Harmoniously without jarring; in which he ought to keep time and measure, and not favour one String more than another, in those which are to make the Consort, and whol∣ly forget others; for in this Instrument of the Government all have their proper Functions, tho' they are unequal and easily jarr, which Discord is very dangerous, when he shall grant too great Authority to the Magistracy; or too much Favour the Commons, and slight the Nobility; or Admi∣nister to some, and not to others; or confound Offices Mi∣litary with Civil, or does not well know to sustain his Ma∣jesty by Authority; his Kingdom by Love; the Court by Gravity; the Nobility by Honour, the People by Plenty

Justice by Equality; the Laws by Fear; Arms by Rewards; Power by Frugality; War by Riches, and Peace by Repu∣tation; every one of these Instruments are different, both in their Nature, and the Disposition of the Strings, which are the Subjects; and so should be manag'd and play'd upon by different ways, and a different hand; one Kingdom is like a Harp, which not only requires the softness of the Fingers ends, but also the hardness of the Nails too. Ano∣ther is more like an Organ, which requires both Hands to express the Harmony of the Pipes. The third is so de∣licate, like a Guitarre, that it won't bear the Fingers, but must be touch'd with a fine Quill, to make it exert its Har∣mony. A Prince ought therefore to be well vers'd in the Knowledge of these Instruments, and their Strings, to keep 'em always in Tune, and to take Care not to strain too hard upon the Notes of Severity or Avarice (as St. Chry∣sostom observ'd in God himself)2 1.257 for even the best String when too much strain'd, if it does not break, at least spoils the Sweetness of the Consort.

EMBLEM LXII.

[illustration]

THE ingenuous and industrious Bee cautiously con∣ceals the Art by which it makes its Combs. They are all busie, and none can find out their Oeconomy and method of Government. And if any one more curious than ordinary shall endeavour to inspect it, by means of a Glass Hive, they soon plaister it over with Wax, that they may have no Spyes, nor Witnesses of their Domestick Trans∣actions. O prudent Commonwealth, Mistress of the World! Thou hadst long since extended thy Empire over all Ani∣mals, had Nature furnish'd thee with Strength equal to thy Prudence. Let all others come to thee to learn the impor∣tance of Silence and Secrecy, in the management of Affairs; and the Danger of discovering the Artifice and Maxims of Government, Negotiations and Treaties, Counsels and Resolutions, the Ails and inward Infirmities of States; if

Drusus the Tribune had duly consider'd this Prudence of Bees, when a Builder promised him to make the Windows of his house, so that no Body should look in, he had not given him this Answer:

Rather, says he, so contrive my House if you can, that all may see what I do1 1.258; this was a piece of Pride of an open ingenuous Spirit, or the confidence of a private Person, not of a publick Minister, or a Prince, in whose▪ Court there should be some Retirements, where they may unseen treat and deliberate of Affairs. Coun∣sel is like a Mystery, to be communicated but to few2 1.259

. Ancient Rome erected Altars to the God (whom they call∣ed Consus) who presided over Counsels, but they were Sub∣terraneous ones, to intimate, that Counsels ought to be pri∣vate; by the benefit of which Secrecy it grew to that Great∣ness, and maintain'd it self so long;

For Silence is the best and strongest Bond of Government3 1.260.

Their Senate was so close and trusty, that never any of their Debates were publish'd; there was not one for many Ages who dis∣cover'd 'em. They had all Ears to hear, but none Tongues to divulge. I question whether the same may be said of pre∣sent Governments. That which was yesterday debat'd in Council, is to day the Subject of Womens Chat; who with ease (notwithstanding the Prophet Micah,4 1.261 coaks them out of their Husbands, and so tell 'em again to others; as it was in that Secret, which M••ximus told his Wife Mar∣ti•• 5 1.262, and she to Livia. By these Channels, those Secrets soon come to the Ears of foreign Ambassadours, whose in∣quisitiveness nothing scapes. They are publick Spies, and Plummets that always search the bottom; prudent are those Governments, which allow them not continual Residence. They are more prejudicial, than beneficial to the publick Peace, and they oft'ner breed Disturbances than promote Tranquility. They are ever making Glass Hives, that they

may treacherously inspect the Deliberations of Councils. Let a Prince therefore attentively indeavour to stop all those Crevises, through which inquisitive Curiosity may pry into his Concerns. For if any Enemy penetrates them, he easi∣ly prevents and frustrates them. As Germanicus did, who understood all the Designs of his Enemies6 1.263. This was the Reason of the Advice which Sallust gave Livia, that the Secrets of the Family, nor the Counsels of Friends, nor the Ministery of the Militia, should by no means be di∣vulg'd 7 1.264. Sampson in discovering wherein his Strength lay to Dali••h8 1.265, gave his Enemies opportunity of robbing him of it9 1.266. Private Designs strike a Fear upon all, and create a Veneration for the Prince; and though at first they are not well grounded, yet may a prudent Judgment afterwards find means to make them Successful. The Re∣spect and Esteem which we have for Princes and Common∣wealths, would all be lost, if their private Consultations were made publick. They are carv'd Gyants, which seem tall and vast to the Eye, and which frighten more than hurt, but if that Fear shall approach nearer, 'twill find them govern'd and fram'd by Men of no higher Statu••e than themselves. States which are close in their Counsels, and Actions are respected, but otherwise despis'd by all10 1.267. How smooth and pleasant does a deep River glide along; and how rough and uncouth that, which discovers the Peb∣bles and Weeds at the bottom! None dare wade that, but this every one skips over. Those things which Opinion magnifies, the Eye shews less. Reverence proceeds from di∣stance 11 1.268. For this Reason, God when he conferr'd with Moses upon Mount Sinai, about the Laws and Government of his People, he veil'd its Top not only with Fire, but also with a thick Cloud12 1.269, least any one should treacherously observe them; he also Commanded upon pain of Death, that none should approach the very Foot of the Moun∣tain

13 1.270. If God himself, is so cautious in his Commands and Consultations, what then should Man be, whose wisest Counsels are Ignorance? When their Resolutions are pub∣lish'd in due time, they seem elaborate and compos'd with profound Judgment; they shew the Majesty and Prudence of the Prince, and we believe there are Reasons and Consi∣derations which we can't comprehend; nay we many times imagine some, that the Ministers never so much as thought of. But if we were to hear the Debates, Grounds, and Rea∣sons of their Resolves, we should perhaps deservedly ridicule them. As upon the Stage the Actors appear, Gay and Splendid, and move the Respect of all; but behind the Scenes is despicable Misery and Confusion. 'Tis yet more dangerous to entrust the Mysteries of Government to Fo∣reigners, these King Henry II. ever suspected* 1.271. And though perhaps many would be true, yet the safest way is, not to admit any of 'em to the management of Affairs, espe∣cially those of the Treasury; chiefly when they are not Sub∣jects, or of equal Capacity. Least they should dive into the Maxims of the Government14 1.272; 'tis our unhappy Temper to slight and contemn our own, and admire all fo∣reign Commodities. We think there is no Courage, Know∣ledge, or Prudence but is imported, not regarding the Ad∣vice of the Holy Spirit: Admit not a Stranger within thy Door, for he will raise a Whirlwind against thee, and at last turn thee out of thy own Dwelling.

If a Prince would have his Counsels kept secret and close, let him himself set a good Example of Prudence and Taciturnity. Let him imitate Q. M••tellus, who we are told us'd to say, That if his Shirt knew his Thoughts, he would order it to be burnt. Let him diligently endeavour to con∣ceal his Mind; for he who is Master of his Thoughts, has already the main Instrument of Government. This Tiberi∣us knew, who even in Matters which he had no Design to conceal, either naturally, or through use, always spoke in∣tricately and obscurely; but then most of all, when 'twas

discours'd of his succeeding Augustus15 1.273. Secrets are not to be communicated to all Ministers, though they are ne∣ver so faithful; but only to those to whom they some way belong, or those from whom they can't be conceal'd with∣out greater Damage. Christ when he desir'd to have one of his Miracles private, made only three of his Apostles privy to it, thinking it not safe to intrust it to them all16 1.274. The keeping of a Secret requires great Care; for though we can be Silence, yet it is not in our Power to Command the interiour Passions17 1.275, or to suppress that quick Mo∣tion of the Blood, which betrays the Secrets of the heart, by the Face and Eyes18 1.276. The Mind being like the finest Paper, which discovers on the other side what is written within; so Britannicus's Death appear'd in Agrippina's Face, though she did what she could to stifle it19 1.277. Au∣gustus and Tiberius knew this, and because they doubted they could not enough dissemble their Joy for Germanicus his Death, durst not appear in publick20 1.278. The Tongue is not the only blabb of the Secrets of the Heart; Man has many as great Tell-tales as that about him; as Love, which being a Fire gives light to, and discovers the darkest Designs: An∣ger which froths and boils over; fear of Punishment; vio∣lence of Sorrow; Self-interest, Honour or Infamy; Vain∣glory of our own Thoughts, which prompts us to disclose them before they are put into Execution. In short, the weakness of the Mind, either from Wine, or any other Accident. No caution can deceive these natural Spies. Nay, the more Care is taken to blind them, the sooner they discover the Secret. As it befel Sevinus in a Conspiracy, which he was concern'd in, who discover'd his Care and Concern through all his pretended Joy21 1.279, and though

long use may in time correct Nature, and make it more re∣tentive, as Octavia, who though very young could hide her Grief and other Affections22 1.280; and Nero who beside his natural Propensity▪ had almost an acquir'd Faculty of disgui∣sing his Hate with false Flatteries23 1.281; yet Art can't be so vigilant and attentive, as not sometimes to forget it self, and give Nature its free Course, especially when urg'd and pro∣vok'd by designing Malice; which is done many ways, which I will here describe, that the Prince may beware of them, and not suffer any one to fathom his private Sentiments.

Malice then sometimes touches the peccant Humour, that it may exert and declare it self24 1.282. So Sejanus Egg'd on Agrippina's Relations to incense her haughty Spirit, that she might be urg'd to discover her desire of Reigning, and so give Tiberius occasion to suspect her25 1.283.

Injuries and Affronts also do the same, being the Keys of the Heart. As close and reserv'd as Tiberius was in his Thoughts, he could not contain himself when Agrippina affronted him26 1.284.

He who concealing his real Sentiments pretends contra∣ry ones, will soon discover peoples thoughts of them; with which Artifice the Emperour Tiberius us'd to fathom the Thoughts of the Senate, making a shew as if he would not accept of the Empire27 1.285.

There is yet another piece of Cunning, which insinuates 〈…〉〈…〉 or discommending that, 〈…〉〈…〉 bottom of, 〈…〉〈…〉 be of the Party to gain Credit, and induce the other to disclose his Sentiments. This way Latiaris by commending Germanicus, pitying Agrippina's misfortune, and accusing Sejanus, so in∣gratiated himself with Sabinus, that he discover'd to him his Aversion to Sejanus28 1.286.

Many Questions ask'd at a time, are like so many Bul∣lets discharged at once, which no Caution can avoid, and which disarm the most retentive Breast; as were those of Tiberius, to Piso's Son29 1.287; the Mind is also confounded by sudden and unexpected Questions; as Tiberius on•••• found, by those of Asinius Gallus30 1.288, when though he had taken time to answer, yet he could not hide his Con∣cern so, but that Afinius took notice of it31 1.289.

The Authority of the Prince, and the Veneration due to Majesty, are means to discover Truth, and sometimes more than Truth; as Tiberius found, as often as he examin'd the Criminals himself32 1.290.

By Discourse and Talk, which some can promote with great Dexterity, the Mind is discover'd; as by joyning the several pieces of a torn Letter, you may read the Sence of it, and by this method the Conspirators against Nero, knew that Fenius Rufus was of their Party33 1.291.

From all which a Prince may inferr, how difficult a mat∣ter 'tis to keep a Secret, and if it is safe within our own Breasts, it is much less so, when committed to others; wherefore it should without absolute necessity be entrusted to none; 'tis like a Mine, which if it has too many Vents the force of the Powder is lost, and it proves ineffectual, but if there is a necessity of a Prince's communicating his Secrets to his Mi∣nisters, and he seeing 'em divulg'd would know by whom, let him feign several important Secrets, and commit one to each, and by that which he hears of first, he will find who was Tardy before. Let not these Cautions seem frivolous for from very small Causes, great Commotions often pro∣ceed 34 1.292. The most Potent Empires are in danger of being sapp'd by the Sea, if its Curiosity could find but the least Chink to enter at When this Worm has once found the Root of the Secret, it soon brings the tallest Tree to the ground.

EMBLEM LXIII.

[illustration]

IN all Affairs the Beginnings and Ends ought mutually to correspond; the Form should be perfect, and not easily to be chang'd. The Potter does not give his Wheel so much Liberty, nor use his hand so carelesly, as to form a different Pot from what he began. Let any undertaking be uniform and agreeable to its self.

* 1.293 When you begin with so much Pomp and Shew, Why is the End so little and so low? Be what you will, so you be still the same.

There is nothing more pernicious than this, inequality of Actions and Government, when the Beginnings don't an∣swer the Ends. He makes himself ridiculous to all, who begins his Reign with Care and Diligence, and after∣wards grows negligent and careless. It had been better al∣ways to have kept the same Pace though dull and slow, the Commendation which the beginning of his Reign merited accuses the end. Galba lost his Reputation, for that, at the begin∣ning of his Empire he promis'd to reform the Militia, and afterwards admitted Persons wholly desertless1 1.294. Many Princes seem very good, and are very bad. Many Talk and Discourse prudently, and Act without Discretion. Others promise much, and perform little; some are very valiant in Peace, and mere Cowards in War; others undertake e∣very thing and do nothing. This Disagreement is much below the Majesty of a Prince, in whom a firm Constancy should appear in all his Words and Actions. The People can never be firm in their Obedience to a Prince, who stag∣gers thus himself. Wherefore he should attentively consi∣der, before he concludes any thing, whether in the Exe∣cutions of his Counsels, the middle will be answerable to the Beginning and End; as Godfrey advises.

Let him who does at great Begin••••••g•• ••m,* 1.295 Make the Thread even; and both Ends the same.

The Web of Government, tho' never so finely wrought, cannot be good and strong unless it be even. Nor is it suf∣ficient to know, how to enter upon an Affair, but 'tis ex∣pedient too, to know how to end it. By the Head and Stern of a Ship, the Ancients represented perfect Counsel, duly weigh'd from the beginning to the end2 1.296. Whence I took the Figure of this present Emblem, representing prudent

Counsel, careful of its Beginning and End; by a Ship moored between two Anchors, one a Head, and the other a Stern, to preserve it from the violence of Tempests; only one at the Bow would be of small effect, if the Wind blow∣ing hard a Stern, should drive her upon the Rocks.

There are three things requisite in Resolutions, Pru∣dence to deliberate, Diligence to dispose, and Constancy to proceed. All the heat and toil about the beginning of Affairs would be insignificant, if (as it usually is) we are careless about the end3 1.297; 'tis at each end that Prudence ought to cast Anchor. But since Prudence only regards things present and past, not future, upon which all Affairs depend; 'tis necessary by Discourse and Reason, to conje∣cture and foresee what such and such means should produce; to make use of Deliberation and Counsel; which are as the Wise Alphonso says,

The best Foresight a Man can have in dubious Matters.

And in those there's three things to be consider'd, the Probability, Justice, and Profit of the thing propos'd; and also the Capacity and Experience of the Minister, who gives the Counsels; whether he be mov∣ed by Interest or private Ends; whether he offers himself to the Danger, what are the Difficulties of the Enterprize, and upon whom the Blame and Honour of the event will fall4 1.298. These Cautions premis'd, and the Matter stated, such means ought to be applys'd, as are conformable to the above mentioned Qualities; for nothing will be just and beneficial, which shall be attain'd by indirect or extravagant means: In this also should be consider'd, four Distinctions of time, which occur in all Affairs, but especially in Dis∣eases of States, as well as those of humane Bodies, and these are the Beginning, the Growth, or Progress, the Consistence, and Declension; by which, and a timely Application of proper means, the desir'd End is easily obtain'd; as on the

contrary, by transposing these Methods, 'tis retarded; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Course of a Ship would be, if the Rudder were chang'd to the Head; the Art consists in selecting means proper to the Ends design'd, using sometimes these, and sometimes tho•••• those being not less useful and assistant which are omitted than those which are apply'd; as in a Consort of Voices, where some cease while others Sing, and yet all equally make the Harmony. Affairs will not move of themselves, tho their good Disposition, and Justice, or common In∣terest seem to drive 'em, and if not guided by Judgment, they certainly miscarry5 1.299; few Princes would Err, if they go∣vern'd with Assiduity and Circumspection; but either they tire, or else despise these Arts, and will obstinately accom∣plish their Designs by their own methods. This is the way of stubborn Ignorance, but Prudence uses other means. What Force can't subdue, is easily obtained by Dexterity, adapted to time and circumstance. So Caecinus, when he could neither by Prayers, nor by Threats stop the Flight of the German Legions possess'd by a vain Fear, he at last threw himself in the Gate way, and by the Horror, they conceiv'd of trampling over their Generals Body, stopt them6 1.300. The same thing Pompey did in another Case; one single word spoken to Purpose has gained the Victory. Fer∣dinando Gonsalez Count of Castile, having drawn up his Ar∣my against the Moors, a certain Person putting Spurs to his Horse, rode out of his Rank towards the Enemy, and immediately the Earth open'd and swallow'd him, the whole Army was in a Consternation at it, but the Count turning to 'em:

Courage Gentlemen, says he, If the Earth can't bear us,

much less will our Enemies, and instantly joyning Battle he gain'd the Victory. That which happen'd at the Battle of Cirniola is not less remarkable; an Italian think∣ing the Spaniards were routed, set Fire to two Waggons of Powder, the great Captain Gonsalvo readily and cheerfully animated them with these words:

Courage my Friends,

these are the Bone-Fires for our Victory;

which the Event prov'd* 1.301; so much it imports a Minister to have a quick ready Wit, and address to make use of Opportunities, and by proper means to turn Misfortunes to his Advantage.

If after the Election of good Ministers, and the Appli∣cation of proper means, Events don't answer the Prince's Desire, let him not be discouraged, but rather shew his Constancy; for Resolutions should not be measur'd by Chance, but Prudence. Casualties which can't be fore∣seen, or prevented, accuse not the Action; and to blame a Man for doing his endeavour is Impudence. This usual∣ly befalls Princes, who either want Judgment or Courage; who being oppress'd by ill Success, and as it were beside them∣selves, give themselves up to Melancholy, and lose that time in vain Reflections upon what has happen'd, which should be imploy'd in remedying it, quarrelling with themselves, that they did not take another method7 1.302; and laying all the Fault upon him who was the Author of this, not considering whether 'twas grounded upon Reason or no. Whence 'tis that Ministers are afraid of declaring their Opinions, and let slip many Opportunities, without advertising the Prince thereof, for fear of exposing their Favour and Reputation to the uncertainty of Casualties. These Inconveniences a Prince ought most industriously to avoid, by persisting constant in Adversity, and excusing their Ministers, when they are not notoriously to blame, that they may more readily and couragiously assist him in overcoming them. And tho' there are palpable Errours in some Resolves and Executi∣ons, yet he ought to bear it calmly; for what is once done, as we say, can't be undone▪ we ought to reflect upon past Actions, for Instruction not Affliction; it requires as much Courage, to pass by Faults, as to encounter Dangers; there is no Empire free from 'em. He who is too timorous can∣not resolve, and oftentimes Irresolution is worse than Er∣rour it self. Business requires a quick and ready Genius; if each particular should take up his whole time, many must of necessity be neglected, to the utmost Detriment of the Parties concern'd, and of the Government in general.

EMBLEM LXIV.

[illustration]

THE Ancients in War made use of certain Cha∣riots arm'd with Scythes, which mov'd and exe∣cuted at the same time; the Wheels and Scythes being both govern'd by the same Motion; those were no sooner whirl'd about, but these did Execution, with equal Speed and Effect, and are therefore in the present Figure, the Emblem of speedy Execution; as those fiery Wheels in the Throne of God, signified the Activity of his Power, and the Quickness of his Operation1 1.303. Let Prudence (as we said before) chuse a fit time for Consultation, but let its Re∣solves, and Executions have such a mutual Correspondence, as they may both seem to move together, without any interpos'd

Delay. For Consultation and Execution should joyn hands, that they may assist each other in the Production of the desir'd Effects2 1.304. The Emperour Charles V. us'd to say, That delay was the Soul of Counsel, and speed that of Execution, and that both joyn'd together were the Quin∣tessence of a Princes Prudence. King Ferdinand the Ca∣tholick had not been so successful in his undertakings, had he not maturely weigh'd, and speedily executed his Reso∣lutions. Were a Prince indued with both these Vertues, he would never want Success, which is ever the Daughter of opportunity, which once past is not to be recall'd. One minute brings us great Advantage, or great Detriment, wherefore Demosthenes blam'd the Athenians, for spending too much time in Preparations, saying that Opportunities would not wait their Delays. If the Counsel be advanta∣geous, that time which is spent in Delay deducts from its Advantage. There is no room for Delay in Counsels which are not valuable, but in their Effects3 1.305. Counsel is an Embryo, and unless Execution which is the Soul thereof gives it Life, it dies. 'Tis the Product of the Understand∣ing, and an Act of practick Prudence, which if it exert not it self but remains in Contemplation, 'tis nothing but a vain Imagination and Fancy. Resolution, says Aristotle, should be executed with haste, but deliberated with leisure. Iames I. King of England, advised his Son to be prudent and cautious in his Deliberations, firm and constant, in his Resolutions, and prompt and resolute in his Executions; for that, for this last Nature had supplyed the Hands and Feet with so many Joynts and such ready Motion. Delay is base and mean▪ but speed great and Royal.4 1.306. This Vice of Delay is very frequent in great Kingdoms, and proceeds from their too great Confidence of their Power, as was

visible in the Emperour Otho5 1.307. As also from the un∣weildiness of the Wheels, upon which its Grandeur is car∣ry'd, and least the Prince should run the Risque of losing what he already has, he lives content within the Bounds of his own Empire. That which is really Laziness and Sloth is call'd Wisdom, as was that of the Emperour Galba6 1.308. Empires in their Infancy acquire Strength and Vigour by dispatch, whilst the Blood boyls, and the Spirits of Glory and Ambition are active. The Roman State throve by Action and Bravery, not by those Dilatory Counsels which Cowards call Cautions7 1.309. But after they are at their full growth, their very Majesty and Authority sup∣ports 'em long, though that Vigour and heat of Glory, and Ambition be extinguish'd, as the Sea keeps its Moti∣on for a considerable time after the Wind ceases. When therefore Empires are in this Vigour, I don't so much dis∣approve of these tedious Deliberations. For so they gain more time to enjoy quietly what they have gotten: too speedy Resolutions being often attended with Danger. In this Sence that of Tacitus is to be understood, that Power is better preserv'd by cautious than rash Counsels8 1.310. But when this Age decays, and the Esteem and Authori∣ty of the Empire begins to Flag, other methods ought to be us'd, Counsels should be speedy, and other means ap∣ply'd to recover its former Vigour, before decrepid old Age comes on, and renders it irrecoverable; this difference of Ages is not considerable in small States, but they should al∣ways be ready to spread their Sails to every favourable Wind, which sits sometimes this way, sometimes that. As in the Circumference of the Horizon, the Winds rule alternative∣ly upon the Earth; the Goths and other Nothern Nations, had formerly very favourable Winds, of which they made so good use, loosing all their Sails, that they penetrated even

to Hercules's Pillars, the then utmost limits of the World; but this Wind ceasing another succeeded more favourable to other Empires.

Constancy in executing Resolutions, whether they are the Prince's own, or given him by others, is always of great Importance. For want of this Paetus could not triumph over the Parthians9 1.311. All eager and fiery Spirits quickly resolve, and soon repent, they are hot at the beginning, but cold in the end of Affairs; they aim at all, but bring nothing to Perfection; they are like the Animal call'd Calipes, which mo••es with great haste, but advances not a Foot in an hour. The management of all Affairs requires Conduct and Valour, one to form and t'other to execute them; to a resolv'd and brave Spirit nothing is diffi∣cult; but he who is scrupulous, and timorous, meets with a world of Difficulty, and loses many lucky Oppor∣tunities. Great Men are long in their Deliberations, and jealous of what may happen, but once resolv'd they Act with Vigour and Confidence10 1.312, without which the Cou∣rage sails, and not applying convenient means, wholly de∣sists from the Enterprize.

There are few Affairs which cannot he accomplished by Wit, or which time, and Opportunity cannot facili∣tate; wherefore 'tis not proper wholly to confound them, but to preserve 'em entire. Chrystal once broken can't be rejoyn'd, and so Affairs; be the Tempest never so great, ••tis safer to keep some Sail abroad, than to fu••l all. Most Affairs die by being despair'd of.

'Ti•• also highly conducive, that he who is to execute Orders, should first approve them, otherwise he will not ••hink 'em necessary, or else find Difficulties in them, and so ••ot apply himself to them as he ought, not caring whether they succeed or no. That Minister is most proper to exe∣••ute who first gave the Counsel. For his Honour and Re∣••utation 〈◊〉〈◊〉 concern'd in its Success.

EMBLEM LXV.

[illustration]

A Stone cast in a Pond creates such a continual Series of Waves, that they at last become innumerable, and wholly disturb that transparent Element, and calm Looking-Glass; from which the Species of things which were before distinctly represented, appear now in Disorder and Confusion. 'Tis the same with the Mind, in which from one Errour proceeds many, so that the Judgment being confounded and blinded, and the Waves of Passion raised, the Understanding can't perceive the truth of things represented, but striving to remedy the first Errour falls into another, and thence into a third, which at length become infinite, and the further they are from the first the greater they are, like Waves that are most distant from the Stone that caus'd 'em. The Reason of this is,

That the Beginning is said to be half of the

whole,

so that a small Errour in the Beginning correspond to the other Parts1 1.313. Wherefore great Care of the first Errour should be taken, for from thence all others pro∣ceed 2 1.314. This is visible in M••smissa, who being checked by Scipio for marrying Sophonisba, thought to remedy that Fault by a far greater, in poisoning her. King Witiza by his Vices obscured the Glory of the Beginning of his Reign, and that the number of the Mistresses he kept might not seem scandalous, he allow'd all his Subjects the same Liberty; nay, and made a Law for impowering the Clergy to marry; and at last finding his Errours con∣tradictory to Religion, he deny'd the Pope's Authority, and thence incurr'd the Odium of the whole Kingdom, wherefore to prevent their rebelling he demolish'd the Fortifications of most Cities and Castles, and so laid all Spain open to the Incursions of the Moors* 1.315, and all these Faults proceeding, as you see, at last occasion'd his Death. The same Series of Crimes is visible in Duke Valentine: He endeavoured to build his own Fortune upon the Ruin of others, to which End he omitted no sort of Tyranny, one piece of Cruelty being follow'd by a greater3 1.316, which at last cost him his State and Life too, proving himself an unfortunate Scholar, and Machiavel, a pernicious Ma∣ster.

The Faults of Princes are Difficulty corrected; for that they usually affect many; or sometimes because of Obstina∣cy or Ignorance. Great Spirits which are often more in∣genuous and tractable than others, easily acknowledge their Errours, and being convinced of them, study to amend them, pulling down the ill built Edifice Stone by Stone, to rebuild it with more firm and durable Materials. The Motto of the Emperour Philip III. was,

Be not asham'd

to alter that which was ill began. He who returns by the same way he went, will find his mistake, and soon re∣cover the right Road; Repentance would be afterward in∣significant.

To own you, have at last your Errour found* 1.317, Is of small use, when once the Ship's aground.

Policy is a certain Chain, in which if one Link be bro∣ken, the whole is useless, unless soon solder'd: A Prince who knows the Danger of his Resolutions, yet still per∣sists in them, is a greater Lover of his own Opinion, than his Countrey; esteeming an empty shadow of Glory more than Truth; and while he would be thought constant, he is stubborn and perverse, 'tis the general Vice of Sovereign Power, to think it beneath 'em to retire when they have once advanced.

—He thinks it Brave† 1.318 Who grasps the Scepter in his Royal Hand Not to retreat—

Though the Emperour Charles V. was better advised, who having Sign'd a Grant, which he was afterwards in∣formed was illegal and disallowable, order'd it to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 brought him, and immediately tore it:

I had rather, say•• he, tear my writing than my Soul.

To know ones ••••∣rours, and still to persist in them is tyrannick Obstinacy; but to defend them••upon pretence of Honour, is to resolve to Sin on, and to incourage Ignorance and Folly, 'tis gilding Iron with Gold, which soon wears of, and the Iron appea•••• in its rusty Hue. An Errour corrected makes us more ca••∣tious for the future, and to commit Faults sometimes is a means to prevent greater. So small is our Capacity, that we are to be instructed by our very Faults, and are taught by them how to Act discreetly. 'Tis certain, that the be•• Laws and Examples proceed from others Crimes4 1.319. The

most prudent State committed many miscarriages, before it arriv'd to Perfection. God alone could compleat the Fa∣brick of this World without Errour, and yet even he did afterwards in a manner repent him, that he had made Man5 1.320. We are sometimes more indebted to our mis∣carriages, than to our Success; for those instruct us, but these are only the Seeds of Pride and Vanity. The Pa∣triarchs Instruct not on••y the Wise, but the Sinful6 1.321, 'tis the Shades give light to a Picture, to them we owe the Excellency of that Art.

Errour does not always proceed from Imprudence, time and other accidents are often the occasion of it. For that which was at first convenient, is afterwards prejudicial. The greatest Prudence can't give Counsel, which will be proper at all times; which makes it necessary to alter Resolutions, and repeal Laws and Statutes, especially when there is an apparent Advantage7 1.322; or Danger, or when the Prince finds himself mis-inform'd of Matters, upon which such Resolutions were grounded.

This was the Reason King Ah••suerus gave for recalling the Sentence, which he had pronounced against the People of God, upon the unjust Accusation of Haman8 1.323. In these and the like Cases, 'tis not levity of Mind, but Pru∣dence to alter Counsels and Resolutions, nor can it be call∣ed Inconstancy, but a firm Zeal to be guided by Reason in all things, as the Weather-Cock is by the Wind; and the Needle by the North Pole. The Physician varies his Me∣dicines according to the Accidents, having Respect to no∣thing, but the recovery of his Patient. The different Dis∣eases which States labour under, require different methods of Cure. Let a Prince then think it a Credit to review, and correct his Decrees, and his Errours too, without be∣ing asham'd of 'em to commit 'em might be Inadvertency; but to amend is Prudence; Obstinacy is ever a certain Sign

of Folly. Yet 'twill be Prudence to make this Alterati∣on with such Address and Dexterity, that the People may not perceive it: for they ignorant and foolish as they are, call Mistake want of Prudence, and Amendment, Levity.

But tho' I advise a Prince to correct his Errours, yet I would not be understood of all in general; for some are so small and insignificant, that the Danger of being censur'd for Levity in the amendment of them is more than the Da∣mage they can do by continuing. So that where they will by Degrees cease of themselves, without drawing on greater, 'twill be better to let 'em remain. There are some of that Nature, that 'tis better to follow 'em, nay, and vigorously to persist in them, there being perhaps more danger in retra∣cting; and these frequently happen in War; there are some Affairs, in which that you may succeed, 'tis requisite to use indirect means, tho' you incur some small Inconveniencies, as the way to straiten a crooked Stick is to bend it the contrary way; in these Cases small Errours are not to be valu'd, nor their Causes, nor Means, provided they be not wholly opposite to Honour and Justice, and when the Ad∣vantage to be reap'd from 'em is considerable: For so they are allowable, and ought rather to be call'd Disposition to Success than Errours. Others are so interwoven in great Attempts, that like Roses there is no approaching them without pricking ones hand. And this in those Counsels which concern the general Good of a Nation, which are al∣ways prejudicial to some private Persons. The Bodies of States are compos'd of different and opposite Parts, as to their Qualities and Humours, and a Remedy which is apply'd to the whole Body, is usually disagreeable to some Part: A Prince therefore has need of great Prudence, to weigh and compare Advantages with Damages, and of a great Cou∣rage to execute without hazarding the loss of those for fear of these.

EMBLEM LXVI.

[illustration]

RENOVATION perpetuates the most fading things in Nature; each individual Eternizes it self in another, and by that means preserves its Species. 'Tis for this the Husbandman carefully preserves young Plants to substitute in the room of those Trees which die. He does not leave this to Chance, because per∣haps they will either not spring at all, or not such as he desires, or else not in proper places, nor will they of them∣selves grow strait and handsome, without his Care in set∣ting them while they are young; for when once grown up no Force can straiten them. The same Care ought to be taken in the Education of Youth', especially in those Coun∣treys, where the Constitution of the Climate is apt to produce great and noble Spirits, which are like fertile Fields soon over-run with Wood and Brambles, unless

their Fertility be corrected by the Art and Industry of the Husbandman. The greater the Spirit is, the more dan∣gerous it is to the State, unless timely moderated by Edu∣cation. A high aspiring Spirit cannot contain it self; it shakes off the Curb of the Laws, and is eager for Liberty, and should therefore be restrain'd by Art and Instru∣ction, and afterwards by being busied in some honourable Exercise, but when a little more advanc'd in years, the Cure for its Levity is, to employ it in Affairs of State; I take this to be the Reason, why some States admitted young Persons into their Senates. But the best way is, that which Gardiners use, to transplant their young Trees in∣to another Ground, that the superfluous Roots may be prun'd, and the Tree grow strait and tall. Youth seldom thrives well in its own Countrey. For their Friends and Relations by too much Indulgence make them Extrava∣gant. In other Countries 'tis otherwise, for their Neces∣sity obliges them to regulate their Actions, and to endea∣vour to gain People's Esteem. At home we generally ex∣pect a little more Liberty, and are apt to promise our selves Pardon; but abroad when we are not known, we are afraid of the Rigour of the Laws, besides Travel po∣lishes our Behaviour, and corrects the Roughness of our Nature, and that foolish Vanity, which attends our home∣bred Gentlemen. There Languages, and Men are learn't, and their Manners and Customs observed, the Knowledge of which qualifies a Man for Affairs, as well of Peace as War. 'Twas Travel made Plato, Lycurgus, Solon, and Py∣thagoras, such prudent Lawgivers and Philosophers. At home Men are born and die with the same Fortune, but abroad they raise it. No Planet is exalted in its own House, but in anothers, though not without Detriment and Inconveniency to it self.

Travel is the great Mistress of Prudence, if made for Information, as well as Direction. In this the Northern People are very much to be commended, who with great Curiosity and Attention travel the World over to learn Languages, Arts and Sciences. The Spaniards who have greater Conveniency for travelling than any other Nation,

because of the great Extent of their Kingdom, have the least inclination to it, lazily spending all their time at home, unless sometimes they are call'd out by War; when ne∣vertheless 'tis absolutely necessary for Princes, who have often occasion to bring their Armies into several Coun∣tries, to have a perfect Knowledge of them. The two chief Reasons which detain our Spanish Nobility at home, are first, because Spain being almost wholly surrounded by the Sea, 'tis more inconvenient Sailing, than Travelling by Land; the other is a vain Conceit, that they can't ap∣pear abroad without great Pomp, and expensive Equipage, in which Strangers, though Persons of the best Quality are more modest.

Nor is it sufficient only to transplant Youth, but Nur∣series should be also rais'd, of which vacant Offices may be supply'd, to avoid the necessity of employing fresh Per∣sons, who must buy their Experience at the hazard of the State. This is represented in the present Device by a bundle of Rods, the Emblem of Magistracy; for these being planted produce more of the same; and because in each of the three Forms, that's to say Monarchy, Aristo∣cracy, and Democracy, the methods of Government are different, so should also the methods of Education of Youth, according to the different Institutions and Customs of each State; and according to those things, in which they have most occasion for able Men. The Persians, Aegyptians, Chaldaeans, and Romans were particularly careful about this; but principally about the Education of Youth for the Magistracy, the Welfare or Ruine of States, depending upon the Capacity, or insufficiency of the Magistrates, who are as it were their Soul, and according to the Affe∣ctions of it the whole Body is govern'd. There were seve∣ral Colleges erected in Spain for this Purpose, which were so many Seminaries of able Men for the Admini∣stration of the Government; these though their Institutions might seem vain and frivolous, yet were they of great Use upon this account, that they first taught those to obey, who were afterwards to command.

I have elsewhere said, that the Knowledge of Sciences was a necessary Qualification for a Prince, and will now examine whether it be proper for Subjects, or whether the young Commonalty should be instructed therein. Nature has plac'd in the Head, as having the Command over the whole Body, the Understanding to apprehend Sciences, and the Memory to retain them. But to the Hands and other parts she has given only a Disposition to Obedience. Men at first enter'd into Society, for the mutual Assistance of each other, not for Contemplation; more for the conveniency of Action, than the Subtilty of nice Speculation: The Happiness of Governments pro∣ceeds not from the Vivacity of the Wit, but the Activity of the Hands. The leisure of Studies is imploy'd in Vi∣ces, and Eternizes all those upon Paper, which the wicked∣ness of the Times shall invent; plotting against the Go∣vernment, and raising Seditions among the People. The Spartans thought it sufficient to learn Obedience, Patience, and Conquest1 1.324. Too subtil and learn'd Subjects are al∣ways fond of Novelty, continually reflecting upon the Go∣vernment, and disputing the Princes Orders, and raising Commotions among the People; Obedience should be prompt not ingenious, sincere not cunning2 1.325. Ignorance is the principal Foundation of the Turkish Empire. And the readiest way to Ruin it is to sow Literature among the People. The Happiness and Tranquility of the Swisse pro∣ceeds from the same Cause, for frivolous Sophistry is for∣bid among them, yet are they govern'd with as much Policy and Prudence, as any Nation whatever. Study enervates the Body, and deba••es the Mind, giving it too quick an apprehension of Danger. Most Men are charm'd by the Pleasure, Honour, or Profit of Learning, so that few would apply themselves to Arms, or Military Exer∣cise for the defence of the State, whose Interest is in ha∣ving its People Valiant, rather rather than Learned. The

Genteel Politeness of Learning, makes the Mind wholly averse to all laborious Exercises. Study makes Men me∣lancholy, and Lovers of a retired and single Life; which is wholly opposite to the Design of Government, which is to multiply, and raise Men fit and capable of publick Imployments, and such as are able to Act offensively, or defensively with an Enemy. The Neatherlands shew us, that it is not Learning and Ingenuity, but Arts, Industry and Trade, that makes a Nation flourish. The Germans and other Nations consider'd these Inconveniencies, and therefore founded their Nobility upon Arms, not regarding the Honour and Reputation of Learning; whence almost all the Nobility apply'd themselves to War, and Arts Military. Though Literature conduces much to the Knowledge of the true Religion, yet 'tis evident, that from thence arise different Opinions, which create as many Sects, whence proceed the Confusion and Ruin of Empires, so that the true Religion being now found, a sincere and cre∣dulous Ignorance would be much safer, than a presum∣ptuous and conceited Knowledge, which is expos'd to so many Errours. These and some other Reasons which might be alledg'd, seem to advise an utter Extirpation of Learning, according to the Rules of Policy, which regard more the Authority of the Prince, than the advantage of the Subject; but these are Maxims of a Tyrant, not a good and just Prince, who should have no other Object than the Honour and Welfare of his People; to whom Learning is absolutely necessary to confute the Errours of Sectaries, which always flourish where Ignorance Reigns, and also to administer Justice, and to preserve and improve Arts Military, as well as Civil. For Scholars are as useful in defending Cities as Souldiers; as Syracuse formerly found in the Person of Archimedes: And Dole in its learn'd Senate, by whose prudent Counsel, ingenious Machines, and vigorous and resolute Defence, it resisted the whole Power of France; changing their Libraries into Magazines, their Gowns into Coats of Mail, and their Pens into Swords, which dip'd in French Blood, recorded their Names and Actions to Eternity. 'Tis only too great a

number of Universities and Students, which is prejudicial to the Publick, as Spain found, whence 'tis highly neces∣sary, that the greatest number should apply themselves to Arts of Navigation and War, not to Law or Speculative Sciences: For which Reason there should be greater In∣couragement given to those than the other, that Men may be the more inclined to follow them; for want of such In∣couragement in Spain, there are so many apply themselves to Learning, that there wants Souldiers to defend the Kingdom. This ought to be remedied by the Care and Prudence of the Prince, who should so judiciously dispose the Education of Youth, that the number of Scholars, Souldiers and Tradesmen might be proportioned to his State.

The same Proportion should be observ'd in those who would lead a religious Monastick Life, of whom too great a number is very prejudicial, both to the Prince and State. Though Religion and Piety ought not to be mea∣sur'd by the Rule of Policy, and in the Church Militant, Spiritual Arms are of more use than Temporal, he who was the first Founder of that State, will maintain and preserve it without Detriment to the Publick; nevertheless since human Prudence ought to believe, not expect Miracles, I leave it to him whose Duty 'tis, to consider, whether if the number of Ecclesiasticks, and religious Orders should ex∣ceed the Laity which should support 'em, it would not be of great Detriment even to the Church it self The Council of Lateran in the time of Innocent III. provid∣ed a Remedy for this Inconveniency, by prohibiting the Introduction of new Religions3 1.326. The Royal Counsel of Castile, also perswaded his Majesty to request of the Pope, that there might be none admitted into any Con∣vent under the Age of sixteen years, and not be ordain'd under twenty; but pretended Piety and nice Scruples of Conscience, easily pass over these Inconveniencies.

But this Proportion in those who are design'd for Busi∣ness or Speculation, will be of small use, unless the Prince also take Care of the Nurseries of the Commonalty, which should produce a sufficient number of well qualified Citi∣zens to succeed in the room of those whom Death daily takes off. The Ancients were always very careful of Pro∣pagation, that each Individual might be succeeded by ano∣ther. Of the necessity of this, the Romans in particular were so well satisfied, that they not only proposed Re∣wards for Procreation, but also looked upon a single Life as infamous. Germanicus the better to oblige the People to revenge his Death among the rest of the Services, he had done the Government, he urg'd, that he had six Children by his Wise4 1.327. Tiberius also told it, as a good Omen to the Senate that Drusus's Wife, was brought to Bed of Twins5 1.328. The Strength of Kingdoms consists in the number of Sub∣jects; and he is the greatest Prince whose State is most populous, not he whose Territories are largest: For they of themselves can neither defend nor offend; but by means of their Inhabitants••, on whom all their Glory depends. The Emperour Adrian us'd to say, That he had rather his Empire should ab••und with Men than Riches; and with a great deal of Reason, for Riches without Subjects do only invite Wars, without being able to defend themselves, as on the contrary, Subjects without Riches, want neither Power to acquire, or maintain them6 1.329, in the multitude of People is the King's Honour: but in the want of Peo∣ple, is the Destruction of the Prince7 1.330. The Wise Al∣phonso would have a Prince take particular care to People his State, and that not only with Commonalty, but also with Nobility; in which he judg'd with great Prudence, for one without the other is like a Body without a Soul, the Commonalty being insignificant without the Nobility,

which are their Life, and by whose Example they learn to covet Glory, and despise Danger. It ought therefore to be a Prince's chief Care, to preserve and maintain them. As Augustus did, who not only caus'd Hortalus to marry, but also allowed wherewithall to his Quality, that that No∣ble Family might not be extinct8 1.331. The Germans are very circumspect in this Point, for which Reason they an∣ciently gave no Portion with their Women9 1.332, and even now give very small ones, that their Vertue and Nobility might be their only Dowry, and that their Lovers might respect the Endowments of their Minds and Bodies, more than their Fortunes, that Marriages might be sooner con∣cluded, without losing so much time in Fortune-Hunt∣ing; for which Reason Lycurgus wholly prohibited the gi∣ving Dowries to Women; and the Emperour Charles V. regulated them; 'tis said also, that Aristotle reprehended the La••edaemonians, for giving such large Fortunes to their Daughters10 1.333. King Alphonso also advises, that a Prince unless upon extraordinary occasions should not People his State with Foreigners, and truly with a great deal of Rea∣son, for different Manners and Religions are the worst Do∣mestick Enemies. This made the Spaniards drive the Iews and Moors out of Spain. Foreigners introduce with them their Vices, and Errours, and are ready upon every occasion to rise against the Natives11 1.334. But this Incon∣veniency would not be much to be fear'd, if only Labou∣rers and Husbandmen were admitted, nay, this is some∣times of great Advantage. So the Grand Signior Selim sent a vast number of Labourers from Cairo to Constantino∣ple. The Poles having Elected Henry Duke of Anjou King, among other Articles 'twas agreed, That he should bring with him several Families of Artificers. Nebuchad∣nezzar upon the taking of Ierusalem, carried away all the

Men of might even seven thousand, and Crafts Men, and Smiths a thousand, and all that were strong, and kept for War, even them the King of Babylon brought

Captive to Babylon12 1.335. But because this method may be too troublesome and chargeable, and also because such a Supply may be insufficient, I will here set down the usual Causes of want of People in Nations. And these are ei∣ther internal or external; External are Wars and Planta∣tions; War is a sort of Monster which feeds on humane Blood; and since 'tis the Interest of each State to maintain it abroad as the Romans did, it must necessarily be done at the Expence of the Lives and Estates of the Subjects13 1.336. Neither can Plantations be long ma••ntain'd, without great Suppl••es of Men, as we have found in Spain; for which Reason the Romans during the War with Hannibal, and for some years after, took little Care of planting new Co∣lonies 14 1.337; they having more reason to recruit than weaken their Forces. Velleius Paterculus esteem'd the plan∣ting Colonies out of Italy as very pernicious, because be∣ing so far distant from the Heart of the Empire, they could ••ot assist it upon occasion15 1.338. The other Causes are In∣ternal. The principal of which are Taxes, want of Hus∣bandry and Trade, and too great a number of Holy Days, the Inconveniencies, and Remedies of which I have set down elsewhere.

The Court is also a great Cause of the want of People, for as a hot Liver draws all the natural Heat to it self, leaving other parts of the Body spiritless and faint, so the Pomp, Ease, Delight, Profit, and hopes of Reward at Court, allure the Minds of most, especially of the Artifi∣cers and Tradesmen, who think it a more pleasant and easie

Life to serve some Person of Quality; than to toil at their own Trade; the Nobility also, invited by the Prince's Pre∣sence, or the Charms of the Court, leave their Estates in the Countrey for a Court Life; whence not being able to look after them, but spending their Revenu••s upon extra∣vagant and unnecessary Expences, their Estates become poo•• and uninhabited, whereas they would have been rich and populous, had their Lord resided there. The Emperor Iusti••••n prudently reflected upon these Inconveniencies, and appointed an Officer on purpose to prevent them16 1.339. King Iohn II. also order'd, that all the Nobility at his Court should at certain times, visit their own Estates, as also the Emperor Trojan did before him.

Birth-right also, especially in Spain is very prejudicial to Propagation; for the eldest Brother Claims the whole Estate (which King Theodorick thought very unjust)17 1.340, so that the youngest not having wherewithal to maintain a Family, instead of marrying, either shut themselves into Convents, or turn Soldiers. For this Reason Plato call'd Riches and Poverty, the ancient Plagues of Commonwealths, knowing that almost all their misfortunes proceeded from an une∣qual Distribution of Riches. If the Citizens had all an equal Dividend, State would undoubtedly flourish more. But though the advantage redounding from hence wou••d be great, the Preservation of the Nobility by means of Fie•••• would not be less, for by that means they would be in a Capacity to serve the Prince and State; so that those may be allowed to the ancient Nobility, not to the modern, by making a Law, that all Relations to the fourth Degree, should be joynt Heirs, if not of the whole, yet of the greatest part of the Estate18 1.341; thus the Inconveniencies of Lega∣cies

and Gifts would be prevented, which are more the Effects of Vanity, than a design to serve the Publick, as al∣so of that religious Prodigality, which observing neither Bounds, nor Proximity of Blood, gives all to the Church, not leaving so much as Subsistence to Brethren, or any other Relations, whence Families become Extinct, the Royal Revenues are exhausted, the People impoverish'd, and un∣able to pay Taxes, the Power of those who are exempted is increased, and the Authority of the Prince diminished. This Moses considering19 1.342 forbid by Edict, any one from offering any more towards the Work of the Sanctuary20 1.343, though God himself was the Author of those Offerings, and th••y were offer'd through pure Devotion▪21 1.344; the Republick of ••e••ice have made very prudent Provisions a∣gainst this.

'Tis necessary also, that a fit time should be observed in Marriages: for if too late the Succession is endanger'd, and the Government would be too much expos'd to the Incontinency of Youth: And if soon the Children being almost of the same Age with their Fathers, would soon for∣get their Duty, and grudge 'em the time they live.

EMBLEM LXVII.

[illustration]

THE Policy of our Times presupposes Malice and Fraud in all things, and therefore arms it self with greater, without any regard to Religion, Justice or Honour. It thinks nothing disallowable that is advan∣tageous; but as these Practices are now common, they must need justle and confound one another, to the Detri∣ment of the publick Tranquility, and without obtaining their propos'd Ends. But let a Prince cautiously avoid such Doctrine, and learn rather of Nature the Mistress of true Policy, without Malice, Fraud, or any ill Practice, there being none so certain, firm and solid, as that which she

observes in the Government, of Vegetables and Ani∣mals, more especially that which she dictates to every Man by his Reason. Particularly to Shepherds and Husbandmen, for the Preservation of their Flocks, and improvement of their Ground: Hence may be 'tis, that those Kings who have been chosen from the Crook or the Plow, have made the best Governours. Though the Shepherd (whose Office is almost the same of a Prince's)1 1.345 enjoys the Benefit of the Wool and the Milk of his Flock, yet 'tis with such moderation, that he neither draws Blood from their Duggs, nor shears their Skin so close as to leave 'em wholly expos'd to the In∣conveniences of cold and heat. So a Prince, says King Alphonso)

ought more to value the common Good of his People, than his own particular Interest, for the com∣mon Good and Riches of his Subjects, are as it were his own

* 1.346. The Husbandman cuts not down the Bo∣dy of the Tree, for his Domestick occasions, but only Lops the Branches, and not all of them neither, but leaves enough to sprout out and serve his Occasi∣ons the next Year; but the Farmer is not so careful, who is for making the best of his Farm while his Lease continues, not caring how much he impoverishes his Ground for his Landlord2 1.347. This is the diffe∣rence between a lawful Prince and a Tyrant, in respect of Taxes and Impositions. This having an unjust Ti∣tle, and fearing soon to be dethron'd, makes the best use of his time, stocking up all by the Roots, fleaing in∣stead of shearing his Flock, instead of feeding them he gluts himself,3 1.348 and instead of defending them, leaves them a naked Prey to every Wolf4 1.349. But a just and lawful Prince in imposing Taxes, considers the Justice of the Cause, the Quantity, Quality, and Occa∣sion, and also Proportions them to his Subjects Estates and Persons, treating his Kingdom not as a Body which

is to die with him, but to remain to his Posterity; knowing that though Princes are Mortal, States are Eternal,5 1.350 and since he expects a new Crop from his Kingdom every Year, he preserves it carefully, as his best Treasury, which he may make use of upon ur∣gent Occasions: for as King Alphonso said in one of his Laws, borrowing his Thought from a Precept of Ari∣stotle to Alexander the Great:

The best and most last∣ing Treasure of a King, is his People, when they are well defended; according to a saying of the Em∣peror Iustinian, that the Kingdom was always rich, and the Exchequer full when the Subjects were weal∣thy, and the Land plentiful* 1.351.

When therefore a Prince raises Taxes with this Mo∣deration, the Subjects ought chearfully to pay them, nor can they without a sort of Rebellion refuse them; for Sovereignty has no other Portion, nor publick ne∣cessity any other Assistance; there is no Peace without Soldiers, no Soldier without Pay, no Pay without Taxes6 1.352. For this Reason when Nero would have remitted the Taxes, the Roman Senate oppos'd him, say∣ing, that without them the Empire would be ruin'd7 1.353. Taxes are the Prince of Peace: but if they are too heavy, and the People not well satisfied of their necessity, they soon rebel against their Prince. 'Twas for no other Reason that King Alphonso Sirnamed the Great, grew so odious to the People, that after many Troubles and Vexations he was oblig'd to quit his Crown; for the same also Garcios King of Galicia lost both his King∣dom and Life too† 1.354. K. Henry III. consider'd this Dan∣ger, when being advised by some, to raise new Taxes to defray the Expence of War, he answer'd,

I fear

the Discontent of my People more than my Enemies.

Money collected from unjust Taxes, is mingled with the Subjects Blood, as was seen to drop from that piece which St. Francis of Padua broke in the Presence of Ferdinand King of Naples, and this ever crys for Ven∣geance against the Prince.

Great Taxes therefore ought not to be rais'd till the People be well convinced of the Necessity o•• them; for when they are satisfied of that, and of the Justice of the Cause, they patiently bear the heaviest Impositions, as we see in those which were rais'd by K. Ferdinand IVth, and in the Grant which the Parliament, of Toledo made of a Million, in the times of Henry III. permitting him also to raise more of his own accord, to carry on the Wars against the Moors. For though 'tis not for private Persons to examine into the Justice of Taxes, though they cannot often apprehend the Causes of Ex∣pences, nor can they be communicated to them with∣out evident Danger8 1.355, yet are there some general Reasons which they may without Damage be inform'd of, and though Natural and Divine Reason do allow the Power of levying Impositions to the Prince, without the Subjects Consent, when they are just and necessa∣ry (as King Alphonso us'd to say) yet will a prudent Prince so manage the matter, and dispose the Minds of his Subjects, that it may seem to be done with their Ap∣probation; Taxes are (according to the Scripture) the Bridle of the People9 1.356; they keep them in Obedience, and uphold the Prince's Authority. Those who are free from all Taxes are ungovernable; yet this Bridle should be so easie, as not to gall them too much; as King Flavius Herwegi••s prudently consider'd in the Thirteenth Council of Toledo, saying, That that Government was best which neither oppress'd the People with too

great Taxes, nor made them remiss and negligent by too little* 1.357.

The Command which Princes have over the Lives of their Subjects, is executed without Danger, it be∣ing done by Law, which punishes some as Examples to the rest; but not so that Command which they have over their Goods and Estates, for that comprehend•• all in general, and People are more sensible in what concerns their Estates than their Bodies; especially when they are got by Sweat and Blood, and are to be imployed to supply the Prince's Luxury. In which that remarkable Action of K. David ought to be consider'd, when he refus'd to drink the water which his three Soldiers brought him from amidst the Enemies Camp, least he should seem to drink the Blood of those Men10 1.358. 'Tis no good Policy to impoverish the People by Taxes the better to keep them in Obedience, for though Po∣verty, whether Original or Accidental, debases our Spi∣rits, which always rise and fall with our Condition; yet does Oppression provoke our Minds, and urge us to Rebellion11 1.359. All the Israelites that were in Di∣stress, and every one that was in Debt, and every one that was discontented joyn'd David against Saul12 1.360. The People are always most obedient when they are richest. The plenty of Egypt made the People of God, though very severely us'd, forget their Liberty; but afterwards when they came to want in the Wilderness, they complain'd heavily of their Slavery and Bondage.

When a Kingdom is given upon Condition, that no Taxes shall be levy'd without its Consent, or if this be afterwards provided by some general Decree, as was in the Parliament of Madrid, in the time of King Alphonso XIth. or when it has acquired this Privilege

by long Prescription, as in Spain, and France; in such Cases the Prince must wait the Consent of the Parlia∣ment, least he should expose himself to the same Dan∣ger, as Charles VIIth. of France did formerly, when he went to raise a certain Tax without communica∣ting it to his Council. 'Tis also of great advantage to a Prince to be so well es••eem'd of his People, that from their Opinion of his Zeal for their Good, they may think whatever Taxes he imposes upon them are just and reasonable, and blindly agree to whatever he proposes, committing themselves wholly to his Pru∣dence and Management, as the Egyptians did to Io∣seph's, when he exacted the fifth part of their Estates 13 1.361. When the People have once this Confidence in the Prince, he ought diligently to take Care, not to burthen them without sufficient Cause, and mature Deliberation. But if necessity does require it, let him at least take Care that the Taxes be well expend∣ed; for the People take nothing more hainously, than to see no advantage from their Oppressions, and to see their Estates squander'd away to no purpose. They are also very uneasie to see Taxes continued, when the Occasion for which they were rais'd is over. As 'twas in Vespasian's time, when the Taxes rais'd for the ne∣cessity of War were continued in time of Peace14 1.362. For afterwards Subjects dread them, and grudge to pay them though never so small, thinking that they will be perpetual. Queen Mary gain'd the Hearts of her Subjects, and preserv'd their Loyalty in the most difficult times, by remitting the Excise which her Husband King Sancho IVth. had laid upon Provi∣sions.

'Tis difficult to perswade People to part with their Money to maintain a foreign War, nor can they easily

apprehend how much it conduces to their Interest, to keep War from their own Doors, and maintain it in foreign States, and how much safer is the Defence of a Shield than that of a Helmet, that being farther di∣stant from the Head. The Purblind Mobb can sel∣dom see so far. They weigh rather the present Bur∣then, than the future Benefit, not thinking all the Ri∣ches of the Kingdom will be afterwards too little to make good the Damage they have suffer'd by their obstinate Negligence15 1.363. It requires therefore, all the Pru∣dence and Dexterity of a Prince to make them know their Interest.

In raising Taxes, Care ought always to be taken not to oppress the Nobility: for Exemption from Taxes being the chief Distinction between them and the Commons, they can't brook to see themselves de∣graded, and their Privileges violated, which were ac∣quir'd by the Valour and Vertue of their Ancestors. This was the Reason why the Nobility of Castile took up Arms against Henry III. who tax'd 'em at fi••e Marvedees of Gold apiece, towards the Charge of the War.

Neither should Taxes be laid upon such things as are absolutely necessary for Life; but rather upon Toys, Curiosities, Pride and Vanity: for so besides correcting Luxury, they would fall in the greatest measure upon the Rich, and would be Encouragement to Husbandmen and Tradesmen, which part of the Government ought most to be cherished and support∣ed; so the Romans laid great Taxes upon the Spices, Pearls and Jewels, which were imported from Arabia; as Alexander Severus did upon those Offices which tended more to Debauchery, than Use and Necessity,

'tis the readiest way to Reformation, to inhance the Price of Vanity. There are no Taxes paid more easily than those which are laid upon Commodities im∣ported; for the greatest part of them is paid by Fo∣reigners; wherefore in England the Royal Revenue is very prudently raised from these kind of Taxes, the Kingdom it self being Exempt.

The greatest Inconveniency in raising Taxes and Ex∣cise is, in the Collectors and Receivers, who are often more burthensome than the Taxes themselves; for there is nothing that the Subjects take more grievously, than the violence and importunity of these sort of Men in collecting their Money. 'Tis an Observation that only Sicily endur'd them with Patience: God himself complains of them by the Prophet Isaiah, that they oppress'd his People16 1.364. In Egypt some Prophet was always President of the Customs, for they thought it not safe to trust 'em to any but God's immediate Servant; but now they are committed to Pedlars and Broakers, who wreck a Ship in Port, which had escap∣ed the Fury of the Wind and Sea17 1.365, like Robbers plundering Travellers of their Goods and Money. What wonder therefore that Trade decays, and that Riches and Merchandice are not imported, if they are expos'd to such as these, who plunder 'em by Authority, what Wonder, I say, That the People complain of Taxes, if for one Shilling that comes to the King, ten goes to the Collectors and Receivers for this Reason, when in the Parliament of Guadal••jara, the Kingdom of Castile offer'd to raise 150000 Ducats, it was upon Condition, that they themselves should keep Books of the Receipts and Disbursements of it, that they might know what was imployed to the publick Interest, and

how it was expended, without trusting it to the Manage∣ment of those who had the Government of the King∣dom during the Kings Minority. For the same Reason, the People of France propos'd to King Henry II. that if he would discharge his Collectors, they would them∣selves pay in their Assessments, where-ever he should Order; which the King had agreed to, had not some of his Ministers disswaded him. The Kingdoms of Castile have often offer'd the same thing, nay, and also to pay off the Crown Debts; but 'twas judg'd that it would be a Diminution to the Royal Authority, to be instructed and tutor'd by the Kingdom, and besides, that such a Power could not be without Danger. But I believe the true Reason was, that the Court was un∣willing to lose so many beneficial Offices, and such rea∣dy means of getting Money. A Prince's Credit con∣sists not in the Administration, but in the Possession of Riches. The Roman State was not less careful of their Authority than any other, yet by Reason of the Trou∣ble and Charge of Collecting, it order'd each Province to Collect and pay in their own Taxes; taking Care to keep the Officers in their Duty, that they might not oppress the People through Avarice and Extortion; in this Tiberius took particular Care18 1.366. Modesty in the Collecting of one Tax, obliges the People more readily to grant others.

EMBLEM LXVIII.

[illustration]

THE Ingenious Greeks included in certain pretty Fables, as the Aegyptians in Hieroglyphicks, not only all Natural Philosophy, but also Moral and Politick; either to hide them from the Vulgar, or else that they might be the better imprinted in their Minds, by these pleasant and delightful Fictions. So, to represent the Power of Navigation, and the Riches thereby acquir'd, they feign'd, that the Ship Argo (which was the first that durst venture upon the main Ocean) obtained the famous Fleece, which instead of Wool, yielded Gold; for which glorious Exploit it was consecrated to Pallas, the Goddess of War, and placed amongst the Constella∣tions, as a Reward of such dangerous Voyages: shewing

the World, that by the Help of Oars and Sails, they might make Way through Mountains of Waves; and by the Assistance of the Wind, carry Arms and Mer∣chandise all the World over. This Morality, and the Preferment of that Ship to the Skies, occasion'd me to draw two in this present Emblem; as the Poles of the Globe Terrestrial, to shew that Navigation is the Sup∣port of the World, by Commerce and Arms: These Poles are Movable, but in their Motion consists the Stability of Empires: There's scarce any Monarchy which has not receiv'd its Rise and Preservation from thence. If the Grandeur of Spain were not supported by both those Poles, the Mediterranean and Ocean, it would soon fall: For 'tis evident, that Provinces so distant from one another, would be in imminent Danger, were it not, as 'twere, united by Oars and Sails, and timely supplied with Recruits for its Support and De∣fence: So that Ships and Gallies seem to be nothing but a kind of Sea-Bridge. For this Reason, the Emperor Charles V. and Ferdinand Duke d' Alva, advis'd King Philip II. to maintain a great Fleet at Sea. King Sisebutus well knew the Advantage of it, being the first that kept a Fleet upon the Spanish Seas. Themistocles gave the same Adice to his State; and the Romans made use of it afterwards to conquer the World. This Element begirts and conquers the Earth: In it Strength and Speed are united; and whoever can make use of them with Valour, has the World at command. Arms at Land attack and terrifie only one Nation, but at Sea they Alarm the whole World. There is no Circumspection, or Power sufficient by Land, to defend the Sea Coasts. 'Tis the Sea which has civiliz'd all Nations, which had been rude and barbarous, without the Use of Navigation and Commerce, which has taught 'em to know one another's Languages and Customs: This Antiquity meant, when they feign'd that the Rudder of the Ship Argo spoke; intimating, that by the Help of that, foreign Languages were learn'd. 'Tis Navigation that supplies each Nation with the Goods and Riches of others, all Nations mu∣tually

furnishing each other with what they want; which Advantage promotes that mutual Love and Correspon∣dence between Men, which is necessary for their reci∣procal Assistance.

This Marine Power is more necessary for some King∣doms than others, according to their several Situation and Disposition. The Asiatick Monarchies have more Occasion for a Land than Sea Force. Venice and Genoa, of which one lies upon the Sea, the other near it, being utterly unapt for Husbandry and Agriculture, apply themselves wholly to Navigation: And as long as they maintain'd their Power at Sea, they were the Terrour and Glory of the World. So Spain, which is in a man∣ner surrounded with the Ocean, must establish its Power at Sea, if it would aspire to Universal Monarchy. The Situation of its Ports is very commodious, not only for the Support of such Force, but also for hindring the Navigation of other Nations, who, by our Trade, get Riches and Strength to make War upon us afterwards. For which Reason, 'twill be convenient to provide suffi∣cient Security for Commerce and Traffick, they being the principal Causes; 'tis they turn all the Ports into Magazines and Stores, furnishing the Kingdom with all things necessary, making it flourish, and grow Populous. These and other Conveniences the Prophet Ezekiel inti∣mated, in the Allegory of the Ships which belong'd to Sidon (a City situate at the Entry of the1 1.367 Sea,) which was full of Merchants and Mariners2 1.368. They of Persia, and of Lud, and of Phut, were in its Armies, Men of War: they hang'd the Shield and Helmet in it, they set forth its comeliness3 1.369. Tarshish was its Merchant, by reason of the multitude of all kind of Riches; with Silver, Iron, Tin, and Lead, they traded in its Fairs4 1.370. In a word, There was nothing in any Nation, which was not sold in its Fairs; so that it might be truly called glorious in the midst of the Seas5 1.371. We find also its Prince exalted, and

lifted up by its Traffick6 1.372. The Republicks of Si•••• Nineveh, Babylon, Rome, and Carthage, flourish'd bo•••• in War and Peace, as long as they maintain'd the•••• Trade and Commerce. When Venice and Genoa fail'd •• Traffick and Navigation, their Grandeur and Glory soon faded. Holland, situate upon a barren Sand, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 capable of being manur'd by either Spade or Plow supports very numerous Armies by their Trade an•• Commerce; and maintains such populous Cities, as the most fertile Plains would not be able to supply. Fr•••••• has neither Mines of Silver nor Gold, yet does it enri•••• it self by its Trade in several kind of Toys and Guga•• in Iron, Lead and Tin: Whereas we, through Lazi∣ness, neglect these Riches, which the Conveniency 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Sea offers us. We, with great Toil and Danger bring Home the Treasures of both the Indies, as Diamond•• Pearls, Spice, &c. without proceeding any further; where••as other Nations reap the Benefit of this our Labour, b•• transporting them into all the Countries of Europe, Asia and Africa. We support the Genouese with Gold 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Silver to trade with, and afterwards pay 'em extravaga•• Prices for their Commodities, so paying Interest for o•• own Money. We furnish other Nations with Silk•• Wool, Steel, Iron, and many other Commodities which, after they are wrought, are brought to us again and we buy them at a prodigious Rate, by reason of th•• Carriage and Workmanship: So that we pay very de•• for the Ingenuity and Industry of other Nations. Th•••• bring us trifling, insignificant Ware, and carry hen•••• our substantial Gold and Silver. Whence it is, (•• King Henry II. said) That Foreigners, nay, sometimes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 very Enemies, grow Rich and Powerful, while our own 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are Impoverish'd and Beggar'd. This the Emperor Tiber•••• formerly complain'd of, when he saw the Extravagan•• of the Roman Ladies in Pearls and Jewels7 1.373. Yo•• R. H. would gain Immortal Honour, in Encouragi••

and Promoting Trade and Navigation, both in the Citizens and Nobility; for the Products of the Earth are not more Natural than those of Traffick and Com∣merce. The Kings of Tyre did not disdain to Trade; and the Fleets which Solomon sent to Tarshish, carry'd not only Necessaries, but also Merchandize and Effects to Trade with, that he might exceed all the Kings of the Earth for Wisdom and Riches8 1.374. We read, that Pompey put out his Money to Use. The Nobility also of Rome and Carthage thought it not beneath 'em to Traffick. Rome Instituted a College of Merchants; whence, I believe, the Dutch took the Institution of their Companies. How much more commodiously might Spain Establish them, by securing them with Men of War; which would make it not only Rich, but For∣midable. These Conveniencies the Kings of Portugal considering, setled their Commerce in the East, by Force of Arms; maintaining their Arms by their Trade; and by the help of both, founded a new and large Em∣pire9 1.375; Establishing Religion, before unknown to those remote Countries: As it was also to the Western Part of the World, till introduc'd by the Valour and Prowess of the Castilians, who instructed that Heathen Country in what before they never so much as heard of10 1.376; so that receiving from them the True Reli∣gion of the Gospel, and the Mysterious Bread of the Encharist, brought them so far11 1.377, that they cried out for Joy, with the Prophet Isaiah, Who hath begotten me these; seeing I have lost my Children, and am desolate, a Captive, and removing to and fro? and who hath brought 〈◊〉〈◊〉 these? Behold, I was left alone, these, where had they ••een12 1.378?

'T would be also conducive, that if, as the Romans formerly establish'd Garrisons at Constantinople, Rhodes, ••pon the Rhine, and at Cadiz, as in the four principal Angles of the Empire; so now the Spaniards should

erect Military Orders in several Places in the Mediter∣ranean and Ocean, who might Cruise about the Seas, and clear them of Pyrates, and secure our Trade with other Nations. These Badges of Honour and Nobility, are sufficient Rewards for Vertue and Valour; and the Pre∣sidency of these Orders are rich enough to give a Begin∣ning to so Glorious and Royal an Undertaking. But if their Revenues should not suffice, nor the Crown be willing to be depriv'd of so many Noble Posts, the Ad∣ministration of which is invested in it by the Apostolick See, some Ecclesiastical Rents might be apply'd to that use. This was the Advice of King Ferdinand the Ca∣tholick, who would have Constituted the Knights of St. Iames at Oran; and the Orders of Alcantara, and Calatrava, at Bugia and Tripoli; having obtained leave of the Pope, to convert the Revenues of the Conven•••• del Villar de Venas, St. Martin, in the Diocese of Saint Iames, and that of Oviedo, to that use. But by reason of the War, which soon after broke out in Italy, this Design was not accomplish'd, or perhaps because God reserv'd the Glory of this Institution for some other King. Nor is the State-Objection, against Intrusting such Potent Offices to the Nobility, of force. Military Orders were, 'tis true, the Occasion of so many Rebel∣lions in Castile: yet now, when the Power of our King is enlarg'd by the addition of so many Crowns, tha•• Inconveniency is not to be fear'd; especially if these Orders were setled out of Spain, and the Presidency of them Ingrafted, as it were, in the Crown.

EMBLEM LXIX.

[illustration]

DIvine Providence would not suffer this Monarchy of the World to be one moment without Gold and Iron; one to preserve, and the other to defend it: For if it did not create them at the same time with the World; yet did the Sun, the Second Governor of all things, immediately after its Creation, operate in Purifying and Refining the Mineral Matter, and locking it up in Moun∣tains, as in publick Treasuries; where also Mars, after the Matter was harden'd and re••in'd into Iron and Steel, erected his Armory. Arms are the Hands of Govern∣ments; and Riches their Blood and Spirit: And if these don't supply the Hands with Strength, and they again preserve and defend them, the whole Body will

soon fall, and be expos'd to Ruine and Violence. Pliny tells of a sort of Ants, in India, which instead of Grains of Corn, heap up Grains of Gold. Nature has not granted those laborious Animals the Use of this Metal; yet it would have them, like Masters, inform every Government of the Importance of laying up Treasure. And though it be the Opinion of some Statesmen, That hoarding up Riches, serves for nothing but to invite Enemies, as Hezekiah found, when he had shewn his Treasure to the Embassadors of Assyria1 1.379; and as the Egyptians knew, who, for this Reason, employ'd all their Royal Revenues in Building; yet are their Reasons invalid, and these two Examples of no force: For 'twas not Hezekiah's shewing his Riches, that brought the War upon him; but his Vanity and Pride, in put∣ting his Trust in them, more than in God: 'Twas this that made Isaiah prophesie, That he should lose all that he had2 1.380. Nor did the Egyptians employ their Trea∣sure in Building, through fear of losing it, but through Vain-glory, and a design to amuse the Peoples Minds, as we shall observe in its proper place. If a Prince amasses Treasure, through Avarice, not making use of it, when Occasion requires, to defend his Country, and offend his Enemy, and, to save Charges, leaves his State unprovided of Arms and Men, he will soon invite his Enemies to forge Keys to open his Chests, and plunder him of his Riches. But if he applies those Treasures to the Use and Service of his State, he will at once strike an Awe and Respect into his Enemies. For Riches are the Nerves of War3 1.381: 'Tis they procure Friends and Allies. In a word, A Full Exchequer does more Execu∣tion than Artillery, Fleets, or Armies. When thus apply'd, hoarding Riches, and Moderation of Expences, are not Avarice, but Prudence; as was that of King Ferdinand the Catholick, who, while living, was call'd

Miserable and Covetous; but after his Death, was clear'd of that Aspersion, he leaving behind him but a very inconsiderable Summ; whatever he hoarded, he used to expend upon the Fabrick of the Kingdom, placing his Glory not in spending, but in having what to spend. It must be observ'd, That Treasures are sometimes col∣lected with a true and Heroick Design, to execute some Great and Glorious Action: yet does this, by degrees, dwindle into Avarice, and the Ruine of States happens before the Treasury is open'd for their Relief. Man's Mind is easily taken with the Love of Riches, and is wholly possess'd with a desire of obtaining them.

Nor is it sufficient, that these Treasures be divided among the whole Body of the State, as Chlorus in Eutropius desired4 1.382: For Riches secure the Prince, but endanger the People. Cerealis told the People of Treves, That their Riches were the chief Cause of their Wars5 1.383. When the Publick is Poor, and private Persons Rich, Misfortunes arrive, before they can be prevented. Counsels are prejudiced; for the People avoid those Resolutions, which seek to redress the Publick Grievances, at the Expence of particular Persons, so that they can very difficultly be induced to make War. Aristole, for this Reason, blam'd the Constitution of the Common∣wealth of Sparta, it having no Publick Treasury6 1.384. And if the People are more intent upon their own pri∣vate, than the Publick Interest, with how much Regret will they be induced to remedy the Grievances of the Publick, at their own particular Expence7 1.385? The Republick of Genoa feels this Inconveniency. And Plato ascribes the Ruine of that of Rome to no other Cause, in an Oration which Sallust says he made in the Senate,

against the Accomplices of Cataline's Conspiracy; having (as St. Augustine explains it* 1.386) stray'd from their first Institution, in which private Persons were Poor, but the Publick Rich. Of which Horace complains† 1.387:

Non it a Romuli Praescriptum, & intonsi Catonis Auspiciis, &c.

Great Princes, relying too much upon their own Power, lay aside all Care of laying up Treasure, or of preserving what they already have; not considering, that if the Necessity of their Affairs should require Money, they must be oblig'd to oppress their Subjects with Taxes, to the great hazard of their Fidelity; and the greater the Kingdom is, there will be need of greater Expence and Charge. Princes are Briareus's, who, what they receive with fifty Hands, spend with a hundred; nor is any Kingdom rich enough to supply the Extravagance of one. Clouds, in one Hour, spend all the Vapours which they have been many Days in collecting. Those Riches which Nature had for many Ages hoarded up in the close Treasury of the Earth, were not sufficient for the extravagant Prodigality of some of the Roman Emperors. And this Extravagance is usual to Successors who find the Treasury filled to their Hands: For they spend that carelesly and lavishly, which they never knew the trouble of acquiring; they soon pull down the Banks of the Treasury, and drown their State in Pleasure and Luxury. In less than three Years time, Caligula squan∣der'd away Sixty Six Millions of Gold, though then One Crown was as much as Two now. Power is self-will'd and foolish, and should therefore be corrected by Pru∣dence; for without that, Empires would soon fall to Ruine: that of Rome seem'd to decline, from the Time that the Emperors began to squander away its Treasures. The World is wholly ruled by Arms and Riches. Which is represented in the present Emblem, by a Sword and

Golden Bough, which a Hand holds over a Globe; to inti∣mate, that by both these the World is govern'd: alluding to Virgil's Story of Aeneas, who, by the help of both these, conquer'd even Hell it self, and subdued its Mon∣sters and Furies. The Sword wounds most, whose edge is Gold; and Valour without Conduct, and Magazines without Treasuries, are insignificant. A Prince ought therefore to consider, before he declares War, whether he is sufficiently furnish'd with these Means to prosecute it: For which Reason, 'twill be convenient, that the President of the Treasury should be one of the Council, that he may give an Account of the State of the Revenue, and what Grounds they have to proceed upon. Power ought to be cautious and circumspect, and diligently consider of what it undertakes. Prudence does the same in the Mind, as the Eyes do in the Head; with∣out that, Kingdoms and States would be blind: And Polyphemus, who having once lost his Eye by the Cunning of Vlysses, in vain threw Stones about, and storm'd for Revenge: so will they vainly squander and throw away their Treasure and Riches. What prodigious Summs have we seen spent in our Times, upon some vain Fear, in countermining Enemies Designs, in raising Armies, and making War, which might have been avoided by a Friendly Composition, or by Dissimulation? How much in Subsidies and Taxes ill apply'd, and in other Ne∣cessary Expences, by which Princes, thinking to make themselves Powerful, have found the contrary: The Ostentations and Menaces of Gold extravagantly and unseasonably squander'd away, render themselves in∣effectual, and the second are less than the first, for one weakens the other. Strength lost, is soon recruited; but Riches once spent, are hard to be recover'd. They ought not to be us'd but upon absolute Necessity. Aeneas did not first shew the Golden Bough, but offer'd to force his Passage with his Sword.

The Chief unsheath'd his shinning Steel, prepar'd, Though seiz'd with sudden Fear, to force the Guard.

But when he found that neither Force nor Fair Means could oblige Charon to waft him over, the Golden Bough was produc'd, which had been hitherto conceal'd8 1.388: At the sight of which, the angry God was pacified.

* 1.389 If neither Piety, nor Heaven's Command, Can gain his Passage to the Stygian Strand, This fatal Present shall prevail, at least, (Then shew'd the Golden Bough, conceal'd within her Vest.) No more was needful; for the Gloomy God Stood mute with Awe, to see the Golden Rod, &c.

Let Princes therefore take Care to keep those Eyes of Prudence upon their Scepters, clear, and quick-sighted, not disdaining Oeconomy, which is the Safety and Pre∣servation thereof; Princes being, as 'twere, the Fathers of their People. The Great Augustus condescended, as we have said before, for the Good of the Publick, to take the Accompts of the Empire with his own Hand. Spain had had long since the Universal Empire of the World, if it had been less Extravagant in War, and more Regular and Methodical in Peace; but through a certain Negligence, the usual Effect of Grandeur, it has suffer'd those Riches which should have render'd it Invin∣cible, to be made use of by other Nations. We pur∣chase them of the simple Indians, for Toys and Baubles; and afterwards, we our selves, as silly as they, permit other Nations to Export them, leaving us Brass, Lead, or some such worthless Commodities, in their stead. 'Twas the Kingdom of Castile, which, by its Valour and Prowess, erected our Monarchy; yet others triumph, and that suffers, not knowing how to make good Use of the vast Treasures which are brought to them. So Di∣vine Providence, in a manner, levels and equals States; giving to the Great Ones Strength, without Industry; and to the Little, Industry to acquire Strength. But lest I should seem only to discover Wounds, and not heal

them, I will prescribe some Remedies; not drawn from the Quintessence and Nicety of Speculation, which are approv'd at first, when new, but afterwards rejected by Experience; but such as Natural Reason shall suggest, and such as Ignorance slights as vulgar.

The chief Wealth and Riches of Nations, are the Fruits of the Earth; no Mines in the World being richer than Agriculture. This the Aegyptians knew, who made the lower End of their Scepters like a Plow-share; to intimate, that its Power and Grandeur was founded upon that: The fertile Sides of Vesuvi••s, are richer than Potosus with all its Gold. 'Tis not by Chance, that Na∣ture has so liberally imparted the Fruits of the Earth to All, and hid Gold and Silver in the very Bowels of the Earth: It made those common, and expos'd them upon the Superficies of the Earth, on purpose for Man's Nou∣rishment9 1.390; and hid these in the Bowels thereof, that they might not easily be dug out, and refined, knowing they would prove the Bane and Ruine of Mankind. Spain was, in former times, so rich, almost only from the Fruits of the Earth, that Lewis King of France, com∣ing to Toledo, in the time of King Alphonso the Em∣peror, was surpriz'd at the Splendour and Magnificence of that Court, affirming, That he had not seen the like in all that Part of Asia or Europe, which he had travell'd through, in his Voyage to the Holy Land. Such was then ••he Grandeur of one King of Castile, though distracted with Civil Wars, and the greatest part of his Kingdom possess'd by the Moors. There are some Authors affirm, That there was in this Kingdom, in the time of the Holy War against the Heathens, a Rendezvouz of a Hundred Thousand Foot, Ten Thousand Horse, and Sixty Thousand Waggons; and that King Alphonso III. daily paid both the Soldiers, Captains, and Generals, according to their Office and Quality. These vast Ex∣pences

and Provisions, which at present seem incredible, the single Kingdom of Castile could afford; nay, and at the same time maintain'd a greater Number of Enemies, without the Assistance of Foreign Riches; until a certain Biscayner, roving upon the Sea, by fortune, got a sight of this New World, either unknown to, or forgotten by the Ancients, and preserv'd for the Honour of Columbus, who, after the Death of this Spaniard, dili∣gently considering the Observations that he, the first Discoverer had made, undertook to demonstrate the Discovery of the Provinces which Nature seem'd de∣signedly to separate from us by Mountainous Waves. He communicated this his Project to several Princes, hoping, by their Assistance, to facilitate his great and difficult Enterprize: But all slighted it, as vain and no∣tionary. Which if they had done through Prudence and Caution, and not Distrust and Misbelief, they had merited the same Praise which Carthage gain'd of old; which, when some Sailors were boasting in the Senate, of the Discovery of a wonderful Rich and Delicious Island, (supposed to be Hispaniola) caus'd 'em imme∣diately to be put to Death, thinking the Discovery of such an Island would be of more Detriment than Advantage to the Commonwealth. Columbus, at last, applies him∣self to Their Catholick Majesties, Ferdinand and Isabella; whose Generous Spirits, capable of many Worlds, could not be content with one alone. So that having received necessary Assistance, he put to Sea; and after a tedious and hazardous Voyage, in which he encounter'd as great Dan∣ger from the Diffidence of his Companions, as from the Sea it self, he at last return'd to Spain, laden with Gold and Silver. The People flock'd to the Shore of Guadalquivir, to admire these precious Products of the Earth, brought to light by the Indians, and thither by the Valour and In∣dustry of their Countrymen. But this great Plenty of them soon perverted all Things; the Husbandman soon leaves Plough, gets into his Embroider'd Silks, and be∣gins to be more curious of his Tawny, Sun-burnt Hands; the Merchant steps from his Counter into his Sedan,

and lolls it lazily about the Streets; Workmen disdain their Tools, and all, forsooth, must now turn Gentle∣men. No Money is current now but Silver and Gold; and our Coin being wholly unmix'd and pure, is coveted and desired by all Nations. Gold and Silver now growing common, all Things raise their Price. In fine, It befel our Kings, as it did the Emperor Nero, whom a certain African put a Trick upon, telling him, in his Grounds he had found a vast Treasure, which he believ'd Queen Dido had buried there, either lest too much Riches should enervate the Minds of her Subjects, or lest they should invite others to Invade her Kingdom. Which the Emperor giving credit to, and thinking himself al∣ready sure of the Treasure, squander'd away the Old Stock, upon the Hope of these New-found Riches: The Expectation of Riches being the cause of the Publick Want10 1.391. Cheated by the same Hopes, we were persuaded that we had no more need of fix'd and stand∣ing Treasuries, but think our Ships sufficient, not con∣sidering that all our Power depends upon the Uncertainty of the Winds and Seas; as Tiberius said the Lives of the Romans did, because their Provisions were all brought them from Foreign Provinces11 1.392. Which Hazard Aleto consider'd, when dissuading Godfredo from going to the Holy Wars, he said,

* 1.393 Shall then your Life upon the Winds depend?

And as Mens Hopes are generally above their Estates12 1.394, State and Pomp encreases; the Salaries, Wages, and other Charges of the Crown are enlarged, out of Confidence and Expectations of these Foreign

Riches; which being afterwards ill and negligently ma∣naged, were not sufficient to defray such Expences: and this made way for Debts, and those for Usury and Interest. Necessity daily encreas'd, and occasion'd new Expences: But nothing was so prejudicial to the Publick, as the Al∣teration of the Coin; which, though not consider'd, should be preserv'd in as much Purity as Religion it self; the Kings, Alphonso the Wise, Alphonso XI. and Henry II. who did offer to alter it, endanger'd both themselves and Kingdoms; and their Misfortunes ought to have been a Warning to us. But when Ills are fatal, neither Ex∣perience, nor Example, can move us. King Philip II. deaf to all these Cautions, doubled the Value of Copper Coin, which was before convenient for common Use, and answerable to bigger Money. Foreigners coming to understand the Value that the Royal Stamp gave to this paultry Metal, began to Traffick with nothing else, bringing us in vast quantities of Copper ready Coin'd, in Exchange for our Gold, Silver, and other Merchan∣dise: Which did us more Damage, than if all the Mon∣sters and venomous Serpents of Africa had been brought among us: And the Spaniards, who us'd to ridicule the Rhodians for their Copper Money, became themselves the Jest and Laughing-stock of the whole World. Trade was ruin'd by this troublesome, scoundrel Metal, all things grew dearer, and, by degrees, scarcer, as in the time of Alphonso the Wise. Buying and Selling ceas'd, and at the same time the Revenues of the Crown were diminish'd, so that new Impositions and Taxes were unavoidable; whence, for want of Commerce, the Wealth of Castile was spent, and the same Inconveniencies renew'd, proceeding one from another in a pernicious Circle; which will at last prove our Ruine, unless a Remedy be timely apply'd, by reducing that king of Money to its former and intrinsick Value. Who would not think that this World must be subdu'd by the Riches and Wealth of the other? And yet we see there were greater Exploits perform'd formerly by pure Valour, than since, by all these Riches; as Tacitus observ'd, in

the time of Vitellius13 1.395. Foreign Nations did soon after find the same Damage, from the Discovery of the Indies, from their too great Dependance upon their Riches; all things grew dearer with them; as with us, their Expences surmounted their Revenues: In a word, they suffer'd all the same Inconveniencies with us; which were so much greater to them, as being farther Distance from those Provinces; and the Remedy of Gold and Silver which is brought us from the Indies, and which they must receive from us, being more uncertain.

These are the Inconveniencies which the Discovery of the Indies caused: In knowing the Causes of which, we know also their Remedies. The First, is, Not to neglect Agriculture, upon Hopes of those Riches: Those which we receive from the Earth, being more natural, sure, and common to all: Wherefore Husbandmen should be encourag'd and exempted from the Oppressions of War, and all other Incumbrances.

The Second, is, That since all things are restored by the contrary Means to which they were ruin'd, and the Expences are greater than the Hopes and Expecta∣tion of those Metals; the Prince should, like a prudent Governor, provide, as the Senators of Rome advis'd Nero14 1.396, That the Publick Revenues should rather Exceed, than fall short of the Expences; That he should moderate those that were superfluous and unnecessary: imitating the Emperors Antoninus Pius, and Alexander Se∣verus, the last of which us'd to say, That 'twas the Part of a Tyrant, to support them with the Intrails of his State. Such a Reform would only Disgust some few, not the whole Nation. And if Abuse or Imprudence has rais'd the Salaries of Offices, and Charges in Peace and War; and if they are only introduc'd by Vanity, under the title of Grandeur; Why should they not be corrected and reform'd by Prudence? And as the greater the King∣doms

are, those Abuses will be greater; so also will be the Effects of this Remedy. Frugality is the best Revenue. Gold once spent, returns not. By damming up the Streams, the Fountain-Head rises. And the way to keep Silver, is to fix the Mercury of it; that being the True and Approv'd Philosopher's Stone. Wherefore, I am satisfy'd, that if a Prince be inform'd by his Ministers, of all superfluous Expences by Sea and Land, and would resolve to moderate them; he would soon find himself enabled to pay his Debts, lessen his Taxes, and fill his Treasury. As King Henry III. who finding the Crown much in Debt, consulted with his Parliament, how to remedy it: And they could not find a better Expedient, than what we have here propos'd; that is, To Reduce Salaries and Pensions, and Regulate Superfluous Ex∣pences. The Treasurers also, and other Officers in the Treasury and Exchequer, should be reduc'd to a less number, as also the Collectors of Taxes, who all, like the thirsty Sands of Africk, soak and drink up all the Streams of the Revenue, which pass by them. The Great Emperor of the Turks, though he has immense Revenues, has but two Treasurers, one in Asia, and 'tother in Europe. Henry IV. of France (not less a States∣man than a Soldier) was satisfy'd of the Inconveniency of this, and therefore reduc'd the Ministers of his Re∣venue to a less, yet sufficient number.

The Third Remedy, is, That since Princes are, by Importunity, often forced to grant those Things which are not in their Power; all such Grants, Privileges, Immunities and Rewards, as are prejudicial to the Crown, should be revok'd; especially when the same Causes concurr, as mov'd Their Catholick Majesties to repeal those of King Henry IV. For, said they, in another Law, A Princes Liberality should not be so great as to ruine him▪ and the Immunities granted to Subjects, should be such as may not prejudice the Crown. But if a Prince, through Negli∣gence or Necessity, has not consider'd this; it must be remedy'd afterwards. As was after the Abdication of Ramirez King of Arragon; at which time, all Grants that

had weakned the Crown, were made void. King Henry the Liberal, and Queen Isabella, did the same thing: And King Iohn II. repeal'd the Privileges and Immunities which himself and his Predecessors had granted. 'Tis with Princes, as 'twas with the Idols of Babylon; from whose Crowns, according to Ieremiah, the People took the Gold and Silver, and apply'd it to their own Use15 1.397. King Henry III. perceiving the same Abuse, Imprison'd several of his Nobility, and made 'em refund what they had purloin'd from the Crown; by which, and a just Administration of his Revenues, he amass'd a prodigious Treasure in the Castle of Madrid.

The Last Remedy, (which should have been the First) is, That a Prince should first regulate the Expences of his own Family, if he would reform those of his People: For their Reformation, as King Theodatus said16 1.398, must be begun by the Prince, that it may be effectual. St. Lewis, King of France, advised his Son Philip to take care that his Expences were moderate and reasonable17 1.399 'Tis a Misfortune, that Princes think it becomes their Grandeur to be Careless, and keep no Accompts; and take Extravagance to be Liberality, not considering how contemptible they are when poor; and that true Great∣ness does not consist in Shews, and gaudy Ostentation, but in Castles, strong Garrisons, and Armies. The Em∣peror Charles V. in the Parliament of Valladolid, mode∣rated the Expences of his Houshold. The true Great∣ness of Princes, consists in being liberal to others, and moderate and sparing to themselves. For which Reason, Sisenand, King of Spain and France, (so stiled by the Fourth Council of Toledo) us'd to say, That Kings should be Mais Escasos que Gastadores; that is, Rather Rich than Lavish. I well know the Difficulty of these Reme∣dies; but, as Petrarch said, in the like case, I do my Duty: And though all that is requisite, cannot be executed; it

ought to be represented, to accomplish the Design of this Book18 1.400.

I dare hardly say any thing about the Remedies of Money, it being the Apple of the Eye of the State, which you cannot touch, without hurting; so that 'tis better to let it alone, than to alter the ancient Method: The acutest Judgment cannot foresee all the Inconveniencies which attend every Alteration thereof, until they are discover'd by Experience: For it being, as it were, the Rule and Measure of Contracts, every one feels the least Variation of it; Commerce is disturb'd, and the whole State disorder'd. Wherefore, after King Peter II. had Abdicated the Throne, it was prudently Enacted by the Kingdom of Arragon, That all their Kings thenceforward, should take an Oath, not to alter any thing about the Coin. This is the Duty of a Prince, as Pope Innocent III. wrote to the same King Peter, when his Subjects began to rebell against him. Of which this seems to be the Reason; That the Prince is subject to the Law of Nations, and as Publick Trustee, ought to take care that there be no Alteration in the Nature of the Coin, which consists in Matter, Form, and Quantity; nor can any Kingdom be constituted, where that is not pure. But not to be wholly silent in a Matter so Important to Government, I'll mention Two things. First, That Money is then Just and Convenient, when the Coin or Stamp adds no∣thing to the Intrinsick Value of it, and when the Gold and Silver have the common Alloy of other Nations; for this will prevent its being Exported. The other, is, That it should be of the same Weight and Value with that of other Nations, permitting also the Currency of Foreign Coin: Nor will it at all derogate from the Prince's Authority, since the Coin serves only to shew the Weight and Value of it. And this seems most commodious, i•• those Kingdoms which hold Correspondence and Trade with many Nations.

EMBLEM LXX.

[illustration]

EMPIRE admits of no Companion, nor can Majesty be divided: For it is impossible that each should Command and Obey at the same time; especially since Power and Accidents cannot be so nicely shar'd between them both, nor Ambition so equally ba∣lanced, but that one will desire to be above the other, or that Envy and Emulation will disturb their Agreement.

* 1.401 Rivals in Empire still mistrustful are; Nor can Authority a Part'ner bear.

It seems next to an Impossibility, that the Orders and Commands of two Governors should not thwart one

another. Moses and Aaron were Brothers; and yet when God made them Part'ners, he thought it necessary to be in the Mouth of one, and in the Mouth of the other, and to teach them what to do, lest any Dissention should arise between them1 1.402. A Republick has but one Body, and should therefore be guided but by one Soul2 1.403. A King will hardly entertain even a de∣pos'd Prince within his Kingdom. This was the King of Portugal's Excuse, for not admitting King Peter, when depos'd by his Brother Henry. Nothing but Matrimony, which unites Bodies and Souls, and the singular Prudence of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella, could have pre∣vented the Inconveniencies of their Joint-Reign in the Kingdom of Castile. For Power and Concord are very rarely found together3 1.404. And though there was some Consent and Union in the Joint-Empire of Dioclesian and Maximinian, yet was not that without its Troubles and Inconveniencies; for which Reason, the Roman Consuls used to Command by Turns.

But if there be occasion for more Princes than One, 'tis better to have Three; for the Authority of One, will check the Ambition of the other Two. There can be no Faction, where there is no Equality; which was the Reason why the Triumvirates of Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, and of Anthony, Lepidus and Augustus, continued for sometime. The Kingdom was well govern'd, during the Minority of King Henry III. by his Three Guardians* 1.405. Upon which Consideration, King Alphonso the Wise pro∣pos'd, That during the Nonage of Kings, the Admini∣stration of Affairs should be committed to One, Three, Five, or Seven. Which not being observ'd in the Mi∣nority of Alphonso XI. the Kingdom of Castile felt great Commotions, from the Government of the two Infants, Iohn and Peter, which at last oblig'd the Royal Council to take upon 'em the Administration. Though Empires

are always violent, and of short continuance, which are divided, and depend not upon one; as it happen'd to Alexander's, which, vast as it was, ended with his Life; for that after him, 'twas divided among many. That which the Moors had founded in Spain, had lasted longer, had it not been divided into many Kingdoms. This is re∣presented in this present Emblem, by a Crown'd Tree, which signifies a Kingdom: To intimate, that if two Hands, tho' of the same Body, should pull this Tree two different ways, they would rend, burst, and ruine the Crown. For Humane Ambition sometimes forgets the Bonds of Nature. When States are divided among Brothers, the Crown can never remain entire, and in Union; for every one is for himself, and grasps at the whole Sceptre as his Father held it. So it befell King Sancho the Elder. Divine Providence united all the Kingdoms of Spain to his Empire, that by their Joint-Force they might expell the Moors, and free themselves from their Tyrannick Slavery: But he, through Fatherly Affection, rather than prudent Policy, divided his Kingdoms among his Children, thinking that so they would be stronger, and more ready to unite against the Common Enemy* 1.406. But instead of that, each of the Brothers set up for King himself. So that the Crown being thus rent in pieces, lost its Strength and Splendour. And as Domestick Feuds and Grudges are more inveterate than other, they soon grew to Civil Wars, each endeavouring to depose his Brother, to the utmost Detriment of the Publick. This Example might, one would have thought, have been a Warning to all Princes, for the future; yet we find King Ferdinand the Great, the Emperor Alphonso, and Iames I. King of Arragon, guilty of the same fault, divi∣ding the Command of their Kingdoms among their Chil∣dren † 1.407. I know not whether this be the Effect of Self-Conceit, or Humane Nature, ever greedy of Novelty, and fond of old rejected Opinions, thinking that best, which was done by their Ancestors; if 'tis not that we

seek for Examples to excuse our own Resolutions. Iames II. King of Arragon, was more prudent upon this score, when he firmly Enacted, That the Kingdoms of Arragon and Valence, and the Province of Catalonia, should never be separated* 1.408.

Nor can these Errors be excused, either by the Law of the Twelve Tables, or the Common Law, which shares the Father's Estate equally among the Children; or by Natural Reason, which seems to urge, that as the Children receiv'd their being in common from their Father, they should also be Sharers of his Estate. For a King is a Publick Person, and ought to act as King, and not as a Father; and ought rather to attend the Good of his Subjects, than his Children. Besides, a Kingdom is a kind of Publick Chattel, and so belongs to no one in particular; it not being in the King's Power to dispose of that, as of his own private Goods: For the Subjects, in submitting themselves to One, have re∣quir'd a Right to be preserv'd, defended and maintain'd by him; which is inconsistent with the Division of the Empire: And since this Right is Common and Universal, it ought surely to be preferr'd to private Love, and Pa∣ternal Affection, or to Desire of making Peace among his Children, by the Ruine of the Publick. Besides, instead of making them agree, it arms 'em with Power to quarrel with one another about the Dividends, which cannot be made so equal as to satisfie all. Brothers would live much more quietly, if their Maintenance should de∣pend upon him who Commands in Chief; for so each would receive a Revenue sufficient to support the Gran∣deur of his Birth. Thus Iehosaphat did4 1.409. There being no Occasion for that barbarous Custom of the Turks, or that Impious Policy of some, who think no Government firm and secure, unless its Foundation be mix'd with the Blood of all such who have but the least Pretensions to it; as if that, like Cement or Mortar, fasten'd the Stones of the Building.

For the said Reason, almost all Nations preferr Suc∣cession to Election; well knowing that an Interregnum is liable to Dissentions and Civil Wars, and that 'tis safer to accept a Prince, than to seek one5 1.410.

Wherefore, since Succession is best, 'tis most agreeable to follow the Course of Nature, preferring him whom she first sent into the World; so that neither Minority, nor any other Natural Defect, is a sufficient Objection to this Right, especially when there are greater Incon∣veniencies attend the admittance of another, of which the Scriptures afford us very many Examples.

There is the same Reason and Right for the Succession of Women to the Crown, in default of Heirs Male; for otherwise the Crown would be subject to Divisions, by Collateral Pretensions. And though the Salique Law, under the Pretence of the Frailty and Imbecility of that Sex, (if it mayn't rather be call'd the Envy and Ambition of Men) does, contrary to the many glorious Examples of the Valour and Conduct of the Female Sex, urge many Inconveniencies, which may seem to exclude them from the Administration; yet is there none so weighty as to balance the Advantage of preventing an Interregnum. Nay, there are strong Reasons why they ought to be ad∣mitted, it preventing Pretensions and Civil Wars about the Succession: And besides, matching the Heiress to some Great Prince, there acceeds a considerable Addi∣tion to the Crown; as it happen'd to the Kingdom of Castile and the House of Austria. If the above-mention'd Inconveniencies are ever of weight, 'tis in small Princi∣palities; where the Heiress marrying with other Princes, the Family may become extinct, and one State be con∣founded with the other.

EMBLEM LXXI.

[illustration]

WHAT does not Labour overcome? It subdues Iron, softens Brass, draws out Gold into the finest Wire, and cuts the hardest Diamonds. A soft Rope does, by continual Motion, wear the Marble Edge of the Well. By this Consideration, St. Isidore, when he apply'd himself to Study, overcame the Dulness of his Genius. What Fort was ever so strong, as that Assiduity could not conquer it? The continued Force of that Engine, which the Ancients call'd a Ram, would make a Breach in the thickest and strongest Walls. And we see now a-days, that Castles, though defended by Artillery Walls, Ramparts and Ditches, are at last forced to yield to the Spade and Mattock. No Difficulty retards or checks a Constant Spirit. The Temple of Glory is not situated in a delightful Valley, nor in a

delicious Plain, but upon a rugged Mountain's Top, not to be arriv'd at, but by rough, uncouth Paths, over-run with Thorns and Brambles. The Temples of Minerva, Mars, and Hercules, (Deities glorious for their Vertue) were not built of Corinthian or Carv'd Work, finely imbellish'd with curious Engravings, as were those of Flora and Venus; but after the Dorick Fashion, rough and unpolish'd: Nor did the Cornices and Chapiters of the Pillars shew any thing, but that they were built by Labour and Industry, not by Luxury and Ease. 'Twas not the Ship Argos's lying at Anchor in Port, that pre∣ferr'd it to the Skies; but its daring the Wind and Sea, and resolutely exposing it self to all Dangers and Diffi∣culties. Never did any Prince Enlarge his Territories by Effeminacy, Luxury and Ease. Labour, Traffick and Industry are necessary to all, but to none more than to a Prince; for others are born only for themselves, but a Prince for All. A Kingdom is not an Office of Repose and Rest. Certain Courtiers once were dis∣coursing before Alphonso, King of Arragon and Naples, against the necessity of a Prince taking Pains; Do you think then, says he, that Nature gave Princes Hands to do nothing. That wise Prince had, doubtless, considered the admirable Composure of them, their Joins, their Readi∣ness to open, and their Strength to hold, and also their mutual Aptness to do whatever the Mind proposes, be∣ing, as it were, the Instruments of all Arts: Whence he concluded, that this exquisite Structure was not acci∣dental, or merely for no Use, but for Pains and Toil, Labour and Industry. The Prince whose Hands are careless and unclinched, will soon drop his Sceptre, and give his Courtiers opportunity of catching at it. As it befell King Iohn II. who so wholly gave himself up to the Diversions of Poetry and Musick, that he could not endure the Weight of Affairs, and either carelesly transacted them himself, or left 'em totally to the Management of his Ministers; rather chusing this sottish Ease, than the glorious Labour of Government; not at all regarding the Examples of his Heroick Prede∣cessors.

So we often find, that the Vertue and ar∣dent Courage of Ancestors is wholly extinguish'd in their Posterity, by the Luxury and Voluptuousness of Empire, and so the Race of great Princes becomes dege∣nerate; as we see in Horses, when they are remov'd from a dry and lean Pasture, into one too fat and fertile. This Consideration mov'd Frederick King of Naples, upon his Death-bed, to write to his Son the Duke of Calabria, to inure his Body to Military Exercise, and not suffer himself to be debauch'd by Pleasures, nor vanquish'd by Difficulties and Dangers* 1.411. Labour and Employment is, as it were, the Anchor of the Mind: without which, it would be toss'd about with the Waves of Passion, and dash'd to pieces upon the Rocks of Vice. God enjoyn'd Labour to Man, as a Punishment; yet so, as it might be at the same time the Means of his Quiet and Prospe∣rity 1 1.412. Those Foundations and noble Superstructures of the Monarchies of the Medes, Assyrians, Greeks and Romans, were not founded by Sloth and Laziness, but by Toil and Labour. It was that which so long supported their Grandeur; 'tis this which still preserves Oeco∣nomies in Kingdoms: For since it partly depends upon the mutual Assistance of Peoples Labours, when they flag, all those Conveniencies at the same time cease; which oblig'd Men to Society and Order of Govern∣ment. Divine Wisdom proposes the Example of the Ant, to instruct Men in their Duty; for that, with great Care and Prudence, lays up a Store in the Summer, to supply its Necessity in Winter2 1.413. Let Princes learn from this little, prudent Animal, timely to provide their Cities, Forts and Garrisons with Necessaries; and to make Preparations in the Winter, to meet the Enemy in the Spring. Nor is the Commonwealth of Bees less assiduous than these; you shall never find them idle, but continually employ'd both within and without their little Cells; the Diligence of each, causes the Prosperity of all. And if the Labour of these little Animals can

enrich the whole World with Honey and Wax; What would a Kingdom do, in which all the People should be equally Industrious? For this Reason, in China, tho' it be so Populous, that it reckons Seventy Millions of Inhabitants; they all live in the greatest Affluence and Plenty, there being none among them but exercises some Trade. The Scarcity of things in Spain, proceeds from the want of this, not from the Infertility of the Soil; for in the Countries of Muroia and Carthagena, Wheat re∣turns a hundred Corns for one, and might thereby sustain a War for many Ages: But this Misfortune arrives from the neglect of Husbandry, Trades, Business, and Com∣merce; the People, even the meanest of them, being so excessive proud, that they can't be content with what Lot Nature has given them, but aspire to something greater, loathing those Employments which are not agreeable to their affected Grandeur. The Reason of which, seems to be, that the Bounds between the Nobi∣lity and the Commonalty are not so well distinguish'd with us, as in Germany.

But as Noble and Well-employ'd Labour is Advan∣tageous, that which is Nice and Superfluous is Preju∣dicial. For Mens Minds are not less effeminated by soft and easie Employments, than by Idleness.

Wherefore the Prince ought to take particular care to employ his Subjects in such Arts as tend to the De∣fence and Preservation of the State, not to Luxury and Debauchery. How many Hands are vainly wearied in adorning one Finger, and how few in the Necessities of the Body? How many are employed in making Con∣veniencies for Pleasure and Recreation, and how few in making necessary Works for the Defence of Cities? How many in Gardening, and forming curious Figures in Box or Myrtle; and how few in Agriculture? Whence we see Kingdoms abound so much in superfluous Trifles, and want those things which are most necessary. Since therefore Labour is so conducive to the Preserva∣tion of a State, the Prince ought to take care that it be continual, and not be hindred by too great a number of

Holy-Days, such as the People, through a kind of Pious Levity, dedicate to Divine Worship: For Experience shews us, that such are more employ'd in profane Games and Sports, than Religious Exercise. But if Labourers would spend those Days, as we read St. Isidore of Madrid did, 'twere to be hop'd that the Time would not be lost, and that Angels would descend and hold the Plough: But Experience has taught us the contrary. One Holy-day in which all Arts and Trade ceases, is more con∣siderable than any Tax; and, as St. Chrysostom says, Saints take no delight in being worshipp'd, at the Expence of the Poor3 1.414. So that Holy-Days and Working-Days should be so divided, as that those might not hinder the other4 1.415. And it was argued in the Council of Mentz, in the time of Pope Leo III. whether 'twas not better either to reduce them to a less Number, or else to trans∣ferr some of them to the next Sundays.

Though generally the End of all Actions is Rest, yet 'tis otherwise in those which belong to Government: For 'tis not sufficient for Princes and States to labour, but their Labour must also be continual. One Hour's Neg∣ligence in a Garrison, frustrates the Care and Vigilance of many Months. The Roman Empire, which had been supported by the Labour and Valour of Six Ages, was ruin'd by the Negligence of a few Months. Spain would scarce repair the Loss in Eight Year, which it sustain'd in Eight Months. There should be no Interposition of Idleness between the Acquisition and Preservation of Empires. The Husbandman has no sooner got his Har∣vest into the Barn, but he immediately goes to Plough again; his Labours never end, but continually renew. If he should rely upon his Grainery, and leave his Lands untill'd; he would soon find one empty, and the other over-run with Weeds and Bryers. But there is this difference between the Husbandman and the Prince;

That he has his Set-times of Sowing and Reaping, but the Prince has not: For in Government, all Months are Septembers to Sow, and Augusts to Reap in.

Let not a Prince believe that the Pains and Labours of his Ancestors excuse him, for this Motion must be con∣tinual: And as declining things surely fall, unless suppor∣ted by some new Force; so do Empires, unless sustain'd by the Strength of the Successor. This is the Cause (as we have observ'd) of the Ruines of all Kingdoms. When any Monarchy shall be once instituted and founded, it should ne'er be idle, but should imitate Heaven, whose Orbs continue their Motion from their first Creation; and if they should once stop, the Generation and Pro∣duction of all Things would cease. The Exercise of States should be always continual and vigorous, and not be corrupted by Idleness or Intermission; as we see the Sea, if not agitated by the Winds, is kept in Motion by its Tides. Citizens who carelesly give themselves up to Pleasure and Luxury, without ever moving their Hands to Work or Labour, are their own greatest Enemies. Such Idleness plots against the Laws and Government, and is nourish'd by Vice, from whence proceeds all the Internal and External Misfortunes of States. That Repose only is commendable and beneficial which is the Gift of Peace, and which is employ'd in Trade, and Employ∣ments and Exercises Military and Civil, by which all enjoy a serene, peaceable and secure Tranquility.

EMBLEM LXXII.

[illustration]

THE Steel would lost its Spring, and the String its Force, if a Bow were always bent. Labour is necessary and beneficial, but cannot continue without some intermission. The Yoke does not always hang upon the Oxe's Neck. The Force and Vigour of Things consists in Vicissitude. From Motion comes Rest, and from thence Motion again1 1.416. Nothing, (says the wise Alphonso) can continue long, which takes no Re∣spite. Even Land must be Fallowed, that it may af∣terwards brings better Crops. Vertue is refresh'd and strengthned by Rest2 1.417, like the Stream of a Fountain

(the Figure of the present Emblem) when stopp'd by the Hand.

A seasonable Rest, Refreshment gives; And weary Valour, after Ease, revives.

For this Reason, Day and Night have divided the Hours into Labour and Rest. While half the World wakes, th'other sleeps. And the Ancients feign'd, that even Iove himself sometimes eas'd himself, by laying the Burthen of the World upon the Shoulders of Atlas. The most Robust Constitutions are not able continually to bear the Fatigues of Government. Continual Toil weakens the Body, and besots the Mind; so does also too much Ease3 1.418. It should be therefore only as a Watering to Plants, which refreshes, not drowns them: or like Sleep, which, if moderate, corroborates; if excessive, rather enervates the Body. There are no Diversions better than those which at the same time re∣create and instruct the Mind, as does the Conversation of ingenious and learned Persons. Such the Emperor Adrian always entertain'd at his Table; which, for that reason, Philostratus call'd, A Rendezvouz of the Learned. The same, Pliny commends in Trajan; and Lampridius in Alexander Severus4 1.419. Alphonso, King of Naples, always retir'd with them, after Dinner, into another Apartment, that he might (as he us'd to say) feed his Mind, as he had done his Body. Tiberius never travell'd from Rome without Nerva and Atticus, Men of excellent Learning, to direct him5 1.420. Francis, the First King of France, learn'd so much from his constant and continual Conversation with such learned Men, that though he had never apply'd himself to Literature, he

would discourse very pertinently upon any Subject. But this commendable Custom is out of date; and instead of it, Princes keep Buffoons, Jesters, and Ridiculous Fel∣lows, for their Entertainment at Table. The Errors and Shame of Nature are become now their Diversions. They love to hear themselves prais'd, though unde∣servedly: And though Reason and Modesty would re∣ject those Praises, as coming from some Fool; yet Self-conceit easily receives them; and the Ears being by de∣grees us'd to them, soon give way to Flatterers and Pick-thanks. Their Jests impose upon the Will, being generally obscene, sometimes vicious. And if such Buffoonry can divert the Mind, how much more will the neat and witty Discourses of the Learned, who not being too grave and rigid (as they are sometimes) can be facetious and witty upon occasion? If there be any Diversion in looking upon some mishapen, ridiculous Monster; What Satisfaction will it be, to hear of the prodigious Works of Nature, and to discourse of her Wonders and Secrets? Athenaeus mentions of Anacharsus, that some of these Buffoons being once brought to Table, to promote Mirth, he remain'd grave and serious, but laught heartily at the sight of an Ape, saying, That th•••• Animal was naturally ridiculous, but Man only by Art, and base Affectation6 1.421 This Composure was great, and becoming the Dignity of a Prince. These Fools are a kind of Publick Spies in Courts, Corruptors of Manners, and very often Plotters against the Prince and State: For which Reason, the Emperors Augustus, and Alexander Severus, would never entertain them. If they are good for any thing, 'tis for the Truth they tell the Great Ones by way of Jest.

Some Princes, through the Glory and Ambition of Affairs, think themselves sufficiently eas'd, in resting

from Matters of Importance, and employing themselves in those of less moment; as the Hair of a Mad Dog cures his Bite. But because then all Minds are not di∣verted by this means, and that there is no Affair, though never so little, but requires Attention enough to tire the Mind; 'tis necessary to be sometimes wholly unemploy'd, and to quit, for a time, the Trouble and Toil of Govern∣ment 7 1.422. Business ought to be so mix'd with Diver∣sion and Pastime, as that the Mind may neither be op∣press'd by the first, nor enervated by the latter: It being like a Mill, which having nothing to grind, wears out it self. Pope Innocent VIII. sometimes laid by the Helm of the Church, and diverted himself in his Garden, in planting Trees. In these Truces of Repose, Age, Time, and the Quality of the Diversion, ought also to be con∣sider'd: So that Gaiety mayn't be offensive to Reserv'd∣ness, Ingenuity to Gravity, nor Recreation to Majesty. For some Pastimes not only debase the Mind, but also diminish the Prince's Authority. So Artaxerxes was infamous for Spinning; Viantes, a King of Lydia, for fishing for Frogs; Augustus, for playing at Even or Odd with the Boys; Domitian, for killing Flyes with a Bodkin; Solyman, for making Pins; and Selim, for Embroidering with the Women. While the Prince is young, there are no Diversions more proper than such as confirm the Mind and Body; such as Fencing, Horse-races, Tennis, and Hunting; and also those Noble Arts of Musick and Painting, which we elsewhere commended in a Prince's Education; which are very requisite to refresh the Spirits, when exhausted by Assiduity of Affairs, provided they be us'd with Moderation: So as not to waste that Time therein, which should be employ'd in Matters of State.

King Ferdinand the Catholick diverted himself so pro∣fitably, that even amidst his Recreations he forgot not his Affairs; but while a Hawking, he gave ear to the Journals and Dispatches which his Secretary read to him,

and at the same time observ'd the Game. Emanuel, King of Portugal, never deny'd Audience amidst his Diver∣sions. A Prince should divert himself upon Affairs, as the Dolphin does upon the Waves, though never so deep, not seeking the quiet Retreat of some River. His Repose should not be Idleness, but Refreshment.

'Twill be convenient sometimes to entertain the People with Publick Diversions, that they may breath a little, and return more vigorously to their Work, upon which their Thoughts are employ'd: For if they are always sad and melancholy, they turn them against the Prince and Magistracy; whereas if they are allow'd some Re∣freshment and Recreation, they submit their Necks to any Burthen; and losing their Heat and Restiness, live in Obedience. For this reason, Croesus told Cyrus, That he must learn his Lydians to Sing, Dance, and Revel, if he would keep them in Obedience8 1.423. These Diver∣sions keep the People as firm in their Obedience, as did that Method of Pharaoh, in employing the People of Israel in making Bricks. For the same reason, Agricola granted the Britains many of these Diversions; and they looked upon that as a Favour, which was part of their Slavery9 1.424. This the Embassadors of the Tencteri knew, when being sent to Cologn, they propos'd the ••estitution of their Ancient Native Customs, and the Abolition of those Pleasures which the Romans had intro∣duced, by which they subdu'd more than by Force of Arms10 1.425.

States being more observant of this Policy, than Princes, permit every one to live according to his Plea∣sure, conniving at Vices, that the People may less ap∣prehend the Tyranny of the Magistracy, and be more in love with that way of Government, taking this Licence

for Liberty; they being ever more prone to a Dissolute, than a Regular way of living11 1.426. But this Policy is none of the safest: For when People have once laid aside Respect for Vertue and the Laws, they begin to despise the Authority of the Magistracy; nay, almost all Mis∣chiefs in States proceed from Libertinism; it being suffi∣cient to keep the People in Peace and Tranquility, and to allow them some honest and agreeable Recreations. To live conformable to Government, is not Slavery, but Liberty. But since in all things the Publick Good ought to be the only aim, 'tis conducive to convert all these Diversions into such Pastimes as exercise the Strength, prohibiting all such as depend upon Luck, as pernicious both to the Government and Subject: To these, because they give themselves so much to them, that they neglect their Business; to that, because by such Games the People squander away their Livelyhood, and so, through Want, are necessitated to Plunder and Rebel.

EMBLEM LXXIII.

[illustration]

THE Diseases of States are hidden: Nor can any one judge of them by their present Disposition; for when they seem in full Health and Vigour, they are taken ill of a sudden, the Distemper breaking out when least thought of; like the Vapours of the Earth, which are not visible till gathered into Clouds. Wherefore a Prince ought carefully to remedy the first Symptoms; nor are they to be slighted, as seeming fri∣volous and distant: as neither the first Rumors of Ills, though to appearance never so unreasonable. Who can penetrate the unsetled Designs of the frantick Mobb? Upon the least Occasion, the least Shadow of Slavery, or Male-Administration, it rises, and takes Arms against the Prince. Seditions arise from small Causes, and after∣wards

proceed to greater1 1.427. If they are neglected at first, they will be at last incurable; they spring like Rivers from small Fountains, and afterwards flow into large Streams. Their Beginnings always create too much Fear, or too much Confidence2 1.428. These Considera∣tions kept Tiberius in suspence, when he had notice that a certain Slave pretended to be Agrippa, and began to raise Commotions in the Empire: For he was in doubt whether he should punish him out of hand, or let Time discover the Cheat; sometimes considering that nothing should be slighted, then again, that he ought not to be frighted at every thing, being dubious between Shame and Fear, but at last he resolved upon a Remedy3 1.429. Certain it is, that sometimes the Torrent of the Mutinous Mobb is so rapid, that unless Care be taken, it leaves its own Channel dry, or falls into Civil Wars, the Con∣sequences of which are always terrible, but are, if taken in time, moderated by Accidents and Chance, and wholly quash'd by Care and Prudence4 1.430. Experience shews many ways to appease the Commotions and Sedi∣tions of Kingdoms; sometimes Chance offers them, and sometimes the Inclination of the Seditious. As it hap∣pened to Drusus, who seeing the Legions repent of their having Mutiny'd, because of an Eclipse of the Moon, which happened at that time, and which they took for an ill Omen, made use of that Inclination to appease 'em5 1.431. The same also Herman Cortez did, upon ano∣ther Occasion. Nor are these Means to be slighted as frivolous; for the Mobb is often quieted with the same Ease it is rais'd: Neither of which Motions are guided by Reason. A blind Hurry puts them in motion, and

an empty Shadow stops 'em. All the Art lies in know∣ing how to humour their Rage; while that works, they are uncontrollable; they always either fear, or are fear'd6 1.432. If any one should endeavour, by a set, pre∣meditated Speech, to appease and quiet them, he would lose his Time and Pains. A sharp Sentence, or severe Check, has more Force than all the Rhetorick in the World. Iulius Caesar with one Word quash'd a Mutiny among the Soldiers;

* 1.433—Begone, ye Roman Drones, And leave our Ensigns to be born by Men.

But the most effectual Means to pacifie a Sedition, is Division; by drawing the Heads thereof into divers Factions and Parties. This Way we use with Bees, whene'er that Wing'd People begin to Mutiny, (for even that Republick has its Intestine Broils) and leaving their waxen Houses, begin to gather in the Air, by throwing a little Dust among them, they are soon sepa∣rated:

† 1.434 Throw but a little Sand, they settle straight.

Whence the Figure and Motto of this present Emblem is taken. But though this Division be always good, 'tis more Prudence thereby to prevent Ills e're they happen, than to remedy them afterwards. King Ferdinand IV. understanding the Commotions of some of the Nobility of Galicia, sent for them; and giving them Commissions, sent them to the Wars. The Romans us'd to send all turbulent and seditious Men to their Colonies or Armies. Publius Aemilius transported the chief Authors of Seditions to Italy; as also Charles V. did the Nobles of Saxony. Rutilius and Germanicus, instead of Punishing some Mutineers, made 'em Freemen. Drusus appeas'd the Mutinous Legions, by separating them from one another7 1.435. Loyalty, and Military

Vertue, are maintain'd by Division, because it hinders Forces and Vices from joyning. For this Reason, the Armies were separated, in the time of Galba8 1.436 'Tis for this Reason, that many think it requisite to prohibit all Cabals and Meetings of the People: For the same Cause, Grand Cairo was divided into several Districts or Parishes, by very high Walls, that the People might not so easily associate. Nor is it any thing else that has so long preserv'd Venice in quiet, than that all its Streets are divided by the Sea. Separation makes People dubious and unresolv'd, not knowing which Part is safest; but without that, they would all unanimously side with the Strongest9 1.437. This made Pisander sow Discord among the Athenians, that he might divide and separate them.

In Military Seditions, 'twill be sometimes conducive to set them together by the Ears10 1.438: for one Mutiny is generally remedied by another. The Roman Senate was advis'd, upon a certain Popular Insurrection, to appease the Mobb by the Mobb11 1.439, weakning their Force by Division. And doubtless this is the meaning of that Law of Solon, which Condemn'd a Citizen, who, in a Sedition, did not adhere to some one Party. But this is rather to enflame, than quench and divide it; since, at this rate, there would remain none who might be Me∣diators to compose it.

There is also another effectual Remedy, which is the Presence of the Prince, bravely and resolutely confront∣ing the Fury of the People: For as the Sea, which foams and dashes against Rocks and Hills, runs smooth upon the even Sand; so is the Mobb hush'd and quieted by the serene Presence of its Prince. Augustus, with his Looks, frighted the Actian Legions into Obedience12 1.440.

In the Disorders of the German Legions, when the Sol∣diers look'd upon the Multitude, they shouted; but when again they cast their Eyes upon Caesar, they seemed to tremble13 1.441. Sedition is soon quash'd by Authority and Presence. As the Blood hasts to the Assistance of the Part wounded, so ought the Prince to assist with his Presence at the Disorders of his State. Majesty easily reduces Subjects to their Obedience; for in that Nature has plac'd a certain Occult Force, which often produces wonderful Effects. Certain Conspirators had enter'd the very Palace of Peter IV. King of Arragon, with a Design upon his Life; and he readily going to meet them, quite dash'd their Resolutions. The Rebellion in the Belgick Provinces had never gone so far, had Philip II. been himself upon the Spot. But this Remedy ought well to be weigh'd and consider'd of, whether or no absolute Necessity requires it: for 'tis the last; and if that fails, there is no other. For this Reason, Tiberius sent Drusus and Germanicus to compose the Mutinous Le∣gions in Hungary14 1.442. The Prince's Presence is also dangerous, if he be hated, or a Tyrant; for then the Subjects are willing and eager to shake off the Yoke of Obedience.

But if any Kingdom be divided into Factions, by the private Grudges of Families one to another, 'tis Prudence to prohibit their Names from being mention'd. Thus did King Francis of Navarr, forbidding any one, upon severe Penalties, to be call'd Agramont or Biamont, which were two Families in that Kingdom at continual Enmity.

But if the Peoples Dissatisfaction and Sedition proceed from the Male-Administration of some Minister, there is no Dust more effectual to appease them, than the Punishment of that Person. If they impute to the Mi∣nister that which is really the Prince's fault, and so rise

against him, their Errour must have its free course; since neither Force nor Reason can stop it, without greater Detriment to the Publick. Innocence, 'tis true, will thereby suffer, but not through the Prince's fault. In all such great Accidents there is no Remedy without Injustice, which is compensated by the Publick Good15 1.443. Sedition is a Poison which strikes at the Heart; and 'tis therefore necessary sometimes to lop off a Limb, to save the Body; and to give way to the Torrent of Fury, though disagreeable to Reason and Justice. Thus did Queen Isabella, in a Rising of the People of Sevill: For when they insisted upon her turning Andrew Cabrera, Governor of the Palace, out of his Office, and were running on to further Demands, she cut 'em off short; Gentlemen, says she, what you demand, I had before resolv'd on; Go, remove not only the Governor, but also all my other Domesticks. By which Answer, she seem'd to command that which she was forc'd to, and the Mutineers took it as her Favour and Kindness; and having satisfy'd their Rage, by tumbling down those headlong, whom they found upon the Towers, they were quiet; and after∣wards she, upon Examining the Accusations which they laid to the Governor's Charge, finding them unjust and groundless, restor'd him to his Office. When the Mu∣tineers think that the Punishment of the Heads of the Sedition will be sufficient, they spare none, hoping by that means to expiate their Crime; as the German Le∣gions did16 1.444; though Patience and Connivance did encrease their Insolence17 1.445; and the more you grant them, the more they crave, as did the Soldiers which Flaccus sent to Rome18 1.446: Yet this chiefly happens, when the Person so Granting is but of small Authority

among them, as was Flaccus, whom the whole Army despised19 1.447. But in the fore-mention'd Case of Ger∣manicus, the Demands of the Mutineers ought to be com∣ply'd with, though violent and unreasonable, that their Fury might have been qualified, or that he might have had some honourable Pretence, to wave their Punish∣ment. He knew the Injustice and Inconvenience of a general Punishment, and that it would of necessity involve the Innocent: But though it could not wholly be avoided, it seemed not to be done by his Command, but was rather to be imputed to Chance, and the Fury of the Seditious20 1.448.

The fault of the Minister ought to be excused, as a piece of Policy, when by Popular Constraint he becomes Head of the Sedition; that he may afterwards, when their Fury begins to abate, with more ease reduce them to Obedience. So Spurinna gave way to the Soldiers Rage, and pretended to Countenance them, that he might preserve his Authority among them, when they began to repent21 1.449.

Sometimes the People, upon pretence of Preservation of their Liberties and Privileges, encroach upon the Royal Prerogative: A piece of Arrogance that ought by no means to be connived at, lest they should thence become more saucy. In this Case, the Punishment of the Delinquents should be speedy, and the Heads of the Promoters stuck up, as a Terrour to the rest, when they least think on't. For there is nothing quells their Inso∣lence more, than the Punishment of their Leaders22 1.450; it being an approved Truth, That the Body of the Mobb dare attempt nothing without them23 1.451.

Ramirus, King of Arragon, being embroil'd in the Insurrections of his People, ask'd Advice of the Abbot of Tomer: Who gave him no Answer, but with his Switch, imitating Periander24 1.452, lopt off the Heads of the Tallest Flowers in his Garden, (where he was then walking) and by that shew'd him what he was to do. Upon which he Beheading the chief Authors of the Re∣bellion, and restor'd Peace to his Kingdom. The same was the Advice of Don Lopez Barrientos, to King Henry IV. Yet will it be convenient to use this Method with such Moderation, as that the Execution may fall but on few: But those who cannot be punish'd, must be conniv'd it, or so dealt with, as that their Affections may be gain'd; as we read Otho did, when his Army Mutiny'd25 1.453. Severity with Moderation, appeases all Commotions: For when the Bad begin to fear, the Good will obey; as Vocula found, who, in a general Mutiny of the Legions, punish'd but one Man26 1.454.

The Method also of the Punishment ought to be so mild, as not to give the People occasion to resent it as a Na∣tional Grievance, for that would make them more Reso∣lute. Slavery, Wounds, and all the Miseries of War, were not so grievous to the Germans, as that Trophy which Germanicus erected out of the Spoils of the Re∣bellious Provinces27 1.455. Ferdinand Duke d'Alba did not forget this Precept, when he erected a Statue of the Rebels Heads: Nor had he omitted it, though he had read or heard, that Vitellius would not put to Death Iulius Civilis, a Man of great Authority among the Dutch, lest he should thereby alienate the Minds of that

Warlike People28 1.456; for he thought a severe Animad∣version more proper: which nevertheless created no Disturbance; though there were not wanting those who urg'd it as an Aggravation, to make that People revolt.

There is another sort of Disobedience, which proceeds from a too zealous and inconsiderate Fidelity; in which case the Subjects are to be brought to their Duty, by benign and mild Means. Such as Iohn II. King of Arragon, us'd, in an Insurrection at Barcelona, upon the Death of his Son, Prince Charles: For he wrote to that City, That unless compell'd by Necessity, he would never use violent Methods; but that if they would re∣turn to their Obedience, he would use them as his own Children. This Mildness, and his Promise of a General Pardon, reduced them all to their Devoir. A Prince ought always to discover an Inclination to Clemency; for without Hopes of that, Criminals grow desperate. For which Reason, Valentinus, after he had mov'd the People of Treves to a Rebellion, order'd the Roman Em∣bassadors to be kill'd, that he might, by the Peoples Despair, strengthen his Crime29 1.457. Sedition turns to Obstinacy, where there is no Hopes of Pardon; and the Seditious had rather die Rebels, than Malefactors. Upon this account, those who follow'd the Faction of Vitellius, were Pardon'd30 1.458. This Generosity is par∣ticularly necessary in Insurrections of the Mobb. This King Ferdinand the Holy us'd in the Commotions of Castile; and Iohn I. in the Convention of the States of Guadalajara, pardoning all those who sided with the Portuguese. But if a Prince has lost his Reputation, and is in contempt with his Subjects; then, I confess, Cle∣mency will be of small use: nay, those very Remedies which should cure these Wounds, do more exulcerate, and render them incurable. For his Authority once

lost, he can neither maintain the Severity of Punish∣ment, nor terrifie the Offenders by Example: so that he must give way to his Misfortunes, and as prudently as he can, circumvent them by Policy and Stratagem. Thus Vocula did, when he saw he was unable to punish the Mutinous Legions31 1.459. For the same Reasons, King Iohn II. releas'd those Noblemen whom he had in Prison.

Nor are those Favours and Benefits more effectual in appeasing Seditions, which proceed from a Prince who has lost his Reputation: For the Receiver either imputes them to Cowardice, or persists in Rebellion to preserve them32 1.460; and sometimes sets up another King, by whose Protection he may enjoy them: As did those who Conspired against King Henry IV. for they would never be obliged by his Favours, though never so great and numerous. When a Prince resolves to quench the Fire of Sedition, 'twill be conducive, that those Resolutions should be thought to proceed from his own Vertue, not from the Persuasions of others; for the People are gene∣rally more Incens'd, when they find the Prince does no∣thing but by the Instigation of his Ministers. But when a General Pardon is once granted, the Prince ought punctually to observe it, wholly forgetting all former Offences and Injuries; for otherwise he would give oc∣casion for fresh Commotions: As Ferdinand King of Naples did, when he offer'd to punish some Noblemen whom he had already pardon'd, and who had put them∣selves under the Protection of King Ferdinand the Catholick. But if they are afterwards found Delinquent, they should be punish'd with the utmost Rigour of the Law, to curb them, and prevent others from abusing the Prince's Authority.

In these, and all other Remedies, there is nothing more useful than Expedition33 1.461: For the People grow

Arrogant and Saucy, when their Insolence meets wi••h no Check nor Opposition. Time confirms them in their Revolt, and makes those who were Dubious declare for them, and so endangers the most Loyal. Therefore Artabanus endeavoured, with utmost Speed and Dili∣gence, to compose the Commotions of his Kingdom34 1.462. As Seditions are suddenly raised, they ought suddenly to be remedied. There is more need of Action than of Consultation, before the Venom takes Root and spreads. When the People are once us'd to Murther, Rapine, and all other Ills that Sedition brings with it, 'tis very difficult to recall and pacifie them. This King Henry well knew, when, upon the Death of his Brother, King Peter, he immediately seized upon the chief Cities and Garrisons of the Kingdom; and by this Diligence, soon establish'd its Tranquility.

Seditions therefore, and Civil Wars, being Distem∣pers which consume the Life of the State35 1.463, and enervate the Prince, by the Losses which he receives, and the Gratuities which he is oblig'd to give, 'tis the best way to compose them upon any Terms. This mov'd King Ferdinand the Catholick to agree with Alphonso King of Portugal, in his Pretensions to the Crown of Castile. For in such Disorders, the Weakest, and most Op∣press'd, are strongest36 1.464. Princes are at the Discre∣tion of those who have their Arms in their Hands, and the Soldiers have more Authority than their Com∣manders 37 1.465.

EMBLEM LXXIV.

[illustration]

ANIMALS naturally endeavour nothing but the Preservation of their Individuals; and if at any time they injure one another, 'tis generally from that Reason, and a certain Natural Fierceness, which is not subject to the Command of Reason. On the contrary, Man, animated with that Celestial Flame, which gives him the Command of all Things, easily persuades him∣self, that he is not born only to live, but also to enjoy all those Things, even beyond the Bounds which Reason has prescribed him; and his Imagination being cheated by the false Appearance of Good, seeks this Enjoyment in several Objects, and therein places his Felicity and Satisfaction. Some think it consists in Riches, others in Dainties and Luxury, others in Dominion, and every

one in what the Errors of his Appetite or Fancy suggest; for the Enjoyment of which, they apply those Means which their rambling and unquiet Minds prompt 'em to, though never so unjust1 1.466. Whence proceed Murthers, Rapine, and Tyranny, which make Man the most unjust of all Animals: And since one cannot be se∣cure from another, several kind of Arms were invented, to repell Villany, and preserve Innocence and Liberty, and so War was introduced into the World2 1.467. This was the Original of this Monster, unless it came from Hell, after the Fall of the Rebellious Angels. War is so hateful to God, that he would not permit David, as Just as he was, to build the Temple, because he had shed much Blood3 1.468. All good Princes dread it, as knowing the various Events and Success thereof4 1.469. War disturbs the Order and Harmony of States; changes Religion, violates Justice, silences the Laws, destroys Friendship and Relation, makes Arts forgot, Agricul∣ture cease, ruines Trade, depopulates Cities, and alters Governments. King Alphonso calls Wars, the Alienation from Peace, the Disturber of Quiet, and the Destruction of Order. A Civil War is like a Burning Fever, which soon scorches up the State: A Foreign War cuts its Veins, and dreins it of its Riches, Strength and Vigour. War is a Vice contrary to Reason, Nature, and the End of Man; for God created him after his own Image, and gave him the Command of all Things here below, not to destroy them by War, but to preserve 'em by Peace: He did not create him for War, but Peace; not for Rage, but Quiet; not to Ruine, but to Preserve: For which Reason he sent him into the World Naked, without Arms to offend others, or a thick Hide to defend himself; so indigent of the Assistance and Government of others, that even in his most flourishing Estate he can't subsist without foreign Aid. This Necessity oblig'd

him to Society, and Civil Correspondence; from which, by the Joint-Labour of all, he might be supply'd with necessary Conveniencies for Life, and that this Politick Felicity might unite all in the firmest Bonds of mutual Friendship; and that one Country, haughty with its own Riches, might not disdain Communication with the rest, he has shar'd his Blessings among all; Wheat he has given to Sicily, Wine to Crete, Purple to Tyre, Silk to Calabria, Aromaticks to Arabia, Gold and Silver to Spain and the West-Indies; Diamonds, Pearls and Spices, to the East-Indies. The Desire and Want of the Riches and Rarities creating Commerce, by which the whole World became as one common House, and that they might understand one another in this Correspon∣dence, and mutually express their Affections of Love and Benevolence, he endued them with a Voice Arti∣culate, smooth and pleasant, to explain their Concep∣tions; Laughter, to shew their Satisfaction; Tears, to shew their Sorrow; Hands, to exert their Faith and Liberality; Knees, their Submission and Obedience: Which are all Tokens of a Civil, Benign, and Pacifick Animal. But those Animals which Nature designed for War, she created with Arms Offensive and Defensive, for that purpose; to the Lion she has given Claws, to the Eagle Talons, to the Elephant a Trunk, to the Bull Horns, to the Bear Fangs, to the Porcupine sharp Quills; she has made Adders and Vipers formidable by their Poison, for their Defence consists in our Danger, and their Security in our Fear. For which Reason, she has cloathed almost all Beasts with a thick Skin, for their Defence; the Crocadile with a Breast-Plate, Serpents with a Coat of Mail, Scorpions with Scales: She has given all an Aspect terrible, and a Voice horrible and dreadful. Let therefore Savage War be for them, not for Man, in whom Reason is predominate over Rage. Nature has hid Iron, Steel, Gold and Silver, in the Bowels of the Earth, lest Men should make ill Use of them; but Revenge or Injustice has found them even there, some for the Instruments, and some for the Price

of Murther5 1.470. Great Abuse of Mankind, to employ Gold and Silver to the Destruction of Life, which was given for its Preservation!

But because many Men (as we have said) more Savage than the very Beasts themselves, are more sway'd by Lust and Ambition, than Reason, and so unjustly covet to oppress and govern others, War became necessary for Natural Defence; for there being two Methods of deciding Matters, one by Justice, the other by Force, which is common to all Animals, when the one can't be us'd, the other must6 1.471, provided the Cause and Intention be just, and the Authority of the Prince be lawful; in which also nothing should be resolv'd on, without due Deliberation. So the Athenians us'd to con∣sult their Orators and Philosophers, about the Legality of their Wars; for 'tis in our Power to begin, but not to end them; he who undertakes them in haste, will repent at leisure. War (says King Alphonso) ought to be well weigh'd e're 'tis begun, that it may be agreeable to Reason and Iustice; for from hence proceed three great Advantages: The first, is, That God favours those who do so: The second, is, That they themselves are more encourag'd, upon Confi∣dence of their Iustice: The third, is, That those who know it, if they are Friends, join more chearfully; if Enemies, they have the less hopes of Success* 1.472. War ought not to be undertaken for slight and frivolous Matters, such as were those which mov'd Xerxes to bring War upon the Greeks, and the Lumbards to make an Irruption into Italy. That Prince is a Tyrant, who wages War for another State; but he Just and Commendable, who does it for the De∣fence of his own, or the Recovery of unjust Usurpa∣tions; in such case especially where Justice cannot be

obtained otherwise, or where it is more securely decided by the Sword, than the Book so subject to Deceit and Cavil7 1.473. The Success of War is a Just Judge, giving the Right of Victory to him to whom it belongs. King Philip II. was so desirous to clear his Right to the Crown of Portugal, upon the Death of King Sebastian, that after having had the Opinions of many Divines and Lawyers, and his Army being then upon the Frontiers, he stopp'd, to conferr with them further about it. A Prince who desires gradually to raise his Fortune, may do it by War, provided he has just Occasion. But he who is already in quiet Possession of a competent Greatness, ought dili∣gently to consider how he engages himself in War; and to endeavour, as much as possible, to avoid it by ho∣nourable Means, without loss of Authority and Reputa∣tion; for if he loses them, the Refusal will rather kindle it. The Emperor Rodolphus I. us'd to say, That 'twas more commendable to Govern a State well, than to Enlarge it. 'Tis not less Glorious for a Prince to preserve Peace with his Sword, than to Conquer in War. Happy is that Kingdom, in which the Reputation of Arms maintains Plenty, and where Lances support the Vines and Olive-Trees; where Ceres is protected by Bellona's Head-piece. The greater the Courage is, the more averse 'tis to War, as knowing to what it must be obliged. Many times, Cowards advise and promote it, and the Brave act it8 1.474. If War is commenc'd for the sake of Peace, what need of that, when we may enjoy this? The Choice of it ought not to proceed from the Will, but from Force or Necessity9 1.475. The Ancients feign'd, that Pallas was born out of the Head of Iupiter; to intimate, that War ought to proceed from Prudence, not from the Perverseness of the Mind. Sebastian, King of Portugal, who carried it into Africk, more by the

impulse of his Courage than Counsel, with his Blood imprinted on those Sands the Truth of this Precept. The Bees don't chuse an armed King, that he mayn't be given to War, and neglect the Government of his own State, for foreign Conquests. If Francis King of France, and Gustavus King of Sweden, had duly consider'd this, the first had not been taken at Pavia, nor the last kill'd at Lutzen. Ambition of Rule, is that which begins the Ruine of many States. This Hanibal knew at last, when he told Scipio, That 'twould have been better, had the Gods given Men more modest Thoughts, that the Romans might be content with Italy, and the Carthaginians with Africk.

Great Princes ought to carry on War with their utmost Power and Vigour, that they may the sooner end it, as the Romans did; for the Protraction of it is both chargeable and dangerous. The Enemy is also thereby disciplin'd, and forewarn'd, and encouraged. Power, without Vigour, loses its Esteem. For these Reasons, two Wars ought not to be commenc'd at the same time; for the Forces being divided, they can't be ended so soon, nor is any Power sufficient to maintain 'em long, nor Subjects capable to Command them. The Romans ever endeavoured, as do the Turks at this day, not to be engaged in two Wars at a time. Upon this were grounded the Threats of Corbulo to the Parthians; telling them, That all the Empire enjoy'd a firm Peace, and that they had only that War10 1.476.

EMBLEM LXXV.

[illustration]

MEDEA (to facilitate the Conquest of the Golden Fleece) sowed Serpents Teeth in Col••hos, whence immediately sprang Troops of armed Men, who falling together by the ears, destroyed one another. So some Princes and States, the pernicious Medea's of the World, sow Discord among Princes, and reap Wars, and Confusion, the Fruit thereof, in their own States1 1.477. They think to enjoy themselves that Repose which they molest in others, and the Event proves contrary. Cosmographers say, about the Aequilibrium of the World, that it is so Equidistant from the Center, that the least Weight moves the Earth.

'Tis the same in War; there is none so distant, but it changes the Center of Rest of other Kingdoms. War is a raging Fire, which kindled in one Place, runs on to others, and very often to its own Home, according as the Wind drives it. The prudent Farmer dreads the Storm he sees gathering upon the Mountain's top, though at never so great a distance: Much greater need has he to fear, who raises it, by supplying it with Vapours. Those who foment the Dutch Power and Grandeur, may in time repent it, when subject to the Yoke of their Slavery; as it befell those who favour'd the Rise of the Roman Grandeur. The Venetians, jealous of the Portuguese, for that by their Voyages they depriv'd 'em of the Traffick of the Persian Sea, and the East-Indies, sent an Embassador against them to Cairo, and Engineers and Carpenters to arm the King of Cal••cut against them, persuading the Dutch to oppose their Passage by the Cape of Good Hope. But they having comply'd with their Desires, and establish'd their own Factories and Commerce, quite disappointed the Republick, who had better have left the Portuguese Trade free, since so they might have made use of their Ships to Import the Eastern Commodities; which when they had brought to their Ports, the Inha∣bitants might with more Industry and Profit disperse over Europe. Thus we see the Means which humane Prudence makes use of for its own Safety, turn to the Ruine of the Author. The Dukes of Savoy and Parma thought to maintain the War in the State of Milan; and the one utterly ruin'd his own, and the other made his the Seat of War. Ill Advice impos'd upon the Goodness of the French King, made him fearful of him∣self, diffident of his Mother and Brother, and of the whole Kingdom, being persuaded, that without War he could not subsist, and that his Preservation depended upon the Ruine of the House of Austria; and for that end, he rais'd (with the Blood of the Nobility of that Kingdom, engag'd in Civil Broils) Clouds which created a general Tempest against all Christendom; the Rhine, Moselle, Danube, and Elbe, being summoned to

his Assistance. He foments the Clouds in England, Holland and Denmark. He breaks the Ice of Sweden, that he might pass the Baltick Sea by those Northern Streights, to the Ruine of Empire3 1.478. He thaws the Snows of the Switzers and Grisons, and scatters them through Germany and Italy. He turns the River Po upon the State of Milan, summoning the Tyber and Adriatick to his Assistance4 1.479. He raises the Fogs of Africk, Persia, Turkey, Tartary and Moscovia, that they might in Clouds of Arrows and Lightning invade Europe. He forces through the secret Crannies of the Earth, Earth∣quakes which shook Brazil and the East-Indies. He sends through all Parts furious Hurricanes, which made one continual Tempest; and he disturbed the Heavens with such Diligence and Art, that it darted Fire, hail'd Shot, and rain'd Blood upon the Earth5 1.480. He reaches from Pole to Pole with the Shot of his Artillery6 1.481, and with his Dragoons, more swift (by the Negligence or Malice of some) than the Imperial Eagles7 1.482. Their Neighings are heard in all Parts, and Mars triumphs in Blood and Dust8 1.483. The Author of so many Wars, verifying what Isaiah said of Lucifer, That he disturbs the Earth, ruines Kingdoms, dispeoples the World, and destroys its Cities9 1.484. For when God makes use of one as a Scourge to the rest, he gives him his Power, by which he suc∣ceeds in whatever he undertakes, while his Divine Anger continues10 1.485. He told Moses, That he had made him God over Pharaoh11 1.486; and so, as God, he wrought Miracles, to punish him and his Kingdom12 1.487.

But I am not so bold to say, that in Pharaoh's Person, and his Kingdom, is represented that of France, and the Punishment that Divine Sun of Justice threatens it, and that we must hope for other miraculous Actions for the Preservation and Grandeur of the House of Austria13 1.488,

That his Displeasure being appeased, will by little and little dispell the Clouds which obscure its Pinnacles, discovering thereupon the Triumphant Imperial Eagle, which having sharpned its Talons and its Beak, and re∣fresh'd its Feathers in the Waters of its Trouble, shall join that Divine Lightning, which shall be Light to it, and Fire to France, causing to fall upon them the whole Tempest which they had raised against other Kingdoms. The Spirit of so many Tempests shall waste it self, their Counsels being rash and violent14 1.489. French shall War with French, Friend with Friend, Brother with Brother, City with City, and the Kingdom with the Kingdom15 1.490, by which it shall become the Bloody Scene of that War which it has so industriously procured other Na∣tions 16 1.491. Such Counsels are like Spiders Webs, drawn from their own Bowels; their due Punishment is, to fall into the same Nets which they have spread for others17 1.492. Perillus invented a Brazen Bull for the Exercise of his Tyranny, and was himself the first that made it Bellow.

No Possession is secure, which is founded upon the Destruction of others. A certain French Embassador advised the League of Cambray against the Republick of Venice, insinuating, That she should sow Dissentions a∣mong the Princes, and build her own Fortune upon their Ruine: And several of them uniting, disarmed her, and took from her all the Lands she possess'd upon the Con∣tinent. It may be, that those Times required such Ar∣tifices; or that the Prudent Noblemen, of which that Illustrious Senate always consists, knew those Inconve∣niencies, but could not prevent 'em, either through the furious Torrent of the Multitude, or through fear of rendring themselves suspected by Opposition. This is the Misfortune of Republicks, that Malice, Tyranny, fomenting Hatred, and Self-Interest, without respect to Justice, pass for Zeal and Love to their Country, hin∣dring

Persons of Integrity from appearing. That the Prudent endeavour to procure the Peace of the State, while giddy Fellows, who have no Prospect of the Time to come, molest it by their vain and dangerous Enterprizes18 1.493, and that in their Resolves, their Votes are counted not weighed; and that Communities are always fuller of Raw, Ignorant Persons, than of those of Prudence and Experience; thence happen grievous In∣conveniencies. And we see at present that Republick governs with great Applause by the best Maxims, and that she always promotes the universal Peace and good Correspondence with her neighbouring Princes, not be∣ing to be prevail'd upon by the continual Importunities of France to join in the present War; by which she has not only oblig'd the House of Austria, but has been also freed from this general Influence of Mars, by which she has gained more than she could have done by the Sword. The Neighbourhood of greater Power is not always Dangerous; it is sometimes like the Sea, which Ebbing, leaves whole Provinces to the Continent. There are not few Princes and Republicks which owe their Preser∣vation to this Monarchy. 'Twould be a dangerous At∣tempt for the lesser Powers always to join in making War upon the Greater, (as we observ'd elsewhere.) States gain more by their good Correspondence with Princes, than by Force. They are cunning Ladies, who easily captivate their Heart and Will, and guide their Actions to their particular Ends. Let 'em not there∣fore be disturbed, if Princes are sometimes angry with them; for such Anger is like the Petty Quarrels of Lovers, which are the Renewing of Love: Let them blame ra∣ther Jealousies, and credulous Suspicions, which make them doubt the Fidelity of their best Friends; which is the Vice of the Multitude, who measure Things not by Reason, but by their vain Suspicions.

These Arts of Sowing Discord, and procuring the Rise of one by the Fall of others, are most in use in Courts

and Palaces: They proceed from Ambition; for Re∣wards being already divided, and there being no means to introduce new Forms, but by the Corruption of o∣thers, they procure it by Scandal and Violence. Some∣time 'tis the Envy of one Minister to another, for some excellent Qualifications, endeavouring to prevent his continuance in a Post where they may be conspicuous, or else to ruine the Reputation he has already acquir'd, by false Accusations: And when he can't obscure the Truth, he Sneers, Joaks at, and Ridicules it, under pre∣tence of a kind of Friendship; that losing his Credit in Things of small concern, he may afterwards gain it in Things of greater moment. Such malicious, sly Tricks, are ever perni••ious to their Author, as Tacitus remark'd in Hispon19 1.494, and in those who followed him. Notwith∣standing, Lucinus Proculus succeded well, by accusing others20 1.495. This sometimes happens, when Goodness and Modesty are so reserv'd as to live privately, despising the Honours and Favour of Princes, as it befalls those, who, through distrust of their own Abilities, are thought unfit for the Management of Publick Affairs; such as these, assiduous Malice, such as is intent upon gaining Mens Opinions, easily robs of the due Rewards of their Vertue, as Tigillinus us'd to do21 1.496 But such Artifices fall with the same speed they rise; of which Tigillinus is an Example, who died infamously by his own Hands22 1.497.

EMBLEM LXXVI.

[illustration]

THE Sun darts the Rays of his Light upon a Concave-Glass, and thence proceeds, in Rays of Fire, the Figure of this present Emblem; intimating, That in the good or bad Intention of the Ministers consist Peace or War. The Reverberation of the Orders they receive, is Fatal. If the Breast be of clear and plain Crystal, the Orders flow thence as pure, if not purer, than they entred; but if it be Steel, they will imbroil the whole World in Wars. To this end, Princes, desirous of Peace, should beware of making use of Warlike Ministers; for as they found all their Fortune upon Arms, they continually seek Occasions to exercise them. France had never bewail'd the Effects of so much Discord, nor Europe of so many Wars, had not the Pre∣servation of that King's Favour consisted therein. We

find, in Holy Writ, that the Priests carried the Trum∣pets wherewith they declared War1 1.498; that the Mo∣desty and Gravity of their Sacred Office would not use them without great Occasion. The Breasts of Princes are Seas, which swell with Mountains of Waves, when their Ministers are blustering Boreas's, but are calm and serene when they are gentle Zephyrs; for a generous and peaceful Mind tempers the hot and dangerous Orders, and turns them to good; like the Sun, whose Rays, though they pass by Angles, endeavour to free them∣selves from this imperfect Form, and return Spherical in their Reverberation. And sometimes it suffices not that their Intention is good, if they pass for Warriors; for either none believe that Men of their Courage would neglect an Occasion, and Fear arms against their Bravery, or at least Malice takes it as a Pretence. The Count of Fuentes, foreseeing what would happen to the Valtoline, from the Revolt of the Grisons, upon account of the League with the Republick of Venice, built a Fort at the Mouth of the River Ada, for the Security of the State of Milan. The Duke of Feria, in the same Country, sum∣mon'd the Catholicks to defend themselves from the Protestants. The Duke d' Ossuna endeavour'd, by a Fleet which he had in the Adriatick, to divert the Arms of Venice upon Friuli. And to these three Ministers are ascrib'd the Wars which were afterwards occasion'd through the Troubles of the Duke of Savoy.

In those who assist at Treaties of Peace, the Danger is yet greater, each acting according to his Inclination and Passion, and not according to the good Intention of the Prince. Don Lopez de Haro being disgusted by King Sancho the Strong, reveng'd himself in the Treaties of Peace between that King, and Peter III. King of Arragon, differently reporting the Answers of both; which in∣cens'd them more than before. The greatest Misfortune

of Princes, is, that they can't Personally assist at all Affairs, but are oblig'd to be guided by others Reports, which are like Streams which are always tinctur'd with the Quality of the Minerals through which they pass, pro∣ceeding always infected with the Malice, Passion or Affe∣ction of the Ministers, and answer their Conveniencies and Designs; by these they strive to flatter the Prince, preparing them so, that they may be grateful to his Taste and Inclination. Ministers, and principally Em∣bassadors, eager to shew their Abilities, and that they penetrate all things, report to the Prince for Certainty, not that which is, but that which they fansie may be; they are too prone to Suspicions, which they form from the least Shadow, and then give credit to them, whence proceed great Equivocations and Errors, and is the chief cause of Quarrels and Wars among Princes; for no Minister but has Power to promote Broils and Dis∣cord2 1.499. Let Princes therefore be cautious of giving Credit to the first Relations of their Ministers, but com∣pare them first with those they receive from others: And to form a more certain Judgment of what is written to them, let them be perfectly acquainted with their Humour and Genius, and with their Method of Con∣ceiving Things, whether they act by private Interest and Passion; for it happens sometimes, that the Minister is taken with a Love for the Country or Prince with whom he Treats. and thinks all things Right and Just; and sometimes suffers himself to be oblig'd by their Favours and Civilities, and being naturally Grateful, is of their Side, and acts their Cause. Sometimes is de∣luded by plain Appearances, and by contrary Reports, cunningly spread, and so easily deceives his Prince; for there is none more apt to deceive others, than one who has been impos'd upon before. Many Ministers are mov'd by slight Reasons, or by some Passion or private Aversion which disturbs their Judgments, and turn every thing to ill. There are some also naturally en∣clin'd

to Misconstrue all Actions and Designs; whereas others are so Frank and Generous, that they think nothing ill design'd. Both the one and the other are dangerous, and these last not less so than the others.

Sometimes the Minister, thinking it part of his Duty to discover to the Prince his Enemies, and that by that means he shall gain the Character of a Zealous and Un∣derstanding Person, becomes so nicely suspicious, that no one is safe from his Tongue and Pen; and to make his Surmises and Apprehensions sure, gives occasion, by his Distrust, to Friends to become Enemies, to the great Detriment of the Prince, to whom it were much better to have a good Confidence in all, or for the Minister to apply Remedies to cure, not to infect the Minds and Wills of the Subject.

Ministers also, weary of Embassies, that they may retire to enjoy the Conveniencies and Ease of a Do∣mestick Life, stick not to promote a Rupture between the Princes they assist, or at least to suggest Counsels not less pernicious.

Princes are much deceived, who think their Ministers act always as Ministers, and not as Men. If it were so, they would be much better served, and find less Incon∣veniencies. But they are Men, and their Office does not strip 'em of their Inclination to Ease, and to the Pleasures of Love, Anger, Revenge, and other Affections and Passions, which Zeal nor Duty are not always ca∣pable to correct.

But let Princes be apprized, that those who can't seduce Good and Loyal Ministers, (for that they fathom their Artifices and Counsels, and know what is their Prince's Interest, what not) they traduce them as Di∣strustful, Passionate, Perverse and Obstinate, and there∣fore endeavour to remove them from the Management of Affairs, and to introduce others less Knowing, or to treat immediately with the Prince himself, tendring him specious Propositions, which oblige him to Resolves more prejudicial. He must not give the least grounds to any one, to think that he can't change the course of

Affairs, or displace Ministers; for if such Thoughts take place, the Prince will be ill served: For such Confidence causes Disdain and Disobedience in the Accuser, and the Fear of it discourages the Minister. The Errors of these are less dangerous than those to admit the Accusations against them, especially if they are Foreigners: And were they true, yet 'tis more Prudence to deferr the Re∣medy, till he from whom they came can't ascribe it to himself.

EMBLEM LXXVII.

[illustration]

THE farther those two Luminaries of Day and Night are distant from each other, the greater their Influence and Light is Below: But when they are in Conjunction, their being Brethren; does not

prevent the one from obscuring the other's Rays; and such Eclipse creates Shadows and Inconveniencies to the Earth. Princes, by the benefit of their Ministers and Letters, maintain and uphold mutual Correspondence with each other: But if they should Conferr Personally with one another, their Interview would create shadows of Suspicion and Jealousie, which would put all their States in Confusion, for that they never find in one ano∣ther what they promis'd to themselves, and that neither measures himself by his own Rule, but pretends always to much more than his Due. An Interview of two Princes, is almost like a Duel, in which they fight with Ceremonies, each endeavouring to conquer t'other. The Families of each assist at the Engagement, like two Hostile Troops, each being zealous for his Prince's Triumph over the other, in Personal Accomplishments or Grandeur; and as in such a number all can't be Men of Prudence, some light Expression, or slight Affront, causes Dissatisfaction in the rest. So it happen'd in the Interview between King Henry, and Lewis XI. of France; in which the Spaniards exceeding them in Pomp and Greatness, and scouting the Meanness and Slovenliness of the French, those two Nations departed Enemies, who had till then maintain'd a good Correspondence toge∣ther* 1.500. The Hatred between Germanicus and Piso was private, till they saw one another1 1.501. The Interview between Ferdinand IV. of Castile, and Dionysius, his Father-in-Law, King of Portugal, caused great Disorders; as did that of King Philip I. and King Ferdinand. And though the Meeting of Iames I. and King Alphonso, pro∣duced very good Effects, yet is it the safest way for Princes to manage their Affairs by Embassadors.

Sometimes Favourites sow Discord between the Prince and those of the Blood-Royal, (as we have before ob∣serv'd) of which there are many Examples in our Hi∣stories. Don Lopez de Haro procured a Separation be∣tween King Sancho the Strong, and the Queen his Con∣sort.

The Domesticks of Queen Catharine, Mother to King Iohn II. incens'd her against the Infant, Don Fer∣dinand. Don Alvarez de Lara endeavoured (thereby to keep the Government in his own Hands) to persuade King Henry I. that his Sister, Queen Berenguela, design'd to poison him. Those who were interested in the Quarrels between the Infant Sancho, and King Alphonso the Wise, his Father, took what care they cou'd, to pre∣vent their Meeting and Agreement. The Grandees of Castile hindred the Reconcilement of King Iohn II. to his Son Henry. Don Alvarez de Luna, that of King Iohn of Navarre, to his Son Prince Carlos of Viana. The Favou∣rites of King Philip I. dissuaded him from an Interview with King Ferdinand. Such Artifices we have seen us'd in France, in these Times, to the Detriment of that Kingdom, and of all Christendom. The only Remedy is, to despise the Difficulties and Inconveniencies which these Favourites represent, and to come to an Interview, when the secret Operation of the Blood has appeas'd their Minds, and discover'd the Malice of those who procur'd the Misunderstanding. Upon these Reasons, King Ferdinand gave a Meeting at Segovia, to King Henry IV. his Brother-in-Law, not fearing the Danger of exposing himself to the Resentment of an offended King, who, either through Natural Affection, or to disguise his Infamy, procur'd his Daughter Ioanna 's Suc∣cession to the Crown* 1.502. For though he was sufficiently pre-advis'd by his Ministers of the Danger of the thing; yet in the Scales of Prudence, this Consideration out∣weigh'd, That no Force nor Treaty was so effectual as Presence.

EMBLEM LXXVIII.

[illustration]

WHAT we see of the Mermaid, is Beautiful; what we hear, Melodious; that which the In∣tention conceals, Pernicious; and that which is hidden under Water, Monstrous. Who could imagine so great an Inequality in so fair an Appearance? Such Beauty as to charm the Mind, and such Harmony as to intice Ships upon Rocks? Antiquity admir'd this Monster as an extraordinary Prodigy: yet is nothing more fre∣quent; Courts and Palaces are full of them1 1.503. How often is a fair, smooth Tongue, the Snare to entrap a Friend2 1.504? How often does a Friendly, Smiling Look,

conceal a Heart full of Rancour and Malice? How often are Tears forc'd from a Spring of Joy3 1.505! Those who shew'd most Sorrow for the Death of Germanicus, were those who rejoyc'd most4 1.506. When the Head of Pompey was brought to Caesar, he, by his Tears, dis∣sembled the Satisfaction of the Sight:

Caesar, at first, his Gift would not refuse, Nor turn his Eyes away, but fix'dly views Till he perceiv'd 'twas true, and plainly saw 'Twas safe to be a pious Father-in-Law; Then shed forc'd Tears, and from a joyful Breast Drew Sighs and Groans, as thinking Tears would best Conceal his inward Ioy—* 1.507

We see much of the Syren in the Pretexts of some Princes: How full of Religion and Concern for the Publick Good? How Obliging, Kind, and Promi∣sing? And what Cheats do they impose upon each other, under these Feints and Appearances? They have the Face of Angels, but end in Serpents; and Em∣brace, only to Sting and Poison: The Wounds of a Well-meaning Sincerity are more wholsom than the Kisses of such Lips5 1.508. The Words of those are smooth and balmy, but of these sharp-pointed Arrows6 1.509. How often has Treason took Rise from Honours? Ti∣berius, designing the Death of Germanicus, as jealous of the Glory of his Victories, and to extinguish thereby the Race of Augustus, call'd him to Triumph, and made him his Companion in the Empire. By such Arts he strives to disguise his Mind: He burns with Envy of Germanicus; and makes his Glory blaze more, only the sooner to ex∣tinguish it: What appears is Honour and Affection, what is conceal'd is Hatred and Malice7 1.510 The more

Frank and Sincere a Man appears, the more Fraud and Design he harbours. We are not so apt to be deceiv'd by Muddy as by Clear Fountains, which hide their Poison, and invite by their Clearness. For this Reason, Prudence should be upon her Guard, to penetrate these Arts of Princes, suspecting them most when they seem most fair and obliging, and acting against their Custom and Nature; as Agrippina did, changing her morose Temper into good Humour and Dalliance, to take Nero off from the Love of his Slave8 1.511: Which Alteration was suspe∣cted by Nero and his Friends, who advis'd him to beware of her Subtilties9 1.512. We should be more cautious against what Princes conceal, than against what they shew; more against what they are silent of, than what they declare. The Elector of Treves delivers up that City to the French King, to put therein a Garrison, though he knew 'twas Imperial, and under the Hereditary Prote∣ction of the King of France, as Duke of Luxemburgh, and Lord of the Lower Burgundy, and that thereby he not only ran counter to that Protection, but also to the Constitu∣tions of the Empire; for which Reason, the Troops of Spain surprize this City from the French, and accidentally detain the Person of the Elector, and treat him with all Respect due to his Dignity: And the King of France having Eighteen Days before concluded a League with the Hol∣landers against the Netherlands, makes use of this Pre∣text, though happening afterwards, and enters with his Forces in their behalf, under pretence of setting at liberty his Friend and Allie. He who seeks Occasions, easily finds or makes 'em. Malice is like Light, which enters at the least Chink; and such is our Inclination to Liberty, and so blind our Ambition, that there is no Pretence which respects either of them, but we immediately em∣brace it, suffering our selves to be deceived by it, though

never so unlikely or unreasonable. Italy does not yet apprehend the Designs of France, to Lord it over her, under pretence of Protection, though she has seen the Publick Faith so often violated, as in the Treaties of Ratisbon, Carasco, and Mon••on; the Usurpation of Mont∣ferrat, the Valtoline, and Pignerol, and a Garrison put into Monaco. By such Pretexts Princes mask their Am∣bition, their Avarice and Designs, to the expence of the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects. Hence proceed all the Commotions and Wars that the World labours under.

As Interests alter, so also do these Pretexts; for they give Umbrage to them, and follow them. The Repub∣lick of Venice enter into League with the Grisons; the French oppose it, lest it should diminish their Alliance with them. Whereupon the People are divided into Factions, to the prejudice of the Catholicks, whom the Protestants endeavour to extirpate. The Switzers here∣upon summon a Diet, and can find no better Remedy, than to invite the Spaniards into the Valley; an Expedient before thought on by Pope Clement VIII. in the Instru∣ctions given to the Bishop of Veglia, when sent to the Catholick Cantons in Quality of Nuncio. Which Me∣thod was also approv'd of by Gouffier, who managed the Affairs of France, and who persuaded Count Alphonso Casati, Embassador from Spain to the Switzers, to write to the Duke of Feria, to enter the Valtoline with His Ma∣jesty's Forces; that thereby shutting up the Passage of Valcamonica from the Venetians, they might desist from their Pretensions, and that the Valley might be clear'd of the Protestants. The Duke, moved by these In∣stances, and by the common Danger of this Sect, which threatned the State of Milan, and all Italy, and also by the Complaints and Tears of the Catholicks, enter'd the Valtoline; and immediately the French, upon new Con∣siderations, change their Minds, and oppose this Intent, entring into League in Avignon with Venice and Savoy, under Pretence of the Liberty of Italy, though that con∣sists more in the stopping that Passage from the Protestants

on t'other side the Mountains, than in any Acquisitions the Spaniards could make in this Country; and the Val∣toline being only the Pretence of the League, the Arms of the Allies serv'd only as a Diversion, and all the Force and Design were turn'd to the Oppression of the Repub∣lick of Genoa. So that Pretences vary according to the Alteration of Interests.

Times by their Effects discover the Falsity of these Pretences; for either they don't perform what they pro∣mise, or don't act where they propos'd. The Republick of Venice had a mind to seize Gradisca, and took for a Pretext the Incursions of the Vscoques in Croatia: They made a Feint to defend the Liberty of the Sea, and made War upon the Land.

Many times they make War, upon pretence of Zeal for the Glory of God, and rather hinder it; sometimes for Religion, and confound it; sometimes for Publick Peace, and disturb it; sometimes for the Peoples Liberty, and oppress 'em; sometimes for Protection, and enslave them; sometimes to preserve their own State, and they invade others. O Men, O People, O States, O King∣doms! whose Tranquility and Happiness depends upon the Ambition and Capriche of a few.

When the Ends of Actions are Just, but are in danger of not being so interpreted, or of miscarrying if they are understood, we may so dispose them, that our Actions may appear different to the Eyes of the World, and be thought to be guided by other honest Causes. He who acts so, cheats none, but acts justifiably, but only a∣muses Malice by false Appearances, by which it deceives it self, and prevents its opposition to the just Designs of the Prince; for no Reason obliges him to point at the Mark at which he levels; for it would be impossible for him to strike one, if at the same time he did not seem to aim at another.

There is not less Danger to States, in the feign'd Zeal with which some would seem to respect the Publick, and regard only their own particular Interest. They pretend to reform the Government, to weaken its Au∣thority:

They propose Means, and suggest Counsels after the Effect, to discover Errors already past Remedy: They affect Liberty, to gain the Applause of the People against the Magistracy, and confound the State, by re∣ducing it afterwards to Slavery10 1.513. These Artifices are us'd by all Tyrants of Republicks11 1.514. What Feints did Tiberius make of restoring Liberty to that of Rome, when his whole Design was to oppress it12 1.515. The same Methods the Prince of O—us'd to make the Netherlands Revolt, which his Family have made use of since to Lord it over the Vnited Provinces. Time will shew them, to their Cost, the difference between a Natural Prince and a Tyrant; then they will repent of having preferr'd Rebellion with their Ruine, to Obedience with Security, as Cerialis advis'd those of Treves13 1.516. The People blindly fly to the Call of Liberty, and don't know it till they have lost it, and find themselves intangled in the Nets of Slavery. They suffer themselves to be moved by the Fears of these false Crocodiles, and rashly intrust them with their Lives and Fortunes. How peaceable would the World be, if Sub∣jects knew, that whether the Government be of All, of Many, or of One, it would have its Inconveniencies, with some kind of Tyranny: For though Speculation may invent a perfect Form of Government, as it must be of Men, not of Angels, it may be commended, but not practised14 1.517. So that Liberty consists not in this or that Form of Government, but in the Preservation of that which a long Use and Experience has constituted and approved, in which Justice is defended, and Pub∣lick

Peace preserv'd, supposing that some sort of Go∣vernment must be obey'd; for Liberty never suffers more than in such Changes. We think to find a better, and we fall into a worse; as it happen'd to those who survived Tiberius and Caius15 1.518; and when we better our selves, it does not countervail the Damage we sustain in the change of one Form to another. So that 'tis bet∣ter to bear with the present, though unjust16 1.519; and hope, that if the Prince be bad, God will be pleas'd to send another good one17 1.520. 'Tis he bestows King∣doms; and 'twould be accusing his Divine Decrees, not to obey those whom he has constituted. Nebuchadnezzar was a wicked Prince, yet God threatned a severe Punish∣ment to those who did not obey him18 1.521. As we are contented with the Seasons, and bear patiently the In∣conveniencies of Nature; so also we should the Defects of our Princes19 1.522. While there are Men, there will be Vices20 1.523. Where is there to be found a Prince with∣out them? These Evils are not continual. If one Prince be bad, another good one succeeds, and so one makes amends for the other21 1.524.

EMBLEM LXXIX.

[illustration]

NO Bird so much resembles Man in the Articulation of the Voice, as the Parrot* 1.525. Its Vivacity is so great, that some Philosophers have doubted whether it did not participate of Reason. Cardan says, that it surpasses all Birds in Ingenuity, and Quickness of Apprehension; and that it not only learns to Speak, but also to Meditate with a Desire of Glory1 1.526. This Bird is very Candid and Ingenuous, the Quality of Great Spi∣rits: yet is not its Candour exposed to Deceit, but she

knows how to prevent it; and as sly and crafty as the Serpent is, it evades his Artifices, and to secure its Nest from him, it hangs it at the end of the highest and slenderest Twig of a Tree, in the manner here represented, that when he would pass by them to devour its young ones, he falls by his own weight. So Artifice must be frustrated by Artifice, and Counsel by Counsel. In which Case, King Ferdinand the Catholick was an Exellent Master for Princes, as he sufficiently shewed in all his Designs, par∣ticularly in his Marriage with Germana de Foix, Niece to Lewis XII. of France, to break the Peace clapt up at Hagenaw, between the Emperor, and his Son-in-Law, King Philip I. without his knowledge, and to his preju∣dice. Nor did he use with less Address the Opportunity offer'd by the same King of France 's desiring a League with him, to get liberty to Invade the Kingdom of Naples, contriving the Matter so that he might recover the Governments of Rousillon and Sardinia: And when he saw the French King had already made an Inroad into Italy with that Intent, and withal how dangerous a Neighbour he would prove to the Kingdom of Sicily, which his Eye was upon, he put a stop to his Progress, broke the Treaty, and denounc'd War against him, entring into an Alliance with the Republick of Venice, and other Princes. And these Weapons are more ne∣cessary in War than Peace; for their Wit does more than Strength. And certainly that Commander deserves no small Praise, who despising the Vain-glory of Con∣quering his Enemy with the Sword, steals the Victory, and triumphs by Policy and Stratagem, whereby the Law of Nations is not the least violated2 1.527. For if the War be Just, the Methods thereof are so also3 1.528:

'Twixt Force and Fraud, what Difference in War?

And indeed, what Reason can be given, why you may not deceive him, whom it is lawful even to kill? It is

a piece of Magnanimity to preferr the Publick Safety before a Triumph, and make sure of Victory without exposing it to the manifest Fortune of War, when there's none, in Humane Judgment, can appear so certain, but it is subject to a thousand Chances. In countermining the cunning Designs and Intrigues of an Enemy, we must not always regard what a Prudent Man would do in the like case, (though to have also some Fore-thought of that were adviseable) but a Judgment must be formed from the Condition and Capacity of the Person to be dealt with; for all Men take not always the most proper and prudent Methods. Ferdinand Duke of Alba 's entring Portugal with an Army, upon King Sebastian 's Death, was Amazing; by several blamed as a very Dangerous En∣terprise, in a Person so eminently versed in the Art of War. To whom he reply'd, That he was not ignorant of the Danger; but he trusted in having to do with a Nation, which by a continued Enjoyment of Peace, had probably forgot the Affairs of War. Even when we have to do with Men eminent for Prudence, the Judgment and Conjecture we pass upon their Actions, even by the Rule of Reason and Prudence, is not infallibly certain; for sometimes they suffer themselves to be carry'd away by Passion, and the wisest Men are now and then guilty of the greatest Er∣rors, Self-conceit rendring them negligent, or too much Confidence in their Discretion, making them presume, that though they have a little lost their Way, they can easily find it again. Sometimes in Things they presuppose, Time and other Events deceive them. Wherefore it is the safest way, ever to suspend one's Judgment in Things that depend upon another's Pleasure, and not to go about to regulate them by our own Private Discretion; for every one has his particular Reasons unknown to others, and consonant to his Nature, which are the Spring of his Actions. What to one seems impossible, another thinks easie: And there be some Genius's that fear not the most hazardous Enterprises; some that are guided by Reason, others that are utterly averse to it.

The most secret Artifices of Enemies, or those who under colour of Friendship, aim wholly at their own Interest, are such particularly whereby they make their Proposals with so much Subtilty, that they seem to re∣dound to the Prince's Advantage, when they really tend to his Ruine; a Thing his Integrity is easily deluded in, if he want Experience, or smell not their Drift. It re∣quires therefore no small Prudence and Attention to turn such Counsels to the Destruction of the Authors thereof. Into what Precipes will that Government fall, which is directed by Foreign Councils, contrary to the Advice of the Holy Ghost4 1.529. But although an Enemy's Designs are usually discoverable by bare Reasoning, yet is it convenient to trace them also by Spies, the principal Instruments of Government, without which a Crown can never be secure, or admit of Encrease, nor a War be carry'd on with Success5 1.530. Vitellius was condemned for being improvident in Council, in War∣fare ignorant, how to draw up an Army, what belong'd to Scouts, when to prosecute, when protract a War. And indeed, of what ill Consequence this Negligence is, Germany can abundantly testifie, which has lost several advantageous Opportunities, and its Soldiers been often∣times surprized and cut off in their Quarters, for want of Intelligence of the Enemies Designs and Marches6 1.531. Ioshua made use of Spies, though God himself took care of his Arms7 1.532. Moses never March'd, but an Angel carry'd a Pillar of Fire before him, to shew where to encamp; yet by God's Command, he sent out Men to search the Promis'd Land8 1.533. Embassadors are nothing

but Publick Spies; and without prejudice to the Law of God, or that of Nations, may endeavour, by Bribes and Presents, to corrupt the Fidelity of Ministers, who even by Oaths are oblig'd to it, and to sift out what ill Con∣trivances are in Agitation against their Prince; for these are no way obliged to keep the Secret, and the other have on their side the Natural Reason of Self-preserva∣tion.

EMBLEM LXXX.

[illustration]

THE Stone-cutter at Home first prepares and polishes the Marbles he designs for the Orna∣nament of a Building; because afterwards it would be more troublesome, and the Work imperfect. For this Reason, I conceive, those of Solomon's Temple

were fashion'd, that it might be erected without Noise, and the Sound of Tools. Thus wise Princes ought to polish their Designs, and bring their Resolutions to Ma∣turity, before they put them in Execution; for not to consider of them but in the Field, is more like a Gladiator than a Prince. The Bull(the Figure of this Emblem) before he engages his Rival, practises by making Trial of himself, and by often running his Horns against a Tree, by degrees learns the Art of Defending himself, and Goring his Opposer1 1.534. He who is to Consult in heat of Action, fears all things, and knows not what Measures to take. But because Occasions happen not al∣ways as we wish, and sometimes it is not in our Power to retard or hasten them, it will be the part of Prudence to consider whether it is better to execute our Resolu∣tions with Leisure or Expedition, for that some Affairs require Speed in their Resolutions, others Time, and mature Consultation; and to offend on either hand, will be to the prejudice of the Government. Consideration, when of worse consequence than Rashness, is by all means to be avoided. In sudden Emergencies, Counsels are better snatch'd than taken. Whatever Time is spent in Deliberation, will either overcome the Danger, or lose the Opportunity. Fortune's nimble, but the gene∣rality of Men move but slowly, and that's the reason so few overtake her. The greatest part of our Delibera∣tions are upon Things already past, and the Counsel comes after the Event2 1.535. Our Affairs run with so much swiftness, that Counsel must be speedy to pursue them; nay, even that will be too slow, it ought to be in a readiness to expect them. When Time favours, it is assisted by Delay; otherwise Expedition surmounts it, and then Counsellors of lively, active Spirits, are chiefly necessary. Other Affairs, which allow Time, should be transacted with Maturity; for nothing is more opposite

to Prudence, than Haste and Passion. Impetuousness ever miscarries, and Examination and Attention are confounded by it. Hence it is that hot, rash Counsels almost always please at first Sight; are difficult in the Execution; in the Event grievous; and the Persons who suggest them, though they may appear at first daring, yet when they come to execute, are at a stand, being embroiled by their own Counsels: For Haste is blind, and without Forecast3 1.536. Wicked Counsels require Precipitation, but Good usually get Strength by Delay4 1.537. And although the Common People love to see Effects before they do Causes, and so always condemn slow Counsels; yet the Prince ought to be Proof against these Murmurings, which, upon Success, will afterwards re∣dound to his Glory5 1.538. Nevertheless, Delay must not be so great, as to let slip the Opportunity of Execution; a Fault the Emperor Valens was guilty of, who idly spent the Time of Action in Consultation6 1.539. This is a general Error in imprudent Counsellors, who, per∣plex'd with the Weight of Affairs, can neither judge of the Danger, nor come to any Conclusion; whence they start at the least Shadow, nay, and think by these very Doubts to pass for Discreet. They suspend their Coun∣sels, till Time it self furnish them; and then begin to Resolve, when the Opportunity is gone. Counsels there∣fore should be ripened, not hurried; for Maturity errs neither in Excess nor Defect of Time: as it is admirably express'd by Augustus, in his Device of a Dolphin twin'd round an Anchor, with this Inscription, Festina lente; with which that of Alexander the Great is not incompa∣tible, Nihil cunctando: the one being understood of Af∣fairs of Peace, the other concerning those of War, where Expedition gives Success to the greatest Designs. Cerealis

succeeded well in all Things, by Resolving and Executing with Expedition7 1.540. But notwithstanding Speed does generally produce great Effects in War; yet Care should be taken, that it be not blind and inconsiderate, begin∣ning briskly, but in the end languisheth8 1.541. When the Thing it self admits of Delay, and there is room for Deliberation, this is of more service than Rashness9 1.542: Though both in the one and the other Prudence should measure Time, either lest through want of it the Coun∣sels be like Whelps, born blind, or as Hedghogs with Prickles and Difficulties, by being too slow.

When therefore Orders come first out of the Prince's Hand, let them be Absolute, to prevent Confusion or Doubt in their Execution. For the most prudent Mini∣sters can never perform as they ought, such as come to them rough and deformed: It is for him that Com∣mands to prescribe the Form, for the Subject to Execute it. And if each do not keep to their distinct Duties, the Work will remain defective. The Prince should do the part of a Master-Workman, the Minister that of an infe∣rior Labourer. That Prince who leaves all to the Dis∣posal of his Ministers, either is ignorant or weary of his Office. 'Tis an ill-constituted Government, where ••ower is lodg'd in many; nay, it is indeed no Govern∣ment, which is not under one Head. If Ministers Rule, all Authority and the Order of Government will perish. Then only they may and ought to suspend the Execution of Orders, when the same appear evidently unjust, inasmuch as they are born for God, before their Prince. As also when the Prince's Commands are prejudicial to his Patrimony or Reputation, or inconsistent with good Government, and depend upon the knowledge of some particular Matters of Fact, or lastly, when Distance or other Accidents shall seem to have made such an Altera∣tion

in the state of Affairs, that it may be probably ga∣ther'd, that had the Prince known these before, he would not have given those Orders; in this Case, pro∣vided however there be no other considerable Danger in Delaying, they may be deferred and excepted against, modestly however, and with all the Respect due to his Authority and Judgment, with this Hope at least, that upon better Information, he may Command what is more proper to be done. Thus the Great Captain did, when, contrary to the Orders of Ferdinand the Catholick, he stay'd at Naples with his Army, considering with what Impatience the Italian Princes expected the Result of the Interview between the two Kings, Ferdinand, and his Son-in-Law, Philip I. and what a desperate Condition the Affairs of Naples would be in, if he abandon'd them at that Juncture. For all this, if the Minister know his Prince to be so great a Lover of his own Counsels, as rather to do amiss, than admit of Instruction, he may hold his Tongue, and Dissemble; for it were down∣right Folly for him to expose himself to Danger, with∣out hopes of a Remedy. Corbulo was already engaged in some considerable Enterprize; but the Emperor having Commanded him to desist, he retir'd: For tho' he knew those Orders were unadvisedly given, yet he would not ruine himself by Disobeying them10 1.543.

No Orders require so punctual Observance in the Mi∣nister, as those which relate to Matters of State. In this Case (unless the above-mention'd Circumstances occurr, or there be otherwise any considerable evident Danger in the Execution) he is implicitly to Obey, without giving any heed to his private Opinion and Ar∣g••ments. For the Designs of Princes are often too deeply rooted, to be penetrated by the Minister, or rather they would not have him dive into them; and

therefore he should side with the Prince's Commands, and presume upon his Prudence that so it ought to be. Hence Dolabella, when Commanded by Tiberius to bring the Ninth Legion out of Germany, readily Obeyed, al∣though he wanted not Reasons to the contrary11 1.544. If every one had liberty to canvas and examine what is enjoined, all things would be confounded, and infinite Opportunities lost. A Kingdom (as has been said else∣where) is like a Musical Instrument, whose Strings the Prince tunes, who runs them all over with his Fingers; whereas the Minister touches only one, and not hearing the rest sound, cannot know whether it be too high or too low, and would very easily be mistaken, if he went to set it according to his own Fancy. The Count de Fuentes, by the liberty of his Years, Zeal, Services and Experiences, crowned with so many signal Trophies and Victories gave him, sometimes (while he governed the State of Milan) suspended his Obedience to King Philip the Third's Orders, because he ••udged them improper, and to proceed rather from the Self-Interest or Ignorance of his Ministers, than his own Mind: Which Example many afterwards have followed, to the great prejudice of the Publick Repose, and Regal Authority. It would be of very ill Consequence, for Ministers to be always allow'd to question, whether what is Commanded, be the Prince's Will or not; an Abuse which usually has its first Rise from their knowing it not to be his own Hand that proportions and polishes the Stones designed for the Edifice of Government. But suppose it be ano∣ther's, yet due Honour and submission ought to be paid to the Commands, no less than if they came from his own Will and Judgment, or else there would be nothing but Confusion and Disorder. Zealous and Prudent Obedience reverences the bare Hand and Seal of its Sovereign.

But if Princes are too remote, and there is Danger of their Orders coming too late, even after the Event, or that variety of Accidents (particularly in Affairs of War)

may not allow Time for Deliberation, and there be certain Intelligence that the Opportunity will be in the mean time lost, it will be Prudence to give full Power of Acting as Occasion shall require, lest that happen which befell Vespasian, in the Civil War with Vitellius, when Distance of Place made the Counsels come after the Events. To avoid which Inconveniency, Tiberius, upon sending Drusus to Command the German Legions, joined with him some Prudent and Experienc'd Coun∣sellors, whom he might Consult as Occasion required, but a full Power to Act as he saw Opportunity. When Helvidius Priscus was sent into Armenia, he had a Com∣mission to Act as he saw Occasion. In••fine, this was the usual Practice of the Roman Senate, to leave all to the Discretion and Conduct of their Commanders, and to recommend nothing in particular to them, but only all possible Care that the Commonwealth suffer'd no Damage. An Example the Republicks of Venice and Florence are far from imitating; who, unwilling to let their Liberty lie at the Mercy of one Man, restrain the Power of their Generals; being forewarned by the Example of Augustus, who turned the Arms upon the Commonwealth, which he had taken up in its Defence against Mark Anthony.

This Freedom of Power the Ministers who are near the King's Person are wont to limit, to encrease their own, and render it necessary for all to pass through their Hands. Whence it is that so much Time is spent in Deliberating, and that Resolutions are taken too late to be executed, or at least to have the Success that might be expected from them; and consequently the Charges and Pains in Preventing is utterly thrown away. It hap∣pens also sometimes, that while there passes so great a Space of Time between the Accidents themselves, and their being known and examined, fresh Advice is brought of the State of Affairs, with new Circumstances, which make it necessary to alter the former Orders; and after this manner Days and Years slide away, without any Effect either of Resolution or Action.

EMBLEM LXXXI.

[illustration]

THE Forces of all Powers are limited, those of Ambition alone (the common Vice of Humane Nature) infinite. This, the more it has, the more it desires to have, or rather is a kind of fiery Ap∣petite by the Heart exhaled, which draws Strength and Encrease from the very Matter it is apply'd to. This Failing is greater in Princes than in other Men; for to the Desire of Getting is joined that Glory of Com∣manding, both which neither submit to Reason nor Danger, and hate to measure themselves by their Abili∣ties. Wherefore the Prince ought to weigh well what his Sword is able to strike, what his Shield to defend, always remembring this, that his Crown is a finite and

limited Circle. King Ferdinand the Catholick, in all his Undertakings, never failed to consider every Circum∣stance of them, their Cause, Disposition, Time, Means, and End. He who attempts nothing but what he can effect, will pass for Invincible; whereas one that aspires to a Thing impossible, or too difficult, discovers the Bounds of his Power, and the frustrated Designs are, as 'twere, publick Records of his Weakness. There is no Monarchy so Potent, but it is upheld more by Opinion than Reality, by Reputation than Strength. Desire of Glory and Sovereignty hurry us on, so that all things seem easie, but in the end we meet with Difficulties un∣observed before. Almost all Wars might be avoided, were their Means and End throughly examined at first: It is therefore incumbent on the Prince, before he en∣gage in them, perfectly to know his Forces, as well Offensive as Defensive, the State of his Malitia, and what Officers he has to Command them, the Substance of his Coffers, what Contributions he may expect from his Subjects, and whether they be like to continue Loyal in Adversity, also by Study, Reading and Conversation, to instruct himself in the Disposition and Situation of Countries, in the Customs of Nations, the Natures of his Enemies, their Wealth, Auxiliaries and Allies. Let him measure every one's Sword, and examine wherein his Strength consists. Henry, King of Castile, notwithstanding his Sickness, never neglected this, but sent several Embassadors as far as Asia, to inform him of the Manners and Customs of those Parts. The same did Moses, before the Israelites entred the Promised Land1 1.545. And lest the Prince we frame by these Emblems should want this Matter also, I shall here, in general, touch upon some Points of it, with what brevity the present Design requires.

Nature, willing to shew her Beauty and Power, by the variety of her Productions, has stampt a Difference

not only upon the Faces, but also on the Minds of Men; there being a vast Disagreement between the Tempers and Morals of Nations. To this end, she has variously disposed the Causes themselves; which either jointly all operate in some Places, or separately; in these some, in those others. Geographers have divided the Globe of the Earth into divers Climates, each of which is subject to a particular Planet, as to the principal Cause and Fountain of that Diversity: And because the First Cli∣mate, which is drawn through Meroe, an Island of the River Nile, is subject to Saturn, they say its Inhabitants are Black, Barbarous, Rough, Suspicious, Treacherous, and Cannibals.

That those of the Second, which is attributed to Iupiter, and passes through Siene, a City of Egypt, are Religious, Grave, Honest and Prudent.

Those of the Third, which is subject to Mars, and reaches through Alexandria, are Restless and Warlike.

Those of the Fourth, which is under the Sun, and is stretch'd through the Isle of Rhodes and the Midst of Greece, are Men of Learning, Orators, Poets, and Inge∣nious Artists.

Those of the Fifth, which passes through Rome, di∣viding Italy from Savoy, and is ascribed to Venus, are Effeminate, Lovers of Musick and Luxury.

Those of the Sixth, govern'd by Mercury, and passing through France, are Fickle, Inconstant, and addicted to Sciences.

Lastly, Those of the Seventh, where the Moon pre∣sides, and which is extended through Germany, the Low-Countries, and England, are Flegmatick, Lovers of Good-Fellowship, Fishing, and Trading.

Nevertheless, this one Cause seems not to be always uniform, nor sufficient: For under the same Parallel or Climate, with the same Elevation of the Pole, and an equal Rising and Setting of the Stars, we see opposite Effects, particularly in the Climates of the Lower Hemi∣sphere. In Aethiopia, for Instance, the Sun's Beams scorch and blacken Mens Bodies; but in Brasil, which

has the same Latitude, their Skins are White, and the Air Temperate and Agreeable. The Ancients held the Torrid Zone, for its excessive Heat, to be uninha∣bitable, yet in Armenia it is very Temperate, and well Peopled. And though those Eternal Luminaries of Heaven have some energy, yet the Disposition of the Earth contributes more; for we find the Effects of their Rays to be greater or varied, according to the various Situation of Hills and Valleys, and temper'd even by Rivers and Lakes. This is undeniable, That Nature is wonderful in her Works, and that she sometimes seems to swerve from the ordinary Laws of Causes, and from Reason, as it were on purpose to baffle Humane Curiosity. Who can account for what we see happen in the Country of Malabar, where Calecut is? Vast high Mountains, which touch the very Clouds, and end in a Promontory call'd anciently Corus, now Cape Comorin, divide this Country into two Parts, and altho' both have the same Elevation of the Pole, yet when on this side the Moun∣tains Winter begins, and Neptune's Billows rage and swell, on the other side the Fields and Towns are burnt up with the scorching Heats of Summer, and the Waters continually calm.

This Diversity then which is in Climates, in the Situa∣tion of Places, the Temperature of the Air, and Food, variously distinguishes Mens Complexions, and these again their very Natures. For the Manners of the Mind follow the Temperament and Disposition of the Body. The Northerns, by reason of the Sun's Remoteness, and the Coldness of their Countries, are Sanguine, Robust, and Valiant; whence they have almost ever had Domi∣nion over the Southern Nations2 1.546; the Assyrians over the Chaldaeans, the Medes over the Assyrians, the Parthians over the Greeks, the Turks over the Arabians, the Goths over the Germans, the Romans over the Africans, over the French the English, and over these the Scotch. They

love Liberty, as those also do who inhabit Mountains, as the Switzers, Grisons, and Biscayners, their Temperament being not much unlike the Constitution of the Northerns. In Nations very near the Sun, Excess of Heat quite dries up the Blood; which makes the Inhabitants Melancholy, and Profound in the Penetration of Nature's Secrets; whence all other Northerly Nations have received the Mysteries of Sciences from the Egyptians and Arabians. Those Countries which lie between the two Torrid Zones enjoy a favourable Air, and there Religion, Justice and Prudence Flourish3 1.547. But because every Nation differs from others in many Particulars, although they are all situate under one Climate, I shall here set down what I have by long Experience and Study ob∣served of each, lest this necessary piece of Knowledge should be wanting to your Highness, who exercise Do∣minion over almost all.

The Spaniards love Religion and Justice, are patient of Toil, in Counsel profound, in Execution slow; of such great Souls, that neither Good Fortune elevates, nor Ill dejects them. What is in them a Natural Glory, and Greatness of Mind, is imputed to them for Pride, and a Contempt of other Nations, when notwithstand∣ing it is that which is most agreeable to all, and makes them most esteemed4 1.548; that, I say, which above all follows the guidance of Reason, and by the Dictates of that checks its Passions and Appetites.

The Africans are Subtile, Deceitful, Superstitious and Barbarous, and observe no Military Discipline.

The Italians Cautious and Prudent: There's no Spe∣cies or Image of Vertue which they represent not in their Words and Behaviour, to promote their Ends and Interest. A Glorious Nation, whose Temporal Empire

did heretofore, as its Spiritual one does at this day, Rule almost the whole World. They are no less able and fit to Command, than Obey; of Prodigious Cou∣rage and Ingenuity in Arts, as well of Peace as War. Their excess of Judgment makes them enclinable to Suspicion, to the prejudice of themselves, and other Nations. They are in continual fear and jealousie of greater Powers, and make it their endeavour to balance them. There's not a Sword drawn, nor Pike trail'd in any part of the Earth, but what has been first made and sharpened in the Forge of Italy.

In Germany, variety of Religions, Civil Wars, and the Soldiers of other Nations serving there, have cor∣rupted their ancient Candour and Ingenuity of Mind. And as things of a Delicate Make receive most Damage by being corrupted; so where Foreign Malice has infected these People, it has render'd them more Mistrust∣ful and Depraved in their Morals. Some of them have wholly thrown off Allegiance to their Prince. The Horror of so many Cruelties has render'd their Minds so Savage, that they are neither touch'd with Love nor Compassion towards their Neighbours or one another. One cannot, without Tears, compare what this Illu∣strious Heroick Nation has been, with what it is now, ruin'd no less by the Vices, than Arms of others. Al∣though this must be confess'd, that in a great many Na∣ture has had more Force than Example, several still re∣faining the Candour and generous Sincerity of their An∣cestors; those ancient Manners are yet in our Time suffi∣ciently demonstrated by the Integrity and Nobleness of these. Nevertheless, tho' the Case be thus in Germany, yet we cannot deny but Good Manners have more In∣••••••nce there, than in other Places Good Laws5 1.549. All Arts are in request there; Nobility is most diligently preserved, in which Thing it may boast above all other

Nations. Their Obedience and Patience in War is great, their Hearts strenuous and valiant. The Power of the Empire perished, by being too prodigal of it Grandeur and Majesty among the Princes, and suffering the Usur∣pation of so many Provinces, and the too great Liberty of the Free Towns, the chief Rise of its Troubles, by the Disunion of the Parts of so Puissant a Body.

The French are Civil, Affable, and Warlike: Their first Onsets, with the same Speed they are heated, cool again. They neither know how to keep within the Bounds of their own, nor preserve themselves in ano∣ther Land; are Impatient and Fickle; in Look lovely, in Manners intolerable; their Vivacity, and Freedom of Action, being very disagreeable to the Gravity of other Nations. All Arts and Sciences flourish among them.

The English are Grave and Resolute, have a good Opinion of themselves; and, when Occasion requires, undauntedly expose their Lives to the greatest Dangers, though sometimes carry'd on by too bold and impetuous Passion, rather than premeditated Choice. They are excellent and Powerful by Sea, and good Soldiers also at Land, when by long Use inured to Arms.

The Irish are Hardy; despise Arts, and proudly boast of their Extraction.

The Scots are Constant and Faithful to their Kings, having continued the Crown in one Line for Twenty Ages down to these Times. They know no other Tri∣bunal of their Anger and Revenge, but the Sword.

The Netherlands are Industrious, Men of Candour and Sincerity, fit for Arts both of Peace and War, in which that Soil has always produced Eminent Men. They love Religion and Liberty; know not how to cheat others, nor will they suffer themselves to be cheated. Their kind Natures are like melted Metals, which after∣wards consolidated, always retain the Impression of their Jealousies. Hence the Wit and Address of Count Maurice were able to give them an Aversion to the Spaniards,

••••d under a Pretence of Liberty, bring on them that Yoke of Slavery under which the Vnited Provinces live even at this day6 1.550.

The rest of the Northern Nations are Wild and Un∣governable; know how to Conquer, and maintain their Conquests.

The Polanders are Martial, but better at Preserving than Acquiring.

The Hungarians Haughty, and resolute Assertors of their Privileges. They retain also many of the Manners of those Nations which have took up Arms for or against them.

The Sclavonians Fierce.

The Greeks Vain, Superstitious, and without Faith; forgetful now of what they have been heretofore.

The Asiaticks are Slaves to their Sovereigns, to their Vices also, and Superstitions. That vast Empire was at first raised and is still supported more by our Cowardice than the Courage of that People, more for our Punishment than their Desert.

The Moscovites and Tartars are naturally Servile; rush with heat into the Battel, and as presently fly.

But these General Observations comprehend not with∣out Exception every Individual: For there are found some Grateful and Loyal Persons in the most Ungrateful and Perfidious Nation, inasmuch as Alteration of Govern∣ments, passing from one Nation to another, Conversa∣tion, Inter-Marriages, War, Peace, and those very Mo∣tions of the Spheres which from the Poles and from the Zodiack of the Primum Mobile derive on Things here below Celestial Influences, change Customs and Man∣ners, nay, even Nature it self. For if we consult Hi∣stories, we shall find the Germans were noted for their Bravery; the Italians, on the contrary, branded with Cowardice: a Difference not visible now. Nations have

been uppermost by turns; and while Monarchy lasted in them, Vertues, Arts and Arms flourished, which have been afterwards, with the Empires Ruine, buried in its Ashes, and with it revived again in another Place. Nevertheless, all Nations have some peculiar Inclinations and Passions, which insensibly stick to Foreigners, if they make any considerable Stay amongst them.

The Customs then of Nations being known, the Prince will be able far better to manage Affairs whether of Peace or War, and know how to rule Foreign Countries, every one of which enclines to a particular Manner of Govern∣ment 7 1.551, as conformable to its Nature. They have not all an Uniform Reason of State, no more than one Medicine is a Cure for all their Diseases. And herein Unexperienc'd Counsellors are generally out, who think others can be govern'd by the Maxims and Principles of their own States. The Bit which is easie to the Spaniard, is not so to the Italian and Netherlander: And as the ways of Dressing, Managing and Breaking the Horses of Spain, Naples and Hungary are different, though they are all of one Species; so Nations also should be diffe∣rently govern'd according to their Natures, Customs and Habits.

From this variety of Peoples Conditions, we may gather, how careful the Prince ought to be in sending Embassadors, to see that they be not only endued with all the Qualifications necessary for the Representation of his Person, and Exercise of his Power; but withal, that their Natures, Wit and Manners, agree with those of the Nation they are to treat with: For if this Con∣formity be wanting, they will be fitter to kindle War, than to make Peace; to excite Hatred, than procure Love. Hence God himself was, as it were, in Suspence, and Dubious in the Choice of a Minister to send to his People, and therefore deliberates thus with himself; Whom shall I send, and who will go for us8 1.552? Every

Court requires a Minister suitable to its Nature. In that of Rome, Men of Thought are approved, who are perfectly versed in the Art of Dissimulation, so as not to betray any Passion, either in their Speech or Looks: such as appear Sincere, and are Subtile and Prudent; who know how to Oblige all Men, and be Obliged to none; are Civil in Negotiations, Easie in Treaties, Re∣served in Counsels, Constant in Resolutions, Friends to all, Intimate with none.

The Emperor's Court requires a Man who maintains his Authority without Pride, who Speaks with Sincerity, Proposes with Modesty, Answers with Truth, and Ex∣pects with Patience; who anticipates not Accidents, but makes use of them when they happen; who, in a word, is Cautious in Promising, Exact in performing.

The French Court likes Men of Facetious, Pleasant Hu∣mours, that can mix Seriousness with Gaiety; that nei∣ther despise, nor very much regard Promises; who change with the Times, though more according to the present than future.

In England, the Grave and Reserved are commended, such as are slow both in Negotiations and Dispatches.

At Venice are valued Men of Eloquence, of a Ready lavention, Ingenuous in Reasoning and Proposing, and Quick-sighted into others Designs.

At Genoa, Persons of Frugality, loving rather to com∣pose than breed Dissention; who keep up their Autho∣rity without State, are Patient, and Time-Servers.

The Suissers require such as can, upon occasion, lay aside Publick Grandeur, and be Familiar in Conversa∣tion; as have learn'd to ingratiate themselves by Pre∣sents and Hopes, to have Patience, and watch their Op∣portunities; for they have to do with a Subtile and Jealous People, differing from each other in Religion, Factions, and Methods of Government, but are unanimous in their Resolutions and Decrees, and in their Counsels avoid Extremes, which each Canton afterwards executes according to its own Method.

Now, as these Qualities are proper for every Court before-mention'd; so are Complaisance, Civility, and Splendour, of universal use in all, if accompany'd with a good Mien and Carriage, with some Learning and Knowledge of Languages, particularly the Latine; for these affect every body, procure the Applause and Esteem of Foreigners, and Credit to one's own Country.

As Nations differ in Manners, so do they also in Strength. That of the Church, consists in the Respect and Obedience of Christian Believers; that of the Em∣pire, in Reputation of Grandeur; of Spain, in its Infantry; France, in the Nobility; of England, in the Sea; of the Turks, in their Number; that of Poland, in its Cavalry; that of the Venetians, in their Prudence; of the Savoyards, in their Judgment.

Almost all Nations differ from each other in Arms both Offensive and Defensive, which are adapted to the Genius and Disposition of each Country; wherein it is principally to be considered which are the most common and general, and whether those of our own Country are inferior to others, that the most advantageous may be made use of; for Excellency in one kind of Weapons, or the Novelty of the late-invented ones, often give or take away Empires. The Parthians enlarged theirs by the use of Darts: The French and Northerns opened a way to theirs by that of the armed Lance, forc'd on by the Swiftness of their Cavalry: The Art of Fencing, which the Romans practis'd in their Publick Sword-Plays, (wherein Judgment has great effect) made them Masters of the Universe: And the Spaniards have conquer'd a New World, and establish'd a Monarchy in Europe, by the Invention of several sorts of Fire-Arms; for these, above all, require Courage and Resolution, which are the particular Vertues of that Nation. To this Ele∣ment of Fire the very Earth has opposed it self, (so that now all the Four Elements conspire the Destruction of Mankind;) and by introducing the Pick-ax and Shovel, the Industry of the Dutch has made such advances, as to be able to resist the Valour of Spain.

The greatest Politicians often mistake the Balance of Governments; particularly some of the Italians, who vainly strive to keep them always in Aequilibrio; for that Government is not the most Dangerous or Potent, whose Dominions are of the Largest Extent, or Subjects most Numerous, but which knows best how to use its Strength. If you put the Forces in a pair of Scales, and one fall down, the other hang in the Air; yet, upon adding to this but one drachm of Prudence and Valour, or else if the quantity of Ambition and Tyranny exceed in that, the former shall poise, if not out-weigh the latter. They who have raised their Fortune in this World, and ruled it, have all had but slender Beginnings. The Grandeur of the House of Austria inflamed the Envy of many, and all conspired to bring it down, while not one so much as thought of Sweden, which had undoubtedly enslaved Germany, and perhaps Italy too, had not the King's Death prevented it. Powers that begin to grow, are more to be feared than those that are already grown; for in these their Declension is Natural, as in those their Encrease. The one strive to preserve themselves by the Publick Quiet, the other to advance themselves by di∣sturbing Foreign Dominions. Suppose one Power be in it self stronger than another, this has not therefore less Valour than that, to defend and protect it self. One Planet has more Force and Vigour in its own House, than another in its Elevation. Nor are these Fears of a Neigh∣bouring Power always well grounded; on the other side, they often turn to its Advantage. Italy was under Ap∣prehensions of Slavery from the West, when it saw the Kingdom of Sicily united to the Crown of Castile; which were not a little augmented when Naples was added, and both at once paid Obedience to Castile: But when the Emperor Charles V. annexed the State of Milan to the Crown of Spain, it seemed absolutely to Despair; yet for all this, the Princes lost not their Liberty; on the contrary, have been effectually preserv'd against the Turkish and Transalpine Arms, and enjoy'd a whole Age of Peace. The Fort de Fuentes, built by the Spaniards,

was a great Eye-sore to many, who look'd on it as a Bridle to Italy, yet Experience has shew'd its only Design was their Defence. But all these Examples are not suffi∣cient to cure the Pannick Fears of that Hypochondria of State-Interest, as they call it, especially complicated with the ill Humours of Envy and Emulation, so as to make it shake off those Melancholy Whimsies. His Ca∣tholick Majesty lays Siege to Casal, to dispossess the French of it, and put it into the Hands of the right Owner, to promote the Peace of Italy: And what do the Envious, but immediately enter into a new League to oppose him? As if one City, more or less, were of any moment to so vast a Dominion. From this false Apprehension of future Evils and Dangers, which per∣haps would never have really come to pass, proceed other present ones, much greater, by the Anticipation of their Remedies. Let such Persons then as are thus solicitous to poise the Balance of Governments, lay aside their Emulations; for it cannot be effected without pre∣judice to the Publick Repose. Who can so keep the Globe of the World in this Equinox of Power, that some shall not come nearer the Solstices of Grandeur than others; Nations would be in perpetual War; nothing giving more Disturbance to them, than to be once pos∣sess'd with such empty Chimera's which never have an end, especially since the Union of inferiour Powers against a Greater cannot be of long continuance: And should they pull this down, who will they find to share the Grandeur among them, so that each shall be satisfy'd, and not every one desire the Whole? Who shall keep them so even, that one shall not encrease faster than another? Since Man's Body is preserved by the inequality of its Members, why should not States, as well by the Greatness of one and Mediocrity of another Commonwealth? It is the securer Policy to follow the most Powerful, and conform to their Fortune, than to oppose them. Opposition awaken•• Power, and gives a Pretence to Tyranny. The Orb•• of Heaven suffer themselves to be whirled by the Vio∣lence of the Prim••m Mobile, which they cannot resist;

and in following the Motion of that, perform their own Course. Ferdinand de Medicis, Duke of Tuscany, learn'd at Rome the Art of Molesting Superior Powers, and pra∣ctised it against Spain by certain new Devices, in France, England, and Holland; but he afterwards found the Danger of it, and left it as a Lesson to his Successors never to use them; which they observe to this day, to the great Benefit of the Publick Tranquility.

EMBLEM LXXXII.

[illustration]

SOme adorned their Helmets with Swans and Pea∣cocks, by the Generosity of these Creatures to ani∣mate their Minds, and inflame them with a Desire of Glory; others with a Bear's or Lion's Head, letting

the Skin hang down their Shoulders, to strike Terror into their Enemies. So that of this Device (the Design of which is to shew what a Price the Prince ought to set upon Arms) I have chosen for the Crest a Porcupine, whose Quills, no less agreeable for their Roughness, than the Ostrich's Feathers are for their Smoothness, at once Defend and Assault. There's no Garb more graceful than Armour adorned with Arms. The Splendour of Purple, however sparkling with Gold, Pearls and Dia∣monds, is insignificant; and the Magnificence of Palaces and Attendance, and the Pomp of Courts useless, except flaming Swords, and the Glittering of Arms, contribute to render Princes Illustrious. Solomon, the wisest of Kings, gloried not so much in his costly Wardrobes, as in his rich Arsenals, which were stored with Shields and Targets of an inestimable Value1 1.553. The Spaniards of old prized a War-Horse more than their Blood2 1.554: now that Esteem is sunk, by the Convenience of Coaches and Chariots, the Use of which was prohibited among the Romans to all but Senators, and Ladies of Quality3 1.555. To remedy which Abuses, and once more introduce the Custom of Riding, the Emperor Charles V. spoke thus in the Assembly of the States of Madrid, in the Year 1534: The Natives of these Kingdoms(said he)have ever been esteemed and honoured both at Home and Abroad, for their Skill in Chivalry; and it is by this alone they have obtained so many glorious Victories over their Enemies, as well Chri∣stians as Infidels, conquered so many Kingdoms and Dominions as at this day depend on our Crown. The Scripture says, in the Praise of Men of Courage, that their Shields are of Fire4 1.556; intimating how careful they are to keep them

bright and well polish'd: and in another place observes, that their Rays reflected on neighbouring Mountains were like Lamps of Fire5 1.557. David said, a Sword added Grace even to the Majesty of God6 1.558. Hannibal's Habit was mean and modest, but in Equipage he surpass'd all others7 1.559. The Emperor Charles V. took more delight in Military Pomp, than in Robes embroider'd with Gold. Ottocarus, King of Bohemia, being over∣come by the Emperor Rodolphus, came with great Splen∣dour to swear Homage to him, and, as he was exhorted by his Attendance, to deck himself as became his Majesty: he replied; Arm, and March in Rank and File, and shew these men, that you place your Bravery and Gallantry, not in Fine Cloaths, but in your Arms, for they best become both me and you. That Majesty begets Princes most Autho∣rity, which proceeds from Power. The People chuse them for their Defence; which was intimated by the Navarrois, when, in their Coronations, they seated the Kings on a Shield: This was their Throne, and Heaven their Canopy. The Prince should be a Buckler to his Sub∣jects, armed against all Assaults, and exposed to Dangers and Injuries. He will never appear more beautiful either to them or Foreigners, than when in Armour. The first Ornaments and Marks of Honour the ancient Germans gave their Youth, was a Sword and Buckler: Till then they were part of their Family, but afterwards became Members of their Government8 1.560. The Prince never looks like himself, but when in Arms. There's no Equipage more splendid than a Troop of Curiassiers; no Train more pleasing to the Eye than that of Squa∣drons, whose Sight is then most agreeable, when they are Martially equipt with all things necessary for an Attack, and want Nothing either for their Defence or

Subsistence. An Army requires no other Ornament but what is necessary for them. Splendid Furniture is but Luggage and Cumber9 1.561. That makes the best Ap∣pearance in War, which conduces most to the principal End of Victory. Hence Scipio the African, upon going into Spain, commanded each of his Men to carry on his Shoulders Thirty Days Provision, and Seven Stakes for Intrenchments. Such was then the Equipage of that Warlike Nation, so inured to Hardships, that they took the City to be built for the Roman Senate and People, the Temples for the Gods, but thought their Glory was in the Fields, under Tents and Pavilions10 1.562. By such Discipline they were able to rule the World. Delights, Costly Cloaths, and Riches, are for Courtiers; in Sol∣diers they do but excite the Enemy's Avarice. Hence Hannibal had just cause to smile, when Antiochus, shewing him his Army, rather beautiful in Apparel, than strong in Arms, demanded whether this would be enough for the Romans: Yes,(answer'd he, with an African Subtilty) certainly enough, be they never so Covetous. Let not the empty Show and Glittering of Gold and Silver terrifie you, which neither Defend nor Wound, said Galgacus to the Britains, to take away the fear of the Romans11 1.563. And Solyman, going to relieve Ierusalem, to encourage his Men, tells them:

Their Glorious Equipage you view from hence, Shall be our Plunder, 'stead of their Defence.* 1.564

And tho'Iulius Caesar was for having his Soldiers Rich, because he thought fear of losing their Estates would make such Men more Resolute; yet large Spoils expose Victory to sale12 1.565, and Arms adorned with nothing

but their own Strength buy it: For the Soldier is gene∣rally more solicitous to preserve what he has, than even to get the Victory. He that goes to fight, with a Spirit of Covetousness, is desirous to conquer his Enemy, only that he may afterwards rifle him. Interest and Glory are powerful Incentives to Man's Breast. How would Hannibal have laugh'd to have seen the Soldiers of these times so fine and spruce, and with such sumptuous Equi∣pages, that there are scarce Horses and Carriages enough for them. How could he have pass'd the Pyrenaean Hills, or open'd a Way over the Snowy Alps, with such a num∣ber of Chariots? They now (particularly in Germany) look not like Armies, but large Colonies of Nations, removing from one Place to another, with their whole Families, and all their Houshold Goods, as if they were Instruments of War13 1.566. The like Remissness in Disci∣pline Tacitus observ'd to be in Otho's Army. There is no Prince rich enough, no Province plentiful enough to sup∣ply them with Provision. They are equally injurious to Friends and Enemies. The same slackness was introduc'd by Duke Fridland, to raise a great number of Soldiers, suf∣fering them to Forage whole Countries, with a Design, as some thought, to oppress and weaken them, so that they should never after be able to make head against his Forces, or else by this Licentiousness to enervate the Army it self, following herein the Practice of Caecinna14 1.567.

This Abuse threatens great Inconveniencies, unless a timely Remedy be applied, and that one which shall not appear desperate. For tho' it costs no less Pains to cor∣rect undisciplin'd Soldiers, than resist Enemies, as Corbulo ••ound in Syria15 1.568; yet this must be understood, when the Enemy gives not Time, or at least when it is im∣proper to make so sudden a leap from one extreme to the other. But if Time allow, nothing hinders but an

Army may be reduced to Order and Discipline, by Exercise, Severity, and Example; without which three, it is impossible it should be reformed, at least long con∣tinue so, as Vitellius experimentally found true16 1.569. Corbulo was sensible of the same, when he was sent into Germany, and therefore reduced those slothful, disorderly Legions to their ancient Discipline. The same he did afterwards with his Army in Syria17 1.570, where he found Soldiers so ignorant in the Affairs of War, that there were many, even Veterans, who had never kept Guard, or stood Centinel, who were utter Strangers to Trenches and Fortifications, unarmed, but rich and magnificent, as having served all their time in good Gar∣risons 18 1.571; and cashiering such as were unserviceable, kept the rest encamped all the Winter, to inure them to Cold, himself in a thin Habit, and his Head uncovered, always attending them, whether on a March or in their Works, commending the Valiant, comforting the Weak, and giving Example to all19 1.572; and when he perceiv'd the Inclemency of the Weather made many leave their Colours, he remedy'd that by Severity, not pardoning (as was usual in other Armies) the first and second Transgression of that nature, but whoever Deserted was immediately put to Death. And that was found to be of more use than Clemency; for fewer deserted his Camp, than did those where it was pardoned20 1.573. The Soldier could never be brought to undergo those great Fatigues, and expose himself to the present Hazards of

War, without some other Severity, or some Reward to equal those two. Princes, by Honours and Recompences, make good Generals; and these good Soldiers, by Example, Rigour, and Liberality. Godfrey well knew Courage to be encreased by Glory, and Hopes of Ad∣vantage, when, upon the point of giving Battel,

He clears the Doubts, and elevates the Hopes Of those whose Bravery deserves Reward.—

Some he with Wealth, with Honour some excites, And diff'ring Genius's as each delights.* 1.574

I dare affirm, no Soldiers can be good, unless their Commanders be something enclin'd to Prodigality and Severity. And 'tis probably on this account the Germans call a Regiment, and all that belongs to it, the Colonel's Staff, (den Regiment oder Colonelstah,) for with that Sol∣diers are to be ruled. Moses kept his in such strict Discipline, that suing once for Passage through the King of Edom's Country, he withal engaged, that none of them should drink of the Water of his Wells, or pass through any one's Fields or Vineyards21 1.575.

Antiquity has left us an illustrious Example of the Re∣establishment of decayed Military Discipline in the Person of Metellus, when he was in Africa, where he found the Roman Army so corrupted, that the Soldiers would not stir out of their Quarters, deserted their Colours, and dispersing themselves over the Province, Ravag'd and Plunder'd where-ever they came, being guilty of all the Extravagancies that Avarice and Luxury are capable of inspiring. Yet all these he insensibly remedied, by Ex∣ercising them in Military Arts. He first order'd, that no Bread, or any other Meat dress'd, should be sold in the Camp; forbad the Sutlers to follow the Army; suffer'd not any Common Soldier, upon a March, to

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have a Servant or Mule. And thus correcting the other Abuses, he restor'd them to their former Courage and Strength. The effect of which Care was so great, as of it self to terrifie Iugurtha, and oblig'd him, by Embassa∣dors, to beg his Life, and the Lives of his Children of him, and to promise the Delivery of all besides to the Romans. Arms are Vital Spirits, which cherish and give motion to the Body of a Government; the Surety of Publick Tranquility, wherein the Preservation and Encrease of the same consists, provided they be well ordered, and admit of Discipline. This the Emperor Alexander Severus well knew, when he said, Ancient Dis∣cipline was the Support of the Commonwealth, the Fall of which would be the Ruine of the Roman Name and Empire22 1.576.

Since then it is of so great Importance to have good Soldiers, it is the Duty of Princes to conferr Favours and Honours upon them. Saul loved a brave Soldier so well, that he would not suffer him out of his sight. Reward and Honour find, and Exercise makes them: For Nature produces few Valiant Men; but Industry, with good Instruction, brings up many23 1.577. This ought to be the care of the Captains, Colonels, and Generals, as it was of Sopher the Chief of the Host, who exercised his Fresh-water Soldiers24 1.578. And thus the Holy Scriptures call Commanders, Masters of Soldiers25 1.579, it being their business to teach and instruct them; such were Potiphar and Nebuzaradan26 1.580.

But because this, through the excessive Indulgence and Carelesness of Officers, and upon account of other Im∣pediments in War, is not easily reduc'd to Practice, the Evil of it ought rather to be timely prevented; a Thing which Princes and Commonwealths are strangely negli∣gent in. Upon the Study of Literature are founded Col∣leges;

for Religion, Convents and Monasteries. The Church Militant has its Nurseries for the Edification of Spiritual Soldiers to defend it; for Temporal ones there is none. The Turk alone regards this, who, to that end, gathers Children of all Nations into certain Seraglio's, and sees them brought up in the Exercise of Arms; whence afterwards is formed the Body of his Janizaries, who knowing no other Father or Lord but the Grand Signior, are the chiefest Strength and Defence of his Empire. Christian Princes ought to do the same in all great Cities, by taking Orphans, Foundlings, and all other of that nature, into Seminaries for that purpose, there to be instructed in Military Exercises, taught to forge Arms, twist Ropes, make Gun-powder, and all other Ammunition, to prepare them for War-Service. There might also be some educated in Sea-Port Towns, where they might have an early insight into Navigation, and see the manner of Building Ships, of making Sails and Cables, which would be a means to cleanse the Com∣monwealth from those Dregs of Vagabonds, and furnish it with Persons that would be useful in Military Arts, which might be kept out of what they daily earn; or, if that would not suffice, a Law might be made to assign such Seminaries the Third of all Pious Gifts or Legacies: For assuredly they deserve no less who defend the Al∣tars, than those that offer Incense at them.

It would be also a very good way, for the Subsistence of an Army, to endow the Treasury of War with cer∣tain stated Revenues, to be employed to no other uses: As Augustus did, who setled the Tenth of all Heredita∣ments and Legacies, and the Hundredth part of all Com∣modities sold upon it. Which Tax Tiberius would not afterwards take off, even though the Senate requested it, because it was the Support of the Military Treasury27 1.581. Thus Peter Count de Lemos endowed that of N••ples;

but Envy afterwards overthrew all that his Zeal and Prudence had establish'd.

Neither should this Care be taken for Soldiers only, but also in Erecting Fortresses, and Garrisoning them; forasmuch as that Charge may prevent many greater. The Weakness of a Place invites an Enemy, whereas scarce any one Attacks a State he thinks able to Defend it self. If all that is lavishly squander'd away in Gaming, Shows, and Building, were expended upon this, Princes would live abundantly more Secure, and the whole World enjoy more Peace and Tranquility. The Em∣perors, Dioclesian and Maximilian, took it as a signal piece of Service of a certain Governor of a Province, who laid out a Summ of Money design'd for the Structure of an Amphitheater, upon the Repair of a Citadel28 1.582.

EMBLEM LXXXIII.

[illustration]

THE very Ground whereon Fortresses are built is their greatest Enemy. It is upon the Surface of that with the Shovel and Pick-Axe (Wea∣pons of this Age) Trenches and Approaches are made to begin a Storm. 'Tis within the Bowels of the same, that Mines are secretly sprung under the Foun∣dations of the Walls and Bulwarks, which taking Fire, blow them all up. That Castle only is Impregnable, which, situated in the midst of Waters, is on all sides surrounded with the Fury of Foaming Billows; which, although they beat against it, yet do at the same time also defend it, by not admitting of a Naval Siege; and all the Danger would be in a Calm, if it should continue

long. Thus Governments, while engaged in War, are generally safe1 1.583: Then are they industriously Vigilant, providently forewarn'd; Glory animates; Exercise re∣doubles their Courage; Emulation prompts to great En∣terprizes; and Common Danger unites Mens Affections, and purges off the State's ill Humours. Fear of an Enemy, keeps a People Regular, and under Laws2 1.584. The Romans were never more Valiant, nor their Subjects more Quiet and Obedient to the Magistrates, than when Pyrrhus first, and after him Hannibal, came up to the very Gates of their City. A great Monarchy is in more Danger upon the account of its Power, than others are from their Weakness; for that, through too much con∣fidence in its Strength, neglects to provide against fu∣ture Casualties3 1.585: whereas, on the contrary, Fear puts this always upon its Guard. If Military Discipline cease, and be not kept in continual Exercise, Sloth effe∣minates Minds, weakens and throws down Walls, rusts Swords, and gnaws the Straps of Shields; Debaucheries, by degrees, encrease with it, and Ambition reigns; whence arise Dissentions, and from them Civil Wars: so that there is not one Intestine Malady or Infirmity ingender'd by Laziness, but the whole State suffers by it. Nothing grows or is preserved without Motion. Q. Me∣tellus, upon the News of the Loss of Carthage, said openly in the Senate, That he now apprehended that of Rome would follow, when he saw that Rival Republick destroyed. Pub. Nasica, hearing one say, This Success put Affairs in a better Posture; answer'd, Nay, rather, they are now in greater Danger. This wise Man well knew those Hostile Forces were like Surges, which indeed shook the City, but withal added Strength and Courage to it; and therefore exhorts them to beware of their Ruine, as knowing weak Minds to have no greater Enemy than Security, and

〈◊〉〈◊〉 Fear was a necessary Tutor to this Pupil People4 1.586. ••••inthila, King of the Goths, was great in Spain, and ••••quired Renown by his Atchievements, while he was engag'd in War: when that ceas'd, he abandon'd him∣••elf to Luxury, and was ruin'd. King Alphonsus VI. re∣••lecting upon the Losses he had receiv'd from the Moors, ••••k'd the reason of it; and was answer'd, It was the Sloth and Looseness of his Men: upon which he im∣mediately forbad Bathing, and all other Wantonnesses that impair Strength. The Oscitancy and Drowsiness of the two Kings, Roderick and Vitiza, made almost all Spain fall a Prey to the Africans, till the times of Pelagius and his Successors, when Warfare beginning to flourish again, Valour, and the Glory of Arms, encreased by constant Emulation, and not only deliver'd Spain from that heavy Yoke, but render'd it Head of a Puissant Monarchy. The Emulation between the Military Or∣ders of Castile produced abundance of Great Men, who ••trove more to surpass each other in Military Glory, than to conquer an Enemy. The House of Austria had never ascended to this Pitch of Grandeur, had it always been given up to Idleness. The same means Envy takes to pull it down by, strengthen and render it more glo∣rious: For they who live in Peace, like Iron not used, lose their Brightness, and become rusty5 1.587. Lesser Powers may indeed be preserv'd without Arms, but not great ones: For it is not so difficult to keep Fortune equal in them, as in these; out of which, if Arms be ••ot sent abroad, War is kindled at Home: As it befell the Roman Monarchy; with whose Grandeur, Ambition, that old inbred Vice, encreased and broke out. For when Affairs were in a low Condition, it was easie to keep an Equality: but after the Conquest of the World, when their Rival Cities and Kings were destroyed, and they at leisure to share their Riches, then it was that the

Senators and Common People first began to fall out6 1.588. The Emulation of Valour which is exercised against Enemies, when there is any, is usually inflamed between Country-men, when there is none. This the Germans had Experience of, when, upon the Romans leaving them, and their being exempt from Foreign Fear, out of Emu∣lation, turn'd their Arms upon one another7 1.589. The Peace of the Roman Empire was very bloody, it being the Source of all their Civil Wars8 1.590. Long Peace was agreeable to the Cherusci, but of no advantage9 1.591. The Wars of the Low-Countries put an end to the Intestine Commotions in Spain. That Theater of War, or ra∣ther that School of Mars, where so many Military Arts have been taught and exercised, has been very much to the Advantage of this Monarchy: Though, 'tis true, this Military Exercise and Discipline has been common to its Enemies and Rivals, almost all the Princes of Europe having learn'd the Use of Arms there, although it is a prodigious Charge to make War in Countries so disturb'd and remote, with so much Bloodshed and Ex∣tortion, so much Advantage on the Enemies side, and so little on ours, that it may reasonably be question'd whether it were better to conquer or be conquered; or if it would not be more expedient to apply some Remedy, whereby to quench, or at least damp, for a time, that ardent Thirst after Blood and Riches; to the end, that what is thrown away there, might be laid out upon a a Fleet, for the Establishment of the Empire of the Ocean and Mediterranean, and the carrying on a War in Africa, the successful Progress of which, by reason of the near∣ness

of Spain and Italy, would the more unite this Mo∣narchy. However, Love of those so Ancient and Loyal Subjects, join'd with a Desire to see them redeemed from that vile Slavery, they are, under the Notion of Li∣berty, miserably oppress'd with, and to reduce them to the true Worship of God, have more Influence on us, than State-Interest.

Now as the Encouragement of Valour and Military Glory in a Monarchy, is the Security thereof; so is it not without Danger, when the Supreme Power is lodg'd in many, as in Commonwealths; their greatest Hazard being in their own Arms, while they intrust the Power of the Army to one; that very Hand which they first arm'd usually laying the Yoke on them; those Forces themselves gave, oppressing their Liberty. Thus it was with the Roman Republick, and from thence Tyranny pass'd to almost all other Nations. However requisite therefore it be to keep Armies always ready, and in Exercise; yet the Arts of Peace are still more secure, especially if the People be corrupted, and separated in distant Places: For the Fierceness of War does but ren∣der them more Insolent; and it is better to keep them in view of Danger, than secure from it, if you expect they should unite for their Conservation. The Liberty of the Republick of Genoua was not less safe, when its Mountains were not regularly fortified, than now that through singular Industry and Labour they are made as Impregnable Walls to the State. For too much Security breeds ill Humours, divides the People into Factions, begets Presumptuous Spirits, and despises External Means. In a word, In Commonwealths harrass'd with Intestine Broils, Wars are more dangerous than useful; and consequently then only will be of advantage to Genoua, when that prudent Senate shall act as if they had never built them.

EMBLEM LXXXIV.

[illustration]

IT has been the Opinion of some, That Nature was rather a Step-Mother to Man, than his own; and that she had shewed her self more liberal to other Creatures, in giving them a clearer Instinct and Notice of the Means necessary for their Defence and Conserva∣tion. But these Persons did not sufficiently consider their own Excellency, their Power and Dominion over Sublunary Things; Nature having bestowed on them a swift Understanding, in a Moment penetrating both the Earth and Heavens: a Memory, wherein, without the least confusion or disorder, are reposited the Idea's of Things so various: a Reason, which Distinguisheth, Collects, and Concludes: a Judgment, that Compre∣hends,

Weighs, and Determines; Gifts whereby Man is intitled to the Sovereignty of all Created Beings, and a Liberty to dispose of them according to his Pleasure, having Hands framed with such Skill and Wisdom, that they are Tools fit for all Arts; so that although he comes into the World naked and without Arms, yet he forges them according to his Fancy, either to defend himself, or assault others. The Earth, to that end, furnishes him with Iron and Steel; the Water (as you see in this Device) turns the Mill that strikes them: Thus all the Elements obey his Will. With any slight Plank (Boat) he tames the Sea's Pride, and gathers the Winds into a small piece of Canvas, to make them serve him for Wings to fly from one Place to another; confines all the Fire's Violence within Brazen Pipes, call'd Guns, and thence shoots Thunderbolts no less terrible than those of Iupiter himself. By Wit and Art he facilitates many Things impossible to Nature: By these he improves Nature1 1.592; he tempers Breast-Plates, and sharpens Iron into Lances. It behoves the Prince to use Industry more than Force, Wisdom than Arms2 1.593, the Pen rather than the Sword3 1.594. For to attempt every thing with one's utmost Power, is the Folly of the Gyants, who heaped Mountains upon Moun∣tains. It is not the greatest Strength that always Triumphs; the little Remora stops the Course of a Ship. That one City, Numantia, fatigu'd the whole Roman Empire, for fourteen Years: Nor did the Conquest of those vast Countries of Asia cost it so much Pains as the Taking of Saguntum* 1.595. Strength decays by degrees, and is consumed, but Wisdom and Ingenuity endures for ever; and except War be managed by this, Victory is never obtained by that. A War carry'd on by Po∣licy is secure; that which relies wholly upon Strength, hazardous and uncertain.

One Wise Head is worth Twenty Hands.† 1.596

Tiberius, writing to Germanicus, boasts, that in the nine times he was sent by Augustus into Germany, he had done more by Stratagem than by Force4 1.597. Nor did he use to take any other Measures, when Emperor, especially to maintain the remote Provinces; and would frequently say, That Foreign Affairs should be managed by Wisdom and Policy, and Armies kept as far off as possible5 1.598. All things are not surmounted by Strength and Expedition, but many by Policy and Deliberation6 1.599. The Low-Countries were ruin'd amidst their continual Victories; because they confided in Strength, more than Pru∣dence. Let Force submit to Policy; for that will con∣quer where the other cannot. When the Moorish Armies annoyed Spain, in the time of King Roderick, the Go∣vernor of Murcia was defeated in a Battel, where all the Nobility of this City lost their Lives; and the Women having Intelligence of it, placed themselves along the Walls, in Mens Habit, and all in Armour. Upon which the Conquerors, thinking by this they were still very Numerous, consented to Honourable Terms. Edward IV. King of England, used to say, That Charles the Wise, of France, without any Armies, by writing Letters only, did him more mischief than his Father or Grand-father had done with all theirs. The Sword can exert its Force but in a few Places; good Management is of Uni∣versal Influence. Nor does Princes being remote one from another signifie any thing: For as Trees have Com∣munication with, and are united to each other by the means of Roots, their Activity being a very large Extent; so they, by their Embassadors, and secret Pra∣ctices, may do the same. Policy makes the Strength of Foreigners its own by Alliance, having the Common In∣terest in view. A Prince may do more from a private Closet, than in an open Plain. King Philip II. never went out of Madrid, yet kept the World in Awe and

Obedience: He made himself more Formidable by Pru∣dence than by Power. The Power that makes use of Address, is in a manner Infinite. Archimedes often said, If he had a Place to stand on, he could, with his Machines, move this Terraqueous Globe. Any Potent Monarchy might easily attain to an Universal Empire, if to its Strength were joined Skill and Industry: But lest this should be, that Primum Mobile of Empires permits the Great Ones to want Prudence, and wholly trust to their Power. More Affairs are transacted by Counsel and Con∣duct, than by Blows7 1.600. Power with Rashness is as dangerous as Rashness without Power. Abundance of Wars between Christian Princes might be avoided by Industry; but either Judgment is insensible of their Inconveniencies, and cannot find a way to decline them Honourably, or it does not regard them, Ambition blinding Prudence; or else Vanity and Haughtiness look on it as a piece of Bravery, voluntarily to face them; and thus are tickled with a Counterfeit-Glory of War, which, as it is a Publick Action, whereon the Common Preservation of all depends, ought not to be measured by thin Shadows of Honour, but by the Publick Advan∣tage and Utility; yet so, that the Prince must in the mean time leave no Stone unturn'd to shun War, cut∣ting off all Occasions, before they happen, or if they be already, getting the Hearts of such as by their Counsel can promote Peace. Let him find out all endearing ways imaginable to preserve Friendship: Let him embrace his Enemy both within and without his Realms; and by cros∣sing his Designs, and entring into Leagues and Alliances Defensive, terrifie him. And to these Humane Means let him join the Divine Assistances of Prayer and Sacri∣fice, and apply himself to the Pope, as the Common Fa∣ther of Christendom, ingenuously telling him his Inten∣tions and Desire of the Publick Quiet, of the Injury re∣ceived, or the Reasons that induce him to take up Arms,

if Satisfaction be not made him. Whence the Matter being also carry'd to the College of Cardinals, and the Autho∣rity of the Apostolick See interposed, either the War will be avoided, or the Prince justifie the Cause of it at Rome, where is the Tribunal at which all Princes Actions ought to be judged, and their Controversies decided. Nor is this a Mean-spiritedness, but rather a Christian Generosity, and Political Provision for the maintaining Amity among Nations, and the avoiding of Emulations, and the Con∣federacy they occasion.

EMBLEM LXXXV.

[illustration]

WHen the Bear has got a Bee-Hive, he finds no better way than to plunge it under Water; for any other would rather hinder his Design of getting the

Honey, and escaping the Stings of the Bees. By this Example, the present Emblem shews the Inconveniencies of keeping a Mediocrity in Counsels; experienc'd in that which Herennius Pontius gave the Samnites, when they had got the Romans in a narrow Pass, who seeing his first Advice rejected, which was to let them all go, was for putting them all to the Sword: And being ask'd why he thus went from one Extreme to the other, when the Middle-way might be taken, of giving them their Liberty, after the Imposition of certain Laws, as being Conquer'd? He answer'd, That it was necessary either to shew themselves generous to the Romans, by so signal a Kind∣ness to establish a firm and inviolable Peace with them, or else to give such a Blow to their Forces, that they should never again be able to make Head against them; Any way between these two, said he, will neither make Friends, nor take away Enemies1 1.601. Hence that of Aristodemus to the Aetolians: We must have the Romans either our Allies or Enemies; there's no Middle-way2 1.602. In those Cases where any one would oblige a Friend or Enemy, Moderate Expressions of Kindness do nothing: For Gra∣titude always looks upon the Omissions are made, and seldom fails to find a Reason not to think it self Obliged. Thus Francis I. King of France, laid not aside his Enmity to the Emperor Charles V. notwithstanding he set him at liberty, because his Captivity was not so generous as that of Alphonsus King of Portugal, who being taken in a Battel by Ferdinand King of Leon, was treated by him with all the Humanity imaginable, his Wounds dress'd carefully, and himself set at liberty after his Recovery; Favours which wrought upon him to lay his whole Kingdom at the Conqueror's Feet: But Ferdinand re∣fused the Offer, satisfied with the Restitution of such Places as had been lately taken in Galicia. The same Consideration had Philip, Duke of Milan, when having taken Prisoners the Kings of Arragon and Navarr,

(the first of which was Alphonsus V.) he call'd a Council, to deliberate what should be done with them; and while some were for having them pay a Ransom, others for binding them to certain Conditions, and lasty, others for freely Dismissing them without either, he took this last Advice, thereby to lay the greater Obligation upon them, and so engage their Friendship.

When Kingdoms are embroil'd in Civil Wars, there's nothing more dangerous than standing Neuter, as Henry the Infant endeavoured to do, during the Troubles of Castile, occasion'd by the Nonage of King Ferdinand IV. by which means he lost his Friends, without obliging his Enemies.

Nor is it less dangerous in the Punishments of the Multitude, to inflict them promiscuously on all; where∣fore it seems most adviseable, either wholly to connive at their Faults, or to make a severe Example of some one. Hence Germanicus was counsell'd, in the Rebellion of the German Legions, either to grant All or None of what the Soldiers demanded3 1.603; and deservedly blam'd for indulging them Part, taking a Middle-way4 1.604. Thus Drusus, in another Occasion of the like nature, was advised either to Dissemble, or Punish with Rigour. The prudentest Counsel certainly in the World: For the Common People can never keep a Medium between two Extremes, but always exceed in the one or the other5 1.605.

If the Matter require Expedition, it is certain Ruine not to venture enough, or not to use sufficient Precau∣tion; as it happened to Valens, who wavering between the Counsels that were given him, could not come to any determinate Resolution6 1.606.

In Affairs of War, Fear would sometimes appear prudent; and to that end, suggests Moderate Resolu∣tions; which serve but to encourage the Enemy, and give him Time to look about him. As King Iohn I. found, who pretending the Crown of Portugal was devolved on him by the Death of Ferdinand, his Father-in-Law, resolved to enter that Kingdom alone, and to have his Army follow: whence the Portuguese gained Time to take up Arms in the interim; which had never been done, had he immediately fell upon them; but he, to avoid War, left his Right to the Decision of Justice. Threats signifie little, if the Hand lifted up, have no Weapon in it, and do not sometimes punish Disobe∣dience in earnest.

The Hastiness of the French, makes them regard nei∣ther the past nor present Time, and through the Heat of their Minds they are too adventurous, and too pre∣cipitous in their Resolutions: However, this very thing oftentimes gives Success to them; for by this means they avoid Luke-warmness, and dispatch every thing in a trice. The Spaniards, on the other side, are Dilatory, that they may, by long and much Consideration, pro∣ceed with more Caution; and out of an Affectation of Prudence, use to Hesitate; nay, while they take Time to Consult, lose the Opportunity of Execution.

The Italians know better how to make their Advan∣tage both of the one and the other, using the Opportu∣nities as they present themselves: Not like the Germans, who are slow in Resolving, lazy in Executing, and consult only the present Time, without any regard to the past or future. Their Minds change with Events, which is the reason they have so little advanced their Fortune; it being otherwise a Nation, which, consider∣ing its innate Courage, might extend its Dominions far and near. To the same Cause may be ascribed the long Continuance of the Civil Wars the Empire is harrass'd with at this day; which undoubtedly, by resolute Coun∣sel and Expedition, might have been laid asleep long ago; whereas by slow Counsels, which yet pass'd for

Prudent, we have seen vast Armies, upon the Rhine, which might have made way even into France, and forced it to an Universal Peace: a thing has done them more prejudice, than if they had lost several Battels: For there can be no greater Overthrow, than for an Army insensibly to waste and perish within it self. It is this has made Havock of their own Country, and the Places adjacent, through which War ought to be car∣ried, when now its Seat is in the very Heart of Germany.

In all other Affairs of Civil Government, Middle-Counsels may have place; because of the Danger of Extremes, and because it is of great Importance ever to take away from which you may afterwards (in case of Necessity) come to any one of the two with the less inconvenience. Between these two Extremes, the An∣cients placed Prudence, represented by the flight of Daedalus, who came neither too near the Sun, nor too near the Sea, lest the excessive Heat of the one should melt, or the Moisture of the other wet his Wings. I•• Countries whose Inhabitants are not of a Servile Nature, but of a Polite Genius, and Generous Spirit, the Reins of the People ought to be govern'd with so much Caution and Address, that neither too much Indulgence shall breed Arrogance, nor too much Rigour Aversion. It is equally dangerous to curb them with Bits and Bar∣nacles, and turn them loose without a Bridle; for they can neither endure all Liberty, nor all Slavery, (as Galba told Piso of the7 1.607 Romans.) Always to execute Power, is to wear out the Chain of Servitude: 'Tis a kind of Tyranny, to go about to reduce Subjects to the model of an absolute Perfect State, in that the Condition of Humane Nature admits not of it. It is not necessary for a Government to be such as it ought to be, but as it is capable of being; for all things that are expedient,

are not possible to Humane Infirmity. It is an Absurdity, to wish there may be no Defect at all in a Common∣wealth. There will be Vices, as long as there be Men. Excess of Zeal is the Spring of many Mistakes in Go∣vernors, in not knowing how to conform to Prudence. The same is Ambition, when Princes affect to pass for Severe, and imagining their Reputation consists in Ruling their Subjects so, that they shall never in the least degree swerve from Reason and the Laws. 'Tis a dangerous Strictness, which consults not the ordinary Passions of the Vulgar. Open Address prevails more than Power; Example and Complacency, than Inhuman Severity. Let the Prince therefore rather make believe he finds his Sub∣jects good, than value himself upon making them so: which Tacitus commends Agricola for, in his Government of Britain8 1.608. Let him not suffer himself to be deceived in the past Times, so as to wish he could see those Good Manners he fancies were in those Days: For Malice was ever the same in all Times; but 'tis a fault of our cor∣rupt Nature, always to like the Past better than the Present9 1.609. Besides, granting that Severity and Obe∣dience were greater formerly, yet this Age will not bear it, if those Ancient Manners are alter'd in it: This Mistake cost Galba both his Life and Empire10 1.610.

EMBLEM LXXXVI.

[illustration]

MAN's Mind has not been satisfy'd with the Speculation of Terrestrial Things; but impa∣tient that the Knowledge of the Heavens should be deferred so long as till after Death, has broke the Prison of the Body, and soar'd above the very Elements, to find out, by Reasoning, what it could not by Touch∣ing, Sight, and Hearing: and to this end, hath form'd in Imagination an Idea of that most Beautiful Fabrick, contriving a Sphere with such various Circles, Equa∣tions and Epicycles, as aptly represent the several Mo∣tions of the Planets and Constellations; and though he be not positively assured whether the thing be really so, he hath, however, acquired this Glory, that he can now

conceive how this World is, or at least how it might have been created. Neither does the Mind stay here; but restless and venturesom in its Researches, has ima∣gin'd another quite different Hypothesis, and would persuade others, that the Sun is the Center of those Orbs which move round it, and have their Light from it. An Hypothesis impious, and directly contrary to Na∣tural Reason, which gives Rest to heavy Bodies; repug∣nant to Holy Writ, which says, the Earth stands for ever1 1.611: lastly, inconsistent with the Dignity of Man, as if he must be moved to enjoy the Sun's Rays, and not the Sun to bring them him, when yet this (as all other Creatures) was made, only for his Service2 1.612. It is certain then, that this Prince of Light, who has in Charge the Empire of all Things here below, illumi∣nates, and by his Presence informs them, by going, without intermission, from one Tropick to the other, with a Contrivance so wonderful, that all Parts of the Earth receive from him, if not an equal Heat, at least, an equal Light, whereby the Divine Wisdom has pre∣vented the Evil that would unavoidably ensue, if the Sun should never leave the Aequator; for then its Rays would utterly burn up some Countries, while others would freeze, and be involved in perpetual Darkness. This Natural Example teaches Princes how much it advances the Publick Utility, for Them, like that Swiftest of the Planets, continually to move about their States, to warm the Affection of their Subjects, and give Life to their Affairs3 1.613. This is what the Royal Prophet would intimate, when he says, God has placed his Tabernacle upon the Sun4 1.614, which never stands still, but is present on all Occasions. King Ferdinand the Ca∣tholick, and the Emperor Charles V. kept not their Courts in one certain Place; by which means they atchieved

many Notable Things which they could not possibly have done by Ministers, who, although dexterous and careful enough, yet never perform what the Prince would, were he present in Person; because they want either Orders or Power. Our Saviour Christ no sooner came to the Sheep-pool, but he healed the Paralytick5 1.615, which the Angel could not do in Eight and thirty Years, whose Commission being only to trouble the Water, he, as a Minister, could not go beyond it6 1.616. 'Tis im∣possible for States to be well govern'd by the bare Rela∣tions of others, and therefore Solomon advises Kings to give ••ar to their Subjects themselves7 1.617; for this is a part of their Office, and to them, not to their Ministers, is given of the Lord that Power and Vertue which ac∣companies the Scepter only, wherein it infuses the Spirit of Wisdom and Counsel, of Courage and Piety; nay, I may say, a kind of Divinity, enabling the Prince to foresee Things to come, so as that he cannot be put upon either in what he sees or hears8 1.618. Nevertheless, in Time of Peace, some fix'd Place of Residence seems by no means inconvenient; and it will be sufficient, by going a Progress round each Country, to have once visited his States. Nor indeed are any Treasuries ca∣pable of defraying the Expences frequent Removals of a Court will require; nor can they be made without con∣siderable Detriment to the Subject, without disturbing the Order of Councils and Tribunals, and retarding the Proceedings of Government and Justice. King Philip II. throughout his whole Reign, scarce ever went a step out of Madrid.

But in Occasions of War, it appears more adviseable for the Prince to be himself present, and to Head his Subjects: For 'tis for that Reason the Scared Writings

call him Shepherd and Captain9 1.619. Thus God, com∣manding Samuel to anoint Saul, does not say to be King, but to be Captain over Israel10 1.620: intimating that this was his principal Office; and in effect, that this was the Practice of all Kings in former Ages. Upon this it was that the People grounded their Petition for a King, that they might have one to go out before them, and fight their Battels11 1.621. Nothing encourages Soldiers more in War, than their Prince's Presence12 1.622 The Lacedaemonians thought theirs, even while in their Cradles, had the same Power, and therefore carry'd them, in their Infancy, into the Field. Antigonus, the Son of Demetrius, took his Presence, in a Sea-fight, to be equivalent to a great many Ships of the Enemy13 1.623. Alexander the Great animated his Men, by representing to them, that he first exposed himself to Dangers. When the Prince, in such a case, is upon the Place, great Exploits are often per∣formed, which no one, in his absence, would dare to undertake: Nor is there need to wait for Orders from Court, whence they generally come too late, after the Opportunity is gone, and always full of vain Appre∣hensions, and impracticable Circumstances; a Thing we have often experienc'd in Germany, not without great Prejudice of the Publick. There's nothing kindles Spirits so generously, nothing that inspires such Lofty Thoughts in the Minds of Soldiers, as to have the Prince, in whose Hand is Reward, an Eye-witness of their Bravery14 1.624. This Argument Hannibal made use of, to inflame the Courage of his Men; There's none of you,

said he, whom I am not a Witness and Spectator of, and cannot too, in convenient Time and Place, requite, where I observe Merit15 1.625. To the same effect, Godfrey thus spoke to his Men:

Whose Country is not known? Whose Noble Blood, Whose Courage or whose Conduct is not understood?* 1.626

Upon this account, it will not be convenient for the Prince to intrust his Forces with a General; which is so certain a Danger, that it was looked upon as unsafe for Tiberius to put his into the Hands even of his Son Ger∣manicus 16 1.627. And this takes place more particularly in Civil Insurrections, where (as has been said) the Princes appearing, easily dashes the Rebels17 1.628. Notwith∣standing, every Motion of War, or the loss of any small Town, should not make the Prince come abroad, and desert the Court; whence Government flows to all the other Parts, as Tiberius well observed in the Troubles of Germany18 1.629: He, at another time, hearing himself reviled, for not going to quiet the Hungarian and German Legions, stood unshaken at those Murmurings, and was fix'd not to abandon the Head of the Monarchy, and expose that and himself to the Chance of War. By these Reasons were they led, who persuaded David not to go out to fight against the Israelites who adhered to Absolom, saying, That their being put to flight, or cut off, would not be of so bad consequence, as if he should fly or be killed in his own Person, which was

worth Ten Thousand of them, and therefore that it seemed best that he should stay behind to guard the City: Which accordingly he did19 1.630. So if the War be made to revenge an Injury or Affront,

Vindictam mandâsse sat est.* 1.631

The same may be said when Arms are taken up for Defence only, and there be no evident Danger; for then the Prince will get more Credit by despising it, and leaving it to a General. So if the War be waged to make any new Conquests, it will be thought too eager Ambition in him to hazard his Person, and be greater Prudence to try his Fortune by another; as King Ferdi∣nand the Catholick did, committing the Conquest of Naples to the Great Captain, and that of the Indies to Herman Cortez. If a General fall, it is easie to find ano∣ther to succeed him; but if the Prince be lost, all is lost, as it befell King S••bastian. The Absence of Princes from their Courts is very dangerous, as Spain found to its cost, in that of the Emperor Charles V. Nor should a Prince venture his own State, to conquer others20 1.632 The same Sun (whose Figure we use in this Device) never visits the Poles, because one of them would be endanger'd in the mean time:

—Medium non des••rit unquam Coeli Phoebus iter, radiis tamen omnia lustrat.† 1.633

Nature has given the Kings of the Bees Wings, but those very small, lest they should stray too far from their Kingdoms. Let the Prince go to those Wars only whose Seat is within his own Dominions, or that threaten him with evident Danger. Hence Mucianus advised the Emperor Domitian to stay at Lyons in France, and not stir till the State of those Provinces, or the Empire

it self, were in greater danger21 1.634. Nor was it good Counsel which Titianus and Proculus gave Otho, not to be at the Battel of Bedriacum, upon the Issue of which the whole Empire depended22 1.635. The Arch-Duke Leopold shews much more Courage and Prudence, who though he sees himself assaulted at Salefeld, by the Joint-Forces of his Enemies, much superiour to his, yet undervalues his Personal Dangers, and always maintains a general Constancy, well knowing the Safety of the Empire and House of Austria to consist in this Event; and so is the foremost in the Perils and Fatigues of War.

—Monstrat tolerare labores, Non jubet—* 1.636

But even in these Cases too, it is necessary to examine the Condition of the War, whether the Prince, by ab∣senting himself, will not leave his State in greater dan∣ger, either from within or abroad; if he shall not hazard his Succession; whether he have Courage enough, and be capable of Arms, and have an Inclination to them: For if he want but any one of these Qualities, he will do more by putting his Power and Forces into ano∣ther Hand; as we see in the Loadstone, which by touching the Iron, and communicating its Virtue to it, lifts up a greater Weight than it could do by it self. But if the Necessity be great, it will suffice, if the Prince be hard by, to Influence his Army, staying in some Place, whence he may readily Consult, Resolve, and give Orders: This was the Emperor Leopold's way, who removed sometimes to Aquileia, sometimes to Ravenna or Milan, to be near the Wars of Hungary and Germany

EMBLEM LXXXVII.

[illustration]

PRudence is not always fortunate, nor Temerity always unhappy:

—Quisquis sapit celeriter, non tuto sapit.

It is however good for fiery Tempers to follow the first impetus of Nature, because by delay they cool insensibly, and can never determine themselves; nor has it usually an ill End (in War particularly) to let themselves be l••d by that secret Force of Second Causes, which if it does not compell, at least moves them so, that with it they seldom miscarry. Some Divine Genius favours Daring Actions.

Scipio passes the Sea into Africa, and freely trusts him∣self to the Punick Faith of Syphax, with apparent Risque of his Life, and the Publick Safety of Rome: Julius Caesar in a small Bark abandons himself to the Fury of the Adriatick; and both succeed in their Ras••ness. It is impossible for all things to be provided against by Pru∣dence; nor would any thing great be attempted, if that should stand to consult all Casualties and Hazards. Cardinal Gaspar Borgia enter'd Naples in Disguise, upon hearing of the Sedition between the Commons and No∣bility: The Danger was great; and when some of the Nobility proposed several ways for him to secure him∣self, he answer'd, with a p••esence of Mind truly gene∣rous, It is not now a Time for Deliberation, something must be allow'd to Chance1 1.637. If after the Success of great Enterprizes, we should look back upon all the Dangers that attended them, we should scarce venture on them again. Iames, King of Arragon, was so adven∣turous, as to sit down before Valencia with only a Thou∣sand Foot, and Three hundred and sixty Horse: And though this Undertaking was look'd on by all Men as rash, nay, impossible, yet the Town surrender'd. Bold Counsels are commonly judged by the Event; if they succeed, they are commended for Prudent2 1.638, and those Persons blamed who gave safer Advice. No Judgment can either in Precipitation, or when it acts calmly, suffi∣ciently provide for it self, in that Affairs depend upon Contingencies, which are uncertain even to the most wary Foresight. Sometimes Rashness comes before Oc∣casion, and Moderation follows it; sometimes this slides swiftly between them, nor has it any Hair behind to be held by.

All things depend on that Eternal Providence, which efficaciously moves us to act, when the Disposition of it, and the Accomplishing of its Divine Decrees so require;

and then Fool-hardy Counsels are Prudence, and Errors the highest Reason. When Providence would pull down the Pride of a Monarchy, lest, like the Tower of Babel, it should attempt to reach Heaven, it confounds the De∣signs and Languages of its Ministers, that they may disagree; so that if one asks for Lime, another either does not understand what he means, or else offers him Sand. In the Untimely Death of those who are invested with Supreme Government, its end is not to cut their Thread of Life, but to throw down that Grandeur. The Holy Spirit, mentioning David's Victory over Goliah, says not that his Body, but that his Boasting was beat down with the Stone3 1.639. So if, on the other side, it has decreed to Exalt a Monarchy, it creates in that Age brave Commanders, and wise Councellors, or causes them to be made choice of, and gives them occasion of exerting their Valour, and giving Proof of their Wis∣dom, by which two more is done than by the Arm and Sword4 1.640. Bees then swarm into Helmets, and Weapons grow, as that Hunting Spear of Romulus did, upon Mount Palatine, and erected at a Wild Boar. The very missing of the Blow of this Founder of the Roman Monarchy was fortunate, being a kind of Prognostick of it. Which shews, that it is not always Courage or Pru∣dence that raises and supports Monarchies, (though they are generally the Instruments) but that Superior Impulse which moves all Causes together, for their Encrease or Preservation; and then even Chance, directed by that Eternal Mind, effects what Prudence could not so much as have imagined before. When Germany Revolted, and the Roman Affairs were extremely desperate, the For∣tune of this Nation, as it had often upon other Occasions, came to its Assistance out of the East5 1.641. If the Valour and Conduct of any Hero be ordained to these ends, no

other Person, though never so Brave, and truly Great, can deprive him of the Glory of obtaining them. Could there be a finer Soldier than D'Aubigny? Yet he was unsuccessful, having to deal with the Great Captain, who was Destined to Establish the Spanish Monarchy in Italy: God so disposing (as he did in favour of the 6 1.642 Roman Empire) its Beginnings and Causes, by the means chiefly of Ferdinand the Catholick, who, by his Prudence and Skill in Government, laid the Foundations of that Monarchy, and by his Valour erected and enlarg'd it; being so careful and vigilant to encrease it, that he neglected no Occasion which offer'd it self; nay, of himself, found all that Humane Judgment is capable of: Lastly, so strenuous in the prosecution of them, that he was always the first in Danger and Fatigue; and as Imi∣tation is abundantly more easie to Mankind than Obe∣dience, he made it his business to Command more by his Actions than Orders. But because so great a Fabrick required Workmen, that Age (fertile in Great Persons) produced Columbus, Herman Cortez, the two Brothers Francis and Ferdinand Pizarro, Antony de Liba, Fabritius, and Prosper Colonna, Raimond de Cardona, the Marquesses of Pescara and Basto, and many other Hero's so illustri∣ous, that a whole Age now scarce brings forth one such. To that end, God then prolonged their Lives; whereas now, not Mars's Fury, but some lingring Fever, carries them off before their time. Within how few Years has untimely Death depriv'd us of Peter of Toledo, Lewis Ta∣jardo, Frederick of Toledo, the Marquess Spinola, Gonsalez of Cordova, the Duke de Feria, the Marquess d'Aytona, the Duke of Lerma, John Fajardo, the Marquess de Zelada, the Count de la Fere, and the Marquess de Fuentes, all Persons no less considerable for the glorious Actions they did, than those which all the World still expected from them? How Profound and Inscrutable is the Pro∣vidence of this Eternal Deity! Who would not from

hence inferr the Decay of the Spanish Monarchy? as in the Emperor Claudius's time, the Death of so many Magistrates, as a Quaestor, Aedile, Tribune, Praetor, and a Consul, in a few Month's time, was look'd on as a Prodigy portending some Evil7 1.643, unless he con∣sider'd, that these Instruments are taken away, to let all Men see, it is by Divine Grace, rather than Humane Strength, is upheld that Power, the Pillar and Support of Christian Commonwealths. It is this First Mover of the Universe that disposes these interchangeable Al∣terations of Things, these Revolutions of Empires. One Age raises up great Men in a Country, improves Arts, and makes Arms flourish; and the succeeding immediately overturns and confounds all, without leaving so much as the Traces of the Vertue and Valour which were an Ornament to those of the past. What great, what secret Force on Things, nay, even on Minds, is conceal'd in those Second Causes of the Heavenly Spheres? It is not by meer Accident that those Superior Lights are so different one from another, some having a Fix'd Place, others Wandring; and since this Disorder and Irregularity gives no additional Beauty, it is a sign at least they contribute to Operations and Effects. O vast Volume! in the Leaves of which, God, the Contriver and Maker of all Things (yet without laying any Obli∣gation upon his own Power, or8 1.644 Man's Will) has wrote their Changes and Vicissitudes in Characters of Light, for the Glory of his Eternal Wisdom, which past Ages have, the present do, and those to come will for ever read! Greece was heretofore flourishing both in Arms and Arts; it left Rome enough to learn, but little to invent; but now it lies buried in the Depth of Ignorance and Degeneracy. The Wits in Augustus's time exceeded even Expectation, but under Nero they began to flag, so that all the Pains and Industry in the

World was not sufficient to save the Arts and Sciences from Destruction. Unhappy are those great Genius's who come into the World when Monarchies are de∣clining, in that they either are not employed, or if they be, cannot withstand the weight of their Ruine, or per∣haps miserably fall with them, without Honour or Re∣nown; nay, sometimes their Fate seems deserved, and they are blamed for what was the effect of Chance9 1.645. God lays no Constraint upon Free-Will; but yet either the course of Causes draws it on, or, for want of that Di∣vine Light, it stumbles of it self, and its Designs are overthrown or executed too late. Princes and Coun∣cellors are the Eyes of Kingdoms; and when God Al∣mighty determines the overthrow of these, he blinds them, that they may neither see Dangers, nor know their Remedies10 1.646. That which they think to suc∣ceed most by, leads them most into Miscarriages: They see Accidents, but do not prevent, but rather, as much as in them lies, forward them. A Dangerous Instance of this Truth we have in the Swiss-Cantons, ever so pru∣dent and stout in defending their Country and Liberty, but now so negligent and supine, that themselves are the Cause of the Ruine that threatens them. The First Author of Monarchies had situated their Republick be∣tween the Outworks of the Alpes and the Rhine, and environ'd it with the Countries of Alsace, Lorrain, and Burgundy, against the Power of France, and other Princes; and when they were farthest from the Fire of War, in the Fruition of a happy and desired Peace, they of them∣selves called and encouraged One upon their own Bor∣ders, standing by and seeing the Ruine of those Pro∣vinces, redounding afterwards to their own Prejudice, they not considering the Danger of a neighbouring Power, superiour in Strength, and whose Fortune must of neces∣sity be raised out of their Ashes. May I be deceived,

but I fear this Body of the Switzers is already at its full growth, and that it will begin to decay, when those Spirits and Forces are spent which supported its Reputa∣tion and Grandeur. Empires, 'tis certain, have their Periods: That which has endured longest, is nearest its Ruine.

EMBLEM LXXXVIII.

[illustration]

WHat strange Force has the Loadstone, to pro∣duce such Wonderful Effects? What so Amo∣rous Correspondence with the Polar Star, that although because of its Weight it cannot always gaze on its Beauty, yet the Needles it touches should? What

Resemblance can there be betwixt these two? What so great Virtue, that is not lost at so wide and remote Distances? And why does it encline to that Star or Point of Heaven, rather than to any other? Were not the Experience common, Ignorance would be apt to im∣pute it to Magick, as it does all other Extraordinary Effects of Nature, when it cannot penetrate the Ob∣scurity of its Operations.

Nor is the Loadstone less admirable in that other Virtue of Attracting and Lifting up Iron, against its Innate Gravity; nay, even this, carried by a kind of Natural Tendency to obey that Superior Power, closes with it, and does voluntarily, what, one would think, could not but be violent. How much were it to be wish'd that the Prince would, by this Example, learn to know that concourse of Causes, which (as hath been said) sets up or pulls down Empires, and how to carry himself therein, so as not to encrease their Force by a too obsti∣nate Opposition, nor by a too easie Yielding to facilitate their Effects, it being with this Series and Connexion of Causes moved by the First Cause, as with a River1 1.647, which while it streams in its ordinary Current, is easily parted into several Branches, or, by Banks cast up, turned this or that way, and suffers Bridges to be made over it; but when swelled by continual Rains, or melt∣ing Snows, admits of no Resistance; and for any one to contend with it, does but augment its Force, and put it in a condition to carry all before it. Hence the Holy Spirit admonishes us not to strive against the Stream2 1.648. Patience surmounts that Violence, which in a moment loses both its Power and Being. Upon which account it was look'd on as an ill Omen to the War of Vitellius, in the East, that Euphrates overflowed, and bubbled into a kind of Frothy Crowns, by those who consider'd how Transitory these were. When therefore many Causes conspiring together, attend the Victories of a••

Enemy, and open an happy Way to his Military Expe∣ditions, it will be great Prudence to allow them Time to disperse sensibly of themselves, not that they lay any necessity upon the Freedom of the Will, but because this Freedom has power only over the Motions of the Mind and Body, not over those External Things: It may indeed give way to Accidents, but cannot avoid being overwhelmed by them. Constancy in Expecting, is infinitely more valuable than Valour in Fighting. This Fabius Maximus well knew; and therefore let that Torrent of Hannibal run by, till having by long Delays weakened, he at length surmounted it, and saved the Roman State. Successes get strength from one another; and by the Reputation Opinion gives them, suddenly en∣crease to that degree, that no Power is able to grapple with them. The Spanish Monarchy render'd Charles V. Fortunate and Glorious; and he, by his Prudence, Courage and Vigilance, made the Empire happy. Which eminent Qualities were followed by the general Accla∣mations and Applause of all Nations. All Men joined with his Fortune; and the French King, Francis I. emulous of so great Splendour, striving to eclipse it, lost his own Liberty. What Terrors does Lightning strike us with, when it breaks out of the Clouds! Then first exerting its Force when it meets with Resistance; without that, vanishing into Air. Such was that Thun∣derbolt raised out of the Exhalations of the North; within a few Days it triumphed over the Empire, and struck almost the whole World with Terrour: And yet one leaden Bullet piercing it, made it presently disap∣pear. There is nothing so frail and uncertain as the Fame of a Power that stands not upon its own Bottom3 1.649. All those Efforts of several Causes concurring, are very brittle, in that they hinder each other; and are subject not only to various Accidents, but to Time also, which by degrees brings their Effects to Nothing. Many Wars,

hot and impetuous at the first, vanish by Delay4 1.650. He who can but a little while bear up against the Forces of Confederate Enemies, certainly gets the better of them at last: For as they are many, they have different Causes, different Interests and Designs; and if they happen to disagree in any one thing, part and leave one another. There was never a greater League than that of Cambray against the Republick of Venice, yet the Resolution and Prudence of this Valiant Senate soon broke it. All things in the World arrive to a certain Period; after which, they decline again. Were that Critical Minute known, it would be easie to overcome them5 1.651. 'Tis for want of this Knowledge, which sometimes consists in the least Delay imaginable, that we sink under Accidents. Our Impatience or Ignorance aggravates them, in that often, not sensible of their Force, we voluntarily submit to them, or else perhaps promote them by the violence of those very Means we take to shun them. God had undertaken the Grandeur of Cosmo de Medicis; and they who strove to put a stop to it, by Banishing him from the Republick of Venice, were the Instruments of making him Master of it. Nicholas Vzanus observ'd, with much greater Prudence, the Torrent of that Fortune; and lest it should encrease by Opposition, thought it most advisable (as long as he lived) to give him no Occasion of Displeasure; but with his Death the Consideration of such discreet Counsel fell. Nor is it possible for the greater Force of such like Cases to be concealed; forasmuch as all things con∣spire to their Success, though they appear, at first sight, directly contrary to that end. And therefore it is then best to Endure what you cannot Mend; and quietly to conform to God, by whose Appointment all Things come to pass6 1.652. The Iron should not obey the Load∣stone more readily, than we the Divine Pleasure. He

comes to less Harm who lets himself be carried down by the Stream, than he that struggles against it. It is a foolish Presumption, to think to overthrow the Decrees of the Almighty. The Predictions of the Statue with Feet of Clay, in Nebuchadnezzar's Dream, was never the less certain, for his making another of Gold, and commanding it to be worshipped7 1.653. However, this Resignation of our Will to the Divine must not be so Brutish, as that we should believe all Things were so Ordain'd from Eternity, that nothing can be Improv'd by our Diligence and Conduct; for this would be the very Weakness of Mind which had given occasion to that Divine Decree: We are to Act as if all depended on our Will, for God makes use of our Selves to bring us to Happiness or Misery8 1.654. We make a part of the Creation, and that no small one; and though Things were set in order without us, yet they were not made without us. 'Tis true, we cannot break that Web of Events wrought on the Loom of Eternity, but we might very well concurr to the weaving of it. The same that ranged the Causes foresaw their Effects, and permitted their Course, yet so that it should be still at his Com∣mand. He has saved from Danger whom he thought fit; and left others in it, by abandoning them to their liberty: If the first was an Effect of his Mercy, or our Merit, this is of his Justice. Our Will involved in the Ruine of Accidents, falls with them; and as this most Wise Contriver of the Universe is the Supreme and Absolute Arbitrator, he might break his Vessels as he pleased, and make one to Honour, another to Dishonour9 1.655. In the Eternal Disposal of Empires, their Progresses, Revolutions, or Ruines; that Sovereign Governor of the Orbs had always present in his Mind our Valour and Vertue, our Negligence, Impudence, and Tyranny: And upon this Prescience it was, that he disposed the Eternal Order of Things, in conformity to the Motion and Execution of our Choice, without the

least Violence done to the same. For as he lays no Constraint upon our Free Will, who discovers its Ope∣rations by Reasoning; so neither does the Supreme Being, who by his Immense Wisdom foresaw them long ago. He forced not our Will in the Alterations of Em∣pires; but rather altered Empires, because our Wills freely and deliberately deviated from Justice. The Cruelty exercised by King Peter was the cause of his Brother Henry's succeeding him; not, on the contra∣ry, this the Occasion of that. For the Mind has more Power than any Fortune, turns its Affairs which way it pleases, and is the sole Cause of a Happy or Miserable Life10 1.656. To expect Fortune from Chance, is Heart∣lesness; to think it prescribed and already determined, Desperation. At this rate, Vertue would be useless, and Vice excusable by Compulsion. Let your Highness but look upon your Glorious Ancestors, who have raised the Greatness of this Monarchy, and I am assured you will see, it was not Chance that Crowned them, but Vertue, Courage, and Fatigues, and that it has been supported by the same Means, by their Descendants, to whom an equal Glory is due; he no less contributing to the Fabrick of his Fortune who maintains it, than he that at first raised it. 'Tis a thing equally difficult to get, and easie to lose. One Hour's Imprudence ruines what cost many Years to acquire. By Labour and Vigilance alone is procured God's Assistance, and the Grandeur of Princes is deriv'd from Eternity11 1.657.

EMBLEM LXXXIX.

[illustration]

THE smallest things encrease by Concord; by Discord the greatest fall to the ground. Those which being divided, were weak and impo∣tent; when united, resist any Force whatever1 1.658. What Arm can pull off a Horse's Main when the Hairs are not parted, or break a Bundle of Arrows? And yet either of these, of it self, is unable to withstand the least Violence. By these Emblems, Sertorius, and Scilurus the Scythian, express'd the Force of Concord, which of many distinct Parts makes one united and consequently strong Body. Care of the Publick Repose has raised the

Walls of Cities so much above the reach of Men, that they might not scale them; but however, many Soldiers at once closing their Shields, and mutually joining and agreeing to lift one another up, have got above their Battlements, and stormed them. All the Works of Na∣ture are preserved by Amity and Concord; and when this fails, they decay and die: The cause of Death being no other than a Discord of the Part, whereon Life depends. The very same happens in Commonwealths; as common Consent made them a Society, so a Dissention between the greatest or most powerful part dissolves again and dissociates, or else new models them. That City, which by Concord was but one, without it becomes two, nay, sometimes three or four, for want of that Body of Love whereby its Inhabitants made one Body. This Division engenders Hatred, whence Revenge arises, and from that a disrespect of Laws; without the Authority of which, Justice loses its force; and where that fails, Arms are taken up; and a Civil War breaking out, the Order of the State, which wholly consists in Unity, is confounded2 1.659. The Bees no sooner fall out, but their Commonwealth is destroyed. The Ancients, to repre∣sent Discord, painted a Woman tearing her Cloaths.

Et scissâ gaudens vadit discordia pallâ.* 1.660

Now if it has the same effect between Citizens, how will they be able to unite for their Common Defence and Interest? How will they have God on their side, who is Peace it self, and so great a Lover of it, that (as Iob says) with it he maintains his Heavenly Mo∣narchy 3 1.661. Plato used to say, Nothing was so pernicious to Commonwealths as Division. Concord is the Ornament of a City, its Walls and Guard; even Malice it self can∣not stand long without it. Domestick Dissentions are so many Victories for the Enemy4 1.662; as those of the

Britains, Galgacus said, were to the Romans5 1.663. But notwithstanding these and other Reasons, some Politi∣cians assert, That it is necessary, for the Preservation of a State, to sow Discords among the People; and to this end, alledges, for an Example, the Bees, in whose Hives is always heard a kind of Murmurring and Dissen∣tion. But, alas, this is so far from strengthning, that it rather overthrows their Opinion; for that Humming is not a Dissonance, as I may say, of Wills, but a Harmony of Voices, whereby these Creatures, as it were, en∣courage and stir up each other to the Labours of making Honey, as Mariners do when they Hoise Sail. Nor is the Argument drawn from the contrariety of the four Humours in living Bodies, of any force; for 'tis rather from this Conflict of theirs that proceed Diseases, and Shortness of Life, that which is Prdominant at last getting the Victory. Hence Vegetables, because with∣out that contrariety, endure longer. What differs from, and is at variance with it self, must of necessity suffer; and what suffers, can never be lasting. Who, when a Republick is divided, can keep the Flame of Dissentions within certain Bounds? Who will afterwards quench it, when All are involved in them? The more Power∣ful Faction will now oppress the Weaker; and that to Defend, this to Revenge it self, make use of Foreign Forces, and so enslave the Commonwealth, or else intro∣duce a new Form of Government, which will almost always be Tyrannical, as several Instances witness. It is not the Prince's Duty to distract the Minds of his Sub∣jects, but rather to keep them loving and amicable; and besides, 'tis impossible they should conspire to love and obey him, who are divided amongst themselves, or con∣sider not whence their Evil comes. As often therefore as the Prince himself is the cause of Discord, Divine Providence (as it abominably6 1.664 detests it) permits

those very Means he thought to preserve himself by, to be the Instruments of his Ruine: For when the Parties come to know it, they despise and abhorr him, as the first Author and Promoter of their Differences. King Italus gained the Affection and Applause of the Germans, by never fomenting Dissentions, and carrying himself alike to all.

For these then, and such like Reasons, the Prince should beware of letting Discords take root; and rather strive to encourage the Union of his State, which will easily be maintained, if he look carefully to the Ob∣servance of the Laws, the Unity of Religion, Plenty of Corn and Provision, to the equal Distribution of Favours and Gratuities, to the Maintaining of Privileges; if he take care that the Common People be employed in Mechanick Arts, the Nobility in Publick Government, Arms, and Literature, to prohibit Cabals, and Clan∣destine Meetings, to keep the Great Ones Frugal and Modest, and the Inferiours Peaceable, to restrain Pri∣vileged Persons, and those who pretend to be exempt from Duties; in a word, if he see that Riches be re∣duced to a Mediocrity, and Poverty remedied. For from the Reformation and Regulating these, results good Government; and where that is, there Peace and Concord ever flourish. There is but one Case wherein it seems convenient and warrantable to kindle Discords in Kingdoms, and that is, when they are already troubled with Seditions, and Intestine Broils; for then to di∣stract them into Factions, will be a means to weaken the Power of the Bad, the only end in that being to render Peace to the Good. And it is a piece of Self-Preserva∣tion, not to let Disturbers be at quiet; inasmuch as the Concord of Ill Men is to the Prejudice of the Good; as 'tis to be wish'd that these may live Peaceably, so it is that those may be in Discord: For Good Men always come by the worst, when Bad Men are united7 1.665.

The Discord we condemn as pernicious to Common∣wealths, is that which arises from Hatred and Enmity; not that Contention which has place between several Conditions and Members of the same Commonwealth, as between the Lords and Commons, the Soldiers and Tradesmen: For that Contrariety, or rather Emulation, by the very diversity of Natures and Ends, keeps up a Distinction in the Degrees and Spheres of the State, and supports it; nor are there Seditions, but when the States combine together, and make every private Person's the Common Interest: just as from the commixtion of the Elements, and the meeting of Rivers and Streams, pro∣ceed Storms and Inundations. It concerns the Prince therefore to employ all his Care upon this Division; so moderating it, that it shall neither come on the one hand to absolute Rupture, nor on the other to unlawful Com∣binations.

The same thing should be done between Ministers, that some kind of Emulation and Diffidence one of ano∣ther, may make them more attentive of their Duty; for if once, through a neglect of this, they Dissemble, and conceal one another's Faults, or with one consent join the pursuit of their own Interests, there will be an end of the Prince and the State, without the possibility of a Remedy, in that none can be apply'd but by their Hands. But if this Honest and Generous Emulation should degenerate into Aversion and Enmity, it will create the same Inconveniencies; for they will then be more intent on contradicting and thwarting one another, more solicitous to overthrow each others Counsels and Actions, than to promote the Publick Good, and their Prince's Service. Every one has his Friends and Creatures, and the Common sort of People are apt to be ••ead into Factions, whence generally arise Tumults and Dissentions. For this Reason, Drusus and Germanicus ••oined themselves, lest the Flame of the Differences ••indled in Tiberius's Palace, should be encreased by the ••last of their Favour. Whence it is apparent how ••••roneous the Judgment of Lycurgus was, who sowed

Dissentions among the Kings of Lacedaemon, and ordained, that when Embassadors were to be sent afar off, such Persons should be made choice of, as had some grudge to each other. We have not a few Examples in this Age of Publick Losses, occasion'd by the clashing of Mi∣nisters joined in one Commission, upon a Supposition that this very Emulation would incite them to execute it carefully. The Prince's Service is One, and cannot be perform'd but by Persons Unanimous: Whence Tacitus commends Agricola, for one who was far from envying his Colleagues8 1.666. And certainly it is less dangerous for an Affair to be managed by one Bad, than by two Good Ministers, if they don't agree, which rarely happens.

The Nobility is the Prince's greatest Security, or greatest Hazard, being a Powerful Body, that draws most of the People after it. Spain and France furnish us with many Bloody Instances of this Truth; that in former Ages, this in all. The best Remedies are, by the means of Emulation, to keep them divided from the Commons and themselves, yet with the Moderation above-mention'd. To multiply and level the Titles and Dignities of the Nobles; to spend their Estates upon Pub∣lick Ostentations, and their Great Souls in the Toils and Dangers of War; to divert their Thoughts by Employ∣ments of Peace, and humble their Exalted Spirits by the servile Offices of the Court.

EMBLEM XC.

[illustration]

KINGS, in Holy Scripture, are compared to Rivers; for so the Prophet Habakkuk is to be understood, when he says, God would cleave the Rivers of the Earth1 1.667; meaning, that God would divide the Forces of those who took up Arms against his People: As David actually found he did, in his Defeat of the Philistines; and therefore openly confessed, that the Lord had divided his Enemies before him, as Waters are divided2 1.668. Division is the most effectual means

to pull down any Power; the very greatest, if divided, being uncapable of making any further Resistance. How impetuously does a River stream down the midst of its Channel, breaking through its very Banks to open it self new Passages; yet if parted into several Rivulets, it loses its strength, and becomes passable to all. Thus it happened to the River Gyndes, where a beloved Horse of Cyrus's having been drowned, it so enraged him, that he immediately commanded it to be cut into an Hun∣dred and sixty Canals; by which means it lost both its Name and Greatness; and that which before would scarce bear Bridges, might afterwards be easily forded. This the Counsel had regard to, which some gave the Roman Senate, to weaken the River Tiber, by turning the Course of the Lakes and Brooks that discharged them∣selves into it3 1.669, to rid the City of continual Fear and Danger of its Inundations. But the Senate refused to do it, as unwilling to deprive the Tiber of its Glory4 1.670. All these things have given occasion to the present ••mblem, which (by a River parted into several Branches) shews of what consequence it is to distract the Forces of Puissant Princes: For the greater the Power is, the more Forces and Expence its Defence requires; nor is it hardly possible to find Officers and Soldiers enough for it, or to prevent all Mischances. Courage and Prudence are confounded, when Dangers threaten thus on all sides. Besides, this is the most secure and the cheapest Method that can be taken; inasmuch as a Trumpet on a sudden sounding an Alarm in several Parts of a Kingdom, has abundantly greater Effects, than a War solemnly denounced.

It is always the best and securest way, to divide Ene∣mies Forces, and sow seeds of Dissention within their States5 1.671: Nothing so much exposing to Plots and

Invasions, as Discord and Sedition6 1.672. By these Ar∣tifices the Phoenicians established their Dominion in Spain, dividing it into various Factions. The same did the Carthaginians against them. Therefore the Counsel of the Marquess of Cadiz was not at all imprudent, when having taken Boabdili, King of Grenada, he moved Ferdinand the Catholick to set him at liberty, that his Presence might foment the Factions a foot between him and his Father, about the Crown, which had distracted the Kingdom into a great many Parties. When the Roman Empire, says Tacitus, began to decline, and hasten to decay, nothing greater could be desired of Fortune, than the Discord of its Enemies7 1.673. No Money is laid out to more Advantage, none with less Bloodshed or Danger, than that which is employed in encouraging the Dissentions of an Enemy's Kingdom, or in getting another Prince to make War upon it; for the Charges and Damage become hereby much more incon∣siderable. But this matter demandeth extraordinary Ad∣vertency; for sometimes, upon a mis-grounded Appre∣hension, Money is expended to no purpose, and the Discovery of the ill Intention begets open Hostility: A thing we have many Instances of, in those who with∣out any Provocation, or the least Prospect of Advan∣tage, have countenanced the Adversaries of the House of Austria, to keep its Hands full, by continual Wars, in the mean time unprofitably exhausting their Treasuries, without considering, that if they should once be attack'd by those of this House, it would be much better to have still by them, for their own Defence, what they had laid out upon the Diversion of their Forces.

And this whole Doctrine has place, without any scruple in Policy, in an open War, where the Reason of Self-Preservation is more cogent, than other Conside∣rations less solid; and the same Cause that makes the

War lawful, justifies also this Discord. But when the case is nothing but an invidious Emulation of Grandeur, these Artifices are not warrantable; for he who stirs up the Subjects of another Prince to Rebellion, at the same time teaches his own to be Traitors. The Emulation should be between the Persons, not the Offices: Dignity is of the same kind in all its parts; that which wounds one, wounds all. Passions and Hatreds are transient, but Bad Examples remain for ever. It is the Interest and Concern of every Prince, not to suffer the Dignity of another to be injured by Contempt or Disobedience, or his Person by Treason. 'Tis an Action unworthy of a Prince to conquer by Poison, not by the Sword. It was ever accounted base, among the Romans8 1.674; and is to this day with the Spaniards, who have been so far from making use of such secret Practices against their Enemies, that they have often been assisting to them. A remarkable Example of which, our Catholick King left your High∣ness, when he sent an Army to aid the French King against the English, who had possess'd themselves of the Isle of Rhea, not regarding the Duke of Roan's Advice, which was, to divide the Kingdom into several Govern∣ments. And another time, when His Majesty offered, by Monsieur de Maximi, the Pope's Nuncio, to assist the same King in Person to subdue the Hugonots of Mon∣tauban, and drive them out of his Country. Which Signal and Heroick Kindness had no other Return but Ingratitude; leaving a Lesson to Reason, not to let it self be too easily touch'd with Compassion towards a Foreign State.

From what hath been said, it is obvious to deduce how much the Agreement of Subjects Minds, and the Union of States, contribute to their Common Defence: If, I say, every particular Person did look on the Danger of his Neighbour as his own, be it at never so remote a distance, and accordingly endeavour all ways,

both with Men and Money, to relieve him, that the whole Body may be preserved. But not a few are de∣ceived in this Point; they who are far off, flattering themselves with the Thoughts that the Danger will never reach them, or that they are no way obliged to anticipate such Expences, and that it is greater Prudence to keep their Forces entire till the Enemy come nigher. But alas! then all the Difficulties being surmounted, and those States taken, which served them for Out-works the rest will never be able to hold out. This was the Fate of the Britains: of whom, thus Tacitus; Heretofore they were under Kings, now are by petty Princes distracted into Factions; nor does any thing further our Designs against the strongest Nations, than their not consulting the Common Good. Seldom above two or three Cities associate to repell the Common Danger: Thus while every one fights single, all are overcome9 1.675. The Kingdoms of Spain, and Pro∣vinces of Italy, Burgundy and Flanders are sensible of this Danger, with a greater Prudence, a more eminent and exemplary Piety, Zeal and Affection towards their Lawful Lord; in that with a generous Emulation they voluntarily offer His Majesty their Lives and Fortunes, to protect them from their Enemies, who with joint-Forces conspire the Overthrow of the Catholick Reli∣gion, and that Monarchy. Let Your Highness ingrave these Services on your tender Breast; and let the Gra∣titude and Esteem due to Subjects so Loyal, encrease with your Glorious Years:

Then you will judge which is most excellent, To Rule the World, or such a Government.* 1.676

EMBLEM XCI.

[illustration]

FRiendship seems to restrain a Government more, and to have been more considered by Law-Givers, than Iustice. For if all Men were Friends, there would be no need of Justice; but though all were Just, yet would they want the Protection of Friend∣ship 1 1.677. Friendship is the greatest good Mankind en∣joys; a sure Sword always by one's side, both in Peace and War; a faithful Companion in both Fortunes.

With this, Prosperity is crown'd, and Adversity be∣comes more easie. For it neither is diminished by one, or encreased by the other: In one it is guided by Mo∣desty, in the other by Constancy; in the one and the other always at hand, as if by both it were like to gain. Consanguinity may be without Kindness and Affection, Friendship cannot. This comes from our own Choice, that from Chance. That may be without the Bond of Communication and Mutual Assistance, this cannot; forasmuch as there are three things, which, as consti∣tuent parts of its Being unite it; Nature by the means of Resemblance; the Will, by that of Good Humour; and Reason, by that of Honour. Hereunto, certainly, King Alphonsus the Wise alludes, when he accuseth a cer∣tain Person of Cruelty and Injustice, for carrying away Prisoner one of two Persons who were endeared to each other by Consanguinity and Friendship2 1.678.

The more tried therefore and sincere the Friendship has been, so much the less valuable will it be, when once violated. A Crystal crackt, is good for nothing. The Diamond loses all its Worth, when divided into Pieces. A Sword once broken, can never be solder'd again. Whoever trusts to reconciled Friendship, will find himself deceived; for upon the first Blow of Ad∣versity, or Prospect of Advantage, it will presently relapse again. Neither David's Mercy, in sparing Saul's Life, nor the Acknowledgments and fair Protestations of Saul, confirmed by Oath, were sufficient to make the first think himself e'er the safer for this Reconcilement, or the last to cease Plotting against him3 1.679. Esau, with Embraces, and Tears in his Eyes, tried to regain the Favour of his Brother Iacob; and though there passed great Signs and Expressions of Friendship on both sides, yet could they never take away Iacob's Distrust, who, notwithstanding, endeavoured all he could to be severed from him, and secure himself* 1.680. Renewed Friendship

is like a vessel of Metal, which to day shines, and to morrow is covered with Rust4 1.681. Nor are all the good offices in the World capable of making it firm, because the remembrance of Injuries is never quite erased out of the Mind. Ervigius, after the Usurpation of Wamba's Crown, marry'd his Daughter Cixilon to Egica, a very near Relation of that King's, and afterwards nominated him for his Successor; but even this could not keep Egica from giving some marks of his Hatred to his Father-in-Law, as soon as ever he came to the Crown* 1.682. The Scars of Wounds made by Injuries on the Mind, always remain in the Person wrong'd, and upon the first motion bleed afresh. Injuries are like Marshes, which, though dried up, are easily filled with Water again. There is a certain Shadow always be∣twixt the Offender and the Offended, which no Light of Excuse or Satisfaction can dispell. Nor is Friendship secure on the former's side, in that he never is persuaded the other has really and from his heart forgiven the Injury, and always looks on him as an Enemy. Besides that, it is natural to hate one you have injured5 1.683.

This is what happens in the Friendship of private Per∣sons, but 'tis not so in those of Princes, (if indeed there be any true Friendship to be met with between them) for Self-Interest makes them Friends or Enemies; and though the Friendship be broke a thousand times, yet it is pre∣sently renewed again by hopes of Advantage; and as long as this may be executed, continues firm and con∣stant. Wherefore in such Friendships as these, no re∣gard is to be had to the Ties of Blood, or Obligations of Favours received, for these are things disowned by Ambition. Their Duration is to be esteem'd by Utility, in that all Friendships now-a-days are like those of Philip, King of Macedon, who made Interest, not Faith, the Measure of them. In these, Friendships, which are more

Reason of State, than any Mutual Harmony of Wills, Aristotle and Cicero would never have so sharply repri∣manded Bias, for saying, We ought to love no otherwise, than if we were to hate again: For a Prince would be de∣ceived in his Confidence, should he ground it upon such Friendship. It is best then for Princes to be Friends so to day, as to think they may possibly fall out to morrow. But although this Precaution is not to be found fault with, yet Interest and Self-ends are not to be preferred to Friendship, ever the more, for that 'tis common for others to do so. Let Friendship fail in others, but not the Prince we propose to form by these Emblems, whom we exhort to Constancy in his Actions and Obligations.

All that has been said hitherto, has respect to such Friendships as are betwixt neighbouring Princes, be∣tween whom there is some Emulation of Grandeur; for among others, sincere Amity, and a reciprocal Cor∣respondence, may have place. Power should not be so over-careful, as to trust no one. Like a Tyrant, he will be ever in Fear, who puts no Confidence in his Friends. Without these, the Crown is Slavery, not Majesty. 'Tis an unjust Empire, that deprives Princes of Friendships. Not Armies nor Treasures are the Defence of a Kingdom, but Friends6 1.684. 'Tis not the Golden Scepter that protects a King, but abundance of Friends; those are the truest, those the securest Scepter7 1.685. Nor is there any greater Instrument of good Government, than good Friends8 1.686.

Friendship between great Princes, should be main∣tained rather by a good Correspondence, than by Pre∣sents; for Interest is always ungrateful and insatiable: For the sake of that, Friendships are pretended, never really contracted; as Vitellius found, who thinking to preserve his Friends, by the Richness of his Presents,

not by his Merit, deserved rather than had them9 1.687. Friends are to be kept by Iron, not Gold; for Fear of Arms creates more of them, than Desire of Money. Pecuniary Subsidies enervate the Giver; and the greater they are, the lesser time can they be continued; and as fast as the Prince's Coffers empty, his Reputation dimi∣nishes. Princes are esteem'd and lov'd for the Trea∣sures they still have, not those they have already squan∣dered away; more, I say, for what they can give, than for what they have given: For Hope prevails much more with Men than Gratitude. He who buys Peace, is unable to uphold it with Arms. This is a Fault which almost all Monarchies fall into, when arrived to some height of Grandeur, they strive to maintain it by Money, not Arms; and thus consuming their Treasures, and oppressing their Subjects, to raise Contributions for neighbouring Princes, to keep the Circumference quiet, they weaken the Center. And though that Greatness be supported for a time, yet 'tis at the Price of a greater Downfall; for that Weakness being known, and the Frontiers once lost, the Enemy, without Opposition, makes way to their Heart. Thus it befell the Roman Empire, when, after having been at so many useless Expences, and wasted their Strength, the Emperors went about to gain the Parthians and Germans by Pre∣sents, which was the first beginning of their Ruine. Hence Alcibiades advised Tisaphernes not to be so liberal of his Succors to the Lacedaemonians, but to remember, that it was not his own, but another's Victory he pro∣moted; and that he was to support the War, so as not to be obliged to abandon it through Want10 1.688. This Counsel we may make our Advantage of, by taking care, what is expended on Favour of Foreign Princes, to the great prejudice and weakening of Castile; which

yet, as being the Heart of the whole Monarchy, should be furnish'd with the greatest quantity of Blood, to di∣stribute Vital Spirits to all the other Parts of the Body; as Nature her self, the best Mistress of Politicks, in∣structs, who fortifies with the strongest Fences the inte∣riour Parts, whereon Life depends. If what Timorous∣ness and Solicitude spends Abroad to keep the Monarchy in Security, Prudence would lay out at Home in main∣taining Forces both by Sea and Land, in Fortifying and Garrisoning Strong Holds, Forts and Cities, the remote Provinces would be abundantly more safe; and if any one should be lost, it might easily be recovered by the Forces within. Rome was able to defend it self, and even to retake all that Hannibal had gotten from them, nay, even to overthrow Carthage it self, by keeping all its Wealth and Strength within the Bowels of the Com∣monwealth.

Not that I say this, with a desire to persuade Princes always to refuse their Money to their Friends and Neigh∣bours, but only that they might be very careful how they lay it out, and rather assist them with Men than Money; for this stays with them that receiv'd it, where∣as those return to him who sent them. And this is to be understood, when there is no danger of engaging themselves in the War, by drawing it into their own States, or of getting their Friend greater Enemies; as also when it is more Expensive, and liable to more Inconveniences to aid with Money, than Arms: For one of the two ways State-Interest absolutely requires us to defend a neighbouring Prince, as often as our Fortune is inseparably joined with his; it being prudenter to carry on a War in another's State, than to feed it in the very Heart of our own. Thus, of old, it was the peculiar way of the Romans to make War far from Home, and by the Fortresses of the Empire to defend the Fortunes of their Allies11 1.689, not their own Houses.

And this we ought to have learn'd from that Govern∣ment, that we might not be forced to lament at this day so many Calamities. 'Tis this Policy, rather than Am∣bition, that has moved the Swiss-Cantons to undertake the Protection of some People; for though they were sensi∣ble this could not be done without great Charges, and the running the Risque of their own Defence, yet they thought it more their Interest to keep the War out of their own Territories: The Confines of a neighbouring State are the Walls of our own, and as such, to be guarded with all the Care imaginable.

EMBLEM XCII.

[illustration]

EVen the Feathers of Birds are in danger, when too near those of the Eagle; in that these, by that na∣tural Antipathy surviving in them, which is between the

Eagle and the other Birds, corrode and destroy them1 1.690. Thus Protection changes into Tyranny. A Superiour Power observes no Laws, Ambition no Respect. What was committed to its Trust, it afterwards detains as its own, under colour of Self-Preservation. Petty Princes think to secure their States by Foreign Aids and utterly ruine them: They fall a Prey both to Friend and Enemy; the former being no less dangerous from Confidence, than the latter from Hatred. With a Friend we live secure, without the least Fear or Precaution; so that he may easily strike us, without any Danger on his side. Upon this Reason, I conceive, was founded that Law, which commanded, the Oxe that had gored any one, to be stoned2 1.691, but says nothing of the Bull; because we trust the Oxe more, as being a Domestick Animal we every day make use of. Ambition creeps in, under the pretext of Friendship and Protection; and that, by their means, is easily obtained, which never could have been by Force. With what specious Names did the Romans mask their Tyranny, when they received the People of other Nations for Citizens, Friends, and Allies? They admitted the Albani into their Common∣wealth, peopling it with those who before were Enemies: The Sabines they made Free of their City; and abun∣dance of Countries called them to their Aid, against their Enemies, as the Protectors of their Liberties and Privileges, and the Universal Arbitrators of Justice. Thus they, who of themselves could not have 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one Foot of Ground, by the Ignorance of others, ex∣tended their Dominions far and near. At first they exacted but moderate Tributes of those Nations; thus disguising their Treachery, under the Appearance of Morality. But when that Imperial Eagle had spread its Wings wider, over the three Parts of the World, Europe, Asia, and Africa, she whet her Beak upon Ambition,

and discovered the Claws of her Tyranny. The People then found their Confidence was miserably deluded, and the Feathers of their Power destroyed, under those of the Oppression of Taxes, and the loss of their Liberty and Privileges; and now the Tyranny was grown powerful, could neither recover themselves again, nor re-establish their Forces: And to the end the Venom might turn into Nature, the Romans invented Colonies, and introduced the Latin Tongue, thus to efface the Distinction of Nations, and leave the Romans alone to enjoy the Empire of all. This was that Eagle in Ezekiel's Vision, with great Wings, and many Feathers3 1.692; or, as the Septuagint has it, many Talons, because such were its Feathers. How often do Men think they stand under the one, when they are really under the other? How often do they think themselves covered with the Lily, when stuck so fast amidst Thorns and Briars, that they can't escape without tearing their Cloaths. The City of Pisa put their Rights and Pretensions against the Republick of Florence, under the Protection of Ferdinand the Catholick, and the King of France; and both agreed to deliver it to the Florentines, under the pretence of the Repose of Italy. Lewis Sforza employed the Assistance of the French against his Nephew, Iohn Galeas; and they having divested him of the Dutchy of Milan, car∣ried him Prisoner into France. But what need is there to look so far for Examples? Let the Duke of Mantua 〈◊〉〈◊〉 how dear another's Protection has cost him? Let 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Elector of Treves, and the Grisons, say whether they have ••••eserved their Liberty, by admitting Foreign Armies into their States, for their Defence and Pro∣tection: Let Germany tell us how it finds it self, under the Patronage of Sweden; now the noble Circles of its Provinces, heretofore the Splendour and Support of the Imperial Diadem, are divided and broken; now those sparkling Diamonds, the Cities of the Empire, its an∣cient

Ornament, are sullied and unset, the Orders of its States overthrown and confounded, the Harmony of its Politick Government destroyed, its ancient Nobility stript and impoverished; that, of all its Provinces which knew best how to assert its Liberty, now without the least appearance of it, is trampled under foot and laid waste by the Fire and Sword of Foreign Nations, and exposed to the Will of a thousand Tyrants, all living Pictures of the King of Sweden; in a word, a Slave both to Friends and Enemies, and so stupified by its Misfortunes, that 'tis render'd incapable of discerning its Interest or Disadvantage. This is the Fate of all People at variance with themselves, of all Princes who make use of Foreign Forces; especially if he who sends, does not also pay them. Thus it hap∣pened to the Cities of Greece, when Philip, King of Macedon, contriving to ensnare the Liberty of all, fo∣mented their Contentions; and by fiding with the Weaker, made both the Victors and Vanquished submit to one Yoke4 1.693. Glory, at first, prompts to the De∣fence; but in the end, Ambition seizes all. Whoever employs his Forces for another, expects some Amends for it. The Country always loves the Power that pro∣tects it; the Subjects imagining they shall live more secure and happy under his Government, freed from the Fear and Danger of Wars, and the severe Taxes inferiour Princes are wont to impose, and from those Grievances they generally suffer at their Hands. The Nobles too, think it more Honourable to serve a greater Master, who has larger Rewards to give, and greater Preferments to confer upon them. All these Conside∣rations make way for Tyranny and Usurpation. Auxi∣liary Troops always obey him who sends them, or in whose Pay they are, and treat those Countries they serve in, as Foreign; so that when the War is ended with the Enemy, they must begin with the Friend. Therefore

I think it better, and less hazardous and expensive, for the weaker Prince to come to a Composition, upon any Terms, with the more powerful, than even to conquer him with Foreign Arms: What cannot be obtained but by them, can much less be preserved without them, after they shall be withdrawn.

This Danger of Auxiliary Forces is yet more to be feared, when the Prince who sends them is of a different Religion, or has, or at least pretends to some Right to that State; or else, if it be of any considerable Advan∣tage for him to be possessed of it, for the opening a Passage to his own, or obstructing that of an Enemy. These Apprehensions should be measured by Necessity, the Condition and Manners of the Prince being well examined; for if he be open and generous, Publick Faith and Reputation will have more Influence on him, than Interest, and Reasons of State; as has been expe∣rienced in all the Princes of the House of Austria, (re∣presented by that powerful protecting Cherub to which Ezekiel5 1.694 compares the King of Tyre, before he failed in his Duty) of whose Friendship no one can justly com∣plain. Piedmont, Savoy, Cologne, Constance, and Brisac, all Places defended by the Spanish Arms, and afterwards re∣stored without so much as a Garrison left in them, are everlasting Witnesses of this Truth. Nor can Genoua deny it; for when oppressed by France and Savoy, it put its Liberty into the Hands of the Spaniards, these People most faithfully preserved it, as esteeming more their Friendship, and the Glory of Publick Faith, than Do∣minion.

But if Necessity, at any time, oblige the Prince to have recourse to a Foreigner, he may avoid the Dangers men∣tioned, by these two or three Cautions: If he take care that the Foreign Forces be not greater than his own; That his own Officers Command them; That they be not put in Garrisons; That they be mixed or divided, and immediately drawn out against the Enemy.

EMBLEM XCIII.

[illustration]

OFten has the Tyrrhene Sea felt the Danger of the Neighbourhood of Mount Vesuvius: But we learn not always to profit by our Misfortunes, being, out of a vain confidence, apt to persuade our selves, they will never happen a second time. The World had long since been at the height of Wisdom, had it known how to improve by its Experiences: But Time, we see, effaces them, as it did in the Ruines the late Conflagra∣tions had left upon the skirts of that Mountain, covering it with a prodigious quantity of Ashes, which, but a few Years afterwards, the Plough cultivated, and re∣duced again to Soil. The Remembrance of the Losses sustained, was lost, or rather, no one would retain it,

when yet they ought to have ever kept Humane Caution upon its Guard. The treacherous Mountain conceal'd under its green Garment the Heat and Drought of its Entrails; and the Sea, suspecting no harm, made an Alliance with it, and embraced it with its Waters, not regarding the contrariety of those two Natures. But the treacherous Mountain kept its Intention so close, that not the least Smoke gave any sign of what was plotting within. Their Communication encreased by secret ways: Nor co••ld the Sea imagine this pretended Friend was raising Fortifications against it, and preparing Mines with divers sulphurous Metals; which being afterwards filled, and that in our Age, was set fire to. There open'd, on the top of it, a wide and deep Mouth, breathing out Flames, which at first seem'd to be no more than P••••mes, as I may say, of Sparks, or Bonfires, but in a few hours proved tragical Prodigies. This heavy Body several times shook; and amidst its dreadful Thunder, vomited up the liquid Flames of those indi∣gested Matters of melted Metals which boiled in its Stomach: like Torrents of Fire they streamed down it, into the Plains adjacent, burning the Trees, and car∣rying the Houses along with them, till at length they run into the Sea; which, astonish'd at so sudden an Hostility, retired with its Waters to the very Center, whether out of Fear, or Policy, to raise a greater Body of Waves to defend it self withal; for now the old League was violated, it was obliged to prepare for its Defence. The two Elements engaged not without the trembling of Nature her ••elf, afraid of seeing this beautiful Fabrick of the Universe on Fire: The very Waves, conquered by a superiour Enemy, burned; and the Fish, swimming in the Flames, were drowned: For the Fire, (as Solomon1 1.695 speaks) had power in the Water, forget∣ting his own Vertue; and the Water forgot his own quenching Nature.

Such will be the Effects of all the like Alliances of contrary Natures. Let not the Catholick Prince, who enters into a Confederacy with Infidels, expect less Evils. For there being no more inveterate Animosities than those which arise from the Difference of Religions, the present Necessity may indeed dissemble them, but it is impossible that Time should not discover them: And how is it to be imagined that Amity can ever be main∣tained between them, when the one cannot trust the other? when the Ruine of this, is the Interest of that? They who differ in Opinions, differ also in Minds; and as Creatures of that Eternal Artificer, we cannot suffer any other Adoration to be paid him, than what we judge to be true and Orthodox. And altho' the Friendship of Infidels were never so good, yet Divine Justice permits us not to obtain our Ends by the means of his Enemies, nay, usually chastises us by the very Infidel's Hand that Sign'd the Treaty. The Emperor which Constantine the Great translated into the East, was ruin'd by the Al∣liance of the Palaeologi with the Turk; God permitting it to remain to Posterity, for an Example of his Cor∣rection, but not any living Memorial of that Family. But if, by reason of the Distance of Places, or Disposition of Things, the Chastisement cannot be inflicted by those very Infidels, God uses his own Hand. What Calamities has not France suffered, since Francis I. more through Emulation of Charles the Fifth's Glory, than forced by any Necessity, made a League with the Turk, and called him into Europe? This Fault he acknowledged in the last moments of his Life, expressed his utmost Detestation of it in Words; which piously we ought to impute to a Christian Compunction, though otherwise they seemed to proceed from extreme Despair. God pursued his Chastisement in some of his Successors, by taking them off with violent and unhappy Deaths. Now if this Just Judge be thus severe on Princes who do but ask the Aid of Infidels and Hereticks, what will he do to those who assist them against the Catholicks, and are the reason of their making such great Progresses? The

Example of Peter II. of Arragon, will tell us2 1.696: This King stuck with all his Forces to the Faction of the Al∣bigenses in France; and though he fought at the Head of One hundred thousand Men, against the Catholicks, who were but Eight hundred Horse, and a Thousand Foot, lost at once both his Life and the Battel. Iudas Machabaeus no sooner joined with the Romans, tho' only to defend himself against the Grecian Power, but the two Angels, that stood by his side, left him, and he was slain. The same Punishment, and for the same Cause, suffered Ionathan and Simon, his Brothers and Successors.

Nor is the Excuse of Self-Defence always sufficient; for all the Conditions and Circumstances that make such Confederacies allowable, very rarely concurr, and are of greater weight than that universal Scandal and Dan∣ger of defiling the true Religion with Errors; the Communication of Hereticks being a Poison apt to infect, a Gangrene that soon spreads, where Minds are enclined to Novelty and Licentiousness3 1.697. Policy distrusting the Divine Assistance, and wholly relying upon Humane Artifices, may indeed deceive it self, but not God, at whose Tribunal meer Appearances of Reason are not received. Baasha, King of Israel, built a Fortress in Ramah, the last City of the Tribe of Benjamin, in the Kingdom of Asa, and so stopt its Avenues, that no one could go in or out of it with safety4 1.698. This occasion'd a War between those two Kings; and Asa fearing the Alliance of Ben-hadad, King of Syria, with his Enemy, contrived first to break that, and then enter'd himself into a Confederacy with Ben-hadad: which when Baasha heard, he left off building the Fortifications of Ramah5 1.699. Nevertheless, though Asa made this League out of Ne∣cessity,

and only for his own Defence, whereof the good Effect soon appeared; yet God was displeased that he put more confidence in the King of Syria than in him, and sent Hanani the Prophet to represent his fault to him, and threaten him with Wars, as a Punishment6 1.700; which accordingly happened. Whence it will be easie to gather, how much France has incurred the Divine Displeasure, by the Alliances it has now engaged it self in with those of another Religion, to oppress the House of Austria: Where is no room for the Pretence of Self-Preservation in extreme Necessity, since without any Provocation or Reason, he has sided with all its Adver∣saries, and made War upon it, fomenting it out of their States, and enlarging these by the Usurpation of foreign Provinces, and assisting the Hereticks and their Allies with Counsel and Arms to conquer the Catholicks; no one, in the mean time, coming thence to the Treaty of Peace at Cologne, although the Pope, the Emperor, and King of Spain, had all sent their Plenipotentiaries thither.

Nor is it unlawful only to make Leagues with Hereticks, but even to make use of their Forces. The Holy Scrip∣tures give us an illustrious Instance of this, in the Person of King Amasiah, who having hired an Army of the Sons of Israel, was commanded of God to dismiss it, and reproved, for not rather relying on him7 1.701. And because he presently obeyed, without any regard to the Danger, or to the hundred Talents he had given them, God gave him a signal Victory over his Enemies. Con∣federacy with those of a different Religion is lawful,

when its End is the Intermission of War, and Liberty of Commerce; such as that was which Isaac made with Abimelech8 1.702, and as now is between Spain and England.

When any Treaty is made with Hereticks, provided it interfere not with Religion or Good Manners, and be confirmed by Oath, the Publick Faith is by all means to be kept with them; for in the Oath, God is called to be a Witness to the Agreement, and, as it were, a Surety for the Performance of it, both Parties consenting to make him Judge of it, to punish the Perjurer. And cer∣tainly it were a hainous Sin, to call him to witness to a Lye. Nations have no other Security of the Treaties they make, than the Religion of Oaths; which if they should make use of to deceive, there would be an end of Com∣merce in the World, nor would it be possible for firm Truces or Peace to be ever concluded. But though there pass no Oath, yet the Treaties should nevertheless be observed: For from the Truth, Fidelity and Justice whereby they are maintained, there arises in them a mutual Obligation, and a Duty common to all Nations; and as it is not allowable to kill or hate a Man of a diffe∣rent Communion, so neither is it to cheat, or break a Promise to him. Hence Ioshua kept his Oath with the Gibeonites9 1.703: A thing which was so pleasing to God Almighty, that he vouchsafed in his savour to interrupt the Natural Order of the Orbs of Heaven, obeying the Voice of Ioshua, and stopping the Sun in the midst of its Course, to give him Time to prosecute the slaughter of his Enemies, and acquit himself of his Obligation10 1.704:

As, on the contrary, he punished David with a Three Years Famine, for Saul's breaking this very Treaty Three hundred Years after11 1.705.

EMBLEM XCIV.

[illustration]

THE Sun, when in Libra, distributes his Rays with so much Justice, that he makes the Days and Nights equal; not, however, without having a more particular regard to the Zones that are nearest

and most subject to his Empire, to which he imparts a greater Force of Light, always preferring those Climates and Pa••allels that are least remote; and if any Country suffers the Intemperatures of Heat under the Torrid Zone, the fault is in its ill Situation, not in the Sun's Rays, since they are at the same Time benign to other Parts of the same Zone. Now what the Sun does in the Equi∣noctial-Line, a Part of Heaven so considerable, that if the immense Being of God could be confined to any limited Place, it could be no other than that; the same Effect, I say, is produced here below, by that Pontifical Triple-Crown, which from Rome, as a Fixed Equinox, with its Divine Rays illuminates all the Parts of the World: This is the Sun of these inferior Orbs, in which was substituted the Power of the Light of that Eternal Sun of Righteousness, that all Things Sacred might receive from it their true Form, so as never to be called in question by the shadows of impious Opinions. There is no Country so near the Poles, but the Brightness of its Rays, in spite of the Frosts and Mists of Ignorance, has reached it. This Tiara, or Triple-Crown, is the Touch-stone on which other Crowns are tried, and the Caracts of their Gold and Silver proved, in that, as in a Crucible, they are separated from other base Metals; and it is by the Tau they are stampt with, that they are assured of their real Value. Hence Ramius, King of Arragon, and many others, voluntarily offered to become Feudataries to the Church, looking on it as an Honour and Happiness for their Crowns to pay it Tribute. Those that refuse the Touch of this Apostolical Stone, are of Lead and Tin, and so soon wear out, and con∣sume, rarely passing to the Fifth Generation, (as we see by frequent Experience.) It was with the Respect and Obedience of Princes, that their Temporal Gran∣deur and Dignity, foretold by the Prophet Isaiah1 1.706,

was encreased; who afterwards armed the Spiritual Sword, so as to render it capable of being the Balance of the Kingdoms of Christendom. And by the same means the Popes still endeavour to support their Power, procuring the Favour of Potentates by their Paternal Affection. Their Empire over Minds is a Voluntary one, imposed by Reason, not Force: and if at any time this latter has been too immoderate, it has had quite contrary Effects; for Passion is blind, and easily runs headlong. The Papacy even unarmed, is stronger than the best appointed Armies. The Presence of Pope Leo in his Pontifical Robes, struck such a Terrour into Attila, that it made him retreat, and lay aside his Thoughts of Sacking of Rome; which had he attempted by Arms, he had never quelled the haughty Spirit of that Barbarian. The bare Whistle of the Shepherd, or a kind Menace of the Crook or Sling, do more than the hardest Stones. It is a Rebellious Sheep, that must be led by Rigour: For if the Piety of the Faithful has given Force to the Papal Dignity, that was rather for the Security of its Grandeur, than done with a design to let them use it, except when the Maintenance of Religion, and the Uni∣versal Benefit of the Church so required. When, con∣trary to this one Consideration, the Mitre is turned into a Helmet, no more Reverence or Obedience is due to it, than if it were merely Temporal* 1.707: And if it will depend on Reasons of State, it will be looked upon only as a Politick Prince's Crown, not as the Diadem of a Pope, whose Empire is supported by a Spiritual Autho∣rity. His Pastoral Office is of Peace only, not War; his Crosier crooked, to guide, not pointed, to wound. The Sovereign Priest is the Sovereign Man, and there∣fore should not, as other Men, be guilty of Envy, Hatred or Partiality, which are always Incentives of War2 1.708. This even the very Pagans required in their Chief-Priest.

The Splendour of his Vertues strike the Mind more than the Sword does the Body, which is much less prevalent in composing the Differences of Princes than Love and Respect; for when Princes once see that his good Offices proceed from a true Paternal Love, free from Passions, Affections, and Politick Artifices, they willingly lay their Rights, and Arms, at his Feet. This several Popes have had Experience of, who avoid∣ing Neutrality, have shewn themselves the Common Fathers of the whole World. He who adheres to one alone, denies himself to all besides; and he that is neither on this Side nor that Side, takes the Part of none. Whereas the High-Priests should be for All, as their Garments, in the Old Law, gave us to understand, whose exquisite Make represented the Globe of the Earth3 1.709. 'Tis a piece of Cruelty to stand with Arms a-cross at the sight of other Mens Calamities. Should a Father stand still while his Children quarrel, he would be deservedly blamed for whatever mischief they should do one to another; he ought, sometimes by Rigour, sometimes by good Words, to part them, putting him∣self betwixt them, or, if need be, espousing one's Cause, the better to reduce the other to Agreement. Thus if Princes refuse to hearken to the Fatherly Admonition of His Holiness, if they pay not the Respect due to his Authority, and there be no hopes of ever recovering them, it seems best to declare in favour of the most just Side, always having regard to the Publick Quiet, and the Advancement of Religion and the Church, to assist that, till the other be brought to its Duty: For he that approves the Cause of the one and the other, will be thought to co-operate with both. * 1.710 In Italy, more than in any other Part of the World, this Care of the Popes is ne∣cessary 4 1.711: For if once they so openly betray their Inclination to the French, that they may promise themselves their Aid and Favour,

they will soon bring their Arms thither. This Conside∣••••tion prevailed on some Popes to shew themselves more addicted to Spain, the better to keep France within Bounds; and if at any time, any one, induced by an appearance of Good, or through Partiality or Self-Interest, and a Forgetfulness of this Caution, has used Secular Arms, and called in the Aid of Foreigners, he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 given occasion to great Commotions in Italy; as Historians observe, in the Lives of5 1.712 Vrban IV. who sent for Charles, Count of Anjou and Provence, to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Relief, against Mainfroy, King of both Sicilies: Of Nicholas III. who being jealous of the Power of King Charles, had recourse to Peter, King of Arragon: Of Nicholas IV. who enter'd into a League with Alphonsus ••f Arragon, against King Iames: Of Boniface VIII. who ••ppealed to Iames, King of Arragon, and called in the Assistance of Charles of Valois, Count of Anjou, against ••rederick, King of Sicily: Of Eugenius IV. who sided with the Faction of Anjou, against Alphonsus, King of N••ples: Of Clement V. who sought the Aid of Philip of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, against the Viscounts of Milan: Of Leo X. and c••••ment VII. who made a League with Francis, King of France, against Charles V. to throw the Spaniards out of Italy. This Inconveniency proceeds from the Weight of the Apostolick See, it being so great, that the Scale wherein 'tis put must necessarily fall very much. It is probable that some Appearance of Good moved those ••••pes to do thus; but certainly, in some of them, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was far from answering their Intention.

But as it is the Duty of the Popes to endeavour to ••••intain Princes in Peace and Tranquility; so ought these, out of Interest (were there no Divine Obligation for it, as there really is) to have continually their Eyes, like the Heliotrope, upon that Sun of the Pope's Triple-Crown, which always shines, and never sets, and to be ••••edient to, and protect it. Hence Alphonsus V. King of Arragon, upon his Death-bed, charged his Son

Ferdinand, King of Naples, to esteem nothing beyond the Authority of the Apostolick See, and the Favour of the Popes; and to take care not to disgust them, whatever Reason he had on his side6 1.713. Impious or Imprudent Princes think it a piece of Bravery to carry themselves haughtily towards the Popes: but such an Humility is so far from being a Weakness, that 'tis a Religious Act; 'tis no Dishonour, but a Glory. The most submissive Deferences paid them by the greatest Princes, are but a pious Magnanimity, that teaches Sub∣jects what Respect is to be paid to all that is Sacred; they beget not any Infamy, but rather an Universal Ap∣plause. No one condemned the Emperor Constanti••••, for taking a low Seat in a Council of Bishops7 1.714; nor King Egica, for prostrating himself upon the Ground, in another held at Toledo8 1.715. No one ever succeeds in opposing the Popes; those are Quarrels that nev•••• have a good end? And who can separate the Inter•••••• of the Temporal Prince from that of the Head of the Church? Injury and Authority are so joined, that the greater that is, the more it derogates from this. The Pontifical Dignity, when armed with both the Temporal and Spiritual Sword, withstands the greatest Power. It meets with an unshaken Obedience in Foreign King∣doms; and if it once goes to make War upon them, the People's Piety grows cold, and from fighting with Arms, they come to that of Books; Allegiance tott••••▪ and Religion being confounded, changes of Governm•••••• ensue, and the overthrow of Kingdoms, whose only Bottom is the Reverence and Respect of the Priest∣hood 9 1.716. which made some Nations unite it to the Re•••• Dignity. Princes ought therefore to carry themsel•••• with so much Prudence, as to decline, as much as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sible, giving any Occasion of Distaste to the Pope•••• which they will do, if they pay a due Respect to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Apostolick See, maintaining its Privileges, Rights, 〈◊〉〈◊〉

••munities inviolable, and asserting their own with ••urage and Resolution, when they interfere not with ••••••m, without admitting any Innovations prejudicial to ••••eir own States, and which tend not to the Spiritual ••ood of their Subjects. When Charles V. went into ••ely to be Crown'd, the Pope's Legates would oblige ••••••m to take an Oath to preserve the Rights of the Church. ••o which he answer'd, That as he would not alter them, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 neither would he, on the other side, do any thing against 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Constitutions of the Empire: Which he said, upon the ••••count of the Fiefs which the Church pre∣••ded on Parma and Placentia.* 1.717 King ••dinand the Catholick was so exact in this, ••at one may, in a manner, say he fell ••to Excess; judging it not fit to transgress ••••e Limits of Rights and Privileges the ••st in the World; because when the Foot is once ••••ed, it presently defends the Place it stands on, as a ••••••ssession; and insensibly goes farther, when, by briskly ••••posing its first steps, much greater Losses might be ••••oided. Iohn, King of Arragon, refused to ratifie the ••••ant of the Archbishoprick of Saragossa, made by Pope ••••tus IV. to Cardinal Ausias Dezpuch, because he did not ••ominate him, as was then the Custom; but causing the ••••rdinal's Goods and Revenues to be seized, and mis∣••ing his Relations, forced him to quit the Pontificate, ••••ich he afterwards conferred upon his Nephew Al∣••••••sus 10 1.718. Such another Dispute, a little after, arose ••••on the Subject of the Church of Tarrassona; which a ••rtain Temporal Judge having been made Bishop of, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ordered him to leave it instantly, threatning, if he ••••d not, to drive him, and all that belong'd to him, out 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Kingdom. The same did his Son Ferdinand, in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Bishoprick of Cuenca, to which Pope Sixtus had ••••••ated Raphaël Galeot, a Relation of his own11 1.719: For ••••e King, incens'd that it should be given to a Foreigner,

and without his Nomination, enjoined all the Spaniards to leave Rome, protesting he would call a Council upon that and some other Matters; and when the Pope afterwards sent his Nuncio into Spain, he bid him return, complain∣ing that His Holiness did not use him as such an obedient Son of the Church deserved, and wondred that the Em∣bassador should undertake such a Commission: But he humbly making answer, That he would renounce the Pri∣••••es of an Embassador, and submit wholly to His Ma∣jesty's Pleasure; by this, and the good Offices of the Car∣dinal of Spain, he was admitted, and all the Differences adjusted. But unless, for Self-Preservation, or other∣wise, the Case be extremely dangerous, recourse should not be had to these Methods; and it is befitting the Pa∣ternal Affection of the Popes, not to give Occasion to them, behaving themselves so Courteous always, so as thereby to maintain a good Correspondence with Princes: For although they have in their Hand, as was said, the two Swords of Spiritual and Temporal Authority, yet this ought to execute nothing but by the Arms of Empe∣rors and Kings, as Protectors and Defenders of the Church: Which makes it (as Alphonsus the Wise says* 1.720) of so much concernment for those two Powers always to agree, so that each may help the other, when Occasion requires. I doubt not but all those whom God hath placed in this High Station, have this Care deeply rooted in their Hearts; but yet it is often-times perplexed by the Courtiers of Rome, whose only business is to sow Discords; as also by the Ambition of some Ministers, who think to wind themselves into the Favour of the Popes, and to procure the best Preferments by their In∣dependency on Princes, and by the Aversion they bear them, always inventing Pretences to reject their Petitions, and taking all occasions of Affronting their Embassadors; and who, to appear Stout, suggest violent Counsels, under colour of Religion and Zeal: all which ruine the good Understanding of the Popes and Temporal

Princes, to the great prejudice of the Christian Com∣monwealth, and chills the Veins of Piety, for want of Love, the Artery that cherishes them, and maintains their warmth.

EMBLEM XCV.

[illustration]

THE Isthmus maintains it self between the Force and Power of two contrary Seas, as their com∣mon Arbiter, not enclining more to this than that: Hence, what one takes from it, the other restores again; and by the conflict of both, it is preserved en∣tire; for if the Waves of either should once swell and overflow the whole Tract of Ground, they would spoil

its Jurisdiction, and it would be no longer an Isthmus. This Neutrality betwixt two great Powers supported, for a long time, Peter Ruiz d'Azagra in his Govern∣ment of Albarraein, situate on the Frontiers of Castile and Arragon1 1.721; for each of these Kings took care not to let it be oppress'd by the other, and those Emu∣lations kept the Freedom of that little State untouch'd. By this the Dukes of Savoy may see how much it is their Interest to stand Neuter between the two Crowns of France and Spain, and to keep in their Hands the free Disposal of the Passes into ••••aly by the Alps, as a thing whereon their Grandeu••, their Conservation, and the Necessity of their Friendship, entirely depends; it high∣ly concerning each of these Crowns not to let them be subdued by the other. Hence the Spaniards have so often marched to the Aid of Charles Emanuel, and re∣covered such Places as the French had taken from him. I know only one Case wherein it is better that these Princes brea•• this Neutrality, and side with one of the two Crowns and that is, when the other attempts the Conquest of their Dominions, particularly that of France: For if once the French should drive the Spaniards out of Italy, they would become so powerful (considering they have already e••tended their Dominions from the very utmost Limits of the Ocean, as far as the Mediterranean, through Cal••••ria) that over running the States of Savoy and Piedmont, they must of necessity either unite them to the Crown of France, or but then them with an intolerable Slavery, which the whole Body of Italy would soon feel the Effects of, without hopes of redeeming their Liberty again; and for Spain ever to retrieve their Losses, or balance their Forces, would be extremely difficult, considering the vast distance between them too. This Danger the Republick of Venice, with a great deal of Prudence, weighed, when seeing Charles the Eighth's Power encrease in Italy, they struck up that which was called the Holy League. From that time, one may say,

Divine Providence began to contrive the Security and Preservation of the Apostolick Chair, and of Religion, and to prevent its falling under the Tyranny of the Turk, or being infected with the Heresies, then taking root in Germany; advanced the Greatness of the House of Austria, and establish'd the Spanish Monarchy in the States of Naples, Sicily, and Milan, that Italy might have a Catholick Prince to defend it on all sides: And to restrain the Power of Spain, and make it content with the Rights of Succession, Fiefs, and Arms, it raised it a Rival in the Person of the King of France, to lay its Kings under a necessity for their Preservation of gaining the Love and Good-will of their Subjects, and the Esteem of other Princes, by maintaining Justice among them, with these Peace, without giving the least Occasion to War, which always hazards the Rights and Designs of the most Powerful.

This Advantage which Italy reaps from the Power of Spain, is, by some, unjustly traduced as a Yoke of Slavery; when, on the contrary, it is the only Instru∣ment of its Repose, of its Liberty and Religion: The Mistake proceeds from their not well knowing the Im∣portance of this Counterpoise. A Person, ignorant in Navigation, seeing the Bottom of a Ship filled with Sand and Stones, thinks it carries the Cause of its Wreck in this Weight: whereas they who are acquainted with Sea-Affairs, know, that without this Ballast, the Lightness of the Ship could never subsist long against the Agitation of the Waves. Nicephorus, speaking of this Aequilibrium between two Crowns, looks on it as a Common Advantage to the Subjects of both Kingdoms, when he says,

That he could not enough admire the inscrutable Wisdom of God, who makes two directly opposite Means tend to the same End; as when he would keep two Powers at variance, without however subjecting the one to the other, he either gives to both Commanders, whose Capacity and Courage discover the Artifices, and oppose the Attempts of the adverse Party, which makes for the Liberty of the Subjects of both Sides;

or else sets over them Men so senseless and cowardly, that they undertake nothing considerable one against another, but leave the Limits of the Kingdom as they found them

2 1.722. For the same ends, Divine Pro∣vidence has parted the Forces of the French and Spanish Kings, by interposing the high Walls of the Alps, lest Propinquity of Territories, or Easiness of Passage, should be a Temptation to War, and favour the French most, if that Nation should have these Doors so often open. It has still, for greater Security, given the Keys of them to the Duke of Savoy, an Italian Prince, who having his States between those two Kingdoms, can lock or leave them open, according as the Publick Good requires. This Divine Disposition Pope Clement VIII. was sensible of, and with singular Prudence procured the State of Saluzzes to fall into the Duke of Savoy' s Hands.* 1.723 This was a very an∣cient State-Maxim; on which Alphonsus, King of Naples, grounded his Advice to the Duke of Milan, not to deliver up Asti to Lewis the Dauphin: For (said he) it is not for the good of Italy, that the French strive to get footing there, but to bring it under their Subjection, as was attempted in the Genoese Expedition. That Italian Prince penetrated not the force of this Counsel, who advised the prefent French King, by making himself Master of Pignerol, to get firm footing on the Alps; deceived probably (unless it were Malice) by the appearing Conveniency of having the French ready against any Attacks of the Spaniards; not considering, that by the fear of a future War, which might perhaps never have really happen'd, a present and most certain one is kindled, upon the admission of

the French into Italy; it being impossible for Peace to be preserved in any one Province betwixt two Nations so opposite and disagreeing: Nor were Italy like to reap any other Benefit from it than this, That it would nourish a Serpent in its Bosom, whose poisonous Sting would certainly afterwards envenom it. Besides that the French, even when within their own Limits, on the other side of the Alps, are always near enough to march into Italy, when called, nor is it necessary that they be so near as to have the Passage at their Command. Be∣sides, were the French so modest, so void of Ambition, as to confine themselves there, and not move but when called upon; yet who doubts but upon such an Occasion they would widely transgress the Bounds of Protection; as Lewis Sforza, Castruchio Castrocani, and several others, have actually experienc'd, who sought their Aid with no other Advantage, than that the same befell them (as it does some at this day) which Tacitus relates to have happened to the Frecentini, who, while they agreed among themselves, valued not the Parthians; but upon their falling into Dissentions, while each called in Aid against his Rival, the Person invited by one Party conquered both3 1.724. Now if that Power might be brought into Pignerol, so as to be wholly at the Disposal of Italy, either to call it in, or send it out of its Ter∣ritories, as Occasion should require, there had then been some Reason in the Policy, some colour of Zeal for the Publick Good, in this Counsel: But now, in a time the most improper in the World, to place it within the very Gates of Italy, to enter them upon every Motion of Ambition or Levity, and that Fear of it might keep the Spaniards continually upon their Guard, and Occasion be given to other Princes to take up Arms, and a Storm of Wars be raised never to be calmed, was so far from being good Counsel, that it was the rankest Treason,

being, in plain terms, no other than exposing it to the Power of France, and wresting that out of the Italian Prince's Hand, which he had over the Alps, for the Common Good of All.

In the other Potentates of Italy, which are not situate between those two Crowns, this Reason of Neutrality has not the same force; for when once War is brought into Italy, they cannot but fall a Prey to the Conqueror, without having obliged either Party; as the Consul Quinetius said to the Aetolians, to persuade them to de∣clare for the Romans, in the War against Antiochus; and as the Florentines found, when refusing to join with the King of Arragon, they stood Neuter; thereby losing the Favour of the French King, without appeasing the Anger of the Pope4 1.725. Neutrality neither makes Friends, nor removes Enemies5 1.726. Hence Alphonsus, King of Naples, said of the Sienois, who thinking to save themselves by Neutrality, were ruin'd,

That the same happened to them, which usually does to one who lodges in the middle of an House, whom they below fill with Smoke, those above pour Water down upon him.

What did not the Thebans suffer, by being Neutral, when Xerxes invaded Greece? While Lewis XI. of France continued so, he never had Peace with any Prince6 1.727. * 1.728 Let not the Prince be deceived, in imagining this Neutrality to be the best means to balance the Forces of Spain and France; for cer∣tainly there ought to be some Decla∣ration in behalf of the former, not that it may enlarge its Territories, or make an Inrode into France, but that it may maintain what it is already possessed of, and the French be kept within their Kingdom, and not by any Neutrality or Affection be invited out. And this is so certain, that the very Declaration of Favour, without any other Publick De∣••••nstrations,

poises these Scales, and is a sufficient Ar∣••ment of War. Italy can never bear two Factions that ••ive to raise their Fortunes by the Contention of both ••owns within its Bowels. This Charles V. was sensible 〈◊〉〈◊〉 when, to restore Peace to Italy, he destroyed them, ••••d new-modelled the Republick of Florence, which at ••••at Time encouraged them; for one of the two Balances 〈◊〉〈◊〉 France or Spain, never so little over-loaded, turned. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Scale of Peace, which consists in keeping them even. ••••on the knowledge of this Truth, all prudent Princes ••••d Commonwealths have shewed themselves more ad∣••••ed to Spain, to add some Weight to it; and that by ••••ing a more perfect Aequilibrium, they, with their ••••tes, might enjoy a happy Tranquility; and if at any ••ne any one has disordered it, by espousing the contrary ••••ty, he has been the Occasion of great Troubles, and ••••moted the Ruine of Italy.

Glory, that constant attendant of Ambition, prompts ••ne Italians to think it would be more advantageous 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them to unite against both Crowns, and have no ••••er Masters but themselves, either by dividing them∣••••ves into Republicks, or setting up one Head. Thoughts ••re for Talk, than Effect, considering the present ••••ndition of Italy; for either this Sovereign must be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Pope, or some other. If the Pope, there want not ••••y many plausible Reasons to shew the impossibility 〈◊〉〈◊〉 maintaining a Spiritual Monarchy changed into a ••mporal one under an Elective Prince (especially if 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be of a declining Age, as generally all the Popes are) ••sed only in Arts of Peace, and Ecclesiastical Tran∣••lity, wholly employed in Spiritual Affairs, and sur∣••nded with Nephews and Relations, who, should ••••••y not require to secure to themselves the Succession 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their States, will be sure to share them by Investitures. ••••••des, it being the Interest of Christendom, that the ••••••es be the Common Fathers of all its Members, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have any Differences with other Princes, they will ••••••eby be engaged in perpetual Quarrels with those two ••••wns; which, on account of the Claims each lay to

the Dutchy of Milan, and the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, will soon fall upon the Apostolick See, whethe•• joined by some Compact to divide the Conquests of these States, or separately, one breaking into Italy through, the Milanese, the other through Naples, with the Danger too of one of them calling in the Aid of the Germans, or the Turk, who would afterwards fix in Italy.

But suppose any Person were created King of all Italy, yet still the same Inconveniencies would remain; nay, another much greater would arise from hence; that in form a Monarchy, this King must necessarily make other Princes subject to him, and strip the Pope of his Empire: For should he leave them in the same Con∣dition they are at present, (though it were under some acknowledgment of Homage, or in Alliance) he could never support himself; besides that thus Italy would lose that Spiritual Empire, which renders it no less Ill••∣strious than heretofore the Roman did, and being d••∣prived of its Liberty, would be brought to a kind 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Tyrannical Confusion.

There is yet less probability of Italy 's continuing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Peace, under several Native Princes, for they can neve•• agree so uniformly as to unite against the two Crow•• but will rather ruine one another by Intestine Wars, •• it happened in former Ages; the Italian Nation being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so lofty a Genius, that it scorns a Medium; either it m•••••• absolutely Govern or Obey.

From all which, it appears, how necessary so•••• Foreign Power is to Italy, which, opposed to all othe•• neither suffers Wars between its Princes, nor allo•• them to make use of Foreign Arms; which is the reas•• that since it was united with the Crown of Spain, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 always enjoy'd a perfect and continual Peace.

The Advantage therefore that attends that necessity 〈◊〉〈◊〉 joining it self to one of the two Crowns, may pre•••••• upon the Italian Nation to conform to the present 〈◊〉〈◊〉 especially since if there should happen any Alteration 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Milan, Naples and Sicily, it could not but give a 〈◊〉〈◊〉

••••••••rbance to other Governments: For no New Forms 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ntroduced without the corruption of others; and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 one of the two Nations must be incorporated 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Italy, the Spanish has most Reason for it, they lying 〈◊〉〈◊〉 under the same Climate, which renders them more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Firmness of Religion, Observance of Justice, ••vity of Actions, Fidelity to their princes, Constancy in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Promises and Publick Faith, in Moderation of Mind, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 briefly, in all other Customs and Manners; and ••es, because the King of Spain governs not in Italy 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Stranger, but as an Italian Prince, who aims at no∣••••••g more there, than to maintain what he justly pos∣•••••• since he can, with much more Advantage to his 〈◊〉〈◊〉, extend his Monarchy over the vast Countries 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Africa. This Maxim Ferdinand the Catholick left to Successors, in generously refusing the Offer of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Emperor of Italy, saying, That he desired nothing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 what of Right belonged to him, and that it was not his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to dismember the Imperial Dignity. This Truth is ••••••ently attested by the Restitutions the King of Spain 〈◊〉〈◊〉 made of several Places, without making use of any 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Arms, or demanding Satisfaction for Charges 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Damage, or taking up Arms but upon necessity, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for his own defence, or that of another, as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Mantua have experienc'd; and if he has at 〈◊〉〈◊〉 time made War upon the Duke of Nevers, it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as Malice would insinuate, to make himself Master ••asal, but to put it in the Power of the Emperor to justice to those who laid Pretensions to these States. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Duke of Nevers having implored, by the Marquess Mirebaean, His Majesty's Protection and Consent to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Marriage of his Son, the Duke of Retel, with the ••••••eess Mary, obtained both: But after the Conclusion of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Matter, Advice was brought to Madrid, That by the ••er-hand Practices of Count d'Estrige, the Wedding 〈◊〉〈◊〉 already celebrated, Vincent, Duke of Mantua, being ••he point of Death, without the King's knowledge, ••••••ctly against the Agreement between him and the 〈◊〉〈◊〉; which was the reason that this Novelty, which

appeared to some a kind of Slight and Distrust, deferred first the execution of the Protection, and gave after∣wards place to fresh Deliberations; wherein it was re∣solved, That without any Notice taken of all this, the Favour promised, should remain in full force, and One be sent to give the Married Couple Joy. But as Divine Providence had determined the Destruction of the City and House of Mantua, for the Vices of its Princes, and their Violation of so many Marriages, it directed all Events to that end; and accordingly, for this Reason, while these Things passed in Spain, Car∣dinal Richlieu, a sworn Enemy to the Duke of Nevers, brought it about, that the Duke of Savoy, assisted by his Master, denounced War against him, to get what he laid claim to in Montferrat. But the Duke smelling this to be nothing but a Pretence, under which to bring th•• French Arms into Italy, and by the Ruine of both Dukes, to encrease the Grandeur of France, discover'd the whole Intrigue to Gonsalvo of Cordoua, Governor of Milan, promising to desert the French, if he would ass•••••• him. Gonsalvo desired Time to consider, and se•••••• Advice of it into Spain; and seeing the Duke make some difficulty to grant it, and that if he did not succo•• him, the Doors of the Alps would be open to the French, he, of his own head, agreed with the Duke, hoping to make himself Master of Casal, by the mea•••••• of Espadin, whereby (as himself wrote to His Majesty) the Emperor might with much more ease determine the Controversies on foot in Montferrat and Mantua: a Reso••∣lution which obliged His Majesty to suspend a second time•• the execution of the Protection promised, though con∣trary to his Design of procuring the Peace of Italy▪ nevertheless, to maintain that, and cut off all Occasi•••• of Jealousie, he gave Order to Gonsalvo of Cordoua, That if, as was supposed, he was already possessed of Casa••▪ he should keep it in the Name of the Emperor, the true Master of it, at the same time dispatching Letters to him to that effect, to convey, in that case, to His Im∣perial Majesty. But the Treaty with Espadin not su••••ding,

Gonsalvo, without any Order from His Ma∣••••••y, invested Casal; which was the Occasion of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of France' s Journey to Susa, and of Spain's being ••xpectedly engaged in the War, after having pub∣••ly protested that those Forces were only Auxi∣••ies to the Emperor, to the end the Rights of the ••••enders upon Mon••ferrat and Mantua might be ••••ded by way of Justice; nor would Gonsalvo accept ••he Term offered him by the Duke of Nevers, of ••••••ng Casal, lest any should think His Majesty engaged ••ese Commotions more out of private Interest, than 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the fake of the Publick Quiet. This is the very ••th of the Matter, which so many have unjustly ••aim'd against, so few really known.

••et the Prince therefore and Republick of Italy lay ••e the empty Shadows of Jealousies assuring them∣••es that Spain aims at nothing more than to keep up 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Grandeur amongst them, not to encrease it; and let 〈◊〉〈◊〉 give place to this true piece of Policy, if they desire Peace of Italy: for these imaginary Emulations tend ••o other end, but to promote its Disquiet; there ••g no War but what proceeds either from the Ambi∣•••••• of a powerful Monarch, or the Apprehensions of ••••feriour Prince.

EMBLEM XCVI.

[illustration]

VIctory in just Wars, aims at no other end 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Peace: Hence that is the most Glorious, wh•••••• is obtained with least Damage, and more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Stratagem than Force, which was least covered 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Dust and Blood; which Horace calls,

—Dulcis sine pulvere palma:* 1.729

Lawrels with Ease obtain'd, smell always sweet.

The Romans, for bloody Victories, sacrificed a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and an Oxe, for those got by Stratagem. If by Wit••••••

••nderstanding we are like God, but have Force in com∣••on with Brutes, undoubtedly there is more Glory in ••••quering with the former than the latter. Tiberius ••s better pleas'd in having quieted the Empire by Pru∣••nce, than if he had done it by the Sword1 1.730: And Agricola looked on it as Glorious to vanquish the Britains ••••••thout the loss of Roman Blood2 1.731. If Victory pro∣••oses the Preservation and Encrease of the Common∣••ealth, it will succeed much better by Policy or Nego∣••tion, than by Arms. The Life of one Citizen is of ••ore account than the Death of many Enemies. Whence ••••pio the African used to say, That be had rather save 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Citizen, than conquer a thousand Enemies: A Sentence ••hich afterwards the Emperor Marcus Antoninus Pius ••ok for his Device. For to conquer an Enemy is the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Work of a General; to save a Citizen, that of a ••••triot. Vitellius considered not this, when having de∣••••ded Otho, he said, in passing among the dead Bodies, ••••he smell of dead Enemies is sweet, but that of Citizens yet ••••eter. A barbarous Saying, unworthy even of a Vulture. •• quite different Compassion was seen in Himilcon, who ••ving obtained considerable Victories in Sicily, because 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had lost most of his Men by Sicknesses which seized 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Army in their Camp, entered Carthage, not in ••riumph, but in Mourning, and the Habit of a Slave, ••••d going strait to his Quarters, killed himself, without ••aking a word to any. Cruel Victory seems to be ••••re the Heat of Revenge, than Effect of Courage; it has ••••re of Fierceness than Reason in it. When Lewis XII. ••ing of France, received News, that his Army had ••otten the better in the Battel of Ravenna, though with 〈◊〉〈◊〉 loss of all his Officers, and the best part of his ••••diers; Would to God (said he, sighing) I had lost the ••ay, and my brave Captains were now alive! May such ••ctories as these be for my Enemies, wherein the Conquered 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Conqueror, and the Victor vanquished. For this Reason,

the most prudent Commanders decline Engagements and Attacks as much as possible; and value themselves more upon obliging the Enemy to yield, than upon sub∣duing him by Force3 1.732. The Great Captain received Gajeta by Surrender: and some thinking he had better, since he was now Master of the Field, have stormed it, and taken the Officers, with the Garrison, Prisoners, to prevent any mischief they might do, if let go; he an∣swered, It would have cost more in Powder and Ball than the Danger would have been worth. It is a generous Valour that brings the Enemy to a Surrender without Blood∣shed, and a happy War that is ended by Mercy and Pardon4 1.733. Valour is for the Enemy, but Mercy for the Captive5 1.734. This Generosity of Mind is very rare now-a-days, when War is undertaken more to satisfie Passion, than to exert Valour, more for Devasta∣tion than Conquest. It is called Peace, to reduce Cities into Ashes, and Countries into Desarts6 1.735, to lay waste and burn up Fields, as we see in Germany and Burgundy. What a barbarous Cruelty, how inconsistent with Hu∣mane Reason is it thus to wage War with Nature her self, and take from her those Means wherewith she nourishes and supports us? The Holy Scriptures forbid even the Trees that grow near besieged Cities to be cut down, because they are Wood, not Men, and so can∣not encrease the Enemy's Number7 1.736. To that degree does God abhorr Blood spilt in War, that though he had made his People take up Arms against the Midianites yet he afterwards enjoined, That whosoever had killed any Person, or touched any Slain, should purifie himself

••••ven Days out of the Camp8 1.737. Aeneas thought it •• Crime to touch Things Sacred before he had washed ••is Hands in some living Stream:

Attrectare nefas, donec me flumine vivo Abluero.* 1.738

God, as he is equally the Author of Peace and Life, hates those who disturb that, or cut the thread of this: ••ven to Weapons, as the Instruments of Death, he has ••eclared his aversion; for hence, I conceive, he com∣••anded his Altars to be built of rough, unpolish'd ••tone, which no Iron had touched; such as that was ••hich the People of Israel raised, after they had passed ••••e River Iordan9 1.739; and that of Ioshua, after his ••ctory over the Men of Ai10 1.740. The Reason of this, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that Iron is the Matter of War, whereof Swords are ••ade: nor would he suffer the use of it in the purity and ••aceableness of his Sacrifices, as that other Precept ••••••ms to intimate11 1.741.

But ambition of Glory seldom gives place to these ••nsiderations, imagining there can be no Reputation ••t, where Valour is not exercised, and Blood spilt; ••••d thence it is that some care not to make use of ••••xiliaries, or admit of Companions in Victory. ••ing Alphonsus III. lost the Battel of Arc, only because 〈◊〉〈◊〉 would not stay for the coming up of the Forces of ••on and Navarr; and Tilly, that of Leipsick, by not ••aiting for the Imperial Forces. In which thing Ambi∣••on is much in the wrong; the Glory of Victories con∣sisting

not so much in any degree of Courage, as in having known how to make good use of safe Counsels; forasmuch as the one depends on Chance, the other on Prudence. He obtains the Victory soon enough, who has with Judgment so provided that he should not be overcome. Ambition burns; and Reason, once di∣sturbed, follows its Natural Force and Tendency, and destroys it self. States are never more beholding to their Prince, than when undervaluing Trophies and Triumphs, he strives to maintain Peace by Negotiation, and pur∣chases Victory with Money; for it is much cheaper buying for that than Blood, and generally safer fighting with Golden than Iron Weapons.

The variety of past Accidents is apt to make Victory forget it self; Glory, to make it vanish; Joy, to dis∣order; Spoils, to puff it up; Acclamations, to make it over••confident; and Bloodshed prompts it to despise the Enemy, and sleep secure, when it should be most vigilant, and shew greater Fortune in subduing it self, than it met with in conquering the Enemy: for this lat∣ter may possibly be more an effect of Fortune than Cou∣rage; but in the Triumph over our Affections and Passions, Chance has no part. The General therefore would do well, immediately after a Victory, to retire into himself, and with Prudence and Constancy com∣pose the Civil War of his Passions; forasmuch as with∣out this Triumph, that other will but be more dan∣gerous. Let him watch his Spoils and Trophies the more carefully, the more of them he has gotten; for in Danger, Fear doubles Guards and Sentinels, when he who thinks himself out of it, abandons himself to Sleep. Ioshua drew not back his Hand, till he had utterly de∣stroyed all the Inhabitants of A••.12 1.742. Between the Battel and Victory there is no Security: Despair is daring; and the most contemptible Animal, when pro∣voked,

turns again. This Experience cost Archduke Albert dear, at Newport: And Abner told Ioab the danger of making his Sword too bloody13 1.743. Besides, Ad∣versity is ingenuous; and the Enemy it oppresses often lays hold on the Occasion, and recovers in a moment whatever it had lost, baffling Fortune by her own Incon∣••ancy: A Goddess, who the more she shines, the more brittle she is, and the sooner broken. A General must not therefore be elated by his Victories, nor think it impossible for him to become in his turn a Trophy to the Person he ••as conquered. He should have ever before his eyes the like Casualty, phansying he always sees plunged ••der the Waters of Calamities the same Palm which ••e has once lifted up in Triumph: Thus that of this ••••blem looks it self in the Water, whose liquid Mirrour ••••presents to it the Condition, the Force of Winds, or ••••jury of Time, may reduce it to. This prudent Cau∣••••usness made the Spouse compare the Eyes of her ••eloved to Rivers of Waters14 1.744, because in them the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dresses and prepares it self for Adversities. ••••sperity is Glory's greatest Enemy: Confidence ren∣••ing Vertue negligent, and Pride undervaluing Danger. ••cessity obliges the Conquered to good Discipline; ••ger and Revenge animate him, and inspire Cou∣••ge 15 1.745: Whereas the Conqueror, through Arro∣••••••ce, and breach of Discipline, grows dull and ••••••vy16 1.746. The gain of a Battel is often-times the ••ginning of Happiness to the Conquered, of Misfortune 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Victor; the one being blinded by his Fortune, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 other casting about to retrieve his. What Arms ••••rishing could not conquer, those thrown down often 〈◊〉〈◊〉; and Spoils scattered here and there, inflaming the

Avarice of the Victorious, make of them an ea••ie Victory. Thus it befell the Sarmatae, who being loaded with Plunder, were cut in pieces, as if they had been bound, and immovable17 1.747. The Battel of Tarro, against Charles VIII. of France, was lost, at least dubious, ••••debanmur, Tac. Hist. l 2. only by the Italian Soldiers falling too soon upon the Baggage. Hence Iudas Maccabaeus required his Men not to touch the Booty, until the Fight was over18 1.748.

Victories are to be esteemed more for the Progresses may be expected from them, than for themselves, and therefore should be cultivated, that they may bear the more. To give the Enemy Time, is to Arm him; and to sit down satisfied with the Fruit already gathered, to leave Arms barren. It is as easie for a Fortune raised to fall, as it is to lift up again one fallen. Tiberius, considering this Uncertainty of Things, endeavoured, with many Arguments, to persuade the Senate not to be so quick in executing the Honours decreed to Germanicus, for his Victories in Germany19 1.749.

Although Victories should be pursued, yet it ought not to be with a Heat so secure and careless as to slight Dangers. Let Expedition consult with Prudence, with regard to Time, Place, and Occasion. Let the Prince use his Victories with Moderation, not with a Bloody and Inhumane Tyranny, always having before him that Counsel of Theodorick, King of the Ostrogoths, in a Letter to his Father-in-Law, Clovis, about the Germa•• Victories; In such Cases, let him be heard who has most Experience: No Wars have been more successful to me, than those I have ended with Moderation; for he comes oftenest off Conqueror, who best uses his Victory; and Fortune ever favours them most, who are least puft up* 1.750.

The French follow not this prudent Advice, but rather have imposed a heavier Yoke on Germany than it ever yet bore, and hastened the Ruine of that Empire. The Piety and Modesty of Marcellus made a greater Shew, when he wept to see the Ruine of the beautiful Build∣ings of Syracuse, than his Valour and Glory in having stormed it, and made a Triumphant Entry at the Breach. Count Tilly struck the Hearts of several, more by the Tears he shed for the burning of Magdeburg, than by his Sword. And though Ioshua commanded the Officers of his Army to put their Feet upon the Necks of the Kings taken in the Battel of Gibaon20 1.751; yet this was not done out of Pride or Vain-glory, but to animate his Soldiers, and to remove the Fear they had conceived of the Giants of Canaan21 1.752.

To treat those one has subdued with Humanity, to maintain their Privileges and Nobility, and to ease them of Taxes, is twice to conquer them, once by Arms, and afterwards by Kindness, and in the mean while to prepare a Chain for other Nations; no fewer yielding to Generosity, than to Force.

Expugnat nostram clementia gentem, Mars gravior sub pace latet.* 1.753

By these Artifices the Romans made themselves Masters of the whole World; and if ever they forgot them, their Victories were the more difficult. Despair it self arms against a bloody Conqueror.

Vna salus victis nullam sperare salutem.† 1.754

The Wretch's only Comfort is Despair.

There are some Men, who, with more Impiety than Reason, advise, for greater Security, to extirpate the hostile Nation, as the Romans did in demolishing Carthage, Numantia, and Corinth, or else to oblige it to seek a new Habitation; which is a barbarous and inhumane Counsel: Others are for extinguishing the Nobility, building Forts, and disarming the Inhabitants. But this Tyranny is practicable only in servile Nations, not among People of •• more generous Nature. Cato the Consul, to secure himself from some People of Spain, near the ••iver ••berus, took away their Arms, but was soon obliged to return them; they being so exasperated to see themselves without them, that they killed one another; they despised a Life destitute of Instruments to defend their Honour, and acquire Glory22 1.755.

EMBLEM XCVII.

[illustration]

HERCVLES having master'd the Lion, knew how to enjoy his Victory, in covering his Shoul∣ders with its Skin, in order the more easily to tame other Monsters. Thus the Spoils of a Triumph arm the Conqueror, and encrease his Power. Thus ought Princes to use their Victories, augmenting their Forces by the Prisoners, and advancing the Grandeur of their States by the Places they take. All Kingdoms, in their Original, were small; and if they encreased, it was by getting, and preserving. The same Reasons that make the War lawful, justifie also the detaining of what it brings. To spoil, only that you may restore again, is a foolish and extravagant Levity. That Man

holds not himself at all obliged, who to day receives what was yesterday wrested from him with Bloodshed. Princes, by Restitution, barter for Peace, and buy its contrary: 〈…〉〈…〉 render them Formidable; what they 〈…〉〈…〉 contemptible, this being generally 〈…〉〈…〉; and if after, upon 〈…〉〈…〉, they go about to recover it, 〈…〉〈…〉 Difficulties. His Majesty 〈…〉〈…〉 put the Val∣taline in 〈…〉〈…〉; and the French 〈…〉〈…〉 the State of Milan in 〈…〉〈…〉 and Arms. By holding 〈…〉〈…〉 is check'd, 〈…〉〈…〉 by so many Pawns 〈…〉〈…〉 Necessity. Time and 〈…〉〈…〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in what Cases it is 〈…〉〈…〉, to prevent greater 〈…〉〈…〉, however, must be 〈…〉〈…〉, whose blind appetite 〈…〉〈…〉 by those very means it 〈…〉〈…〉.

Princes 〈…〉〈…〉, let several con∣siderable Forts 〈…〉〈…〉, in War, they are sorry for, but too late. Present Necessity accuses past Liberality. No Power should be so confident of it self, as to think it stands not in need of every one of them for its Defence. The Eagle parts not with her Tallons; which if she did, she would become the Je•••• of other Birds: They respect her not as their Queen, for her Beauty, since in that the Peacock much exceeds, but for the Strength of her Pounces. The Grandeur of His Majesty would now be in far more Veneration and Security, had he still kept the State of Siena, the Gar∣rison of Placentia, and, in general, all those Places which he has left in other Hands. Even Restitution of a State is not to be made, when it cannot be without Prejudice to another.

There is no less Inconveniencies in making War upon another, than in using Arms negligently: To take them

〈◊〉〈◊〉 only to offer Blows, is a dangerous way of fighting. •• Sword drawn without being dyed in Blood, returns ••••amed into the Scabbard; if it wounds not our Enemy, •• does our Honour. Fire is the Instrument of War; ••••oever holds it up in his Hand, will be burnt by it. ••he Army, if not kept in the Enemy's Country, wasts ••s own, nay, is wasted it self. Courage grows cold, ••ithout Occasions to exercise, and Spoils to inflame it. ••ence Vocula quartered his Men in the Enemies Land1 1.756; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 David went out of his own Realms to meet the Philistines2 1.757. The same did Iehoash, King of Israel, ••hen he heard that Amaziah, King of Iudah, was ••••ming against him3 1.758. Subjects can never long bear 〈◊〉〈◊〉 War at Home; for by maintaining, in this manner, ••oth Friends and Enemies, Charges encrease, Means ••il, and Dangers continue. But if any one thinks ••••reby to sooth up, and the more easily appease him he ••••gaged with, it is imprudent Counsel, there being no ••••ttering a declared Enemy. Moderation in War, is ••ot imputed to Clemency, but to Weakness, and the ••ost Powerful lose their Reputation, and are endanger'd 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it. The King of Spain 's Mildness to Charles of Savoy, ••••st him dear. This Duke made War against Ferdinand Duke of Mantua, to assert his ancient Pretensions upon Montferrat; and King Philip III. not thinking it fit that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Sword should decide this Suit, then depending be∣fore the Emperor, and that the Quarrel of these two ••rinces should disturb the Peace of all Italy, made War ••pon the former, and sate down before Asti, not with ••••y design to enter that Place forcibly, (which might ••••ve been easily done) but by this Menace to oblige him 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Peace, as accordingly he did. This moderate way ••f proceeding encreased the Duke's Obstinacy, and,

contrary to the Treaty, he again took up Arms, kindling another War more dangerous than the first. Upon which, His Majesty besieged Ver••eil; which he took, but presently restored again: so that the Duke, who saw his Designs succeed so happily, struck up a Leag•••• with the French and Venetians at Avigno••, and a third time disturbed Italy. All which Wars might very easily have been avoided, had the Duke of Savoy been made to feel the weight of the Spanish Arms, and suffered the loss of part of his State. Whoever has once opposed a greater Power, will never become a Friend, till he sees him∣self oppressed and robb'd of all, (as Vocula said to the Mutinous Legions, when he encouraged them against some Provinces of France4 1.759 that revolted.) Princes are not feared for having the Weapons in their Hands, but for knowing how to use them. No one assaults him who dares turn again. Almost all Wars are grounded either upon the Oscitancy or Cowardice of the Person against whom they are waged. What Risque is there in making War against a Prince wholly devoted to Peace, since whatever the Success be, that will certainly be obtained? For this Reason, it seems convenient, that the Maxims of the Spaniards be changed in Italy, which endeavour to inculcate, That the King wishes nothing so much as Peace, and would purchase it at any Rate. It is fit, indeed, Princes should know that His Majesty is always Sincere, and willing to keep a good Under∣standing with them, ready to employ all his Forces for their Conservation and Defence, and that he will spare no Care which may contribute to the Quiet of those Provinces: but withal, they should know, That if any one unjustly opposes his Grandeur, and conspires to overthrow it, putting him to the Damages and Expences of War, he will get Satisfaction, by detaining what he shall take from them. What Court of Justice will not allow Costs to the Party that sues another without Reason?

••••o will not try his Sword upon the Body of a potent 〈◊〉〈◊〉, if he can do it with safety?

When a Victory is obtained, the Spoils should be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 among the Soldiers, and particular Honour shewed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as have eminently signalized themselves in the Fight; ••••at Valour seeing it self rewarded, may be encouraged 〈◊〉〈◊〉 greater Enterprizes, and be an Example to others. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 this end, the Romans invented so many Crowns, ••ollars, Ovations, and Triumphs. Saul erected to him∣••••lf a Triumphant-Arch, upon the Defeat of the Ama∣••••••ites 5 1.760. Nor are these Honours to be done the ••••rvivors only, but those also who have valiantly lost ••••eir Lives in the Battel, since they bought the Victory 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so dear a Price. Signal Services done the State, can∣••ot be recome••••••ed but by some Eternal Remembrance. ••hus those of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were requited with a Sepulchre ••hich lasted 〈◊〉〈◊〉 many Ages6 1.761. The Soul, sensible of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 own 〈◊〉〈◊〉, undervalues Dangers, to make the ••emory of its Actions immortal too: Hence the Spaniards 〈◊〉〈◊〉 old raised as many Obelisks about every Soldier's ••omb, as he had killed Enemies7 1.762. God being the ••••vereign Disposer of Victories, to him we ought to pay 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Acknowledgments first, to engage him to grant us ••thers, not only by way of Thanksgiving and Sacrifice, ••ut by Spoils 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Offerings; as the Israelites did, ••pon raising the Siege of Bethulia, and routing the Assyrians8 1.763; and Ioshua, after his Victory over the

Men of Ai9 1.764. In which particular the Spanish Kings have always been very liberal; which Piety of theirs God has rewarded with the present Monarchy.

EMBLEM XCVIII.

[illustration]

WAR, in many things, resembles Fire, not only in its Nature, which is to destroy, but also for that the same Matter wherewith it i•• fed, when there is too much of it, extinguishes it. Arms support War; but if they are very powerful, quench it,

〈◊〉〈◊〉 change it into Peace. Therefore whoever would ob∣••••in this, must use them; it being impossible that any ••eace should be concluded with Honour and Advantage, ••Nless it be treated of under the Shield••, and with this ••he Arm must be guarded, which reaches out the Hand to receive the Olive of Peace. Clovis wish'd for two Right-Hands; one arm'd, to oppose Alaricus; the other ••aked, to present in token of Peace to Theodorick, the Mediator between them. The Arms of a Prince should be equally prepared for Peace and War. Clovis never thought he could obtain that by shewing his unarmed Right-Hand, without having at the same time another ••pon its Guard. This is that the Greeks meant, by the Hieroglyphick of a Man holding in one Hand a Pike, in the▪ other a Caduceus. Negotiation, expressed by the latter, can never succeed, except the Menace of the former attend it. When the Athenians were annoyed by Eumolphus, their General marched first, with a Caduceus in his Hand, and was follow'd by the flower of his Men in Armour, hereby shewing himself ready as well for Peace as War. When the Rhodians sent an Embassy to Constantinople, there went one by the Embassador's side carrying three Boughs, signifying the same Disposition of Mind: To which Virgil seems also to have alluded, in this Verse of his,

Pacem orare manu, praefigere puppibus arma.* 1.765

To sue for Peace, yet prosecute the War.

Even after the Conclusion of Peace, Care ought still to be taken of War; since between the Conqueror and Conquered no firm Faith is ever established1 1.766. One Day saw that of the French several times engaged and violated at Casal, and the Marquess de Saint Croix 's Goodness abused, he who preferred the Quiet of Italy before the Glory of Victory, which an advantageous

Post, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Forces, offered him as 〈…〉〈…〉

In Treaties of Peace, a Free Temper is no less requi∣site than i•• the Management of a War. He that cons••lts too much his Honour in them, and would conquer his Enemy as well with the Pen as Sword, bu••ies Sparks un∣der the Ashes, to kindle the Fire of a greater War. Those Peaces which Pompey, and after him, the Consul Mancinus, made with the Nu••••••tines, had no effect, because they were not a little derogatory to the Honour of the Roman Commonwealth. The Capitulation of Asti, between Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, and the Marquess de Hino••osa, was soon broken, upon account of one of the Articles about Di••arming the Soldiers, not much for His Majesty's Reputation, which those Disturbances and Innovations of the Duke seemed to tend to. No Peace can be secure, when there is so much inequality2 1.767. One of the Pri∣vernates being asked by the Roman Senate, how his Countrymen would observe the Peace, if it were allowed them; answered, Faithfully, and for Ever, if you grant us a good and equal one; but if you impose hard Conditions, you must not expect we should keep them long3 1.768. Never does any one observe a Peace which he knows is to his Disadvantage4 1.769. Except it be Honourable, and for the Conveniency of both Parties, it will be but a lame Contract: he that studies most his own Interest in it, makes it most slender, and subjects it to an easie Rupture.

Upon any ill Success, one is not immediately to have recourse to Peace, as long as the least room is left for putting Affairs in a better posture; otherwise it can never go well with the Oppressed: Hence, after the loss of the Battel of Toro, Alphonsus, King of Portugal, thought it not a good Time to talk of Agreeing with

••••rdinand the Catholick. That is a weak Peace which ••••rce and Menace extort; for Honour and Liberty never 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to plot against it.

There are usually no less Cheats and Contrivances in ••reaties of Peace than in War: witness those pretended 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Rhadamistus, to take away Mithridates 's Life* 1.770. ••hey are generally set on foot only to discover the ••ctions and Designs of the Enemy, to give Time for ••••rtifications, Succours, and the Practices of Alliance; 〈◊〉〈◊〉 waste the Enemy's Forces, break Confederacies, and ••ll asleep with the Hopes of Peace, Diligence and Pre∣caution. Sometimes they are clapt up, in order to raise ••ew Forces, frustrate Counsels; and, in a word, to serve 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Truce, or Cessation of Arms, until a better Oppor∣••••nity for taking them up again shall offer it self, or that the Seat of the War may be changed. Thus the French Sign'd the Peace of Mouzon, with no other intent than to remove the War into Germany, and fall upon the Valtoline that way. So the only end of the Peace of Ratisbone was to disarm the Emperor; for at the same Time the French agreed to it, they were brewing a League with the Crown of Sweden against him, and there was not above two Months between the one and the other. Now in the like Cases, War is much better than a suspected Peace5 1.771; this being indeed a Peace without Peace6 1.772.

Peaces should be perpetual, as all those of God have been7 1.773. Hence the Holy Scriptures call such Treaties, Covenants of Salt; by this expression intimating their Permanency8 1.774. A Prince who is a real Lover of Peace, and sincerely endeavours the Settlement of it, is

not afraid to bind even his Posterity to its Observance. A short Peace is good for nothing but to gather Fuel to light War withal. The same Inconveniencies attend Trucer made for a few Years; they do but suspend Anger for a time, and give place for the sharpening of Swords, and pointing of Lances; by their means Usur∣pations pass into Prescription, and Peace is afterwards rendred more difficult, inasmuch as no one resigns wil∣lingly what he has possessed a long time. The Ten Years Truce between the Emperor Charles V. and Francis I. gave not Peace to Europe, as* 1.775 Pope Paul III. very well observed.

But when the Peace is secure, firm, and honourable, no prudenter Course can be taken than to embrace it, however Victorious your Arms are, or whatever con∣siderable Progresses may be expected from them; since the Casualties of War are various and fortunate, often beget unhappy Successes. How frequent is it to see him begging for Peace, who was but just before asked it. A Certain Peace is better than a Victory in Expecta∣tion; the one depends on our own Pleasure, the other is in God's Hand9 1.776. And though Sabinus said, That Peace was to the Glory only of the Conqueror, but Profitable to the Conquered10 1.777: yet this Advantage reaches the Victor too; for by being so, he may have it the more advantageous, and secure the Progresses already made. There is no better Time for Peace, than when one is uppermost in War. This, among other Reasons, moved Hanno, when News was brought to Carthage of the Victory of Cannae, to advise the Senate to close with the Romans: And it was for nothing but the neglect of this, that they were forced in the end to submit to such Laws and Conditions as Scipio thought fit to impose. In the Heat of Arms, when Success is yet dubious, to shew a Desire of Peace, betrays weakness, and gives

Heart to the Enemy. He that is too passionate for it at such a time, never obtains it: Valour and Resolutions are much better Persuasives to it. Let the Prince then love Peace, yet not to that degree, as to commit In∣••ustice, or suffer Indignities, for the sake of it: Let ••im not look on that he has made with a Neighbour superiour in Strength, to be safe; for it can never be, where the one is powerful, the other weak11 1.778. Ambition knows not how to contain it self, where ••here is a prospect of Usurping any thing; and specious Names, and Pretexts of Moderation and Justice, are never wanting to him that seeks to enlarge his Do∣••inions, and aspires to be a Monarch: For one who is so already, aims at nothing more than the Enjoyment of his own Grandeur, without going to intrench ••pon that of another, or designing any thing against it12 1.779.

EMBLEM XCIX.

[illustration]

HE knows not how to value the Quietness of the Harbour, who has not felt the Storm; nor is he sensible of the sweetness of Peace, that has never tasted the bitterness of War: Then first this wild Beast, the sworn Enemy of Life, appears in its true Colours, when it is tamed. To that agrees Samson 's Riddle of the dead Lion, in whose Mouth Bees swarmed, and wrought their Honey-Combs1 1.780. For when War is ended, Peace opens the Doors of Commerce, brings the Hand to the Plough, re-establishes the Exercise of

Arts, the effect of which is Plenty, as of that Riches which freed from the Fears that drove them away, then begin to circulate. Peace then, as Isaiah the Pro∣phet speaks2 1.781, is the greatest Good that God has bestowed on Mankind, as War the greatest Evil. Hence the Egyptians, to describe Peace, represented Pluto, the God of Riches, as a Boy crowned with Ears of Corn, Laurel and Roses, to signifie all the Happiness it brings along with it. God has given it the Name of Beauty, in Isaiah, saying, his People should take their Rest in it, as upon a Bed of Flowers3 1.782. Even the most insensible Beings rejoyce at Peace. How chearful, how fertile do the Fields look, which that cultivates? How beautiful the Cities adorned and enriched by its Calmness? On the other side, what Desarts, what ruinous Countries are not those where the Fury of War has ranged? Scarce can one know now the fair Cities and Castles of Germany, by those disfigured Carkasses. Burgundy sees its Verdant Perriwig (as I may call it) dy'd in Blood; and its Cloaths, once so gay and fine, now ragged and scorch'd up, with amazement at so wonderful a Change. Nature has no greater Enemy than War. He who was the Author of the whole Creation, was at the same time Author of Peace. Justice gives it self up to its Em∣braces 4 1.783. Laws tremble, hide themselves, and are dumb at the frightful sight of Weapons. Hence Marius excuses himself, for having done something against the Laws of the Country, by saying, he could not hear them for the Noise of Arms. In War, it is equally unfortunate to good Men to kill and to be kill'd5 1.784. In War, Fathers, by a subversion of the Order of Mor∣tality, bury their Children; whereas in Peace, these bury them. Here every one's Merit is considered, and

Causes examined: In War, Innocence and Malice run the same Fortune6 1.785. In Peace, Nobility is distinguisht from Populacy: In War, they are confounded, the Weaker obeying the Stronger. In that, Religion is 〈◊〉〈◊〉; in this, lost; that maintains, this usurps Do∣minions; the one breaks the haughty Spirits of Subjects, and renders them Submissive and Loyal7 1.786, the other makes them haughty and rebellious. This made Tiberius fear nothing so much as disturbing the Repose Augustus had left in the Empire8 1.787. With Peace, Delights and Pleasures encrease; and the greater these are, the weaker are Subjects, and more secure9 1.788. In Peace, all depends on the Prince himself; in War, on him that has the Command of the Armies. Hence Tiberius dissembled all Occasions of War, that he might not commit it to the Management of another10 1.789. Pomponius Laetus well knew all these Inconveniencies, when he said, That while the Prince could live in Peace, he should by no means kindle War. The Emperor Marcianus used this Motto, Pax bello potior; and certainly not without Reason, forasmuch as War can never be convenient, unless carried on to maintain Peace. This is the only Good that Infernal Monster brings with it. That of the Emperor Aurelius Caracalla, Omnis in ferro salus, was a Tyrannical Saying, and fit for that Prince only who cannot maintain himself but by Force. That Empire is of a short continuance, whose support is War11 1.790. As long as the Sword is by the Side, Danger is so too: and though Victory be in one's Power, yet Peace is rather to be embraced: for there is none so happy, but the Damage that attends it is greater.

Peace is the greatest Treasure Man e'er knew, A Thousand Triumphs to it seem but few.* 1.791

No Victory can make amends for the Expences of it. So mischievous is War, that even when triumphant, it throws down Walls, as it was the Custom among the Romans.

Now then we have conducted our Prince amidst Dust and Blood, and thus seated him in the quiet, happy state of Peace; our next Advice is, That he do his utmost to preserve it, and enjoy the happiness thereof, with∣out imbittering it with the Perils and Calamities of War. David never took up Arms, but when indispensibly obliged. The Emperor Theodosius did not seek, but rather found War. It is a Glorious and Princely Care, that of procuring Peace.

Now Caesar 's Grandeur, Caesar 's Glories reign, His Conqu'ring Arm sheathing his Sword again.* 1.792

Nothing in the World is more an Enemy to Possession than War. It is a wicked, as well as foolish Doctrine, which teaches, that Seeds of Hatred should be nourished, that Matter for War may be furnished, whenever it shall be thought fit12 1.793. He always lives in War, who has it always in his Thoughts. The Advice of the Holy Spirit is much more wholsom, Seek Peace, and pursue it13 1.794.

When a Peace is once Concluded, the Laws of God and Man oblige to a faithful Observance of it, even although transacted with one's Predecessors, without any Distinction between the Government of One and Many; both the Kingdom and Commonwealth, for the Benefit, and upon the Faith of which the Contract was made, being always the same, and never dying. Time, and Common Consent, have Passed what was once Agreed upon into a Law. Nor is Force or Necessity a sufficient Excuse for making War: For if the Publick Faith might be violated for these things, there would be

no Capitulation, no Treaty of Peace, but might be broken, under the same colour. Francis I. was blamed for declaring War against Charles V. contrary to the Agreement made during his Imprisonment, under pre∣tence of Constraint. By such Artifices, and Equivocal Negotiations, it comes to pass, that none at all are firm; so that to establish them, it is necessary to demand Hostages, or detain some considerable Place; things which embarrass a Peace, and fatigue the World with perpetual Wars.

The Prince then being free from the Toils and Dan∣gers of War, should apply himself wholly to the Arts of Peace, (according to Tasso,)

Learning and Arts promote throughout your Realm, Divert your Subjects Minds with Plays and Balls: With equal Iustice punish and reward; And out of Danger, stand upon your Guard.

Yet not without reflecting how soon War may possibly disturb his Rest. Let not his Eye quit the Arms his Hand has laid down; nor those old Medals influence him, upon the Reverse of which Peace was described burning Shields with a Torch: This was far from being a pru∣dent Emblem; for there is nothing so necessary after War, as the preserving of Arms, to keep Violence from making any attempt against Peace. None but God alone could, when he gave it to his People, break the Bow, (as the Psalmist expresseth it) cut the Spear in sunder, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Chariots in the fire14 1.795; forasmuch as he being the Arbiter of War, needs not Arms to maintain Peace withal: But among Men there can be no Peace, where Ambition is not restrained by Fear or Force. This gave Occasion to the Invention of Arms, which Defence found out before Offence. The Plough marked out the Walls before the Streets were disposed, and almost at the same time Tents were pitched, and Houses built. The Publick Repose would never be secure, did not Care armed

guard its Sleep. A State unprovided with Arms, awakens the Enemy, and invites War. Never had the Alps heard the Echo's of so many Trumpets, had the Cities of the Milanese been better fortify'd: This State is, as it were, an Outwork to all the Kingdoms of the Spanish Monarchy, and each ought, for its own Security, to contribute to its Strength; which, joined with the Power of the Sea, would render the Monarchy firm and unshaken. Mens Hearts, were they of Adamant, could not supply the Defect of Walls. King Witiza, by de∣molishing these, made the Moors so bold as to invade Spain, when those Banks were gone, which, till then, had stopt their Inundations15 1.796. Augustus was not guilty of this Negligence, in that long Peace he enjoyed; but ap∣pointed a Publick Treasury, as a Provision against a War. Except Forces be Exercised in Time of Peace, and the Mind disciplin'd in the Arts of War, it will not easily be done, when Danger of Invasion shall have put all Men in a Consternation, and they be more intent on flying and saving what they have, than on their Defence. There is no greater Stratagem, than to leave a Kingdom to its own Idleness. When Military Exercise fails, Valour does the same. Nature produces in all Parts great Souls, which either Occasion discovers, or want of Business burieth. Past Ages have not furnish'd braver Men in Greece and Rome, than are at this day born; but they then appeared so Heroical, because Desire of Rule made them use themselves to Arms. Let not a Prince be discouraged at the Sluggishness of his Subjects; Disci∣pline will fit them either to preserve Peace, or to main∣tain War. Let him keep them always employed in the Exercise of Arms; for he that desires Peace, must pre∣vent War.

EMBLEM C.

[illustration]

IT is a short breathing between the Cradle and the Tomb; short, I say, yet 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of occasioning considerable Evils, if ill employed. Often does a Commonwealth lament whole Ages the Errour of one Moment. On this Point turns the Fall or Rise of Empires. One bad Counsel, in a Minute throws down what has cost Valour and Prudence many Years to build1 1.797. And therefore it is not enough, in this Amphitheater of Life, to have run well, if the Course be not equal to the End. He only receives the Crown, who has lawfully touch'd the last Goal of Death. The Foundation of

Houses consists in the first Stones; that of Renown, in the last; except they be Glorious, it soon falls, and is buried in Oblivion. The Cradle does not flourish until the Tomb has first, and then even the Briars of past Vices turn to Flowers; for Fame is the last Spirit of our Actions, which thence receive their Beauty and Lustre, a thing never seen in an infamous Old Age, that ra∣ther effacing the Glory of Youth, (as it happened to2 1.798 Vitellius.) The most perfect Stroaks of the Pencil or Chizel are not esteemed, if the whole Work remain imperfect: And if ever Fragments were re∣garded, it was for being the Reliques of a once per∣fect Statue. Envy or Flattery, while Life lasts, give different Forms to Actions; but Fame, unbyass'd by those Passions, pronounces, after Death, true and just Sentences, which the Tribunal of Posterity confirms3 1.799. Some Princes are sensible enough of how great Conse∣quence it is to Crown their Life with Vertues; but they are mistaken, in thinking to supply that, by leaving them described in Epitaphs, and represented in Statues; not considering that they blush to accompany him in Death, whom they had not accompanied while alive, and that the Marbles are, as it were, in Indignation to see the Counterfeit-Glory of a Tyrant inscribed on them, but seem to soften to facilitate the engraving of that of a Just Prince, hardening again afterwards to preserve it to Eternity; which even the Stones themselves some∣times write on their hardness. Letters of a miraculous Epitaph were the Tears of Blood, shed by those before St. Isidore's Altar at Leon, for the Death of King Alphonsus VI.* 1.800 Nor came they out of the Joints, but from the Heart of the Marbles, which seemed mollified for the Loss of so great a King. The Statue of a vitious Prince is a kind of Transcript of his Vices, nor is there either Marble or Brass so durable as not to submit to

Time: For as the Natural Fabrick is dissolved, so also is the Artificial; and that only is lasting which Vertues frame, those intrinsick and inseparable Ornaments of an immortal Soul4 1.801. What is engrav'd on the Minds of Men, being successively deriv'd from one to another, endures as long as the World. No Statues are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 perpetual than those carved by Vertue and good Offices 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Esteem and Acknowledgment of Men, (as Mecanus5 1.802 told Augustus••) For this Reason, Tiberius refused the Temples which the Nearer Spain would have built in Honour of him, saying, That the Temples and Statues which he most esteemed, was to perpetuate his Memory in the Minds of the Commonwealth6 1.803. The Ashes of Hero's are preserved in the Everlasting Obelisks of Universal Applause and Triumph, even after having been spoiled by Fire, as it happened to those of Trajan. The dead Body of that Valiant Prelate, Giles d' Albornoz was carry'd 'from Rome to Toled•• upon the Shoulders of Nations as well Friends as Enemies, and a Guard was forced to be set to defend that of Augustus7 1.804. But granting the Firmness of the Marble, and Solidity of the Brass, should equal future Ages, yet it is not known afterwards who they were raised for* 1.805; as it is at this day with the Pyramids of Aegypt, where we see that Names of those worn out who laid their Ashes there to immortalize themselves8 1.806.

From what has been said, may be easily gathered how much it concerns the Prince, in the Declension of his Life, to endeavour that his former Glories may re∣ceive new Life and Vigour from those of his last Days, and that both, after his Death, may remain for ever in the memory of Mankind. To which end, we shall offer some Rules to direct him how he ought to govern himself, with relation to his Person, his Successor, and his Dominions. As to his Person, he is to know, that as he advanceth in Years, his Empire grows more savage, and less subject to Reason; for the variety of Acci∣dents he has met with, instruct him in Malice; and by indulging Jealousies and Distrusts, he becomes Cruel and Tyrannical. A long Reign is apt to beget Pride and Presumption9 1.807; and the Experience of Want, Avarice: whence proceed many things inconsistent with the Decorum of Majesty, and from them con∣tempt of the Royal Person. Princes will still retain their ancient Customs and Gravity, forgetting what they did when young, and thus they render themselves odious. In the Beginnings of Government, Passion for Glory, and Fear of Ruine, make them take care to Act with Prudence and Caution: But afterwards Ambition is tired, and the Prince has neither any Satisfaction in good, nor any Concern for ill Success10 1.808; but imagining Vice to be the Recompence of his Glory, and Reward of his Toils, shamefully gives himself up to it: Whence it is that so few Princes grow bet∣ter by Ruling, of which the Holy Scriptures give us Instances in Saul and Solomon. They are, in their Government, like the Image in Nebuchadnezzar's Dream, its Beginning's of Gold, its End of Clay. Vespasian was the only Prnce remarkable for having passed from bad to good11 1.809. Besides, let the Prince strive never so much to continue like himself, it is impossible for

him to please All, if his Reign be long; for the People hate to be ruled so long by the same Hand. They love Novelty, and rejoyce at Revolutions, though dangerous, as it fell out in the Reign of Ti∣berius 12 1.810. If the Prince be Vertuous, he is hated by the Bad; if Vitious, both by the Good and Bad, and then the only talk is of the Successor13 1.811, whom every one makes his Court to; a thing which cannot but incense the Prince, and which usually enclines him to hate his Subjects, and use them ill. As his Strength decays, his Care and vigilance, his Prudence also, Understanding and Memory proportionably fail: For the Sense•• grow old no less than the Body14 1.812; and as he desires to reserve this small remainder of his days to himself, free from the Hurry and Fatigue of Government, he surrenders all to his Ministers, or some Favourite, on whom the Weight of Affairs lies, and the Odium of the People is transferred. In which Case, they who are not in the Prince's Favour, and have no share in the Administration and Preferments, wish for, and do their utmost to procure a new Master.

These are the most dangerous Rocks of a declining Age, among which the Prince cannot use too much Precaution against a Shipwreck. Yet though the Course be hazardous, he ought not therefore to despair of passing securely, since many Princes have maintained their Esteem and Respect to their last Gasp. An Ex∣cellency which the whole World admir'd in Philip II. The motion of a prudent Government continues uni∣form to the very shore of Death; a former Cha∣racter and Reputation support it against the Hatreds and Inconveniencies of Age, as Tiherius experienc'd in himself15 1.813. Besides we pass over a great many

Slips in Old Age, which would be unpardonable in Youth, (as Drusus16 1.814 observed.) The more boi∣sterous the Storms are, with the more Resolution the Prince had need be armed to bear up against them, and the closer he ought to keep to the Helm of Go∣vernment; lest by entrusting it in the Hands of o∣thers, both himself and the Commonwealth should fall a Prey to the Sea. While the Prince's Vigour lasts, he should live and die in Action. Government is like the Spheres, which never stand still; it admits no Poles but those of the Prince. In the Arms of the State, not those of Sloth, the Prince must find Refresh∣ment in the Toils of his Old Age17 1.815: And if through the Infirmities of his Age he wants Strength to bear them, and has need of other Shoulders, yet let him not wholly refuse the Assistance of his own, were it only for Shew, since that is the same thing in the Eyes of the ignorant Mobb as Reality, and (as we observed elsewhere) is a Restraint to Ministers, and Support to Reputation. In this Case it is safer to form a Privy-Council of Three, as Philip II. did, than to leave all to the Management of One single Person; because the People look not on them as Favourites, but as Coun∣cellors.

Let the Prince beware of Covetousness, a Vice uni∣versally detested, and peculiar to Old Age, which it never forsakes, though it has bid adieu to all others. Undoubtedly Galba might have ingratiated himself with the People, had he been in the least Generous18 1.816. Let him conform to the Mode, and present Customs, and forget those more harsh and rigid ones of former Times, a fault Old Men are too apt to fall into, whe∣ther it proceed from the prejudice of their Education,

from Vain-glory, or the difficulty they find in taking up those new Customs; whence they incurr the hate of all Men. They give way to that melancholy Humour, which ariseth from the Coldness of their Age, and exclaim against all Pastimes and Divertisements, not remembring how much Time they have formerly spent in them themselves.

Let him not discover any Jealousy of his Successor, as Ferdinand the Catholick did, when Philip I. was to succeed him in the Kingdom of Castile. That is the time when most adore the Rising Sun; and if any one appears reserved in this particular, it is a Trick to make himself pass for a Loyal, Constant Man, in the Opinion of the Successor, and to gain his Esteem; as was observed of several, at the Death of Au∣gustus 19 1.817.

Let him strive to endear himself to All by Cour∣tesy, Equality of Justice, by Clemency and Plenty; being assured, that if he have governed well, and got the Love and good Opinion of his Subjects, he will maintain them without much difficulty, begetting in their Minds a fear of losing, and a desire of keep∣ing him.

All these Methods will be yet of more force, if the Successor be such as he may be in a manner born again, and immortalized by; for although Adoption be only a Fiction of the Law, yet the Person Adopting seems to renew his Youth in him, (as Galba20 1.818 said to Piso.) Succession ought not to be the least Care of Princes, it being not so frivolous a thing as Solomon imagined21 1.819. Sons are the Anchors and Props of a State, the Joy and Comfort of a Government and Court, Augustus

well knew this, when having none, he Adapted his Nearest Relations, to be, as it were, Pillars to sup∣port the Empire22 1.820. Neither Fleets nor Armies are greater Securities to a Prince, than a numerous Off-spring23 1.821. There are no greater Friends than They; no more zealous Opposers of Tyranny, Do∣mestick and Foreign. All bear a part in the Happi∣ness of Princes, their Children only are Sharers in their Misfortunes24 1.822. Friends change and fall off with Adversity, but never our own Blood, which though transfused into another, still corresponds with us by a secret and Natural Inclination25 1.823. The Safety of the Prince includes that of his Relations, and his Faults reflect upon them; and therefore they endeavour to mend them, being most concerned to observe, and most free and bold to reprove them. Thus Drusus made it his business to discover what was disliked at Rome in his Father, that he might correct it26 1.824. And these Reasons may serve to excuse that Autho∣rity which some Popes have allowed their Nephews in the Management of Affairs. The Subject has, in the Heir, one to reward his Services; and, on the other side, he is afraid to offend the Father, who leaves a Son to inherit his Power and Quarrels27 1.825. On this Marcellus grounded his Advice to Priscus, not to pretend to prescribe to Vespasian, a Man grown old in Triumphs, and the Father of many young Children28 1.826.

The Hopes of the Rising Sun makes the cold and gloomy Evenings of the Setting much more tole∣rable. Ambition is confounded, and Tyranny trembles. Liberty dare not break the Chain of Servitude, when she sees the Links continued in a Long Train of Suc∣cessors. The Publick Repose is not disturbed by Factions and Differences about the Succession29 1.827, every one already knowing that a new Phoenix must arise out of the Ashes of the old one, and that even now this Successor has taken Root, and got Strength, by making himself beloved and feared; as an old Tree shoots out of its Stump a young Sprig, which, in time, comes to grow in its place30 1.828

Nevertheless, if it lie in the Prince's Breast to ap∣point the Successor, he is not to make such use of this Advantage, as to preferr the Interest of his Kindred to that of the Publick. Moses, distrusting the Abili∣ties of his own Sons, left to God the Choice of a new Captain of his People31 1.829: And Galba gloried, in having had more Regard to the Publick Good, than to his Family, and having chosen a Person out of the Commonwealth to succeed him32 1.830. This is the last and greatest Benefit the Prince is capable of doing his States, (as the same Galba told Piso33 1.831, when he Adopted him.) 'Tis a Noble Instance of the Prince's Generosity, to strive to make his successor better than himself. He has but a mean Opinion of his Merit, who seeks a Name only by the Vices of him that comes after, and by the Comparison of one Reign with ano∣ther. Herein Augustus himself was faulty, in chusing

Tiberius upon the same motive34 1.832, without consider∣ing, that the glorious or infamous Actions of a Successor are charged upon the Predecessor who was concerned in his Election.

This Care to provide a good Heir is a Natural Duty in Parents, and they ought to attend it with utmost Application, since in their Sons they in a manner live for ever: And indeed it were against Natural Reason to envy the Excellency of their own Image, or leave it unpolish'd. And though the Institution of a Great Person be generally the Occasion of Domestick Dangers, inasmuch as Mens Ambition is proportion'd to the Capacity of their Souls35 1.833; and though often∣times, by the subversion of the Ties of Reason and Nature, Children grow weary of expecting the Crown so long, and seeing the Time of their Pleasure and Glory waste, as it was with Rhadamistus, in the long Reign of his Father Pharasman, King of Iberia36 1.834; although too it was the Counsel of the Holy Spirit37 1.835 to Fathers, not to give their Sons Liberty in their Youth, nor wink at their Follies: yet for all this, I say, a Father ought to spare no Pains that may contribute to the good Education of his Son, which is the second Obligation of Nature, nor let fall his Hopes and Confidence for a few particular Cases. No Prince was ever more jealous of his Children than Tiberius, yet he absented himself from Rome to leave Drusus in his Place38 1.836.

But if the Prince would prevent these Suspicions by Politick Methods, let him allow his Son a part in the Administration of Affairs both Civil and Military, but never in the Dispensation of his Favours; for by

the former the Applause of the People is not so much got, who are apt to be taken with the Liberal and Obliging Temper of the Son, a thing not very pleasing to the Fa∣thers who sit on the Throne39 1.837. In a word, he may be admitted into the Secrets of State, not into the Hearts of the Subjects. Augustus, who well understood this, when he desired to have Tiberius made Tribune, com∣mended him with so much Artifice, that he discovered his Faults in excusing them40 1.838. And it was believed that Tiberius, to render Drusus odious, and make him pass for one of a cruel Temper, gave him leave to frequent the Sword-Plays41 1.839; as he was glad when any Contest arose between his Sons and the Senate42 1.840. But these Artifices are more hurtful and treacherous than becomes the Sincerity of a Father; it is more prudent to join with the young Prince some Confident, in whose Power the Direction and Management of Affairs may be: as Vespa∣sian did, when her gave the Praetorship to his Son Domi∣tian, and assigned Mutian for his Assistant43 1.841. But if the Son shall seem to harbour great and enterprising Thoughts, such as may give just Apprehension of some ambitious Design against the Respect due to a Father, out of impatience of his long life, the best way will be to employ him in some Undertaking that may wholly engage those Thoughts, and cool the warmth and vigour of his Mind. It was this made Pharasman, King of Iberia, put his Son Rhadamistus upon the Conquest of Armenia44 1.842. But as this Caution of Honouring the Son, and employing him in Places of Difficulty, is absolutely necessary, so also must care be taken to put the Command of the Armies

in the Hand of another; for whoever is Master of them, rules the whole State. To this end, Otho gave his Brother Titianus the Name and Reputation of the Supreme Com∣mand, yet left all the Authority and real Power lodged in Proculus45 1.843: And Tiberius, when the Senate had decreed Germanicus all the Provinces beyond the Seas, made Piso Lieutenant of Syria, to be a Check to his Hopes and De∣signs 46 1.844. Indeed, the Constitution of States and Go∣vernments in Europe is such, that there is little fear of those Dangers; yet if the Genius of the Son should be so violent and terrible, that the Remedies mentioned cannot sufficiently provide for the Father's Security, let him con∣sider whether it be proper to apply that which Philip II. used with his only Son, Don Carlos, the execution of which made Politicks admire its own Power, struck Nature with Amazement, and the whole World with Horrour.

But if he distrust the Fidelity of his Subjects, because of their Aversion to his Son, there is usually no better Re∣medy than to have him educated in some other Court, and under the Protection of some greater Prince, (provided there be no danger of any Emulation between them) with whom he may afterwards establish an Alliance. This Motive prevailed with Phraates, King of Parthia, to bring up Vonones in the Court of Augustus47 1.845: Though this oftentimes produces a contrary effect, the People being apt to hate him afterwards as a Foreigner, who returns to them with strange Manners, which was the Case of the same Vonones48 1.846. In the Disposal of his Dominions to his Children, the Prince cannot be too cautious; inasmuch as it is sometimes the Advancement, sometimes the Ruiné of a Kingdom, especially in the Younger Sons, who gene∣rally envy the Elder his Prerogative, and in the Daughters matched with his own Subjects; whence arise Jealousies and Uneasinesses, which end in Civil Wars. Augustus

re••••••••ting upon this, refused his Daughter to a Roman Knight, who might occasion Disturbance49 1.847, and pro∣posed Proc••dejus, and others, who lived a calm and re∣tired Life, and intermedled not with Affairs of State50 1.848

The Choice of a Tutor for the Son who is to succeed in his Non-age is another thing, which demands all the Skill and Prudence the Father is Master of, there being nothing more exposed to Casualties than that; as we see present, and read of past Examples of many Princes, who, during their Minority, have lost their Lives and Kingdoms, at least been reduced to great Distress51 1.849. For if the Guardianship be left to the Mother, though that may be looked upon as most secure, yet the Prudence and Expe∣rience requisite for such a Task are rarely to be met with in a Woman, and most of that Sex want Courage to awe Subjects, and gain Respect. But should it fall to the Uncle, Ambition of Rule is wont to break the strongest and most close Ties of Blood. If it light upon the Mini∣sters, every one of them is wholly devoted to his private Interest, which occasions Divisions among them. Besides, Subjects despise the Government of their Equals, which is the Rise of Troubles, and Civil Commotions; and there∣fore out of all these Dangers and Inconveniencies the Prince must chuse the least, considering the Nature of the State, and of the Persons most capable of the Education of his Son, and picking out a Class of Subjects, whereby the Security of the Pupil may be so provided for, that they cannot possibly unite and conspire to ruine him. In this Case it is highly requisite that they be immediately brought into Business, who are to have, after the Father's Death, the Tuition and Guidance of the Heir, and Admi∣nistration of the Government.

Nor is it the Prince's only Duty to get the Successor se∣cured and instructed, but he is also to prevent the Acci∣dents of his new Government, and their ill Consequence;

for when the Sails are changed the Ship is endanger'd; and by the Introduction of New Forms, Nature suffers; because Things end faintly, but begin with vigour: 'Tis from this Vicissitude of Things that those Dangers pro∣ceed which threaten upon the meeting of the Waves of both Reigns, as it happens when one rapid River runs violently into another of an equal Current. The Autho∣rity of the Successor is easily lost, and Conspiracies and Innovations contriv'd against him52 1.850; and therefore the Prince should endeavour to make the latter part of his Reign so calm, that the new one may be entred on without the least hazard: and as Seamen, when they enter the Port, quit their Oars, and furl their Sails; so ought he to close his Government, by laying aside all thoughts of Enter∣prizes and Wars, by confirming ancient Alliances, and making new ones, particularly with his Neighbours, that Peace may be setled in his Realms.

'Tis no less worthy Praise, when Age draws on, To settle Peace and Quietness at Home; That no Intestine Broil•• subvert the State, Or pow'rful Neighbours War without create.* 1.851

Let him dissemble Injuries, us Tiberius did with Getu∣licus 53 1.852 and Philip II. with Ferdinand de Medicis; for at such a time the most prudent Princes order a Rainbow to be put over their Tombs, for a Token of Peace to their Successors, not a Lance fixed in the Earth, to prompt them to revenge their Quarrels, as the Athenians used to do. Let him govern his foreign Provinces with Counsel and Address, not Arms54 1.853; and see that the Governors he sets over them be Eloquent, Lovers of Peace, and unexperienc'd in War, lest they kindle it, as it was done in the time of Galba55 1.854. Let him compose

the Minds of his Subjects, and reconcile their Differences; protect them from Inj••ries, moderate their Taxes, and re••ove all Nor••lties odiovs to the People. Let him make choice of prudent Ministers, Friends to peace and the Publick Quiet; for by this means his Subjects Minds being formed to Ease, and gentle Usage, will promise themselves the same from the Successor, and so not at∣tempt any Innovation.

EMBLEM CI.

[illustration]

MAny great Men have laboured, by Speculation and Exper••ence, to form the Idea of a Perfect Prince. It hath 〈…〉〈…〉 this Royal Porcelain, this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Vessel of Ear••••, no less brittle than others,

and more subject to Casualties than any; particularly when the Potter is of the School of Matchiavel, whence all come out distorted, and of short continuance, as that was which he laid down as a Model of the rest.

The Design of these Emblems has been to set off that Purple, whose Scarlet Dye soon turns to Ashes; they be∣gan at the Cradle, and end at the Tomb. They are the Parenthesis of Man's Life, which the least clause of Time includes; nor is it easie to determine which Hour is the most happy, that wherein the Eyes are open to the Day of Life, or that in which they are closed to the Night of Death1 1.855, since the one is the beginning, the other the end of our Labours; and however great the difference may be betwixt being and not being, yet the Material Part of Man only feels that, not the Form, which is Immortal, and improved by Death. The Dread we have of the Grave is natural; but had Reason more influence on us than De∣sire of Living, we should rejoyce at the fight of it, as those do, who looking for Treasures, find urns, being sure to meet with Riches there2 1.856; for it is in the Grave that the Soul finds the real Treasure of Eternal Rest. This Simon Maccahaeus signified by that Hieroglyphick of Ships carved upon the Pillars he set about the Maus••laeum of his Father and Brothers3 1.857; intimating, that the Ship of our Life floating upon the Billows of the World, is never quiet till landed at the Shore of Death. In effect, what is Life but a perpetual Fear of Death? without any thing to assure us of its continuance. Many Signs por∣tend the Approach of Death, not one exactly marks out the Bounds of Life, The most flourishing Age and strongest Constitution are not sufficient Sureties for one Hour of Health. The Heart, which performs the part of a Balance in this clock of the Body, points indeed to

the present•• Hours, but never to the future. Nor ought this ••ncertainty to be termed Disdain, but rather a Favour of Nature; for were the precise Time determined for Death as it is for Birth, for the Dissolution as for the Formation of the Body, Man would become Insolent to Reason; and therefore she has not only given him one sure Minute to breath in, but, on the contrary, hath in all things imaginable laid before him Evidences of the Short∣ness of Life: The Earth represents it to him in the Youth of its Flowers, and Gray-Hairs of its Harvests; the Wa∣ter, in the Rapidness of its Current; the Air, in the Fires it kindles, and extinguishes again in a moment; and the Heavens, in the Prince of Light which the same Day sees rise in the golden Cradle of the East, and set in the dark Tomb of the West. But if Death be the last of all Evils, that it comes not too late is to be esteem'd a Hap∣piness. The shorter the Interval is between the Cradle and the Tomb, the shorter is the Course of our Labours; and therefore Iob wished he had been immediately car∣ried from the Womb of his Mother to that of the Earth4 1.858. We are bound as soon as born, and all our Life-time after involved in Care••5 1.859; nor have Kings, in this, any Pri∣vilege above the rest of Mankind* 1.860. Did Humane Felicity consist in long Life, Man would undoubtedly out-live the Stag; for it were absurd that any Creature should be hap∣pier than him, for whose Service they were all created6 1.861. That Natural Desire we have of seeing Hours pass swiftly away, is an Argument that it is not Time which makes our Happiness; for then would the Mind find its Rest in that: whatever it desires out of Time, it always wants. In Princes, more than in others, as they are exposed to greater Accidents, Experience shews that in a long Life

Fortune is endanger'd, she being tired as much with be∣ing propitions, as with being adverse. Lewis XI. had been a happy Prince, had he ended his Days before the Cala∣mities of his last Years. Sovereignty is a kind of tem∣pestuous Sea, not to be kept calm by a long Course of Life; he who lives longest, suffers most Storms and Dangers. But if we consider the End and Perfection of Nature, a long Life is happy, when, according to the Testimony of Iob, it comes into the Grave in its Maturity, as Corn into the Barn7 1.862, before Decrepidness makes it wither; for with the Shadow of Death the Vital Spirits congeal, and the Body remains useless. The Trembling Hand can no longer steer the Helm of the State, the Eye perceive the Clouds of Heaven, the Course of the Winds, and the Rocks of the Sea, nor the Ear hear the Barkings of Scylla and Carybdis. Amidst so many Miseries of Nature, Con∣stancy fails the Prince; and being reduced, by the Moi∣sture of the Senses, to a second Infancy, he believes every thing, and suffers himself to be govern'd by Malice, which is then most awake in those about him, who at such a time offend with equal Profit and Impunity8 1.863. Women get Possession of his Will, as Livia did of Augustus's, when she made him banish his Nephew Agrippa9 1.864, bring∣ing him to such a pass, that he who before knew how to maintain the whole World in Peace, became incapable of ruling his own Family10 1.865. By this means Majesty is made the Derision of all Men, of which Galba was an In∣stance11 1.866 Other Nations despise him, and are not afraid to rise up against him, as Arbanus did against Tiberius12 1.867. The Authority of a decrepid Prince is lost, and his Orders

〈…〉〈…〉, not taken for his own, as it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of those of 〈◊〉〈◊〉13 1.868. He is hated by the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, who look upon him as an unprofitable Instru∣ment, the Source of all the Evils the Government suffers: And as Love is in a manner bred by interest, and brought up by Hope, all make slight of him; inasmuch as he is not ••ble to give much, who hath but a little while to live. His Empire is accounted precarious, and short lived, as that of Galba was14 1.869; and the Ministers, like the Goss∣Hawks of Norway, that they may get the day, lay their Pounces upon the Publick Trea••ures, selling Places and Favours, as the Servants of the same Emperor did15 1.870. When therefore the Age is come to this pass, the Prince has more need of Instructions to make him sensible of his inability, and resign the weight of the Government to his Successor, than of Precepts to continue it to himself. Let not Ambition delude him, by the Representation of his post Character and Applause; for Men consider not the Prince as he was, but as he now is: Nor is it enough to have once made himself feared, if he cannot do it now; nor to have governed well heretofore, if he neither is able nor knows how to govern well still. Dominion is like the Sea, which immediately casts on Shore all unpro∣fitable Carkasses. The Prince is esteemed for the Form of the Soul with which he Ordains, Commands, Rewards and Punishes; so that when Age comes to discompose that Form, the Esteem vanishes; a••d therefore it will be pru∣dent to acknowledge the Injuries and Contempts of Age in time, and so slip from them before they arrive. If the Prince and Business must part, it is better that he bid the first adieu. 'Tis a glorious Action to submit to own one's Frailty, and voluntarily divest one's self of Grandeur, before Death takes it away by Force; lest it should be said, that he died unknown by himself, who

lived known by all Men. He should consider, that his Royal Scepter is like the Herb of the same Name, which in a little time turns to Worms16 1.871: and that if the whole Globe of the Earth be no more than a Point, in comparison of the Heavens; What will one Monarchy, one Kingdom be? And though this were never so large, yet he can have no more of it than a Place to bury him in17 1.872, or, as Saladin said, a Shrowd, without carrying away with him any other Glory. The Prince is not to live always for the Commonwealth; he should reserve some Time to himself, and endeavour, that at the setting of his Life the Horizon of Death may be cleared from the Vapours of Ambition, and the Clouds of Passion and Interest, as is expressed by the Sun in this Emblem, taken from the Sepulchre of Ioshua, upon which a Representation of that Planet was raised, with this difference only, that there it was put in memory of its standing still, at the Voice of this Great Captain18 1.873; here, to signifie, that as a Clear and Fair Evening is an infallible Sign of the Serenity of the next Morning, so a Reign ended in Sanctity and Hap∣piness, portends, that he who is a to succeed will be also happy, for a Reward to the Vertue, and by the irre∣sistible Efficacy of this last Example. The Art of Living and Dying well, that glorious Retirement of the Em∣peror Charles Va. May teach, who so far laid aside all Publick Cares, that he never so much as enquired after the State of his Monarchy, but brought his great Soul, other∣wise made for brave Atchievements, to the dressing of a Garden, or to divert the Hours (after his Spiritual Exer∣cise performed) at some Ingenious Art or other.

But if there are any Disputes or Revolutions to be ap∣prehended upon account of the Succession, it will be Pru∣dence in the Persons present at the King's Death to keep it secret, and make that and the Possession of the Successor publick at one time. For in such Cases the People are like a Colt not broke, which suffers not the Saddle, unless it

〈…〉〈…〉 sees it. Th•••• Livi•• concealed the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 untill 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was setled in his 〈◊〉〈◊〉19 1.874; as Agrippin•• did that of Claudius, with so much Di••••imulation, that even after his Decease a Senate was convened in his Name, and Prayers offered for his Health, till Time was gained to contrive Nero's Succes∣sion 20 1.875. The Death of the Prince being made known, neither Piety nor Prudence dissuade from Tears, and Demonstrations of Sorrow. The Holy Ghost, far from forbidding, recommends th••em21 1.876. All the People of Israel lamented the Death of Abner, and David followed his Corps to the Grave22 1.877. For though there want not Christian Considerations to comfort us; and though there hath been heretofore a Nation, which, less enlightned with the Rays of Immortality, received those with Tears who came into the World, and took leave of them that went out of it with Rejoycings; yet these Reasons stand good only on their side who are gone to a better Life, but are not for those who are left alone, and deprived of their Services and Conversation. Even our Saviour Christ going to raise Lazarus, wept over his Sepulchre23 1.878. These last Expressions of Grief must not be denied the Tenderness and Resentments of Nature: They are the Scales wherein the Merit of the deceas'd Prince is weighed, and whereby may be known what Value his Subjects had for him; in a word, the Touch-stone on which their Love and Obedience is tried, which strengthens the Links of Subjection, and gives Heart to the Successor. Yet for all this, the People must not be obliged to an expensive Mourning, for fear their Prince's Death should turn to a burthensom Tax.

Not, however, that Funeral Pomp, and magnificent Tombs, adorned with Statues, and costly Imbossed Works, are to be look'd on as a meer Vanity of Princes; they are

rather a generous piece of Piety, which marks out the last Bounds of Humane Greatness, and shews, in the Magnifi∣cence wherewith their Ashes are honoured, what Respect is owing to Majesty; Sepulchres being no other than a kind of mute History of the Royal Race24 1.879. The Obsequies of David and Solomon were celebrated with extraordinary Pomp and Splendour.

In the Funerals of private Persons great Care is re∣quired, because Superstitions prejudicial to Religion are easily introduced, the Imagination being deluded in what is hoped or feared from the Deceased; and for that Funeral Charges are things which happen every day, and concern many, it is absolutely necessary they should be moderated, Sorrow and Vain-glory being apt to raise them too high. Plato set a certain Rate upon the Building of Sepulchres, as did Solon also, and after them the Romans. King Philip II. made a Law to regulate the Abuses and Excesses of Funerals and Monuments; saying, That what was laid out superfluously upon them, were better given to pious Uses, and to pray for the Souls of the Deceased.

Thus far Your Highness has seen the Birth, Death, and Burial of the Prince whom these Emblems form; being, as it were, present at the Building of this Politick Edifice, from the very Foundation, to the last Stone.

And now, that your Highness may with more ease take a Review of the whole Fabrick, I have thought con∣venient to subjoin here a kind of Platform thereof, or Looking-Glass, wherein it may be represented, as a greater City is in a lesser. This shall be King Ferdinand the Catholick, one of Your Royal Highnesses's Ancestors; in whose glorious Reign, all the Arts both of Peace and War flourished, and Accidents both of prosperous and adverse Fortune occurred. The Infancy of this Great King was ripe and vigorous, his Youth employed in Military Exer∣cises; and what art and Industry could not perfect in

him, Experience supplied. His very Leisure was Em∣ployment; and his Diversions, Attention of Mind. He was absolute Master of his Passions, following more the Dictates of Policy, than his own Natural inclinations. He own'd his Grandeur to be from God only; and glo∣ried in his own Actions, not those of his Ancestors. He look'd on Sovereignty rather as a Charge than a Succes∣sion. He qu••e••ed his Realms by Dil••gence, and Personal Presence, rais'd his Monarchy by Valour and Prudence, ••stabllsh'd it by Religion and Justice, supported it by Love and Respect, embellish'd it with Arts and Sciences, enrich'd it by Trade and Husbandry, and eterniz'd it by Maxims and Institutions truly Politick. He was a King as well of his Court as Kingdoms, and Master as well as Home as Abroad. He temper'd his Liberality with Fru∣gality, Affab••lity with Authority, Modesty with Gra∣vity, and Clemency with Justice. By punishing some few, he terrified many; and by rewarding others, he en∣courag'd the Hopes of all. Personal Affronts he easily pardon'd, but those which struck at the Royal Dignity he never forgave. The Injuries done to his Subjects he reveng'd as his own, behaving himself always as a Father to them. He valu'd his Glory more than his Dominion; but was neither puft up by Prosperity, nor dejected by Adversity: In the one he fortify'd himself against the other; and when Fortune frown'd, he us'd all his Industry to retrieve her Favour. He made use of Time, not Time of him; and though he submitted to Necessity, he made it subservient to his own Advantage. His Conduct render'd him both belov'd and fear'd of all. He gave Audience with readiness; Hearing, that he might know; and asking Questions, for his more certain In∣formation. He trusted not his Enemies, and was re∣serv'd even with his Friends. His Friendship was Con∣v••niency; his Kindred, Reason of State; his Confidence vigilant; his Diffidence considerate; his Providence, Assurance; his Jealousy, Circumspection; his Malice, a Defence; and his Dissimulation, a Refuge. He deceived none, yet others were deceived by the Am∣biguity

of his Words and Treaties, which he knew how to manage with so much Artifice (when it was necessary to baffle Malice with Prudence) as to be able to extricate himself without violating the Publick Faith. Neither Falshood dared attack his Majesty, nor Flattery his Know∣ledge. He made his Ministers serviceable to him, without making them Favourites; and suffer'd himself to be coun∣sel'd, not govern'd by them. What he could do him∣self, he committed not to others. He took Time for Consultation, but was very Expeditious in Execution. In his Resolutions the Effects were seen sooner than the Causes. He conceal'd his Designs from his Embassadors, when he desir'd, that being deceiv'd themselves, they should more effectually persuade others the contrary. He knew how to rule with his Queen, and obey his Son-in-Law. He imposed Taxes through Necessity, not out of Avarice and Luxury; and what he then took from the Church, he afterwards restor'd, respecting the Ecclesia∣stical Jurisdiction, and maintaining the Regal. He kept no fixed Court, but, like the Sun, mov'd continually about the Orbs of his Realms. He manag'd Peace with Moderation and Integrity, and prosecuted War with Force and Stra∣tagem, neither desiring the one, nor refusing the other. Whatsoever his Foot was fixed on, his Arm and Conduct join'd in the Defecne thereof, encreasing his Strength by the Spoils of his Enemies. He did as much by his Nego∣tiations, as by his Arms, never committing to the Sword, what he could conquer by Address. he plac'd the Osten∣tation of his Grandeur and Pomp in the Bravery of his Battalions. He was always present, in time of War, within his Kingdoms. The same Orders which he gave, he observ'd himself; and made Leagues so as to remain Arbiter, not subject. He was neither exalted when Con∣queror; nor when beaten, dispirited. He Sign'd Trea∣ties of Peace under the Shield. In a word, He liv'd to all the World, and dy'd to himself; yet always remain∣ing, in the memory of. Men, as an absolute Pattern for Princes, and Immortalizing himself in the Desire of his Subjects.

[illustration]

THis naked Skull of Death, the dismal Sc••••e, Which now the simple Spider measures o're WIth its slight Web; which baffled heretofore The nicest Subteilties of Humane Brain,

Once wore a 〈◊〉〈◊〉, and triumphant stood, As Monarch of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Peace and War: His Smiles gave Life; his Anger dire Despair; And all the World depended on its Nod.

What oncee gave proudly Laws to War and Peace, Spiders and Ear-wigs do now possess. Why then this Pride, O Princes, since the Grave Makes no Distinction 'twixt the Base and Brave, Betwixt the mighty Prince and wretched Slave?

On the Author and his Book, in Allusion to the EMBLEM.

WHither so fast, vain Man? 'fore out of breath, Stop, and behold this lively Scene of Death. The Head thou seest was Great Saavedra's once, A greater Name no Rhetorick can pronounce. Here Piety with Policy were join'd. Here Honour, Sence and Learning were combin'd False Machiavilian Notions to convince, And form at oncea Wise and Vertuous Prince. Where now, alas! Worms having eat it bare, The Death-watch Spiders spread their curious Hair, And with their Bowels nobly re-interr, Scepters and Crowns here tumbled down you see; A trifling Lose to one so Great as He: But since this Work remains, the World may cry, Death, where's thy Sting? Grave, where's thy Victory?

FINIS.

Notes

• 1 1.1

  Eccles. 13. 31.
• 2 1.2

  The heart is deceitful above all things, an•• desperately wicked: Who can know it? Ierem. 17. 9.
• 3 1.3

  Utrumq•• in viti•• est, &. omnib••is credere, &. nulli. Seneca.
• † 1.4

  Gon••alez Fernandez of Cordov••. Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 4 1.5

  Sibi fidem integram, &. si nullis infidiis peteretur, mansuram. Tac. 6. ann.
• 5 1.6

  Quippe proditores, etiam iis, quos anteponunt, invisunt. Tac. 1. ann.
• 6 1.7

  Mansitque Celso velut fat alit••r etiam pro Othone fides integr•• &. infelix. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 7 1.8

  He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much, Luk. 16. 10.
• 8 1.9

  Acerrimè increpuit, quod contra institutum Augusti, non sponte Principis Alexandriam introisset. Tac. 2. ann.
• 9 1.10

  Numb. 27. 18.
• 10 1.11

  Neque enim imminentes virtutes sectabatur, & rursus vitia oderat; ex optimis periculum sibi, à pessimis dedecus publicum metuebat. Tac. 1. ann.
• 11 1.12

  Qui in affluentia fortunae, virium, opum, & amicorum, ālioruam{que} talium constituti sunt, Reginaeque ob••dire norunt. Arist. 4. Pol. c. 11.
• 12 1.13

  Auri vim, atque opes Principibus infensas. Tac. 11. ann.
• 13 1.14

  Nuntiata ea Tiberium laetitia curaque affecere. Tac. 1. ann.
• 14 1.15

  Ut to specie Germanicum suetis Legionibus abstraheret, nov••sque Provineiis impositum, dolo simul & casibus objectaret. Tac. 2. ann.
• 15 1.16

  Acriùs modestiam ejus aggreditur, alterum Consulatum offerend••. Tac. 2. ann.
• * 1.17

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 16 1.18

  Difficiles fratrum dissentiones, & qui valdè am••nt, valdè edio habent. Arist. 7. Pol. c. 6.
• * 1.19

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 1 1.20

  Nam qui maguam potestatem habent, etiam si ipsi nullius pretii sint, multum nocent. Arist. 1. Pol. cap. 9.
• 2 1.21

  For the Children of this world are in their Generation, wiser than the Children of light, Luke 16. 8.
• 3 1.22

  Regiae potentiae Ministri. quos delectat superbiae suae longum spectacu∣lum; minus{que} se judicant posse, nisi diu, multumque singulis, quid possint ••ftendant. Seneca.
• 4 1.23

  Posse etiam sub mal••s Principibus magnos vires esse. Tac. in vit. Agr.
• 5 1.24

  Neque nunc properè, s••d per octo annos capto experimento. Tac. 3. ann.
• 6 1.25

  Nam unum opus ab uno optim•• perficitur, quod ut fiat, munus est Legumlatoris providere, nec jubere, ut tibia canat quisquam, & idem Gale••••s confici••t. Arist. 2. Pol. cap. 9
• 7 1.26

  1 Macch. a 65.
• 8 1.27

  Sic enim optimè instrument a profici••nt, si eorum singula, non inultis, sed uni deserviant. Arist. lib. 1. Pol. cap. 1.
• 9 1.28

  Nec sit concessum cui∣quam duobus assistere Magistratibus, & utriusque Iudicii curam peragere, nec facile cre••endum duabus necessariis rebus, unum suff••cere. L. F. de Asses
• 10 1.29

  •• Chron. c. 4. 5.
• 11 1.30

  1 Kings 7. 26.
• 12 1.31

  Ubi aliquos voluisset, vel Rectores Provinciis dare, vel Praepositos facere, vel Procurat••res, id est, rationales ordinare, nomina eorum propo∣nebat, & Lamp. in vit. Alex. Sev.
• 13 1.32

  Haud semper errat famae, aliquando & eligit. Tac. in vit. Agr.
• 14 1.33

  Non ex rumore statuendum multos in Provinciis, contra quem spes, aut metus de illis fuerit, egisse, excitari quosdam ad meliora Magnitudine r••rum, hebescore alios. Tac. 3. ann.
• 15 1.34

  Officiis ac administrat ••onibus, potiùs non peccaturos, quam dam∣nare cum peccassent. Tac. in vit. Agr.
• 16 1.35

  Quia sine Ambitione, aut proximorum Precibus, ignotos etiam, ac ultro accitos M••nificentia juver at. Tac. 4. ann.
• 17 1.36

  Sorte &. urna mores non disecrni: suffragia & ex∣istimationem senafus reperta, ut an eujusque vitam, famamque penitra∣rent. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 1 1.37

  Eccles. 5. 9.
• 2 1.38

  Eccles. 14. 9.
• * 1.39

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 3 1.40

  Exod. 18. 21.
• 4 1.41

  Pl••raque eor••m quae h••mines injuste faciunt, per Ambitionem & Ava••i••••am commit tuntur. Aristo••. 2. Pol. cap. 7.
• 5 1.42

  Prov. 29. 4.
• * 1.43

  L. 4. tit. 3. p. 2.
• 6 1.44

  Prov. 28. 15.
• 7 1.45

  Job 27. 18.
• 8 1.46

  Job 8. 14.
• 9 1.47

  Provincias spoliari, & nummarium tribunal, audita utrinque li∣citatione, alteri addici non mirum quando quae emerit vendere gentium jus est. Sen. lib. 1. c. 9. de ben.
• * 1.48

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 10 1.49

  Sed caput est in omni Rep. ut legibus, & omni alia ratione provisum sit, ne qu•••• facul∣tas quaestus faciendi Magistratibus relinqu••tur. Arist. Pol. 5. c. ••.
• 11 1.50

  Tunc utrumque ei molestum est, quod nec honorum particeps sit•• & quod à quaestibus submoveatur. Ibid.
• 12 1.51

  Quasi impossibile ••it, qui egenus existat, eum benè Magistratum gerere, aut quietem optare. Arist. Pol. 2. c. 9.
• 13 1.52

  Haud enim frustra placitum olim, ne foeminae in S••∣cios aut gentes externas traherentur. Tac. 3. ann.
• 14 1.53

  Hest. 1. 11.
• 1 1.54

  Naturam duas necessarias res, easdem salutares human•• generi comparasse, ut alii cum Imperio essent, al••i ei subjicerentur, nihilque quod citra haec, nec 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quidem queat spatio perdurare. Dion. lib. 14.
• 2 1.55

  1 Kin. 11. 28.
• 3 1.56

  1 Kin. 11. 26.
• 4 1.57

  Est autem omnis Monarchiae cautio communis, neminem facere nimis magnum, aut certè plusquam unum facere: ipsi enim inter se, quid quisque agat observant. Arist. 5. Pol. c. 11.
• 5 1.58

  Gen. 41. 40.
• 6 1.59

  Job 4. 18.
• 7 1.60

  Id morum Tiberii suit, continuare Imperia, ac pleros{que} ad fine•• vitae in eisdem exercitibus, aut Iurisdictionibus habere. Tac. 5. ann.
• 8 1.61

  Superbire homines etiam annua designatione: quid si honorem per quinquennium agitent? Tac. 2. ann.
• 1 1.62

  Apoc. 5. 6.
• 2 1.63

  Superior debet esse totus mens, &c totus oculus. S. Antioc. Hom. 5.
• 3 1.64

  Nam Principes ac Reges nunc quoque multos sibi oculos, multas a••∣res, multas item manus atque pedes faciunt. Arist. Pol. 5. c. 12
• 4 1.65

  H•••• enim ratione, & omnium oculis cernet, & omnium auribus audiet, & om∣nium denique consiliis in unum tendentibus consultabit. Sines. ad Arcad
• 5 1.66

  Consilium oculus futurorum. Arist. lib. 6. de Regim.
• 6 1.67

  ••erem: 1▪ 11. Vid. Version. Vulgar.
• 7 1.68

  Morum, animor••mque Provincie nisi s••••gneri qui de ea consulant, perdant se, & R••mpub. Cicero.
• 8 1.69

  Ec∣cles. 3. 4.
• * 1.70

  L. 5. tit. 9. p. 2.
• 9 1.71

  Eccles. 8. 20
• † 1.72

  L. 7. tit. 1. p. 4.
• 10 1.73

  2 Chron. 3. 12.
• 11 1.74

  Populi Im••erium juxta libertatem: pau∣corum Dominatio Regi•• l••bidini proprior est. Tac. 6. ann.
• 12 1.75

  Hinc factum est, ut vulgò jactarunt Per••arum Regem multos h••bere e••ules, au∣resque multas: quod si quis putet unum oculum expetendum Regi, eum egregie falli certum est, unus enim & pa••ca videat, & pa••ca 〈◊〉〈◊〉; Xenoph. lib. 4. Cyri.
• 13 1.76

  Et Majestas qui 〈◊〉〈◊〉 imperium habere a∣pud Ministrum sol••t; Regi, aut Principi 〈…〉〈…〉 relinqui∣tur. Plutarch.
• 14 1.77

  Unde si de jure tractaretur, in consilium solos doctos adhibebat, ••••vero de re militari, milites veteres, & senes ac bene meritos & locorum pe∣ritos. Lamp. in Vit. Alex.
• † 1.78

  L. 1. tit. 9. p. 2.
• 15 1.79

  Si de sua uni•••• sententia omnia geret, superbum hunc judicabo, magis quam prudente•• Livius.
• 16 1.80

  Jos. 8. 10.
• 17 1.81

  Hest. 1. 13.
• 18 1.82

  Prov. 13. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• 19 1.83

  Nemo solus sapit. Plaut.
• 20 1.84

  Prov. 11. 12.
• 21 1.85

  Prov. 4. 25.
• 22 1.86

  Prov. 12. 15.
• * 1.87

  Homer. ••
• 23 1.88

  Prov. 13. 16.
• 24 1.89

  Bene enim quod cum vestro consilio fuerit ••••••dinatum, id ad beatitudinem nostri imperii, & ad nostram Gloriam red••••••dare. L. Humanum, c. de Leg.
• 25 1.90

  indignum esse, Rempub, & f••••tunas civium ei committi qui alienis oculis uti crederetur. Tit. Li••▪ lib. 26.
• 26 1.91

  Prov. 21. 1.
• 27 1.92

  Non omnia consilia cuncti•• praesentibus tracta∣ri, aut occasionum velocitas patitur. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 28 1.93

  Ne 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sententi•• indig••••s videretur, i•• diversa ac deterior•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Tac. 11. ann.
• 29 1.94

  Ezek. 13. 10.
• 30 1.95

  Cry aloud, spare not, lift up thy voice like a Trumpet, Is•• 58. 1.
• 31 1.96

  For every High Priest taken from among Men, is ordained for Men in things appertaining to God, Heb. 5. 1.
• 32 1.97

  Behold I have put my words in thy mouth, Ierem. 1. 9.
• 33 1.98

  I know thy Works, and Charity, and Service, and Faith, and thy Patience, and thy Works; and the last to be more than the first. Notwithstanding I have a few things against thee. Revel. 2. 19.
• † 1.99

  L. 4. tit. 9. p. 2.
• 1 1.100

  Sit annullus tuus, non ut vas aliquod, sed tanquam ipse tu; no•• Minister alien•• voluntatis, sed t••stis tuae. Cicer. Epist. 1. ad Quint. fratrem.
• 2 1.101

  Revel. 4. 8.
• 3 1.102

  Ibid.
• 4 1.103

  Ezek. 1. 11.
• 5 1.104

  Ezek. 1. 12.
• † 1.105

  L. 4. ti•• 9. p. 2.
• ‖ 1.106

  L. 12. ti••. 1. p. 2.
• 1 1.107

  Neve Tiberius vim Principatus resolveret, ••unc••a ad senatum vocando, eam conditionem esse ••mperan••••, ut non aliter ratio const••t, quam si uni reddatur. Tac. 1 ann.
• 2 1.108

  For the transgression of a Land, many are the Princes thereof Prov. 28. 2.
• 3 1.109

  And I will set up one Sheph••rd over them. Ez••••. 34. ••3.
• 4 1.110

  Nihil arduum videbat••r in ani••o Principis, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non judiciu••, non odium erat nisi indita & j••ssa. Tac. 12. ann.
• 5 1.111

  Is••••. 9. 6
• 6 1.112

  And the Cook to••k up the Shoulder, &c. 1 Sam. 9. 24.
• 7 1.113

  Ezek. 1. 18. lm LXX.
• † 1.114

  2 Kings 2 12.
• 8 1.115

  Ips•• n••q••e jub••nd••, neque vi••an••i po∣t••ns, non jam Imperator, sed tantum 〈…〉〈…〉. T••c 1. H••st.
• 9 1.116

  Non Aedilis, aut Praetoris, aut Consulis Partes sustineo, majus a∣liquod, & excelsius à Principe postulatur. Tac. 3. Hist.
• 10 1.117

  Et proximi Senatus die, Tiberius castigatis per literas oblique Patribus, quod cunct•• curarum ad Principem rejicerent. Tac. 3. ann.
• 11 1.118

  Sanguinius Maxi∣mus è Consularibus oravit Senatum ne curas Imperatoris conquisitis insu∣per acerbitatibus augerent, sufficere ipsum statuendis remediis. Tac. 6. ann.
• 12 1.119

  Gen. 2. 19.
• 13 1.120

  Inclinatio Senatus incitamentum Tiberio fuit, quo promptiùs 〈◊〉〈◊〉 saretur. Tac. 2. ann.
• 14 1.121

  Violentèr increpuit, velut coram rogit•••• quid illi cum militibus, quos, neque dicta Imperatoris, neque pr••mia, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ab imperatore accipere par ••sset. Tac. 6. ann.
• 15 1.122

  Et honores ipse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se tribuere, p••nas autem per ali••s Magistratus, & judices irrog•••• Arist. lib. 5 Pol. c. 11.
• 16 1.123

  Quo lo••o cens••bis Caesa••? Si pri••us, habeo quod sequor: si post omnes, vereor nè imprudens dissentiam. Tac 1. ann.
• 17 1.124

  Exemit etian•• Drusum Consule•• designatum dicendae primo loco sententiae, quod alii ci∣••ile reb••ntur, nè 〈…〉〈…〉 fieret. Tac. 3. ann.
• 18 1.125

  Sed quod in cjusmodi rebus accidit, consili••m ab omnibus dat•••• est, periculum pauci sensere.
• 19 1.126

  Nec patrum cognitionibus satiatus, Iudiciis adsidebat in co••nu tribunalis. Tac. 1. ann.
• * 1.127

  L. 20. tit. 23. p. 3.
• 20 1.128

  And all Israel h••ard of the Judgment which the King had judged, and they feared the King: for they saw that the Wisdom of God was in him to do ••udgment, 1 Kin. 3. 28
• 21 1.129

  Now make us a King to judge us like all the Nations, 1 Sam. 8. 5.
• 22 1.130

  A King that sitteth in the Throne of Judgment, sca••••ereth away all evil with his Eyes, Prov. 20. 8.
• 23 1.131

  Psalm 9. 14.
• 24 1.132

  1 Sam. 17. 31.
• 25 1.133

  Isa. 1. 17.
• 26 1.134

  Opes publicae continebantur, quantum civium, sociorumque in ••••∣mis, quot Classes, Regna, Provinciae, Tributa & Necessitates, ac Largiti••∣nes, quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus. Tac. 1. ann.
• 27 1.135

  Est senatori necessarium nosse Rempub. quàm latè p••tet, quid habeat Militum, quid valeat aerarium, quo•• socios Resp. habeat, quos amicos, quos ••ipendiarios, qua quisque sit lege, conditione, foedere, &c. Cicero.
• 1 1.136

  Velle pecuniis excellere Tyrannicum, H••noribus vero magis Regium. Arist. Po••. lib. 5.
• 2 1.137

  Itaque Monarchas, non ut sibi vendicent Monarchiam, invadunt, s••d ut famam & gloriam adipiscantur. Arist. Pol. 5. cap. 10.
• * 1.138

  Ennius.
• 3 1.139

  Ut quicquid sine detrimento accommodari possit id tribuatur velignoto. Cicero.
• † 1.140

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 4 1.141

  Illo in corpore decus owne Cheruscorum, illius consilia gesta, quae prosper•• ce••id••rint testa••atur. Tac. 2. ann.
• 5 1.142

  Nam quod Domino in monte demorante, & ipsis cum turba resid•• tibus quid••m tepor eorum fidem retardaverat. Hilar. cap. 7. Sup. Matth
• 6 1.143

  And I brought him to thy Disciples and they could not cu•• him, Matth. 17. 15.
• 7 1.144

  Caeterum anxius invidia, & mulieb••e fastigium in diminutionem sui ••ccipiens, ne lictorem qui••••em ei decern•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Tac. 1. ann.
• 8 1.145

  Tum verò aequari adolescentes senectae suae, uis hoentèr indoluit. Tac. 4. ann.
• 9 1.146

  Vanescit Augusti honor, si promis•• noribus vulg••∣tur. Tac. 4. ann.
• 1 1.147

  Test••dinem, ubi collecta in suum tegmen est, tutam ad omnes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 esse, ubi exerit partes aliquas, quodcunque nudavit obnoxium at que i•• mum habere Cic
• 2 1.148

  Et sua retinere privatae domus, alienis ce•••••• Regiam laudem esse. Tac. 15. ann.
• 3 1.149

  Suam quisque fortunam in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••lio habeat, cum de ••lieno deliberat. Curtius.
• 4 1.150

  Quibus nova & ancipitia praecolere avida, & plerumque fallax 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est. Tac. 14. ann.
• 5 1.151

  Vetus, & jampridem insita Mortalibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cupido, cum imperii Magnitudine adolevit erupitque. Tac. 2▪ 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• 6 1.152

  Et quae ab exiguis profecta initiis ••o ••reverit, ut j••m Magni∣••••ine laboraret sua. Liv. lib. 1.
• 7 1.153

  Addideratque consilium coercendi in∣•••• terminos imperii. Tac. 1 ann.
• 8 1.154

  I••pone felicitati tu•• fraena, faci∣•••• reges. Curti••,
• 9 1.155

  Fa••ilius est qu••dam vincere quam tenere. Curt.
• 10 1.156

  Fortunam 〈…〉〈…〉 invenies quam retineas Publ.
• 11 1.157

  Fortunam tuam pressis manibus tene, lubrica. Curtius:
• 12 1.158

  Anceps & operosa nimis est mutatio, quae subitò & cum qu•••• violentiâ suscipitur; facilior autem quae sensim & paulatim de. li•••• fit. Arist. 6. Pol.
• 13 1.159

  Sed populum per tot annos mollitèr habi•• nondum audebat ad duriora vertere. Tac. 1. ann.
• 14 1.160

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 veterem disciplinam, atque ita quatuordecim annis à Nerone 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ut haud minus vitia Principis amarent, quam olim virtutes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 rabantur. Tac. Hist. 1.
• 15 1.161

  Non minus negotii est Remp. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quam ab initi•• ••onstituere. Arist. 4. Pol. cap. 1.
• 16 1.162

  2 S••m. 3. 39.
• 17 1.163

  1 Kings 12. 14.
• 18 1.164

  Ubi famae inserviret, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in novis c••ptis validissima est. Tac. 13. ann.
• 19 1.165

  Non ignarus instandum fa••••ae, & prout prima ••essissent, fore universa. Tac. in vit. Agr.
• 20 1.166

  Cur abstinuerit Spectaculo ipse, variè trahebant; ali•• taedio caetus, ••••id••m tristitia ingenii, & met•• comparationis, quia Augustu•• comi••er ••••••fuisset. Tac. 1. ann.
• 21 1.167

  Tum formam futuri Principatus pr••scripsit, ca maximè declin••••, querum recens flagrabat invidia. Tac. 13. ann.
• 22 1.168

  Sed prompti ad∣ius, obvia comitas, ignotae Parthis Vertutes, nova vitia. Tac. 2. ann.
• 23 1.169

  Quod hic prima ab infantia instituta. & cultum Armeniorum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 latus, venatu, epulis, & quae alia barbari celebrant proceres, plebem•••• juxta devinxerat. Tac. 2. ann.
• 24 1.170

  Novum Imperium inchoanti•••• utilis clementia. Tac. 4. Hist.
• † 1.171

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 25 1.172

  Laudatorum Principum usu•• ex aequo, quamvis prout agentibus, s••vi proximis ingr••nt. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 26 1.173

  1 Sam. 10. 27.
• 27 1.174

  Egregium vita, famaque quoad privatus, vel in imperiis sub Augusto fuit. Tac. 6. ann.
• 28 1.175

  Major privato visus, dum privatus fuit. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 29 1.176

  Non parcit populis Regnum breve. Statius.
• 30 1.177

  Difficilius est temperare felicitati, qua te non putes di•• us••rum. Tac. 2. ann.
• 31 1.178

  Si immensum Imperii corpus starè, ac librari sine rectore posset, dignus eram à quo Respub. inciperet. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 32 1.179

  Prima domi∣nandi spes in arduo; ubi sis ingressus, adsunt studia & Ministri. Tac. 4. ann.
• 33 1.180

  Magna cum invidia novi Principatus, cuju•• ••oc primum spe∣cimen nosce••atur. Tac. 2. Hist.
• 34 1.181

  Nemo enim unquam imperium flagitio quaesitum, bonis artibus exer∣cuit. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 35 1.182

  Simul reputans non posse Principatum scelere quaesitum, subita modestia & prisca gravitate retineri. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 36 1.183

  Nono decimo Caesar Octavianus civilia bella sustinuit. Tac. 13. ann.
• 37 1.184

  Mansisse, C••s••re Augusto victore, Imperium. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 38 1.185

  Le∣pidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere. Tac. 1. ann.
• 39 1.186

  Cuncta discordiis civilibus fess••. Ibid.
• 40 1.187

  Nulla jam public•• arma. Ibid.
• 41 1.188

  Nullo adversante cum ferocissimi per acies out proscrip∣tione cecidissent. Ibid.
• 42 1.189

  Neque Provincia illum rerum statum abnue∣b••nt, suspecto Senatus populi{que} Imperio, ••ob certamina, potentiam & avari∣tiam magistratuum. Ibid.
• 43 1.190

  Non alitèr discordantis patriae remedium suisse quam ut ab uno regeretur. Ibid.
• 44 1.191

  Ad tuendam plebem tribuni∣tio jure contentam. Ibid.
• 45 1.192

  Non Regno tamen ne{que} Dictatura, sed Prin∣cipis nomine constitutam Remp. Ibid.
• 46 1.193

  eadem Magistratibus vocabu∣la, militem donis populum annona, cunctos dulcedine ••tii pellexit. Ibid.
• 47 1.194

  Multa Antonio & multa Lepido concessit. Ibid.
• 48 1.195

  Quanto quis servitio promptior, opibus & honoribus extollebatur. Ibid.
• 49 1.196

  Pauca admodum vi tractata, quo caeteris quies esset. Ibid.
• 50 1.197

  Augusto prompta ac profluens, quae decerat Principem, eloqu••ntia fuit Tac. 15. ann.
• 51 1.198

  Ius apud cives, modestiam apud socios Ibid. 3. ann.
• 52 1.199

  Oh impudicitiam filiae & nep∣tis, quas••urbe d••puli••, Tac. 3. ann.
• 53 1.200

  In lect••s à Divo Augusto liberalitate decies sestertium duc••re u••orem, ••è clarissima familia extingueretur.
• 54 1.201

  Primus Augustus cognitionem, ••e famosis libellis, specie legis ejus tractavit &c. Tac. 1. ann.
• 55 1.202

  Sed ipse Divus Iulius, ipse Divus Augustus & tulêre ea, & reliquêre Tac. 4. ann.
• 56 1.203

  Urbem ipsam magnifico ornatu. Tac. 1. ann.
• 57 1.204

  M••ri oceano, aut a••nibus longi••quis septum imperium. Tac. 1. ann.
• 58 1.205

  Regiones, Pro∣vincias, Classes, cuncta inter so co••••exa. Ibid.
• 59 1.206

  Novis ex rebus aucti tuta & pr••••••ntia quam vet••ra & periculosa mallent. Ibid.
• 60 1.207

  Quid aliud exitio Lacedaemoniis & Atheniensibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant? Et conditor no∣ster R••mulus tantum s••pientia valuit, ut pleros{que} populos, eodem die hostes, deind•• cives habuit. Tac. 2. ann.
• 61 1.208

  Eadem Magistratuum vocabula. Tac. 1. ann.
• 62 1.209

  Sed Tiborius vim Principatus, sibi firmans, imaginem antiquitatis senatui praebebat. Tac. 3. ann.
• 63 1.210

  Non omnia statim, uti decretum erat, executus est, veritus, nè parum succederet si simul homines transferre & invertere vellet, sed qu••dam extempore disposuit, quaedam rejicit in tempus. Dion.
• 64 1.211

  Ec∣cles. 46. 16.
• 65 1.212

  Idque adversus Britanniam pro••iturum, si Romana ubi∣que arma, & velut è conspectu libertas tolleretur. Tac. in vit. Agric.
• 66 1.213

  Quaedam ex Regiis tributis diminuta, qu•• mitius Rom. Imperi∣•••• speraretur. Tac. 2. ann.
• 67 1.214

  Pa••em exu••re, nostrae magis avaritiae, quam obsequii impatientes. Tac. 4. ann.
• 68 1.215

  Quid 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in modum deferre Census, pati tributa adigebatur. Tac. 4. ann.
• 69 1.216

  Verba fuere pauca, & s••••su permodesto. Tac. 1. ann.
• 70 1.217

  Et minus sibi invidiam, adempta salutantium turb••, sublatisque inanibus••, vera potentia au∣g••ri. Tac. 4. ann.
• 71 1.218

  Apud qu••s vis imperii valet, inania transmit∣••untur. Tac. 15. ann.
• 72 1.219

  Validus alioqui spernendis Honoribus. Tac. 4. ann▪
• 73 1.220

  Nomen Patris Patriae Tiberi•••• à popul•• saepius ingestum, repudi•• vit. Tac. 1. ann.
• 74 1.221

  C••ncta mortalium incerta, quantoque plus ad••••∣tus sere••, tant•• se magis in lubrico dictitans. Tac. 1. ann.
• 1 1.222

  Nec enim in melius verti, nec diu sistere valent, reliquum est, ••t 〈◊〉〈◊〉 deterius dilabantur. Hippoc.
• 2 1.223

  Qui causam esse tradit, quod nihil perpetuò maneat▪ sed omnia motu qu••dam orbicular: mutentur. Arist. 5. Pol.
• 3 1.224

  Naturales esse convers••∣••••es Rerumpub. Cic. lib. 2. de nar. Deor.
• 4 1.225

  Regum majestatem dissi∣••ilius à summo fastigio ad medium detra••i, quam a mediis ad ima prae∣••ipitari. Livius.
• 5 1.226

  Fati maligna, perpetua{que} in ommbus rebus Lex est, ••t ad summum perducta, rursus ad infimum velocius quidem quam ascen∣••erunt, relabantur. Seneca.
• 6 1.227

  Ego ita comperi omma Regna Civit••tes▪ Nationes{que} usque eo prosp•••• imperium habu••sse, dum apud eos vera consilia valuerunt; ubicun{que} Gr•••• Timor Voluptas ••a corrupt••re, post paulo imm••nut•• opes, deinde 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in perium, postremè servitus imposita est. Sallust.
• 7 1.228

  Numb. 33. 5.
• 8 1.229

  Honor quoque quant•••• valeat, & quomodo sit causa seditionis 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est Arist. 5. Pol. c. 3.
• 9 1.230

  Et multae conspirationes, & invasio∣••s in Monarchas propter pudendas contumelias, in corpus illatas fact•• sunt. Arist. 5. Pol. l. 10.
• 10 1.231

  Prop••er contemp••um etiam seditiones conspira∣t••••••qu•• f••••n•• A••••st. 5. Pol. c. 3.
• * 1.232

  L. 14. tit. 3. lib. 2. recop.
• 11 1.233

  Non multitudo qu••dem gravit•• fert inaequalitatem patrimoniorum, praestantes autem honorum inaequalita∣tem. Arist. lib. 2. Po••. c. 5.
• 12 1.234

  Nam homines tum quod ipsi inhonorati fiunt inovent seditiones, tum quod alios videant in honore. Arist. 5. Pol. 3.
• 13 1.235

  Gen. 12. 17.
• 14 1.236

  2 Sam. 12. 10.
• 15 1.237

  Cum enim multitudo in••∣pum est in civitate, eadem{que} ab honoribus exclusa, necesse est eam civita∣tem plenam hostium Reipub Arist. lib. 3. Pol. c. 7.
• 16 1.238

  Honori incumbit, tam ignarus quam bonus. Arist. 2. Pol. 5.
• * 1.239

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 17 1.240

  Insuper seditiones oriuntur, non solum ob pa∣trimoniorum, verum etiam ob honorum inaequalitatem. Arist. lib. 2. Pol. 5.
• 18 1.241

  Sed illud primum omnium dubitar•• non potest, quin cognitis iis quae Reipub interitum important, ea quo{que} quae salutem afferunt, intelligantur. Arist. lib. 5. pol. cap. 8.
• 19 1.242

  〈…〉〈…〉 diora sunt remedia quam mala. Tac. in vit. Agr.
• 20 1.243

  Ezek. 1. 24.
• 21 1.244

  Attamen quantum sine bello dabatur, revocare priscum morem, exercitare Legiones cura provisus agere, p••rinde acsi hostis ingrueret. Tac. 12. ann.
• 22 1.245

  Aliae ••yrannides ex Regibus, qui moribus institutis{que} majorum violatis, imperia magis concupierunt. Arist. Pol. 5. cap. 10.
• 23 1.246

  Nam si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 volentibus imperet, protinus desinit ••sse Reg••um. Arist. 5. Pol. cap. 10.
• 24 1.247

  Omnium consensu c••pax imperii, ••isi imperasset. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 25 1.248

  Jerem. 1. 16.
• 26 1.249

  Illud clarum te••tatum{que} exemplis est, quod homines felicitatem as∣sequantur be••ignitate in alios, & bona de se opinione, iidem cum adepti, qu••e voluerant, ad injurias & impotenti••n in imperiis dilabuntur, fit me∣ritissimo, ut una cum imperantium mutatione, ••psi sub••iti se & affectus mutent Polyb.
• 27 1.250

  Qui occuparunt imperia, eo••um pleri{que} eadem retinu••∣runt, qui vero tradita ab aliis accepere, hi statim fer•• omnes amiserunt. Arist. 5. Pol. 9.
• 28 1.251

  Eccles. 1. 8.
• 29 1.252

  Conservantur etiam Respub. non solum, qui•• procu•• sunt ab iis, ••uae interitum aff••runt, sed etiam, quia prope sunt, nam Timor intentiore cur•• R••i••ab, consul••re c••gis. Arist. 5. pol. cap. 8.
• 30 1.253

  Ibid.
• * 1.254

  L. 13. tit. 5. p. 2.
• † 1.255

  Ma••••.
• 1 1.256

  1 Kings 2. 24.
• 2 1.257

  Neque nervum intendit, neque remittit ultra modum, nè harmi••••iae consensum laedat. Chrysost.
• 1 1.258

  Tu vero, inquit, siquid in te artis est, it a compone do••num meam, ut quicquid again, ab omnibus perspici possit. Vell. Pat lib. 2.
• 2 1.259

  Judith. 2. 2.
• 3 1.260

  Taciturnitas optimum atque tutissimum rerum administran∣darum Vinculum Val. Max. l. 2. c. 2.
• 4 1.261

  Micah. 7. 5.
• 5 1.262

  Quod Maxi∣mum uxori Martlae aperuisse, illam Liviae. Tac. 1. ann.
• 6 1.263

  Nihil ex iis Caesari incognitum; consilia, locos, prompta multa noverat, astus{que} hostium in perniciem ipsis vertebat. Tac. 2. ann.
• 7 1.264

  Ni arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ne ministeri•• militum vulgarentur. Tac. 1. ann.
• 8 1.265

  Jud. 16. ••
• 9 1.266

  Ibid.
• 10 1.267

  Prov. 20. 5.
• 11 1.268

  Ma∣jor è longinquis reverentia. Tac. 1. ann.
• 12 1.269

  Exod. 19. 6.
• 13 1.270

  Exod 19. 12.
• * 1.271

  L. 4. tit. 3. lib. 1. Re••op.
• 14 1.272

  N•• ali••ni Regni, quod non convenit, scrutentur arcana. L. M••rcato••es C de Commer.
• 15 1.273

  Tib••rio{que} etiam in rebus, quas non occuleret, seu natura, sive ad∣suetudine suspensa semper, obscur•• semper: tunc vero nitenti ut sensus suos abderet Tac. 1. ann.
• 16 1.274

  Luk. 8. 51.
• 17 1.275

  Si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci quam tacere. Tac. in vit. Agric.
• 18 1.276

  Psal. 54. 16.
• 19 1.277

  At Agrippinae is Pavor, ea consternatio mentis▪ quamvis vultu premeretur emi∣••uit. Tac. 13. ann.
• 20 1.278

  Anne omnium oculis vultum eorum scrutantibus salli inteliigerentur. Tac. 3. ann.
• 21 1.279

  Atque ipse moestus & magnae co∣gitationis manisestus erat, quamvis laetitiam vagis sermonibus simularet. Tac. 1••. ann.
• 22 1.280

  Octavia quo{que} quamvis rudibus annis omnes affectus abscondere di∣dicerat. Tac. 13. ann.
• 23 1.281

  Factus Natura, & consuetudine exercitu••, ve∣l••re odium fallacibus blanditiis. Tac. 14. ann.
• 24 1.282

  Eccles. 22. 24.
• 25 1.283

  Agrippinae quo{que} proximi inliciebantur pravis sermonibus tumidos Spiritus perstimulare. Tac. 4. ann.
• 26 1.284

  Audita haec raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuit correptam{que} Graeco versu admonuit, ideo laedi quia non regna∣ret. Tac. 4. ann.
• 27 1.285

  Postea cognitum est ad introspiciendas etiam procerum v••luntates, inductam dubita••ionem. Tac. 1. ann.
• 28 1.286

  Tac. 4. ann.
• 29 1.287

  Crebris interrogationibus exquirit, qualem Piso diem supre•••••• Noctem{que} exegisset, at{que} illo plera{que} sapientèr, quaedam inconsultius resp••••∣dente. Tac. 3. ann.
• 30 1.288

  Perculsus improvisa interrogatione paululum re∣ticuit. Tac. 1. ann.
• 31 1.289

  Etenim Vultu offensionem conjectaverat. Ibid.
• 32 1.290

  Non temperante Tiberio quin premeret voce; Vultu, ••ò quod ipse ••re∣berrimè interrogabat: neque▪ refellere aut eludere dabatur; ac saepe eti∣am confitendum erat nè frustra quesivisset. Tac. 3. ann.
• 33 1.291

  Crebr•• ip∣sius sermne fact•• fides. Tac. 15. ann.
• 34 1.292

  Tac. 4. ann.
• * 1.293

  Ld. Roscom. Hor. Art Poet.
• 1 1.294

  Nec enim ad hanc forman caetera erant. Tac. 1. ann.
• * 1.295

  Tass. cant. 1.
• 2 1.296

  Mihi prora & puppis, ut Gr••ecorum proverbium est, fuit à me tui dimittendi ut rationes meas explicares; Prora itaque & Pupp•• summam consilii nostri significamus; propterea quod à prora & puppi, tan∣quam à capite, & calce pendeat totan••vis. Cicero.
• 3 1.297

  Acribus ut ferme tali•• initiis, incuri••so fine. Tac. 1. ann.
• 4 1.298

  Om∣nes qui Magnarum rerum consilia suscipiunt, astimare debent, an quod inchoatur Reip. utile, ipsis glorios••m. aut pr••mptum effectu, aut certè non ••rduum sit, simul ipse qui ••uadet considerandus est adjiciatne consilio peri∣culum suum: Et si fortuna coeptis fuerit cu•• s••mmum decus acquiratur. Tac. 2. Hist.
• 5 1.299

  Nam saepe honest••s rerum causas, ni judicium adhibeas, pernic•••••• exitus c••nsequuntur. Tac. 1. Hist
• 6 1.300

  Projectus in limine portae, misera∣tione demum, quia per corpus Legati eundum erat, clausit viam. Tac. 2. an.
• * 1.301

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 7 1.302

  Eccles. 22. 24.
• 1 1.303

  Dan. 7. 9.
• 2 1.304

  Priusquam incipias, censulito, & ubi cons••lueris mature facto opus ••st: ita utrumque per se indigens alter al••••••ius auxilio viget. Sallust.
• 3 1.305

  Nullus cun••••ationi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est in eo co••••••lie, quod non p••test laudari, nisi peractum, Tac. 1. Hist
• 4 1.306

  Barbaris 〈…〉〈…〉; statim exe∣qui regium videtur▪ Tac. 6 ann.
• 5 1.307

  Quo plus virium ac roboris, è fiducia tarditas inerat, Tac. 2. Hist
• 6 1.308

  Et motus temporum obtinuit, ut quod segnities erat, sapienti•• voca••etur. Tac. 1. Hist
• 7 1.309

  Agendo, audendoque res Romana crevit, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hic signibus consiliis, quae timidi ••••uta voc••nt. Tit. Liv.
• 8 1.310

  Potenti•••• cautis, quam acrioribus consiliis tutius haberi. Tac. 11. ann.
• 9 1.311

  Eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, si Paeto aut in suis, ••ut in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 consiliis constantia fuisset. Tac. 15. ann.
• 10 1.312

  Vir ea ratione fiet 〈◊〉〈◊〉: si in deliberando quidem cunctetur, & praetim••••t quicquid potest 〈◊〉〈◊〉, in agendo autem ••••nfidat. Herod.
• 1 1.313

  In principio enim peccatur; principium autem dicitur dimidium t••tius, itaque parvum in Principio erratum correspondens est ad alias partes. Arist. pol. lib. 2. cap. 4.
• 2 1.314

  Cum fieri non possit, ut si in primo, atque principio peccatum fu••rit, non ad extremum malum aliquod evadat. Arist. pol. 5. cap. 2.
• * 1.315

  Marian. Hist. Hisp. lib. 6. cap. 19.
• 3 1.316

  Ferox sce∣lerum, & quia prima provenerant, volutare secum, quonam modo Germa∣••i liberos perverteret. Tac. 4. ann.
• * 1.317

  Claud.
• † 1.318

  Seneca.
• 4 1.319

  Usu probatum est P. C. leges egregias, ••••••∣pta honesta, apud bonos ex delictis aliorum gigni, Tac. 15. ann.
• 5 1.320

  Gen. 6. 6.
• 6 1.321

  Instruunt Patriarch••, non solum docentes, sed eti∣am errantes. A••b lib. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de A••••. C. 6.
• 7 1.322

  Non d••bet reprehensibile judicari, si secundam varietatem temporum, Statu••a qundoque varientur humana, p••s••••t••m cam urg••ns N••••••ssitas, vel evidens utilitas id exposuit. Cap. non deber de Cons. & A••••.
• 8 1.323

  Hest. 16. 9.
• 1 1.324

  Literas ad usum saltem discebant, reliqua omnis disciplina erat, ut pulchrè parerent, ut labores perferrent, ut in pugna vincerent. Plutar.
• 2 1.325

  Patres valere decet consilio, populo supervacanea calliditas est. Sallust.
• 3 1.326

  Ne nimia Religionum diversitas grav••m in Ecclesia Dei confusio∣nem i••ducat firmiter prohibemus, nequis de c••ter•• novam Religionem in∣ven••at, &c. Conc. Later.
• 4 1.327

  Ostendite populo Romano Divi Augusti neptem, eandemque conjuge•••• meam, numerate sex liberos. Tac 2. ann.
• 5 1.328

  Nulli ante Romanoru•••• ejusdem fastigii viro g••••inam stirpem editam. Tac. 2. ann.
• 6 1.329

  Cum ampliari imperium ••ominum add••••••iion•• potiùs, quam pecuniarum copi•• malim.
• 7 1.330

  Prov. 14. 28.
• 8 1.331

  Ne clarissima familia extingueretur. Tac. 2. ann.
• 9 1.332

  Dotem no•• uxor marito, sed uxori maritus affert. Tac. de Mor. Germ.
• 10 1.333

  Sta∣tuit virgines sine dote nubere: jussit uxores eligerentur, non pecunia. Trog. lib. 3.
• 11 1.334

  Quare qui inquilinos & advenas antehac in Civi∣tatem receperunt, ••i magna ex parte seditionibus jactati sunt. Arist. ••. 5. pol. c. 3▪
• 12 1.335

  2 Kings 24. 16.
• 13 1.336

  Fuit proprium Pop. Rom. longe à dom•• bellare, & propugnaculum imperii sociorum fortunas, ••on sua tecta defen∣dere. Cic. pro leg. Man.
• 14 1.337

  Dei••d•• neque dum Annibal in Italia mo∣raretur, nec proximis post excessum ejus annis vacavit Romanis Colonias ••••ndere, cum esset in bello conquirendus potius miles, & post bellum vires ref••ve••dae, potius quam spergendae, Vell. lib 1.
• 15 1.338

  In legibus Gracch•• inter perniciosissima num••raverim, quod extra Italiam Coloni••s posuit, Vell. lib. ••.
• 16 1.339

  Invenim•••• enim quia populatim Provinci•• suis habitatoribus spo∣lr••••••••: Magno vero haec nostra civitas populos•• est, turbis diversor•••••• h••minum, & maxima Agricolarum suas civitates & culturas relinquen∣tiam, Auth de Quaest.
• 17 1.340

  Iniquum est enim ut de una substantia, qu••∣bus competit. aequa successio. alii abundantèr affuant, alii paupert ati•• r••∣comm••d•• ••••gemiscunt Cass. lib. 1. Epist 7.
• 18 1.341

  Commodum est etiam, 〈…〉〈…〉 donati••••e sed jure cognitionis tradantur, Arist l. 5. pol. 8
• 19 1.342

  Exod. 36. 5••.
• 20 1.343

  Exod. 36. 6.
• 21 1.344

  Exod. 35. 29.
• 1 1.345

  Jerem. 23.
• * 1.346

  L. 19. ti••. 2. p. 3.
• 2 1.347

  Alitèr utimur propriis. alitèr commodatis Quint. de Orat.
• 3 1.348

  Ezek. 34. 2.
• 4 1.349

  John 10. 12.
• 5 1.350

  Principes mortales, Rempub. aeternam esse, Tac. 3. ann.
• * 1.351

  Lib. 15. tit. 5. p. 2.
• 6 1.352

  Neque quies gentium sine armis neque arma sine stipendiis, neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt, Tac. 4. Hist.
• 7 1.353

  Diss••lution••m Imperii docendo, si fructus quibus Resp. sustinetur 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Tac. 13. ann.
• † 1.354

  Mar. Hist. Hisp. lib. 9. cap. 8.
• 8 1.355

  Tibi summum rerum judicium dii dedere: nobis obs••quii gl••∣••ia relict•• est, Tac. 6. ann.
• 9 1.356

  2 Sam. 8. 1. Vide.
• * 1.357

  Ut nec incauta exactio populos gravet, nec indiscreta r••missio sta∣tum gentis fociat deperire, Concil. Tol xiii.
• 10 1.358

  2 Sam. 23. 17.
• 11 1.359

  Ferocissimo quoque adsumpto, aut quibus ob egestatem, ac metum ex Flagitiis maxima peccandi necessitudo, Tac. 3. ann
• 12 1.360

  1 Sam. 22. 2.
• 13 1.361

  Gen. 47. 25.
• 14 1.362

  Necissitate arm••rum excusorta, etiam in pace mau••er••, Tac. 2. ann.
• 15 1.363

  Plerumque accidit, ut quae provinciae pecuniae parcendo, ••∣mota pericula contemnunt incumbentibus demum malis, desperat•• s••∣pe remedio graviora sentiant detrim••nta, Paul. Jov.
• 16 1.364

  Isa. 3 12. Vid.
• 17 1.365

  Portus nostros navis veniens non pa∣veseat, ut certum nautis possit esse naufragium, si manus non incur∣rere••t exigentium: quos frequenter plus affligunt damna, quam solent naufragia, Cassiod. lib. 4. Ep. 19.
• 18 1.366

  Ne Provinciae nobis oneribus turbarentur, utque vetera sin•• a varitia, ••ut crudelitate Magistratuum tolerarent, Tac. lib. 4. ann.
• 1 1.367

  Ezek. 27. 3.
• 2 1.368

  Ibid.
• 3 1.369

  Ibid. ver. 10.
• 4 1.370

  Ibid. ver. 12.
• 5 1.371

  Ibid. ver. 25.
• 6 1.372

  Ezek. 28. 5.
• 7 1.373

  Quid? lapidum causa pecuniae nostra •• hostiles gentes transferuntur. Tac. 3. Annal.
• 8 1.374

  1 King. 10. 22.
• 9 1.375

  Psalm 71. 8.
• 10 1.376

  Isai. 49. 12
• 11 1.377

  Prov. 31. 14.
• 12 1.378

  Isai. 49. 21.
• 1 1.379

  2 King. 20. 13.
• 2 1.380

  Ibid. ver. 17.
• 3 1.381

  Sed nihil aqu•• fatigabat, quam pecuniarum conquisitio; eos esse belli civilis nervos dicti∣tans, Tac. 2. Hist.
• 4 1.382

  Melius publicas opes à privatis haberi, quam intra unum claustrum asservari. Eutrop.
• 5 1.383

  Penes quos Aurum, & opes praecipuae bellorum causae. Tacit. 6. Hist.
• 6 1.384

  Male e••iam circa pecunias publicas consti∣tutum est apud ill••s, quia neque in publi••o habent quicquam, & magna bella gerere coacti, pecunias agre con••erunt. Arist. l. 2. c. 6. Pol.
• 7 1.385

  Privato usui bonum publicum postponitur. Tac. 6. Annal.
• * 1.386

  St. August. lib. 5. de Civ. Dei, cap. 12.
• † 1.387

  Lib. 2. Ode 15.
• 8 1.388

  Prov. 21. 14.
• * 1.389

  Dryden's Virgil.
• 9 1.390

  Maxima pars hominum è terra vivit & fructibus. Aristor. Polit. lib. 1. c. 5.
• 10 1.391

  Et divitiarum expectatio inter causas paupertatis publicae erat. Tac. 16. Annal.
• 11 1.392

  At hercule nemo refert, quod Italia extern••e opis indiget; quòd vita populi Romani per incerta maris & tempestatum quotidie vivitur. Tac. 3. Annal.
• * 1.393

  Tasso.
• 12 1.394

  S••epe enim de facultatibus suis amplius quam in his est, sperant homines. Justin. Instit. quibus ex causis man. § in fraudem.
• 13 1.395

  Vires luxu corrumpebantur, contra veterem disciplinam, & insti∣tuta majorum, apud quos virtute, quam pecunia res Rom. melius stetit. Tac. 2. Hist.
• 14 1.396

  Vt ratio quaestuum, & necessitas erogationum inter se congruerent. Tac. 13. Annal.
• 15 1.397

  Baruch 6. 9.
• 16 1.398

  A domesticis volumus inchoare disciplinam, ut reliquos pudea•• errare, quando nostris cognoscimur excedendi licentiam non praebere. Cas. lib. 10. ep. 5.
• 17 1.399

  Da operam ut impensae t••ae mo∣derat•• sint, & rationi consentaneae. Bell. in Vit. S. Lud.
• 18 1.400

  Multa scribo non tam ut saeculo meo prosim, cujus jam despera•••• miseria est, quàm ut meipsum conceptis exonerem, & animum script•••• soler. Petrarch.
• * 1.401

  Lucan.
• 1 1.402

  Exod. 4. 15.
• 2 1.403

  Vnum esse Reip. Corpus atque unius animo re∣gendum. Tac. 3. Annal.
• 3 1.404

  Quanquam arduum sit, eodem loci potenti•••••• & concordiam esse. Tac. 4. Annal.
• * 1.405

  Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 15. c. 12.
• * 1.406

  Mat. Hist. Hisp. l. 9. c. 1.
• † 1.407

  Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 9. c. 8.
• * 1.408

  Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 15. c. 19.
• 4 1.409

  2 Chron. 21. 3.
• 5 1.410

  Minori discrimine sumi principem quàm quaeri. Tac. 1. Hist.
• * 1.411

  Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 28. 11.
• 1 1.412

  Gen. 3. 19.
• 2 1.413

  Prov. 6. 6.
• 3 1.414

  Non gaudent Martyres, quando exillis pecuniis honorantur, in quibus pauperes plorant. St. Chrysoft sup. Matth.
• 4 1.415

  Oportere dividi sacros & negotiosos dies, quibus divi••a colerentur, & humana non impedirent. Tac. 13. Annal.
• 1 1.416

  Nostram omnem vitam, in remissionem atque studium esse divis••••▪ Plat. de lib. Educat.
• 2 1.417

  Otium enim tum ad virtutes generandas, 〈…〉〈…〉 civilia munera obeunda requiru••••tur. Arist. Pol. l. 7. c. 9.
• 3 1.418

  Nascitur ex assiduitate laborum animorum hebetatio quaedam, & l••nguor. Senec. de Tranquil. Anim.
• 4 1.419

  Cum inter suos convivaretur, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Vlpianum, aut doctos homines adhibebat, ut habere fabulas literatas, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 se recreari dicebat & pasci. Lamp. in Vit. Alex. Sev.
• 5 1.420

  Co••∣ceius Nerva, cui legum peritia: eques Romanus, praeter Sejanum, & illustribus Curtius Atticus; ••aeteri liberalibus artibus praediti fer•••• Graeci, quorum sermonibus levaretur. Tac. 4. Annal.
• 6 1.421

  Accitis in convivium peritis ad risum commovendum hominibus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 omnium non risisse, post autem inducta simia in risum solutum, dixisse, Na∣tura id Animal ridiculum, hominem autem arte, & studio eoque pa•••••• honesto. Athen. l. 4.
• 7 1.422

  Satis Onerum Principibus, satis etiam potentiae. Tac. 3. Annal.
• 8 1.423

  Impera, ut liberos cit••aram pulsare, psallere, cauponari doceant, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 comperies, O Rex, viros in mulieres degenerasse, nihilque metuendum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 rebelles •• te unquam desciscant. Herod. lib. 40
• 9 1.424

  Idque apud 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ritos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset. Tac. in Vit. Agr.
• 10 1.425

  Instituta cultumque patrium resumite, abruptis voluptatibus qui•••• Romani plus adversus subjectos, quam armis valent. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 11 1.426

  Item vivere ut quisque velit permissio, quoniam sic magna erit tali Reip. faventium multitudo, ••••am vulgo dissoluta gratior est quam temperata vita. Arist. 6. Pol. 4.
• 1 1.427

  Ex parvis orta seditione de rebus magnis dissidetur. Arist. l. 5. Pol. cap. 4
• 2 1.428

  Primis eventibus metum ac fiduciam gigni. Tac. l. 12. Annal.
• 3 1.429

  Vi ne militum servum suum coërceret, an inanem credulitatem tempore ipso vanescere sinere••, modò nihil spernendum, modò omnia metuend••, ambi∣guus pudoris a•• metus reputabat. Tac. 2. Annal.
• 4 1.430

  Initia bellorum civilium fortunae permittenda, victoriam consiliis & ratione perfici. Tac. •• Hist.
• 5 1.431

  Vtendum inclinatione e•• Caesar, & quae casus obtulerat, in sapientiam vertenda ratus. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 6 1.432

  Nihil in vulgo modicum: terrere ni paveant, ubi pertimuerint impunè contemni. Tac. 1. Annal.
• * 1.433

  Lucan.
• † 1.434

  Virg. in Georg.
• 7 1.435

  Tyronem à ve••erano, Legionem à Legione dissociant. Ta••. 1. Annal.
• 8 1.436

  Longis spatiis discreti exercitus, quod saluberrimum est ad ••ontinendam ••ilitarem fidem, ne vitiis nec viribus mis••ebantur. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 9 1.437

  Quod in seditionibus accidit, unde plures ••rant, omnes fuere. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 10 1.438

  Dux ad solvendam militum conspirationem alterum in alterum con∣citat. S. Chrysost.
• 11 1.439

  Remedium tumultus fuit alius tumultus. Tac. 2. Hist.
• 12 1.440

  Divus Augustus vultu & aspectu Actiacas Legione•• exterruit. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 13 1.441

  Illi quoties oculos ad multitudinem retulerant vocibus trucul•••••• ••••repere, rursum viso caesare trepidare. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 14 1.442

  Res••st••••••••esque Germanico & Druso, posse à se mitigari, vel infringi: quod aliud s••••∣sidium si Imperatorem sprevissent? Tac. 1. Annal.
• 15 1.443

  Habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum exemplum, quod contra 〈◊〉〈◊〉 utilitate publica rependitur. Tac. 14. Annal.
• 16 1.444

  Gaudebat cae∣••••••••s miles, tanquam semet absolvere••. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 17 1.445

  Nihil ••••••ci Patientia, nisi ut graviora, tanquam ex facil tolerantibus imperen∣••••••. Tac. in Vit. Agr.
• 18 1.446

  Et Flaccus multa concedendo, nihil aliud 〈◊〉〈◊〉, qu••m ut acrius exposc••rent, quae sci••bant negaturum. Tac. 4. Annal.
• 19 1.447

  Superior exercitus Legatum Hordenium Flaccum spernebat. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 20 1.448

  Nec Caesar ar••ebat, quando nihil ipsius jussu, penes ••osd•••• saevitia facti & invidia ••rat. Tac 1. Annal.
• 21 1.449

  Fit temerit•••••••• alienae comes Spurinna, primo coactus, mox velle simulans, quo plus aucto••itat•••• inesse•• consiliis, si seditio mitescere••. Tac. 2. Hist.
• 22 1.450

  Neque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 glis••entis discordiae remedium, quàm si unus alt••••ve maximè prompti subver∣terent••r. Tac. 4. Annal.
• 23 1.451

  Nihil ausuram plebem principibus amot••••. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 24 1.452

  Nam Periander caduceatori, per quem Thrasybulus consilium ejus exquirebat, nihil respondisse fertur, sed s••icis eminentibus sublatis segetem ad••quasse. Arist. Pol. 3. c. 9.
• 25 1.453

  E•• oratio ad perstringendos mulcen∣dosque militum animos, severitatis modus (neque enim in plures quàm in duos animadverti jusserat) gratè accepta, compositique ad praesens, qui coer∣ceri non poterant. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 26 1.454

  Et dum mali pavent, optimu•• ••••isque jussis paruere. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 27 1.455

  Haud peri••de Germanos vul∣••era, luctus, excidia, quàm ea species dolore & ira adfecit. Tacit. 2. Annal.
• 28 1.456

  Iulius igitur Civilis periculo exemptus praepotens inter Bata••••s, ne supplicio ejus ferox gens alienaretur. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 29 1.457

  Quo minor spes veniae, cresceret vinculum sceleris, Tac. 4. Hist.
• 30 1.458

  Tac. 4. Hist.
• 31 1.459

  Sed vires ad coercendum deerant, in frequentibus infidisque Legio∣nibus, &c. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 32 1.460

  Nihil spei, nisi per discordias habeant. Tac. 11. Annal.
• 33 1.461

  Nihil in discordiis civilibus festinatione tuti••s, ••••i facto magìs, quam con••ulto opus est. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 34 1.462

  Pergit properus & pra••veniens inimico••um actus, amicorum ••••••••i∣te••tiam. Tac. 6. Annal.
• 35 1.463

  Paul. ad Gal. 5. 15.
• 36 1.464

  Quippe i•• turbis & discordiis pessimo cuique plurima vis. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 37 1.465

  Civi∣libus bellis plus militibus quam ducibus licere. Tac. 2. Hist.
• 1 1.466

  Vn•• ac ca vetus causa bellandi, profunda libido imperii, & d••••••∣tiarum. Sal. in Cons. Catil.
• 2 1.467

  Iam. 4. 1.
• 3 1.468

  1 Chron. 22. 8.
• 4 1.469

  2 Sam. 11. 25.
• 5 1.470

  Video serrum ex iisdem tenebris esse prolatum, quibus A••rum & Ar∣gentum, ne aut instrumentum in caedes mutuas deesset, aut Pretium. Senec.
• 6 1.471

  Nam cum duo sint genera disceptandi, unum per disceptationem, alter•••• per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc belluarum, confugiendum e•••• ad posterius, si ••ti non licet superiori. Cicero.
• * 1.472

  L. 2. tt. 23. p. 2.
• 7 1.473

  Castrensis jurisdictio secura, & obtusior, & plura manu agens, calli∣ditatem fori non exerceat. Tac. in Vit. Agric.
• 8 1.474

  Sumi Bellum etiam ab ignavis, tenu••ssimi cujusque Periculum geri. Tac. 4. Annal.
• 9 1.475

  Pa••em habere debet Voluntas, Bell••m Necessi••••s. De August. Epist. 207. Tom. 2.
• 10 1.476

  Tac. 15. Annal.
• 1 1.477

  For they have sown the Wind, and reap'd the Whirlwind. H••sea 8. 7.
• 3 1.478

  Isai. 23. 11.
• 4 1.479

  Ezek. 32. 2.
• 5 1.480

  Ier. 4. 13.
• 6 1.481

  Ier. 8. 16.
• 7 1.482

  4. 13.
• 8 1.483

  Ier. 8. 16.
• 9 1.484

  Isai. 14. 16.
• 10 1.485

  Isai. 10. 5.
• 11 1.486

  Exod. 7. 1.
• 12 1.487

  Data est Moysi authoritas, & potest••••, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vel••t Deus Pharaontem ••erreret, puniret. Hil. l. 7. de Trin.
• 13 1.488

  2 Mac. 15. 8.
• 14 1.489

  Isai. 19. 3.
• 15 1.490

  Ibid.
• 16 1.491

  Ezek. 29. 10.
• 17 1.492

  Pro••. 26. 27.
• 18 1.493

  Sapientibus quietis & Reip. curae: levissimus quisque, & futuri im∣p••ovidus spe vana tumens. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 19 1.494

  Perniciem aliis, ac postremum sibi invenere. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 20 1.495

  Vt cuique erat, criminando, quod facillimum factu est, prav••s & callidus, bonos & modestos anteibat. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 21 1.496

  Praefectur•••• vigilum, & praetorii, & alia praemia virtutum velocius vitiis adeptus. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 22 1.497

  Inter stupra concubinarum, & oscula, & deforme•• mores, sectis novacula faeucibus, infamem vitam foedavit, etiam exi••u se•••• & inhonesto. Tac. 1. Hist.
• 1 1.498

  And the Sons of Aaron the Priest shall blow with the Trum∣pets, and they shall be for an Ordinance for ever to you, throughout your Generations. Numb. 10. 8.
• 2 1.499

  In turb••s & discordi••s pess••mo cuique plurima vis. Tac. 4. Hist.
• * 1.500

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 1 1.501

  Discesser••ntque opertis Odiis. Tac. 2. An••al.
• * 1.502

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 1 1.503

  Isai. 13. 22.
• 2 1.504

  Prov. 29. 5.
• 3 1.505

  Peractis tritsitia imitamentis. Tac. 13. Annal.
• 4 1.506

  Periisse Ger∣manicum nulli jact antius moerent, quam qui maxime laetantur. Tac. 2. Annal.
• * 1.507

  May's Version of Lucan.
• 5 1.508

  Prov. 27. 6.
• 6 1.509

  Psal. 54. 22.
• 7 1.510

  Nec ideo sincerae charitatis fidem adsecutus, amoliri juvenem specie ho∣••oris statuit, struxitque caus••s, aut fortè oblatas a••ripuit. Tac. 2. Annal.
• 8 1.511

  Tum Agrippina ver••is Artibus, per blandimenta juvenem aggredi, suum potiùs cubiculum ac sinum offerre contegendis, quae prima aetas, & summa fortuna expeterent. Tac. 14. Annal.
• 9 1.512

  Quae muta••i•• nequ•• Ner••nem fefellit, & proximi amicorum metuebant, orabantque caver•• in••idis mulior is semper ••trocis, tum & falsae. Tac. 13. Annal.
• 10 1.513

  Vt Imperium evertant Libertatem praeferunt: si impetraverint ipsam aggredientur. Tac. 16. Annal.
• 11 1.514

  Caeterum libertas, & speciosa nomina praetexuntur, nec quisquam alienum servitium & dominationem sibi concupivit, ut non eadem ista vocabula usurparet. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 12 1.515

  Spe∣ciosa verbis, re inania au•• subdola: quantaque majore libertatis imagine ••egebantur, tanto eruptura ad infensius servitium. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 13 1.516

  Ne cont••••aciam cum pernicie, quam obsequium cum securitate m••∣litis. Tac. 4. Hist▪
• 14 1.517

  Dilecta ex his, & constituta Reipub. forma laudari facilius quam evenire, vel si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest. Tac. 4. Annal.
• 15 1.518

  An Neronem extremum Dominorum putatis? idem crediderunt, qui Tiberio, qui Caio superstites fuerunt: cum interim instabilior & saevior exor∣tus est. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 16 1.519

  Ferenda Regum ingenia, neque usui crebraes mu∣tationes. Tac. 12. Annal.
• 17 1.520

  Vlteriora mirari, praesenti•• sequi, bonos Imperatores voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 18 1.521

  Ier. 27. 6.
• 19 1.522

  Quomodo sterilitatem, aut nimios imbres, & ••aetera Naturae mala, ita Luxuriam vel avaritiam dominantium tolerare. Tac. 4. Hist.
• 20 1.523

  Vi••ia erunt, donec Homines. Ibid.
• 21 1.524

  Sed neque haec continua; & meliorum interventu pensantur. Ibid.
• * 1.525

  Si me non vide••s esse negabis avem. Mar••.
• 1 1.526

  Inter aves Ingenio, Sa••••citateque praestat, quod grandi sit c••pite, atque in India coelo sincero 〈◊〉〈◊〉, undè didicit non solum loqui, sed etiam meditari, meditatur ob st••dium Gloriae. ••ardan.
• 2 1.527

  Cum justè Bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis, aut ex Insidiis, nihil ad Iustitiam interest. D. Aug.
• 3 1.528

  Dolus an Virtus quis in Hoste requirat. Virg.
• 4 1.529

  Receive a stranger into thine house, and he will disturb thee, and turn thee out of thine own. Eccles. 11. 34.
• 5 1.530

  Ignarus militiae, improvidus con••ilii, quis ordo Agminis, quae cura explorandi, quantus ur∣gendo, trahendove Bello modus. Tac. Hist. l. 3.
• 6 1.531

  And Joshua sent out two men to spy secretly. Ios. 2. 1.
• 7 1.532

  And the Angel of God which went before the camp of Israel, remov'd and went behind them; and the pillar of the cloud went from before their face, and stood be∣hind them. Exod. 14. 19.
• 8 1.533

  Send thou men, that they may search the Land of Canaan, which I give unto the Children of Israel. Numb. 13. 2.
• 1 1.534

  Timet, atque eum deficere omnia videntur, qui in ipso negotio ••••••∣silium capere cogitur. Jul. Caes.
• 2 1.535

  Res nostrae feruntur, imo vol∣vuntur; ergo consilium sub die nasci debet; & hoc quoque tardum est 〈◊〉〈◊〉, sub manu, quod aiunt nascatur. Seneca.
• 3 1.536

  Omnia non properanti clara certaque sunt, festinatio improvida est & 〈◊〉〈◊〉Livy.
• 4 1.537

  Scelera impetu, bona consilia morâ valescere solent. ••ac. l. 1. Hist.
• 5 1.538

  Festinare quodvis negotium gignit errores, ••nde 〈◊〉〈◊〉 detrimenta exoriri solent; at in cunctando bona insunt, quae si non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 talia videantur, in tempore bona quis esse reperiat. Herod.
• 6 1.539

  Ips•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cunctatione agendi tempora consultando consumpsit. Taci••.
• 7 1.540

  Sane Cerealis parum temporis ad exequenda imperia dabat, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 consiliis, sed eventu clarus. Tac. l. 5. Hist.
• 8 1.541

  Omnia inconsulti imp•••••• caepta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. Tac. 3. Hist.
• 9 1.542

  Duces pr••∣videndo, consultando, curctatione saepius, quam temerita••e prodesse. Idem Ibid.
• 10 1.543

  Iam castra in hostili loco moliebatur Corbulo, acceptis tamen à 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Imperatore literis, quibus se recipere jubebatur, re subita, quanquam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 simul offenderentur, metus ex Imperatore, contemptus ex Barbaris, 〈◊〉〈◊〉brium apud socios; nihil aliud prolocutus, quam ••eatos quos••am Duces 〈◊〉〈◊〉, fignum recep••ui dedit. Tac. l. 11. Annal.
• 11 1.544

  Iussa Principis magis, quam incerta belli metuens. Tac. l. 4. Annal.
• 1 1.545

  See the land what it is, and the People that dwell therein, whether they be strong or weak, few or many. Numb. 13. 18.
• 2 1.546

  Homines, qui frigida h••••, Europamque habitant, sunt illi quidem 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Arist. l. 7. Pol. c. 7.
• 3 1.547

  Graecorum autem genus, ut locorum medium tenet, sic ex utr••q•••• naturâ praeditum, quippe animo simul & intelligentia valet. Arist. l. 7. Pol. c. 7.
• 4 1.548

  Advenientes enim externos benignè hospitio excipiunt, adeo u•• aem••latione quadam invicem pro illorum honore certent: Quos advenae se∣qu••ntur, hos laudant aemicosque Deorum putant. Diod. Sicul. l. 6. c. 9.
• 5 1.549

  Plus ibi bonos Mores valere, quam alibi bonas Leges. Tac. de Mor. ••••••••••norum.
• 6 1.550

  Had the Author liv'd longer, or not wrote so soon, he would have been of another Opinion.
• 7 1.551

  Natura enim quoddam hominum genus proclive est ut imperio herili gubernetur, aliud ut regio, aliud ut civili, & horum imperium cujusque aliud est jus, & alia commodit••s. Arist. l. 3. Pol. c. 12.
• 8 1.552

  Isai. 6. 8.
• 1 1.553

  And King Solomon made two hundred targets of beaten gold, six hundred sheckl••s of beaten gold went to each target: And he made three hundred shields of beaten gold, and three hundred sheckles went to one shield. 2 Chron. 9. 15, 16.
• 2 1.554

  Hispanis militares E•••• sanguine ipsorum cariores erant. Trog
• 3 1.555

  Quibus quidem vehiculi•• 〈…〉〈…〉 & spectatae probitatis, aliàs uti non licuit. Alex. ab Alexan•• l. 8. c. 18.
• 4 1.556

  And the shield of his mighty men is made red Na••um 2. 3.
• 5 1.557

  Now when the sun shined upon the shields of gold and brass, the mountains glistered therewith, and shined like lamps of fire. Macchab. 6. 39.
• 6 1.558

  Psal. 44. 4.
• 7 1.559

  Vestibus nihil inter aequales ••••ellens, arma a••que equi inspiciebantur.
• 8 1.560

  Scuto Frameaque juvenes ••••abant. Haec apud illos toga, hic primus Iuventae honos, ante hoc Domus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 videbantur, mox Reipublicae. Tac. de Mor. Germ.
• 9 1.561

  Supellex pretiosa nihil aliud quam onus & impedimentum. Curt. l. 5.
• 10 1.562

  Vrbem Senatui, & Populo Romano, Templa Diis reddita, propri•• esse Militiae decus in Armis. Tac. l. 3. Hist.
• 11 1.563

  Ne terreat va•••• aspectus, & auri fulgor atque argenti, quod neque regit neque vulner••••. Tac. in Vit. Agric.
• * 1.564

  Tass. Can. 9.
• 12 1.565

  Quod tenaciores eorum i•• pretio essent metu damni. Sueton.
• 13 1.566

  Quidam luxuriosos apparatus conviviorum, & irritamenta libidinum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 instrumenta belli mercarentur. Tac. l. 1. Hist.
• 14 1.567

  Cui perfidiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉, infringere exercitûs virtutem inter artes erat. Tac. l. 2. Hist.
• 15 1.568

  Sed Corbuloni plus molis adversus ignaviam militum, quàm contra per∣••••iam hostium erat. Tac. l. 13. Annal.
• 16 1.569

  Degenerabat à labore ac virtute miles, assuetudine voluptatum & conviviorum. Tac. l. 2. Hist.
• 17 1.570

  Legiones operum & laboris ignar••••, popul••tionibus laetantes, veterem ad morem reduxit. Tac. l. 11. Annal.
• 18 1.571

  Veterani qui non stationem non vigilias inissent, vallum, fossamque quasi nova & mira viserent, sine galeis, sine loricis, nitidi, & quaestuo••••, militi•• per oppida expietâ. Tac. l. 13. Annal.
• 19 1.572

  ••pse cultu levi, capite intecto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse; laudem strenu••••, solatium invalidis, exemplum omnibus o••tendere. Ibid.
• 20 1.573

  Remediu•• severitate quae••i••um est. Nec enim ut in aliis exercitibus, primum alterumqu•• venia prosequebatur, sed qui signa reliq••erat, s••atim capite poenas luebat. Idque usu salubre, & misericordia melius apparuit. Quippe pauciores castr•• deseru••re, quam ea in quibus ignoscebatur. Ibid.
• * 1.574

  Tass. Can. 20.
• 21 1.575

  We will not pass through the fields nor through the vineyards, neither will we drink of the water of the wells. Numb. 20. 19.
• 22 1.576

  Disciplinam majorum Rempublicam tenet, quae si dilabatur, & nomen Romanum, & Imperium amissum iri. Alex. Sever. apud Lamprid.
• 23 1.577

  Paucos viros fortes natura procreat, bona institutione plures reddit industria. Veget.
• 24 1.578

  And the principal scribe of the army, who mustered the people of the land, &c. 2 King. 25. 9.
• 25 1.579

  Gen. 37. 36.
• 26 1.580

  Ierem. 39. 9.
• 27 1.581

  Centesimam rerum venalium post bella civilia institutam, de∣precante populo, edixit Tiberius militare ••rarium eo subsidio niti. Tacit. ••. 1. Annal.
• 28 1.582

  Ita enim & tutelae civitatis instructae murorum praesidio providebitur, & instaurandi agonis voluptas, confirmatis his, qua ad securitatis cautionem spectant, in secuti temporis circuitus circuitione repraesentabit. L. Unica C. de Expen. Publ. l. 11.
• 1 1.583

  Civitates magna ex parte bellum gerentes conservantur, caedem I••∣per••o potitae corrumpuntur. Aristot. l. 7. Polit. c. 14.
• 2 1.584

  Metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Salust.
• 3 1.585

  Whose arrows are sharp, and all their bows bent: their horses hoofs shall be counted like ••lints. Isai. 5. 28.
• 4 1.586

  Timens infirmis animis hostem securitatem, & tanquam pupilli•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 idoneum tutorem necessarium videns e••se terrorem. Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 5 1.587

  Nam pacem agentes, tanquam ferrum, splendorem amittunt. Arist. l. 7. Polit. c. 14.
• 6 1.588

  Vetus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 jam pridem in••ita mortalibus potentiae cupido, cum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 per••i magnitudine adolevit, erupitque. Nam rebus modicis, aequalitas fa•••••• habeb••tur, sed ubi subacto orbe, & aemulis Vrbibus Regibusque excisi•• s•• cu••as opes concupiscere vacuum fuit, prima inter Patres Plebemque 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mina exarsere. Arist. l. 7. Pol. c. 14.
• 7 1.589

  Decessu Romanorum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vacui externo metu gentis assuetudine, & tum aemulatione gloriae arma in se verterant. Tac. l. 2. Hist
• 8 1.590

  Pacem sine dubio post haec verum cruent••••. Tac. l. 1. Annal.
• 9 1.591

  Cherusci nimiam ac marcentem diu pacem illacessui nutrierunt, idque ju••undius quam tutius fuit. Tac. de Mor. Roman.
• 1 1.592

  Multa quae natura impedita erant, c••nsi••io expediebat. Livy, Dec. 2.
• 2 1.593

  Wisd. 6. 1.
• 3 1.594

  Eccl. 9 18.
• * 1.595

  A City of Spain, now call'd Morvedre.
• † 1.596

  Eurip.
• 4 1.597

  Se novies à Divo Augusto in Germaniam missum, plu••a consilio, qu•••• vi perfe••isse. Tacit. l. 6. Annal.
• 5 1.598

  Consiliis & astu, exter••as res ••••∣liend••s, arma procul habenda.
• 6 1.599

  Non omnia viribus superantur, non vela∣citate, non celeritate, sed corilio & sententia. C••cero. Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 7 1.600

  Pleraque in summa fortuna auspiciis & consiliis, magis quam ••elis & ••••nibus geri solent. Tac. 13 Annal.
• 1 1.601

  Neutralitas nec amicos pa••it, nec inimicos tollit. Polyb.
• 2 1.602

  Romanos 〈◊〉〈◊〉 socios habere oportuit, aut hostes, media via null•• est. Aristodem.
• 3 1.603

  Periculosa severitas, flagitiosa l••rgitio: seu nihil militi, seu omnia concedereniur in ancipiti Republica. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 4 1.604

  Satis superque missione, & pecunia & mollibus consul••is peccatum. Id. Ibid.
• 5 1.605

  Al••i fortioribus remediis agendum, nihil in vulgo modicum: terrere ni paveam, ubi pertimuerint, impunè contemni. Tac. 1. Annal.
• 6 1.606

  Mox utrumque consilium aspernatur, quod inter ancipitia deterrimum est, dum media se quitur, nec ausus est satis, nec providit. Id. l. 3. Hist.
• 7 1.607

  Neque enim hic, aut in caeteris gentibus, quae regnantur, certa Do∣minorum Domus, & caeteri servi: sed im••eraturus es hominibus, qui ne•• ••otam servitutem pati possunt, nec totam libertatem. Tac. l. 1. Hist.
• 8 1.608

  Maluit videri invenisse bonos quam fecisse. Tacit. in Vit. Agric.
• 9 1.609

  Laudamus veteres, praesentes carpimus annos.
• 10 1.610

  Nocuit antiqu••s rigor, & nimia severitas, cui pares non sumus. Tac. l. 1. Hist.
• 1 1.611

  Eccles. 1. 4.
• 2 1.612

  This Opinion was embraced and main∣t••i••ed by Copernicus, Rheticus, Rothmannus, Kepler, Galilaeus, Des Cartes, and Gassendus, by whom all Arguments to the contrary are fully answer'd.
• 3 1.613

  Velocissimi sideris more, omnia invisere, omnia au∣••ire. Plin. Jun.
• 4 1.614

  Psal. 19 4.
• 5 1.615

  Rise, take up thy bed and walk. Iohn 5. 8.
• 6 1.616

  For an Angel went down at a certain season, and troubled the water. Ibid. 4.
• 7 1.617

  Give ear, you that rule the people, &c. Wisd. 6. 2. ibid. ver. 4.
• 8 1.618

  And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge, and of the fear of the Lord. Isai. 11. 2.
• 9 1.619

  And I will set up shepherds over them, which shall feed them, and they shall fear no more, &c. Jer. 23. 4.
• 10 1.620

  And thou ••••alt anoint him to be a Captain over my people I••rael. 1 Sam. 9. 16.
• 11 1.621

  Rex enim Dux erat in Bello. Arist. l. 3. Pol. c. 11.
• 12 1.622

  Nay, but we will have a King over us; That we also may be like all the ••••tions, and that our King may judge us, and go out before us, and ••••ght our battels, 1 Sam. 8. 19, 20.
• 13 1.623

  Mevero, inquit, praesentem, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 multis navibus comparas. Plut. in Ep••ph.
• 14 1.624

  Ego qui nihil 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unquam praecepi, quin primus me periculis obtulerim, qui saepe cive•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cl••peo texi. Curt. l 8.
• 15 1.625

  Nemo vestrum est, cujus non idem ego spectator & testis, notata tem∣poribus locisque referre possim decora. Liv. Dec. l. 2.
• * 1.626

  Tass. Cant. 20.
• 16 1.627

  In cujus manu tot legiones, immensa sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favor, habere imperium quàm expectare mallet. Tac. l. 4. Annal.
• 17 1.628

  Divus Iulius seditionem exercitus verbo uno compescuit. Quirites ••••∣cando, qui sacramentum ejus detrectabant. Divus Augustus vultu & aspect•• Actiacas legiones exterruit. Tac. l. 1. Hist.
• 18 1.629

  Neque decorum pri••∣cipibus, si una ••lterave civitas, omissa urbe, unde in om••ia regimen. Tac. l. 3. Annal.
• 19 1.630

  2 S••m. 18. 3, 4.
• * 1.631

  Claud.
• 20 1.632

  Ne nova molire••ur, nisi ••ioribus firmatis. Tac. Annal. l. 12.
• † 1.633

  Claud.
• 21 1.634

  Ipse Lugduni vim fortunamque Principatus è proximo ostenta••••••, nec parvis periculis mixtus, & majoribus non defuturus. Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 22 1.635

  Postquam pugnari placitum, interesse pugnae Imperatorem, an se•••••• melius foret, dubitavere. Paulino & Celso non adversantibus, ne Pr••••∣cipem objectare periculis viderentur; iidem illi deterioris consilii perpul••••••, ut Brixellum conderet, ac dubiis praeliorum exemptus, summae rerum & ••••∣perii seipsum reservaret. Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• * 1.636

  Lucan.
• 1 1.637

  Nullum nunc in is••a occaaione deliberandi tempus est, aliquid 〈◊〉〈◊〉 permittendum. Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 12. c. 19.
• 2 1.638

  Fortuna in sapient•••••• cessit. Tac▪ de Mor. Germ.
• 3 1.639

  When he lift up his hand with the stone in his sling, and beat down the boasting Goliah Eccles. 47. 4.
• 4 1.640

  Pleraque in summa ••••••una, auspiciis & consiliis potius quam telis ac manibus geruntur. Tac. Annal. l. 3.
• 5 1.641

  Affuit ut saepe aliàs fortuna populi Romani 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Oriente. Tac. Hist. l. 3.
• 6 1.642

  Struebat jam fortuna, in diversa parte terrarum, initia causasque imperio. Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 7 1.643

  Numerabatur inter osfenta, diminutu: omnium magistratuum numerus, Quaestors, Aedile, Tribu••o, ac Praetore & Consule, paucos intra menses de∣functis. Tac. Annal. l. 12,
• 8 1.644

  Etiam merito accidisse videtur, & casus in culpam transit. Velleius.
• 9 1.645

  Cuj••scunque fortunam mutare constituit, consilia corrumpit. Velleius.
• 10 1.646

  For the Lord hath poured forth upon you the spirit of deep sleep, and hath closed your eyes; the prophets, and the rulers, and the seers hath he covered. Isai 29. 10.
• 1 1.647

  Fluminum instabili•• natura, simul ostendere•• omnia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Tac. Annal. l. 6.
• 2 1.648

  Eccles. 4. 32.
• 3 1.649

  Nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum, quam fama potentiae non suî vi nixae. Tac. Annal. l. 13.
• 4 1.650

  Multa bella impetu valida per t••edia & moras evanuisse. Tac.
• 5 1.651

  Opportunos magnis conatibus transitus rerum. Tacit. Hist. l. 1.
• 6 1.652

  Optimum est pati quod emenda••re non possis, & Deum, quo Authore ••uncta eveniunt, sine murmure ••omitari. Sen. Ep.
• 7 1.653

  Dan. 3. 1.
• 8 1.654

  Eccles. 10. 5.
• 9 1.655

  Rom. 9. 21.
• 10 1.656

  Valentior enim omni fortuna animus est, in utramque partem res suas ducit. Sen. Epist. 98.
• 11 1.657

  Non enim votis, neque supplici•••• muliebribus auxilia Deorum parantur; vigilando, agendo, prosperè omni•• cedunt. Sallust.
• 1 1.658

  A three-fold cord is not quickly broken.
• 2 1.659

  Wisdom 18. 9.
• * 1.660

  Virg
• 3 1.661

  He maketh peace in high-places.
• 4 1.662

  Nostris illi dissentionibus, & discordiis clari, vitia ••ostium in gloria•• exercitus sui vertunt. Tac. in Vit. Ag••ic.
• 5 1.663

  Conversis ad civile bellum animis, externa sine cura ••abentur. Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 6 1.664

  And a seventh doth my heart abhorr, he that soweth discord among brethren. Prov. 6. 14.
• 7 1.665

  Concordi•• malorum contraria est bonorum, & sicut optandum est, ut boni pacem habeant ad invicem, ita optandum est, ut mali sint discordes, Impeditur enim iter bono um, si unitas non dividatur malorum. S. Isid.
• 8 1.666

  Procul ab aemulatione adversus collegas. Tac. in Vit. Agric.
• 1 1.667

  Thou didst cleave the earth with rivers. Haba••. 3. 9.
• 2 1.668

  The Lord hath broken forth upon mine enemies before me, as the breach of waters. 2 Sam. 5. 20.
• 3 1.669

  Siamnis Nar (id enim parabatur) in Rivos diductus supernavigasset. Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 4 1.670

  Quin ipsum Tiberim no••••e, prorsus accolis fluv••s ••••batum, minori gloria fluere. Ibid.
• 5 1.671

  Prudentis est Ducis inter bostes discordi••e causas serere. Veget.
• 6 1.672

  Discordia & Seditio omnia facit opportuniora insidiantibus. Livy.
• 7 1.673

  Vrgentibus Imperii Romani fatis, nihil jam praes••are fortuna majus ••••tuit, quam hostium discordiam. Tac. de Mor. Germ.
• 8 1.674

  Non fraude neque occultis, sed palam, & armatum populum Ro∣manum bostes suos ulcisci. Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 9 1.675

  Olim Regibus parebant, nunc per Principes factionibus, & studiis trabantur; nec aliud adversus validiss••mas gentes pro nobis ••••ilius, quam quod in commune non consulunt. Rarus duabus, tribusve civitatibus, ad propulsandum commune periculu•• conventus: ita dum singuli pu••nant, uni∣versi vincuntur. Tac. in Vi••. Agric.
• * 1.676

  Cam. Lus.
• 1 1.677

  Videtur amicitia magis continere, & majore quam justitia in studio fuisse Legislatoribus. Nam si amicitia inter omnes esset, ni••il esset, quod justitiam desiderarent; at si justi essent, tamen amicitiae praesidium requi∣rerent. Arist. Ethic. l. 1.
• 2 1.678

  L. 19. Tit. 2. p. 2.
• 3 1.679

  And Saul went home; but David and his men gat them up unto the hold. 1 Sam. 24. 22.
• * 1.680

  Gen. 33. 12.
• 4 1.681

  Never trust thine enemy; for like as iron rusteth, so is his wickedness: though he humble himself, and go crouching, yet take good heed, and beware of him, Eccl. 12. 10.
• * 1.682

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 5 1.683

  Proprium humani ingenii est, odisse quem laeser is. Tac. Vit. Agric.
• 6 1.684

  Non exercitus neque thesauri, praesidia Regni sunt, verum amici, Sallust.
• 7 1.685

  Non aureum istud sceptrum est, quod Regem custodit, sed copia amicorum, ea Regibus sceptrum tutissimum, Xenoph.
• 8 1.686

  Nec ••llum majus boni Imperii instrumen••um quam boni Amici, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 9 1.687

  Dum amicitias magnitudine munerum, non constantia morum con∣tinere putavit, meruit, magis quam habuit, Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 10 1.688

  Ne tanta stipendia classi Lacedaemoniorum praeberet, sed nec auxiliis nimis enixe ju••andos, quippe non immemorem esse debere, alienam esse victoriam non suam instruere, & eatenus bellum sustinendum, ne inopia deseratur, Trog. l. 5.
• 11 1.689

  Fuit proprium populi Romani longè à domo bellare, & pro••ugnaculi••, Imperii sociorum fortunas, non sua tecta defendere, Cic. pro leg. Man.
• 1 1.690

  Plin. l. 10. c. 3. Ael. l. 9. c. 11. de Animal.
• 2 1.691

  If an oxe gore a man or a woman, and they die, the oxe shall be s••rely stoned, Exod. 21. 28.
• 3 1.692

  And there was also another Eagle, with great wings, and many feathers, &c. Ezek. 17. 7.
• 4 1.693

  Philippus Rex Ma••edonum libertati ••••••ium insidiatus, dum conten∣tiones civitatum alit, auxilium inserioribus ferendo, victos pariter, victo∣resque subire regiam s••rvitutem coëgit. Justin.
• 5 1.694

  Thou art the anointed Cherub that governeth, Ezek. 28. 14.
• 1 1.695

  For earthly things were turned into watry; and the things that before swam in the water, now went upon the ground, Wisd. 19. 9.
• 2 1.696

  Mar. Hist. l. 12. c. 2.
• 3 1.697

  And their word will eat as doth a canker, 2 Tim. 2. 17.
• 4 1.698

  In the six and thirtieth year of the reign of Asa, Baasha king of Israel came up against Judah, and built Ramah, to the intent that he might let none go out or come in to Asa king of Judah, 2 Chron. 16. 1.
• 5 1.699

  And it came to pass, when Baasha heard it, that he left off building of Ramah, and let his work cease, 2 Chron. 16. 5.
• 6 1.700

  Because thou hast relied on the king of Syria, and not re∣lied on the Lord thy God, therefore is the host of the king of Syria escaped out of thine hand, &c. Herein thou hast done foolishly; therefore from henceforth thou shal•• have wars, 2 Chron. 16. 7, 9.
• 7 1.701

  O king, l••t not the army of Israel go with thee: for the Lord is not with Israel, to wit, with all the children of Ephraim. But if thou wilt go, do it, be strong for the battel: God shall make thee fall before the enemy: for God hath power to help, and to cast down, 2 Chron. 25. 7, 8.
• 8 1.702

  We s••e certainly that the Lord is with thee: and we said, Let there be now an oat•• betwixt us, even betwixt us and thee, and let us make a covenant with thee, That thou shalt do us no hurt, Gen 26. 28, 29.
• 9 1.703

  We have sworn unto them by the Lord God of Israel: now therefore we may not touch them, I••sh. 9. 19.
• 10 1.704

  So the sun stood still in the midst of heaven, and hasted not to go down about a w••ole day. And there was no day like that, before it, or after it, that the Lord hearkened unto the voice of man: for the Lord sought for I••rael, Iosh. 10. 13, 14.
• 11 1.705

  Then there was a famine in the days of David, three years, year af••er year; and David enquired of the Lord. And the Lord answered, It is for Saul, and for his bloody house, because he slew the Gi••eonites, 2 Sam. 21. 1.
• 1 1.706

  Then thou shalt see and flow together, and thine heart shall fear, and be enlarged, because the abundance of the sea shall be con∣verted unto thee, the forces of the Gentiles shall come unto thee, Isai. 6••. 5.
• * 1.707

  The Italian is ••ere guilty of par••ial Omissions and Additions.
• 2 1.708

  Summum Pontificem etiam summum h••minem esse, non amulationi•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 odio aut privatis affectio••i••us 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Tac. Annal. li••. 3.
• 3 1.709

  For in the long garment was the whole world, Wisd. 18. 2••.
• * 1.710

  A whole Page is here omitted in the French.
• 4 1.711

  Zurit. Hist. Arragon. l. 13. c. 13.
• 5 1.712

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 6 1.713

  Zurit. Ann. de Arrag.
• 7 1.714

  Euseb. in Vit. Const.
• 8 1.715

  〈…〉〈…〉 Reg. Goth.
• 9 1.716

  Honor 〈…〉〈…〉 Tac. Hist. l. 5.
• * 1.717

  A Page and an half is here omit∣ted in the Ita∣lian.
• 10 1.718

  Zur. Hist. Arrag Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 24. c. 16.
• 11 1.719

  Anton. ••eb. Hist. Hisp.
• * 1.720

  In Proem. p. 2.
• 1 1.721

  Mar. Hist. Hisp. l. 11. c. 16.
• 2 1.722

  Mirari 〈◊〉〈◊〉 subit impervestigabile•• Dei sapientiam, qui plane ••••••traria uno fine conclusit. Nam cum du•••• ad••ersarias potestates inter se co••mittere statuit, nee alteram alteri subjicere, aut ingenio & virtute 〈◊〉〈◊〉 utrinque parti moderatores praeficit, ut alter alterius consilia & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vertas, & utrinque subditorum libertati consulatur, aut utrosque ••ebetes & imbelles deligit, ut neuter alterum tentare, & s••pta (quod aiunt) 〈◊〉〈◊〉 aude••••, veteresque regnorum limites convellere. Niceph.
• * 1.723

  Here is a Page and an half omitted in the French.
• 3 1.724

  Quoties concordes agunt, spe••nitur Parth••••; ubi dissensere, dum sibi quisque contra aemulos subsidium vocant, accitus in partem adversu•• omnes valescit. Tac. Annal. l. 6.
• 4 1.725

  Quippe sine dignitate praemium victoris eritis. Liv. l. 35.
• 5 1.726

  Neu∣tralitas neque a••icos parit, ••eque inimicos tollit. Polyh.
• 6 1.727

  Phil. de Comin.
• * 1.728

  This whole Paragraph is omitted in the French.
• * 1.729

  Horat.
• 1 1.730

  Laetiore Tiberio, qui•• pacem sapienti•• firmaverat, quim si bellu•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a••ies consecisses, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 2 1.731

  Ingens victoria dec•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Romanum sanguinem bellants, Id. in Vit. Ag••ic.
• 3 1.732

  Dare in discrimen legiones haud imperatorium ratus, Tac. Annal. lib. 2.
• 4 1.733

  Bellorum egregios ••ines, quoties ignoscendo transigatur, Ta•• Annal. l. 12.
• 5 1.734

  Quanta pervicacia in hostem tanta beneficentia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 versus supplices utendum, Id▪ ibid.
• 6 1.735

  Vbi solitudinem fa•••••• pacem appellant, Tac. in Vit. Agric.
• 7 1.736

  When thou shalt besi•••••• a city a long time, in making war against it to take it, thou shalt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 destroy the trees thereof, by forcing an are against them: for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mayest eat of them, and thou shalt not cut them down (for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the field is man's life) to employ them in the siege, Deut. 20. 19.
• 8 1.737

  And do ye abide without the camp seven days: whosoever ••••th killed any person, and whosoever hath touched any slain, purifie ••••••h your selves and your captives, on the third day, and on the ••••••••th day, Numb. 31. 19.
• * 1.738

  Virgil.
• 9 1.739

  And there shalt 〈◊〉〈◊〉 build an altar unto the Lord thy God, an altar of stone: thou ••••it not lift up any iron tool upon them, Deut. 27. 5.
• 10 1.740

  Then ••••ua built an altar, &c. an altar of whole stones, over which no 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had lift up an iron, Iosh. 8. 30. 31.
• 11 1.741

  If thou wilt make ••an altar of stone, thou shalt not build it of hewn stone: for if thou 〈◊〉〈◊〉 up the tool upon it, thou hast polluted it, Exod. 2••. 25.
• 12 1.742

  For 〈◊〉〈◊〉 drew not his hand back wherewith he stret•••••••• out the spear, until he had utterly destroyed all the inhabitan•• A••, Josh. 8. 26.
• 13 1.743

  Shall the sword devour for ever? knowest thou not that it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be bitterness in the latter end? 2 Sam. 2. 26.
• 14 1.744

  His eyes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as the eyes of doves by the rivers of waters, Cant. 5. 12.
• 15 1.745

  Aliquando etiam victis ira virtusque, Tac. in Vit. Agric.
• 16 1.746

  Acriore hodiè disciplinî victi quam victores agunt: h••s ira, odium, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cupiditas ad virtutem acc••ndit, Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 17 1.747

  Qui cupidine praedae graves onere sarcinarum velut vi••cti
• 18 1.748

  But ••tand ye now fast against your enemies, and overcome them; then may ye safely take the spoils, 1 Maccab. 4. 18.
• 19 1.749

  Cuncta mortal um incerta, quan•••••••• plus ad••ptus forat, tanto se magis in lubrico dictans, Tac. Annal. l. ••.
• * 1.750

  Cassiod.
• 20 1.751

  Come near, put your feet upon the necks of these kings, ••osh. 10. 24.
• 21 1.752

  Fear not, nor be dismayed; be strong, and ••f good courage: for thus shall the Lord do to all your enemies against whom ye fight, Iosh. 10. 25.
• * 1.753

  Claud.
• † 1.754

  Virg.
• 22 1.755

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 1 1.756

  Vt praeda ad virtutem incenderentur, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 2 1.757

  And ••avid ca••e to Baal-perazim, and David smote them there, 2 Sam. ••. 20.
• 3 1.758

  Therefore Jehoash king of Israel went up, and he and Amaziah king of Judah lo••ked one another in the face at Bethshemeth, ••••ich belongeth to Judah: And Judah was put to the worst before Israel, 2 King. 14. 11, 12.
• 4 1.759

  〈…〉〈…〉 cum spoli••••i exutique 〈…〉〈…〉 fore, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 5 1.760

  Saul came to Ca••mel, and behold, ••e set him up a place, 1 Sam. ••5. 12.
• 6 1.761

  And set up 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pillars upon it, one against another, for 〈◊〉〈◊〉 father, his 〈…〉〈…〉: And he set great pillars round ••••out them, and set arms upon the pillars, for a perpetual memory, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 carved ships beside the arms, that they might be seen of men ••••••lling in the sea. This sepulchre, which he made at Modin, standeth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 unto this day, 1 Maccab. 13. 28, 29, 30.
• 7 1.762

  〈…〉〈…〉, Arist. l. 7. Po••. c. 2.
• 8 1.763

  After, when they 〈…〉〈…〉 Jerusalem, they worshipped the Lord; and as soon as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were purified, they offered their burnt•• offerings, and their 〈◊〉〈◊〉-offerings, and their gifts, Iudith 1••. 18.
• 9 1.764

  And thou shalt offer burnt-offerings thereon unto the Lord thy God, and thou shalt offer peace-offerings, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 27. 6.
• * 1.765

  Virg.
• 1 1.766

  Cum in victores victosque, munquam solida fides con∣valesceret, Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 2 1.767

  Bellum anceps, an pax in••onesta placeret, nec dubitatum de bello, Tac. Annal. l. 15.
• 3 1.768

  Si 〈◊〉〈◊〉 dederitis, & fidam, & perpetuam; si 〈…〉〈…〉 Tit. Liv. l. 8.
• 4 1.769

  Nec credideris ullu•• 〈…〉〈…〉 in ea conditione, cujus cum paniteat, diutius, quam necesse sit, mansurum, Tit. Liv. l. 8.
• * 1.770

  Tac. Annal. l. 12.
• 5 1.771

  In pace suspecta tutius bellum, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 6 1.772

  Saying, Peace, peace, when there is no peace, Ier. 6. 14.
• 7 1.773

  And I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant; to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, Gen. 17 7.
• 8 1.774

  The Lord God of Israel gave the kingdom over Israel to David for ever, even to him and to his sons by a covenant of salt, 2 Chron. 13. 5.
• * 1.775

  In ••ul. Indict. Conc. Trident.
• 9 1.776

  Melior enim tutiorque est certa pax, quam sperata victoria; illa in tua••, haec in Deorum manu est, Liv. Dec. 3. l. 1.
• 10 1.777

  Pac••m, & concordiam victis uti••ia, victorib•• tantum pulc••ra esse, Tac. Hist. l. 3.
• 11 1.778

  Quia inter innocentes, & validos ••also qu••escunt, Tac. de Mor. ••••rm.
• 12 1.779

  Vbi manu agitur, modestia, ac probitas, nomina 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sunt, Tac. ibid.
• 1 1.780

  And behold, there was a swarm of bees, and honey in the carkass of the lion, Iudg. 14. 8.
• 2 1.781

  Lord, thou wil•• ordain Peace ••or us: for thou hast wrought all our works in us▪ Isai. 26. 12.
• 3 1.782

  And my people shall dwell in a peaceable habitation, and in sure dwellings, and in quiet resting places, Isai. 32. 18. Et sedebit pop••l••s 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in pulc••ritudine pacis, Vulg.
• 4 1.783

  Righteousness and Peace have kissed each other, Psal. 85. 10.
• 5 1.784

  Aequè apud bonos miserum est occidere, quam perire, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 6 1.785

  Nam i•• pace causas, & merita spectari: ubi bellum ingrua••, inno∣centes a noxios juxta ca••dere, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 7 1.786

  Sed longa pax ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉 servitium fregerat, Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 8 1.787

  Ni••il aque Tiberium 〈◊〉〈◊〉 habebat, quam ne composita turbarentur, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 9 1.788

  Quantâ pecuniâ dites, & voluptatibus opulentos, tanto magis imbelles, Tac. Annal. l. 3.
• 10 1.789

  Dissimulante Tiberio damna, ne cui bellum per∣mitteret, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 11 1.790

  Violentia nemo imperia continuit diu, ••••derata durant, Seneca.
• * 1.791

  Sil. Ital.
• * 1.792

  Propert.
• 12 1.793

  Semina odiorum jacienda, & omne scelus externum habendum cum laetitia, Tac. Annal. l. 12.
• 13 1.794

  Psal. 34. 14.
• 14 1.795

  Psal. 46. 9.
• 15 1.796

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 1 1.797

  〈…〉〈…〉 Ta••. Annal. l. 5.
• 2 1.798

  Cesserunt que prim•• postremis, & bo••a•• juventae, senectus flagitios•• ••••••teravit, Tac. Annal. 1. 6.
• 3 1.799

  S••••m ••uique decus posteritas re∣pendit, Tac. Annal. 1. 4.
• * 1.800

  Mar. Hist. Hisp.
• 4 1.801

  Vt vultus ••ominun, it a simulacr•• v••ltus imbecilla a•• mortal••a 〈◊〉〈◊〉; for••a mentis aeterna, quam tene▪ e, & exprimere non per alie•••••• ••••teriam, & artem, sed iuu ipse moribus possi••, Tac. in Vit. Agri••.
• 5 1.802

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 tibi neque aureas, nequ•• argemeas. ••ieri ••••q••am 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a••tem ali••s tibi sta••••as in ipsi•• hominu•• animis nibil 〈…〉〈…〉 effice, Me••aen. ad August.
• 6 1.803

  Hac mibi in ••nimis vestris templa, bae pulcherrim••e effigies & ma••surae, n••m que saxo 〈◊〉〈◊〉, si ••••dicium poster••••um in odium vert••t, pro 〈…〉〈…〉, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 7 1.804

  Auxilio militari t••••ndu••, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sepul∣tr•• ejus 〈…〉〈…〉, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• * 1.805

  The memory of them is forgotten, Eccle••. 9. 5.
• 8 1.806

  ••••ter omnes eos n••n cons••at à quib•••• factae s••••t, justi••••i•••• casu ••bliteratis t••••ta vanit••ti•• au••••orib••s, P••••n. 36. 12.
• 9 1.807

  Ve••ustate imper•••• c••alita ••udacia, Tac. Annal. l. 14.
• 10 1.808

  Ip∣s•••• sa••e se••em, & prosperis, adversisque satiatum, Tac. Hist. l. 3.
• 11 1.809

  Solusque ••••••ium ante se princip••••, in meliu•• mutatus est, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 12 1.810

  Multi odio praesentium cupidine mutationis, suis quoque periculis l••tab••••tur, Tac. Annal. l. 3.
• 13 1.811

  Pars ••u••to maxima imminen••es d••••inos var••is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 differeb••nt, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 14 1.812

  Quippe ut ••••••pus, sic e••iam mens su•••• ••abet senium, Ari••t. l. 2. Pol. c. 7.
• 15 1.813

  Reputante Tiber••o public•••• sibi odi••••, extre•••••• aetatem ••••gisque fama, q••a•• v•• stare res 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Tac. Annal. l. 6.
• 16 1.814

  Sane gravaretur aspectum civium senex imperator, fessamque ••••atem, & actos labores, praetender••t: Druso quod nisi ex arrogant••a impedimentum? Tac. Annal. l. 3.
• 17 1.815

  Se tamen fortiora solatia è complexu Reip. petivisse, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 18 1.816

  Constat po••uisse con••iliari animos quantulacu••que parci senis liberalitate, Tac. Hist. lib. 1.
• 19 1.817

  Patres, Eq••es. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quis illustrior, ••••nto magis falsi a•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ••••ltuque composito, ne laeti excessu P••incipis neu tristiores, pri••ordio lachrymas, gaudi••••, quaestus, adulationes misceb••nt, Tac. Annal. lib••. 1.
• 20 1.818

  Et audita adoptione defi••am videri senex, q••iod nu•••• 〈…〉〈…〉 objicitur, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 21 1.819

  Y••a, I hated all my labour which I had taken under the sun: because I should leave it unto the man that shall be after me, Eccles. 2. 18.
• 22 1.820

  Quo pluri••us munimentis insis••eret, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 23 1.821

  Non legiones, non classer, perinde firma imperii munimenta quàm numer•••• liberorum, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 24 1.822

  Quorum prosperis & alii fruantur, adversa ad justissimos perti••eant, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 25 1.823

  Nam a••icos tempore, fortuna, cupiainibus, aliquando aut erroribus imminui, transfer••i desinere: suum cuique sanguinem indis••retum, Tac. Hist. lib. 4.
• 26 1.824

  Vtrumque in laudem Drusi trabebatu••: ab eo in urbe inter coetus & sermones bominum obversante secreta patris mitigari, Tac. Annal. l 3.
• 27 1.825

  He leaveth behind him an avenger against his enemies, and one that should shew favour unto his friends, Ecclus. 30. 6.
• 28 1.826

  Suadere 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Prisco, ne supra Principem scanderet; ne Vespasianum senem triu••. ••ha••em, juvenum liberorum Patrem prae••eptis ••oër••eret, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 29 1.827

  Intempera••tia civitatis donec ••us eligatur ••ultos desti••andi, Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 30 1.828

  Ex ••rbore 〈…〉〈…〉, & trunco novam producit qu•••• anteq••am antiqua decidat, jam radices & vires accepit, Tol. de Rep. l. 7. c. 4. ••. 1.
• 31 1.829

  Let the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man over the congregation, Numb. 27. 16.
• 32 1.830

  Sed Augustus in d••mo successorem quaes••vit; ego in Republica, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 33 1.831

  Nunc ••o ••ecessitatis jampridem ventum est, ut nec mea senectus conferre plus populo Romano possit qu••m bonum succes∣sore••, nec tua plus j••venta quàm bonum Principe••, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 34 1.832

  Ne Ti••erium quidem caritate aut Reipublicae cura successor••m ••dscitum: sed quoniam arrogan••iam saevitiamque introspexerit, com∣par••tione deterrima ••ibi gloriam quaefi••isse, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 35 1.833

  Op∣timos quippe mort••lirum, altissima cupere, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 36 1.834

  Is modi••um Hyberiae regnum senecta patris detineri, ferocius crebriusque jactabat, Tac. Annal. l. 12.
• 37 1.835

  Give him no liberty in his youth, and wink not at his folly, Ecclus. 30. 11.
• 38 1.836

  Vt amoto P••tre, Drusus munia consulatu•• solus impleret, Tac. Annal. lib. 3.
• 39 1.837

  Displicere regna••ntibus civilia filiorum ingeni••, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 40 1.838

  Qu••nquam ••onor•• ••••atione, qu••dam de habitu, ••••ltuq••e & insti∣tutis ej••s jecerat, qu•• vel••t excu••ando exprobraret, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 41 1.839

  Ad o••te••tand•••• saevitiam in••vend••sque p••pull off••nsio••••••, concess••m f••lio materiam, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 42 1.840

  L••tabatur Tiberi•••• quum inter filios & leges Sen••tus dis••ept••ret, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 43 1.841

  Caesar D••mi∣tianus Pr••••turam capit. Ejus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 epistoli•• edictisque proponebatur, vis penes Mutianum erat, Tac. Hist. l. 4.
• 44 1.842

  ••gitur Pharasmanes juvenem potentiae promptae & studio pop••darium accinctum, vergentibus jam armis suis metuens, alia•• ad spem tra••ere & Armeniam oftentare, Tac. Annal. 1. 12.
• 45 1.843

  ••rofecto Brixellum Othone, honor imperii penes Titianum fratrem, ••is, ac potestas penes Proculum Praefectum, Tac. Hist. l. 2.
• 46 1.844

  Qu•• Syriae imponeretur, ad spes Germanici coercendas, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 47 1.845

  Par∣temque prolis, firmandae amicitiae, miserat: ••aud perinde nostri me••u, quam fidei popularium diffisus, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 48 1.846

  Quamvi•• gentis Arsaci∣••arum, ut extern••m aspernaban••ur, Tac. Annal. l. 2.
• 49 1.847

  Immensumq•••• attolli pro••ideret q••em conjunctione ta•••• super alios 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 50 1.848

  Proculejum, & quosda•• in sermonibus 〈…〉〈…〉, Reip negotiis permixto••, Tac. Annal. l. 4.
• 51 1.849

  Wo to thee, O land, when thy king is a child, Eceles. 10. 16.
• 52 1.850

  Quando ausuros exposcere remedia, nisi novum, & nutantem a••hus Principem, precibus vel armis adirent, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• * 1.851

  Tasso.
• 53 1.852

  M••lt••que gratia man••it reputante Tiberi•• publicum sibi odium, extre∣••am ••••atem, magisque fama quam vi••st••re res suas, Tac. Annal. l. 6.
• 54 1.853

  Consilis & astu res externa•• moliri, arm•• procul ba••ere, Tac. Annal. l. 6.
• 55 1.854

  Hispaniae praeerat Cl••vius Ruf•••• vir fa••und••s, & pacis artibus, belli ine••p••••t••••, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 1 1.855

  And the day of death, than the day of birth, Eccles. 7. 1.
• 2 1.856

  And dig for it more than for rich treasure, which rejoyce ex∣ceedingly, and are glad when they can find the grave, Iob 3. 21, 22.
• 3 1.857

  And set great pillars round about them, and set arms upon the pillars, for a perpetual memory, and carved ships be••ides the arms, 1 Ma••cab. 13. 29.
• 4 1.858

  Wherefore then hast thou brought me forth out of the womb? O that I had given up the Ghost, and no eye had seen me, I should have been as though I had not been, I should have been carried from the womb to the grave, Iob 10. 18, 19.
• 5 1.859

  I was nourished in swadling cloaths and with care••, Wisd. 7. 4.
• * 1.860

  For there is no king that hath any o••••er ••eginning of birth, Wisd. 7. 5.
• 6 1.861

  l••sas 〈…〉〈…〉 fact••s na••••ra fuisse necesse est, Arist. Pol. l. 1. c. 5.
• 7 1.862

  Thou shalt come to thy grave in a full age, like as a shock of corn cometh in, in his season, Iob 5. 26. secund. Septuagint.
• 8 1.863

  Cum ••pud infirmum & credulum, minore metu & majore prae••io peccaretur, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 9 1.864

  Nam senem Augustum devi••xerat, adeo, uti Nepotem unicum Agrippam Posthumu•• in insulam Planasiam projic••ret, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 10 1.865

  Nulla in praesens formidine dum Augustus aetate validus, seque & domum, & pacem sustentavit, postquam profecta jam senectus & agro cor∣pore fatigabatur, aderatque finis, & spei novae; pauci bon•• liber••atis in∣c••ssum disserere, Ibid.
• 11 1.866

  Ipsa aetas Galb••e, & irrisu•• & fastid••o erat, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 12 1.867

  Senectutem Tiberii ut inermem despicient, Tac. Hist. l. 6.
• 13 1.868

  〈◊〉〈◊〉, & Principe i••••••to exitium d••mui ejus i••tendi 〈◊〉〈◊〉, 〈…〉〈…〉 l. 5.
• 14 1.869

  Precarium sibi imperium & brevi transi∣••••••••••, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 15 1.870

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 afferebant ve••alia c••nct••, prap••••••mses libe••••. 〈…〉〈…〉, Tac. Hist. l. 1.
• 16 1.871

  Theophr. l. de Plant.
• 17 1.872

  My breath is corrupt, my days are exti••••••, the graves are ready for me, Io•• 17. 1.
• 18 1.873

  And the sun stood still, and the moon stayed, Ios••. 10. 13.
• 19 1.874

  Sim••l exce••••i••••e Augustum, & rer••m pot••ri Neronem ••ama e••dem ••••lit, Tac. Annal. l. 1.
• 20 1.875

  Dum res firmando Nero•••••• i••p••rio 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Tac. Annal. l. 12.
• 21 1.876

  My son, pour forth tears over the dead, E••clus. 38. 16.
• 22 1.877

  Mourn before Abner: and king David himself followd the bier, 2 S••m. 3. 31.
• 23 1.878

  Jesus wept, Io••. 11. 35.
• 24 1.879

  Quomodo imaginibus suis noscuntur, quas nec victor quidem abolevit, ••ic partem memoriae apud scriptores retinent, Tac. Annal. l. 4.