An essay, concerning critical and curious learning in which are contained some short reflections on the controversie betwixt Sir William Temple and Mr. Wotton, and that betwixt Dr. Bentley and Mr. Boyl / by T.R. Esq.

AN ESSAY, Concerning CRITICAL AND Curious Learning.

SIR,

IF I am at all capable of un∣dertaking your Commands, it is wholly owing to the Advantage of that Converse you

have for some time Honoured me with: But would you be prevailed upon, to lay aside your Authority over me, I could assign the Province to a much more skilfull Hand; I could wish you would rather have Instructed me your-self upon those Points you have offered to my Consideration, than to exact the little I am able to say up∣on them. However, in order to begin that Correspondence betwixt us, which your Letter so kindly proposes, and which is so much for my own Bene∣fit; I will here give my Im∣perfect Thoughts upon your first Question, viz.

Whether Critical and Cu∣rious Enquiries are re∣ally Conducive to the ad∣vancement of solid and useful Learning, or not?

together with my Opinion in general of the Controversie be∣twixt Sir William Temple and Mr. Wotton, and that betwixt Dr. Bentley and Mr. Boyl. This I shall only do, so far as it will come within the Compass and Form of a Letter; for I am not at all inclined to engage in a set Methodical Discourse.

Tho' the Negative side of this Question may hold very well, if applyed to some super∣ficial Wits and pretended Virtuosi

in the World; yet it can never be supported against those learn∣ed Antients and Moderns, that are justly distinguished by the Name of Criticks. For to them we owe what is truly Curious and Entertaining in Philosophy; and to them we must attribute all those admirable Refinements in the Liberal Arts and Sciences. For had not the Censors of for∣mer Times been able, by their great Knowledge of Nature and Reason, to refute the many crude indigested Hypotheses, which fre∣quently were advanced in Athens and Rome; what whimsical In∣ventions had Sophisters imposed upon the more unletter'd sort of People, and transmitted down to Posterity, for rare Systems and unusual heights in Philoso∣phy? and had not the Criticks

of latter Ages, when Learning after a long and dark Interval began to dawn and revive again in Europe, been very industrious in Publishing correct Editions of antient Books, and putting Mo∣dern Authors upon great Care and exactness in their Writings, that they might at last restore Letters to the World, we had not at this day seen Learning in so flourishing a Condition, nor so many Academies, and places of Polite Literature, where Men are wholly set apart for the Cultivation of Knowledge.

There are indeed some Stu∣dies, wherein a Scrutinous Curi∣osity is altogether impertinent and ridiculous; as when we would busie our Thoughts a∣bout things that can neither re∣form

our Morals, nor enlighten our Understandings, when we either sink them to mean and frivolous Niceties, or raise them to secret unknowable Disquisi∣tions. And yet these two Ex∣treams have strangely engaged many great Men.

Simonides (we are told) un∣dertook to give a positive De∣finition of the Nature and Es∣sence of GOD: But he soon found his imperfect Capacity could frame no adequate Con∣ceptions of him, no Descriptions, but what were purely Negative. Aristotle, and many other Philo∣sophers, attempted the Solution of several abstruse Phoenomena in Nature; which we have cause to believe by their bad Success, is beyond the scanty

power of Humane Reason. And our Modern Philosophers and Divines are every day raiseing new Hypotheses, and seem re∣solved to unfold all the My∣steries of Religion. But after all their subtle reasonings and labour'd Disputes, they will find no better Effects of their Stu∣dies than Uncertainty and Con∣fusion. For tho' in Justice to our selves we ought to enter∣tain great and worthy Idea's of the excellency of Humane Reason; yet Experience teaches us, that it is bounded and li∣mitted in many respects, that it is short and imperfect in its Deductions, even in those things that are more immediately with∣in its compass. Why then should some Men be so fond of Speculations, which the wi∣ser

part of Mankind have con∣cluded above their Knowledge, and which they themselves must confess to be nothing better than Learned Amusements?

As to the other Extream; I am so far from admiring those great Men, that have taken wonderful Pains about little in∣significant things, as in traceing the rise and progress of Words; and have written Volumes con∣cerning particular Letters; that I think they miserably lost their time; and so will any one that reads their Works upon these Subjects: Whatever can be said upon them is not worth knowing. The Authors indeed may flatter themselves with the Thoughts of some New Disco∣veries or hidden Secrets; but

the World will never grow wi∣ser for such Labours. We shall not understand the Noble Ex∣pressions and Proprieties of Ho∣mer, nor the Style and Genius of Thucydides at all the better, for being nicely skill'd in the Chronology of the Greek Tongue; or for knowing how many Letters Cadmus first found out, and by what Degrees the Alphabet, as we now have it, was compleated. These are fri∣volous Curiosities, fit only for Pedants and School-masters to amuse their Boys withall; and are wholly Forreign to the ac∣quisition of solid and real Know∣ledge.

But there are however many kinds of Learning, wherein Cu∣rious and Critical Observations

are very commendable, and are doubtless Noble Exercises of Humane Understanding. And of all such Studies, methinks that of Experimental Philosophy is the most noble, beneficial, and sa∣tisfactory. For the Mind is not there seduced with abstracted Arguments and Chymerical No∣tions; but is determined by De∣monstration and Matter of Fact. It is the great Instrument by which such admirable Effects in Nature have been discover∣ed, and from whence the con∣stituent Principles of all mix∣ed Bodies are best known, and those Nice Speculations of Phy∣losophy so excellently ground∣ed. But even this Science, how∣ever desirable and entertaining in it self to an inquisitive Ge∣nius, may be prosecuted to a

great absurdity: As when Men carry on their Experiments to the Land of the Moon; contrive AErial Engines for our passage thither; and teach the Learned to fly as familiarly as others walk: When they are resolv∣ed to refine so far upon all for∣mer Inventions, as to advance New Impossibilities, and instead of improveing useful Naviga∣tion, will propose Methods for Ships sailing under Water, and such like Contradictions to Na∣ture. These, I must confess, are Projections that turn upon too subtle and deep Reasons for my comprehension. Others have discovered by the help of their Glasses, that those Insects which are almost invisible to a Naked Eye, have however as distinct parts as we have;

and that a Louse, compared to those liveing Atoms, is a Creature of a monstrous size. There are yet others; who not only undertake to trace Nature in all her Operations, but will pretend to rival her Works, and produce the same Effects from Artificial Causes. But when Chymists, setting up for Adepti, forget their useful Experiments, and begin to hunt after the Phi∣losophers-Stone; when they talk of nothing but their Diana, their Quintessence and their secret Physi∣cal Matter: When, I say, they are once so besotted as to have these Whimsies in their Head, and to expend their Health, Labour, and Money, in digging for an imaginary Mine in Fairy Ground; we may reasonably Conclude them in the High Road to Po∣verty

and Confusion. I wonder indeed, how Men of Sense can be taken with those Improbabili∣ties, some Chymical Authors impose upon their Readers: I mean, those Stories about the Vast Quantities of Gold made their Mighty Elixir or Transmuting Pow∣der; to which they ascribe little less than a kind of Divinity and Omnipotence. I have read in some of their late Books, that it is Authentically recorded, that Ripley, an English Adeptus, sent for many Years successively an Hun∣dred Thousand Pounds of Arti∣ficial Gold to the Knights of Rhodes, to maintain the War against the Turks: And that Raymund Lully, another Adeptus, furnished Edward the First with six Myriads of the same Mettal, to carry on the Holy War in the Holy Land. Be∣sides,

I have read a great many Tales of Covents, Monasteries, Hospitals, and other Works of Charity, which have been pri∣vately founded at the Expence of the Adepti. But a Man must be arrived at Dotage, be∣fore he believes this Cant: It can have no better Credit sure with any thinking Person, than a fictitious Narrative in a Ro∣mance.

To be well skill'd in Chro∣nology is looked upon as a great and necessary piece of Learn∣ing. For this Science only gives us a distinct View of the Suc∣cessive Order of things from the first Accounts of time: It determines and divides the Pe∣riods of the most considera∣ble Transactions of past Ages;

which History does not oblige it self to, being chiefly imploy∣ed in representing the Causes Vicissitudes and Events of them; in letting us into the true re∣sorts and intrinsick Contextures of publick and private Negotia∣tions; and conveying down such Notices and Observations from Antiquity, as may be of Service in the Conduct of all future Occurrences in Humane Life. And therefore without Chronology we should have but an imperfect knowledge of one of the most useful and pleasant Studies in the World. But I could never understand the use or pleasure of that everlasting Contention some Wri∣ters have raised amongst them∣selves, about small Punctilio's

and Niceties; wherein perchance they are much concerned to discover whether Homer or He∣siod did really live first; to know what Day and Hour such a King or Consul dyed. These little Questions have seem'd so very important, that the World has been troubled with whole Volumes about them; and after all, the Quar∣rel ends as it begun. I am as much at a loss too to know the worth of that hidden and remote Knowledge, Antiquaries so much value themselves up∣on. It is at best but Un∣certain and Conjectural, being drawn out of defaced Monu∣ments, Coins, Inscriptions, Calendars, Traditions, Archives, Fragments, and scattered passages of lost Books.

These Men however put an higher Esteem on such Trea∣sures, (as they call them) than on all the solid and be∣neficial Studies a Man can ap∣ply himself to. To discern the Year of a rusted Medal, or the Date of a Moth-eaten Ma∣nuscript, is in their account a greater piece of Learning, than to be acquainted with the Life and Actions of that Em∣perour whose Image the Coin bears, or to understand the Style and Matter of the Book it self. Perhaps the one kind of Knowledge may cost as much Pains and Labour as the other; but that only proves their Folly more ridiculous and unpardonable.

Grammar is a Science, that is introductory and subservient to most others, and is absolutely Necessary for a Scholar to be well versed in. Without it we could have no acquaintance with the Dead Tongues, from whence is drawn all, or the best part at least of the Learn∣ing now in the World. But I need not endeavour to point out the particular Uses of it, as it is applied to Antient or Modern Languages, and exa∣mines the Idiotisms and Pro∣prieties of them, and lays down Rules, by which they may be more speedily learned, and more correctly spoken: Every body is well enough acquainted with them, and I know who I am wri∣ting

to. But Grammar, as it han∣dles those Grounds and Rules that belong to the Philosophy of Letters, in order to frame a New and Universal Language, wherein every word is a De∣scription of the thing it signi∣fies; is of a vaster extent, and takes in the whole Theory of Nature. To consider the Ana∣logy between words and things, is no doubt a very entertaining Speculation; and it would be a means to reconcile the two distinguishing Characters of Hu∣mane Nature, Speech and Rea∣son. But I believe those few learned Authors that have treat∣ed of it, rather proposed their own private Satisfaction, than any publick Advantage to Man∣kind. Not to mention others,

Dr. Wilkins's Essay towards a real Character, is a Book of great Learning, and is justly admi∣red by all that have read and understood it. But it is like those Noble Schemes and Mo∣dels, that are too fine and ex∣quisite to be put in practice. And I may venture to say, (but with due Respect to this and other Learned Authors, who have placed it among their De∣siderata) That a Philosophical Gram∣mer is at this time as Useless as a Mechanical one is Necessary.

There is another Study, which is of admirable Use and Orna∣ment, and that is Astronomy. But when Men mistake the End and Design of this too, and instead of understanding

the Natural Motions and Situa∣tions of the Heavenly Bodies, with respect to the Earth, will undertake to give an account of Planetary Influences and Im∣pressions, to Calculate Nativi∣ties, to grasp at and anticipate future things, as if they had not enough to do to digest the present. It then becomes a vain and fruitless Impertinence. The common Argument in favour of Astrology is, that since we are assured by Experience it self that Solstices, AEquinoctials, New Moons, Full Moons, and the like greater Revolutions of the Stars do manifestly Operate up∣on Natural Bodies, it must needs follow, that the more ex∣act and subtle Aspect of the Planets should produce Effects

more exquisite and occult, and open a very ample Field to Humane Observation. But this is precariously affirmed, and as weakly applyed. For the great∣er and more apparent Influen∣ces of the Coelestial Bodies are only known to us by meer Conjecture; and if so, what Hopes can Humane Inquiry have of discovering their more sub∣tle occult qualities, or collect∣ing any certain Consequences from them? Horace says admi∣rably well,

Prudens futuri temporis exitum Caliginosâ nocte premit Deus, Ridetque si mortalis ultrà Fas trepidat.

Which Consideration, as well as many others, ought to check the Presumption of those, who pretend to a secret Intelligence from above, and an Immedi∣ate Correspondence with Hea∣ven. This is nevertheless, a Study which some Men think worth their Care; and if at last they attain to the Repu∣tation of an Almanack-maker or Conjurer, they are abundantly sa∣tisfied with the Worthy Di∣stinction.

There are yet other Sciences, as Geometry and Metaphysicks; which in some Degrees are ex∣treamly useful and necessary. For without this great Branch of Mathematicks, many parts of

Nature could never be fully comprehended, nor clearly de∣monstrated, nor accommodated to use with any Skill or Cer∣tainty. And without Metaphy∣sicks, what Notion could we have of that vast Circle of Know∣ledge beyond the Sphere of Matter and Motion, which is conversant about Spirits and In∣corporeal Substances? But I should not desire to be a Pro∣found Critick in them. Be∣cause, the greatest Acquirements, that could be hoped for, would hardly compensate the infinite Pains a Man must bestow up∣on them. Not but that I be∣lieve Mathematicks afford as sub∣stantial a pleasure to those, who are wholly addicted to them, as any other Humane Know∣ledge

whatever. And so do Metaphysicks too; if we believe the Story of the Famous Avicen, who is said to have been so ravished with Aristotle's Metaphysicks, that upon his first Understanding of them, he bestowed large Summs of Money on the Poor, out of the abundance of his Joy and Gratitude; and had the patience to read them over forty times, and get them all by Heart. But, I say, however, I can never be perswaded, that it is worth any Man's while to dedicate his Time and Thoughts to those Abstracted Idea's and Theo∣rems in these Knowledges the Learned so much Talk of. This kind of Pleasure is too Exquisite and Refined for the Taste of the present Age; and

we now adays think it no Re∣flection upon our Understand∣ings, to profess our Neglect and Ignorance of it. The bent of these Times is for Politer Stu∣dies.

And therefore Critical Learn∣ing, in the Modern Acception, is commonly taken for a tho∣rough Understanding of Classick Authors, and an Exact Know∣ledge of those Rules, by which Men judge and determine nice∣ly of all the finer Parts and Branches of Humane Literature. Aristotle was the first that drew these Rules up into Compass, and made Criticism an Art; and the Philosopher took such Care to form his Precepts upon the Practice of the best Writers, and

to reduce them withal to the severest Test of Nature and Reason; that he scarcely left any thing for succeeding Ages to do. We find little or no∣thing in Horace, and the admi∣rable Fragments of Longinus, but what he had in a great measure lay'd down before. The Modern Criticks drain all their Notions from this great Source and Fountain: And tho' later Systems have endeavoured to ex∣plode his Philosophy; yet I find no Reflections on his Criticks, but what are likely to perpe∣tuate that Esteem and Value the World has all along had for them. But in short, he is esteemed a good Critick, who can distinguish the Beauties and Excellencies of an Author; and

discover likewise his Failures and Imperfections. When he makes his Judgment of a Book; he takes it in pieces, and considers the whole Structure and Oeco∣nomy of it; What Connexion and Dependance there is be∣tween one Part or Argument and another; whether all Ma∣terial Circumstances are fully touched upon; whether any thing less remarkable is too far spun out, and dilated. Then he proceeds to a Consideration of the Style; how that is suited and accommodated to the Na∣ture of the things it treats of; how the Language is worked together and digested; how the Figures and Proprieties of Speech are used. And here we see a Critick in this sense has a vast

Room and Scope for his Ob∣servations, wherein he may shew his Judgment and Learn∣ing; and be very Instrumental in the Propagation of Arts and Sciences.

But it is sometimes urged a∣gainst Criticism, that too regu∣lar an adherence to the Forms and Measures of it, is a Restraint upon a Writers Invention, and does more harm than good in Composition. For that the Ima∣gination cannot so freely diffuse and expand it self, when it is obliged to any Bounds or Li∣mits whatever. Which Argu∣ment is sometimes illustrated and supported by that Famous Example of an Ungovernable Genius in Heroick Vertue, I mean that of Alexander the Great;

whose Vast Ambition never failed to hurry him beyond the due Measures of Conduct: Up∣on which very Account, (say they) his Exploits had always something in them wonderful∣ly Surprizing and Astonishing. Whereas Caesar's Actions, that were more Cool, Deliberate and Proportioned to the Rules of Prudence and Policy, never give us such an Exalted Sublime Idea of his Fortitude as we must necessarily entertain of the Greek Hero's. The Friends too of our great Dramatick Writer, Shakespear, will not be perswa∣ded, but that even his Mon∣strous Irregularities were condu∣cive to those Shining Beauties, which abound in most of his Plays; and that if he had been

more a Critick, he had been less a Poet. But, I say, not∣withstanding this; good Con∣duct in War is no hindrance to the boldest Undertakings. For any one that knows Hi∣story, knows that if Caesar had neglected it, his Atchievements had never been so glorious, nor Alexander's neither. Those astonishing (I might call them accidental) Victories, which the latter gained, betrayed (many of them at least) more of Fool-hardiness than Valour. And a due Observation of Critical Rules, that is, a strict attend∣ance to the Rules of Nature and Reason, can never impede or clog an Author's Fancy; but rather produce and enlarge it. They may as well urge,

that good and wholesome Laws, which enjoyn nothing but what a Rational Nature would other∣wise oblige us to, take away the Liberty of Mankind; whereas they are the very Life and Security of it.

Now I am nameing Inven∣tion and Composition, I can∣not but reflect on the Use and Advantage of a frequent appli∣cation to them. Which is ano∣ther Argument in Favour of your Proposals; and you will therefore Pardon a short digressi∣on upon this Head.

It was the Opinion (you know, Sir,) of one of the greatest Men of Antiquity, that all Knowledge was but Remi∣niscence,

and that it was innate in the Soul, tho' obscured and darkened by our grosser part more or less, according to the particular Disposition and Tem∣perament of the Body. The allowance of which Principle would doubtless teach us, that to exert these Original Seeds of Science, we must often use and stretch our Intellectual Pow∣ers. For thus the Mind would as it were dilate it self, and by degrees correct the Tone and Habitude of the Organs. But whether there be any Truth in the Philosophers Doctrine or no, this is most certain, that all the Faculties of the Mind, both active and passive, are mighti∣ly heightened and improved by Exercise. But if they are neg∣lected

and unimployed, they will shrink and contract them∣selves, and be unable to answer their proper Functions. Which (as the Experiments of our Modern Virtuosi have plainly demonstra∣ted) is true also as to some Properties of inanimate Bodies. Our Reason, which is an Active Principle, would, if for some time stifled and suppressed, in a great measure loose that Sagacity and Acuteness implanted in it. The Memory, which is more percep∣tive and passive, could neither retain nor return those Idea's and Images recommended to it, unless it were often proved and examined. It would have but a very Dark and Unfaith∣ful Conception of Things, un∣less we sometimes recollected

and produced our Notions. If we never Committed our Thoughts to Writing, the In∣vention would become faint and sluggish for want of breathing; and the Iudgment could never determine aright of that huddled perplexed Chaos of Knowledge, or rather Ignorance, we should have within us.

It is the Condition and Cir∣cumstance of Humane Nature, under its present Depression, to acquire Science but by Steps and Gradations. The Convey∣ances to our Understanding, are too gross to be consistent with an immediate Intuition, which is the Happiness and Preroga∣tive of Spiritual Intelligences on∣ly: Whereas the Mind of Man takes Impressions from External

Objects; and these Impressions make her reflect upon the Na∣ture of the thing, from whence she receives them, leading us through a long Chain and Se∣ries of Thoughts before we can arrive at any Conclusions. Now in Order to bring these Con∣clusions to some Clearness and Perfection, we must often ru∣minate upon them, we must turn our Thoughts into Words and Expressions; and thus we shall instruct and inform the very Mind that produces them, by putting it still upon a more intense Application. For we doubtless understand our selves better by expressing the Idea we have formed within, than we possibly can by Private Thoughts and Internal Reflections, which are

always a little dark and cloudy. The Image becomes more clear and determinate, when it is set in open Light, and is, as it were, a second time submitted to the Censure of the Mind. We cannot so easily flatter our selves with false Beauties and Appearances. Our Judgments will reform the Mistakes our Vanity might before have fond∣ly entertained, and give us a juster and more exact View of our Abilties. Thus we shall understand the real Compass and Circle of our Knowledge: We shall digest and settle what we have already imbibed, and be the better able to pro∣ceed to further Improvements. We shall discover our own Natural Infirmities or Defects,

and consequently may learn to apply proper Remedies and Re∣liefs to them.

It has been a Controverted Question in Philosphy, An om∣nes animae sint aequales? and tho' I would not undertake to main∣tain the Affirmative in all points; for why should not our Souls be of different Statures and Com∣plexions as well as our Bodies? Yet I am thus far of the Opi∣nion, as to think, that no Man's Soul is so unluckily formed, so sunk and immersed in his Body, that it cannot by due care be made to exert it's Fa∣culties, and advanced to a con∣siderable degree of Knowledge. Not that I would therefore con∣clude, that it is positively in

every Man's power, provided he uses his utmost Industry, to reach what Perfection he pleases in any Science. All are not blest with the same portion of Genius: Nature has visibly framed and fashioned some Men to particular things; wherein they proceed with a great deal of Ease and Delight; the Native Tendency and Pro∣pension of their Souls concurring with their Diligence and La∣bour. On the other hand, it is equally difficult, if not im∣possible, to turn the Stream, and be successful in spight of Nature. Whereof we have a remarkable Instance in the Fa∣mous Cicero, who, tho' he was very fond of Ingenious Men and Writings, and spared no

time nor pains to have made himself as considerable a Poet, as he was an Oratour; yet his Verses are so extreamly Unpoe∣tical, that the Criticks cannot allow him any Title or Pre∣tension at all to the Character. And yet we must not altoge∣ther condemn his Poetical Es∣says, when we consider what he himself somewhere suggests in his own Defence, that such Exercises did not only relieve and unbend his Thoughts from severer Studies, but were of great use to him in his other Composures: They furnished him with the knowledge of Fi∣gurative Ornaments; with that fer∣tility of Imagination, and that Beau∣ty of Conception, which is the Mo∣ther of Eloquence, and of all that

is graceful in Speaking. So that Invention in any kind will turn to some Advantage or o∣ther; There will either be Plea∣sure or Profit, and still the Mind must be improved.

But to return. It too often happens, that those who now adayes set up for the Censors of Wri∣tings are byassed by Partiality; and in spight of all their spe∣cious Pretences, a strong Tin∣cture of ill Nature and Viru∣lence unhappily appears in eve∣ry Line. They commonly tell us indeed in their Prefaces, that they have dealt very handsomly and candidly with the Authors they comment upon; and that a Critick ought to be as Cau∣tious and Impartial in determi∣ning

a Man's Reputation, as a Iudge in the Decision of his Fortune. But all this is soon forgot: For when we come to the Remarks themselves, we are entertained with nothing but continual Snarling and Insolence. The poor Writer is used most inhumanely for the ill Cadence of a Verse, or the Ruggedness of a Period: And if by chance he has offended against any of the smallest Precepts of Aristotle, &c. then to be sure, there is no Mercy nor Quarter for him. The little Lapses of a Pen, and sometimes the Errata of the Press, cannot be passed by without a strange Disgust and and Severe Reprimand. And rather than not swell up his Annotations to a just Volume,

this mild, inoffensive, good na∣tured Creature, will acquit his Conscience, and fall foul upon the Author's Morals; will give us an account of his Religion, Estate, and Pedigree; or if he has the least Reason to suspect his Friend has none, he is very free in discloseing that Secret too. I am sorry some Pieces lately written on good Subjects, and by good Hands, (which I forbear to Name) have fallen under this Censure, and for want of a prudent Conduct have lost a great part of that Reputation they might other∣wise have justly claimed. Thus Criticism dwindles into down right Raillery and Aspersion, and we must take it, as we find it, a Composition of a

great deal of Dogmatical Arro∣gance and ill Nature mingled with a very little Wit and Discernment; which is the Rea∣son it has so small Effect up∣on those Scriblers who eve∣ry day crowd the Press with their senseless Productions. But if Critical Writers would lay aside their private Piques; and employ themselves only in pur∣suing the main Business of their Art, The Reformation and Finish∣ment of Letters, they would prove extraordinary Members in the Common-Wealth of Learning. But 'till Men will divest them∣selves of the prevailing Affe∣ctions of Humanity, this Candor and Ingenuity is rather to be wished for than expected. Not that I would here be supposed

to insinuate, that the present Age hath not actually produced Men of as Considerable Abilities and accurate Learning, as any other Age of the World. For never did Men follow Reason with more steddiness, nor prosecute their Studies to greater Purpose and Advantage, than at this day; as might be proved from several instances not only in the more abstruse Sciences, but in those of Humanity too, had not the Ar∣gument been sufficiently con∣troverted already by some Mo∣dern Criticks both of this and our Neighbour Nations.

But I promised to give you my Opinion of some late Books. I will begin first with Mr. Wot∣ton's Reflections on Antient and

Modern Learning, which he has reprinted not long since with Amendments and Additions. I shall not enter into the Merits of the Cause with him, or pretend to answer his Elabo∣rate Work in an hasty Disser∣tation. For his Design of giv∣ing the World an History of Learning, is doubtless a very Useful and Commendable Un∣dertaking; and I think he has in General, chosen the better side of the Argument. My In∣tention is only to consider cur∣sorily his manner of handling it; and this, I doubt, will not appear so Generous as the Design it self. He, has you know, opposed Sir William Temple, one of the most Gentlemanly Writers of our Age and Na∣tion;

but not with so much Respect and Decency as became either his own, or Sir William's Character. I cannot imagine what Reason he had for it; unless he thought it might be some Honour to him, if he could provoke (tho' rudely) so wor∣thy an Antagonist to enter the Lists with him. But he was unluckily disappointed in that part of his Design, and has there∣fore in this Second Edition re∣tracted many of those under∣valuing Criticisms, that are too frequently urged and insisted upon in the first. But as to the Book it self. It seems Mr. Wotton was engaged by some Friends, or Patrons, to try what could be said in Defence of Modern Learning, against that

of the Ancients. Upon which account he found himself obli∣ged to Consider, who had ap∣peared on the other side. And therefore, least he should be accused of betraying his Cause, proclaims open War against Sir William Temple, for having writ∣ten an Essay in Honour of the Ancients. In order to subdue this popular Adversary, he nice∣ly examines every Word that seems disagreeable to his own Notions; and, least any thing should be wanting to compleat his Victory, quarrels with him about insignificant Trifles wholly forreign to his Point. Any other Man would have thought it sufficient to have refuted the Arguments in general, without citeing and referring so parti∣cularly

to almost every Line. But then Mr. Wotton had lost his End; it was his Business to attack Sir William Temple. And there∣fore he begins his Book like a good Disputant, with General Reflections on the state of the Que∣stion; then proceeds to examine his Hypothesis, and talks much of inquiring into the particular points, that arise from his General Propo∣sitions; of controverting his Argu∣ments; of using proper Mediums; of reasoning severely, &c. Who, upon reading this, would not imagine our Reflecter had some knotty Syllogistical Piece to deal with; and was at least sup∣porting the Reformation and Church of England against a Second Bellarmine? But all this mighty Bustle is how to con∣fute

an Essay; which is so far from being penned in a Scho∣lastick or Polemical Way, that it is writ (as all this Author's Works are, and as all Essays certainly ought to be) in the most easie unaffected Style ima∣ginable. Which is more than I can say of Mr. Wotton's Book; for (tho' I read it with no manner of Prejudice, but with a desire only of being pleased and informed) it appears to me to be done in a stiff ar∣tificial manner. There is in∣deed a Flowingness of fine Language, and Rapidity of smooth Numbers and Periods; but then the same dance and chime of Words is eternally sounding in one's Ears, and the same fine Expressions brought in over and over again,

and affected even to an Impro∣priety; the most nauseous En∣tertainment a Reader can have. For We love Variety; and the best Expressions, as well as Things, con∣stantly reiterated will certainly dis∣gust. But this may look very odd, (especially to the Logical Reasoning Mr. Wotton) to assert all, and prove nothing; and yet I am resolved neither to trou∣ble you nor my self with quote∣ing his Book, which would be the only way, I know of, to prove any thing for or against his Style. I must therefore ap∣peal to your own Judicious Taste for the Truth of what I say; and in the mean time I will venture to assert one thing further, viz. That whatever be∣comes of Sir William Temple's

Hypothesis, his Essay will al∣ways be read with more Plea∣sure, than Mr. Wotton's Reflecti∣ons with Profit. For, notwith∣standing all his mighty Pomp and Boast of much Reading, if we come to examine what Discoveries he has made, what new Lights he hath given the World on this Subject, I be∣lieve we shall find nothing, that was not well known before to any Man of the least acquain∣tance with Letters. And if he was as considerable, as he thinks himself, that is, so considerable as to represent the Learning of the present Age, these Reflecti∣ons might very well be alledged against him by those of the Op∣posite Party, and silence him at once. Perhaps you may

fancy by this General Dislike, that I am byassed in my Opi∣nion, but I assure you what I have said is my real Judgment, which tho' it may be mistaken, is however Impartial. I have no Design of gaining Sir W. Temple's Favour, or incurring Mr. Wotton's Displeasure. I only take the Li∣berty (which all Authors must allow their Readers) of speak∣ing my Thoughts freely, and as such I offer them to You.

I have now done with Mr. Wotton, and am come to his Friend Dr. Bentley. Who has for some Reasons best known to himself, not only en∣gaged a single Gentleman, but a whole Society, upon a much less important Argument than

that of Antient and Modern Learning; viz. Whether those Epistles and Fables common∣ly ascribed to Phalaris and AEsop, &c. be truly genuine or not? The Debate is now de∣pending; and, however insig∣nificant You and I may take it to be, is prosecuted with as much Heat and Contention on both sides, as if some Article of Eternal Life was immediate∣ly concerned in it. I shall not presume to interpose one word in so hot a Dispute; only as a Stander-by I may be allow∣ed to give my Sentiments of their Behaviour that manage it. First then, The Ground of the Quarrel is generally looked up∣on as highly ridiculous on the Dr's. part, even allowing the

matter of Fact to be just as he himself has stated it. For there was no such keen Sting in the Words he resents, [viz. collatas etiam (sc. Epistolas) cum MS ^o. in Bibliothecâ Regiâ, cujus mihi copiam ulteriorem Bibliothecarius pro singulari suâ humanitate nega∣vit] that could have provoked any discreet or sensible Man, whose time did not lye upon his hands, to write a Long and Laboured Dissertation (on a Sub∣ject widely remote from his Profession, and of little or no advantage at all to any other part of the Learned World,) that he might have a proper Opportunity of retaliating upon his Adversaries. But if he de∣nied Mr. Boyl the King's Ma∣nuscript in so rude a manner,

as is pretended on the other side; I think Mr. Boyl was so far from being the Aggressor, that he was obliged in his own Defence, to give the World some Reason why it was not colla∣ted; and he could not say less than he did in his Preface. This is my Opinion of the be∣ginning of this Controversie: But the Dr. perhaps knew better how to apply the Reflection than I do; and had therefore Reason not to brook it. But before he could conveniently re∣tort this bitter unpardonable Iro∣ny, he found it necessary to complement Mr. Boyl out of his Title to the Edition of Phalaris; that he might clear his way to some other Gentlemen he had a greater mind to be dealing with,

and fix the Affront (as he pretends) where it ought to be. All this while Mr. Boyl is made a Child and a Tool of, to serve these malicious Ends. He is a Thing of great hopes, and as such the Dr. says he is willing to en∣courage him. But is so far from looking upon him as a suitable Antagonist, that out of his great Goodness and Condescension he offers by way of Tutor, to give him a clearer View into the Depths and Secrets of Learning, than those Ignorant Pretenders, under whose Care he was bred, have been able to do. The Style of this Book is as re∣markable for it's Roughness and Operoseness, as Mr. Wotton's for its Flowingness. But instead of venturing to Criticize upon

it, I have here rather chose to Transcribe a few Lines, which may serve to give you a small taste of the Man as well as the Book. In the Pre∣lude to this grand Dispute he looks bigg, and says, Phalaris has the Plea and Right of Posses∣sion, and I shall not go to dispossess him, as those have done before me, by an Arbitrary Sentence in his own Tyrannical way; but proceed with him upon lawful Evidence, and a fair impartial Tryal. And I am very much mistaken in the nature and force of my Proofs, if ever any Man that reads them persist in his old Opinion of making Phalaris an Author. After he has quite confounded the Epistles, he pro∣ceeds to his Triumph over the Late Edition; and gives an Ac∣count

of his own Extraordi∣nary Character and Learning, in the following Words. Pro singulari suâ humanitate! I could produce several Letters from Learned Professors abroad, whose Books our Editors may in time be fit to read; wherein these very same words are said of me candidly and seriously. For I endeavour to oblige even For∣reigners by all Courtesie and Hu∣manity; much more would I encou∣rage and assist any useful Designs at home. And I heartily wish I could do any service to that young Gentle∣man of great hopes, whose Name is set to the Edition. I can do him no greater at present, than to re∣move some blemishes from the Book, which is ascribed to him; which I desire may be taken aright, to be no Disparagement to himself, but a

Reproof only to his Teachers, &c. While I write this, I cannot but fancy it is dictated to me by some Haughty School-master, with his Rod in his Hand. It has such a strong Tang of that kind of Pride, that no Body else could have said it. He professes indeed to dislike an arbitrary Tyrannical Way of Writing; but has not Skill e∣nough at the same time to conceal it in himself. But why should I quarrel with the Dr. for that which is a fault in his Nature, and which he has as little Inclination as Power to correct? I have nothing more to add, only to assure him I am not singular in my Sentiments. The same Censure is passed up∣on his Book by all I have dis∣coursed

with about it: And some of them were such as had no great Friendship for his Adversaries.

You are by this time pro∣bably prepared to expect I should determine in favour of Mr. Boyl, (his Quarrel I mean, for I do not interfere with the Argument.) And truly so I should, if he had not lately print∣ed a Book in his own Defence; which I will here give you a short touch of: But it must be in the same superficial man∣ner I have done of the Two Books already dismissed.

This Piece cannot be exempt∣ed from as many Faults at least, as have been charged upon the

Dr's. They are indeed Faults of a different kind: The Dr. all along entertains his Reader with Insolence and Pedantry; and this Gentleman with School∣boy's Jests and little Witticisms. Two Extreams equally distant from fine Satyr; which I the rather mention, because I believe it was more immediately both their Aims, than any true design to Examine the Argument in Debate. But Mr. Boyl has in a great measure acknowledged, that this is not his Performance. For he says, he employed some Friends at Christ-Church, to con∣sult such Authors as would be of use to him. And I believe the Wits of that place could hardly content themselves with dry Citations only, and not be

provoked now and then to exercise the Talent they are so remarkeable for; especially in a Case that concerned them so nearly. There are many more Reasons to suspect Mr. Boyl in this than in the Edition of Phalaris. But I shall only hint at such, as will be no Disho∣nour for him to acquiesce in.

Any one Person certainly would have been quite weary of jesting, before he had swell'd a Book to half this Volume. And as for the Honour of the Quotations, he himself does not contend for it. If I may be permitted to suggest my own Opinion; I fancy this Book was written (as most Publick Com∣positions in that College are)

by a Select Club. There is such a profusion of Wit all along, and such variety of Points and Raille∣ry, that every Man seems to have thrown in a Repartee or so in his turn, and the most Ingenious Dr. Aldrich no doubt was at the Head of them, and smoaked and punned plentifully on this Occasion. It brings the old Character of Christ-Church very fresh into my Mind; which you may remember di∣stinguished it self from the rest of the University, not by its Ex∣traordinary Learning, but its abo∣minable Arrogance. Methinks a little Consideration would have restrained their Fury a∣gainst Dr. Bentley, for being guilty of their own darling Fault; and which the World will justifie him in returning

upon them. Pride and Inso∣lence are certainly as allowable in him, who is a Scholar, as in some young Men, who can∣not reasonably be supposed to be so. Not that I would ju∣stifie such a Character in any Man of twice Dr. Bentley's Learning; for he has made him∣self ridiculous by it, as I have observed before. But I would very fain know what Prero∣gative some People have of san∣ctifying it in themselves, when they have naturally such Scorn and Contempt for it in others. The Dean, instead of checking this intolerable Temper, encourages and promotes it by his own worthy Example. It is not long since he published a small Compendium of Logick, for the

Use of Mr. Boyl, (upon which account I name it,) wherein he gives a Specimen of his haugh∣ty Dogmatical Humour, and takes all Opportunities of in∣veighing very warmly against the Author of L' Art de Penser, a most ingenious and useful Writer. He makes nothing of calling him Coxcomb, Fool, and Blockhead, for dareing to dissent from Aristotle, and for presumeing to advance any thing New, upon a Subject that great Man had quite exhausted so many Ages before him. One would imagine that this learn∣ed Dr. had done his Master Stagyrite some Notable Service. But his Book is only an Epi∣tome of Sanderson, and one of the worst, most obscure Epi∣tome's

I ever read. He has forsooth endeavoured to turn Sanderson's plain intelligible Lan∣guage into terse polite Latin: Which Sanderson could have done as well as he, had he not in∣dustriously avoided it, and with good reason. For he knew, if the Phrase was too laboured, the Rules would still become more obscure; and the Student con∣sequently perplexed with an un∣necessary Pomp and Ornament of Style. But this will be no Fault, when the present Con∣troversie comes to be turned in∣to Latin.

Pedantry is another thing, which they have severely brand∣ed Dr. Bentley with. But this too might have been spared

as well as his Insolence, and upon the same Account. For it is as errant a sign of Pedan∣try to spend ones Time in publishing bad Editions of Old Authors, and to be highly sol∣licitous about the various Read∣ings of them, which former Editions have only neglected, because they were insignificant; as to affect the Use of hard words, and to lard English Writings with Greek and Latin. I think Dr. Aldrich is pretty Notorious at present, for imploying his young unexperienced Students this way. He betrayed Mr. Boyl into the impertinent Controversie he and his Friends are now engaged in; and is still involving others in the Quarrel. We have lately had an Edition of some of

AEsop's (or, as they are called, AEsopical) Fables, in the Preface to which, the young Editor, with a Pertness peculiar to that Col∣lege, has made a very slight∣ing mention of Dr. Bentley. Such a one as I think the Dean ought to have retrench∣ed upon the score of good Breeding; a thing they so fre∣quently exact from others. But instead of that, I find in ano∣ther Book published last Week, called Examen Poeticum Duplex, &c. that he has suffered some of his College to make Sport with him in their Occasional Compositions. Amongst other things, some Body has endea∣voured his Character in two Epigrams, one of which I have here transcribed for You. I am

assured they were made in Christ-Church, and either by the Dean himself, or a Brother Doctor at least.

Intellectus agens illuminat phantasmata.

Ad R. B. Bibliotheca∣rium philocriticum.

Quidam acer doctus{que} (ipsi si cre∣dere possis) Scriptorum judex, & benè notus homo, Dum terit assiduè chartas, rigidi{que} magistri Argutum examen vocula quaeque Jubit;

Saevit•• atrox impunè hinc inde minan∣tia vibrat Arma, ferus calamo, nec minùs ungue ferus. Arbiter ipse unus: Quippe hic mihi perplacet Author, Sit sacer; ille mihi displicet, in∣tereat. Ille idem mancis reddit sua membra Poetis, Siqua dies rapuit longa, vel ignis edax. Quicquid Aristotelis Gellive inter∣cidit, illi Tam notum, quàm qui prostat ubique liber. Praevidet ille etiam seclô scribenda futuro, Et nondum natum mente revolvit opus.

Bacchetum aspexti? minimè, nec curo; necesse est Haec fari, haud aliter scribere, novi hominem. O quàm deliri vis est foecunda ce∣rebri! Quid non ingenii vivida flamma potest? Te praebente facem pellucent, Mome, tenebrae, Splendorem fumus, somnia pondus habent.

Another Gentleman, of the same College, has strained hard in a Poem, intitled Articuli Pacis, to bring in a smart Verse upon him, viz.

Anglo-Graeco-Latino-crepundia Bent∣leiana.

But it may be some Satisfa∣ction to the Dr. that these are by no means the best Copies in the Collection. I have just read it over, and because I know you have a Value for such things, will send it you (with those Books you mentioned) by the first Opportunity. I think I cannot make a better Present of the kind.

But I had almost forgot what an Acquaintance of ours has often said upon this Argument, in Opposition to Dr. Bent∣ley, that if he had had either good Manners or good Sense, he would never have hastily fallen upon a Learned Body, that was so very able to justifie it self, and to confound him, it being the

most likely way to make a Shipwreck of the little Reputation he had got. In Answer to this, (for you see I have changed sides, and as the Case now stands, am en∣tirely for the Dr.) I have al∣ready confessed it my Opinion, that he was too forward in provoking the Dispute, and that he engaged himself in a great deal of unnecessary Trouble when he did it. But I cannot agree with our Friend in my Reasons why I think so. For he would have the College a Match infinitely above Dr. Bent∣ley; whereas I think, that part of it which was at first con∣cerned was rather below him, and upon that Account the Dr. should have been silent. He represents them as too for∣midable

a Society for any single Person to encounter, without Shipwrecking his Reputation, tho' he has the Truth on his side. But a Multitude is not always terrible, because it thinks it self so. Dr. Bentley knew well e∣nough the World had no such Opinions of them, and that both his Character and Argument would stand secure against all the weak Efforts they could make; which I fancy was one great Reason of his being too warm in his first Resentments. I hear he has now prepared an Answer to their Book, which I much wonder at. For the Abu∣sive Part of it is so blunt and ungenteel, that it does not af∣fect his Reputation at all; and the Authorities in the other are

so falsly cited and misapplied, that they answer themselves. In my little Reading, I can perceive several Mistakes, and I doubt not but the Dr. and others, who are more conver∣sant in such Authors, are able to detect many more. But if I might advise both Parties, they should employ their Time and Pains upon some more Useful Subject. There has been too much Dust raised about this al∣ready.

Thus, Sir, you see, by striving to say a great deal in so nar∣row a Compass and short a Time, I have scarce said any thing; I have but just named those Topicks, that should have been minutely considered, to

have done the Subject right, rather proposing all along than proving my Opinions, which I submit to your better Judgment. And I hope you will put the most Favourable Construction upon my Endeavours, if I have been more willing than able to Ob∣serve your Commands.

I am SIR, Yours, &c. T. R.