Lex, rex The law and the prince : a dispute for the just prerogative of king and people : containing the reasons and causes of the most necessary defensive wars of the kingdom of Scotland and of their expedition for the ayd and help of their dear brethren of England : in which their innocency is asserted and a full answer is given to a seditious pamphlet intituled Sacro-sancta regum majestas, or, The sacred and royall prerogative of Christian kings, under the name of J. A. but penned by Jo. Maxwell the excommunicate P. Prelat. : with a scripturall confutation of the ruinous grounds of W. Barclay, H. Grotius, H. Arnisœus, Ant. de Domi P. Bishop of Spalata, and of other late anti-magistratical royalists, as the author of Ossorianum, D. Fern, E. Symmons, the doctors of Aberdeen, &c. : in XLIV questions.

Lex, Rex.

QUEST. I. In what sense Government is from God?

I Reduce all that I am to speak of the power of Kings, to the Author or efficient. 2. The matter or subject. 3. The form or power. 4. The end and fruit of their Government; And 5. to some cases of resistance. Hence,

Quest. I. Whether Government be warranted by a divine Law?

The question is, either of Government in generall, or of the par∣ticular species of Government; such as are Government by one on∣ly, called Monarchy; the Government by some chief leading men, named Aristocracie; the Government by the people, going under the name of Democracie. 2. We cannot but put difference betwixt the institution of the Office, to wit, Government, and the designa∣tion of person, or persons to the Office. 3. What is warranted by the direction of natures light, is warranted by the Law of nature, and consequently by a divine Law; for who can deny the Law of nature to be a divine Law?

That power of Government in generall must be from God:* 1.1 I make good, 1. Because, Rom. 13.—1. there is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of God. 2. God command∣eth obedience, and so subjection of conscience to powers, Rom. 13.5. Wherefore we must be subject not onely for wrath (or civill punishment) but for conscience sake, 1 Pet. 2.13. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake▪ whether it be to the King as Supreme, &c. Now God onely by a divine Law can lay a band

of subjection on the conscience, tying men to guilt, and punishment, if they transgr••sse.

* 1.22. Conclus. All civill power is immediately from God in its root. In that, 1. God hath made man a sociall creature, and one who in∣clineth to be governed by man; then certainly, he must have put this power in mans nature: so are we by good reason taught by (a) 1.3 Aristotle.

2. God and nature intendeth the policie and peace of mankinde, then must God and nature have given to mankinde, a power to com∣passe this end; and this must be a power of Government. I see not then why John Prelate, Master Maxwel the excommunicate P. of Rosse, who speak••th in the name (b) 1.4 of I. Armagh, had reason to say, That he feared that we fancied, that the Government of Superiours was onely for the more perfit▪ but have no Authoritie over or above the perfit, N••c Rex, nec Lex, justo posita. He might have imputed this to the Brasilians, who teach, That every single man hath the power of the sword to revenge his own injuries, as (c) 1.5 Molina saith.

QUEST. II. Whether or not, Government be warranted by the Law of nature.

AS domestick societie is by natures instinct, so is civill societie naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary, in modo, in the manner of coalescing. Politick power of Government, agreeth not to man, singly, as one man, except in that root of reasonable nature; but supposing that men be combined in societies, or that one family cannot contain a societie, it is naturall, that they joyn in a civill so∣cietie, though the manner of Union in a politick body; as (d) 1.6 Bo∣dine saith, be voluntary, Gen. 10.10. Gen. 15.7. and (e) 1.7 Suarez saith, That a power of making Laws, is given by God as a property flowing from nature, Qui dat formam, dat consequ••ntia ad formam, Not by any speciall action or grant, different from creation, nor will he have it to result from nature, while men be united into one politick body: which Union being made, that power followeth without any new action of the will,

* 1.8We are to distinguish betwixt a power of Government, and a power of Government by Magistracy. That we defend our selves from violence by violence, is a consequent of unbroken and sin-lesse nature; but that we defend our selves by devolving our power over in the hands of one, or more Rulers, seemeth rather positively morall, then naturall, except that it is naturall for the childe to ex∣pect

help against violence, from his father: For which cause I judge that learned Senator (f) 1.9 Ferdinandus Vasquius said well,* 1.10 That Princedom, Empire, Kingdom, or Iurisdiction hath its rise from a positive and secundary law of Nations, and not from the law of pure Nature. (g) 1.11 The Law saith, there is no law of Nature agree∣ing to all living creatures for superiority; for by no reason in Na∣ture, hath a Boar dominion over a Boar, a Lyon over a Lyon, a Dragon over a Dragon, a Bull over a Bull; And if all Men be born equally free (as I hope to prove) there is no reason in Nature, why one Man should be King and Lord over another; therefore while I be otherwise taught by the forecasten Prelate Maxwell, I conceive all jurisdiction of Man over Man, to be as it were Artificiall and Po∣sitive, and that it inferreth some servitude, whereof Nature from the womb hath freed us, if you except that subjection of children to pa∣rents, and the wife to the husband; and the (h) 1.12 Law saith, De jure gentium secundarius est omnis principatus. 2. This also the Scripture proveth, while as the exalting of Saul or David above their Bre∣thren to be Kings, and Captains of the Lords people, is ascribed, not to Nature, (for King and Beggar spring of one clay-mettall) but to an act of Divine bounty and grace, above Nature, so Psal. 78.70, 71. He took David from following the Ewes, and made him King and feeder of his people, 1 Sam. 13.13.

There is no cause why Royallists should deny Government to be naturall, but to be altogether from God, and that the Kingly power is immediatly and only from God; because it is not naturall to us to subject to Government, but against Nature, and against the hair for us to resign our liberty to a King, or any Ruler or Rulers; for this is much for us, and proveth not but Government is naturall; it con∣cludeth that a power of Government tali modo, by Magistracy, is not naturall, but this is but a Sophisme; a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ad illud quod est dictum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 this speciall of Government, by resignation of our liberty, is not naturall; Ergo, power of Government is not naturall; it follow∣eth not, a negatione sp••ciei non sequitur negatio generis, non est homo, ergo non est animal.* 1.13 And by the same reason I may by an antecedent will, agree to a Magistrate and a Law, that I may be ruled in a poli∣tick Society, and by a consequent will onely, yea and conditionally onely agree to the penalty and punishment of the Law; and it is most true, no man by the instinct of Nature giveth consent to Penall Laws as Penall, for Nature doth not teach a man, nor incline his spi∣rit to yeeld that his life shall be taken away by the sword, and his

blood shed, except in this remote ground, a man hath a disposition, that a veine be cutt by the Physitian, or a Member of his body cut off, rather then the whole body and life perish by some con∣tagious disease; but here reason in cold blood, not a naturall dispo∣sition is the neerest prevalent cause, and disposer of the businesse. When therefore a communitie by natures instinct and guidance, in∣cline to Government, and to defend themselves from violence; they do not by that instinct formally agree to Government by Magi∣strates; and when a naturall conscience giveth a deliberate consent to good Laws, as to this, He that doth violence to the life of a man, by man shall his blood be shed, Gen. 9.6. He doth tacitely consent that his own blood shall be shed; but this he consenteth unto consequent∣ly, tacitely, and conditionally. If he shall do violence to the life of his brother: Yet so as this consent proceedeth not from a disposition every way purely naturall. I grant, reason may be necessita∣ted to assent to the conclusion, being as it were forced by the preva∣lent power of the evidence of an insuperable and invincible light in the premises, yet from naturall affections there resulteth an act of self-love, for self-preservation. So David shall condemn another rich man who hath many Lambs, and robbeth his poor brother of his one Lamb, and yet not condemn himself, though he be most deep in that fault,* 1.14 1 Sam. 12.5, 6. yet all this doth not hinder, but Government even by Rulers hath its ground in a secondary Law of nature, which Lawyers call, secundariò jus naturale, or jus gentium secundarium; a secondary Law of nature, which is granted by Plato, and denied by none of sound judgement in a sound sense, and that is this, Licet vim virepellere, It is lawfull to repeal violence by violence, and this is a speciall act of the Magistrate.

2. But there is no reason, why we may not defend by good rea∣sons, that politick Societies, Rulers, Cities, and Incorporations, have their rise and spring from the secundary Law of nature: 1. Be∣cause by Natures Law, Family-Government hath its warrant; and Adam though there had never been any positive Law, had a power of governing his own family, and punishing malefactors; but as (a) 1.15 Tannerus saith well, and as I shall prove God willing, this was not properly a Royall or Monarchicall power; and I judge by the reasoning of (b) 1.16 Sotus, (c) 1.17 Molina, and (d) 1.18 Victoria. By what reason a Family hath a power of Government, and of punishing Malefactors,* 1.19 that same power must be in a societie of men, Suppose that societie were not made up of Families, but of single persons;

for the power of punishing ill-doers doth not reside in one single man of a familie, or in them all, as they are single private persons, but as they are in a familie. But this argument holdeth not but by pro∣portion; for paternall government, or a fatherly power of parents o∣ver their families, and a politick power of a Magistrate over many families, are powers different in nature, the one being warranted by natures law even in its species, the other being in its spece and kind warranted by a positive law, and in the generall only warranted by a law of nature.

2. If we once lay the supposition,* 1.20 that God hath immediately by the law of nature appointed there should be a Government; and mediately defined by the dictate of naturall light in a communitie, that there shall be one, or many Rulers to governe the Communitie; then the Scriptures arguments may well be drawn out of the school of nature: as, 1. The powers that are, be of God;* 1.21 therefore natures light teacheth, that we should be subject to these powers. 2. It is against natures light to resist the ordinance of God. 3. Not to feare him to whom God hath committed the sword, for the terror of evill doers. 4. Not to honour the publike rewarder of well-doing. 5. Not to pay tribute to him for his worke. Therefore I see not but (e) 1.22 Go∣varruvias, (f) 1.23 Soto, (g) 1.24 Suarez, have rightly said, that power of Government is immediately from God, and this or this definite pow∣er is mediately from God, proceeding from God by the mediation of the consent of a Communitie, which resigneth their power to one or moe Rulers: and to me (h) 1.25 Barclaius saith the same: quamvis po∣pulus potentiae largitor videatur, &c.

QUEST. III. Whether Royall Power and definite forms of Government be from God?

THe King may be said to be from God and his word in these seve∣all notions. 1. By way of permission, Ier. 43.10. Say to them, thus saith the Lord of hoasts the God of Israel,* 1.26 Behold I will send and take Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon, my servant, and will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and he shall spread his royall pavilion over them. And thus God made him a Catholick King, and gave him all Nations to serve him, Jer. 27.6, 7▪ 8. though he was but an unjust Tyrant, and his sword the best title to those crownes.

2. The King is said to be from God, by way of naked approba∣tion. God giving to a people power to appoint what Government they shall thinke good, but instituting none in speciall, in his Word. This way some make Kingly power to be from God in the generall,

but in the particular to be an invention of men, negatively lawfull, and not repugnant to the Word, as the wretched Popish ceremo∣nies are from God. But we teach no such thing: let (i) 1.27 Maxwell free his Master (k) 1.28 Bellarmine and other Iesuites, with whom he sideth in Romish Doctrine: we are free of this. Bellarmine saith that politick power in generall is warranted by a Divine law; but the particular formes of politick power, he meaneth Monarchie, with the first, is not by Divine right, but de jure ••entium, by the law of nations, and sloweth immediately from humane election, as all things, saith he, that appertein to the law of Nations. So Monarchie to Bellar∣mine is but an humane invention, as Mr. Maxwell his Surplice is: and D. Ferne, sect. 3. p. 13. saith with Bellarmine.

3. A King is said to be from God, by particular designation, as he appointed Saul by name for the crown of Israel. Of this here∣after.

* 1.294. The Kingly or Royall office is from God by divine institution and not by naked approbation: for first, we may well prove Aarons Priesthood to be of divine institution, because God doth appoint the Priests qualification from his familie, bodily perfections, and his charge. And we take the Pastor to be by divine law and Gods insti∣tution, because the Holy Ghost, 1 Tim. 3.1, 2, 3, 4. describeth his qualification, so may we say that the Royall power is by divine insti∣tution, because God mouldeth him, Deut. 17.15. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, one from amongst thy brethren, &c. Rom. 2 13. There is no power but of God, the powers that be, are ordained of God. 3. That power must be ordained of God as his own ordinance, to which we owe subjecti∣on, for conscience, and not only for feare of punishment: but every power is such, Rom. 13.4. To resist the Kingly power, is to resist God. 5. He is the Minister of God for our good. 6. He beareth the sword of God to take vengeance upon ill-doers. 7. The Lord expresly saith, 1 Pet. 2.17. Feare God, honour the King, v. 13. Submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it be to the King as supreme, 14. or unto governours, as unto those that are sent by him, &c. Tit. 3. Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers: and so the fift Commandement layeth obedience to the King on us, no lesse then to our parents. Whence I conceive that power to be of God, to which by the morall law of God, we owe per∣petuall subjection and obedience. 8. Kings and all Magistrates are Gods, and Gods deputies and lieutenants upon earth, Ps. 82.1.6, 7.

Exod. 22.8. Exod. 4.16. and therefore their Office must be a law∣full ordinance of God. 9. By their Office they are feeders of the Lords people, Ps. 78.70.71.72. the shields of the earth, Ps. 47.9. nursing fathers of the Church, Ps. 49.23. Captaines over ••he Lords people 1 Sam. 9.19.10. It is a great Iudg••ment of God, when a land wanteth the benefit of such ordinances of God, Esay 3 1, 2.3.6, 7.11. The execution of their office is an act of the just Lord of he••v••n a••d earth, not onely by permission, but according to Gods revealed Will in his Word; their judgement is not the judgement of men, but of the Lord, 2 Chron. 19.6. and their Throne is the Throne of God, 1 Chron. 19.21.12. (a) 1.30 Hierom saith, to punish murtherers and sacrilegious persons is not bloud-shed, but the mini∣stery and service of good Lawes. So if the King be a living law by Office, and the law put in execution which God hath commanded, then as the Morall Law is by divine institution, so must the Of∣ficer of God be, who is Custos & vindex legis divinae, the keeper, preserver, and avenger of Gods Law, and (b) 1.31 Basilius, this is the Princes Office, Vt opem serat virtuti, malitiam vero impugnet, when Paulinus Treverensis, Lucifer Metropolitane of Sardinia, Dionysius Mediolanensis, and other Bishops, were commanded by Constantine to write against Athanasius, they answered, Regnum non ipsius esse, sed d••i, aquo acceperit, the Kingdom was Gods, not his; as (c) 1.32 Athanasius saith: (d) 1.33 Optatus Milevitanus helpeth us in the cause where he saith with Paul, VVe are to pray for heathen Kings. The genuine end of the Magistrate saith (e) 1.34 Epiphanius, is ut ad bonum ordinem uni∣versitatis mundi omnia ex deo bene disponantur atque administrentur. But some object, if the Kingly Power be of divine institution, then shall any other government be unlawfull and contrary to a divine institution, and so we condemne Aristocracy, and Democracy as un∣lawfull. Ans. This consequence were good, if Aristocracy and De∣mocracy were not also of divine institution, as all my arguments prove; for I judge they are not Governments different in nature, if we speake Morally and Theologically, onely they differ politically and positivel••; nor is Aristocracy any thing but diffused and inlarged Monarchy, and Monarchy is nothing but contracted Aristocra∣cy, even as it is the same hand, when the thumb and the foure fin∣gers are folded together, and when all the five fingers are dilated, and stretched out, and where ever God appointed a King, he never appointed him absolute, and a sole independent Angell, but joyned alwaies with him Iudges, who were no lesse to judge according to

the Law of God, 2 Chron. 19.6. then the King, Deut. 17. v. 15. And in an obligation morall of judging righteously, the conscience of the Monarch, and the conscience of the inferiour Iudges are equal∣ly, with an immediate subjection under the King of Kings, for there is here a co-ordination of consciences, and no subordination, for it is not in the power of the inferiour Iudge to judge, Quoad specifica∣tionem, as the King commandeth him, because the judgement is neither the Kings, nor any mortall mans, but the Lords, 2 Chro∣nicles 19.6, 7.

Hence all the three formes are from God, but let no man say, if they be all indifferent and equally of God, societies and Kingdomes are left in the dark, and know not which of the three they shall pitch upon, because God hath given to them no speciall direction, for one rather than for another. But this is easily answered, that a repub∣lick appoint Rulers to governe them, is not an action indifferent, but a Morall action,* 1.35 because to set no Rulers over themselves I conceive were a breach of the fift Commandement, which com∣mandeth government to be one or other. 2. It is not in mens free will that they have government or no government, because it is not in their free will to obey, or not to obey the acts of the Court of nature, which is Gods Court, and this Court enacteth that societies suffer not mankind to perish, which must necessarily follow, if they appoint no government; also it is proved else where, that no Mo∣rall acts in their exercises and use are left indifferent to us; so then, the aptitude and temper of every Common-wealth to Monarchy, ra∣ther then to Democracy, or Aristocracy is Gods Warrant, and nea∣rest call to determine the wills and liberty of people to pitch upon a Monarchy, Hic & nunc, rather then any other forme of Govern∣ment, though all the three be from God, even as single life and Marriage are both the lawfull Ordinances of God, and the consti∣tution and temper of the body is a calling to either of the two; not are we to think that Aristocracy and Democracy are either unlawfull Ordinances, or mens inventions, or that those societies which want Monarchy doe therefore live in sins.

But some say, that Peter calleth any form of Government, an humane Ordinance,* 1.36 1 Pet. 2.13. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Therefore Monarchy can be no Ordinance of God. Answ. (f) 1.37 Rivetus, It is called an Ordinance of man, not because it is an invention of man, and not an Ordinance of God, but respectu subjecti; (g) 1.38 Piscator, Not because man is the efficient cause of Magistracie, but because they are men

who are Magistrates. (h) 1.39 Diodatus, Obey Princes and Magistrates, or Governours made by men, or amongst men. (i) 1.40 Oecumenius, an hu∣mane constitution, because it is made by an humane disposition, and created by humane suffrages. (k) 1.41 Dydimus, presides presidents made by men. (l) 1.42 Cajetanus, (m) 1.43 Estius, Every creature of God (as Preach the Gospel to every creature) in authority. But I take the word every creature of man, to be put 1. Emphatically, to commend the worth of obedience to Magistrates, though 〈◊〉〈◊〉 men, when we do it for the Lords sake: Therefore (n) 1.44 Betrandu•• Cardinalis Ednen∣sis saith, he speaketh so for the more necessi••y of merit; and (o) 1.45 Glossa Ordinaria saith, Be subject to all powers, Etiam ex in∣fidelibus & incredulis, Even of infidels and unbeleevers. (p) 1.46 Lyra∣nus, For though they be men▪ the image of God shineth in them; and the Syriack, as (q) 1.47 Lorinus saith, leadeth us thereunto, (r) 1.48 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lechullechum benai anasa. Obey all the children of men that are in authority. 2. It is an Ordinance of men, not effectively; as if it were an invention, and a dream of men: But 2. subjectively, because exercised by man. 3. Objectively, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for the good of men, and for the externall mans peace and safety especially; Whereas Church-Officers are for the spirituall good of mens souls. And (s) 1.49 Durandus saith well, Civill power according to its institu∣tion is of God, and according to its acquisition, and way of use, its of man. And we may thus farre call the forms of Magistrates, an humane Ordinance, That some Magistrates are ordained to care for mens lives, and matters criminall, of life and death, and some for mens Lands and estates; some for commodities by Sea, and some by Land; and Magistrates according to these Determinations or humane Ordinances.

QUEST. IIII. Whether the king be only and imediatly from God, & not from the people.

THat this question may be the clearer, we are to set down these Considerations.

1. The question is, Whether the Kingly Office it self come from God; I conceive it is, and floweth from the people,* 1.50 not by formall institution; as if the people had by an act of reason, devised and excogitated such a power: God ordained the power; it is from the people onely by a virtuall emanation, in respect that a community having no Government at all, may ordain a King, or appoint an A∣ristocracie. But the question is, concerning the designation of the person? Whence is it that this man, rather then this man, is crowned

King? and whence is it, from God immediatly, and onely, that this man rather then this man, and this race or family rather then that race and family is chosen for the Crowne? or is it from the people also, and their free choise? for the Pastor and the Doctors Offi••e is from Christ onely; but that Iohn rather then Thomas be the Doctor or the Pastor, is from the will; and choice of men, the Presbyters and people.

* 1.512. The Royall power is three wayes in the people; 1. Radical∣ly and virtually, as in the first subject. 2. Collativè vel communica∣tivè, by way of free donation, they giving it to this man, not to this man that he may rule over them. 3. Limitatè; They giving it so, as these three acts remaine with the people; 1. That they may measure out, by ounce weights, so much Royall power, and no more, and no lesse. 2. So as they may limit, moderate, and set banks, and marches to the excercise. 3. That they give it out, con∣ditionatè, upon this, and this condition, that they may take again to themselves what they gave out, upon condition, if the condition be violated: The first I conceive is cleere, 1. because if every living creature have radically in them a power of selfe-preservation to de∣fend themselves from violence, as we see Lyons have pawes, some beasts have hornes,* 1.52 some clawes; men being reasonable creatures, united in societie, must have power in a more reasonable and hono∣rable way to put this power of warding off violence, in the hands of one or moe Rulers, to defend themselves by Magistrates. 2. If all men be borne, as concerning civill power, alike; (for no man com∣meth out of the wombe with a Diadem on his head, or a Scepter in his hand) and yet men united in a societie may give crown and scep∣ter to this man, and not to this man; then this power was in this uni∣ted societie, but it was not in them formally, for they should then all have been one King, and so both above and superiour, and below and inferiour to themselves, which we cannot say: therefore this power must have been virtually in them, because neither man, nor commu∣nitie of men can give that which they neither have formally, nor vir∣tually in them. 3. Royalists cannot deny, but Cities have power to choose and create inferiour Magistrates, ergo, many Cities united have power to create an higher Ruler; for Royall power is but the united and superlative power of inferiour Judges, in one greater Judge, whom they call a King.

* 1.532 Conclus. The power of creating a man a King, is from the peo∣ple, 1. Because those who may create this man a King, rather then

thi•• man, they have power to appoint a King. For a comparative act on doth positively inferre an action if a man have a power to marry this woman, not that woman; we may strongly conclude, ergo he hath power to marry, now, 1 King. 16. The people made Omri King, and not Zimri; and his sonne Achab, rather then Tibni the sonne of Sinath. Nor can it be replyed this was no law∣full power that the people used, for that cannot elude the argument, for, 1 King. 1. the people made Salomon King, and not Adonijah, though Adonijah was the elder brother; they say, God did extraor∣dinarily both make the Office, and designe Salomon to be King, the people had no hand in it, but approved Gods fact. Answer. This is that we say, God by the people, by Nathan the Prophet, and the servants of David, and the States crying, (God save King Salomon) made Salomon King; and here is a reall action of the people. God is the first Agent in all acts of the Creature, where a people maketh choise of a man to be their King, the States doe no other thing un∣der God but create this man, rather then another; and we cannot here find two actions, one of God, another of the people; but in one, and the same action; God by the peoples free suffrages & voices cre∣ateth such a man King, passing by many thousands, and the people are not patientes in the action, because by the authoritative choise of the States, the man is made of a private man, and no King, a publick person, and a crowned King, 2 Sam. 16.18. Hushai said to Abso∣lom, nay but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide, Iudg. 8.22. The men of Israel said to Gideon, Rule thou over us, Iudg. 9.6. The men of Se∣chem made Abimelech King, Iudg. 11.8.11. 2 King. 14.21. The people made Azariah King, 1 Sam. 12.1. 2 Chron. 23.3.

2. If God doth regulate his people in making such a man King,* 1.54 not such a man, then he thereby insinuateth that the people have a power to make such a man King, and not such a man. But God doth regulate his people in making a King. Ergo the people have a power to make such a man King, not such a man King. The Proposition is cleare, because Gods Law doth not regulate a non-e••s, a meere no∣thing, or an unlawfull power; nor can Gods holy Law regulate an unlawfull power, or an unlawfull action, but quite abolish it, and interdict it; the Lord setteth not downe rules and waies how men should not commit Treason, but the Lord commandeth loyalty, and simply interdicteth men of treason. 2. If people have then more po∣wer to create a King over themselves, then they had to make Pro∣phets,

then God forbidding them to choose such a man for their King, should say as much to his people; as if he would say, I com∣mand you to make Esaiah & Ieremiah Prophets over you, but not these and these men. This certainly should prove that not God onely, but the people also with God made Prophets; I leave this to the considerati∣on of the godly. The Prophets were immediatly called of God, to be Prophets, whether the people consented that they should be Pro∣phets, or not. Therefore God immediatly, and onely sent the Pro∣phets, not the people; but though God extraordinarily designed some men to be Kings, and annoynted them by his Prophets, yet were they never actually installed Kings, till the people made them Kings. I prove the assumption, Deut. 17.—14. When thou shalt say, I will set a King over me, like all the nations round about me. 15. Thou shalt in any wise set him King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, one from amongst thy brethren shalt thou set King over thee, thou maist not set a stranger over thee, which is not thy brother. Should not this be an unjust charge to the people, if God onely; without any action of the people, should immediatly set a King over them? Might not the people reply, We have no power at all to set a King over our selves, no more then we have power to make Esaiah a Prophet, who saw the visions of God, to what end then should God mocke us, and say, make a brother, and not a stranger King over you?

3. Expresly Scripture saith, that the people made the King, though under God, Iudg. 9.6. The men of Sechem made Abimelech King, 1 Sam. 11.15. And all the people went to Gilgall, and there they made Saul King before the Lord, 2 King. 10.5. We will not make any King. This had been an irrationall speech to Iehu, if both Iehu and the people held the Royalists Tenet, that the people had no power to make a King, nor any active or causative influence therein; but that God immediatly made the King, 1 Chron. 12.38. All these came with a perfect heart to make David King in Hebron; and all the rest were of one heart to make David King; on the words (a) 1.55 La∣vater saith, the same way are Magistrates now to be chosen; now this day God by an immediate Oracle from Heaven appointeth the Office of a King; but I am sure he doth not immediatly designe the man, but doth onely mark him out to the people, as one who hath the most royall indowments, and the due qualifications required in a lawfull Magistrate, by the Word of God, Exod. 18.21. Men of truth, hating covetousnesse, &c. Deut. 1.16, 17. men who will judge causes betwixt their brethren righteously, without respect of per∣sons,

1 Sam. 10.21. Saul was chosen out of the Tribes according to the Law of God, Deut. 17. they might not choose a stranger, and Abulensis, Serrarius, C••rnelius a lapide, Sancheiz, and other Popish Writers think that Saul was not onely anoynted with Oyle, first privately by Samuel, 1 Sam. 10.1, 2. but also at two other times before the people, once at Mizpeh, and another time at Gilgal by a Parliament, and a Convention of the States, and Samuel judged the voices of the people so essentiall to make a King, that Samuel doth not acknowledge him as formall King, 1 Sam. 10.7, 8, 17, 18, 19. though he honoured him, because he was to be King, 1. Sam. 9 23, 24. while the Tribes of Israel and Parliament were gathered to∣gether to make him King according to Gods Law, Deut, 17. as is evident. For Samuel, v. 20. caused all the Tribes of Israel to stand before the Lord, and the Tribe of Benjamin was taken; the Law pro∣vided one of their owne, not a stranger to raigne over them; and be∣cause some of the States of Parliament did not choose him, but being children of Belial, despised him in their heart, v. 27. therefore after King Saul, by that victory over the Ammonites, had conquered the affecti∣ons of all the people fully, v. 10, 11. Samuel would have his coronation & election by the Estates of Parliament renewed, at Gilgall, by all the people, v. 14, 15. to establish him King. 2. The Lord by Lots found out the Tribe of Benjamin. 3. The Lord found out the man, by name, Saul the sonne of Kish, when he did hide himselfe amongst the staffe, that the people might doe their part in creating of the King, whereas Samuel had annoynted him before; but the Text saith expresly that the people made Saul King, and Calvin, Martyr, Lavater, and Popish Writers, as Serrarius, Mendoza, Sancheiz, Cor∣nelius a Lapide, Ly••anus, Hugo▪ Cardinalis, Carthusius, Sanctius, doe all hence conclude that the people under God, make the King.

I see no reason why (b) 1.56 Barclaius should here distinguish a power of choosing a King, which he granteth the people hath, and a power of making a King, which he saith is only proper to God. Answ. Choo∣sing of a King is either a comparative crowning of this man,* 1.57 not this man; and if the people have this, its a creating of a King under God▪ who principally disposeth of Kings and Kingdomes: and this is e∣nough for us. The want of this, made Zimri no King: and those whom the Rulers of Iezreel at Samaria, 2 King. 10. refused to make Kings, no Kings. This election of the people made Athaliah a Prin∣cesse: the removall of it, and translation of the crown by the people

to Ioash, made her no Princesse: for I beseech you, what other cal∣ling of God hath a race of a familie, and a person to the crowne, but only the election of the States? There is now no voice from hea∣ven, no immediately inspired Prophets, such as Samuel and Elisha, to annoynt David, not Eliab; Solomon, not Adoniah. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or the heroick spirit of a Royall facultie of governing, is, I grant, from God only, not from the people: but I suppose that maketh not a King; for then many sitting on the throne this day, should be no Kings; and many private persons should be Kings. If he meane by the peoples choosing, nothing but the peoples approbative consent, posterior to Gods act of creating a King; let them shew us an act of God making Kings, and establishing royall power in such a familie, rather then in such a familie; which is prior to the peoples consent, distinct from the peoples consent, I believe there is none at all.

4. Arg. Hence I argue: If there be no calling or title on earth to tie the Crown to such a Familie and Person, but the suffrages of the peo∣ple; then have the line of such a familie, and the persons now, no calling of God, no right to the crown, but only by the suffrages of the people, except we say that there be no lawfull Kings on earth now, when Propheticall unction and designation to Crowns are ceased, contrary to expresse Scripture, Rom. 13.1, 2, 3. 1 Pet. 2.13, 14, 15, 16, 17.

But there is no title on earth now to tye crownes to families, to persons, but onely the suffrages of the people: for, 1. Conquest without the consent of the people, is but royall latrocinie, as we shall see. 2. There is no propheticall and immediate calling to King∣domes now. 3. The Lords giving of Regall parts is somewhat; but I hope Royallists will not deny but a child young in yeares and judg∣ment, may be a lawfull King. 3. Mr. Maxwell his appointing of the Kingly office, doth no more make one man a lawfull King, then an∣other: for this were a wide consequence. God hath appointed that Kings should be; ergo, Iohn a Stiles is a King; yea, ergo, David is a King: It followeth not. Therefore it remaineth only, that the suffrages of the people of God is that just title and divine calling that Kings have now to their crownes. I presuppose they have gifts to governe from God.

* 1.585. If the Lords immediate designation of David, and his annoin∣ting by the divine authoritie of Samuel, had been that which is alone without the election of the people, made David formally King of Israel, then there were two Kings in Israel at one time; for Samu∣el

annointed David, and so he was formally King, upon the ground layed by Royallists, that the King hath no royall power from the peo∣ple: and David after he himselfe was annointed by Samuel, divers times, calleth Saul the Lords anointed, and that by the inspiration of Gods spirit, as we and Royallists doe both agree. Now two lawfull supreme Monarchs in one Kingdome, I conceive to be most repug∣nant to Gods truth, and sound reason; for they are as repugnant as two most Highs, or as two Infinites. 2. It shall follow, that David all the while betwixt his anointing by Samuel, and his coronation by the suffrages of all Israel at Hebron. 1. Was in-lacking, in discharging and acquiting himselfe of his royall duty, God having made him for∣mally a King, and so laying upon him a charge to execute justice and judgement, and defend Religion, which he did not discharge. 2. All Davids suffering upon Davids part must be unjust, for, as King, he should have cut off the murtherer Saul, who killed the Priests of the Lord; especially seeing Saul by this ground must be a private mur∣therer, and David the only lawfull King. 3. David, if he was formally King, deserted his calling in flying to the Philistims; for a King should not forsake his Kingdome upon no hazards, even of his life, no more then a Pilot should give over the helme in an extreme storme:* 1.59 but certainly Gods dispensation in this warranteth us to say no man can be formally a lawfull King, without the suffrages of the peo••le•• for Saul, after Samuel from the Lord anointed him, remai∣ned a private man, and no King, till the people made him King, and elected him. And David, anointed by that same divine autho∣ritie, remained formally a Subject, and not a King, till all Israel made him King at Hebron. And Salom••n, though by God designed and ordained to be King, yet was never King, till the people made him King, 1 King. 1. ergo, there floweth something from the power of the people, by which he who is no King, now becommeth a King, formally, and by Gods lawfull call; whereas before the man was no King, but as tou••hing all royall power a meere private man. And I am sure birth must be lesse then Gods designation to a crowne, as is cleere. Adoniah was elder then Salomon, yet God will have Salo∣mon, the younger by birth, to be King, and not Adoniah. And so Mr. Symons and other Court-Prophets must prevaricate, who will have birth without the peoples election to make a king, and the peo∣ples voyces but a ceremonie.

6. I thinke Royalists cannot deny but a people ruled by Aristo∣craticall Magistrates, may elect a King, and a King so elected is for∣mally

made a lawfull King by the peoples election, for of six apt and gifted to reigne, what maketh one a King, and not the other five? Certainly God disposing the people to choose this man, and not a∣nother man, it cannot be said but God giveth the Kingly power im∣mediately, and by him Kings raigne, that is true. The Office is im∣mediately from ••od, but now the question is, what is that which formally applyeth the Office and Royall Power to this Person, ra∣ther th••n to the other five as meet. Nothing can here be dreamed of, but God inclining the hearts of the States to choose this man, and not this men.

QUEST. V. Whether or no P. P. the Author of Sac. San. Regum Majestas, called the sacred and Royall Prerogative of Kings, proveth that God is the immediate Author of Soveraignty, and that the King is no creature of the peoples making?

COnsider first that the excommunicated Prelate saith, cap. 2. p. 19. Kings are not immediatly from God, as by any speciall Ordinance sent from Heaven by the ministery of Angels and Prophets, there were but some few such; as Moses, Saul, David, &c. yet something may immedi¦atly proceed from God, and be his speciall worke without a revelati∣on or manifestation extraordinary from Heaven, so the designation to a sacred function is from the Church, and from man; yet the power of Word, Sacraments binding and loosing, is immediatly from Jesus Christ. The Apostle Matthias was from Christs immediate constitution, and yet he was designed by men, Act. 1. The soule is by creation and infu∣sion, without any speciall ordinance from Heaven, though nature beget∣eth the body, and disposeth the matter, and prepareth it as fit to be con∣joyned with the soule, so as the father is said to beget the sonne. Ans. 1. The unchurched Prelate striveth to make us hatefull by the title of the Chapter, That God is (by his title) the immediate Author of Soveraingty; and who denyeth that? Not those, who teach that the person who is King, is created King by the people, no more then those who deny that men are now called to be Pastors, and Deaco••s immediately,* 1.60 and by a voice from Heaven, or by the ministery of An∣gells and Prophets, because the Office of Pastors and Deacons is im∣mediately from God. 2. When he hath proved that God is the imme∣diate Author of Soveraingty. What then? shall it follow that the soveraigne in concreto may not be resisted? and that he is above all Law; and that there is no armour against his violence but prayers and

teares. So God is the immediate Author of the Pastors, of the Apostles Office, ergo, it is unlawfull to resist a Pastor, though he turne robber? ergo, the Pastor is above all the Kings Lawes? this is the Iesuite and all made, ergo, there is no Armour against the robbing Prelate but prayer and teares. 2. He saith in his Title, that the King is no Crea∣ture of the peoples making. If he meane the King in abstracto, that is, the royall dignity, whom speaketh he against? Not against us, but against his owne father Bellarmine, who saith (a) 1.61 that Soveraignty hath no warrant by any divine Law. If he meane that the man who is King is not created and elected King by the people, he contradicteth himself and all the Court Doctors. 3. It is false that Saul and David, their originall of Royalty was onely from God by a speciall Ordi∣nance sent from Heaven; for their office is, Deut. 17.14. from the written Word of God, as the killing of Idolaters, v. 3, 7. as the Of∣fice of the Priests and Levites, 8, 9, 10. and this is no extraordinary Ordinance from Heaven, more than that is from Heaven which is warranted by the Word of God. If he meane that these men, Saul, and David, were created Kings by the onely extraordinary revela∣tion of God from Heaven, it is a lye; for beside the Propheticall a∣noynting of them, they were made Kings by the people, as the word saith expresly; except we say that David sinned in not setting him∣selfe downe on the Throne, when Samuel anoynted him first King; and so he should have made away his Master King Saul out of the world; and there were not a few called to the Throne, by the peo∣ple; but many, yea all the Kings of Israel and Iudah. 4. The Prelate contendeth that a King is designed to his royall dignity, immediatly from God, without an extraordinary revelation from Heaven, as the man is designed to be a Pastor by men; and yet the power of Preaching is immediatly from God, &c. but he proveth nothing, except he prove that all Pastors are called to be Pastors immediatly; and that God calleth and designeth to the Throne such a person immediatly, as he hath immediatly instituted by the power of Preaching, and the Apostleship, and hath immediatly infused the soule in the body, by an act of Creation; and we cannot conceive how God in our daies, when there are no extraordinary revelations, doth immediatly create this man a King, and immediatly tie the crown to this family rather then to this; this he doth by the people now, without any Propheti∣call Vnction; and by this medium, to wit, by the free choice of the people. He needeth not bring the example of Matthias more than of any ordinary Pastor, and yet an ordinary Pastor is not

immediatly called of God, because the Office of an ordinary Pastor is from God immediatly, and also the man is made Pastor by the Church.

* 1.62The P. Prelate saith, a thing is immediatly from God three waies. 1. When it is solely from God, and presupposeth nothing ordinary or hu∣mane, antecedent to the obteyning of it. Such was the power of Moses, Saul, David. Such were the Apostles. 2. When the collation of the po∣wer to such a person is immediatly from God, though some act of man be antecedent; as Matthias was an Apostle. A baptized man obtaineth remission and regeneration, yet aspersion of water cannot produce these excellent effects. A King giveth power to a favourite to make a Lord or a Baron, yet who is so stupid as to averre the honour of a Lord commeth immediatly from the favourite, and not from the King. 3. When a man hath by some ordinary humane right, a full and just right, and the approbation and confirmation of this right is immediatly from God.

The first way, Soveraignty is not from God. The second way, Sove∣raignty is conferred on Kings immediatly, though some created act of E∣lection, succession, conquests intervene, the interposed act containeth not in it power to conferre Soveraignty; as in Baptisme, Regeneration, if there be nothing repugnant in the suscipient, is conferred, not by water, but immediatly by God. In sacred Orders designation is from men, po∣wer to supernaturall acts from God: election, succession, conquests re∣motely and improperly constitute a King. To say in the third sence that soveraignty is immediatly from God, by approbation or confirmation onely, is against Scripture, Prov. 8.15. Psa. 82.8. Ioh. 19. then the people say; you are Gods, your power is from below. And Pauls, (ordai∣ned of God) is (approved and confirmed onely of God) the power of de∣signation, or application of the person to royalty is from man; the power of conferring royall power, or of applying the person to royall power is from God. A mans hand may apply a faggot to the fire, the fire onely maketh the faggot to burne.

Ans. 1. Apostles both according to their Office, and the designa∣tion of their person to the Office w••re immediatly and onely from God, without any act of the people, and therefore are badly cou∣pled with the royall power of David and King Saul, who were not formally made Kings, but by the people at Mizpeh and Hebron, 2. The second way God giveth Royall Power by moving the peo∣ples hearts to confer royall power, and this is virtually in the people, formally from God. Water hath no influence to produce grace, Gods institution and promise doth it; except you dream with your

Iesuites, of opus operatum, that water sprinkled, by the doing of the deed conferreth grace, nisi ponatur obex, what can the child doe, or one child more then another baptized child, to hinder the flux of remission of sins, if you meane not that Baptisme worketh as Phy∣sick on a sick man, except strength of humours hinder? and there∣fore this comparison is not alike. The people cannot produce so no∣ble an effect as royalty, a beame of God. True, formally they cannot, but virtually it is in a society of reasonable men, in whom are left beames of authoritative Majesty, which by a divine institution they can give, Deut. 17.14. to this man, to David, not to Eliab; and I could well say the Favorite made the Lord, and placed honour in the man whom he made Lord, by a borrowed power from his Prince; and yet the honour of a Lord is principally from the King. 3. It is true, the election of the people conteineth not formally Royall dig∣nitie, but the Word saith, they made Saul, they made David King: so virtually election must conteine it. Samuels oyle maketh not Da∣vid King, he is a subject after he is anointed; the peoples election at Hebron maketh him King; 2. differenceth him from his brethren; 3. putteth him in Royall state; yet God is the principall agent. What immediate action God hath here, is said and dreamed of, no man can divine, except Prophet P. Prelate. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Royall authori∣tie is given organically by that act by which he is made King: an∣other act is a night-dreame, but by the act of election David is made of no King, a King. The collation of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Royall gifts, is im∣mediately from God: but that formally maketh not a King, if So∣lomon saw right, servants riding on horses, Princes going on foot. 4. Judge of the Prelates subtiltie, I dare say, not his own,* 1.63 he stealeth from Spalato, but telleth not, The applying of the person to Royall authoritie, is from the people; but the applying of Royall authori∣tie to the person of the King, is immediately and only from God: as the hand putteth the faggot to the fire, but the fire maketh it burne. To apply the subject to the accident, is it any thing else but to apply the accident to the subject? Royall authoritie is an accident, the person of the King the subject: the applying of the faggot to the fire, and the applying of the fire to the faggot, are all one, to any not forsa∣ken of common sense. When the people applyeth the person to the royall authoritie, they but put the person in the state of royall autho∣ritie; and this is to make an union betwixt the Man and royall au∣thoritie; and this is to apply royall authoritie to the person. 5. The third sense is the Prelates dreame, not a Tene•• of ours; we never said

that soveraigntie in the King is immediately from God by approba∣tion or confirmation only, as if the people first made the King, and God did only by a posterior and latter act say Amen to the deed done, and subscribe, as Recorder, to what the people doth: so the people should deale kingdomes and crownes at their pleasure, and God behoved to ratifie and make good their fact. When God doth apply the person to royall power, what? is this a different action from the peoples applying the person to royall dignitie? It is not i∣maginable: but the people by creating a king, applyeth the person to royall dignitie; and God by the peoples act of constituting the man king, doth by the mediation of this act convey royall authoritie to the man, as the Church by sending a man, and ordaining him to bee a Pastor, doth not by that, as Gods instruments, infuse supernaturall powers of preaching: these powers supernaturall may be, and often are in him before he be in orders; and sometimes God infuseth a supernaturall power of government in a man, when he is not yet a king, as the Lord turned Saul into another man, 1 Sam. 10.5.6. neither at that point of time when Samuel anointed him, but after that, v. 5. After that thou shalt come to the hill of God, 6. the spirit of the Lord shall come upon thee, and thou shalt prophecie with them, and shalt be turned into another man. Nor yet at that time when he is formally made King by the people; for Saul was not King formally, because of Samuels anointing, nor yet was he King because another spirit was infused into him, v. 5, 6. for he was yet a privat man, till the States of Israel chose him King at Mizpeh. And the word of God useth words of action to expresse the peoples power, Iudg. 9.6. And all the men of Sechem gathered together, and all the men of Millo, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 regnare fecerunt,* 1.64 they caused him to be King. The same is said, 1 Sam. 10.15. they caused Saul to reigne, 2 K. 10.5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 We shall not King any man, 1 Chron. 12.38. They came to Hebron 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to King David over all Israel, Deut. 17. three times the making of a King is given to the people. 7. When thou shalt say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 I shall set a King over me: if it were not their power to make a King, no law could be imposed on them not to make a stranger their King, 1 King. 12.20. all the con∣gregation Kinged Jeroboam,* 1.65 or made him King over all Israel, 2 King. 11.12. They Kinged Joash, or made Ioash to reigne. 6. The people are to say, You are Gods, and your power is below, saith the Prelate: what then? ergo, their power is not from God also: It followeth not, subordinata non pugnant. The Scripture saith both, the Lord

exalted David to be King, and, All power is from God: and so the power of a L. Major of a Citie:* 1.66 and the people made David King also, and the Citie maketh such a man L. Major. It is the Ana∣baptists argument; God writeth his law in our heart, and teacheth his own children, ergo, bookes, and the ministerie of men are need∣lesse: So all Sciences and lawfull arts are from God: ergo, Sciences applied to men, are not from mens free will, industrie and studies. The Prelate extolleth the King, when he will have his Royaltie from God, the way that John Stiles is the husband of such a wo∣man.

P. Prelate. Kings are of God, they are Gods,* 1.67 children of the most High, his servants▪ publike Ministers, their sword and judgement Gods. This he hath said of their royaltie in abstracto, and in concreto; their power, person, charge, are all of divine extract, and so their authoritie and person are both sacred and inviolable. Answ. So are all the congregation of the Iudges, Psal. 82. v. 1.6. all of them Gods: for he speaketh not there of a congregation of Kings. So are Apostles, their office and persons of God;* 1.68 and so the Prelates (they thinke) the successors of the Apostles, are Gods servants, their ministerie, word, rod of discipline not theirs, but of God: the judgement of Iudges, inferiour to the King, is the Lords judgement, not mens, Deut. 1.17. 2. Chro. 19.6. Hence by the Prelates Logick, the persons of Prelates, Majors, Bailiffes, Constables, Pastors, are sacred and inviolable above all lawes, as are Kings. Is this an extolling of Kings? 2. But where are Kings persons, as men, said to be of God, as the Royaltie in abstracto i••? The Prelate seeth beside his booke, Psal. ••2.7. But ye shall die as men.

P. Prelate. We begin with the Law, in which as God by himself pre∣scribed the essentialls, substantialls, & ceremonies of his pietie & wor∣ship, gave order for justice & pietie, Deut. 17.14.15. the King is here originally & immediately from God, and independent from all others, (set over them) Them, is collective, that is, all & every one. Scripture knoweth not this State principle; Rex est singulis major, universis mi∣nor. The person is expressed in concreto, Whom the Lord thy God shall choose. This peremptorie precept dischargeth the people, all, and every one, diffusively, representatively, or in any imaginable capacity to at∣tempt the appointing of a King, but to leave it entirely and totally to God Almighty.

Answ. Begin with the Law, but end not with Traditions. If God by himselfe prescribed the essentialls of pietie and worship, the other

part of your distinction is, that God not by himself, but by his Prelates, appointed the whole Romish Rites, as accidentalls of pietie. This is the Iesuites doctrine. 2. This place is so far from proving the King to be independent, and that it totally is Gods to appoint a King, that it expresly giveth the people power to appoint a King: for the setting of a King over themselves, such a one, and not such a one, makes the people to appoint the King, and the King to be lesse and dependent on the people, seeing God intendeth the King for the peoples good, and not the people for the Kings good. This text shameth the Pre∣late, who also confessed, P. 22. That remotely and unproperly suc∣cession, election, and conquest maketh the King, and so its lawfull for men remotely and improperly to invade Gods chaire.

P. Prelate: Jesuites and Puritans say, it was a priviledge of the Jews that God chose their King. So Suarez, Soto, Navarra.

Answ. 1. The Jesuites are the Prelates brethren, they are under one Banner, we are in contrary Camps to Iesuites. 2. The Prelate said himself, Pag. 19. Moses, Saul, and David, were by extraordina∣ry revelation from God; sure I am, Kings are not so now. The Jews had this priviledge, that no nation had. 1. God named some Kings to them, as Saul, David, he doth not so now. 2. God did tie Roy∣altie to Davids house by a Covenant, till Christ should come, he doth not so now. Yet we stand to Deut. 17.

* 1.69P. Prelate. Prov. 8.15. By me Kings reign. If the people had right to constitute a King, it had not been King Solomon, but King Adonijah. Solomon saith not of himself, but indefinitely. (By me) as by the Author, efficient, and constituent, Kings reign. (Per) is by Christ, not by the people, not by the high Priest, State, or Presbytery, not Per me iratum, by me in my anger, as some Sectaries say. Pauls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an Ordinance by high Authoritie not revocable: So Sinesius useth the word, Aristotle, Lucilius, Appian, Plutarch, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in me, and by me, as Doctor Andrews. Kings indefinitely, all Kings: none may di∣stinguish where the Law distinguisheth not, they reign in concreto: that same power that maketh Kings, must unmake them.

Ans. 1. The Prelate cannot restrict this to Kings only, it extendeth to Parliaments also. Solomon addeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Consules, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 all the Sirs, and Princes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and Magnificents, and Nobles, and more 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and all the Iudges of the earth, they reign, rule, and decree j••stice by Christ. Here then Majors, Sheriffs, Pro∣vosts, Constables, are by the Prelate extolled as persons, sacred, ir∣resistible: Then, 1. the Iudges of England rule not by the King of

Britain, as their Author, efficient, constituent, but by Iesus Christ immediately, nor doth the Commissary rule by the Prelate. 2. All these, and their power, and persons, rule independently, and im∣mediately by Iesus Christ. 3. All inferiour Iudges are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Ordinances of God not revocable. Ergo, The King cannot deprive any Iudge under him; he cannot declare the Parliament no Parliament; once a Iudge and alwayes, and irrevocably a judge. This Prelates poor pleading for Kings deserves no wages. Lavater intelligit superiores & inferiores Magistratus, non est potestas nisi a deo, Vatablus consiliarios. 2. If the people had absolute right, to choose Kings by the Law of Israel, they might have chosen ano∣ther, then either Adonijah, or Solomon, but the Lord expressely, Deut. 17.14. put an expresse Law on them, that they should make no King, but him whom the Lord should chuse: Now the Lord did either by his immediately inspired Prophet, anoint the man, as he anointed David, Saul, Iehu, &c. or then he restricted, by a re∣vealed promise, the Royall power to a family, and to the eldest by birth: and therefore the Lord first chose the man, and then the people made him King: birth was not their rule, as is clear, in that they made Solomon their King, not Adonijah the elder; and this proveth, that God did both ordain Kingly Government to the King∣dom of Israel, and chose the man, either in his person, or tied it to the first born of the Line. Now we have no Scripture, nor Law of God, to tie Royall dignitie to one man, or to one family; produce a warrant for it in the Word, for that must be a priviledge of the Iews, for which we have no Word of God, but we have no immediately inspired Samuels, to say, Make David, or this man King; and no Word of God to say, Let the first born of this family, rather then another family sit upon the throne; Therefore the people must make such a man King, following the rule of Gods Word, Deut. 17.14. and other rules shewing what sort of men Iudges must be, as Deut. 1.16, 17, 18. 2 Chro. 19.6, 7. 3. It is true, Kings in a speciall manner reign by Christ. Ergo, Not by the peoples free election. The P. Prelate argueth like himself: By this Text, a Ma∣jor of a Citie, by the Lord, decreeth justice: Ergo, He is not made a Major of the Citie, by the people of the Citie. It followeth not, 4. None of us teach that Kings reign by Gods anger. We judge a King a great mercy of God to Church, or State: But the Text saith not, By the Lord, Kings and Iudges do not onely reign and decree justice, but also murther Protestants, by raising against them an Army

of Papists. And the word, 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Powers, doth in no Greek Author signifie, irrevocable powers; for Vzziah was a lawfull King, and yet 2 Chron. 26. lawfully put from the throne, and cut off from the house of the Lord: And Interpreters on this place, deny that the place is to be understood of Tyrants: so the Chaldee Pa∣raphrase turns it well, Potentes virga justitiae: so Lavater, and Di••∣datus,* 1.70 and Thomas saith, this place doth prove, That all Kings, and Iudges, Laws, derivari a lege aeterna, are derived from the eternall Law. The Prelate eating his tongue for anger, striveth to prove, That all power, and so Royall power, is of God: but what can he make of it? we beleeve it, though he say Sectaries prove, by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, That a man is justified by faith onely: so there is no power but of God onely:* 1.71 but feel the smell of a Iesuite; it is the Secta∣ries doctrine. That we are justified by faith onely; but the Prelates, and the Iesuites goe another way, not by faith onely, but by works also. And all power is from God onely, as the first Author, and from no man. What then? Therefore men and people inter∣pose no humane act in making this man a King, and not this man: It followeth, And let us with the Prelate, joyn Paul and Solomon together, and say, That Soveraigntie is from God, of God, by God, as Gods appointment irrevocable. Then shall it never follow: it is un∣separable from the person, except you make the King a man immor∣tall: as God onely can remove the Crown; it is true, but God onely can put an unworthy, and an excommunicated Prelate from Office and Benefice, but how? Doth that prove, that men and the Church may not also in their place, remove an unworthy Church∣man, when the Church following Gods Word, delivereth to Satan? Christ onely as head of the Church, excommunicateth scandalous men: Ergo, The Church cannot do it, and yet the Argument is as good the one way, as the other; for all the Churches on earth cannot make a Minister properly, they but design him to the Mini∣stery whom God hath gifted and called: But shall we conclude, ergo, no Church on earth; but God onely, by an immediate action from Heaven, can deprive a Minister? how then durst Prelates ex∣communicate, unmake, and imprison so many Ministers in the three Kingdoms: But the truth is, take this one Argument from the Pre∣late, and all that is in his Book, falleth to the ground, to wit, Sove∣raigntie is from God onely. A King is a creature of Gods making onely; and what then? Ergo, Soveraigntie cannot be taken from him: So God onely made Aarons house Priests. 2. Solomon had

no Law to depose Abiathar from the Priest-hood. Possibly the Prelate will grant all; the place, Rom. 13. which he saith hath tortured us, I refer to a fitter place, it will be found to torture Court Parasites.

I goe on with the Prelate, c. 3. Sacred Soveraignty is to be preser∣ved, and Kings are to be prayed for, that we may lead a godly life, 1 Tim. 3. What then? 1. All in authority are to be prayed for, even Par∣liaments, by that text Pastors are to be prayed for, and without them sound religion cannot well subsist. 2. Is this questioned, but Kings should be prayed for; or are we wanting in this duty? but it followeth not that all dignities to be prayed for are immediatly from God, not from men. Prelate, Prov. 8. Solomon speaketh first of the establish∣ment of Government, before he speake of the workes of Creation, ergo better not be at all, as be without government. And God fixed govern∣ment in the person of Adam before Evah, or any else came into the world; and how shall government be, and we enjoy the fruits of it, ex∣cept we preserve the Kings sacred Authority inviolable? Ans. Moses, Gen. 1. speaketh of Creation before he speaketh of Kings, and Mo∣ses speaketh, Gen. 3. of Adams sins before he speakes of redemption through the blessed seed; ergo better never be redeemed at all, as to to be without sin. 2. If God made Adam a governour before he made Evah, and any of Mankind, he was made a father and a hus∣band before he had either sonne or wife. Is this the Prelates Lo∣gick? he may prove that two eggs on his fathers Table are three this way. 3. There is no government where soveraignty is not kept invio∣lable. It is true, where there is a King, soveraignty must be inviolable, What then? Arbitrary government is not soveraignty. 4. He inti∣mateth Aristocracy, and Democracy, and the power of Parliaments, which maketh Kings to be nothing but Anarchie; for he speaketh here of no government, but Monarchy, P. Prelate, there is need of grace to obey the King, Ps. 18.43. Ps. 144.2. It is God who subdueth the people under David. 2. Rebellion against the King is rebellion against God. Pet. 2.17. Prov, 24.12. Ergo Kings have a neare alliance with God.

Ans. 1. There is much grace in Papists and Prelates then, who use to write and Preach against grace. 2. Lorinus your brother Iesuite will with good warrant of the texts inferre, that the King may make a conquest of his own Kingdomes of Scotland and Eng∣land by the sword, as David subdued the Heathen. 3. Arbitrary governing hath no alliance with God; a rebell to God, his Country and an Apostate hath no reason to terme lawfull defence against ••ut-throat Irish, rebellion. 4. There is need of much grace to obey Pastors, inferiour Iudges, masters, Col. 3.22, 23. ergo their power

is from God immediatly, and no more from men then the King is created King by the people, according to the way of Royalists.

P. Prelate. God saith of Pharaoh, Exo. 9.7. I have raised thee up. Eli∣sha from God constituted the King of Syria, 2 King 8.13. Pharaoh, Abi∣melech, Hiram, Hazael, Hadad, are no lesse honoured with the compella∣tion of Kings, then David, Saul, &c. Ier. 29.9. Nebuchadnezer is honoured to be called by way of excellency Gods servant, which God giveth to David, a King according to his owne heart; and Esay 45.1, 2. Thus saith the Lord to his anoynted Cyrus, and God nameth him neere a hundreth yeare before he was borne, Esay 44.28. He is my shepheard, Daniel 2.19, 20.17.24. God giveth Kingdomes to whom he will, Dan. 5.8. and p. 37. Empires, Kingdomes, Royalties are not disposed of by the composed contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and worke of God, Hos. 13.11. I gave them a King in my anger, I tooke him away in my wrath: Iob, He places Kings in the throne, &c.

Ans. Here is a whole Chapter of seven pages for one raw argument ten times before repeated, 1. to Exod. 9.7. I have raised up Pha∣raoh, Paul expoundeth it, Rom. 9▪ to prove that King Pharaoh was a vessell of wrath fitted for destruction, by Gods absolute Will; and the Prelate following Arminius, with treasonable charity, applyeth this to our King. Can this man pray for the King? 2. Elisha anoynted but constituted not Hazael King, and foretold he should be King; and if he be a King of Gods making, who slew his sicke Prince, and invaded the Throne by innocent bloud, judge you. I would not take Kings of the Prelates making. 3. If God give to Nebuchadnezer the same still of the servant of God, given to David, Ps. 18.1. & 116.16. and to Moses, Ios. 1, 2. all Kings, because Kings are men accor∣ding to Gods heart. Why is not royalty then founded on grace? Nebuchadnezer was not otherwise his servant, then he was the hammer of the earth, and a tyrannous conquerour of the Lords peo∣ple, and all the Heathen Kings are called Kings. But how came they to their Thrones for the most part? as David and Hezekiah? but God anointed them not by his Prophets; they came to their King∣domes by the peoples election, or by blood and rapine; the latter way is no ground to you to deny Athaliah to be a lawfull Princesse, she and Abim••lech were lawfull Princes, and their soveraignty as immediatly and independently from God, as the soveraignty of many heathen Kings. See then how justly Athaliah was killed as a bloody usurper of the throne; & this would licence your brethren the Iesuites to stab heathen Kings, whom you will have as well Kings 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Lords anointed, though Nebuchadnezer & many of them made

their way to the Throne, against all Law of God and man, through a bloudy patent. 4. Cyrus is Gods anointed and his Shepheard too, ergo his Arbitrary government is a soveraignty immediatly depen∣ding on God, ••nd above all Law; it is a wicked consequence. 5. God named him neare a hundreth yeare ere he was borne, God named and designed Judas very individually, and named the Asse that Christ should ride on to Ierusalem, Zach. 9.9. some moe hundred yeares then one. What, will the Prelate make them independent Kings for that? 6. God giveth Kingdomes to whom he will. What then? this will prove Kingdomes to be as independent and immediatly from God, as Kings are; for as God giveth Kings to Kingdomes, so he gi∣veth Kingdomes to Kings, and no doubt he giveth Kingdoms to whom he will; so he giveth Prophets, Apostles, Pastors to whom he will; and he giveth tyrannous conquests to whom he will: and it is Nebuchadnezer, to whom Daniel speaketh that, from the Lord, and he had no just title to many Kingdomes, especially to the Kingdome of Iudah, which yet God the King of Kings gave to him, because it was his good pleasure; and if God had not commanded them by the mouth of his Prophet Ieremiah, might they not have risen, and with the sword have vindicated themselves and their own liberty, no lesse then they lawfully by the sword vindicated themselves from under Moab, Iudges 3. from under Iabin, Iaakin King of Ca∣naan, who twenty yeares mightily oppressed the children of Israel, Iudges. 4.? now this P. Prelate by all these instances making Heathen Kings to be Kings by as good a title as David and Hezekiah, condemneth the people of God as rebells, if being subdued and conquered by the Turke, and Spanish King, they should by the sword recover their owne liberty, and that Israel, and the savi∣ours which God raised to them, had not warrant from the law of na∣ture to vindicate themselves to liberty, which was taken from them violently and unjustly by the sword; but from all this it shall well follow that the tyranny of bloudy conquerours is immediatly and only dependent from God, no lesse then lawfull soveraignty; for Ne∣buchadnezers soveraignty over the people of God, and many other Kingdomes also was revenged of God as tyranny, Ier. 50.6.7. and therefore the vengeance of the Lord, and the vengeance of his Temple came upon him and his land, Ier. 50.16, 17.18.28, 29.30. It is true, the people of God were commanded of God to submit to the King of Babylon, to serve him, and to pray for him, and to doe on the contra∣ry was rebellion; but this was not because the King of Babylon was their King, and because the King of Babylon had a command of

God, so to bring under his yoak the people of God. So Christ had a Commandement to suffer the death of the Crosse, Iohn. 10.18. but had Herod and Pilate any warrant to crucifie him? none at all. 7. He saith, Royalties even of Heathen Kings are not disposed of by the composed Contracts of men, but by the immediate hand and worke of God. But the Contracts of men to give a Kingdome to a person, which a Heathen community may lawfully doe, and so by contract dispose of a Kingdom, is not opposite to the immediate hand of God, appointing Royalty and Monarchy at his owne blessed liberty. Lastly he saith, God tooke away Saul in his wrath; but I pray you did God onely doe it? then had Saul because a King, a Patent Royall from God to kill himselfe, for so God tooke him away; and we are rebells by this, if we suffer not the King to kill himselfe. Well pleaded.

QUEST. VI. Whether the King be so from God onely both in regard of his So∣veraignty, and of the designation of his person to the Crown, as that he is no waies from the people, but by meere approbation?

Dr. Ferne, a man much for Monarchy saith, Though Monarchy hath its excellency,* 1.72 being first set up of God, in Moses, yet nei∣ther Monarchy, Aristocracy, nor any other forme, is jure divino, but we say (saith he) the power it selfe, or that sufficiency of authority to governe, that is in a Monarchy, or Aristocracy, abstractly considered from the qualification of other formes, is a flux and constitution subor∣dinate to that providence; an ordinance of that Dixi, or silent word by which the world was made, and shall be governed under God. This is a great debasing of the Lords anoynted,* 1.73 for so soveraignty hath no warrant in Gods Word formally as it is such a government, but is in the world by providence, as sin is, and as the falling of a Sparrow to the ground; whereas Gods Word hath not onely commanded that government should be, but that fathers and mothers should be. 2. and not only that politick Rulers should be, but also Kings by name, and other Iudges Aristocraticall should be, Rom. 13.3. Deut. 17.14. 1 Pet. 2.17. Prov. 24.21. Prov. 15.16.3. If the power of Monarchy and Aristocracy abstracted from the formes be from God, then it is no more lawfull to resist Aristocraticall Government, and our Lords of Parliament, or Iudges, then it is lawfull to resist Kings.

But heare the Prelates reasons to prove that the King is from the people by approbation only.

P. Prelate. The people,* 1.74 Deut. 17. is said to set a King over them only, as 1 Cor. 6. The Saints are said to judge the world, that is, by consenting to Christs Iudgement. So the people doe not make a King by transferring on him soveraignty, but by accepting, acknowledging, re∣verencing him as King, whom God hath both constituted and designed King. Answ. This is said, but not a word proved: for the Queen of Sheba, and Hiram acknowledged, reverenced and obeyed Solomon as King, and yet they made him not King,* 1.75 as the Princes of Israell did. 2. Reverence and obedience of the people is relative to the Kings lawes, but the peoples making of a King is not relative to the laws of a King; for then he should be a King giving laws, and commanding the people, as King, before the people make him King. 3. If the peoples approving and consenting that an elected King be their King, presupposeth that he is a King designed, and constituted by God, before the people approve him as King; Let the P. Prelate give us an act of God now designing a man King: for there are no immediate voyces from heaven, saying to a people, This is your King, before the people elect one of sixe to be their King. And this infalli∣bly proveth that God designeth one of sixe to be a King, to a people who had no King before, by no other act but by determining the hearts of the States to elect and designe this man King, and passe any of the other five. 4. When God, Deut. 17. forbiddeth them to choose a stranger, he presupposeth they may choose a stranger: for Gods law now given to man in the state of sinne, presupposeth he hath corruption of nature to doe contrary to Gods law: Now if God did hold forth, that their setting a King over them, was but the peoples approving the man whom God shall both constitute and de∣signe to be King, then he should presuppose that God was to de∣signe a stranger to be the lawfull King of Israel; and the people should be interdicted to approve and consent, that the man should be King whom God should choose: for it was unpossible that the people should make a stranger King, (God is the only immediate King-creator) the people should only approve and consent that a stranger should be King; yet upon supposall that God first constitu∣ted and designed the stranger King, it was not in the peoples power that the King should be a Brother rather then a stranger; for if the people have no power to make a King, but doe only approve him, or consent to him, when he is both made and designed of God to be King, it is not in their power that he be either brother or stranger▪ and so God commandeth what is simply impossible. 2. Consider the

sense of the command by the Prelates vaine Logick: I Iehovah, as I only create the world of nothing, so I only constitute and designe a man, whether Iew, or Nebuchadnezzar a stranger to be your King; yet I in∣hibit you under the pain of my curse, that you set any King ••ver your selves, but only a brother. What is this, but I inhibite you to be cre∣ators by omnipotent power? 5. To these adde the reasons I pro∣duced before, that the people by no shadow of reason can be com∣manded to make such a man King, not such a man, if they only con∣sent to the man made King, but have no action in the making of the King.

P. Prelate. All the acts reall and imaginable, which are necessary for the making of Kings, are ascribed to God: Take the first King as a ruling case, 1 Sam. 12.13. Behold the King whom you have chosen and desired, and behold the Lord hath set a King over you. This election of the peo∣ple can be no other but their admittance or acceptance of the King whom God hath chosen and constituted, as the words, whom ye have chosen, imply, 1 Sam. 9.17. 1 Sam. 10.1. You have Sauls election and constitution, where Samuel as Priest and Prophet anointeth him, doing reverence and obeysance to him, and ascribing to God, that he did appoint him supreame and Soveraigne over his inheritance. And the same ex∣pression is, 1 Sam. 12.13. The Lord hath set a King over you: which is Psal. 2.6. I have set my King upon my holy hill of Zion. Neither man nor Angel hath any share in any act of constituting Christ King, Deut. 17. The Lord vindicateth as proper and peculiar to himselfe, the desig∣nation of the person. It was not arbitrary to the people to admit or re∣ject Saul so designed; it pleased God to consummate the worke by the acceptation, consent and approbation of the people, ut suaviore modo, that by a smoother way he might incourage Saul to undergoe the hard charge, and make his people the more heartily, without grumbling and scruple, reverence and obey him. The peoples admittance possibly added something to the solemnitie, to the pompe, but nothing to the essentiall and reall constitution or necessitie; it only puts the subjects in mala fide, if they should contraveen, as the intimation of a Law, the coronation of an hereditary King, the inthronization of a Bishop. And, 1 King. 3.7. Thou hast made thy servant King, 1 Sam. 16.1. I have provided me a King, Psal. 18.50. He is Gods King, Psal. 89.19. I have exalted one chosen out of the people, v. 20. He anointeth them, 27. adopteth them. I will make him my first borne, Psal. 82.6. the first borne is above every brother severally, and above all, though a thousand joyntly.

Answ. 1. By this reason, inferiour Iudges are no lesse immediate

Deputies of God, and so irresistible, then the Kings, because God took off the spirit that was on Moses, and immediately powred it upon the seventy Elders, who were Iudges inferiour to Moses, Num. 11.14.15.16. Answ. 2. This P. P. cannot make a Syllogisme: I•• all the acts necessary to make a King, be given to God, none to the people; then God both constituteth and designeth the King. But the former the Scripture saith, ergo, if all the acts be given to God, as to the prime King-maker, and disposer of Kings and Kingdoms, and none to the people in that notion, then God both constituteth and designeth a King. Both major and minor is false. The major is a•• false as the very P. Prelate himselfe. All the acts necessary for war-making, are in an eminent manner given to God, as 1. the Lord fight∣eth for his people. 2. The Lord scattered the enemies. 3. The Lord slew Og King of Bashan. 4. The battell is the Lords. 5. The victorie the Lords; ergo, Israel never fought a battell. So Deut. 32. The Lord alone led his people; the Lord led them in the wildernesse; their bow and their sword gave them not the land: God wrought all their workes for them, Esa 26.12. ergo, Moses led them not; ergo, the people went not on their own leggs through the wildernesse; ergo, the people never shot an arrow, never drew a sword. It followeth not. 1. God did all these as the first, eminent, principall and effica∣cious pre-determinator of the creature, (though this Arminian and Popish Prelate mind not so to honour God.) 2. The assumption is also false; for the people made Saul and David Kings;* 1.76 and it were ridiculous, that God should command them to make a brother, not a stranger King, if it was not in their power whether he should be a Iew, a Scythian, an Ethiopian, who was their King, if God did on∣ly without them both choose, 2. constitute, 3. designe the person, and performe all acts essentiall to make a King, and the people had no more in them but only to admit and consent, and that for the solem∣nitie and pompe, not for the essentiall constitution of the King. 3. •• Sam. 9.17. 1 Sam. 10.1. we have not Saul elected and constituted king, and Samuel did obeysance to him and kissed him, for the honor Royall which God was to put upon him: for before this propheti∣call unction, 1 Sam. 9.22. he made him sit in the chiefe place, and honored him as king, when as yet Samuel was materially King, and the Lords Vicegerent in Israel. If then the Prelate conclude any thing from Samuel his doing reverence and obeysance to him as King, it shall follow that Saul was formally King, before Samuel, 1 Sam. 10.1. anointed him, and kissd him; and that must be before he

he was formally King, otherwise he was in Gods appointment King, before ever he saw Samuels face; and it is true, he ascribeth ho∣nour to him, as to one appointed by God to be supreame Soveraigne, for that which he should be, not for that which he was, as c. 9.22. he set him in the chiefest place, and therefore it is false, that we have Sauls election and constitution to be King, 1 Sam. 10. for after that time the people are rebuked for seeking a King, and that with a pur∣pose to disswade them from it, as a sinfull desire, and he is chosen by Lots after that, and made King, & after Samuels anoynting of him, he was a private, man, and did hide himselfe amongst the stuffe, v. 22.3. The Prelate if of ignorance, or wilfully I know not, saith, the expression and phrase is the same, 1 Sam. 12.13. and Ps. 2.6. which is false; for 1 Sam. 12.13. it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 behold the Lord hath given you a King, such is the expression, Hos. 13.11. I gave them a King in my wrath; but that expression is not Psal. 2.6. but this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but I have established him my King; and though it were the same expression, it followeth not that the people have not hand any other way in appointing Christ their head; (though that phrase also be in the word, Hos. 1. v. 11.) then by consenting, and beleeving in him as King;* 1.77 but this proveth not that the people in appointing a King, hath no hand but naked approbation, for the same phrase doth not expresse the same action, nay the Iudges are to kisse Christ, Ps. 2.12. the same way, and by the same action that Samuel kissed Saul, 1 Sam. 10.1. and the Idolaters kissed the calves, Hos. 13.2. for the same Hebrew word is used in all the three places, and yet it is certaine the first kissing is spirituall, the second a kisse of ho∣nour, and the third an Idolatrous kissing. 4. The anoynting of Saul cannot be a leading rule to the making of all Kings to the worlds end; for the P. Prelate forgetting himselfe said, that onely some few, as Moses, Saul, and David, &c. by extraordinary manifestation from Heaven were made Kings, pa. 19.5. he saith it was not Arbitra∣ry for the people to admit, or reject Saul so designed. What meaneth he? it was not morally arbitrary, because they were under a law, Deut. 17.14, 15. to make him King, whom the Lord should choose. That is true, but was it not arbitrary to them to breake a law Physically? I think he who is a professed Arminian will not side with Manicheans and Fatalists so, but the P. Prelate must prove it was not Arbitrary, either Morally or Physically to them not to ac∣cept Saul as their King, because they had no action at all in the ma∣king of a King, God did it all, both by constituting and designing the

King, why then did God, Deut. 17. give a Law to them to make such a man King, not such a man, if it was not in their free wil to have any action or hand in the making of a King at all? but that some sonnes of Belial would not accept him as their King, is expresly said, 1 Sam. 10.27. and how did Israel conspire with Absolom, to unking and dethron•• David, whom the Lord had made King? If the Pre∣late meane it was not Arbitrary to them physically to reject Saul, he speaketh wonders, the sonnes of Belial did reject him; ergo they had physicall power to doe it: If he meane it was not arbitrary, that is, it was not lawfull to them to reject him, that is true; but doth it fol∣low they had no hand nor action in making Saul King, because it was not lawfull for them to make a King in a sinfull way, and to re∣fuse him whom God chose to be King? then see what I inferre. 1. Then they had no hand in obeying him as King, because they sinne in obeying unlawfull commandements against Gods Law; and so they had no hand in approving and consenting he should be King, the contrary whereof the P. Prelate saith. 2. So might the P. Prelate prove men are patientes, and have no action in violating all the Commandements of God, because it is not lawfull to them to violate any one Commandement. (6) The Lord Deut. 17. vindi∣cates this as proper and peculiar to himselfe to choose the person, and to choose Saul. What then? ergo now the people choosing a King have no power to choose or name a man, because God anoynted Saul and David by immediate manifestation of his Will to Samuel; this consequence is nothing, & also it followeth in no wise, that therefore the people made not Saul King. 7. That the peoples approbation of a King is not necessary, is Bellarmines and Papists saying, and that the people chose their Ministers in the Apostolick Church, not by a necessity of a divine Commandement, but to conciliate love betwixt Pastor and people. Papists hold that if the Pope make a ••••pish King the head and King of Britaine against the peoples will, yet is he their King. 8. David was then King all the time that Saul presecuted him; he sinned truely in not discharging the duty of a King, onely because he wanted a ceremony, the peoples approbation, which the Prelate saith is required to the solemnity and pompe, not to the necessity and truth, and essence of a formall King. So the Kings Coronation Oath, and the peoples Oath must be Ceremonies; and because the Prelate is perjured himselfe, therefore perjury is but a ceremony al∣so. 9. The enthronization of Bishops is like the Kinging of the Pope; the Apostles must spare Thrones, while they come to Heaven,

Luk. 22.29, 30. the P. Prelates with their head the Pope must be en∣throned. 10. The hereditary King he maketh a King before his Coronation, and his Acts are as valid before as after his Coronation; it might cost him his head to say that the Prince of Wales is now no lesse King of Britaine, and his Acts, Acts of Kingly Royalty, no lesse then our Soveraigne is King of Britaine,* 1.78 if Lawes and Parliaments had their owne vigour from royall Authority. 11. I allow that Kings be as high as God hath placed them, but that God said of all Kings, I will make him my first borne, &c. Psalm 89.26, 27. which is true of Solomon as the Type, 2 Sam, 7. 1 Chro. 17.22. 2 Sam. 7.12. and fulfilled of Christ, and by the Holy Ghost spoken of him, Heb. 1.5.6. is blasphemous; for God said not to Nero, Iulian, Dioclesian, Belshazer, Evilmerodach, who were lawfull Kings. I will make him my first borne; and that any of these blasphemous Idolatrous Princes should cry to God, he is my Father, my God, &c. is Divinity well beseeming an excommunicated Prelate. Of the Kings dignity above the Kingdome I speake not now; the Prelate pulled it in by the haire, but hereafter we shall heare of it.

P. Prelate. God onely anoynted David, 1 Sam. 16.4. the men of Bethleem, yea Samuel knew it not before. God saith, with mine holy oyle have I anoynted him, Ps. 89.91. 1. He is the Lords anoynted 2. The oyle is Gods,* 1.79 not from the Apothecaries shop, nor the Priests Viall; this oyle descended from the Holy Ghost, who is no lesse the true Olive, then Christ is the true Vine; yet not the oyle of saving grace, as some Fantasticks say, but holy, 1. From the Author God. 2. From in∣fluence in the person, it maketh the Person of the King sacred. 3. From influence on his charge, his function and power is sacred. Ans. 1. The Prelate said before Davids anoynting was extraordinary; here he draweth this anoynting to all Kings. 2. Let David be formally both constituted and designed King divers yeares before the States made him King at Hebron,* 1.80 and then 1. Saul was not King, the Pre∣late will tearme that treason. 2. This was a dry oyle, David his person was not made sacred, nor his authority sacred by it; for he remained a private man, and called Saul his King, his Master, and himselfe a subject 3. This oyle was no doubt Gods Oyle, and the Prelate will have it the Holy Ghosts, yet he denieth that sa∣ving grace, yea (p. 2. c. 1) he denyeth that any superna∣turall gift should be the foundation of Royall dignity, and that it is a pernitious tenent. So to me he would have the Oyle from Heaven, and not from Heaven. 4. This holy oyle

wherewith David was annointed, Psalme 89.20. to (a) 1.81 Au∣gustine, is the oyle of saving grace: His own deare brethren the Papists say so, and especially (b) 1.82 Lyranus, (c) 1.83 Glossa ordinaria, (d) 1.84 Hugo Cardinal, (e) 1.85 his beloved Bellarmine, (f) 1.86 and Lorinus, Cal∣vin, Musculus, Marlorat. If these be Fanaticks (as I think they are to the Prelate) yet the Text is evident, that this oyle of God was the oyle of saving gtace, bestowed on David, as on a speciall type of Christ, who received the spirit above measure, and was the anoin∣ted of God, Ps. 45.7. whereby all his garments smell of myrrhe, aloes, and cassia, ver. 8. and his name Messiah is as an oyntment powred out, Cant. 1. 2. This anointed shall be head of his enemies. 3. His dominion shall be from the sea to the rivers, v. 25. 4. He is in the covenant of grace, v. 26. 5. He is higher then the Kings of the earth. 6. The grace of perseverance is promised to his seed, v. 28, 29, 30. 7. His kingdome is eternall, as the dayes of Heaven, vers. 35, 36. 8. If the Prelate will looke under himselfe to (g) 1.87 Diodatus, and (h) 1.88 Ainsworth, they say, this holy oyle was powred on David by Sa∣muel, and on Christ was powred the Holy Ghost, and that by (i) 1.89 war∣rant of Scripture, and (k) 1.90 Junius, and (l) 1.91 Mollerus saith with them. Now the Prelate taketh the Court way, to powre this oyle of grace on many drie Princes, who without all doubt are Kings essentially no lesse then David. He must see better then the man who finding Pontius Pilate in the Creed, said, he behoved to be a good man: so because he hath found Nero the tyrant, Julian the apostate, Nebuchad∣nezzar, Evil-Merodach, Hazael, Hagag, all the Kings of Spaine, and I doubt not, the Great Turke, in the 89 Psalm, v. 19, 20. so all these Kings are anointed with the oyle of grace, and all these must make their enemies necks their footstoole; all these be higher then the Kings of the Earth, and are hard and fast in the covenant of grace, &c.

P. Prelate. All the royall ensignes and acts of Kings are ascribed to God. The Crown is of God, Esa. 62.3. Psal. 21.3. in the Emperours coyne was an hand putting a crowne on their head: the Heathen said they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as holding their Crownes from God. Psal. 18.39. Thou hast girt me with strength (the sword is the embleme of strength) unto battell. See Iud. 7.17. their scepter, Gods scepter. Exod. 4.20, 17, 9. we read of two rods, Moses and Aarons; Aarons rod budded; God made both the rods; Their judgement is the Lords. 2 Chron. 19.6. their throne is Gods, 1▪ Chron. 19.21. The Fathers called them, sacra vesti∣gia, sacra majestas; their commandements, Divalis jussio. The Law

saith, all their goods are res sacrae. Ergo, our new Statists disgrace Kings, if they blaspheme not God, in making them the derivatives of the people, the basest extract of the basest of irrationall creatures, the Multitude, the Communaltie▪

Answ. This is all one Argument from the Prelates beginning of his booke to the end;* 1.92 In a most speciall and eminent act of Gods providence, Kings are from God; but therefore they are not from men, and mens consent: It followeth not. From a most speciall and eminent act of Gods providence, Christ came into the world, and tooke on him our nature: ergo, he came not of Davids l oynes. It is a vaine consequenc••. There could not be a more eminent act then this, Psal. 40. A body thou hast given me; Ergo, he came not of Da∣vids house, and from Adam by naturall generation, and was not a man like us in all things except sinne. It is tyrannicall and dominee∣ring Logick. Many things are ascribed to God only, by reason of a speciall and admirable act of providence: as the saving of the world by Christ, the giving of Canaan to Israel, the bringing h••s people out of Egypt, and from Chaldea, the sending of the Gospel to both Iew & Gentile, &c. But shall we say, that God did none of these things by the ministerie of men, and weake and fraile men? 2. How proveth the Prelate that all royall ensignes are ascribed to God, because Esa. 62. the Church universall shall be as a crown of glorie, and a royall di∣adem in the hand of the Lord; ergo, baculus in angulo, the Church shall be as a seale on the heart of Christ. what then? Hieronymus, Procopius, Cyrillus, with good reason render the meaning thus: Thou O Zion, and Church, shalt be to me a royall Priesthood, and a holy people. For that he speaketh of his owne Kingdome and Church, is most evident, v. 1.2. For Zions sake I will not hold my peace, &c. 3. God put a crown of pure gold on Davids head, Psal. 21.3. therefore Iulian, Nero, and no elective Kings, are made and designed to be Kings by the people: He shall never prove this consequence. The (a) 1.93 Chaldee paraphrase applyeth it to the reigne of King Mes∣siah. (b) 1.94 Diodatus he speaketh of the kingdome of Christ. (c) 1.95 Ains∣worth maketh this crowne a signe of Christs victorie. Athanasius, Eusebius, Origen, Augustine, Dydimus, expound it of Christ and his kingdome. The Prelate extendeth it to all Kings, as the blasphe∣mous Rabbines, especially Ra. Salomon, deny that he speaketh of Christ here: but what more reason is there to expound this of the crownes of all Kings given by God (I deny not) to Nero, Julian, &c. then to expound the foregoing and following verses as applyed to

all Kings? Did Julian rejoyce in Gods salvation? did God grant Nero his hearts desire? did God grant (as it is, v. 4.) life eternall to Heathen Kings, as Kings? which words all Interpreters expound of the eternitie of Davids throne, till Christ come, and of victorie and life eternall purchased by Christ, as (d) 1.96 Ainsworth with good reason expounds it. And what though God give David a Crown; ergo, not by second causes, and by bowing all Israels heart to come in sinceritie to Hebron to make David King, 1 King. 12.38. God gave corne and wine to Israel, Hos. 2. shall the Prelate and the Anabaptist inferre, Ergo, he giveth it not by plowing, sowing, and the art of the husbahd-man? 3. The Heathen acknowledged a Divinitie in Kings; but he is blind who readeth them, and seeth not in their wri∣tings, that they teach that the people maketh Kings. 4. God girt David with strength, while he was a private man, and persecuted by Saul, and fought with Goliah, as the title of the same beareth; and he made him a valiant man of warre to breake bowes of steele; ergo, he giveth the sword to Kings, as Kings, and they receive no sword from the people. This is poore Logick. 5. The P. Prelate sendeth us Judg. 7.17. to the singular and extraordinarie power of God with Gideon: and I say, that same power behoved to be in Oreb and Zeba, v. 27. for they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Princes, and such as the Prelate from Pro. 8.15. saith, have no royall power from the people. 6. Moses and A∣aron their two rods were miraculous. This will prove that Priests are also Gods, and their persons srcred. I see not (except the Prelate would be at wo••sh••pping of Reliques) what more royall Divinitie is in Moses his rod, because he wrought miracles by his rod, then there is in Elias his staffe, in Peters napkin, in Pauls shadow. This is like the strong symbolicall Theologie of his fathers the Jesuites, which is not argumentative, except he say that Moses as King of Je∣surum wrought miracles; and why should not Nero, Caligula, Pha∣roah, and all Kings rods then dry up the red sea, and work miracles? 7. We give all the stiles to Kings that the Fathers gave, and yet we thinke not, when David commandeth to kill Vriah, and a King commandeth to murther his innocent subjects in England and Scotland, that that is Divalis jussio, the command of a God; and that this is a good consequence, What ever the King commandeth, though it were to kill his loyallest Subjects, is the commandement of God, Ergo, the King is not made King by the people. 8. Ergo, (saith he) these new Statists disgrace the King. If a most New Statist sprung out of a poore pursevant of Kraill, from the dunghill to the Court,

could have made himselfe an old Statist, and more expert in state af∣faires, then all the Nobles and soundest Lawyers in Scotland and England, this might have more weight. 9. Therefore the King (saith P. P.) is not the extract of the basest of rationall creatures. He mea∣neth, fex populi, his owne house and linage; but God calleth them his owne people, a royall Priesthood, a chosen generation, and, ps. 78.71. will warrant us to say the people is much worthier before God, then one man, seeing God choose David for Iacob his people, and Israel his inheritance, that he might feede them, Iohn P. P. his fathers suf∣frage in making a King will never be sought. We make not the mul∣titude, but the three Estates including the Nobles and Gentry to be as rationall creatures, as any Apostate Prelate in the three King∣domes.

QUEST. VII. Whether or no the P. Prelate the aforesaid Author doth by force of rea∣son evince, that neither constitution nor designation of the King is from the people?

THe P. Prelate aymeth (but it is an empty ayme) to prove that the people are wholly excluded. I answer only Arguments not pitched on before, as the Prelate saith.

P. Prelate. 1. To whom can it be more proper to give the rule over men, then to him who is the onely King truely and properly of the whole world? 2. God is the immediate Author of all rule and power that is amongst all his creatures, above or below. 3. Man before the fall re∣ceived dominion, and empire over all the creatures below immediatly, as Gen. 1.28. Gen. 9.2. ergo we cannot deny that the most noble go∣vernment (to wit Monarchy) must be immediatly from God, without any Contract or compact of men. Ans. The first reason concludeth not what is in question; for God only giveth rule and power to one man over another; ergo he giveth it immediatly, it followeth not. 2. It shall as well prove that God doth immediatly constitute all Iudges, and therefore it shall be unlawfull for a city to appoint a Major, or a shire a Iustice of peace. 3. The second argument is in∣consequent also, because God in creation is the immediat Author of all things,* 1.97 and therefore without consent of the creatures, or any act of the creature, created an Angell a nobler creature then man, and a man then a woman, and men above beasts; because those that are not, can exercise no act at all. But it followeth not; ergo all the workes of providence, such as is the government of Kingdomes are done immediatly by God, for in the workes of providence, for the

most part in ordinary, God worketh by meanes; it is then as good a consequence as this. God immediatly created man, ergo he kee∣peth his life immediatly also without foode and sleepe. God imme∣diatly created the Sunne, ergo God immediatly without the mediati∣on of the Sunne giveth light to the world. The making of a King is an act of reason, and God hath given a man reason to rule him∣selfe; and therefore hath given to a society an instinct of reason, to appoint a governour over themselves, but no act of reason goeth be∣fore man be created; ergo it is not in his power whether he be crea∣ted a creature of greater power then a beast or no. 4. God by crea∣tion gave power to a man over the creatures, and so immediatly; but I hope a man cannot say, God by creation hath made a man King over men. 5. The Excellency of Monarchy (if it be excellen∣ter then any other government, of which hereafter) is no ground why it should be immediatly from God, as well as mans dominion over the creature; for then the worke of mans redemption being more excellent then the raysing of Lazarus, should have been done immediatly without the incarnation, death and satisfaction of Christ (for no act of God without himselfe is comparable to the worke of redemption, 1 Pet. 1.11, 12. Col. 1.18, 19, 20, 21, 22.) and Gods lesse excellent workes, as his creating of beasts and wormes should have been done mediatly, and his creating of man immediatly.

P. P. They who execute the judgement of God, must needs have the power to judge from God. But Kings are Deputies in the exercises of the Iudgements of God, ergo, the proposition is proved. How is it imagi∣nable that God reconcileth the world by Ministers, and saveth man by them, 1 Cor. 5. 1 Tim. 4.16. except they receive a power so to doe from God? the assumption is, Deut. 1.17. 1 Chro. 19.6. Let none say Moses and Iehosaphat speake of inferiour Iudges, for that which the King doth to others, he doth by himselfe; also 5. The execution of the Kingly power is from God, for the King is the Servant, Angell, Legat, Minister of God, Rom. 13.6, 7. God properly and primarily is King, and King of Kings and Lord of Lords, 1 Tim. 6.15. Rev. 1.5.21.27.29.20. all Kings related to him, are Kings equivocally, and in resemblance, and he the only King. Ans. That which is in question is never concluded; to wit, that the King is both immediatly constituted and d••signed King, by God onely, and not by the mediation of the people; for when God reconcileth and saveth men by Pastors, he saveth them by the intervening action of men, so he scourgeth his people by men, as by his sword, Psal. 17.14. and hand, staffe, and rod, Esay 10.5. his hammer. Doth it follow that God onely doth immediatly

scourge his people, and that wicked men have no more hand and action in scourging his people, then the Prelate saith the people h••ve an hand in making a King? and that is no hand at all, by the Prelates way.

2. We may borrow the Prelates argument: inferiour Iudges exe∣cute the judgement of the Lord, and not the judgement of the King; ergo, by the Prelates argument, God doth only by immediate power execute judgement in them, and the inferiour Iudges are not Gods ministers executing the judgement of the Lord. But the Conclusion is against all truth, and so must the Prelates argument be. And that inferiour Iudges are the immediate substitutes and deputies of God, is hence proved, and shall be hereafter made good, if God will. 3. God is properly King of Kings, so is God properly causa causa∣rum, the cause of causes, the life of lifes, the joy of joyes. What, shall it then follow, that he worketh nothing in the creatures by their mediation, as causes? Because God is light of lights, doth he not enlighten the earth and aire by the mediation of the Sun? then God communicateth not life mediately by generation, he causeth not his Saints to rejoyce with joy unspeakable and glorious, by the inter∣vening mediation of the Word. These are vaine consequences. Soueraignty, and all power and virtue is in God infinitely: And what vertue and power of action is in the creatures, as they are compared with God, are in the creatures equivocally and in re∣semblance, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in opinion, rather then really. Hence it must follow, 1. that second causes worke none at all, no more then the people hath a hand or action in making the King, and that is no hand at all, as the Prelate saith, And God only and immediately worketh all workes in the creatures, because both the power of working and actuall working commeth from God, and the crea∣tures in all their working, are Gods instruments: and if the Prelate argue so frequently from power given of God, to prove that actu∣all reigning is from God immediately, Deut. 8.18. The Lord giveth the power, to get wealth: will it follow that Israel getteth no riches at all, or that God doth not mediately by them and their industrie get them? I thinke not.

P. Prelate. 6 To whom can it be due to give the Kingly office, but to him only who is able to give the indument and abilitie for the office? now God only and immediately giveth abilitie to be a King, as the Sa∣cramentall anointing proveth, Josh 3.10. Othniel is the first Judge after Joshua; and it is said, And the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and

and he judged Israel; the like is said of Saul and David. Ans. God gave royall indowments immediatly, ergo he immediatly now ma∣keth the King. It followeth not, for the species of government is not that which formally constituteth a King, for then Nero, Caligu∣la, Iulian should not have been Kings, and those who come to the Crowne by conquest and blood, are essentially Kings, as the Prelate saith; but be all these Othniels, upon whom the spirit of the Lord com∣meth? then they are not essentially Kings who are babes and chil∣dren, and foolish and destitute of the royall endowments, but it is one thing to have a royall gift, and another thing to be formally cal∣led to the Kingdome, David had royall gifts after Samuel anoynted him, but if you make him King, before Sauls death, Saul was both a traytor all the time that he persecuted David, and so no King, and also King and Gods anoynted, as David acknowledgeth him; and therefore that spirit that came on David, and Saul, maketh nothing against the peoples election of a King, as the Spirit of God is given to Pastors under the new Testament, as Christ promised; but it will not follow that the designation of the man who is to be Pastor, should not be from the Church and from men, as the Prelate denyeth that either the constitution or designation of the King is from the people, but from God onely. 2. I beleeve the infusion of the spirit of God upon the Iudges will not prove that Kings are now both con∣stituted and designed of God solely, onely, and immediatly; for the Iudges were indeed immediatly and for the most part extraordina∣rily raised up of God, and God indeed in the time of the Iewes was the King of Israel in another manner then he was the King of all the nations, and is the King of Christian Realmes now, and therefore the peoples despising of Samuel, was a refusing that God should reigne over them, because God in the Iudges revealed himselfe even in matters of Policy, as what should be done to the man that gathe∣red sticks on the Sabbath day, and the like, as he doth not now to Kings.

P. Prelate. Soveraigntie is a ray of divine glory and majestie•• but this cannot be found in people, whether you consider them joyntly, or singly; if you consider them singly, it cannot be in every individuall man; for Sectaries say, That all are born equall with a like freedom: and if it be not in the people singly, it cannot be in them joyntly; for all the contribution in this compact and contract which they fancie to be humane composition, and voluntary constitution, is onely, by a surren∣der of the native right that every one had in himself; from whence

then can this majestie and authoritie be derived? Again, where the obligation amongst equals is by contract and compact, violation of the faith, plighted in the contract, cannot in proper termes, be called disobe∣dience, or contempt of authoritie: it is no more but a receding from, and a violation of that which was promised, as it may be in States or Counties confederate. Nature, reason, conscience, scripture, teach, That disobedience to Soveraign power is not onely a violation of Truth, breach of Covenant, but also high disobedience and contempt, as is clear, 1 Sam. 10.26. So when Saul, Chap. 11. sent a yoak of Oxen, hewed in pieces, to all the Tribes, the fear of the Lord fell on the peo∣ple, and they came out with one consent, 1 Sam. 11.17. so Job 11.18. He looseth the bonds of Kings, that is, he looseth their authoritie, and bringeth them in contempt; and he girdeth there loyns with a girdle, that is, he strengthneth their authoritie, and maketh the people to re∣verence them. Heathens observe, that there 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 some divine thing in Kings. Prophane Histories say, that this was so eminent in Alexander the great, that it was a terrour to his enemies, and a power∣full Loadstone to draw men to compose the most seditious Counsels, and cause his most experienced Commanders, embrace, and obey his counsel, and command. Some stories write, that upon some great exigence, there was some resplendent majesti•• in the eyes of Scipio. This kept Pharaoh from lifting his hand against Moses, who charged him so boldly with his sins. When Moses did speak with God, face to face in the Mount, this resplendent glory of Majestie so awed the people, that they durst not behold his glory, Exod. 34. This repressed the fury of the people enraged against Gideon from destroying their idol, Judg. 6. And the fear of man is naturally upon all living creatures below, Gen. 9. So what can this reverence, which is innate in the hearts of all subjects toward their Soveraigns be, but the Ordinance unrepealable of God, and the naturall effect of that majestie of Princes, with which they are endowed with from above?

* 1.98Ans. 1. I never heard any shadow of reason while now, and yet (because the lie hath a latitude) here is but a shadow, which the Prelate stole from M. Antonius de Dominis Archiepisc. Spalatensis, and I may say confidently, this Plagiarius hath not one line in his booke which is not stollen; and for the present Spalato his argu∣ment is but spilt, and the nerves cut from it, while it is both bleeding and lamed. Let the Reader compare them, and I pawn my credit he hath ignorantly clipped Spalato: But I answer, 1. Soveraigntie is a beam and ray (as Spalato saith) of divine majestie, and is not either

formally or virtually in the people. So he. It is false, that it is not virtu∣ally in the people: for there be two things in the Iudge, either infe∣rior or supream (for the argument holdeth in the majestie of a Parli∣ament, as we shall hear) 1. The gift or grace of Governing (the Ar∣minian Prelate will offend at this.) 2. The Authority of governing: 1. The gift is supernaturall, and is not in man naturally, and so not in the King; for he is physically but a mortall man, and this is a gift received; for Salomon asked it by prayer from God. There is a ca∣pacitie passive in all individuall men for it: as for the officiall au∣thoritie it self, it is virtually in all, in whom any of Gods image is remaining, since the fall, as is clear; as may be gathered from, Gen. 1.28. yea, the Father, the Master, the Judge, have it by Gods institution in some measure, over son, servant, and subject, though it be more in the supreme Ruler: and for our purpose, it is not re∣quisite that authoritative majestie should be in all. (What is in the Father and Husband, I hope to clear) I mean, it needeth not to be formally in all, and so all are born alike and equall: But he who is a Papist, a Socinian, an Arminian, and therefore delivered to Satan by his mother Church, must be the Sectarie, for we are where this Prelate left us, maintainers of the Protestant Religion, con∣tinued in the Confession of Faith, and Nationall Covenant of Scotland, when this Demas forsook us, and embraced the World. 2. Though not on single man in Israel be a Judge, or King by na∣ture, nor have in them formally any ray of Royaltie, or of Magi∣straticall Authoritie; yet it followeth not, that Israel Parliamenta∣rily convened, hath no such authoritie, as to make Saul King in Mizpah, and David King in Hebron, 1 Sam. 10.24, 25.* 1.99 1 Chro. 11.1, 2. Chap. 12.38, 39. One man alone hath not the Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven, (as the Prelate dreameth) But it followeth not, that many convened in a Church way, hath not this power, Matth. 18.17. 1 Cor. 5.1, 2, 3, 4. One man hath not strength to fight against an Army of ten thousand: doth it follow? Ergo, An Army of twenty thousand hath not strength to fight against these ten thousand: So one Paul cannot Synodically determine the question, Acts 15. It followeth not; Ergo, The Apostles, and El∣ders, and Brethren, convened from divers Churches, hath not power to determine it in a lawfull Synod: And therefore, from a disjoyned and scattered power, no man can argue to a united power: So not any one man is an inferiour Ruler, or hath the rayes and beams of a number of Aristocraticall Rulers: but it followeth not. Ergo, All

these men combined in a Citie, or Societie, have not power in a joynt Politicall body, to chose Inferiour or Aristocraticall Rulers. 3. The P. Prelates reason is nothing. All the Contribution (saith he) in the compact body to make a King, is onely by a surrender of the native right of every single man, (the whole being onely a voluntary constitu∣tion.) How then can there be any majestie derived from them? I answer. Very well. For the surrender is so voluntary, that it is also naturall, and founded on the Law of nature, That men must have Governours, either many, or one supreme Ruler: And it is volun∣tary, and dependeth on a positive institution of God, Whether the Government be by one supreme Ruler, as in a Monarchie, or in many, as in an Aristocracie, according as the necessitie and temper of the Common-wealth do most require. This Constitution is so voluntary, as it hath below it, the Law of nature for its generall foundation; and above it, the supervenient institution of God, or∣daining, That there should be such Magistrates, both Kings, and other Iudges, because without such, all humane societies should be dissolved.* 1.100 4. Individuall persons in creating a Magistrate, doth not properly surrender their right, which can be called a right; for they do but surrender their power of doing violence to these of their fellows in that same Communitie; so as they shall not now have Morall power to do injuries without punishment; and this is not right or libertie properly, but servitude: for a power to do violence and injuries, is not liberty, but serv••tude and bondage. But the Prelate talketh of Royaltie, as of meer Tyranny, as if it were a proper Dominion, and servile Empire, that the Prince hath over his people, and not more paternall and fatherly, then lordly, or masterly. 5. He saith, Violation of faith plighted in a contract a∣mongst equals, cannot be called disobedience, but disobedience to the authoritie of the Soveraign is not onely breach of Covenant, but high disobedience and contempt. But violation of faith amongst equals, as equals, is not properly disobedience; for disobedience is betwixt a superiour and an inferiour: but violation of faith amongst equals, when they make one of their equals their Iudge and Ruler, is not onely violation of truth, but also disobedience. All Israel and Saul while he is a private man seeking his fathers Asses, are equals by Covenant obliged one to another; and so any injury done by Is∣rael to Saul in that case, is not disobedience, but onely violation of faith; but when all Israel maketh Saul their King, and sweareth to him obedience, he is not now their equall, and an injury done to

him now, is both a violation of their faith, and high disobedience also. Suppose a Citie of Aldermen, all equall amongst themselves in∣dignitie and place, take one of their number, and make him their Major and Provost; a wrong done to him now, is not onely against the rules of fraternitie, but disobedience to one placed by God in authoritie over them. 6. 1 Sam. 11.7. The fear of the Lord fell on the people, and they came out with one consent to obey Saul. Ergo, God hath placed authority in Kings, which is not in people: It is true, because God hath transferred the scattered authorities that are in all the people, in one Masse; and by vertue of his own Ordinance, hath placed them in one man who is King. What followeth? Ergo, God conferreth this authoritie immediately upon the King, without the mediation of any action of the people; yea, the contrary ra∣ther followeth. 7. God looseth the bond of Kings; that is,* 1.101 when God is to cast off Kings, he causeth them to lose all authoritie, and maketh them come in contempt with the people. But what doth this prove? That God taketh away the majestie and authority of Kings Immediately; And therefore God gave to Kings this autho∣ritie Immediately, without the peoples conveiance? Yea, I take the Prelates weapon from him. God doth not take the authority of the King from him immediately, but mediately by the people their hating and dispising him, when they see his wickednesse, as the peo∣ple see Nero a Monster, a prodigeous blood-sucker; upon this, all the people contemn him, and dispise him, and so the majesty is taken from Nero, and all his Mandates and Laws, when they see him trample upon all Laws divine and humane; and that mediately by the peoples heart, dispising of his majestie, and so they repeat and take again that aw-some authoritie, that they once gave him: And this proveth, that God gave him the authoritie mediately, by the consent of man. 8. Nor speaketh he of Kings onely, but Vers. 21. He powreth contempt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 super munificos. Pineda. Aria. Mont. super Principes. Upon Nobles and great men. And this place may prove, That no Iudges of the earth are made by men. 9. The Heathen say, That there is some divinity in Princes, as in Alexander the great, toward his enemies, and Scipio: But this will prove, That Princes and Kings have a Superiority over those who are not their native Subjects; for something of God is in them, in relation to all men, that are not their Subjects. If this be a ground, strong and good, because God onely, and independently from men, taketh a∣way this majestie; as God onely, and independently giveth it, then

a King is sacred to all men, subjects, or not subjects; then it is un∣lawfull to make war against any forraign King and Prince, for in invading him, or resisting him, you resist that divine majestie of God, that is in him; then you may not lawfully flee from a tyrant, no more then you may lawfully flie from God. 10. Scipio was not a King. Ergo, This divine majestie is in all Iudges of the earth, in a more or lesse measure. Ergo, God onely and immediately, may take this spark of divine majestie from inferiour Iudges: It follow∣eth not. And Kings certainly cannot infuse any sparkle of a divine majestie, on any inferiour Iudges; for God onely, immediately in∣fuseth it in men. Ergo, It is unlawfull for Kings to take this divini∣tie from Iudges, for they resist God, who resist Parliaments, no lesse then those who resist Kings. Scipio hath divinity in him, as well as Cesar, and that immediately from God, and not from any King. 10. Moses was not a King when he went to Pharaoh, for he had not as yet a people; Pharaoh was the King, and because Pharaoh was a King, the Divines of Oxford must say, His Majestie must not, in words of rebuke, be resisted, more then by deeds. 11. Moses his face did shine as a Prophet receiving the Law from God, not as a King: and is this Sunshine of Heaven upon the face of Nero, and Julian? It must be, if it be a beam of Royall Majestie, if this prat∣ler say right, but 2 Cor. 3.7. this was a majestie typicall, which did adumbrate the glory of the Law of God, and is far from being a roy∣altie due to all Heathen Kings. 12. I would our King would evidence such a Majestie in breaking the Images and Idols of his Queen, and of Papists about him. 13. The fear of Noah, and the regenerated, who are in Covenant with the Beasts of the field, Job 5.23. is upon the Beasts of the earth, not by any approbation only, as the people maketh Kings, by the Prelates way; nor yet by free con∣sent, as the people freely transfer their power to him, who is King. The creatures inferiour to man, have by no act of freewill, chosen man to be their Ruler, and transferred their power to him, because they are by nature inferiour to man, and God by nature hath sub∣jected the creatures to man,* 1.102 Gen. 1.28. and so this proveth not, that the King by nature is above the people, I mean the man who is King; and therefore though God had planted in the hearts of all subjects, a fear and reverence toward the King; upon supposall, that they have made him King: It followeth not, That this au∣thoritie and majestie, is immediately given by God to the man who is King, without the interveening consent of the people; for there

is a native feare in the Scholler to stand in awe of his Teacher, and yet the Scholler may willingly give himselfe to be a disciple to his Teacher, and so give his Teacher power over him. Citizens naturally feare their supreame Governour of the City, yet they give to the man who is their supream Governour, that power and Authority which is the ground of awe and reverence. A Servant naturally fea∣reth his Master, yet often he giveth his liberty, and resigneth it up voluntarily to his Master, and this was not unordinary amongst the Iewes, where the servant did intirely love the Master, and is most ordinary now when servants doe for hyre, tye themselves to such a Master; and Souldiers naturally feare their Commanders, yet they may, and often doe, by voluntary consent make such men their Commanders; and therefore from this it followeth no way, that the Governour of a City, the Teacher, the Master, the Com∣mander in War have not their power and authority only and imme∣diatly from God, but from their inferiours, who by their free con∣sent appointed them for such places.

P. Prelate. This seemeth, or rather is an unanswerable Argument, No man hath power of life and death,* 1.103 but the Soveraign Power of life and death; to wit God, Gen. 9.5. God saith thrice he will require the blood of man at the hands of man, and this power God hath committed to Gods Deputy, who so sheddeth mans blood 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by man shall die, by the King, for the world knew not any kind of goverment at this time, but Monarchiall; and this Monarch was Noah; and if this power be from God, why not all soveraigne power? seeing it is Homogeneous, and as Iurists say in indivisibili posita, a thing in its nature indivisible, and that cannot be distracted, or impaired, and if every man had the power of life and death, God should not be the God of Order.

The P. Prelate taketh the paines to prove out of the text that a Magistracy is established in the text. Ans. 1. Let us consider this unanswerable Argument, 1. It is grounded upon a lye, and a con∣jecture never taught by any but himselfe; to wit, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by, or in, or through man, must signifie a Magistrate. 2. and a King onely. 3. This King was Noah, never interpreter; nay not com∣mon sence can say, that no Magistrate is here understood but a King; the consequence is vaine, his blood shall be shed by man, ergo by a Magistrate, it followeth not, ergo by a King, it followeth not: there was not a King in the world yet as; some make Belus the fa∣ther of Ninus the first King, and the builder of Babylon, this Ni∣nus is thought the first builder of the City, after called Ninivie, and

the first King of the Assyrians, so saith (a) 1.104 Quintus Curtius▪ and o∣thers; but grave Authors beleeve that Nimrod was no other then Belus the father of Ninus, so saith (b) 1.105 Augustin, (c) 1.106 Hierome, (d) 1.107 Eusebius, (e) 1.108 Hieronym. And (f) 1.109 Eusebius maketh him the first founder of Babylon: So saith (g) 1.110 Clemens, (i) 1.111 Pirerius; and Iose∣phus saith the same. 1. their times, 2. their cruell natures are the same. (k) 1.112 Calvin saith, Noah yet lived while Nimrod lived: and the Scripture saith, Nimrod began to reigne, and be powerfull on the Earth. And Babel was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the beginning of his king∣dome. No writer, Moses nor any other can shew us a King before Nimrod. So (l) 1.113 Eusebius, (m) 1.114 Paul. Orosius, (n) 1.115 Hieronym. (o) 1.116 Iose∣phus say that he was the first King. And (p) 1.117 Tostatus Abulens. and our own (q) 1.118 (q) 1.119 Calvin, (r) 1.120 (r) 1.121 Luther, (s) 1.122 Musculus on the place, and (t) 1.123 Ainsworth, make him the first King, and the founder of Babylon. How Noah was a King, or there was any Monarchicall government in the world then, the Prelate hath alone dreamed it: There was but Familie-government before this. 2. And if there bee a Magistracie heere established by God, there is no warrant to say it is onely a Monarchie: For if the Holy Ghost in∣tendeth a policie: it is a policie to be established to the worlds end, and not to bee limited (as the P. Prelate doth) to Noahs dayes:(h) 1.124 all Interpreters upon good ground establish the same poli∣cie that our Saviour speaketh of, when he saith, He shall perish by the sword, who taketh the sword, Matth. 26.52. So the Netherlands have no lawfull Magistrate, who have power of life and death, because their Government is Aristocraticall, and they have no King. So all acts of taking away the lives of ill-doers, shall be acts of homicide in Holland: how absurd? 3. Nor doe I see how the place in the native scope doth establish a Magistracie. (s) 1.125 Calvin saith not so: & Interpreters deduce by consequence the power of the Magistrate from this place. But the Text is generall: He who killeth man, shall be killed by man: either he shall fall into the Magistrates hand, or into the hand of some Murtherer: so Calvin, (t) 1.126 Marlorat. And he speaketh (saith (w) Pirerius) not of the fact and event it selfe, but of the deserving of murtherers; and it's certaine, all murtherers fall not into the Magistrates hands; but he saith, by Gods and mans

laws. Ergo, They ought to dye, though sometime one murtherer kil∣leth another. 4. The Soveraign power is given to the King, ergo, it is given to him immediately without the consent of the people. It fol∣loweth not. 5. Power of life and death is not given to the King only, but also to other Magistrates, yea, and to a single private man in the just defence of his own life. Other arguments are but what the Pre∣late hath said already.

QUEST. VIII. Whether the Prelate proveth by force of reason, that the people can∣not be capable of any power of Government?

P. Prelate. God and nature giveth no power in vain, and which may not be reduced into action; but an active power, or a power of actuall governing, was never acted by the Communitie; therefore this power cannot be seated in the Communitie as in the prime and pro∣per subject; and it cannot be in every individuall person of a Commu∣nitie, because Government intrinsecally and essentially includeth a spe∣cified distinction of Governours, and some to be governed; and to speak properly, there can no other power be conceived in the Communitie naturally and properly, but only potestas passiva regiminis, a capacitie or susceptabilitie to be governed, by one or by moe, just as the first mat∣ter desireth a forme. This obligeth all, by the dictate of Natures law, to submit to actuall government: and as it is in every individuall person, it is not meerly and properly voluntary, because howsoever nature di∣ctates, that government is necessary for the safety of the society, yet e∣very singular person, by corruption and selfe-love, hath a naturall a∣versenesse and repugnancie to submit to any; every man would be a King himselfe: This universall desire, appetitus universalis aut natu∣ralis, or universall propension to Government, is like the act of the un∣derstanding assenting to the first undeniable principles of truth, and to the wills generall propension to happines in generall, which propension is not a free act, except our new Statists, as they have changed their faith, so they overturne true reason, it will puzzle them infinitely to make any thing in its kinde passive, really active and collative of positive acts and effects. All know, no man can give what he hath not: an old Phi∣losopher would laugh at him who would say, that a matter perfected and actuated by union, with a forme, could at pleasure shake off its forme, and marrie it selfe to another: they may as well say, every wife hath power to resume her freedome, and marrie another, as that any such power active is in the Communitie, or any power to cast off Monarchie.

Ans. The P. Prelate might have thanked Spalato for this Argu∣ment, but he doth not so much as cite him, for feare his theft be de∣prehended, but Spalato hath it set downe with stronger nerves, then the Prelates head was able to copie out of him. But (a) 1.127 Iac. de Almain, and (b) 1.128 Navarrus, with the Parision Doctors said in the Concell of Paris, that politick power is immediatly from God, but first from the community; but so, that the community apply their power to this o•• that Government, not of liberty, but by naturall necessity, but Spal••to and the Plagiarie Prelate doe both looke be∣side the booke. The question is not now concerning the vis rectiva the power of governing in the people, but concerning the power of government, for these two di••fer much, the former is a power of ru∣ling and Monarchicall commanding of themselves, this power is not formally in the people, but only vertually; and no reason can say, that a vertuall power is idle, because it cannot be actuated by that same subject that it is in, for then it should not be a vertuall, but a formall power. Doe not Philosophers say such a Hearb ver∣tually maketh hot, and can the sottish Prelate say, this vertuall power is idle,(c) 1.129 and in vaine given of God, because it doth not for∣mally heate your hand when you touch it.(d) 1.130 2. The P. Prelate who is excommunicated for Popery, Socinianisme, Arminianisme, and is now turned Apostate to Christ, and his Church must have changed his faith,* 1.131 not we, and be reasonlesly ignorant to presse that axi∣ome, that the power is idle that cannot be reduced to acts; for a gene∣rative power is given to living and sensitive creatures, this power is not idle though it be not reduced in act, by all and every indivi∣duall sensitive creature. A power of seeing is given to all who na∣turally doe, or ought to see, yet it is not an idle power, because divers are blind, seeing it is put forth in action in divers of the kind; so this power in the community is not idle, because it is not put forth in acts in the people, in which it is vertually, and is put forth in action in some of them, whom they choose to be their Go∣vernours; nor is it reasonable to say that it should be put forth in action by all the people, as if all should be Kings and Governours. But the question is not of the power of governing in the people, but of the power of Government, that is, of the power of making Go∣vernours and Kings, and the community doth put forth in act this power, as a free, voluntary, and active power, for 1. a Commu∣nity transplanted to India or any place of the world, not before in∣habited have a perfect liberty to choose either a Monarchy, or a

Democracy, or an Aristocracy; for though nature incline them to Government in generall, yet are they not naturally determina∣ted to any one of those three, more than another. 2. Israel did of their free will choose the change of government, and would have a King, as the Nations had, ergo they had free will, and so an active power so to doe, and not a a passive inclination only to be governed, such as Spalato saith agreeth to the first matter, 3, Royalists teach that a people under Democracy, or Aristocracy have liberty to choose a King, and the Romanes did this, ergo they had an active power to do it, ergo the Prelates simile crookes, the matter at its plea∣sur•• cannot shake off its forme, nor the wife cast off her husband being once married; but Barclaius, Grotius, Arnisaeus, Blackwood, and all the Royalists teach that the people under any of these two formes of Democracy or Aristocracy, may resume their power, and cast off these formes and choose a Monarch, and if Monarchy be the best government as Royalists say, they may chose the best, and is this but a passive capacity to be governed? 2. Of ten men fit for a King∣dome they may designe one, and put the Crowne on his head, and refuse the other nine, and Israel crowned Solomon and refused Ad••∣niah. Is this not a voluntary action, proceeding from a free active, elective power? It will puzzle the pretended Prelate to deny this, that which the community doth freely, they doe not from such a passive capacity, as is in the first matter, in regard of the forme. 3. It is true that people through corruption of nature are averse to sub∣mit to Governours, for conscience sake, and as to the Lord, because the naturall man remaining in the state of nature can doe nothing that is truely good, but it is false that men have no active Morall power to submit to superiours, but only a passive capacity to be go∣verned, he quite contradicteth himselfe, for he said before, c. 4. pag. 49. that there is an innate feare and reverence in the hearts of all men naturally, even in Heathen toward their Severaign; yea as we have a naturall morall active power to love our Parents and supe∣riours (though it be not Evangelically, or legally in Gods Court, good) and so to obey their commandements, only we are averse to penall Lawes of superiours; but this proveth no way, that we have only by nature, a passive capacity to government; for Heathens have by instinct of nature both made Lawes morally good, submit∣ted to them, set Kings and Iudges over them; which clearely pro∣veth that men have an active power of Government by nature:

4. yea, what difference maketh the Prelate betwixt men and beasts, for beasts have a capacity to be governed, even Lyons and Tigers; but here is the matter, if men have any naturall power of Go∣vernment, the P. Prelate would have it with his brethren Iesuites and Arminians to be not naturall, but done by the helpe of univer∣sall grace, for so doe they confound nature and grace. But it is certaine our power to submit to Rulers and Kings as to rectors, and guides and fathers, is naturall, to submit to Tyrants in doing ills of sinne, is naturall, but in suffering ills of punishment its not naturall. 5. No man can give that which he hath not, is true, but that people have no power to make their Governours, is that which is in questi∣on, and denyed by us. 6. This argument doth prove that people hath no power to appoint Aristocraticall Rulers more then Kings, and sothe Aristocraticall and Democraticall Rulers are all inviolable and sacred, as the King. 2. by this the people may not resume their freedome if they turne tyrants and oppressors; this the Prelate shall deny, for he averreth, p. 96. out of Augustine, that the people may without sin change a corrupt Democracy into a Monarchy.

* 1.132P. Prelate. If Soveraignty be originally inherent in the people, then Democracy, or Government by the people, were the best Government, because it commeth nearest to the fountaine and streame of the first and radicall power in the people, yea and all other formes of government were unlawfull; and if Soveraignty be natively inherent in the multi∣tude, it must be proper to every individuall of the community, which is against that false Maxime of theirs, Quisque nascitur liber, every one by nature is borne a free man, and the posterity of those who first con∣tracted with their elected King, are not bound to that Couenant, but upon their native rest and liberty, may appoint another King without breach of covenant. The posterity of Ioshua, and the Elders in their time, who contracted with the Gibeonites to incorporate them, though in a serving condition, might have made their fathers government nothing.

Ans. The P. Prelate might thanke Spalato for this Argument al∣so,* 1.133 for it is stollen, but he never once nameth his name, lest his theift should be deprehended; so are his other Arguments stollen from Spalato, but the Prelate weakeneth them, and it is seene, stol∣len goods are not blessed. Spalato saith then, by the law of nature every Common-wealth should be governed by the people, and by the law of nature, the people should be under the badest▪ Govern∣ment, but this consequence is nothing; for community of many fami∣lies

is formally and of themselves under no government, but may choose any of the three,* 1.134 for popular government is not that where∣in all the people are Rulers, for this is confusion, no government, because all are Rulers, and none are governed and ruled; but in popular government many are chosen out of the people to rule, and that this is the worst government, is said gratis, without warrant, and if Monarchy be the best of it selfe, yet when men are in the state of sin, in some other respects, it hath many inconveniences. 2. I see not how Democracie is best, because neerest to the multi∣tudes power of making a King; for if all the three depend upon the free will of the people, all are alike a far off, and alike neer hand, to the peoples free choice, according as they see most conducible for the safety and protection of the Common-wealth: And seeing the forms of Government are no more naturall, then politick Incorpo∣rations of Cities, yea, then of Shires: But from a positive instituti∣on of God who erecteth this form, rather then this, not immediate∣ly now, but mediately by the free will of men; not one cometh for∣mally, and ex naturâ rei, neerer to the fountain then another, except that materially Democracie may come neerer to the peoples power, then Monarchie, but the excellencie of it above Monarchie, is not hence concluded; for by this reason, the number of four should be more excellent then the number of five, of ten, of an hundreth, of a thousand, or of millions, because four cometh neer to the number of three, which Aristotle calleth the first persit number, cui additur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of which yet formally all doe alike share in the nature and essence of number. 2. It is denied, that it followeth from this antecedent, The people have power to chose their own Governours. Ergo, All Governments, except Democracie, or Government by the people, must be sinfull and unlawfull. 1. Because Government by Kings is of Divine institution, and of other Iudges also, as is evi∣dent by Gods Word, Rom. 13.1, 2, 3. Deut. 17.14. Prov. 8.15, 16. 1 Pet. 2.13, 14. Psal. 2.10, 11, &c. 2. Power of chosing any form of Government, is in the people: Ergo, There is no Government lawfull, but popular Government; it followeth no wayes, but pre∣supposeth that power to chose any form of Government, must be formally actuall Government, which is most false, yea, they be con∣trary, as the prevalency or power, and the act are contrary, so these two are contrary, or opposite; neither is Soveraigntie, nor any Go∣vernment formally inherent in either the Communitie, by nature,

nor in any one particular man, by nature; and that every man is born free, so as no man, rather then his brother, is born a King and Ruler,* 1.135 I hope, God willing to make good, so as the Prelate shall never answer on the contrary. 3. It followeth not, that the Poste∣ritie living, when their Fathers made a Covenant with their first elected King, may without any breach of Covenant on the Kings part, make voyd and null their Fathers election of a King, and chose another King, because the lawfull Covenant of the Fathers in point of Government, if it be not broken, tieth the children; but it cannot deprive them of their lawfull libertie naturally inherent in them to chose the fittest man to be King: But of this hereafter more fully. 4. Spalato addeth, (the Prelate is not a faithfull theef) If the Communitie by the Law of nature, have power of all forms of Government, and so should be, by nature, under popular Government, and yet should refuse a Monarchy, and an Aristocracie; yet Augustine addeth, If the people should preferre their own private gain to the pub∣like good, and sell the Common-wealth, then some good man might take their libertie from them, and against their will erect a Monarchie, or an Aristocracie: But 1. the Prelate and Augustine, supposeth the people to be under Popular Government; this is not our case, for Spalato and the Prelate presupposeth by our grounds, that the peo∣ple by nature, must be under Popular Government; Augustine dreameth no such thing, and we deny that by nature, they are under any form of Government. 2. Augustine in a case most considerable, thinketh one good, and potent man, may take the corrupt peoples power of giving Honours, and making Rulers from them, and give it to some good men, few, or many, or to one; then Augustine lay∣eth done as a ground, that which Spalato and the Prelate denieth, That the people hath power to appoint their own Rulers; other∣wayes, how could one good man take that power from them? And the Prelates fifth Argument, is but a Branch of the fourth Argu∣ment, and is answered already.

P. Prelate, Chap. 11. He would prove, That Kings of the peoples making, are not blessed of God. The first creature of the peoples making, was Abimelech, Iudg. 9.22. who reigned onely three yeers, well neer Anti-Christs time of endurance; he came to it by blood▪ and an evil spirit rose betwixt him, and the men of Sechem, and he made a miserable end. The ne•••• was Ieroboam, who had this Motto; He made Israel to sin, the people made him King, and he made the same

pretence of a glorious Reformation, that our Reformers now make, new Calves, new Altars, new Feasts are erected; they banish the Levites, and take in the scum and drosse of the vulgar, &c. 3. Every action of Christ, is our instruction; Christ was truely a born King, notwith∣standing, when the people would make him a King, he disclaimed it, he would not be an arbiter betwixt two brethren differing.

Answ. I am not to follow the Prelates order every way, though God willing, I shall reach him in the fore-going Chapters. Nor purpose I to answer his treasonable railing against his own Nation, and the Iudges of the Land, whom God hath set over this seditious excommunicated Apostate. He layeth to us frequently the Iesuites Tenets, when as he is known himself to be a Papist:* 1.136 In this Argu∣ment he saith, Abimelech did reigne onely three yeers, well neer Anti-Christs reign: Is not this the basis, and the mother principle of Popery, That the Pope is not the Antichrist? for the Pope hath con∣tinued many ages. 1. He is not an individuall man, but a race of men, but the Antichrist, saith Belarmine, Stapleton, Becanus, and the nation of Iesuites, and Poplings, shall be one inviduall man, a born Iew, and shall reign onely three yeers and a half. But 1. The Argument from successe, proveth nothing, except the Prelate prove their bad successe to be from this,* 1.137 because they were chosen of the people. When as Saul chosen of God, and most of the Kings of Israel and Judah, who undeniably, had Gods calling to the Crown, were not blessed of God, and their Government was a ruine to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 people and Religion, as the people were removed to all the King∣doms of the earth, for the sins of Manasseh, Iere. 15.4. Was there∣fore Manasseh not lawfully called to the Crown? 2. For his in∣stance of Kings unlawfully called to the Crown, he bringeth us, whole two, and telleth us, that he doubteth as many learned men do, Whether Ieroboam was a King by permission onely, or by a commission from God. 3. Abimelech was cursed, because he wanted Gods calling to the throne, for then Israel had no King, but Iudges ex∣traordinarily raised up by God, and God did not raise him at all, only he came to the throne by blood, and carnall reasons moving the men of Sechem to advance him: The Argument presupposeth, that the whole lawfull calling of a King, is the voices of the people; This we never taught, though the Prelate make conquest a just title to a Crown, and it is but a title of blood and rapine. 4. Abimelech was not the first King, but onely a Iudge; all our Divines with the

Word of God maketh Saul the first King. 5. For Ieroboam he had Gods Word and Promise to be King, 1 King. 11.34, 35, 37, 38. But in my weak judgement he waited not Gods time, and way of coming to the Crown; but that his coming to the throne was un∣lawfull, because he came by the peoples election, is in question. 5. That the peoples Reformation,* 1.138 and their making a new King, was like the Kingdom of Scotlands Reformation, and the Parliament of Englands way now, is a traiterous calumny. For 1. It condemneth the King, who hath in Parliament declared all their proceedings to be legall. Rehoboam never declared Ieroboams Coronation to be lawfull, but contrary to Gods Word made war against Israel. 2. It is false that Israel pretended Religion in that change, the cause was the rough answer given to the supplication of the Estates, complain∣ing of their oppression, they were under in Solomons reign. 3. Re∣ligion is still subjected to policie by Prelates and Caveliers, not by us in Scotland, who sought nothing but Reformation of Religion, of Laws, so far as they serve Religion, as our Supplications, De∣clarations, and the event proveth. 4. We have no new Calves, new Altars, new Feasts, but professe, and really do hazard life and estate, to put away the Prelates Calves, Images, Tree-worship, Al∣tar-worship, Saints Feast-dayes, Idolatry, Masses; and nothing is said here but Jesuites, and Cananites, and Baalites, might say, (though falsly) against the Reformation of Iosiah: Trueth and purity of worship this yeer, is new in relation to Idolatry the last yeer, but it is simpliciter older. 5. We have not put away the Lords Priests, and Levites, and taken in the scum of the vulgar, but have put away Baals Priests, such as excommunicated Prelate Maxwel, and other Apostates, and resumed the faithfull servants of God, who were deprived and banished, for standing to the Protestant Faith sworn too, by the Prelates themselves. 6. Every action of Christ, such as his walking on the Sea, is not our instruction in that sense, that Christs refusing a Kingdom, is directly our instruction: And did Christ refuse to be a King, because the people would have made him a King? that is, non causa pro causa; he refused it, because his Kingdom was not in this world, and he came to suffer for men, not to reign over man. 7. The Prelate and others who were Lords of Session, and would be Iudges of mens Inheritances, and would usurpe the sword by being Lords of Counsell, and Parliament, have refused to be instructed by every Action of Christ, who would not judge betwixt brother and brother.

P. Prelate. Jephtah came to be a Iudge by Covenant, betwixt him and the Gileadites; here you have an interposed Act of man, yet the Lord himself in authorizing him as Iudge, vindicateth it no lesse to himself, then when extraordinarily he authorized Gideon and Samuel, 1 Sam. 12.11. Ergo, whatsoever act of man interveeneth, it contri∣buteth nothing to Royall Authority, it cannot weaken or repeal it.

Answ. It was as extraordinary that Jepthah a bastard, and the sonne of an harlot, should be Iudge, as that Gideon should be Iudge. God vindicateth to himselfe, that he giveth his people favour in the eyes of their enemies; but doth it follow,* 1.139 that the enemies are not agents, and to be commended for their humanitie in favouring the people of God? So Psal. 65.9, 10. God maketh corne to grow; there∣fore clouds, and earth, and sun, and summer, and husbandry con∣tributeth nothing to the growing of corne. But this is but that which he said before. We grant that this is an eminent and singular act of Gods speciall providence, that he moveth and boweth the wills of a great multitude to promote such a man who by nature commeth no more out of the wombe a crowned King, then the poorest shep∣herd in the land: and it is an act of grace to endue him with he∣roick and royall parts for the government. But what is all this? doth it exclude the peoples consent? in no wayes. So the works of supernaturall grace, as to love Christ above all things, to beleeve in Christ in a singular manner, are ascribed to the rich grace of God: but can the Prelate say, that the understanding and will in these acts are meere patients, and contribute no more then the people contribu∣teth to Royall authority in the King, and that is just nothing, by the Prelates way? And we utterly deny, that as water in baptisme hath no action at all in the working of remission of sinnes, so the people hath no influence in making a King, for the people are worthier,* 1.140 more excellent then the King, and they have an active power of ruling and directing themselves toward the intrinsecall end of humane po∣licie, which is the externall safety and peace of a societie, in so far as there are morall principles of the Second Table for this effect written in their heart, and therefore that royall authoritie, which by Gods speciall providence, is united in one King, and as it were over∣gilded and lustered with Princely grace and royall endowments, is diffused in the people, for the people hath an after-approbative con∣sent in making a King, as Royalists confesse, water hath no such a∣ction in producing grace.

QUEST. IX. Whether or no Soveraigntie is so from the people, that it remaineth in them in some part, so as they may in case of necessitie resume it?

THe Prelate will have it Babylonish confusion, that we are divided in opinion. Jesuites (saith he) place all Soveraigntie in the com∣munitie. Of the Sectaries; some warrant any one subject to make away his King, and that such a worke is no lesse to be rewarded then when one killeth a wolfe: Some say, this power is in the whole Communitie: some will have it in the collective body, not conveened by warrant or writ of Soveraignty, but when necessitie (which is often fancied) of re∣forming State and Church, calleth them together. Some in the Nobles and Peeres, some in the three Estates assembled by the Kings writ, some in the inferour Iudges.

I answer: If the Prelate were not a Iesuite himselfe, he would not bid his brethren take the mote out of their eye: but there is no∣thing here said but which Barclaius said better before this Plaga∣rius.* 1.141 To which I answer, We teach that any private man may kill a a Tyrant voyd of all title: and a great Royalist Barclaius saith so also. And if he have not the consent of the people, he is an usurper, for we know no externall lawfull calling that Kings have now, or their familie to the Crown, but only the call of the people; all other calls to us are now invisible and unknown, and God would not command us to obey Kings, and leave us in the darke, that we shall not know who is the King: the Prelate placeth his lawfull calling to the Crown in such an immediate, invisible, and subtile act of omnipoten∣cie, as that whereby God conferreth remission of sinnes by sprink∣ling with water in baptisme, and that whereby God directed Sa∣muel to annoint Saul and David, not Eliab, nor any other brother. It is the Devill in the P. P. not any of us, who teach that any private man may kill a lawfull King, though tyrannous in his government. For the subject of Royall power,* 1.142 we affirme, the first, and ultimate, and native subject of all power is the Communitie, as reasonable men naturally inclining to a societie: but the ethicall and politicall subject, or the legall and positive receptacle of this power is vari∣ous, according to the various constitutions of the policie. In Scot∣land and England, it is the three Estates of Parliament, in other Na∣tions some other Iudges or Peeres of the Land. The Prelate had no more common sense for him to object a confusion of opinions to us,

for this, then to all the Common-wealths on earth, because all have not Parliaments, as Scotland hath; all have not Constables, and Offi∣cials, and Churchmen, Barons, Lords of Councell, Parliaments, &c. as England had. But the truth is, the Communitie orderly convee∣ned, as it includeth all the Estates civill, have hand, and are to act in choosing their Rulers: I see not what priviledge Nobles have above Commons in a Court of Parliament, by Gods law; but as they are Iudges, all are equally Iudges, and all make up one congregation of Gods. But the question now is, if all power of governing (the Prelate, to make all the people Kings, saith, if all Soveraignty) be so in the people, that they retaine power to guard themselves against Ty∣ranny? And, if they reteine some of it, habitu, in habit, and in their power? I am not now unseasonably, according to the Prelates order, to dispute of the power of lawfull defence against tyranny; but I lay down this maxime of Divinitie; Tyranny being a worke of Sa∣than, is not from God, because sinne either habituall or actuall, is not from God; the power that is, must be from God; the Magistrate as Magistrate, is good, in nature of office, and the intrinsecall end of his office, Rom. 13.4. for he is the Minister of God for thy good; and therefore a power ethicall, politick, or morall, to oppresse, is not from God, and is not a power, but a licentious deviation of a power, and is no more from God, but from sinfull nature, and the old serpent, then a license to sinne: God in Christ giveth pardons of sinne; but the Pope, not God, giveth dispensations to sinne. 2. To this adde, If for nature to defend it selfe be lawfull, no Communitie, without sin, hath power to alienate and give away this power: for as no power given to man to murther his brother, is of God, so no power to suffer his brother to be murthered, is of God; and no power to suffer him∣selfe (à fortiori) far lesse can be from God. Here I speake not of phy∣sicall power, for if free will be the creature of God, a physicall power to acts which in relation to Gods law are sinfull, must be from God.

But I now follow the P. Prelate. Some of the adversaries,* 1.143 as Bu∣chanan, say that the Parliament hath no power to make a law, but on∣ly a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 without the approbation of the Communitie. Others, as the the Observator, say, that the right of the Gentry and Commu∣nalty is intirely in the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Com∣mons, and will have their Orders irrevocable. If then the common people cannot resume their power, and oppose the Parliament,* 1.144 how can Tables and Parliaments resume their power, and resist the King?

Answ. The ignorant man should have thanked Barclaius for this Argument, and yet Barclaius need not thanke him, for it hath not the nerves that Barclaius gave it. But I answer, 1. if the Par∣liament should have been corrupted by fair hopes (as in our age we have seene the like) the people did well to resist the Prelates ob∣truding the Masse Booke, when the Lords of the Counsell pressed it against all Law of God and man, upon the Kingdome of Scotland, and therefore it is denyed that the Acts of Parliament are irrevoca∣ble, the observator said they were irrevocable by the King, he be∣ing but one man, the P. Prelate wrongeth him, for he said onely, they have the power of a Law,* 1.145 and the King is obliged to con∣sent, by his Royall Office to all good Lawes, and neither King nor people may oppose them. Buchanan said Acts of Parliament are not Lawes obliging the people till they be promulgated, and the peo∣ples silence when they are promulgated is their approbation, and maketh them obligatory Lawes to them; but if the people speak against unjust Lawes, they are not Lawes at all, and Buchannan knew the power of the Scottish Parliament, better then this ignorant Sta∣tist. 2. There is not like reason to grant so much to the King, as to Parliaments, because certainly Parliaments who make Kings under God, or above any one man, and they must have more authority and wisedome then any one King, except Solomon (as base flatte∣rers say) should returne to the thrones of the earth.* 1.146 And as the power to make just Lawes is all in the Parliament, only the people have power to resist tyrannicall Lawes, the power of all the Parlia∣ment was never given to the King, by God, the Parliament are as essentially Iudges as the King, and therefore the Kings deed may well be revoked, because he acteth nothing as King; but united with his great or lesser Councell, no more then the eye can see, be∣ing separated from the body. The Peeres and Members of Parlia∣ment have more then the King, because they have both their owne power, being parts and speciall Members of the people, and also they have their high places in Parliament, either from the peoples ex∣presse, or tacite consent. 3. We allow no Arbitrary power to the Parliament, because their just Lawes are irrevocable, for the irre∣vocable power of making just Lawes doth argue a legall, not an ir∣reovocable Arbitrary power; nor is there any arbitrary power in the people, or in any mortall man, but of the Covenant betwixt King and people hereafter.

P. Prelate, If Soveraigne power be habitually in the community so,* 1.147 as they may resume it at their pleasure, then nothing is given to the King but an empty title, for at the same instant he receiveth Empire and Soveraignty, and layeth downe the power to rule or determine in matters which concerne either private or publick good, and so he is both a King and a Subject. Ans. This naked consequence the Prelate sayeth, and proveth not, and we deny it, and give this reason, the King receiveth Royall power with the States to make good Lawes, and 2. power by his royalty to execute those Lawes, and this power the community hath devolved in the hands of the King, and States of Parliament, but the community keepeth to themselves a power to resist tyranny, and to coerce it, and ••atenus in so far is Saul sub∣ject, that David is not to compeare before him, nor to lay downe Goliahes sword, nor disband his Army of defence, though the King should command him so to doe.

P. Prelate. By all Polititians, Kings,* 1.148 and enferiour Magistrates are differenced by their different specifice entity, but by this they are not differenced; nay a Magistrate is in a better condition then a King, for the Magistrate is to judge by a knowne Statute and Law, and cannot be censured and punished but by Law. But the King is censurable, yea disabled by the multitude, yea the basest of sub∣jects may cite, and convent the King, before the underived Majesty of the community, and he may be judged by the Arbitrary Law th••t is in the closet of their heart, not only for reall misdemeanour, but for fancied jealousies—It will be said, good Kings are in no danger—the contrary appeareth this day, and ordinarily the best are in greatest danger; no Government except Plato'es Republick wanteth incommodities, subtile spirits may make them, apprehend them. The poore people bewitched, fol∣low Absolom in his treason, they strike not at Royalty at first, but labour to make the Prince, naked of the good counsell of great Statesmen, &c.

Ans. Whether the King and the under Magistrate differ essenti∣ally, we shall see. The P. Prelate saith all Polititians grant it,* 1.149 but he saith untruth; he bringeth Moses, and the Iudges, their power to prove the power of Kings; and so either the Iudges of Israel and the Kings differ not essentially, or then the Prelate must correct the spirit of God tearming one booke of Scripture 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Kings, and another 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Iudges, and make the booke of Kings the booke of Iudges. 2. The Magistrates condition is not better then the Kings, because the Magistrate is to judge by an knowne Statute and

Law, and the King not so. God moulded the first King, Deut. 17.18. when he sitteth judging on his Throne, to looke to a written Cop∣py of the Law of God, as his rule. Now a power to follow Gods Law is better then a power to follow mans sinfull will: so the Prelate putteth the King in a worse condition then the Magistrate, not we, who will have the King to judge according to just statutes and lawes. 3. Whether the King be censurable and deposable by the multitude, he cannot determine out of our writings. 4. The com∣munities law is the law of nature, not their arbitrary lust. 5. The Prelates treasonable raylings, I cannot follow; he first saith, that we agree not ten of us to a positive faith, and that our faith is nega∣tive, but his faith is Privative, Popish, Socinian, Arminian, Pelagi∣an and worse, for he was once of that same faith that we are of. 2. Our Confession of Faith is positive, as the confession of all the reformed Churches, but I judge he thinketh the Protestant Faith of all the reformed Churches but negative. 3. The incommodities of Government before our reformation were not fancied, but prin∣ted by Authority, all the body of Popery was printed, and avowed as the Doctrine of the Church of Scotland and England, as the lear∣ned Author, and my much respected brother evidenceth in his Ludensium, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Canterburian selfe conviction. 4. The Parliament of England was never yet found guilty of Trea∣son. 5. The good Counsellers of great States-men, that Parliaments of both Kingdomes would take from the Kings Majesty, are a faction of perjured Papists, Prelates, Iesuites, Irish cut-throates, Strafords, and Apostate subverters of all Lawes divine, humane, of God, of Church, of State.

* 1.150P. Prelate. In whom so ever this power of Government be, it is the onely remedy to supply all defects, and to set right what ever is disjoyn∣ted in Church and State, and the subject of this super-intending power must be free from all errour in Iudgement and Practice, and so we have a Pope in temporalibus; and if the Parliament erre, the people must take order with them, else God hath left Church and State reme∣dilesse. Ans. This is stollen from Barclaius also; 1. but the same Bar∣claius saith,* 1.151 Si Rex regnum suum alienae ditioni manciparit, regno ca∣dit. If the King shall sell his Kingdome, or inslave it to a forraigne power, he falleth from all right to his Kingdome: but who shall exe∣cute any such Law against him, not the people, not the Peeres, not the Parliament; for this Mancipium ventris & aulae, this slave

saith, p. 147. I know no power in any to punish or curbe Soveraignty, but in Almighty God. 2. We see no super-intending power on earth in King or people infallible, nor is the last power of taking order with a Prince who inslaveth his Kingdome to a forraigne power placed by us in the people, because they cannot erre;* 1.152 Court flatte∣rers, who teach that the will of the Prince is the measure of all right and wrong, of Law and no Law; and above all Law must hold that the King is a temporall Pope, both in Ecclesiasticall and Civill mat∣ters; but because they cannot so readily destroy themselves, (the law of Nature having given to them a contrary internall principle of selfe preservation) as a Tyrant who doth care for himselfe, and not for the people. 3. And because Extremis morbis extrema re∣media in an extraordinary exigent, when Achab and Iezabell did undoe the Church of God, and Tyrannize over both the bodies and consciences of Priest, Prophet, and people, Elias procured the con∣vention of the States, and Elias with the peoples helpe killed all Baals Priests, the King looking on, and no question, against his heart. In this case I thinke its more then evident that the people resumed their power. 4. We teach not that people should supply all defects in Government, nor that they should use their power when any thing is done amisse by the King, no more then the King is to cut off the whole people of God, when they refuse an Idolatrous service obtruded upon them against all Law; the people is to suf∣fer much before they resume their power, but this Court slave will have the people to doe what he did not himselfe, for when King and Parliament summoned him, was he not obliged to appeare? Non-compearance when lawfull, royall, and Parliamentory power summoneth, is no lesse resistance, then taking of Forts and Castles.

P. Prelate. Then this super-intending power in people, may call a King to accompt, and punish him for any misdemeanour, or act of in∣justice. Why might not the people of Israels Peeres, or Sanedrin have convented David before them, judged and punished him for his Adul∣tery with Bathsheba, and his murther of Uriah▪ but it is holden by all, that Tyranny should be an intended universall, totall, manifest destruction of the whole Common-wealth, which cannot fall in the thoughts of any but a mad man. What is recorded in the Story of Nero his wish in this kind, may be rather judged the expression of transpor∣ted passion, then a fixed resolution.

Ans. The P. Prelate contrary to the scope of his booke, which is

all for the subject and seat of Soveraigne power, against all order hath plunged himselfe in the deep of Defensive armes, and yet hath no new thing. 1. Our law of Scotland will warrant any subject, if the King take from him his heritage, or invade his possession against Law, to resist the invaders, and to summon the Kings intrudors before the Lords of Session for that act of injustice: Is this against Gods Word, or Conscience? 2. The Sane∣drim did not punish David; Ergo, it is not lawfull to chal∣lenge a King for any one act of injustice: from the practice of the Sanedrim, to conclude a thing lawfull or unlawfull, is logick; we may resist. 3. By the P. Prelates doctrine, the law might not put Bathshebah to death, nor yet Joab the neerest agent of the mur∣thering of innocent Vriah,* 1.153 because Bathshebaes adulterie was the Kings adulterie, she did it in obedience to King David: Ioabs mur∣ther was Royall murther, as the murther of all the Cavaliers; for he had the Kings hand-writing for it. Murther is Murther, and the murtherer is to dye, though the King by a secret Let alone, a private and illegall warrant command it. Ergo, the Sanedrim might have taken Bathshebaes life, and Joabs head also: and consequently the Parliament of England, if they be Judges (as I conceive God and the Law of that ancient and renowned Kingdome maketh them) may take the head of many Joabs and Jermines, for murther; for the command of a King cannot legitimate murther. 4. David himselfe, as King, speaketh more for us then for the Prelate, 2 Sam. 12.7. And Davids anger was greatly kindled against the man, (the man was himselfe, v. 7. Thou art the man) and he said to Nathan, as the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this, shall surely dye. 5. Every act of injustice doth not un-King a Prince before God, as every act of uncleannesse doth not make a wife no wife before God. 6. The Pre∣late excuseth Nero, and would not have him resisted, if all Rome were one neck, that he might cut it off with one stroke (I read it of Cali∣gula; If the Prelate see more in Historie then I doe, I yield.) 7. He saith, the thoughts of totall eversion of a Kingdome, must only fall on a mad man. The King of Britaine was not mad, when he declared the Scots Traytors, because they resisted the service of the Masse; and raised an Army of Prelaticall cut-throats to destroy them, if all the Kingdome should resist Idolatry, (as all are obliged.) The King sleeped upon this Prelaticall resolution many moneths: passions in fervor have not a dayes raigne upon a man. And this was not so

cleare as the sun, but it was as cleare as written printed Proclama∣tions, and the pressing of Souldiers, and the visible marching of Cut-throats, and the blocking of Scotland up by sea and land could be visible to men having five senses.

Covaruv. a great Lawyer, saith,(a) 1.154 1. that all Civill power is penes remp. in the hands of the Common-wealth. 1. Because Nature hath given to man to be a sociall creature, and impossible he can preserve himselfe in a societie, except he being in communitie, transforme his power to an head. 2. He saith; Hujus vero civilis societatis & resp. rector ab alio quam ab ipsamet repub. constitui non potest justè & abs{que} Tyrannide. Siquidem ab ipso Deo constitutus non est, nec electus cui∣libet civili societati immediatè Rex aut Princeps. Arist. polit. 3. c. 10. saith, It is better that Kings got by election then by birth; because Kingdomes by succession are verè regia, truly Kingly: these by birth are more Tyrannicall, masterly, and proper to Barbarous Nations. And Covarruvias, tom. 2. pract. quest. de jurisd. Castellan. Reip. c. 1. n. 4. saith, Hereditary Kings are also made hereditary by the tacit con∣sent of the people, and so by law and consuetude.

Spalato. Let us grant (saith he) that a societie shall refuse to have a Governour over them, shall they be for that free? in no sort:* 1.155 but there be many wayes by which a people may be compelled to admit a governour; for then no man might rule over a Communitie against their will. But nature hath otherwise disposed, ut quod singuli nollent, universi vellent, that which every one will not have, a Communitie naturally desireth. And the P. Prelate saith, God is no lesse the author of Order, then he is the author of Being; for the Lord who createth all,* 1.156 conserveth all; and without government all humane societies should be dissolved and goe to ruine: Then government must be naturall, and not depend upon a voluntary & arbitrary constitution of men. In nature, the liveles creatures inferior give a tacit consent & silent obedience to their superiour, and the superiour have a powerfull influence on the inferiour. In the subordination of creatures, we ascend from one superior to ano∣ther, till at last we come to one supreme, which by the way pleadeth for the excellencie of Monarchie. Amongst Angels there is an order: how can it then be supposed that God hath left it to the simple consent of man to establish a heraldrie of sub & supra, of one above another, which nei∣ther nature nor the Gospel doth warrant? To leave it thus arbitrary▪ that upon this supposed principle, Mankind may be without government at all, is vain; which paradox cannot be maintained. In nature God hath

established a superiority inherent in superior creatures, which is no ways derived from the inferior by communication, in what proportion it will, and resumeable upon such exigents as the inferior listeth: therefore neither hath God left to the multitude, the communitie, the collective, the representative or virtuall body, to derive from it selfe, and commu∣nicate soveraigntie, whether in one or few, or more, in that measure and proportion pleaseth them, which they resume at pleasure.

Answ. 1. To answer Spalato: No societie hath liberty to be without all government, for God hath given to every societie (saith (a) 1.157 Covarruvias) a faculty of preserving themselves, and warding off violence and injuries; and this they could not doe, except they gave their power to one or many Rulers. But all that the Prelate buildeth on this false supposition, which is his fiction and calumnie, not our doctrine, to wit, that it is voluntary to man to be without all govern∣ment,* 1.158 because it is voluntarie to them to give away their power to one or moe Rulers, is a meere non-consequence. 1. We teach that Go∣vernment is naturall, not voluntary; but the way and manner of Go∣vernment is voluntarie: All societies should be quickly ruined, if there were no Government: but it followeth not therefore, God hath made some Kings, and that immediately, without the intervee∣ning consent of the people, and ergo, it is not arbitrary to the people to choose one supreme Ruler, and to erect a Monarchie, or to choose moe Rulers, and to erect an Aristocracie. It followeth no way. It is naturall to men to expresse their minde by humane voyces; Is not speaking of this or that language, Greeke rather then Latine, (as A∣ristotle saith) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by humane institution? It is naturall for men to eat; ergo, election of this or that meat is not in their choise. What reason is in this consequence? and so its a poore con∣sequence also; Power of Soveraigntie is in the people naturally; ergo it is not in their power to give it out in that measure that pleaseth them, and to resume it at pleasure. It followeth no way. Because the inherencie of Soveraigntie is naturall, and not arbitary, ergo, the alienation and giving out of the power to one, not to three, thus much, not thus much, conditionally, not absolutely and irrevocably, must be also arbitrary. It is as if you should say, a father having six children, naturally loveth them all, ergo, he hath not freedome of will in ex∣pressing his affection to give so much of his goods to this sonne, and that conditionally, if he use these goods well; and not more or lesse of his goods, at his pleasure. 2. There is a naturall subordination

in nature, in creatures superior and inferior, without any freedome of election:* 1.159 the earth made not the heavens more excellent then the earth, and the earth by no freedome of will made the heavens superior in excellencie to it selfe. Man gave no superioritie of ex∣cellencie to Angels above himselfe: the Creator of all Beings did both immediately without freedome of election in the creature, cre∣ate the being of all creatures, and their essentiall degrees of superio∣rity and inferiority, but God created not Saul by nature King over Israel; nor is David by the act of creation, by which he is made a man, created also a King over Israel; for then David should from the wombe and by nature be a King, and not by Gods free gift. Here both the free gift of God, and the free consent of the people inter∣veene: indeed God made the office and royaltie of a King above the dignitie of the people; but God by the interveening consent of the people maketh David a King, not Eliah; and the people maketh a covenant at Davids inauguration, that David shall have so much power, to wit, power to be a Father, not power to be a Tyrant; power to fight for the people, but no power to waste and destroy them. The inferior creatures in nature give no power to the superi∣our, and therefore they cannot give in such a proportion power. The deniall of the positive degree, is a deniall of the comparative and superlative, and so they cannot resume any power: But the desig∣ning of such a man, or such men to be Kings or Rulers, is a rationall voluntary action, not an action of nature, such as is Gods act of cre∣ating an Angell a nobler creature then a man, and the creating of man a more excellent creature then a beast: and for this cause the argument is vaine and foolish: for inferior creatures are inferior to the more noble and superior by nature, not by voluntary desig∣nation, or, as Royalists say, by naked approbation, which yet must be an arbitrary and voluntary action. 3. The P. Prelate commen∣deth order, while we come to the most supreme: hence he com∣mendeth Monarchie above all governments, because it is Gods go∣vernment. I am not against it, that Monarchie well tempered is the best government, though the question to me is most problema∣tick; but because God is a Monarch, who cannot erre or deny him∣selfe, therefore that sinfull Man be a Monarch, is miserable logick: and he must argue solidly forsooth by this, because there is order (as he saith) amongst Angels, will he make a Monarch and a King-Angell? His argument, if it have any weight in it, driveth at that,

even that there be crowned Kings amongst the Angels.

QUEST. X. Whether or not Royall birth be equivalent to divine unction?

SYmmons holdeth, that Birth is as good a title to the Crowne, as any given of God.* 1.160 How this question can be cleered, I see not, except we dispute tha••, Whether or not Kingdomes be proper patrimo∣nies derived from the father to the sonne? 2. I take, there is a large difference betwixt a thing transmittable by birth from the father to the sonne, and a thing not transmittable. 3. I conceive, as a per∣son is chosen to be a King over a people, so a familie or house may be chosen, and a Kingdome at first choosing a person to be their King, may also tye themselves to choose the first borne of his body: but as they transferre their power to the father, 1. for their owne safetie and peace, (not if he use the power they give him, to their destruction) the same way they tye themselves to his first borne, as to their King. 2. As they chose the father not as a man, but a man gifted with Royall grace, and a Princely facultie for government; so they can but tye themselves to his first borne, as to one graced with a facultie of governing: and if his first borne shall be borne an idiot and a foole, they are not obliged to make him King; for the obligation to the sonne can be no greater then the obligation to the father, which first obligation is the ground, measure and cause of all posterior obligations. If Tutors be appointed to governe such an one, the Tutors have the Royall power, not the Idiot; nor can he governe others, who cannot governe himselfe. That Kings goe not as heritage from the father to the sonne, I prove; 1. God, Deut. 17. could not command them to choose such a one for the King, and such a one who sitting on his throne shall follow the direction of God speaking in his word, if birth were that which gave him Gods title and right to the Crowne; for that were as much as such a man should be heire to his fathers inheritance, and the sonne not heire to his fathers crown, except he were such a man: But God in all the Law morall or judiciall, never required that the heire should be thus and thus qualified, else he should not be heire: but he requireth that a man, and so that a familie should be thus and thus qualified, else they should not be Kings: and I confirme it thus: The first King of divine institution must be the rule, paterne and measure of all the rest of the Kings, as Christ maketh the first Mariage,

Mat. 19.8. a paterne to all others, and Paul reduceth the right administration of the Supper to Christs first institution, 1 Cor. 11.23. now the first King, Deut. 17.14, 15. is not a man qualified by naked birth, for then the Lord in describing the manner of the King and his due qualifications, should seeke no other but this; You shall choose onely the first borne, or the lawfull sonne of the former King. But seeing the King of Gods first moulding is a King by election, and what God did after by promises and free grace give to David and his seed, even a throne till the Mesiah should come,* 1.161 and did promise to some Kings, if they would walke in his Com∣mandements; that their sonnes, and sonnes sonne should sit upon the Throne, in my judgement is not an obliging Law, that sole birth should be as just a title, in foro Dei, (for I now dispute the question in point of conscience) as royall unction. 2. If by divine institution God have impawned in the peoples hand a subordinate power to the most High, who giveth Kingdomes to whom he will, to make and create Kings, then is not sole birth a just title to the Crowne. But the former is true; both by precept, Deut. 17.1. and God expresly saith, Thou shalt choose him King, whom the Lord shall choose. And if it had not been the peoples power to create their own Kings, how doth God after he had designed Saul their King, yet expresly 1 Sam. 10. inspire Samuel 17. to call the people before the Lord at Mizpeh, to make Saul King? and how doth the Lord v. 22. expresly shew to Samuel, and the people, the man that they might make him King? and because all consented not that Saul should be King, God will have his Coronation renewed, v. 14. Then said Samuel to the people, Come, and let us goe to Gilgall, and renew the Kingdome there. 15. And all the people went to Gilgall, and there they made Saul King before the Lord in Gilgall. And how is it that David anoynted by God is yet no King, but a private subject, while all Israel make him King at Hebron?

3. If royall birth be equivolent to royall unction, and the best title,* 1.162 and if birth speake and declare to us the Lords appointment and Will,* 1.163 that the first born of a King should be King, as M. Symmons and others say; then is all title by conquest, where the former King standeth, in title to the Crowne, and hath an Heire, unlawfull. But the latter is against all the nation of the Royalists, for Arnisaeus, Barclay, Grotius, Io. Roffensis Episco. the Bishop of Spalato, Dr. Ferne, M. Sym∣mons, the excommunicate Prelat, if his poore learning may bring

him in the roll, teach that conquest is a lawfull title to a Crowne. I prove the Proposition, 1. because if birth speake Gods revealed Will, that the Heire of a King is the lawfull King, then conquest cannot speake the contradicent Will of God,* 1.164 that he is no lawfull King, but the conquerour is the lawfull King. Gods revealed Will should be contradictory to himselfe, and birth should speake it is Gods Will, that the Heire of the former King be King, and the con∣quest being also Gods revealed Will, should also speake that that Heire should not be King. 2. If birth speake and reveale Gods Will that the Heire be King, it is unlawfull for a conquered people to give their consent that a conquerour be their King. For their con∣sent being contrary to Gods revealed Will, (which is, that birth is the just title) must be an unlawfull consent. If Royalists say, God the King of Kings who immediately maketh Kings, may, and doth transferre Kingdomes to whom he will, and when he putteth the sword in Nebuchadnezers hand, to conquer the King and Kingdome of Iudah, then Zedikiah or his sonne is not King of Iudah, but Nebu∣chadnezer is King, and God being above his Law, speaketh in that case his Will by conquests, as before he spake his Will by birth; this is all can be said. Ans. They answer black treason in saying so, for if Ieremiah from the Lord had not commanded expresly, that both the King and Kingdome of Judah should submit to the King of Babylon,* 1.165 and serve him, and pray for him, as their lawfull King, it had been as lawfull to them to rebell against that Tyrant, as it was for them to fight against the Philistimes, and the King of Ammon; but if birth be the just and lawfull title, in foro Dei, in Gods Court, and the only thing that evidenceth Gods Will without any election of the people, that the first borne of such a King is their lawfull King, then conquests cannot now speake a contrardictory Will of God; for the question is not whether or not, God giveth power to Tyrants to conquer Kingdomes from the just Heires of Kings, which did raigne lawfully before their sword made an empty Throne; But whether conquest now, when Jeremiahs are not sent immediatly from God to command? for example; Britaine to sub∣mit to a violent intruder, who hath expelled the lawfull Heires of the royall Line of the King of Britaine, whether I say doth conquest in such a violent way, speake that it is Gods revealed Will, called Voluntas signi, the will that is to rule us, in all our Morall duties to cast off the just Heires of the blood Royall, and to sweare homage

to a conquerour, and so as that conquerour now hath as just right, as the King of Britaine had by birth. This cannot be taken off by the wit of any, who 1. maintaine that conquest is a lawfull title to a Crowne, and 2. that royall birth without the peoples election speaketh Gods regulating Will in his Word, that the first borne of a King is a lawfull King by birth; for God now a daies doth not say the contrary of what he revealed in his Word. If birth be Gods regulating Will, that the Heire of the King is in Gods Court a King, no act of the conquerour can anull that Word of God to us, and the people may not lawfully, though they were ten times subdued, sweare homage and allegiance to a conquerour, against the due right of birth, which by Royalists Doctrine revealeth to us the plaine contradictory Will of God. It is, I grant, often Gods De∣cree revealed by the event, that a conquerour be on the Throne, but this Will is not our rule, and the people are to sweare no Oath of Allegiance contrary to Gods Voluntas signi, which is his revealed Will in his Word regulating us.

4. Things transferrible and communicable by birth from father to sonne, are onely, in Law, those which Heathen call bona fortunae,* 1.166 * 1.167 riches, as lands, houses, monies and heritages; and so saith the Law also. These things which essentially include gifts of the mind, and honour property so called, I meane honour founded on vertue, as Aristotle with good reason maketh honour praeminum virtutis, can∣not be communicated by birth from the father to the sonne; for roy∣all dignity includeth these three constituent parts essentially, of which none can be communicable by birth. 1. The royall faculty of governing, which is a speciall gift of God, above nature, is from God. Solomon asked it from God, and had it not by generation from his father David. 2. The royall honour▪ to be set above the people because of this royall vertue, is not from the wombe, for then Gods spirit would not have said, Blessed are thou O Land, when thy King is the sonne of Nobles, Eccles. 10.17. this honour springing from vertue, is not borne with any man, nor is any man borne with either the gift, or honour to be a Iudge; God maketh high and low, not birth. Nobles are borne to great estates, if judging be he∣ritage to any, it is a municipall positive law. I now speake in point of conscience. 3. The externall lawfull title, before men come to a Crowne must be Gods Will, revealed by such an externall signe, as by Gods appointment and warrant is to regulate our will, but

according to Scripture nothing regulateth our will, and leadeth the people now that they cannot erre, following Gods rule in making a King, but the free suffrages of the States choosing a man whom they conceive God hath endued with these royall gifts required in the King whom God holdeth forth to them in his Word, Deut. 17. now there be but these to regulate the people, or to be a rule to any man to ascend lawfully (in foro Dei) in Gods Court to the Throne; 1. Gods immediate designation of a man by Propheticall and Di∣vinely inspired unction,* 1.168 as Samuel annoynted Saul, and David; this we are not to expect now, nor can Royalists say it. 2. Con∣quest, seeing it is an act of violence, and Gods revenging Justice for the sinnes of a people, cannot give in Gods Court such a just title to the Throne, as the people are to submit their consciences unto, except God reveale his regulating will by some immediate voice from Heaven, as he commanded Iudah to submit to Nebuchad∣nezer as to their King by the mouth of Ieremiah; now this is not a rule to us, for then, if the Spanish King should invade this Iland, and as Nebuchadnezer did, deface the Temple, and instruments and meanes of Gods Worship, and abolish the true worship of God, it should be unlawfull to resist him, after he had once conquered the Iland, neither Gods Word, nor the Law of nature could permit this; I suppose even by grant of adversaries, now no act of violence done to a people, though in Gods Court they have deserved it, can be a testification to us of Gods regulating Will; except it have some warrant from the Law and testimony, it is no rule to our conscience to acknowledge him a lawfull Magistrate, whose sole law to the Throne is an act of the bloody instrument of divine wrath, I meane the sword. That therefore Iudah was to submit, according to Gods Word, to Nebuchadnezer, whose conscience and best warranted calling to the Kingdome of Judah was his bloody sword, even if we suppose Ieremiah had not commanded them to submit to the King of Babylon,* 1.169 I thinke cannot be said. 3. Naked birth cannot be this externall signification of Gods regulating Will to warrant the conscience of any to ascend to the Throne, for the Authors of this opinion make royall birth equivalent to divine unction, for David anoynted by Samuel, and so anoynted by God, is not King, Saul re∣mained the Lords anoynted many yeares, not David, even anoynted by God; the peoples making him King at Hebron founded upon divine unction, was not the only externall lawfull calling that we read of,

that David had to the Throne, then royall birth, because it is but equivalent only to divine unction, not superiour to divine unction, it cannot have more force to make a King, then divine unction. And if birth was equivalent to divine unction, what needed Ioash who had royall birth, be made King by the people? and what nee∣ded Saul and David, who had more then royall birth, even divine unction, be made Kings by the people? and Saul having the vo∣call and infallible testimony of a Prophet, needed not the peo∣ples election, the one at Mizpeh and Gilgall, and the other at Hebron.

5. If royall birth be as just a title to the Crowne as divine uncti∣on, and so, as the peoples election is no title at all; then is it unlaw∣full that there should be a King by election in the world now: but the latter is absurd, so is the former. I prove the Proposition, because where conquerours are wanting, and there is no King for the present, but the people governing, and so much confusion aboundeth, they cannot lawfully appoint a King, for his lawfull title before God must either be conquest, which to me is no title, (and here, and in this case there is no conquest) or if the title must be a Propheticall word immediatly inspired by God, but this is now ceased; or thirdly the title must be royal birth, but here there is no royall birth, because the government is popular; except you i∣magine that the society is obliged in conscience to goe and seek the sonne of a forraine King to be their King. But I hope that such a royall birth should not be a just title before God to make him King of that society, to which he had no relation at all, but is a meere stranger. Hence in this case no title could be given to any man to make him King, but onely the peoples election; which is that which we say. And it is most unreasonable that a people under popular Government cannot lawfully choose a King to themselves, seeing a King is a lawfull Magistrate, and warranted by Gods Word, be∣cause they have not a King of royall birth to sit upon the throne.

Mr. Symmons saith that birth is the best title to the Crowne, be∣cause after the first of the family had been anoynted,* 1.170 unction was no more used in that family, (unlesse there arose a strife about the King∣dome, as betwixt Solomon and Adonijah, Ioash and Athalia) the el∣dest sonne of the predecessor was afterward the chosen of the Lord, his birth-right spake the Lords appointment, as plainly as his fathers unction. Ans. It is a conjecture that unction was not used in the

family, after the first unction, except the contest was betwixt two Brethren, that is said, not proved, for 2 King. 23.30. when good Iosiah was killed, and there was no contest concerning the Throne of that beloved Prince, the people of the Land took Iehoahaz his son and anointed him, and made him King in his fathers stead; and the Priests were anointed, Levit. 6.22. yea, all the Priests were anoin∣ted, Num. 3.••. yet read we not in the History, where this or this man was anointed. 2. In that Adonijah, Solomons elder Brother was not King, it is clear, That Gods anointing, and the peoples e∣lecting, made the right to the Crown, and not birth. 3. Birth de facto did design the man,* 1.171 because of Gods speciall promises to Da∣vids house; but how doth a typicall discent made to David, and some others by Gods speciall promise, prove, that birth is the birth-right, and lawfull call of God to a Crown in all after ages? For as gifts to reign, goeth not by birth, so neither doth Gods title to a Crown go.

M. Symons. A Prince once possessed of a Kingdome coming to him by inheritance, can never, by any, upon any occasion be dispossessed there∣of, without horrible impietie, and unjustice. Royall unction was an indeleble Character of old, Saul remained the Lords anointed till the last gaspe; David durst not take the right of Government actually into him, although he had it in reversion, being already anointed there∣unto, and had received the spirit thereof.

Answ. That is the question, If a Prince once a Prince by in∣heritance, cannot be dispossessed thereof without unjustice: For if a Kingdom be his by birth, as an inheritance transmitted from the father to the son,* 1.172 I see not but any man upon necessary occasi∣ons, may sell his inheritance; but if a Prince sell his Kingdom, a very Barclay and an Hug. Grotius with reason will say, he may be dispossessed and dethroned, and take up his indeleble Character then. 2. A Kingdom is not the Princes own so, as it is unjustice to take it from him, as to take a mans purse from him; the Lords Church (in a Christian Kingdom) is Gods heritage, and the King onely a shepheard, and the sheep in the court of conscience, are not his. 3. Royall unction is not an indeleble Character; for neither Saul nor David were all their dayes Kings thereby, but lived many dayes private men after divine unction, while the people anointed them Kings, except you say, 1. That there were two Kings at once in Israel. 2. And that Saul killing David, should have killed

his own Lord, and his anointed. 4. If David durst not take the right of Government actually on him, then divine unction made him not King, but onely designed him to be King: the peoples election must make the King.

M. Symons addeth, He that is born a King and a Prince,* 1.173 can n••ver be unborn, Semel Augustus semper Augustus; yea, I beleeve the eldest son of such a King is in respect of birth, the Lords anointed in his fathers life time, even as David was before Sauls death, and to deprive him of his right of reversion, is as true unjustice, as to dis∣possesse him of it.

Answ. It is proper onely to Jesus Christ to be born a King, sure I am, No man bringeth out of the womb with him a Scepter, and a Crown on his head. Divine unction giveth a right infallibly to a Crown; but birth doth not so, for one may be born here to a Crown, as was hopefull Prince Henry, and yet never live to be King. The eldest son of a King, if he attempt to kill his father, as Absolom did, and raise forces against the lawfull Prince, I conceive he may be killed in battell, without any unjustice. 2. If in his fa∣thers time he be the Lords anointed, there be two Kings, and the heir may have a son, and so there shall be three Kings, possibly four; all Kings by divine right.

The Prelate of Rochester saith, The people and nobles give no right to him, who is born a King, they onely declare his right.* 1.174

Answ. This is said, not proved. A man born for an inheritance, is by birth an heir, because he is not born for these Lands, as a mean for the end, but by the contrary, these Lands are for the heir as the mean for the end: But the King is for his Kingdom, as a mean for the end, as the watch-man for the Citie, the living Law for peace, and safetie to Gods people; and therefore is not heres hominum, An heir of men, but men are rather heredes regis, heirs of the King.

Arnisaeus. Many Kingdoms (saith he) are purchased by just war, and transmitted by the Law of heritage from the father to the son,* 1.175 beside the consent of the people, because the son receiveth right to the Crown, not from the people, but from his parents, nor doth he possesse the Kingdom, as the ••••trimony of the people, keeping onely to himself the burden of protecting and governing the people, but as a proprietie given to him lege regni, by his parents, which he is obliged to defend and rule, as a father looketh to the good and welfare of the family, yet so also as he may look to his own good.

Answ. We read in the Word of God, That the people made Solomon King, not that David, or any King can leave in his Testa∣ment, a Kingdom to his son. 2. He saith, The son hath not the right of reigning,* 1.176 as the patrimony of the people, but as a proprietie, given by the Law of the Kingdom, by his parents: Now this is all one, as if he said, The son hath not the right of the Kingdom, as the patrimony of the people, but as the patrimony of the people, which is good non-sense; For the proprietie of reigning, given from father to son, by the Law of the Kingdom, is nothing but a right to reign, given by the Law of the people, and the very gift and patrimony of the people, for Lex regni, This Law of the Kingdom is the Law of the people, tying the Crown to such a Royall Family; and this Law of the people is prior and ancienter then the King, or the right of reigning in the King, or which the King is supposed to have from his Royall father, because it made the first father, the first King of the Royall Line. For I demand, How doth the son succeed to his fathers Crown, and Throne? Not by any promise of a divine Covenant, that the Lord maketh to the father, as he pro∣mised, that Davids seed should sit on his throne, till the Messiah should come: this, as I conceive, is vanished with the Common∣wealth of the Iews, nor can we now finde any immediate divine constitution, tying the Crown now to such a race: nor can we say, this cometh from the will of the father King, making his son King: For 1. there is no Scripture can warrant us to say,* 1.177 The King ma∣keth a King, but the Scripture holdeth forth, that the people made Saul and David, Kings. 2. This may prove, That the father is some way a cause, why this son succeedeth King; but he is not the cause of the Royaltie conferred upon the whole Line; because the question is, Who made the first father a King? Not himself; nor doth God now immediately by Prophets anoint men to be Kings, then need force, the people choose the first man, then must the peoples election of a King, be prior and more ancient then the birth-law to a Crown: And election must be a better right then birth. 2. The question is, Whence cometh it that not onely the first father should be chosen King; but also ••hence is that, where∣as it is in the peoples freewill to make the succession of Kings go by free election, as it is in Denmark and Pol; yet the people doth freely choose, not only the first man to be King, but also the whole race of the first born of this mans Family to be Kings. All here

must be resolved in the free will of the Communitie; now since we have no immediate and propheticall enthroning of men: it is evi∣dent, That the lineall deduction of the Crown from father to son, through the whole line, is from the people, not from the parent.

Hence I adde this, as my sixth Argument,* 1.178 That which taketh away that naturall aptitude, and natures birth-right, in a Commu∣nitie given to them by God and nature, to provide the most effica∣cious, and prevalent mean for their own preservation and peace in the fittest Government, that is not to be holden, but to make birth the best title to the Crown, and better then free election, taketh away and impedeth that naturall aptitude, and natures birth-right of chosing, not simply a Governour, but the best, the justest, the more righteous, and tyeth, and fettereth their choice to one of a house, whether he be a wise man, and righteous, and just, or a fool and an unjust man; therefore to make birth the best title to the Crown, is not to be holden.

It is objected: That parents may binde their after Generations, to choose one of such a line; But by this Argument, their naturall birth-right of a free choice, to elect the best and fittest, is abridged and clip∣ped, and so the posterity shall not be tyed to a King of the Royall Line, to which the Ancestors did swear. See for this, the learned Author,* 1.179 of Scripture, and Reasons, pleaded for defensive Arms.

Answ. Frequent elections of a King,* 1.180 at the death of every Prince may have, by accident, and through the corruption of our nature, bloody, and tragicall sequels, and to eschew these, people may tie and oblige their children to chose one of the first born; Male or Fe∣male, as in Scotland and England, of such a line; but I have spoken of the excellencie of the title by election, above that of birth, as comparing things according to their own nature together; but give me leave to say, That the posterity are tyed to that Line, 1. Con∣ditionally: So the first born, ceteris paribus, be qualified, and have an head to sit at the helm. 2. Elections of Governours would be performed, as in the sight of God; and in my weak apprehension, the person coming neerest to Gods judge, Fearing God, hating covetousnesse, and to Moses his King, Deut. 17. one who shall read in the Book of the Law, and it would seem now, that gracious morals are to us insteed of Gods immediate designation. 3. The genuine and intrinsecall end of making Kings, is not simply governing, but governing the best way in peace, honesty, and godlinesse, 1 Tim. 2.

Ergo, These are to be made Kings, who may most expeditely pro∣cure this end: neither is it my purpose to make him no King, who is not a gracious man, onely here I compare title with title.

7. Argument. Where God hath not bound the conscience, men may not binde themselves, or the consciences of the posterity. But God hath not bound any nation irrevocably, and unalterably to a Royall Line, or to one kinde of Government. Ergo, No nation can binde their conscience, and the conscience of the posterity, either to one Royall Line, or irrevocably and unalterably to Mo∣narchy. The proposition is clear.

1. No Nation is tyed, jure divin••, by the tie of a divine Law to a Monarchy, rather then to another Government. The Parisian Doctors prove, That the precept of having a Pope is affirmative, and so tyeth not the Church, ad semper, for ever; and so the Church is the body of Christ without the Pope; and all oaths to things of their nature indifferent, and to things, the contrary where∣of is lawfull, and may be expedient and necessary, lay on a tie onely conditionally, in so far, as they conduce to the end. If the Gibeo∣nites had risen in Joshuaes dayes, to cut off the people of God, I think no wise man can think, that Joshua and the people were tyed by the oath of God, not to cut off the Gibeonites in that case: For to preserve them alive as enemies, was against the intent of the oath, which was to preserve them alive, as friends demanding, and sup∣plicating peace, and submitting. The assumption is clear If a Na∣tion seeth that Aristocraticall Government is better then Monar∣chy, hic & nunc: That the sequels of such a Monarchy is bloody, destructive, tyrannous, that the Monarchy compelleth the free subjects to Turcisme, to grosse Idolatry, they cannot by the divine bond of any oath captive their naturall freedom, which is to choose a Government, and Governours, for their safetie, for a peaceable and godly life; or fetter and chain the wisdom of the posterity unalterably to a Government, or a Royall Line, which hic & nunc, contrary to the intention of their oath, proveth destructive, and bloody. And in this case, even the King, though tyed by an oath to govern, is obliged to the practices of the Emperour Otho. And as Speed saith,* 1.181 of Richard the second, to resign the Crown, for the eschewing of the effusion of blood: And who doubteth but the second wits of the experienced posterity, may correct the first wits of their fathers; nor shall I ever beleeve, that the fathers can

leave in legacie, by oath, any chaines of the best gold to fetter the after-wits of posteritie to a choice destructive to peace and true Godlinesse.

To these adde; 8. That 1. an heritor may defraud his first borne of his heritage, because of his dominion he hath over his heritage: A King cannot defraud his first-borne of the Crown. 2. An heri∣tor may divide his heritage equally amongst his twelve sonnes: A King cannot divide his Royall Dominions in twelve parts, and give a part to every sonne; for so he might turne a Monarchie into an Aristocracie, and put twelve men in the place of one King. 3. Any heritor taken captive, may lawfully oppignorate, yea and give all his inheritance as a ransome for his liberty; for a man is better then his inheritance: but no King may give his Subjects as a price or ransome.

Yet I shall not be against the succession of Kings by birth, with good limitations; and shall agree, that through the corruption of mans nature, it may be in so far profitable, as it is peaceable, and preventeth bloody tumults, which are the bane of humane societies. Consider further for this, Aegid. Romanus, l. 3. de reg. princi. cap. 5. Turrecremat. and Joan. de terra Reubea, 1 tract. contr. Rebelles, ar. 1. con. 4. Yet Aristotle the flower of Natures wit, l. 3. polit. c. 10. pre∣ferreth Election to Succession; He preferreth Carthage to Sparta, though their Kings came of Hercules. Plutarch in Scylla, saith, he would have Kings as dogs, that is, best hunters, not those who are borne of best dogs. Tacitus, lib. 1. Nasci & generari à Principibus, fortuitum, nec ultra aestimantur.

QUEST. XI. Whether or no he be more principally a King, who is a King by birth, or he who is a King by the free election and suffrages of the people?

WIthout deteining the Reader, I desire liberty to assert, that,

1 Assert. Where God establisheth a Kingdome by Birth, that go∣vernment, hic & nunc, is best: and because God principally distri∣buteth Crownes, when God establisheth the Royall line of David to reigne, he is not principally a King, who commeth neerest and most immediately to the fountaine of Royaltie, which is Gods im∣mediate will; but God established, hic & nun••, for typicall reasons

(with reverence of the learned) a King by birth.

* 1.1822 Assert. But to speake of them, ex natura re••, and according to the first mould and paterne of a King by law. A King by electi∣on is more principally King (magis univoce & per se) then an he∣reditarie Prince; 1. Because in hereditary Crownes, the first familie being chosen by the free suffrages of the people, for that cause ulti∣mate, the hereditary Prince commeth to the throne, because his first father, and in him the whole line of the familie was chosen to the Crowne, and, propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. 2. The first King ordained by Gods positive law, must be the mea∣sure of all Kings, and more principally the King, then he who is such by derivation. But the first King is a King by election, not by birth, Deut. 17.15. Thou shalt in any wise set (him) King over thee, whom the Lord thy God shall choose, (One) from amongst thy bre∣thren shalt thou set over thee. If the free will of the people be not the neerest cause of the first moulded King, God could have made no positive law to choose such a man, not such a man; for all positive lawes presuppose free election. 3. The Law saith, Surrogatum fru∣itur privilegiis ejus, in cujus locum surrogatur: He who is substituted in the place of another, enjoyeth the priviledges of him in whose place be succeedeth. But the hereditary King hath Royall priviledges from him who is chosen King. Salomon hath the Royall priviledges of David his father, and is therefore King by birth, because his father David was King by election. And this I say, not because I think sole birth is a just title to the Crown, but because it designeth him who indeed virtually was chosen, when the first King of the race was chosen. 4. Because there is no dominion of either Royalty, or any other way by nature, no more then an Eagle is born King of Eagles, a Lyon, King of Lyons; neither is a man by nature, born King of men: and therefore, he who is made King by suffrages of the people, must be more principally King, then he who hath no title, but the womb of his mother.

Doct. Fern is so farre with us to father Royaltie upon the peoples free election,* 1.183 as on the formall cause, that he saith, If to design the person, and to procure limitation of the power in the exercise of it, ••e to give the power; we grant the power is from the people, but (saith he) you will have the power originally from themselves; in another sense, for you say, they reserve power to depose and displace the Magi∣strate, sometime they make the Monarch supreme, and then they devest

themselves of all power, and keep none to themselves, but before esta∣blished Government, they have no politique power, whereby they may lay a command on others, but onely a naturall power of private resistance, which they cannot use against the Magistrate.

Ans. But to take off those by the way, 1. If the King may choose A. B. an Ambassadour, and limit him in his power, and say,* 1.184 Doe this, and say this to the forraigne State you goe to, but no more; halfe a wit will say the King createth the Ambassadour, and the Ambassadours power is originally from the King; and we prove the power of the Lyon is originally from God, and of the Sea, and the fire is originally from God, because God limiteth the Lyon in the exercises of its power, that it shall not devoure Daniel, and limiteth the Sea, as Ieremiah saith, when as he will have its proud Waves to come thither, and no farther, and will have the fire to burne those who throwe the three Children into the fiery furnace, and yet not to burne the three Children, for this is as if Doctor Ferne said, the power of the King of six degrees, rather then his power of five is from the people, therefore the power of the King is not from the people, yea the contrary is true. 2. That the people can make a King supreame, that is, Absolute, and so resigne natures birth-right; that is, a power to defend them∣selves is not lawfull, for if the people have not absolute power to destroy themselves, they cannot resigne such a power to their Prince. 3. It is false that a community, before they be established with formall Rulers, have no politicke power, for consider them as men onely, and not as associated, they have indeed no politicke po∣wer; but before Magistrates be established, they may convene and associate themselves in a body, and appoint Magistrates; and this they cannot doe if they had no politicke power at all. 4. They have virtually a power to lay on Commandements, in that they have power to appoint to themselves Rulers, who may lay com∣mandements on others. 5. A community hath not formally power to punish themselves, for to punish is to inflict Malum dis∣conveniens natura, an evill contrary to nature;* 1.185 but in appointing Rulers, and in agreeing to Lawes they consent they shall be puni∣shed by another upon supposition of transgression, as the child wil∣lingly going to schoole submitteth himself in that to Schoole-discipline, if he shall faile against any Schoole Law; and by all this tis cleare, a King by election is principally a King. Barclay then

faileth,* 1.186 who saith, No man denyeth but succession to a Crowne by birth is agreeable to nature; it is not against nature, but it is no more naturall, then for a Lyon to be borne a King of Lyons.

Obj. Most of the best Divines approve an hereditary Monarch, rather then a Monarch by election. Ans. So doe I in some cases, in respect of Empire simply it is not better, in respect of Empire now under mans fall in sin; I grant it to be better in some respect. So S••lust In Ingurth.* 1.187 Natura mortalium imperij avida. Tacitus, Hist. 2. Minore discrimine princeps sumitur, quam queritu, there's lesse danger to accept of a Prince at hand, then to seeke one a farre off. 2. In a Kingdome to be constituted, election is better; in a consti∣tuted Kingdome birth seemeth lesse evill. 3. In respect of liberty election is more convenient; in respect of safety and peace, birth is safer and the nearest way to the Well. See Bodin, De Rep. l. 6. c. 4. Thol. ozan, De Rep. l. 7. c. 4.

QUEST. XII. Whether or not a Kingdome may lawfully be purchased by the sole title of conquest?

THe Prelate averreth confidently that a Title to a Kingdome by Conquest,* 1.188 without the consent of the people, is so just and evident by Scripture, that it cannot be denyed; but the man bringeth no Scripture to prove it. Mr. Marshall saith, a conquered Kingdome is but continuata injuria,* 1.189 a continued robbery. A right of conquest is twofold; 1. When there is no just cause. 2. When there is just rea∣son and ground of the war;* 1.190 in this latter case, if a Prince subdue a whole Land, which justly deserveth to dye, yet by his grace who is so mild a conquerour they may be all preserved alive. Now amongst those who have thus injured the conquerour as they deserve death, we are to difference the persons offending, and the wives, children especially not borne, and such as have not offended. The former sort may resign their personall liberty to the conquerour, that the sweet life may be saved; but he cannot be their King properly, but I con∣ceive that they are obliged to consent that he be their King, upon this condition, that the conquerour put not upon them violent and tyrannicall conditions that are harder then death now in reason we cannot thinke that a tyrannous and unjust domineering can be God•• lawfull meane of translating Kingdomes, and for the other part; the

conquerour cannot domineere as King over the innocent, and espe∣cially the children not yet borne.

1. Assertion. A people may be by Gods speciall Commande∣ment, subject to a conquering Nebuchadnezer, and a Caesar, as to their King, as was Iudah commanded by the Prophet Ieremiah to submit unto the yoake of the King of Babylon, and to pray for him, and the people of the Iewes were to give to Caesar the things of Cae∣sar; and yet both those were unjust conquerours: for those Tyrants had no command of God to oppresse and raigne over the Lords peo∣ple, yet were they to obey those Kings, so the passive subjection was just and commanded of God, and the active unjust and tyra∣nous, and forbidden of God.

2. Assert. This title by conquest through the peoples after con∣sent may be turned into a just title, as its like the case was with the Iewes in Caesars time, for which cause our Saviour commanded to obey Caesar, and to pay tribute unto him; as Dr. Ferne confesseth. But two things are to be condemned in the Doctor:* 1.191 1. That God manifesteth his Will to us in this worke of providence, whereby he translateth Kingdomes. 2. That this is an over-awed consent; now to the former I reply,* 1.192 if the act of conquering be violent and unjust, it is no manifestation of Gods regulating and approving Will, and can no more prove a just title to a Crowne, because it is an act of Divine providence, then Pilate and Herod their crucifying of the Lord of Glory, which was an act of Divine providence, flow∣ing from the Will and Decree of Divine providence, Act. 2.23. Act. 4.28. is a manifestation that it was Gods approving Will, that they should kill Jesus Christ. 2. Though the consent be some way over-awed, yet is it a sort of Contract and Covenant of loyall sub∣jection made to the conquerour, and therefore sufficent to make the title just; otherwise if the people never give their consent, the conquerour domineering over them by violence hath no just title to the Crowne.

3. Assert. Meere conquest by the sword without the consent of the people, is no just title to the Crowne; 1. Because the lawfull title that Gods Word holdeth forth to us, beside the Lords choosing and calling of a man to the Crowne, is the peoples election, Deut. 17.15. all that had any lawfull calling to the Crowne in Gods Word,* 1.193 as Saul, David, Solomon, &c. were called by the people, and the first lawfull calling is to us a rule and paterne to all lawfull callings. 2. A

King as a King,* 1.194 and by vertue of his Royall Office is the Father of the Kingdome, a Tutor, a Defender, Protector, a Shield, a Leader, a Shepheard,* 1.195 an Husband, a Patron, a Watchman, a Keeper of the peo∣ple over which he is King, and so the Office essentially includeth acts of fatherly affection, care, love and kindnesse to those over whom he is set, so as he who is cloathed with all these relations of love to the people, cannot exercise those officiall Acts on a people a∣gainst their will, and by meere violence. Can he be a Father, and a Guide, a Patron to us against our will? and by the sole power of the bloudy sword? a benefit conferred upon any against their will is no benefit: Will he, by the awsome dominion of the sword be our father, and we unwilling to be his sonnes? an head over such as will not be menbers? will he guide me as a Father, an Hus∣band against my will? he cannot come by meere violence to be a Patron, a Shield, and a defender of me through violence. 3. It is not to be thought that,* 1.196 that is Gods just Title to a Crowne which hath nothing in it of the essence of a King;* 1.197 but a violent and bloody purchase, which is in its prevalency in an oppressing Nymrod, and the cruellest tyrant that is, hath nothing essentiall to that which con∣stituteth a King: for it hath nothing of Heroick and Royall wise∣dome and gifts to governe, and nothing of Gods approving and regulating will which must be manifested to any who would be a King, but by the contrary cruelty hath rather basenesse and witlesse fury, and a plaine reluctancy with Gods revealing Will, which for∣bideth murther, Gods Law should say, (Murther thou, and prosper and raigne) and by the act of violating the sixt Commandement, God should declare his approving Will, to wit, his lawfull call to a Throne. 4. There be none under a Law of God who may resist a lawfull call to a lawfull Office,* 1.198 but men may resist any impulsion of God stirring them up to murther the maniest and strongest, and cheife men of a Kingdome, that they may raigne over the fewest, the weakest, and the young and lowest of the people against their will, therefore this call by the sword is not lawfull. If it be said, that the Divine impulsion stirring up a man to make a bloody conquest, that the ire and just indignation of God in Iustice may be declared on a wicked Nation, is an extraordinary impulsion of God, who is above a Law, and therefore no man may resist it. Ans. then all bloody Conquerors must have some extraordinary re∣velation from Heaven to warrant their yeelding of obedience to

such an extraordinary impulsion. And if it be so, They must shew a lawfull and immediate extraordinary impulsion now; but it is certaine, the sinnes of the people conquered, and their most equall and just demerit, before God, cannot be a just plea to legitimate the Conquest: for though the people of God deserved vastation and captivitie by the Heathen, in regard of their sinnes, before the throne of Divine Iustice, yet the Heathen grievously sin∣ned in conquering them, Zach. 1.15. And I am very sore displeased with the Heathen that are at ease: for I was but a little displeased, and they helped forward the affliction. So though Iudah deserved to be made captives, and a conquered people, because of their i∣dolatry, and other sinnes, as Ieremiah had prophecied; yet God was highly displeased at Babylon for their unjust and bloody Con∣quest, Jer. 50.17, 18▪33, 34. c. 51.35. The violence done to me and to my flesh, be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitants of Zion say; and my blood upon the inhabitants of Chaldea, shall Jerusalem say. And that any other extraordinary impulsion to be as lawfull a call to the Throne as the peoples free election, we know not from Gods word, and we have but the naked word of our Adversaries, that William the Conquerour, without the peoples consent, made himselfe by blood, the lawfull King of England, and also of all their posteritie; And that King Fergus conquered Scotland. 5. A King is a speciall gift of God, given to feed and defend the peo∣ple of God,* 1.199 that they may lead a godly and peaceable life under him, Psal. 78. v. 71, 72. 1 Tim. 2.2. as it is a judgement of God,* 1.200 that Israel is without a King for many dayes, Hos. 3.4. and that there is no Iudge, no King, to put evill doers to shame, Iudg. 19.1. but if a King be given of God, as a King by the acts of a bloody Conquest to be avenged on the sinfull land over which he is made a King, he cannot be given, actu primo, as a speciall gift and blessing of God to feed, but to murther and to destroy; for the genuine end of a Con∣queror, as a Conqueror, is not peace, but fire and sword. If God change his heart to be of a bloody Vastator, a father, Prince, and fee∣der of the people, ex officio, now he is not a violent Conquerour and he came to that meeknes by contraries, which is the proper worke of the omnipotent God, and not proper to man, who as he cannot worke miracles, so neither can he lawfully worke by contra∣ries: and so if Conquest be a lawfull title to a Crown, and an ordi∣nary calling, as the opponents presume; every bloody Conquerour

must be changed into a loving father, Prince and feeder; and if God call him, none should oppose him, but the whole Land should de∣throne their own native Soveraigne (whom they are obliged before the Lord to defend) and submit to the bloody invasion of a strange Lord, presumed to be a just Conqueror, as if he were lawfully called to the Throne both by birth and the voyces of the people. And truly they deserve no wages, who thus defend the Kings Prerogative royall: for if the sword be a lawfull title to the crown, suppose the two Generals of both Kingdomes should conquer the most and the chiefest of the Kingdome now when they have so many forces in the field, by this wicked reason the one should have a lawfull call of God to be King of England, and the other to be King of Scotland; which is absurd. 6. Either conquest, as conquest, is a just title to the crown,* 1.201 or as a just conquest. If as Conquest, then all conquests are just titles to a Crown; then the Ammonites, Zidonians, Canaa∣nites,* 1.202 Edomites, &c. subduing Gods people for a time, have just title to reigne over them; and if Absolom had been stronger then David, he had then had the just title to be the Lords Anointed and King of Israel, not David; and so strength actually prevailing, should be Gods lawfull call to a Crown. But strength, as strength victorious, is not law, nor reason: it were then reason that Herod behead John Baptist, and the Roman Emperors kill the witnesses of Christ Iesus. If Conquest, as just, be the title and lawfull claime before Gods court, to a Crown; then certainly a stronger King for pregnant na∣tionall injuries, may lawfully subdue and reigne over an innocent posteritie not yet borne. But what word of God can, 1. warrant a posteritie not borne, and so accessarie to no offence against the Con∣querour (but only sin originall) to be under a Conquerour against their will, and who hath no right to reigne over them, but the bloo∣dy sword? for so Conquest, as Conquest, not as just, maketh him King over the posterity.* 1.203 But 2. the fathers may ingage the posterity by an oath to surrender themselvos as loyall subjects to the man who justly and deservedly made the fathers vassals by the title of the sword of justice. I answer, the fathers may indeed dispose of the inheritance of their children, because that inheritance belong∣eth to the father as well ar to the sonne; but because the liberty of the sonne being borne with the sonne, (all men being borne free from all Civill subjection) the father hath no more power to resigne the libertie of his children, then their lives; and the father, as a fa∣ther

hath not power of the life of his child,* 1.204 as a Magistrate he may have power, and as something more then a father, he may have power of life and death. I heare not what Gro∣tius saith, Those who are not borne have no accidents, and so no rights, Non entis nulla sunt accidentia; then Children not borne have neither right, nor liberty, and so no injury (may some say) can be done to Children not borne, though the fathers should give away their liberty to the conque∣rour, those who are not capable of Law, are not capable of injury contrary to Law. Ans. There is a virtuall alienation of rights and lives of children not borne unlawfull, because the children are not borne; to say that children not borne, are not capable of law and injuries virtuall, which become reall in time might say, Adam did not an injury to his posterity by his first sin, which is contrary to Gods Word: so those who vowed yearely to give seven innocent children to the Minotaure to be devoured, and to kill their children not borne to bloody Molech, did no acts of bloody injury to their children; nor can any say then that fathers cannot tye themselves and their posterity to a King by succession, but I say, To be tyed to a law∣full King is no making away of liberty, but a resigning of a power to be justly governed, protected and awed from active and passive vio∣lence. 7. No lawfull King may be dethroned,* 1.205 nor lawfull King∣dome dissolved; but Law and reason both saith, Quod vi partum est imperium, vi dissolvi potest. Every conquest made by violence may be dissolved by violence: Censetur enim ipsa natura jus dare ad id omne, sine quo obtineri non potest quod ipsa imperat.

It is objected, that the people of God by their sword conquered seven nations of the Canaanites, David conquered the Ammonites for the dis∣grace done to his Embassadours. So God gave Egypt to Nebuchadne∣zar for his hire, in his service done against Iudah; had David no right over the Ammonites and Moabites but by expecting their consent•• yee will say, A right to their lands, goods and lives, but not to challenge their morall subjection, well, we doubt not but such conquerours will challenge and obtain their morall consent; but if the people refuse their consent, is there no way? for providence giveth no right. So D. Ferne, so Arnisaeus. Ans. A facto ad jus non vale•• consequentia, God,* 1.206 to whom belongeth the world and the fulnesse thereof, disponed to Abraham and his seed the Land of Canaan for their inheritance, and ordai∣ned that they should use their bow and their sword, for the actuall

possession thereof;* 1.207 and the like divine right, had David to the Edomites and Ammonites, though the occasion of Davids taking possession of these Kingdoms by his sword, did arise from particu∣lar and occasionall exigences and injuries; but it followeth in no sort, That therefore Kings now wanting any word of promise, and so of divine right to any Lands, may ascend to the Throns of other Kingdoms then their own, by no better title then the bloody sword. That Gods will was the chief patent here, is clear, in that God forbad his people to conquer Edom or Esau's possession, when as he gave them command to conquer the Ammorites. I doubt not to say, if Joshua and David had had no better title, then their bloody sword, though provoked by injuries, they could have had no right to any kingly power over these Kingdoms: and if onely successe by the sword, be a right of providence, it is no right of pre∣cept. Gods providence, as providence without precept or promise, can conclude a thing is done, or may be done, but cannot conclude a thing is lawfully, and warrantably done, else you might say the selling of Joseph, the crucifying of Christ, the spoiling of Job were lawfully done. 2. Though Conquerors extort consent, and oath of Loyaltie, yet that maketh not over a Royall right to the Conque∣rour, to be King over their posterity without their consent. 3. Though the Children of Ammon did a high injury to David, yet no injury can be recompensed in justice with the pressure of the constrained subjection of Loyaltie to a violent Lord; if David had not had an higher warrant from God then an injury done to his messengers, he could not have conquered them. But 1. the Ammonites were the declared enemies of the Church of God, and raised forces against David, when they them∣selves were the injurer's and offenders; and if Davids Con∣quest will prove a lawfull title by the sword to all Conquerours, then may all Conquerours lawfully do to the conquered people, as David did; that is, they may put them under saws, and under harrows of iron, and under axes of iron, and cause them passe through the Brick-kilne.* 1.208 But I beseech you, will Royalists say, that Conque∣rours who make themselves Kings by their sword, and so make themselves fathers, heads, defenders, and feeders of the people may use the extreamest Tyranny in the world, such as David used a∣gainst the children of Ammon, which he could not have done, by the naked title of sword-conquest, if God had not laid a Com∣mandment

of an higher nature on him to serve Gods enemies so▪ I shall then say, if a conquering King be a lawfull King, because a Conquerour, then hath God made such a lawfull King, both a fa∣ther, because a King, and a Tyrant, and cruell, and lyon-hearted oppressour of these whom he hath conquered; for God hath given him Royall power by this example, to put these,* 1.209 to whom he is a father and defender by office, to torment, and also to be a torturer of them, by office, by bringing their backs under such Instruments of crueltie, as saws and harrows of iron, and axes of iron.

QUEST. XIII. Whether or no Royall dignitie have its spring from nature, and how that is true (every man is born free) and how servitude is contrary to nature?

I Conceive it to be evident, that Royall dignity is not immediately, and without the intervention of the peoples consent given by God to any one person. 2. That conquest and violence, is no just title to a Crown. Now the question is, If Royalty flow from nature, if Royalty be not a thing meerly naturall, neither can subjection to Royall power be meerly naturall; but the former is rather civill, then naturall: and the question of the same nature is, Whether subjection or servitude be naturall?

I conceive, that there be divers subjections to these that are a∣bove us, some way naturall,* 1.210 and therefore I rank them in order thus. 1. There is a subjection in respect of naturall being, as the effect to the cause, so though Adam had never sinned, this mo∣rality of the fifth command, should have stood in vigour, that the son by nature, without any positive Law, should have been subject to the father, because from him he hath his being, as from a second cause: But I much doubt, if the relation of a father, as a father, doth necessarily infer a Royall or Kingly authority of the father over the son; or by natures Law, that the father hath power of life and death over, or above his children, and the reasons I give, are, 1. Because power of life and death is by a positive Law,* 1.211 presup∣posing sin, and the fall of man; and if Adam standing in innocency, could lawfully kill his son, though the son should be a Malefactor, without any positive Law of God, I much doubt. 2. I judge, that the power Royall, and the fatherly power of a father over his children, shall be found to be different, and the one is founded on

the Law of nature, the other to wit, Royall power on a meere posi∣tive Law. The 2. degree or order of subjection naturall, is a sub∣jection in respect of gifts, or age: so Aristotle, 1 Polit. cap. 3. saith, that some are by nature servants:* 1.212 his meaning is good, that some gifts of nature, as wisedom naturall, or aptitude to govern, hath made some men of gold, fitter to command, and some of iron, and clay, fitter to be servants and slaves. But I judge this title to make a King by birth, seeing Saul whom God by supervenient gifts made a King, seemeth to ow small thanks to the womb, or nature, that he was a King, for his crueltie to the Lords Priests speaketh nothing but naturall basenesse. Its possible Plato had a good meaning, Dialog. 3. de legib. who made six orders here. 1. That fathers command their sons. 2. The noble the ignoble. 3. The elder the younger. 4. The masters the servants. 5. The stronger the weaker. 6. The wiser the ignorant. 3. Aquinas 22. q. 57. art. 3. Dried•• de libert. Christ. l. 1. pag. 8. following Aristotle, polit. l. 7. c. 14. hold,* 1.213 though man had never sinned, there should have been a sort of dominion of the more gifted, and wiser, above the lesse wise and weaker, not antecedent from nature, properly, but consequent, for the utilitie and good of the weaker, in so far, as it is good for the weaker to be guided by the stronger, which cannot be denyed to have some ground in nature: but there is no ground for Kings by nature here. 1. Because, even these who plead, that the mo∣thers womb must be the best title for a Crown,* 1.214 and make it equiva∣lent to Royall unction, are to be corrected in memory, thus; That it is meerly accidentall, and not naturall, for such a son to be born a King, because the free consent of the people making choice of the first father of that Line to be their King, and in him making choice of the first born of the family, is meerly accidentall to father and son, and so cannot be naturall. 2. Because Royall gifts to reign are not holden by either us or our adversaries, to be the specifice essence of a King; for if the people Crown a person their King, say we, if the womb bring him forth to be a King; say the oppo∣nents, he is essentially a King, and to be obeyed as the Lords annoin∣ted, though nature be very Parca, sparing, and a niggard in bestow∣ing Royall gifts: Yea, though he be an idiot, say some, if he be the first born of a King, he is by just title a King, but must have Curators and Tutors to guide him, in the exercise of that Royall right that he hath from the womb. But Buchanan

saith well, He who cannot govern himself,* 1.215 shall never govern others.

1 Assert. de facto, As a man commeth into the world a member of a politick societie, he is by consequence borne subject to the laws of that societie; but this maketh him not from the wombe and by nature subject to a King, as by nature he is subject to his Father who begat him; no more then by nature a Lyon is borne subject to another King-Lyon; for it is by accident that he is borne of pa∣rents under subj••ction to a Monarch, or to either Democraticall or Aristocraticall governours, for Cain and Abel were borne under none of these formes of Government properly: and if he had been borne in a new planted Colonie in a wildernesse, where no govern∣ment were yet established, he should be under no such Govern∣ment.

2 Assert. Slavery of servants to Lords or Masters, such as were of old amongst the Iews, is not naturall, but against nature;* 1.216 1. Be∣cause slaverie is malum naturae, a penall evill, and contrary to na∣ture, and a punishment of sinne. 2. Slaverie should not have been in the world, if man had never sinned, no more then there could have been buying and selling of men; which is a miserable conse∣quent of sin, and a sort of death, when men are put to the toyling paines of the hireling, who longeth for the shadow, and under iron harrowes and sawes, and to hew wood, and draw water continually. 3. The originall of servitude was, when men were taken in warre, to eschew a greater evill, even death, the captives were willing to undergoe a lesse evill, slaverie. S. Servitus, 1. de jur. Pers. 4. A man being created according to Gods image, he is res sacra, a sa∣cred thing, and can no more by natures law be sold and bought, then a religious and sacred thing dedicated to God. S. 1. Instit. de invtil. scrupl. l. inter Stipulantem. S. Sacram. F. de verber. Ob∣ligat.

3 Assert. Every man by nature is a freeman borne, that is,* 1.217 by na∣ture no man commeth out of the wombe vnder any civill subjection to King, Prince, or Judge, to master, captaine, conquerour, teacher, &c. 1. Because freedome is naturall to all, except freedome from subjection to Parents: And subjection politick is meerly acciden∣tall, comming from some positive lawes of men,* 1.218 as they are in a po∣litique societie; whereas they might have been borne with all con∣comitants of n••ure, though borne in a single familie, the only na∣turall

and first societie in the world.* 1.219 2. Man is borne by nature free from all subjection, except of that which is most kindly and naturall, and that is fatherly or filial subjection, or matrimoniall subjection of the wife to the husband, and especially he is free of subjection to a Prince by nature; Because to be under jurisdiction to a Iudge or King, hath a sort of jurisdiction. Argument. L. Si quis sit fugitivus F. de edil. edict. in S. penult. vel fin. especially to be under penall lawes now in the state of sinne. The learned Senator Ferdinandus Vasquez saith, l. 2. c. 82. n. 15. Every subject is to lay down his life for the Prince: now no man is borne under subjection to penall lawes or dying for his Prince. 3. Man by nature is borne free, and as free as beasts;* 1.220 but by nature no beast, no Lyon is born King of Lyons; no Horse, no Bullock, no Eagle, King of Horses, Bullocks, Eagles; nor is there any subjection here, except that the young Lyon is subject to the old, every foul to its damme, and by that same law of na∣ture no man is borne King of men, nor any man subject to man in a civill subjection by nature, (I speake not of naturall subjection of children to parents) and therefore Ferdi. Vasquez. illustr. quest. l. 2. c. 82. n. 6. said that Kingdomes and Empires were brought in, not by Natures law, but by the law of Nations: he expoundeth himself else∣where to speak of the law of nature secondary, otherwise the prima∣rie law of Nations is indeed the law of Nature, as appropriated to man. If any reply, that the freedome naturall of beasts and birds who never sinned, cannot be one with the naturall freedome of man who are now under sin, and so under bondage for sin: my answer is, That the subjection of the miserie of man by nature, because of sinne, is more then the subjection of beasts, comparing spece and kind of beasts and birds with mankind, but comparing individuals of the same kinde amongst themselves, a Lyon with Lyon, Eagle with Eagle, and so Man with Man; in which respect, because he who is supposed to be the man borne free from subjection politike, even the King borne a King, is under the same state of sin, and so by rea∣son of sinne, of which he hath a share equally with all other men by nature, he must be, by nature, borne under as great subjection pe∣nall for sinne (except the King be borne voyd of sinne) as other men; Ergo,* 1.221 he is not borne freer by nature then other men, except he come out of the wombe with a Kings crown on his head. 4. To be a King, is a free gift of God, which God bestoweth on some men a∣bove others, as is evident, 2 Sam. 12.7, 8▪ Psal. 75.6. Dan. 4.32. and

therefore all must be borne Kings, if any one man be by nature a King borne, and another a borne subject. But if some be by Gods grace made Kings above others, they are not so by nature; for things which agree to man by nature, agree to all men equally; but all men equally are not borne Kings, as is evident; and all men are not equally borne by nature under politique subjection to Kings, as the Adversaries grant; because those who are by nature Kings, can∣not be also by nature subjects.* 1.222 5. If men be not by nature free f••om politique subjection, then must some, by the law of relation, by na∣ture be Kings; But none are by nature Kings, because none have by nature these things which essentially constitute Kings, for they have neither by nature the calling of God, nor gifts for the throne, nor the free election of the people, nor conquest: and if there be none a King by nature, there can be none a Subject by nature. And the Law faith, Omnes sumus naturâ liberi, nullius ditioni subjecti. l. Ma∣numiss. F. de just. & jur. S. jus autem gentium, Ins. de jur. nat. We are all by nature free. and D. L. ex hoc jure cum simil. 6. Poli∣ticians agree to this as an undeniable truth,* 1.223 that as domestick society is naturall, being grounded upon Natures instinct;* 1.224 so Politique soci∣etie is voluntary, being grounded on the consent of men; and so po∣litique societie is naturall, in radice, in the root, and voluntary and free, in modo, in the manner of their union: and the Scripture clea∣reth to us, that a King is made by the free consent of the people, Deut. 17.15. and so not by nature. 7. What is from the wombe,* 1.225 and so naturall, is eternall, and agreeth to all societies of men: but a Mo∣narchie agreeth not to all societies of men; for many hundred years de facto, there was not a King, till Nimrods time, the world being governed by families, and till Moses his time we find no institution for Kings, Gen. 7. and the numerous multiplication of mankind did occasion Monarchies, otherwise Fatherly government being the first, and measure of the rest, must be the best; for it is better that my father governe me, then that a stranger governe me; and there∣fore the Lord forbad his people to set a stranger over themselves to be their King. The P. Prelate contendeth for the contrary. Every man (saith he) is borne subject to his father,* 1.226 of whom immediately he hath his existence in nature▪ and if his Father be the subject of another, he is borne the subject of his fathers superiour. Answ. But the con∣sequence is weake, every man is borne under naturall subjection to his father, ergo he is borne naturally under civill subjection to his

fathers superiour or King, it followeth not; yea because his father was borne only by nature subject to his owne father, ergo he was subject to a Prince or King only by accident, and by the free con∣stitution of men who freely choose politick government, whereas there is no government naturall, but fatherly or martiall, and there∣fore the contradictory consequence is true.

P. Prelat. Obj. 2. Every man by nature hath immunity and li∣berty from despoticall and herill Empire, and so may dispose of his owne at will, and cannot inslave himselfe without his owne free will; but God hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, and nature also laid this necessity on him, therefore this soveraignty cannot protect us in righteousnesse and honesty, except it be intirely indowed with soveraigne power to preserve it selfe, and protect us.

Ans. The Prelate here deserteth his owne consequence, which i•• strong against himselfe, for if a man be naturally subject to his fa∣thers superiour, as he said before, why is not the sonne of a slave naturally subiect to his fathers superiour & master? 2. As a man may not make away his liberty without his own consent, so can he not without his owne consent give his liberty to be subject to penall Lawes, under a Prince without his owne consent, either in his fa∣thers or in the representative society in which he liveth. 3. God and nature hath laid a necessity on all men to be under government, a naturall necessity from the wombe to be under some government, to wit, a paternall government, that is true; but under this govern∣ment politique, and namely under soveraignty, it is false; and that is but said, for why is he naturally under soveraignty rather then Aristocracy? I beleeve any of the three formes are freely chosen by any society 4. It is false that one cannot defend the people, except he have intire power, that is to say, he cannot doe good, except he have a vast power to doe both good and ill.

* 1.227Obj. 3. It is accidentall to any to render himselfe a slave, being occasioned by force or extreame indigence, but to submit to Govern∣ment congruous to the condition of man, and is necessary for his hap∣py being, and naturall, and necessary by the inviolable Ordinance of God and nature. Ans. If the father be a slave, it is naturall and not accidentall, by the Prelates Logick, to be a slave. 2. it is also acci∣dentall to be under Soveraignty, and sure not naturall, for then Aristocracy and Democracy must be unnaturall,* 1.228 and so unlawfull Governments. 3. If to be congruous to the condition of man be all

one with naturall man (which he must say if he speake sense) to beleeve in God, to be an excellent Mathematician, to swim in deepe waters, being congruous to the nature of man, must be naturall. 4. Man by nature is under government Paternall, not Politique properly, but by the free consent of his will.

Obj. 4. Luke 11.5.* 1.229 Christ himselfe was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 subject to his Parents, the word that is used, Rom. 13. ergo none is exempted from subjection to lawfull government. Ans. We never said, that any was exempted from lawfull goverment; the Prelate and his fellow Iesuites teach that the Clergy is exempted from the lawes of the ci∣vill Magistrate, not we; but because Christ was subject to his Pa∣rents, and the same word is used, Luk. 11. that is, Rom. 13. it will not follow therefore, men are by nature subject to Kings, because they are by nature subject to parents.

Obj. 5. The father had power over the children by the Law of God and nature to redeeme himselfe from debt, or any distressed condition, by inslaving his children begotten of his owne body, if this power was not by the right of nature, and by the Warrant of God, I can see no other, for it could not be by mutuall and voluntary contract of children and fathers,* 1.230 Ans. 1. Shew a law of nature, that the father might inslave his chil∣dren by a Divine positive law presupposing sin, the father might doe that, and yet I thinke that may be questioned, whether it was not a permission rather then a law, as was the Bill of devorce, but a law of nature it was not. 2. The P. Prelate can see no Law but the law of nature here, but it is because he is blind or will not see; his rea∣son is, it was not by mutuall and voluntary contract of children and fathers, ergo it was by the law of nature; so he that cursed his fa∣ther was to dye by Gods Law. This law was not made by mu∣tuall consent betwixt the Father and the Sonne, ergo it was a law of inature, the Prelate will see no better. Nature will teach a man to inslave hmselfe to redeeme himselfe from death, but that it is a Dictate of nature that a man should inslave his sonne, I conceive not. 3. What can this prove, but that if the sonne may by the law of nature, be inslaved for the father, but that the sonne of a slave is by nature under subjection to slavery, & that by natures law, the con∣trary whereof he spake in the page preceding, and in this same page.

As for the Argument of the Prelate to answer Suarez, who la∣boureth to prove Monarchy not to be naturall, but of free consent, because it is various in sundry nations, it is the Iesuites Argument, not ours, I owne it not. Let Iesuites plead for Iesuites.

QUEST. XIIII. Whether or no the people make a Person their King conditionally, or absolutely? and whether there be such a thing as a Covenant tying the King no lesse then his subjects?

THere is a Covenant Naturall and a Covenant Politick and Ci∣vill, there is no politick or civill covenant betwixt the King and his Subjects, because there be no such equality (say Royalists) be∣twixt the King and his people,* 1.231 as that the King can be brought under any civill or legall obligation in mans Court, to either necessitate the King civilly to keepe an Oath to his people, or to tye him to any punish∣ment, if he faile, yet (say they) he is under naturall obligation in Gods Court to keepe his Oath, but he is comptible only to God, if he violate his Oath.

Asser. 1. There is an Oath betwixt the King and his people, lay∣ing on, by reciprocation of bands, mutuall civill obligation upon the King to the people, and the people to the King, 2 Sam. 5.3 So all the Elders of Israel came to the King to Hebron, and King David made a Covenant with them in Hebron before the Lord, and they an∣noynted David King over Israel, 1 Chron. 11.3. And David made a covenant with them before the Lord, and they annoynted David King over Israel, according to the Word of the Lord by Samuel, 2 Chron. 23.2. And they went about in Iudah and gathered the Levites out of all the Cities of Iudah, and the chiefe of the fathers of Israel, and they came to Ierusalem. 3. And all the congregation made a covenant with the King Ioash in the house of God, 2 King. 11.17. and Jehoiada made a covenant betwixt the Lord and the King, and the people that they should be the Lords people, between the King also and his people, Eccles. 8.2. I counsell thee to keepe the Kings commandement, and that in regard of the Oath of God; then it is evident there was a co∣venant betwixt the King and the people. 2. That was not a cove∣nant that did tye the King to God onely, and not to the people, 1. because the covenant betwixt the King and the people is clearly differenced from the Kings covenant with the Lord, 2 King. 11.17. 2. there were no necessity that this covenant should be made pub∣lickly before the people, if the King did not in the covenant tye and oblige himselfe to the people; nor needed it be made solemnly be∣fore the Lord is the House of God. 3. It is expresly a covenant, that was between Ioash the King and his people, and David made a

covenant at his Coronation with the Princes and Elders of Israel; therefore the people give the Crown to David Covenant-wise, and upon condition that he should performe such and such duties to them; and this is cleare by all Covenants in the Word of God, even the Covenant between God and man is so mutuall; I will be your God, and yee shall be my people. The covenant is so mutuall, that if the people breake the covenant, God is loosed from his part of the co∣venant, Zach. 11. v. 10.2. The covenant giveth to the beleever a sort of action of Law, and jus quoddam, to plead with God, in re∣spect of his fidelity to stand to that covenant that bindeth him by reason of his fidelity, Esay 43.26. Es. 63.16. Daniel 9.4, 5. and farre more a covenant giveth ground of a civill action and claime to a people and the free estates against a King, seduced by wicked counsell to make war against the Land, whereas he did sweare by the most high God, that he should be a father and protector of the Church of God. 2. All covenants and contracts between man and man, yea all solemne promises bring the covenanters under a Law, and a claime before men, if the Oath of God be broken as the Covenant betwixt Abraham and Abimelech, Gen. 21.27. Ionathan and David, 1 Sam. 18.3. the spies professe to Rahab in the cove∣nant that they made with him, Iosh. 2. v. 20. And if thou utter this our businesse (say they) we will be quit of thine Oath, which thou hast made us to swear. There be no mutuall contract made upon certain conditi∣ons, but if the conditions be not fulfilled, the party injured is loosed from the contract. Barclay saith,* 1.232 That this covenant obligeth the King to God, but not the King to the people. Ans. It is a vaine thing to say that the people and the King make a covenant, and that David made a covenant with the Elders and Princes of Israel; for if he be obliged to God only, and not to the people by a covenant made with the people, it is not made with the people at all, nay, it is no more made with the people of Israel, nor with the Chaldeans, for it bindeth David no more to Israel, nor to Chaldea, as a cove∣nant made with men. Arnisaeus saith, when two parties contract, if one performe the duty, the other is acquitted. Sect. Ex hujusmod ubi vult just. de duob. reis, l. 3. F. because every one of them are obliged fully. Sect. 1. Iust. eod. to God, to whom the Oath is made (for that is his meaning) and if either the people performe what is sworne to the Lord, or the King, yet one of the parties remaineth still under obliga∣tion, and neither doth the peoples obedience exempt the King from pu∣nishment,

if he faile, nor the Kings obedience exempt the people, if they faile, but every one beareth the punishment of his owne sin; and there is no mutuall power in the parties to compell one another to performe the promised duty, because that belongeth to the Pretor or Magistrate, before whom the contract was made. The King hath jurisdiction over the people, if they violate their Oath, but the people hath no power over the Prince, and the ground that Arnisaeus layeth downe is that, 1. The King is not a party contracting with the people, as if there were mutuall obligations betwixt the King and the people, and a mutuall coactive po∣wer on either side. 2. That the care of Religion belongeth not to the people, for that hath no warrant in the Word (saith he) 2. We read not that the people was to command and compell the Priests and the King to re∣forme Religion and abolish Idolatry, as it must follow, if the covenant be mutuall. 3. Iehoiada, 2 King. 11. obligeth himselfe and the King, and the people, by a like law to serve God, and here be not two parts, but three; the high Priest, the King, the People, if this example prove any thing. 4. Both King and people shall finde the revenging hand of God against them, if they faile in the breach of their Oath; but with this difference, and every one of the two, King and people by the Oath stand obliged to God, the King for himselfe, and the people for them∣selves, but with this difference, the King oweth to God proper and due obedience as any of the subjects, and also to governe the people accor∣ding to Gods true religion, Deut. 17. 2 Chro. 29. and in this the Kings ob∣ligation differeth from the peoples obligation, the people, as they would be saved must serve God, and the King for the same cause, 1 Sam. 12. But besides this, the King is obliged to rule and governe the people, and keepe them in obedience to God; but the people is not obliged to governe the King, and keepe him in obedience to God, for then the people should have as great power of jurisdiction over the King, as the King hath o∣over the people, which is against the Word of God, and the examples of the Kings of Iudah; but this commeth not from any promise or cove∣nant that the King hath made with the people, but from a peculiar obligation whereby he is obliged to God as a man, not as a King.

This is the mystery of the businesse, but I oppose this in these Assertions.* 1.233

1. Assert. As the King is obliged to God for the maintenance of true Religion, so are the people and Princes no lesse in their place obliged to maintaine true Religion, for 1. the people are rebuked because they burnt Incense in all high places, 2 King. 17.11.

2 Chron. 33.17. Hos. 4.13. And the reason why the high places are not taken away, 2 Chro. 20.33. is given, for as yet the people had not prepared their heart unto the God of their fathers; but you will reply, elicite acts of maintenance of true Religion are commanded to the people, and that the places prove; but the question is De actibus imperatis, of commanded acts of Religion, sure none but the Magi∣strate is to command others to worship God according to his Word. I answer, in ordinary only, Magistrates (not the King on∣ly) but all the Princes of the Land, and Iudges are to maintaine Religion by their commandements, Deut. 1.16. 2 Chro. 1.2. Deut. 16.19. Eccles. 5.8. Hab. 1.4. Mic. 3.9. Zach. 7.9. Hos. 5.10.11. and to take care of Religion; but when the Iudges decline from Gods way, and corrupt the Law, we finde the people punished and rebuked for it, Ier. 15.4. And I will cause them to be removed to all Kingdomes of the earth, because of Manasseh the sonne of He∣zekiah King of Iudah, for that which he did in Ierusalem, 1 Sam. 12.24. only feare the Lord —25. But if yee doe still wickedly, yee shall be consumed, both yee and your King. And this case I grant is extra∣ordinary, yet so as Iunius Brutus proveth well and strongly, that Religion is not given only to the King, that he only should keepe it, but to all the inferiour Iudges and people also in their kind; but because the estates never gave the King power to corrupt Religion,* 1.234 and presse a false and Idolatrous worship upon them, therefore when the King defendeth not true Religion, but presseth upon the people a false and Idolatrous Religion, in that they are not under the King, but are presumed to have no King catenus so farre, and are presumed to have the power in themselves, as if they had not appointed any King at all: as if we presume the body had given to the right hand a power to ward off strokes, and to defend the bo∣dy, if the right hand should by a Palsie, or some other disease be∣come impotent, and be withered up; when ill is comming on the body, it is presumed that the power of defence is recurred to the left hand, and to the rest of the body to defend it selfe, in this case as if the body had no right hand, and had never communicated any power to the right hand at all. So if an incorporation accused of Treason, and in danger of the sentence of death, shall appoint a Lawyer to Advocate their cause, and to give in their just defences to the Iudge; if their Advocate be stricken with dumbnesse, because they have losed their legall and representative tongue, none can say that

this incorporation hath loosed the tongues that Nature hath given them, so as by Natures law they may not plead in their own just & lawfull defence, as if they had never appointed the foresaid lawyer to plead for them. The King, as a man, is not more obliged to the publick and regall defence of the true Religion, then any other man of the land; but he is made by God and the people King, for the Church and people of God's sake, that he may defend true Religion, for the behalfe and salvation of all. If therefore he defend not Re∣ligion for the salvation of the soules of all in his publick and royall way, it is presumed as undeniable, that the people of God, who by the law of nature are to care for their own soule, are to defend in their way, true Religion, which so nearly concerneth them and their eternall happinesse.

2 Assert. When the covenant is betwixt God, on the one part, and the King, Priests, and people on the other part, it is true, if the one performe for his part to God, the whole duty, the other is ac∣quitted; as if two men be indebted to one man ten thousand pounds, if the one pay the whole summe, the other is acquitted: but the King and People are not so, contracting parties in covenant with God, as that they are both indebted to God for one and the same sum of compleat obedience, so as if the King pay the whole summe of o∣bedience to God, the people is acquitted; and if the People pay the whole summe, the King is acquitted: for every one standeth obli∣ged to God for himselfe; for the people must doe all that is their part, in acquitting the King from his Royall duty, that they may free him and themselves both from punishment, if he disobey the King of Kings: Nor doth the Kings obedience acquit the people from their duty. And Arnisaeus dreamed▪ if he believed that we make King and People this way partie contracters in covenant with God. Nor can two co-partners in covenant with God, so mutually compell one an∣other to doe their duty; for we hold, that the covenant is made be∣twixt the King and the People, betwixt mortall men; but they both bind themselves before God to each other. But, saith Arnisaeu••, It belongeth to a Pretor or Ruler,* 1.235 who is above both King and People, to compell each of them; the King to performe his part of the covenant to the people, and the people to performe their part of the covenant to the King. Now there is no Ruler but God, above both King and People. But let me answer: The consequence is not needfull, no more then when the King of Iudah and the King of Israel make a covenant to perform

mutuall duties one to another: no more then it is necessarie that there should be a King and superior Ruler above the King of Israel and the King of Iudah, who should compell each one to doe a duty to his fellow King; for the King and People are each of them above, and below others in divers respects: The People, because they cre∣ate the man King, they are so above the King, and have a virtuall power to compell him to doe his duty: and the King, as King, hath an authoritative power above the People, because Royaltie is for∣mally in him, and originally and virtually only in the People; there∣fore may he compell them to their duty, as we shall heare anon; and therefore there is no need of an earthly Ruler higher then both, to compell both.

3 Assert. We shall hereafter prove the power of the people a∣bove the King, God willing. And so it is false that there is not mu∣tuall coactive power on each side.

4 Assert. The obligation of the King in this covenant, floweth from the peculiar obligation nationall betwixt the King and the E∣states, and it bindeth the King, as King,* 1.236 and not simply as he is a man. 1. Because it is a covenant betwixt the people and David, not as he is the sonne of Jesse, for then it should oblige Eliab, or any other of Davids brethren; yea, it should oblige any man, if it oblige David as a man: but it obl••geth David as a King, or as he is to be their King, because it is the specifice act of a King, that he is obliged unto, to wit, to governe the people in Righteousnesse and Re∣ligion with his Royall power. And so it is false that Arnisaeus saith, that the King, as a man, is obliged to God by this covenant, not as a King. 2. He saith, by covenant the King is bound to God as a Man, not as a King. But so the man will have the King, as King, under no law of God, and so he must either be above God, as King, or coequall with God; which are manifest blasphemies: for I thought ever, the Royalists had not denyed, but the King, as King, had been obliged to keep his oath to his subjects, in relation to God, and in regard of na∣turall obligation; so as he sinneth before God, if he breake his co∣venant with his people:* 1.237 though they deny that he is obliged to keep his covenant in relation to his Subjects, and in regard of poli∣tique or civill obligation to men. Sure I am, this the Royalists con∣stantly teach. 3. He would have this covenant so made with men, as it obligeth not the King to men, but to God. But the contrary is true. Beside the King and the Peoples covenant with the Lord,

King Joash made another covenant with the People, and Jehoiada the Priest was only a witnesse, or one who in Gods name performed the rite of annointing, otherwise he was a subject on the peoples side, obliged to keep allegiance to Joash, as to his Soveraigne and Master. But certainly, who ever maketh a covenant with the peo∣ple, promising to governe them according to Gods word, and upon that condition and these termes receiveth a throne and crown from the people, he is obliged to what he promiseth to the people, Omnis promittens facit alteri, cui promissio facta est, jus in promittentem; Who ever maketh a promise to another, giveth to that other a sort of right or jurisdiction to challenge the promise. The covenant be∣twixt David and Israel were a shadow, if it tye the people to alle∣giance to David as their King, and if it tye not David as King to govern them in righteousnesse; but leave David loose to the people, and only tye him to God; then it is a covenant betwixt David and God only: But the Text saith, It is a covenant betwixt the King and the People, 2 King. 11.17. 2 Sam. 5.3.

Hence our second Argument. He who is made a minister of God, not simply,* 1.238 but for the good of the subject; and so he take heed to walk in Gods law as a King, and governe according to Gods will, he is in so far only made King by God, as he fulfilleth the condition; and in so far as he is a minister for evill to the subject, and ruleth not according to that which the book of the Law commandeth him as King, in so far he is not by God appointed King and Ruler, and so must be made a King by God conditionally: But so hath God made Kings and Rulers, Rom. 13.4. 2 Chron. 6.16. Ps. 89.30, 31. 2 Sam. 7.12. 1 Chron. 28.7, 8, 9. This argument is not brought to prove that Jeroboam or Saul leave off to be Kings, when they faile in some part of the condition; or as if they were not Gods Vicegerents to be o∣beyed in things lawfull, after they have gone on in wicked cour∣ses: For, the People consenting to make Saul King, they give him the Crown, pro hac vice, at his entry, absolutely: there is no condi∣tion required in him before they make him King, but only that he covenant with them to rule according to Gods law: The conditi∣ons to be performed, are consequent, and posterior to his actuall co∣ronation, and his sitting on the Throne. But the argument presup∣posing that which the Lords word teacheth, to wit, that the Lord and the people giveth a crown by one and the same action; for God formally maketh David a King by the Princes and Elders of Israels

choosing of him to be their King at Hebron; and therefore seeing the people maketh him a King covenant-wise, and conditionally, so he rule according to Gods Law, and the people resigning their power to him for their safety, and for a peaceable and godly life under him, and not to destroy them, and tyrannize over them; it is certain God giveth a King that same way, by that same very act of the people; and if the King tyrannize, I cannot say it is beside the inten∣tion of God making a King, nor yet beside his intention as a just pu∣nisher of their transgressions; for to me as I conceive, nothing ei∣ther good or evill falleth out beside the intention of him, who doeth all things according to the pleasure of his Will; if then the peo∣ple make a King as a King conditionally for their safety, and not for their destruction (for as a King he saveth, as a man he destroyeth, and not as a King and Father) and if God by the peoples free election make a King, God maketh him a King conditionally, and so by covenant; and therefore when God promiseth 2 Sam. 7.12. 1 Chron. 28.7, 8, 9. to Davids seed, and to Solomon a Throne, he promiseth not a Throne to them immediatly, as he rai∣sed up Prophets and Apostles, without any mediate action and con∣sent of the people, but he promiseth a Throne to them by the medi∣ate consent, election, and covenant of the people; which condition and covenant he expresseth in the very words of the people,* 1.239 cove∣nant with the King, so they walke as Kings in the Law of the Lord, and take heed to Gods Commandements and Statutes to doe them▪ Obj. But then Solomon falling in love with many outlandish women, and so not walking according to Gods Law, loseth all royall dignity and Kingly power, and the people is not to acknowledge him as King, since the Kingly power was conferred upon him, rather then Adonijah, upon such a condition, which condition not being performed by him, it is presumed that neither God, nor the people under God, as Gods instru∣ments in making King, conferred any royall power on him. Ans. It doth not follow, that Solomon falling in love with strange women doth lose Royall dignity, either in the Court of Heaven, or before men; because the conditions of the covenant upon which God by the people made him King must be exponed by the Law, Deut. 17. now that cannot beare, that any one act contrary to the Royall Office, yea that any one or two acts of Tyranny doth denude a man of the Royall dignity that God and the people gave him, for so David com∣mitting two acts of tyranny, one of taking his owne faithfull Sub∣jects

wife from him, and another in killing himselfe, should denude himselfe of all the Kingly power that he had, and that therefore the people after his Adultery and Murther were not to reknowledge David as their King, which is most absurd; for as one single act of unchastity is indeed against the matrimoniall covenant, and yet doth not make the woman no wife at all, so it must be such a breach of the Royall Covenant, as maketh the King no King, that anulleth the Royall Covenant, and denudeth the Prince of his Royall au∣thority and power, that must be interpreted a breach of the Oath of God, because it must be such a breach upon supposition, whereof the people would not have given the Crowne, but upon supposition of his destructivenesse to the Common-wealth, they would never have given to him the Crowne.

Obj. 2. Yet at least it will follow, that Saul after he is rejected of God for disobedience, in not destroying the Amalekites, as Samuel spea∣keth to him, 1 Sam. 15. is no longer to be acknowledged King by the people, at least after he committeth such acts of tyranny, as are 1. Sam. 8.12, 13, 14, 15. &c. and after he had killed the Priests of the Lord, and persecuted innocent David without cause, he was no longer either in the Court of Heaven, or the Court of men to be acknowledged as King, seeing he had manifestly violated the royall covenant made with the people, 1 Sam. 11. v. 14, 15. and yet after those breaches David ac∣knowledgeth him to be his Prince, and the Lords annoynted. Ans. The Prophet Samuel his threatning, 1 Sam. 17. is it not exponed of actuall unkinging and rejecting of Saul at the present; for after that, Samuel both honoured him as King before the people, and prayed for him, and mourned to God on his behalfe as King, 1 Sam. 16.1.2. but the threatning was to have effect in Gods time, when he should bring David to the Throne, as was prophesied, upon occasion of lesse sinne, even his sacrificing and not waiting the time appointed, as God had commanded, 1 Sam. 13. v. 13, 14.

* 1.2402. The people and Davids acknowledgment of Saul to be the Lords annoynted, and a King, after he had committed such acts of Tyranny as seeme destructive of the Royall Covenant, and incon∣sistent therewith, cannot prove that Saul was not made King by the Lord, and the people, conditionally, and that for the peoples good and safety, and not for their destruction; and it doth well prove that those acts of blood and tyranny committed by Saul, were not done by him as King, or from the principle of Royall power

given to him by God and the people. 2. That in these acts they were not to acknowledge him as King. 3. That these acts of blood were contrary to the covenant that Saul did sweare at his inauguration, and contrary to the conditions that Saul in the covenant tooke on him to perform at the making of the Royall covenant. 4. They prove not but the States who made Saul King, might lawfully dethrone him, and annoint David their King. But David had reason to hold him for his Prince, and the Lords Anointed, so long as the people recalled not their grant of Royall dignity, as David or any man is ob∣liged to honour him as King whom the people maketh King, though he were a bloodier and more tyrannous man then Saul. Any Ty∣rant standeth in titulo, so long as the People and Estates who made him King, have not recalled their grant; so as neither David, nor any single man, though six hundred with him, may unking him, or detract obedience from him as King; So, many acts of disloyaltie, and breachcs of lawes in the Subjects, though they be contrary to this Covenant that the States make with their Prince, doth not make them to be no Subjects: and the Covenant mutuall standeth thus.

3 Arg. If the people as Gods instruments,* 1.241 bestow the benefit of a Crown on their King, upon condition that he will rule them ac∣cording to Gods word; then is the King made King by the people conditionally: but the former is true; Ergo, so is the latter. The assumption is proved thus: because to be a King, is to be an adopted father, tutor, a Politick servant and Royall watchman of the State; and the Royall honour, and Royall maintenance given to him, is a reward of his labours, and a Kingly hire. And this is the Apostles argument, Rom. 13.6. For this cause pay you tribute also; (there is the wages) for they are Gods ministers, attending continually upon this very thing; There is the worke. Qui non implet conditionem à se promissam, cadit beneficio. It is confirmed thus. The people either maketh the man their Prince conditionally, that he rule according to Law; or absolutely, so that he rule according to will or lust: or, 3. without any vocall transactions at all, but only brevi manu, say, Reigne thou over us, and, (God save the King.) And so there be no conditions spoken on either side; Or, 4. The King is obliged to God for the condition which he promiseth by oath to performe to∣ward the people; but he is to make no reckoning to the people, whether he performe his promise or no; for the people being infe∣riour

to him, and he, solo Deo minor, only next and immediate to God, the people can have no jus, no law over him by vertue of any covenant. But the first standing, we have what we seeke; The se∣cond is contrary to Scripture. He is not Deut. 17.15, 16. made ab∣solutely a King to rule according to his will and lust; for, [Reigne thou over us] should have this meaning; Come thou and play the Ty∣rant over us, and let thy lust and will be a law to us: which is against naturall sense: nor can the sense and meaning be according to the third, That the people without any expresse, vocall, and positive co∣venant, give a Throne to their King to rule as he pleaseth; because, 1. it is a vain thing for the Prelate and other Mancipia Aulae, Court-bellies, to say Scotland and England must produce a written authen∣tick covenant betwixt the first King and their People, because, say they, its the Lawes word, De non apparentibus & non existentibus eadem lex; that covenant which appeareth not, it is not. For in po∣sitive covenants that is true, and in such contracts as are made ac∣cording to the Civill or Municipall lawes,* 1.242 or the secondary law of Nations: But the generall covenant of nature is presupposed in ma∣king a King, where there is no vocall or written covenant, if there be no conditions betwixt a Christian King and his people, then those things which are just and right according to the law of God, and the rule of God in moulding the first King, are understood to regu∣late both King and People, as if they had been written: and here we produce our written covenant, Deut. 17.15. Josh. 1.8, 9. 2 Chr. 31, 32.1. Because this is as much against the King as the people, and more; for if the first King cannot bring forth his written and authentick tables to prove that the Crown was given to him and his heires, and his successors absolutely and without any conditions, so as his will shall be a law, cadit causa, he loseth his cause (say they) The King is in possession of the Royall power absolutely, without any condition, and you must put him from his possession by a law. I answer, this is most false; 1. Though he were in mala fide, and in unjust possessi∣on, the law of Nature will warrant the people to repeal their right, and plead for it, in a matter which concerneth their heads, lives, and soules. 2. The Parliaments of both Kingdomes standing in posses∣sion of a nomothetick power to make lawes, proveth cleerely that the King is in no possession of any Royall dignitie conferred ab∣solutely and without any condition upon him: and therefore it is the Kings part by law to put the Estates out of possession. And so

though there were no written covenant, the standing law and pra∣ctice of many hundreth acts of Parliament, is equivalent to a writ∣ten covenant.

2. When the people appointeth any to be their King, the voyce of Nature exponeth their deed, though there be no vocall or writ∣ten covenant; For that fact of making a King, is a morall lawfull act warranted by the word of God, Deut. 17.15, 16. Rom. 13.1.2. and the law of Nature: and therefore they having made such a man their King, they have given him power to be their father, feeder, healer, protector; and so must only have made him King conditio∣nally, so he be a father, a feeder, and tutor. Now if this deed of ma∣king a King, must be exponed to be an investing with an absolute, and not a conditionall power; this fact shall be contrary to Scripture, and to the law of Nature: for if they have given him Royall power absolutely, and without any condition,* 1.243 they must have given to him power to be a father, protector, tutor, and to be a tyrant, a mur∣therer, a bloody lyon to waste and destroy the people of God.

3. The Law permitteth the bestower of a benefit to interpret his own mind in the bestowing of a benefit, even as a King and State must expone their own Commission given to their Ambassadour, so must the Estates expone whether they bestowed the Crown upon the first King conditionally or absolutely.

For the 4th. if it stand, then must the people give to their first elected King a power to wast and destroy themselves, so as they may never controle it, but only leave it to God and the King to rec∣kon together, but so the condition is a Chimera (We give you a Throne, upon condition you swear by him who made heaven and earth, that you will govern us according to Gods Law; and you shall be an∣swerable to God only, not to us, whether you keep the covenant you make with us, or violate it;) but how a covenant can be made with the peo∣ple, and the King obliged to God, not to the people, I conceive not. 2. This presupposeth that the King as King cannot doe any sin, or commit any act of tyranny against the people, but against God only; because if he be obliged to God only as a King by vertue of his cove∣nant: How can he faile against an obligation where there is no ob∣ligation? but as a King he owe no obligation of duty to the people, and indeed so doe our good men expound that Psal. 51. Against thee, thee only have I sinned, not against Vriah; for if he sinned not as King against Vriah, whose life he was obliged to conserve as a

King, he was not obliged as a King by any royall duty to conserve his life. Where there is no sin, there is no obligation not to sin, and where there is no obligation not to sin, there is no sin. By this the King as King is loosed from all duties of the second Table, being once made a King, he is above all obligation to love his neighbour as himselfe, for he is above all his neighbours, and above all man∣kind, and only lesse then God.

4. Arg. If the people be so given to the King, that they are committed to him as a pledge,* 1.244 oppignorated in his hand, as a pupill to a Tutor, as a distressed man to a Patron, as a flocke to a Shep∣heard; and so as they remaine the Lords Church, his people, his flocke, his portion, his inheritance, his vineyard, his redeemed ones, then they cannot be given to the King as Oxen and Sheepe, that are free∣ly gifted to a man; or as a gift or summe of gold or silver, that the man to whom they are given may use, so that he cannot commit a fault against the oxen, sheepe, gold or mony, that is given to him, how ever he shall dispose of them.

But the people are given to the King to be tutored and protected of him, so as they remaine the people of God, and in covenant with him, and if the people were the goods of fortune (as Heathens say) he could no more sinne against the people then a man can sin against his gold; now though a man by adoring gold, or by lavish profusi∣on and wasting of gold may sin against God, yet not against gold; nor can he be in any covenant with gold, or under any obligation of either duty or sin to gold, or to livelesse and reasonlesse creatures properly, therefore he may sin in the use of them, and yet not sin against them, but against God. Hence of necessity the King must be under obligation to the Lords people in another manner, then that he should only answer to God, for the losse of men, as if men were worldly goods under his hand, and as if being a King he were now by this Royall Authority priviledged from the best halfe of the law of nature, to wit, from acts of mercy, and truth, and covenant kee∣ping with his brethren.

* 1.2455. Arg. If a King because a King were priviledged from all covenant obligation to his subjects, then could no Law of men lawfully reach him for any contract violated by him, then he could not be a debtor to his subjects, if he borrowed mony from them, and it were utterly unlawfull either to crave him mony, or to sue him at Law for debts, yet our Civill Lawes of Scotland tyeth the

King to pay his debts, as any other man; yea and King Solomons traffiquing, and buying and selling betwixt him and his owne sub∣jects would seeme unlawfull; for how can a King buy and sell with his subjects if he be under no covenant obligation to men, but to God only. Yea then a King could not marry a wife, for he could not come under a covenant to keepe his body to her only, nor if he committed adultery, could he sin against his wife, because being im∣mediate unto God, and above all obligation to men, he could sin a∣gainst no covenant made with men, but only against God.

6. If that was a lawfull covenant made by Asa, and the States of Iudah, 2 Chron. 15.13.* 1.246 That whosoever would not seeke the Lord God of their fathers, should be put to death, whether small or great, whe∣ther man or woman: this obligeth the King for ought I see, and the Princes, and the people, but it was a lawfull covenant, ergo the King is under a covenant to the Princes and Iudges, as they are to him; it is replyed, If a Master of a Schoole should make a law, who∣ever shall goe out at the Schoole doores without liberty obtained of the Master, shall be whipped,* 1.247 it will not oblige the Schoole-master that he shall be whipped, if he goe out at the Schoole doores without liberty; so neither doth this Law oblige the King the supreame Law-giver. Ans. Suppose that the Schollars have no lesse hand and authority magi∣steriall in making the law, then the Schoole-master, as the Princes of Iudah had a collaterall power with King Asa about that law; it would follow, that the Schoole-master is under the same law. 2. Suppose going out at Schoole doores were that way a morall neglect of studying in the Master, as it is in the Scholars, as the not seeking of God is as hainous a sinne in King Asa, and no lesse deserving death then it is in the people; then should the Law oblige Schoolma∣ster and Scholler both without exception. 3. The Schoolemaster i•• clearely above all lawes of discipline which he imposeth on his Scho∣lars, but none can say that King Asa was clearely above that law of seeking of the Lord God of his fathers. Diodorus Siculus, l. 17. saith, the Kings of Persia were under an oath, and that they might not change the Lawes; and so were the Kings of Egypt and Ethiopia. The Kings of Sparta, which Aristotle calleth just Kings, renew their oath e∣very moneth. Romulus so covenanted with the Senate and People. Carolus V. Austriacus, sweareth he shall not change the Lawes, without the consent of the Electors, nor make new lawes, nor di∣spose or impledge any thing that belongeth to the Empire. So read

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we,* 1.248 Spec. Saxon. l. 3. Act. 54. and Xenophon Cyriped. l. 8. saith, there was a covenant between Cyrus and the Persians. The nobles are crowned when they crown their King, and exact a speciall Oath of the King. So doth England, Polonia, Spaine, Arragonia, &c. Alberi. Gentilis. Hug. Grotius, prove that Kings are really bound to performe Oathes and contracts to their people; but notwithstanding there be such a covenant, it followeth not from this, saith Arnisaeus, that if the Prince breake his covenant and rule tyrannically, the people shall be free, and the contract or covenant nothing. Ans. The covenant may be materially broken, while the King remaineth King, and the sub∣jects remaine subjects, but when it is both materially and formally declared by the States to be broken, the people must be free from their Allegiance; but of this more hereafter.

Arg. 7. If a Master bind himselfe by an Oath to his servant, he shall not receive such a benefit of such a point of service; if he vio∣late the Oath, his Oath must give his servant Law and right, both to challenge his Master, and he is freed from that point of service; an Army appointeth such a one their Leader and Captaine, but they re∣fuse to doe it, except he sweare he shall not betray them to the ene∣my, he doth betray them, then must the souldiers be loosed from that contract; if one be appointed Pilate of a ship, and not but by an Oath, if he sell the Passengers to the Turke, they may challenge the Pilate of his Oath; and it is cleare that 1. the estates should re∣fuse to give the Crown, to him who would refuse to governe them according to Gods Law, but should professe that he would make his owne will a Law, therefore the intention of the Oath is clearely conditionall. 2. When the King sweareth the Oath, he is but King in fieri, and so not as King above the States of Kingdomes, now his being King doth not put him in a case above all civill obligation of a King to his subjects, because the matter of the Oath is, that he shall be under them so farre, in regard of the Oath of God.

Arg. 8. If the Oath of God made to the people doe not bind him to the people to governe according to Law, and not according to his will and lust, it should be unlawfull for any to sweare such an Oath, for if a power above law agree essentially to a King as a King, as Royalists hold, he who sweareth such a Oath, should both sweare to be a King to such a people, and should sweare to be no King in respect by his Oath he should renounce that which is essen∣tiall to a King.

Arnisaeus objecteth; Ex particularibus non potest colligi conclusio u∣niversalis, some few of the Kings, as David & Ioash, made a covenant with the people; it followeth not that this was a universall law. Ans. Yea, the covenant is Deut. 17. and must be a rule to all; if so just a man as David was limited by a covenant, then all the rest also.

QUEST. XV. Whether or no the King be Vnivocally, or only Analogically, and by proportion a father?

IT is true, Aristotle Polit. l. 3. c. 11. saith,* 1.249 That the Kingly power is a fatherly power; and Iustin. Novell 12. c. 2. Pater quamvis legum contemptor, quamvis impius sit, tamen pater est. But I doe not beleeve that, as Royalists say, that the Kingly power is essentially and univocally that same with a paternall or fatherly power; or that Adam as a father, was as a father and King, and that suppose A∣dam should live in Noahs daies, that by divine institution and with∣out consent of the Kingdomes and communities on earth, Adam hoc ipso, and for no other reason but because he was a father, should also be the universall King, and Monarch of the whole world; or sup∣pose Adam were living to this day; that all Kings that hath been since, and now are, held their Crownes of him, and had no more Kingly power then inferiour Iudges in Scotland have under our soveraigne King Charles, for so all that hath been, and now are lawfull Kings should be unjust usurpers; for if fatherly power be the first and native power of commanding, it is against nature that a Monarch who is not my father by generation, should take that po∣wer from me, and be a King over both me and my children.

But I assert, that though the Word warrant us to esteem Kings fathers,* 1.250 Esa. 49.23. Jud. 5.7. Gen. 20. v. 2. yet are not they essenti∣ally and formally fathers by generation, Num. c. 11. v. 12. Have I conceived all this people? have I begotten them? and yet are they but fathers metaphorically; 1. By office, because they should care for them as fathers doe for children, and so come under the name of fa∣thers in the fifth Commandement; and therefore rigorous and cru∣ell Rulers are Leopards and Lyons, and Wolves, Ezech. 22.27. Zeph. 3.3. If then tyrannous Judges be not essentially and formally Leopards and Lyons, but only metaphorically, neither can Kings be formally fathers. 2. Not only Kings, but all Iudges are fathers in defending

their subjects from violence and the sword, and fighting the Lords battells for them, and counselling them. If therefore Royalists argue rightly, A King is essentially a father, and, fatherly power and royall power are of the same essence and nature; As therefore he who is once a father, is ever a father, and his children cannot take up armes against him to resist him, for that is unnaturall, & repugnant to the 5. Comman∣dement: So he who is once a King, is evermore a King, and it is repug∣nant to the fifth Commandement to resist him with armes. It is an∣swered, that the Argument presupposeth that Royall power, and Fatherly power is one and the same in nature, whereas they differ in nature, and are only one by analogie and proportion: for so Pa∣stors of the Word are called fathers, 1 Cor. 4.15. it will not fol∣low, that once a Pastor, evermore a Pastor; and that if therefore Pastors turne wolves, and by hereticall doctrine corrupt the flock, they cannot be cast out of the Church. 3. A father, as a father, hath not power of life and death over his sonnes,* 1.251 because, Rom. 13. by divine institution the sword is given by God to Kings and Iudges: and if Adam had had any such power to kill his sonne Cain, for the killing of his brother Abel, it had been given to him by God as a power politike, different from a fatherly power: for a fatherly pow∣er, as such, is formally to conserve the life of the childaen, and not to take away the life: yea, and Adam, though he had never sinned, nor any of his posteritie, Adam should have been a perfect father, as he is now indued with all fatherly power that any father now hath; yea should not God have given the sword or power of punishing ill doers, since that power should have been in vaine, if there had been no violence, nor bloodshed, or sinne on the earth: for the power of the sword and of lawfull warre, is given to men now in the state of sinne. 4. Fatherly government and power is from the bosome and marrow of that fountaine law of nature; but Royall power is not from the law of nature, more then Aristocraticall or Democrati∣call power.* 1.252 D. Ferne saith, Monarchie is not jure divino, (I am not of his mind) nor yet from the law of Nature, but, ductu naturae, by the guidance of nature. Sure it is from a supervenient commande∣ment of God, added to the first law of nature, establishing Fatherly power. 5. Children having their life and first breathings of nature from their parents, must be in a more intire relation from their father, then from their Prince: Subjects have not their Being natu∣rall, but their civill, politique and peaceable well-being from their

Prince. 6. A father is a father by generation, and giving the being of nature to children, and is a naturall head and root, without the free consent and suffrages of his children, and is essentially a father to one childe, as Adam was to one Cain: but a Prince is a Prince by the free suffrages of a community, and cannot be a King to one only, and he is the politique head of a civill Corporation. 7. A father, so long as his children liveth can never leave off to be a father, though he were mad, and furious, though he be the most wicked man on earth. Qui genuit filium non potest non genuisse filium, what is once past cannot by any power be not passed, a father is a father for ever. But by confession of Royalists, as Barclay, Hug. Grotius, and Arni∣saeus and others grant, if a King sell his subjects by sea or land to other nations, if he turne a furious Nero, he may be dethroned, and the power that created the King under such expresse conditions, as if the King violate them by his owne consent, he shall be put from the Throne, may cease to be a King, and if a stronger King conquer a King and his subjects, Royalists say the conquerour is a lawfull King; and so the conquered King must also lawfully come downe from his Throne, and turne a lawfull captive sitting in the dust. 8. Learned Polititians, as Bartholomeus Romulus, Defens. part. 1. num. 153. Ioannes de Anania in c. fin. de his qui fil. occid. teach that the father is not obliged to reveale the conspiracy of his son against his Prince, nor is he more to accuse his son, then to accuse himselfe; because the father loveth the sonne better then himselfe. D. Listi qui∣dem. Sect. Fin. quod. met. caus. & D. L. fin. c. de cura furiosi, and certainly a father had rather dye in his own person as choose to dye in his sonnes, in whom he affecteth a sort of immortality, In specie, quando non potest in individuo: but a King doth not love his subjects with a naturall or fatherly love thus; and if the affections differ, the power which secondeth the affection, for the conservation either of being, or well being, must also differ proportionally.

The P. Prelate objecteth against us thus,* 1.253 stealing word by word from Arnisaeus: When a King is elected Soveraigne to a multitude, he is surrogated in the place of a common father, Exod. 20.5. Honour thy father; then as a naturall father receiveth not Paternall right, power, or authority from his sonnes, but hath this from God, and the ordinance of nature, nor can the King have his right from the commu∣nity. 2. The maxime of the Law is, Surrogatus gaudet privilegiis ejus cui surrogatur, & qui succedit in locum, succedit in jus. The

person surrogated, hath all the Priviledges that he hath, in whose place he succeedeth, he who succeedeth to the place, succeedeth to the right; the adopted sonne, or the bastard who is legittimated, and commeth in the place of the lawfull borne sonne, commeth also in the priviledges of the lawfull borne sonne; a Prince elected commeth to the full possession of the Majesty of a naturall Prince and Father, for Modus acquirendi non tollit naturale jus possidendi (saith Arnisaeus, more fully then the poore Plagiarius) the manner of acquiring any thing taketh not away the naturall possession, for how ever things be acquired, if the title be just, possession is the Law of Nations; then when the King is chosen in place of the father, as the father hath a divine right by nature, so must the King have that same: and seeing the right proprietor (saith the Pamphleting Prelate) had his right by God, by nature, how can it be, but howsoever the designation of the person is from the disordered com∣munity, yet the collation of the power is from God immediatly, and from his sacred and inviolable ordinance. And what can be said against the way by which any one elected obtained his right, for seeing God doth not now send Samuells or Elisha's to anoynt or declare Kings, we are in his ordinary providence to conceive the designation of the person is the manifestation of Gods Will, called Voluntas signi, as the Schooles speake, just so as when the Church designeth one to sacred orders.

Ans. 1. He that is surrogated in the place of another, due to him, by a positive Law of man, he hath Law to all the priviledges that he hath in whose place he is surrogated, that is true. He who is made Assignee to an Obligation for a summe of money, hath all the rights that the principall party to whom the Bond or Obligation was made, he who commeth in the place of a Major of a City, of a Captaine in an Army, of a Pilot in a ship, of a Pope, hath all the priviledges and Rights that his predecessors had by Law. Jus succedit juri, persona jure predita personae jure preditae. So the Law, so far as my reading can reach, who professe my selfe a Divine; but that he who succee∣deth to the place of a father, by nature, should injoy all the naturall Rights and Priviledges of the person to whom he succeedeth; I beleeve the Law never dreamed it, for then the adopted sonne comming in place of the naturall sonne, hath right to the naturall affection of the father; if any should adopt Maxwell the Prelate, should he love him as the Pursevant of Craile, Maxwell his father loved him? I conceive not; hath the adopted sonne his life, his being, the figure bodily, the manners of the sonne in whose place he is adop∣ted?

or doth he naturally resemble the father as the naturall sonne doth? The Prelate did not read this Law in any approved Iurist, though he did steale the argument from Arnisaeus, and stole the cita∣tions of Homer and Aristotle out of him, with a little Metathesis: A naturall sonne is not made a sonne by the consent of Parents, but he is a sonne by generation, so must the adopted sonne be adop∣ted without the free consent and grace of the father adopting:* 1.254 so here the King commeth in the place of a naturall father, but I con∣ceive the Law saith not that the elected King is a King without con∣sent of the subjects, as the naturall father is a father without con∣sent of his sonnes. 2. Nor is it a Law true, as once a father alwaies a father, so once an elected King, alwaies a King, though he sell his subjects, being induced thereunto by wicked Counsellors. 3. If the King have no priviledges, but what the naturall father hath in whose place he commeth, then as the naturall father in a free King∣dome hath not power of life and death over his sonnes, neither hath the King power of life and death over his subjects, this is no Law. 4 This maxime should prove good, if the King were essentially a father, by generation and naturall propagation, but he is onely a father Metaphorically, and by a borrowed speech. A father non gene∣rando, sed politicò alendo, tuendo, regendo, therefore an elected Prince commeth not in the full possession of all the naturall power and rights of a naturall father. 2. The P. Prelate speaketh disgracefully of the Church of God, calling it a disorderly community, as if he him∣selfe were borne of Kings, where as God calleth the King their Shepheard, and the people, Gods stocke, inheritance and people; and they are not a disorderly body by nature, but by sin; in which sense the Prelate may call King, Priest and people, a company of Heires of Gods wrath, except he be an Arminian still, as once he was. 3. If we are in ordinary providence now, because we have not Samuels, and Prophets to anoynt Kings, to hold the designation of a person to be King, to be the manifestation of Gods Will, called voluntas signi, is Treason, for if Scotland and England should designe Maxwell in the place of King Charles our native Sove∣raigne (an odious comparison) Maxwell should be lawfull King for what is done by Gods Will, called by our Divines (they have it not from Schoolemen, as the Prelate ignorantly saith) his signi∣fied will which is our rule, is done lawfully, there can be no greater treason put in print then this.

QUEST. XVI. Whether or no a despotiticall and masterly dominion of men and things, agree to the King, because he is King.

I May here dispute whether the King be Lord, having a masterly dominion both over men and things. But I first discusse shortly his dominion over his subjects.

It is agreed on by Divines, that servitude is a penall fruit of sinne, and against nature. Institut. de jure personarum, Sect. 1. & F. de statu hominum. l. libertas; Because all men are borne by nature of equall condition.

1 Assert. The King hath no proper, masterly, or herile domini∣on over his subjects:* 1.255 his dominion is rather fiduciary and mi∣nisteriall, than masterly.

1. Because Royall Empire is essentially to feed, rule, defend, and to governe in Peace and Godlinesse, 1 Tim. 2.2. as the father doth his children, Ps. 78.71. He brought him to feed Iacob his people, and Is∣rael his inheritance, Esa. 55.4. I gave him for a leader and commander to the people, 2 Sam. 5.2. Thou shalt feed my people Israel, 2 Sam. 5.2. 1 Chron. 11.2. 1 Chron. 17.6. And so it is, for the good of the peo∣ple, and to bring those, over whom he is a feeder and ruler, to such a happy end; and, as saith Althusius, polit. c. 1. n. 13. and Marius Salomonius, de princ. c. 2. it is to take care of the good of those over whom the Ruler is set, and, conservare est, rem illaesam servare, to keep a thing safe. But to be a Master, and to have a masterly and herile power over slaves and servants, is to make use of servants for the owners benefit, not for the good of the slave, L. 2, de leg. L. Servus de servit. expert. Danae polit. l. 1. Tolossan. de Rep. l. 1. c. 1. n. 15, 16. therefore are servants bought and sold as goods, jure belli. F. de statu hominum, l. & servorum.

2. Not to be under Governors and Magistrates, is a judgement of God,* 1.256 Esa. 3.6, 7. Esa. 3.1. Hos, 3.4. Iudg. 19.1, 2. But not to be un∣der a master, as slaves are, is a blessing, seeing freedome is a blessing of God, Ioh. 8.33. Exod. 21.2. v. 26, 27. Deut. 15.12. so he that killeth Goliah, 1 Sam. 17.25. his fathers house shall be free in Israel, Ier. 34.9. Act. 22.28. 1 Cor. 9.19. Gal. 4.26.31. Therefore the power of a King cannot be an herile and masterly power; for then to be un∣der a Kingly power, should both be a blessing, and a curse and just punishment of sinne.

3. Subjects are called the servants of the King, 1 Sam. 15.2. 2 Chron. 13.7. 1 King. 12.7. Exod. 10.1, 2. Exod. 9.20. but they are not slaves, because, Deut. 17.20. they are his brethren: That the Kings heart be not lifted up against his brethren. And his sonnes, Esa. 49.23. And the Lord gave his people a King as a blessing, 1 King. 10.9. Hos. 1.11. Esa. 1.26. Ier. 17.25. And brought them out of the house of bondage, Exod. 20. v. 2. as out of a place of miserie. And therefore to be the Kings servants, in the places cited, is some other thing then to be the Kings slaves.

4. The Master might in some cases sell the servant for money, yea for his own gain ••e might doe it, Nehem. 5.8. Eccles. 2.7. 1 King. 2.32. Gen. 9.25. Gen. ••6.14. 2 King. 4.1. Gen. 20.14. and might give away his servants; and the servants were the proper goods and riches of the master, Eccles. 2.7. Gen. 30.43. Gen. 20.14. Job. 1.3.15. But the King may not sell his Kingdome or Subjects, or give them away for money, or any other way; for Royalists grant that King to be a Tyrant, and worthy to be dethroned, who shall sell his peo∣ple: for the King may not delapidate the rents of the Crown, and give them away to the hurt and prejudice of his successors, L. ult. Sect. sed nostr. C. Comment. de lege, l. peto. 69. Sect. fratrem de lege, 2. l. 32. ulti∣mo. D. T. and farre lesse can he lawfully sell men, and give away a whole Kingdome to the hurt of his successours, for that were to make merchandize of the living Temples of the Holy Ghost. And Arnisaeus, de authorit. Princip. c. 3. n. 7. saith, Servitude is praeter natu∣ram, beside nature; he might have said, contrary to nature, l. 5. de stat. homin. Sect. 2. Iust. de jur. perso. c. 3. & Novel. 89. but the subje∣ction of subjects is so consonant to nature, that it is seen in Bees and Cranes. Therefore a dominion is defined a facultie of using of things to what uses you will. Now a man hath not this way an ab∣solute dominion over his beasts, to dispose of them at his will; for a good man hath mercy on the life of his beast, Prov. 12.10. nor hath he dominion over his goods to use them as he will, because he may not use them to the dammage of the Commonwealth, he may not use them to the dishonour of God; and so God and the Magistrate hath laid some bound on his dominion. And because the King being made a King, leaveth not off to be a reasonable creature, he must be un∣der a Law, and so his will and lust cannot be the rule of his power and dominion, but law and reason must regulate him.* 1.257 Now if God had given to the King a dominion over men as reasonable creatures,

his power and dominion which by Royalists is conceived to be above Law, should be a rule to men as reasonable men, which would make men under Kings no better then bruit beasts; for then should sub∣jects exercise acts of reason, not because good and honest, but be∣cause their Prince commandeth them so to doe; and if this cannot be said, none can be at the disposing of Kings in politick acts liable to Royall government, that way that the slave is in his actions under the dominion of his master.

The Prelate objecteth out of Spalato, Arnisaeus, and Hug. Gro∣tius,* 1.258 (for in his booke there is not one line which is his own, except his raylings) 1. All government and superioritie in Rulers is not prime∣ly and only for the Subjects good: for some are by God and Nature appointed for the mutuall and inseperable good of the superiour and in∣feriour, as in the government of husband and wife, or father and sonne; and in herili dominio, in the government of a Lord and his servant, the good and benefit of the servant is but secondary and consecutively in∣tended, it is not the principall end, but the externall and adventitious, as the gaine that commeth to a Physitian, is not the proper and inter∣nall end of his art, but followeth only from his practice of Medicine.

Ans. The Prelates logick tendeth to this; some government tendeth to the mutuall good of the superior and inferior, but Royall Government is some government, ergo nothing followeth from a major propositi∣on, Ex particulari affirmante, in prima figura. Or of two particular propositions. 2. If it be thus formed, every maritall government, and every government of the Lord and servant is for the mutuall good of the superiour and inferiour: But Royall Government is such, ergo &c. the assumption is false, and cannot be proved, as I shall anon cleare.

2. Obj. Solomon disposed of Cabul, and gave it to Hiram, ergo a conquered Kingdome is for the good of the conquerour especially. Ans. Solomons speciall giving away some Titles to the King of Tyre, being a speciall fact of a Prophet as well as a King, cannot warrant the King of England to sell England to a forraine Prince, because Willi∣am made England his owne by conquest; which also is a most false supposition: and this he stole from Hugo Grotius, who condemneth selling of Kingdomes.

3 Object. A man may render himselfe totally under the power of a Master, without any conditions: and why may not the body of a peo∣ple doe the like? even to have peace and safety, surrender themselves

fully to the power of a King? A lord of great Mannours may admit no man to live in his Lands, but upon a condition of a full surrender of him, and his posterity to that lord.* 1.259 Tacitus sheweth us it was so anci∣ently amongst the Germans, and the Campanians surrendered them∣selves fully to the Romans.

Answ. What compelled people may do to redeem their lives with losse of liberty, is nothing to the point; such a violent Conque∣rour who will be a father and a husband to a people, against their will, is not their lawfull King; and that they may sell the liberty of their posteritie, not yet born, is utterly denied as unlawfull; yea, a violentated father to me is a father, and not a father, and the poste∣ritie may vindicate their own liberty given away unjustly, before they were born: Qua omne regnum vi partum potest vi dissolvi.

Object. 4. But (saith Doct. Fern) these which are ours, and given away to another, in which there redoundeth to God by donation a speci∣all interest, as in things devoted to holy uses, though after they be abused, yet we cannot recall them. Ergo, If the people be once forced to give away their liberty, they cannot recall it; far lesse, if they willingly resign it to their Prince.

Answ. This is not true, when the power is given for the con∣servation of the Kingdom, and is abused for the destruction there∣of, for a power to destruction was never given, nor can it by rati∣onall nature be given. 2. Mortifications given to religious uses by a positive law, may be recalled by a more divine and stronger law of nature, such as is this: I will have mercy and not sacrifice. Suppose David of his own proper heritage, had given the Shew-bread to the Priests, yet when David and his men are famishing, he may take it back from them against their will. Suppose Christ man had bought the Corns, and dedicated them to the Altar, yet might he and his Disciples eat the Ears of Corn in their hunger. The vessels of silver dedicated to the Church, may be taken and be∣stowed on wounded Souldiers. 2. A people free may not, and ought not totally surrender their liberty to a Prince, confiding on his goodnesse; 1. Because liberty is a condition of nature, that all men are born with, and they are not to give it away,* 1.260 no not to a King, except in part, and for the better, that they may have peace and justice for it, which is better for them, hic & nunc. 2. If a people trusting in the goodnesse of their Prince, inslave themselves to him, and he shall after turn Tyrant; a rash and temerarious

surrender obligeth not, Et ignorantia facit factum quasi involun∣tarium: Ignorance maketh the fact some way unvoluntary; for if the people had beleeved that a meek King would have turned a roaring Lyon, they should not have resigned their liberty into his hand; and therefore the surrender was tacitely conditionall to the King as meek, or whom they beleeved to be meek, and not to a tyrannous Lord; and therefore, when the contract is made for the utilitie of the one party, the law saith their place is for after wits, that men may change their minde, and resume their liberty, though if they had given away their liberty for money, they cannot recall it; and if violence made the surrender of liberty, here is slavery, and slaves taken in war so soon as they can escape, and return to their own, they are free. D. Sect. item. ea Justit. de rerum divin. l. nihil. F. de capt. l. 3. So the learned Ferdin. Vasquez illustri. l. 2. c. 82. n. 15. saith, The bird that was taken, and hath escaped, is free; nature in a forced people, so soon as they can escape from a violent Conqueror maketh them a free people; and si solo tempore (saith Ferd. Vasquez, l. 2. c. 82. n. 6.) justificatur subjectio, solo tempore facilius justificabi∣tur liberatio.

Assert. 20. All the Goods of the Subjects belongeth not to the King:* 1.261 I presuppose, that the division of Goods doth not necessa∣rily slow from the law of nature, for God made man before the fall, Lord of the creatures indefinitely; but what Goods be Peters, and not Pauls, we know not. But supposing mans sin, though the light of the Sun and Air be common to all, and religious places be proper to none, yet it is morally unpossible, that there should not be a distinction of meum & tuum, mine and thine: and the decalogue forbidding theft, and coveting the wife of another man, (yet is she the wife of Peter, not of Thomas by free election, not by an act of natures law) doth evidence to us, that the division of things is so far forth, (men now being in the state of sin) of the law of nature, that it hath evident ground in the Law of nations; and thus farre naturall, that the heat that I have from my own coat and cloak, and the nourishment from my own meat, are physi∣cally incommunicable to any * 1.262. But I hasten to prove the Propo∣sition: If 1. I have leave to premit, that in time of necessitie all things are common by Gods Law: A man travelling, might eat Grapes in his neighbours vineyard, though he was not licenced to carry any away. I doubt if David wanting money, was necessitated

to pay money for the Shew-bread, or for Goliahs sword, supposing these to be the very Goods of private men, and ordinarily to be bought and sold: natures Law in extremity, for self preservation, hath rather a Prerogative Royall above all Laws of Nations, and all civill Laws then any mortall King; and therefore by the civill Law, all are the Kings, in case of extreme necessity; in this mean∣ing, any one man is obliged to give all he hath for the good of the Common-wealth, and so far the good of the King, in as farre as he is head and father of the Common-wealth * 1.263. 2. All things are the Kings, in regard of his publike power, to defend all men, and their Goods from unjust violence. 3. All are the Kings in regard of his Act of conservation of Goods, for the use of the just owner. 4. All are the Kings in regard of a legall limitation, in case of a dammage, offered to the Common-wealth, justice requireth con∣fiscation of Goods for a fault; but confiscated Goods are to help the interessed Common-wealth, and the King, not as a man (to be∣stow them on his children) but as a King; to this we may referre these called bona caduca & inventa, things losed by Shipwrack, or any other providence, Vlpian. tit. 19. t. c. de bonis vacantibus. C. de Thesauro.

And the Reasons why private men are just Lords and proprietors of their own Goods, are, 1. Because by order of nature,* 1.264 division of Goods cometh neerer to natures law, and necessity, then any King or Magistrate in the world; for because it is agreeable to nature, th•••• every man be warmed by his own fleece,* 1.265 nourished by his own meat; therefore to conserve every mans Goods to the just owner, and to preserve a communitie from the violence of rapine and theft, a Magistrate and King was devised. So it is clear, men are just owners of their own Goods, by all good order, both of nature and time, before there be any such thing as a King or Ma∣gistrate. Now if it be good that every man enjoy his own Goods, as just proprietor thereof for his own use, before there be a King, who can be proprietor of his Goods, and a King being given of God for a blessing, not for any mans hurt and losse; the King com∣eth in to preserve a mans Goods, but not to be lord and owner thereof himself, nor to take from any man Gods right to his own Goods.

2. When God created man at the beginning, he made all the creatures for man, and made them by the law of nature,* 1.266 the proper

possession of man, but then there was not any King formally as King; for certainly Adam was a father before he was a King, and no man being either born, or created a King over an other man, no more then the first Lyon, and the first Eagle, that God created, were by the birth-right, and first-start of creation, by nature, the King of all Lyons, and all Eagles to be after created; no man can by natures law, be the owner of all Goods of particular men: And because the law of nations founded upon the law of nature, hath brought in meum & tuum, mine and thine, as proper to every particular man, and the introduction of Kings cannot overturn natures foundation; neither civility, nor grace destroyeth, but perfiteth nature: and if a man be not born a King, because he is a man, he cannot be born the possessour of my Goods.

* 1.2673. What is a Character, and note of a Tyrant, and an oppressing King as a Tyrant, is not the just due of a King as a King: But to take the proper Goods of Subjects, and use them as his own, is a proper Character, and note of a Tyrant, and an oppressour. Ergo, the proposition is evident. A King and a Tyrant are by way of contradiction contrary one to another: the assumption is proved thus, Ezek. 45.9. Thus saith the Lord, Let it suffice you, O Princes of Israel: remove violence and spoil, and execute judgement and justice, take away your exactions from my people, saith the Lord, Vers. 10. Ye shall have just ballances, and a just Ephah, and a just bath. If all be the Kings, he is not capable of extortion and rapine, Micah 3.2. God complaineth of the violence of Kings: Is it not for you to know judgement? Vers. 3. Who eat the flesh of my people, and flea their skins from off them, and they break their bones, and chop them in pieces,* 1.268 as for the pot, and as flesh within the chaldron, Isai. 3.14. Zeph. 3.3. and was it not an act of tyranny in King Achab, to take the vineyard of Naboth, and in King Saul? 1 Sam. 8.14. to take the people of Gods fields and vineyards, and olive-yards, and give them to their servants? Was it a just fault that Hybreas ob∣jected to Antonius,* 1.269 * 1.270 exacting two tributes in one yeer, that he said, If thou must have two tributes in one yeer, then make for us two Summers and two Harvests, in one yeer? This cannot be just; if all be the Kings, the King taketh but his own.

4. Subjects under a Monarch could not give alms, nor exercise works of charity; for charity must be my own, Isai. 58.7. Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry? &c. Eccles. 11.1. Cast thy bread into

the waters; and the Law saith, It is theft to give of another mans to the poor: yea, the distinction of poor and rich, should have no place under a Monarchie, he onely should be rich.

5. When Paul commandeth us to pay tribute to Princes, Rom. 13.6. because they are the Ministers of God, he layeth this ground,* 1.271 That the King hath not all, but that the subjects are to give to him of their goods.

6. It is the Kings place,* 1.272 by justice to preserve every man in his own right, and under his own fig-tree. Ergo, Its not the Kings house.

7. Even Pharaoh could not make all the victuall of the land his own, while he had bought it with money:* 1.273 and every thing is pre∣sumed to be free. Allodialis, free land, except the King prove that it is bought or purchased. L. actius, C. de servit. & aqua. & Joan. And. m. C. F. de ind. & hosti. in C. minus de jur.

8. If the subjects had no proprietie in their own goods,* 1.274 but all were the Princes due, then the subject should not be able to make any contract of buying and selling without the King, and every subject were in the case of a slave. Now the Law saith, L. 2. F. de Noxali. act. l. 2. F. ad legem aquil. When he maketh any Covenant, he is not obliged civilly to keep it, because the condition of a servant, he not being sui juris, is compared to the state of a beast, though he be obliged by a naturall obligation, being a rationall Creature, in regard of the law of nature, L. naturaliter, L. si id quod, L. in∣terdum, F. de conà. indebit. cum aliis. 2. The subject could not by Solomon be forbidden to be suretie for his friend; as King Solomon doth counsell, Prov. 6.1, 2, 3. he could not be condemned to bring on himself poverty by sluggishnesse, as Prov. 6.6, 7, 8, 9, 10. nor were he to honour the Lord with his riches, as Prov. 3.9. nor to keep his Covenant, though to his losse, Psal. 15.4. nor could he be mercifull and lend, Psal. 37.26. nor had he power to borrow; nor could he be guiltie in not paying all again, Psal. 37.21. For subjects under a Monarch, can neither perform a duty, nor fail in a duty, in the matter of Goods; If all be the Kings, what power or dominion hath the subject in disposing of his Princes Goods? See more in Petr. Rebuffus, tract. congruae portionis, num. 225. pag. 109, 110. Sed quoad dominium rerum, &c.

QUEST. XVII. Whether or not the Prince have properly a fiduciarie, and ministeriall power of a Tutor, Husband, Patron, Minister, head, father of a fa∣mily, not of a Lord or dominator?

THat the power of the King is fiduciarie, that is given to him immediatly by God in trust,* 1.275 Royallists deny not; but we hold that the trust is put upon the King by the people. 2. We deny that the people give themselves to the King as a gift, for what is free∣ly given cannot be taken againe▪ but they gave themselves to the King as a pawne; and if the pawne be abused, or not used in that manner as it was conditionated to be used, the party in whose hand the pawne is intrusted, faileth in his trust.

* 1.2761. Assertion. The King is more properly a Tutor then a Father, 1. Indigencie is the originall of Tutors, the Parents dye; what then shall become of the Orphan and his inheritance? he cannot guide it himselfe; therefore nature devised a Tutor to supply the place of a father,* 1.277 and to governe the Tutor; but with this consi∣deration, the father is Lord of the inheritance, and if he be distressed, may sell it, that it shall never come to the sonne, and the father for the bad deserving of his sonne may dis-inherite him; but the Tutor being but a borrowed father, cannot sell the inheritance of the pu∣pill, nor can he for the pupills bad deserving, by any dominion of Justice over the pupill, take away the inheritance from him, and give it to his owne son; so a Community of it selfe, because of sin, is a naked society that can but destroy it selfe, and every one eate the flesh of his brother, therefore God hath appointed a King or governour, who shall take care of that community, rule them in peace, and save all from reciprocation of mutuall acts of violence, yet so, as because a trust is put on the Ruler of a community, which is not his heritage, he cannot dispose of it as he pleaseth, because he is not the proper owner of the inheritance.

2. The Pupill when he commeth to age, may call his Tutor to an accompt for his administration; I doe not acknowledge that as a truth, which Arnisaeus saith, De authoritate. prin. c. 3. n. 5. The Common-wealth is alwaies minor, and under Tutory, because it al∣way hath need of a curator and governour, and can never put away its governour, bu•• the pupill may grow to age and wisedome, so as he may be without all Tutors, and can guide himselfe, and so may call in questi∣on

his Tutor, and the pupill cannot be his Iudge, but must stand to the sentence of a superiour Iudge, and so the people cannot judge or punish their Prince, God must be Iudge betwixt them both.

But this is 1. a begging of the question, every comparison halteth, no community but it is Major in this,* 1.278 that it can appoint its owne Tutors, and though it cannot be without all Rulers, yet it may well be without this or that Prince and Ruler, and therefore may re∣sume its power, which it gave conditionally to the Ruler for its owne safety and good, and in so farre as this condition is violated, and power turned to the destruction of the Common-wealth, it is to be esteemed as not given; and though the people be not a poli∣tique Iudge in their owne cause, yet in case of manifest oppression, nature can teach them to oppose defensive violence against offen∣sive: a community in its politique body is also above any Ruler, and may judge what is manifestly destructive to it selfe.

Obj. The Pupill hath not power to appoint his owne Tutor, nor doth he give power to him, so neither doth the people give it to the King. Ans. The Pupill hath not indeed a formall power to make a Tutor, but he hath vertually a legall power in his father, who appointeth a Tutor for his sonne, and the people have vertually all Royall power in them, as in a sort of immortall and eternall fountain, and may create to themselves many Kings.

Asser. 2. The Kings power is not properly and univocally a Mari∣tall and husbandly power, but only Analogically,* 1.279 1. The Wife by nature is the weaker Vessell, and inferiour to the man, but the Kingdom, as shall be demonstrated is superiour to the King. 2. The Wife is given as an helpe to the man, but by the contrary the man here is given as an helpe and father to the Common-wealth, which is presumed to be the wife. 3. Maritall and husbandly power is naturall, though it be not naturall, but from free election that Pe∣ter is Ana's Husband, and should have been, though man had never sinned: but Royall Power is a politick constitution, and the world might have subsisted, though Aristocracy or Democracy had been the only and perpetuall governments. So let the Prelate glory in his borrowed Logick, he had it from Barclay. It is not in the power of the Wife to repudiat her Husband, though never so wicked, she is tyed to him for ever, and may not give to him a bill of Divorcement, as by Law the Husband might give to her; if therefore the people sweare loyalty to him, they must keep, though to their hurt. Ps. 15. Ans. There's

nothing here said, except Barclay and the Plagiarie prove, that the Kings Power is properly a Husbands power, which they cannot prove, but from a Simile that crooketh; but a King elected upon conditions, that if he sell his people, he shall lose his Crown, is as essentially a King, as Adam was Evahs Husband, and yet by grant of parties, the people may devorce from such a King, and dethrone him, if he sell his people; but a Wife may never devorce from her Husband, as the Argument saith. And this poore Argument the Prelate stole from Dr. Ferne, part 2. Sec. 3. pag. 10, 11. 2. The keeping of Covenant though to our hu••t, is a penall hurt, and losse of goods, not a morall hurt, and losse of Religion.

* 1.280Assert. 3. The King is more properly a sort of Patron, to defend the people, and therefore hath no power given either by God or man to hurt the people, and a Minister or publick and honourable servant, Rom. 13.4. for he is the Minister of God to thee for good; he is the Common-wealths servant objectively,* 1.281 because all the Kings service, as he is King, is for the good, safety, peace and salvation of the people, and in this he is a servant. 2. He is the servant of the people Representatively, in that the people hath impawned in his hand all their power to doe Royall service. Obj. He is the ser∣vant of God, ergo he is not the peoples Servant, but their soveraigne Lord. Ans. It followeth not, because all the service the King as King performeth to God, they are acts of Royalty, and acts of Royall service, as terminated on the people; or acts of their Soveraigne Lord, and this proveth that to be their Soveraigne, is to be their servant,* 1.282 and watch-man.

Object. 2. God maketh a King only, and the Kingly power is in him only, not in the people. Ans. The Royall power is only from God, immediatly, Immediatione simplicis constitutionis, & solum a Deo solitudine primae causae, by the immediation of simple constitution, none but God appointed there should be Kings; but 2. Royall power is not in God, nor only from God; immediatione applica∣tionis regia dignitatis ad personam, nec a Deo solum, solitudine causae applicantis dignitatem, huic, non illi, in respect of the applying of Royall dignity to this person, not to this.

Object. 3. Though Royall power were given to the people, it is not given to the people, as if it were the Royal power of the people, and not the Royall power of God, neither is it any other waies bestowed on the people but as on a beame, a channell, an instrument, by which it is derived

to others, and so the King is not the minister or servant of the people.

Ans. It is not in the people as in the principall cause; Sure all Roy∣all power that way is only in God; but it is in the people as in the in∣strument: and when the people maketh David their King at Hebron, in that same very act, God by the people using their free suffrages and consent, maketh David King at Hebron: so God only giveth raine, and none of the vanities and supposed gods of the Gentiles can give raine, Ier. 14 22. and yet the Clouds also give raine, as nature, as an organ and vessell out of which God powreth down raine upon the dry earth▪ Amos 9.6. and every instrument under God, that is pro∣perly an instrument▪ is a sort of Vicarious cause in Gods room, and so the people as in Gods roome, applyeth Royall power to David,* 1.283 not to any of Sauls sonnes, and appointeth David to be their Royall Servant to governe, and in that to serve God, and to doe that, which a Communitie now in the state of sinne cannot formally doe them∣selves: and so I see not how it is a service to the people, not only objectively, because the Kings Royall service tendeth to the good, and peace, and safety of the people; but also subjectively, in regard he hath his power and Royall authoritie which he exerciseth as King, from the people under God, as Gods instruments: and there∣fore the King and Parliament give out Lawes and Statutes in the name of the whole people of the Land. And they are but flatterers, and belye the Holy Ghost, who teach that the people doe not make the King; for Israel made Saul King at Mizpeh, and Israel made David King at Hebron.

Object. 3. Israel made David King, that is, Israel designed Da∣vids person to be King, and Israel consented to Gods act of making David King, but they did not make David King.

Ans. I say not that Israel made the Royall dignitie of Kings:* 1.284 God, Deut. 17. instituted that himselfe: bu•• the Royalist must give us an act of God going before an act of the peoples making David King at Hebron, by which David of no King is made formally a King: and then another act of the People, approving only and con∣senting to that act of God, whereby David is made formally of no King to be a King. This Royalists shall never instruct, for there be only two acts of God here; 1. Gods act of annointing David by the hand of Samuel; and 2. Gods act of making David King at He∣bron: and a third they shall never give. But the former is not that by which David was essentially and formally changed from the state

of a private subject, and no King, into the state of a publike Judge and supreme Lord and King, for (as I have proved) after this act of annointing of David King, he was designed only and set apart to be King in the Lords fit time; and after this annointing, he was no more formally a King then Doeg or Nabal were Kings, but a subject who called Saul the Lords annointed and King, and obeyed Saul as another subj••ct doth his King: but it is certaine God by no other act made David King at Hebron, then by Israels act of free electing him to be King and leader of the Lords people, as God by no other act sendeth down rain on the earth, but by Gods melting the clouds, and causing raine to fall on the earth: and therefore to say Israel made David King at Hebron, that is, Israel approved only and con∣sented to a prior act of Gods making David King, is all one as to say Saul prophecied, that is, Saul consented to a prior act of the Spirit of God who prophecied: and Peter preached, Act. 2. that is, Peter approved and consented to the Holy Ghosts act of preaching. Which to say, is childish.

Assert. 4. The King is an head of the Commonwealth only me∣taphorically,* 1.285 by a borrowed speech, in a politique sense, because he ruleth, commandeth, directeth the whole politique body in all their operations and functions. But he is not univocally and essentially the head of the Commonwealth. 1. The same very life in number that is in the head, is in the members: there be divers distinct soules and lives in the King, and in his Subjects. 2. The head naturall is not made an head by the free election and consent of armes, shoul∣ders, leggs, toes, fingers, &c. The King is made King only by the free election of his people. 3. The naturall head, so long as the per∣son liveth, is ever the head, and cannot cease to be a head while it is seated on the shoulders: The King, if he sell his people, their per∣sons and soules, may leave off to be a King and Head. 4. The head and members live together, and dye together: the King & the people are not so; the King may dye, and the People live. 5. The naturall head cannot destroy the members, and preserve it selfe: but King Nero may waste and destroy his people. D. Ferne, M. Simmons, the P. Prelate, when they draw arguments from the head, do but dream, as the members should not resist the head. Naturall members should not, or cannot resist the head, though the hand may pull a tooth out of the head, which is no small violence to the head. But the members of a Politique body may resist the Politique head. 2. This or that

King is not the adequate and totall Politique head of the Common-wealth: and therefore though you cut off a Politique head, there's nothing done against nature. If you cut off all Kings of the Royall line, and all Governors Aristocraticall, both King and Parliament, this were against nature; And a Common-wealth which would cut off all Governors, and all Heads, should goe against nature, and run to ruine quickly. I conceive a societie of reasonable men cannot want Governours. 6. The naturall head communicateth life, sense, and motion to the members, and is the seat of externall and internall senses: the King is not so.

Hence Assert. 5. the King is not properly the head of a family,* 1.286 for, 1. (as Tholossa saith well de Rep. l. 5. c. 5.) Nature hath one in∣tention in making the thumbe, another intention in making the whole hand, another in forming the body: so there is one intenti∣on of the God of nature in governing of one man, another in gover∣ning a Familie, another in governing a Citie: nor is the thumbe King of all the members: so domestick government is not Monar∣chicall properly. 1. The mother hath a parentall power as the fa∣ther hath, Prov. 4.5. & 10.3. & 31.17. so the 5. Command saith, Ho∣nour thy father and thy mother. 2. Domestick government is naturall, Monarchicall politique. 3. Domestick is necessary, Monarchicall is not necessary, other governments may be as well as it. 4. Domestick is universall, Monarchicall not so. 5. Domesticall hath its rise from naturall instinct without any farther instruction: a Monar∣chicall government is not, but from election, choosing one Govern∣ment, not another.

Hence that is a fiduciarie power, or a power of trust,* 1.287 wherein 1. the thing put in trust is not his own proper either heritage or gift, so as he may dispose of it as he pleaseth, as men dispose of their goods or heritage. But the King may not dispose of men as men, as he pleaseth; nor 2. of Lawes as he pleaseth; nor 3. of governing men, killing or keeping alive, punishing and rewarding, as he pleaseth.

2. My life and Religion, and so my Soule, in some cases, are com∣mitted to the King as to a publick Watchman, even as the flock to the feeder, the Citie to the Watchmen: And he may berray it to the Enemy. Ergo, he hath the trust of Life and Religion, and hath both tables of the Law in his custodie, ex officio, to see that other men then himselfe keep the Law: But the Law is not the Kings

own, but given to him in trust. 3. He who receiveth a Kingdom con∣ditionally, may be dethroned if he sell it, or put it away to any other is a fiduciarie Patron, and hath it only in trust. So Hottoman, quest. ill. 1. Ferdinand. Vasquez, illust. quest. l. 1. c. 4. Althusius polit. c. 24. n. 35. so saith the law of every Factor or Deputy, l. 40. l. 63. procur. l. 16. C. dict. 1. Antigonus dixit Regnum esse nobilem servitutem. Ty∣berius Caesar called the Senate, Dominum suum, his Lord. Suetonius in vita Tiberii, c. 29.

QUEST. XVIII. What is the law of the King, and his Power? 1 Sam. 8.11. This will be the manner of the King who shall reigne over you, &c.

* 1.288THis place, 1 Sam. 8, 9. and v. 11. The law or manner of the King is alleadged to prove both the absolute power of Kings, and 2. the unlawfulnesse of resistance: therefore I crave leave here to vindicate the place, and to make it evident to all, that the place spea∣keth for no such matter. 1. (a) 1.289 Hug. Grotius argueth thus: that by this place, the people oppressed with injuries of a Tyrannous King, have nothing left them but prayers and cries to God; and therefore there is no ground for violent resisting. (b) 1.290 Barclay will have us to distinguish inter officium Regis, & potestatem, between the Kings office, and the Kings power: And he will have the Lord here speaking, not of the Kings office, what he ought to doe before God, but what power a King hath beside and above the power of Judges, to tyrannize over the people, so as the people hath no power to resist it. He will have the Office of the King spoken of Deut. 17. and the Power of the King, 1 Sam. 8. and that power which the People was to obey and submit unto, without resisting. But I answer, 1. It is a vaine thing to distinguish betwixt the office and the power;(c) 1.291 for the power is either a power to rule according to Gods law, as he is commanded, Deut. 17. and this is the very office or officiall power which the King of Kings hath given to all Kings under him: and this is a power of the Royall office of a King, to governe for the Lord his maker; or this is a power to doe ill, and tyrannize over Gods people:* 1.292 but this is accidentall to a King, and the character of a Tyrant, and is not from God: and so the Law of the King in this place must be the Tyranny of the King, which is our very mind. 2. Barclay. Reges sine dominatione ne concipi quidem possunt.—Iudices dominationem in populum minimè habebant. Hence it is cleare that Barclay saith, that the Iudges of Israel, and the Kings

are different in essence and nature; so that domination is so essen∣tiall to a King, that you cannot conceive a King, but he must have do∣mination, whereas the Iudges of Israel had no domination over the people. Hence I argue that, whereby a King is essentially distin∣guished from a Iudge, that must be from God; but by domination, which is a power to oppresse the subject, a King is essentially di∣stinguished from a Iudge of Israel. Ergo, Domination and a power to do Acts of Tyranny, as they are expressed, Verse 11, 12, 13. and to oppresse a subject, is from God, and so must be a lawfull power; but the conclusion is absurd, the assumption is the doctrine of Bar∣clay: The major proposition I prove. 1. Because both the Iudge and the King was from God, for God gave Moses a lawfull calling to be a Iudge, so did he to Eli, to Samuel, and Deut. 17.15. the King is a lawfull Ordinance of God: If then the Judge and the King, be both lawfull Ordinances, and if they differ essentially, as Bar∣clay saith; then that specifice forme which distinguisheth the one from the other, to wit, Domination and a power to destroy the subject, must be from God, which is blasphemous; for God can give no morall power to do wickedly; for that is licence, and a power to sin against a Law of God, which is absolutely inconsistent with the holinesse of God; for so the Lord might deny himself, and dispence with sin (God avert such blasphemies.) Now if the kingly power be from God, That which essentially and specifically constituteth a King, must be from God, as the Office it self is from God: And (d) 1.293 Barclay saith expressely; That the kingly power is from God, and that same which is the specifice form, that con∣stituteth a King, must be that which essentially separateth the King from the Iudge, if they be essentially different, as Barclay dreameth. Hence have we this jus Regis, this Manner or Law of the King, to tyrannize and oppresse, to be a power from God, and so a law∣full power; by which you shall have this result of Barclayes in∣terpretation, That God made a Tyrant as well as a King. 3. By this difference that Barclay putteth betwixt the King and the Judge, the Judge might be resisted; for he had not this power of domination, that Saul hath, contrary to Rom. 13.2. Exod. 22.28. and 20.12.

But let us try the Text first 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the word cannot in∣force us to expone 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a law; our English rendreth, Shew them the manner of the King. (e) 1.294 Arri. Montanus turneth it ratio Regis.

I grant the Seventy render it, (f) 1.295 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Chalde Paraphrase saith, Statutum regis. g 1.296 Hieronimus tran∣slateth it jus regis; so Calvin: but I am sure the Hebrew both in words and sense beareth a consuetude; yea, and the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth not alwayes a law, as Josh. 6.14. They compassed the citie 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 seven times. 70. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 2 King. 17.26. They know not the manner of the God of the Land, Vers. 33. They served their own gods, after the manner of the Heathen. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 It cannot be according to the Law or right of the Heathen, except 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be taken in an evill part. 70. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Vers. 34. Vntill this day they do after these manners, 1 Kings 18.28. Baals Priests cut themselves with Knives 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 after their manner, 70. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gen. 40.13. Thou shalt give the cup to Pharaoh, according as thou wast wont to do. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Exod. 21.19. He shall deal with her after the manner of daughters, 1 Sam. 27.11. And Da∣vid saved neither man nor woman alive, to bring (tydings) to Gath, saying, So did David, and so will his manner be, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It cannot be, they meaned that it was Davids law, right, or priviledge to spare none alive, 1 Sam. 2.13. And the Priests custome with the people was, &c. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 This was a wicked custome, not a law, and the 70. turneth it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and there∣fore 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is not alwayes taken in a good meaning: so (h) 1.297 P. Martyr, He meaneth here of an usurped law, saith he; Calvin (i) 1.298 Non jus a deo prescriptum, sed tyranidem. He speaketh not of Gods law here (saith he) but of tyranny. (k) 1.299 And Rivetus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sig∣nifieth not ever jus, law. Sed aliquando morem sive modum & ratio∣nem agendi, The custome and manner of doing, so Junius (l) 1.300 and Tremellius. (m) 1.301 Diodatus exponeth jus; This law, namely (saith he) that which is now grown to a common custome, by the consent of nations, and Gods toleration. (n) 1.302 The interline glosse (to speak of Papists) exactionem & dominationem; The extortion and domina∣tion of King Saul is here meant. (o) 1.303 Lyra exponeth it tyranny. (p) 1.304 Tostatus Abulens. He meaneth here of Kings indefinitely, who oppressed the people with taxes and tributes, as Solomon and others. (q) 1.305 Cornelius a lapide: This was an unjust law. (r) 1.306 Cajetanus

calleth it, tyranny. (s) 1.307 Hugo Cardinal, nameth them, exactiones & servitutes, exactions and slaveries: And (t) 1.308 Serrarius, he speaketh not here, Quid Reges jure possint, What they may do by right and law; Sed quid audeant, What they will be bold to do, and what they tyrannically decern against all Laws of nature and humanitie. And so (u) 1.309 speaketh Tho. Aquinas: (x) 1.310 So also Mendoza, saith he, speak∣eth of the law of Tyrants: and (y) 1.311 amongst the fathers, Clemens Alexandrinus saith on this place, Non humanum pollicetur dominum, sed insolentem daturum minatur tyrannum, He promiseth not a humane Prince, but threatneth to give them an insolent Tyrant; and the like also saith (z) 1.312 Beda. And an excellent (a) 1.313 Lawyer, Pet. Rebuffus saith, Etiam loquitur de Tyranno qui non erat a Deo electus. And that he speaketh of Sauls Tyrannicall usurpation, and not of the law pre∣scribed by God, Deut. 17. I prove, 1. He speaketh of such a power, as is answerable to the Acts here spoken of; but the Acts here spoken of, are Acts of meere tyranny, Vers. 11. And this will be the manner of your King, that shall reign over you, he will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and some shall run before his Chariots: Now to make slaves of their sons, was an Act of Tyranny. 2. To take their fields and vineyards, and oliveyards from them, and give them to his servants, was no better then Ahabs taking Naboths vineyard from him, which by Gods law he might not lawfully sell, except in the case of extreme povertie, and then in the yeer of Jubilee, he might redeem his own inheritance. 3. Verse 15, 16. To put the people of God to bondage and make them servants, was to deal with them, as the Tyrant Pharaoh did. 4. He speaketh of such a law, the execution whereof should make them cry out to the Lord, because of their King: but the execution of the just Law of the King, Deut. 17. is a blessing, and not a bondage which should make the people cry out of the bitternesse of their spirit. 5. It is clear here, that God is by his Prophet, not instructing the King in his duty, but as (b) 1.314 Rabbi Levi Ben. Gersom saith, Terrifying them from their pur∣pose of seeking a King, and foretelling the evil of punishment that they should suffer under a tyrannous King; But he speaketh not one word of these necessary and comfortable Acts of favour, that a good King by his good Government was to do for his people, Deut. 17.

15, 16. But he speaketh of contrary facts here; and that he is disswading them from suiting a King, is clear from the Text. 1. Be∣cause he saith, Give them their will; but yet protest against their unlawfull course. 2. He biddeth the Prophet lay before them the tyranny, and oppression of their King; which tyranny Saul exer∣cised in his time, as the story sheweth. 3. Because how uneffectu∣all Samuels exhortation was, is set down, Verse 19. Neverthelesse, they would not obey the voice of Samuel, but said, Nay, but we will have a King over us; if Samuel had not been dehorting them from a King, how could they be said in this, to refuse to heare the voice of Samuel?* 1.315 6. The ground of Barclay and Royalists, here is weak, For they say, that the people sought a King like the Nations, and the Kings of the Nations were all absolute, and so Tyrants; And God granted their unlawfull desire, and gave them a Tyrant to reign over them, such as the Nations had. The plain contrary is true, they sought not a Tyrant, but one of the speciall reasons why they sought a King, was to be freed of Tyranny; for 1 Sam. 8.3. Because Samuels sons turned aside after lucre, and took bribes, and perverted judgement; therefore all the Elders of Israel gathered themselves to∣gether, and came to Samuel, to Ramah, and their they sought a King. 7. One could not more clearly speak with the mouth of a false Pro∣phet, then the Author of active and passive obedience doth, while he will have Samuel here to describe a King,* 1.316 and to say; yee have formerly committed one errour in shaking off the yoke of God, and seeking a King; so now beware you fall not in the next errour, in cast∣ing of the yoke of a King, which God at your own desire hath laid on you, for God hath onely power, both to make and unmake Kings; therefore prepare your selves patientlie to suffer and bear. Answ. For if he were exhorting to patient suffering of the yoke of a King, he should presume it were Gods revealed and regulating will, that they should have a King; But the scope of Samuels Sermon, is to disswade them from a King, and they by the contrary (Verse 19. say they) Nay, but we will have a King; and there not one word in the Text, that may intimate patience under the yoke of a King. 2. There is here the description of a Tyrant, not of a King. 3. Here is a threatning and a prediction, not any thing that smelleth of an exhortation.

* 1.317Object. But it is evident, that God teaching the people how to be∣have themselves under the unjust oppressions of their King, he sets

down no remedy but tears, crying to God, prayer, and patience; there∣fore resistance is not lawfull.

Answ.* 1.318Though this be not the place due to the doctrine of Re∣sistance, yet to vindicate the place; I s••y, there is not one word of any lawfull remedy in the Text, onely it is said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Et cl••matis in illa die a faciebus regis vestri: It is not necessarily to be exponed of praying to God, Iob 35.9. by reason of the multitude of the oppression, They make the oppressed to cry, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 clamare faciunt, Isai. 15.4. And Heshbon shall cry. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 The armed souldiers of Moab shall cry out. There is no other word here, then doth expresse the idolatrous prayers of Moab, Isai. 17.12. and Habbak. 2.11. The stone shall cry out of the wall 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Deut. 22.24. You shall stone the maide 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because she cryed not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; but she is not to be stoned, be∣cause she prayed not to God, Ps. 18.4. Davids enemies cryed, and there was none to save, even to the Lord, and he heard not. 2. Though it were the Prophets meaning, they cryed to the Lord, yet it is not the crying of a people humbled, and in faith speaking to God in their troubles, Zach. 7.13. They cryed, and I will not heare, therefore Royalists must make crying to God out of the bitternesse of affliction, without humiliation and faith, and such prayers of sinners as God heareth not, Psal. 18.41. Ioh. 9.31. Esay 17.12. to be the only remedy of a people oppressed by a Tyrannous King; now it is certaine, God prescribeth no unlawfull meanes to an oppressed people, under their affliction, therefore it is cleare here, that God speaketh only of evills of punishment, such as is to cry in trouble, and not be heard of God, and that he prescribeth here no duty at all, nor any remedy. 3. All Protestant Divines say; Ex particulari non valet argumentum negativé, from one particular place, a negative argument is not good. This remedy is not written in this particular place, therefore it is not written at all in other places of Scripture; so 1 Tim. 1.19. The end of excommunication is, that the party excommunicated may learne not to blaspheme, ergo the end is not also that the Church be not infected, it followeth not, the contrary is cleare, 1 Cor. 5. v. 6. D. Ferne and other Royalists teach us, that we may supplicate and make prayers to a Tyranous King. 2. We may fly from a tyranous King: but neither supplicating the King, nor flying from his fury shall be lawfull meanes left by this Argument, because these meanes are no more in this text (where Royalists say the spi∣rit

of God speaketh of purpose of the meanes to be used against Tyranny) then violent resisting, is in this text.

Barclay, Ferne, Grotius, Arnisaeus, the P. Prelate following them saith,* 1.319 An ill King is a punishment of God, for the sins of the people, and there is no remedy but patient suffering. Ans. Truely it is a silly Argument. The Assyrians comming against the people of God, for their sins, is a punishment of God, Esa. 10.5.12.13. But doth it fol∣low that it is unlawfull, for Israel to fight and resist the Assyrians, and that they had warrant to doe no other thing, but lay downe Armes, and pray to God, and fight none at all? Is there no lawfull resisting of ills of punishment, but meere prayers and patience? The Amalikites came out against Israel for their sinnes, Senahkerib against Ezekiah, for the sins of the people. Asa his enemies fought against him for his sins, and the peoples sins; shall Moses and the people, Hezekiah, Asa, do then nothing but pray and suffer? Is it un∣lawfull with the sword to resist them? I beleeve not, Famine is often a punishment of God in a Land, Amos. 4.7, 8. is it therefore in fa∣mine, unlawfull to till the earth, and seeke bread by our industry and are we to doe nothing but to pray for daily bread? It is a vaine Argument.

Observe therefore the wickednesse of Barclay, contra Monarch. l. 2. p. 56. for he would prove, that a power of doing ill, and that without any punishment to be inflicted by man, is from God; because our Lawes punish not perjurie, but leaveth it to be punished of God, l. 2. l. de Reb. cred. Cujacius, l. 2. obs. c. 19. And the husband in Moses his law, had power to give a bill of divorce to his wife, and send her away; and the husband was not to be punished. And also Stewes and work-houses for harlots, and to take usurie, are tolerated in many Christian Com∣monwealths, and yet these are all sorts of murthers, by the confession of Heathen: Ergo, (saith Barclaius) God may give a power for Tyran∣nous acts to Kings, so as they shall be under no punishment to be inflicted by men.

Ans. All this is an argument from fact. 1. A wicked Magi∣stracie may permit perjurie and lying in the Common-wealth,* 1.320 and that without punishment; and some Christian Commonweales, he meaneth his own Synagogue of Rome, spirituall Sodome, a cage of uncleane birds, suffereth Harlotrie by Law, and the whores pay so many thousands yearely to the Pope, and are free of all punishment by Law, to eschew homicides, adulteries of Romish Priests, and o∣ther

greater sinnes: Therefore God hath given power to a King to play the Tyrant, without any feare of punishment to be inflicted by man. But 1. if this be a good argument, The Magistrate to whom God hath committed the sword to take vengeance on evill doers, Rom. 13.3, 4, 5▪ 6. such as are perjured persons, professed whores and harlots, hath a lawfull power from God to connive at sinnes and grosse scandals in the Commonwealth, as they dreame that the King hath power given from God to exercise all acts of Tyranny without any resistance. But, 1. this was a grievous sinne in Eli, that he being a father and a Iudge, punished not his sonnes for their uncleannesse, and his house, in Gods heavy displeasure, was cut off from the Priest∣hood therefore. Then God hath given no such power to the Iudge. 2. The contrary duty is lying on the Iudge, To execute judgement for the oppressed, Iob 29.12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. Ier. 22.15, 16. and per∣verting of judgement, and conniving at the heynous sinnes of the wicked, is condemned, Num. 5.31, 32. 1 Sam. 15.23. 1 King. 20.42, 43. Esa. 1.17. & 10.1. & 5.23. and therefore God hath given no power to a Iudge to permit wicked men to commit grievous crimes, without any punishment. As for the Law of Divorce, it was indeed a per∣missive law, whereby the husband might give the wife a bill of di∣vorce, and be free of punishment before men, but not free of sinne and guiltinesse before God, for it was contrary to Gods institution of Mariage at the beginning, as Christ saith: and the Prophet saith, that the Lord hateth putting away.* 1.321 But that God hath given any such permissive power to the King, that he may doe what he pleaseth, and cannot be resisted: This is in question. 3. The Law spoken of in the Text, is by Royalists called, not a consuetude of Tranny, but the divine law of God, whereby the King is formally and essentially distin∣guished from the Judge in Israel: Now if so, a power to sinne, and a power to commit acts of Tyranny, yea, and a power in the Kings Sergeants and bloody Emissaries to waste and destroy the people of God, must be a lawfull power given of God: for a lawfull power it must be, if it commeth from God, whether it be from the King in his own person, or from his servants at his commandement, and by ei∣ther put forth in acts, as the power of a bill of Divorce was a power from God, exempting either the husband from punishment before men, or freeing the servant, who at the husbands command, should write it, and put it in the hands of the woman. I cannot beleeve that God hath given a power, and that by Law, to one Man to command

twenty thousand Cut-throats to kill and destroy all the Children of God, and that he hath commanded his Children to give their necks and heads to Babels sonnes without resistance. This I am sure is another matter then a Law for a bill of Divorce to one woman, maried by free election of a humorous and unconstant man. But sure I am, God gave no permissive law from heaven, like the law of Divorce, for the hardnesse of the heart, not of the Iewes only, but also of the whole Christian and Heathen Kingdomes under a Mo∣narch; that one Emperour may, by such a Law of God, as the Law of Divorce, kill, by bloody Cut-throats, such as the Irish Rebels are, all the Nations that call on Gods name, men, women, and sucking infants. And if Providence impede the Catholike issue, and dry up the seas of Blood, it is good: but God hath given a law, such as the law of Divorce, to the King, whereby he, and all his, may without resistance, by a legall power given of God, who giveth Kings to be fathers, nurses, protectors, guides, yea the breath of nostrils of his Church, as speciall mercies and blessings to his people, he may (I say) by a law of God, as it is 1 Sam. 8.9, 11. cut off Nations, as that Lyon of the world, Nebuchadnezzar did. So Royalists teach us.

Barclaius l. 2. cont. Monarchoma. pag. 69. The Lord spake to Samuel the Law of the King, and wrot it in a book••, and laid it up be∣fore the Lord. But what Law? That same law which he proposed to the people when they first sought a King: but that was the Law con∣temning Precepts rather for the peoples obeying, then for the Kings commanding, for the people was to be instructed with those precepts, not the King. Those things that concerned the Kings duty, Deut. 17. Moses commanded to be put into the Arke, but so if Samuel had commanded the King, that which Moses, Deut. 17. commanded, he had done no new thing, but had done againe what was once done, actum egisset, but there was nothing before commanded the people concerning their obedi∣ence and patience under evill Princes. Ioseph. Antiq. l. 6. c. 5. he wrote 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the evills that were to befall them. Ans. It was not that same Law, for though this Law was written to the people, yet it was the Law of the King: and I pray you, did Samuel write in a booke all the Rules of Tyranny,* 1.322 and teach Saul and all the Kings after him (for this book was put in the Ark of the Covenant, where also was the booke of the Law) how to play the Tyrant? And what instruction was it to King or people to write to them a book of the wicked waies of a King, which nature teacheth without a Doctor?

Sanctius saith on the place, These things which by mens fraud, and to the hurt of the publick may be corrupted, were kept in the Taberna∣cle, and the booke of the Law was kept in the Arke. Cornelius a La∣pide saith, It was the Law common to King and people, which was commonly kept with the booke of the Law, in the Arke of the Covenant. Lyra contradicteth Barclay, he exponeth Legem, legem regni non se∣cundum usurpationem supra positam, sed secundum ordinationem Dei positam, Deut. 17. Theodat. excellently exponeth it the fundamentall Lawes of the Kingdome, inspired by God to temper Monarchy, with a liberty befitting Gods people, and with equity toward a Nation—to withstand the abuse of an absolute power. 2. Can any beleeve Samuel would have written a Law of Tyranny, and put that booke in the Arke of the Covenant before the Lord, to be kept to the posterity, seeing he was to teach both King and people the good and the right way, 1 Sam. 12.23, 24, 25. 3. Where is the Law of the Kingdome called a Law of punishing innocent people? 4. To write the duty of the King in a booke, and apply it to the King, is no more super∣fluous, nor to teach the people the good and the right way out of the Law, and apply generalls to persons. 5. There is nothing in the Law, 1 Sam. 8.9.11.12. of the peoples patience, but rather of their impatient crying out, God not hearing nor helping; and no∣thing of that in this booke, for any thing that we know, and Iosephus speaketh of the Law, 1 Sam. 8. not of this Law, 1 Sam. 12.

QUEST. XIX. Whether or no the King be in Dignity and power above the people?

IN this grave question divers considerations are to be pondered.

1. There is a Dignity materiall in the people scattered, they be∣ing many representations of God and his Image,* 1.323 which is in the King also, and formally more as King, he being indued with formall Ma∣gistraticall and publick Royall Authority, in the former regard this or that man is inferiour to the King, because the King hath that same remander of the Image of God that any private man hath, and something more, he hath a politicke resemblance of the King of Heavens, being a little God, and so is above any one man.

2. All these of the people taken collectively having more of God, as being representations, are according to this materiall dignity ex∣cellenter then the King, because many are excellenter then one, and the King according to the Magistraticall and Royall Authority he hath, is excellenter then they are, because he partaketh formally of

Royalty, which they have not formally.

3. A meane or medium, as it is such, is lesse then the end, though the thing materially that is a meane,* 1.324 may be excellenter; every mean as a meane, under that reduplication hath all its goodnesse and ex∣cellency in relation to the end, yet an Angell that is a meane, and a ministring Spirit, ordained of God for an heire of life eternall, Heb. 1.13. considered materially, is excellenter then a man, Psal. 8.5. Heb. 2.6, 7, 8.

4. A King and leader in a military consideration, and as a Go∣vernour and conserver of the whole Army, is more worth then ten thousand of the people, 2 Sam. 18.3.

* 1.3255. But simply and absolutely the people is above, and more ex∣cellent then the King, and the King in Dignity inferiour to the peo∣ple; and that upon these Reasons. 1. Because he is the meane or∣dained for the people,* 1.326 as for the end, that he may save them, 2. Sam. 19.9. a publick shepheard to feede them, Ps. 78.70, 71, 72, 73. the Captaine and Leader of the Lords inheritance, 1 Sam. 10.1. to de∣fend them,* 1.327 the Minister of God for their good, Rom. 13.4. 2. The Pilot is lesse then the whole Passengers, the Generall lesse then the whole Army, the Tutor lesse then all the children, the Physician lesse then all the living men whose health he careth for; the Master or Tea∣cher lesse then all the Schollars, because the part is lesse then the whole: the King is but a part and a member (though I grant a very eminent and Noble Member) of the Kingdome.* 1.328 3. A Christian people especially is the portion of the Lords inheritance, Deut. 32.9. the sheepe of his pasture, his redeemed ones, for whom God gave his blood, Act. 20.28. And the killing of a man is to violate the Image of God, Gen. 9.6. and therefore the death and destruction of a Church, and of thousand thousands of men is a sadder and a more heavy matter then the death of a King, who is but one man. 4. A King as a King, or because a King is not the inheritance of God, nor the chosen and called of God,* 1.329 nor the sheepe or flocke of the Lords pasture, nor the redeemed of Christ, for those excellencies a∣gree not to Kings, because they are Kings; for then all Kings should be indued with those excellencies, and God should an be ac∣cepter of persons, if he put those excellencies of Grace upon men for externall respects of highnesse and Kingly power, and worldly glory and splendor; for many living Images and representations of God, as he is holy, or more excellent then a politique representation

of Gods greatnesse and Majesty, such as the King is; because that which is the fruit of a love of God, which commeth nearer to Gods most speciall love, is more excellent then that which is farther re∣mote from his speciall love; now though Royalty be a beame of the Majesty of the greatnesse of the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords; yet is it such a fruit and beam of Gods greatnesse, as may consist with the eternall reprobation of the party loved, so now Gods love from whence he communicateth his Image, representing his owne holinesse, commeth nearer to his most speciall love of election of men to glory.

5. If God give Kings to be a ransome for his Church,* 1.330 and if he stay great Kings for their sake, as Pharaoh King of Aegypt,* 1.331 Esa. 43.3 and Sihon King of the Amorites, and Og King of Bashan, Ps. 136.18, 19, 20. if he plead with Princes and Kings for destroying his people, Esa. 3. v. 12, 13, 14. if he make Babylon and her King a threshing-floore, for the violence done to the inhabitants of Zion, Ier. 51.33, 34, 35. then his people as his people, must be so much dea∣rer and more precious in the Lords eyes, then Kings because they are Kings, by how much more his Justice is active to destroy the one, and his Mercy to save the other. Neither is the Argument ta∣ken off, by saying the King must in this question be compared with his owne people; not a forraigne King with other forraigne people over whom he doth not Raigne, for the Argument proveth that the people of God are of more worth then Kings as Kings; and Ne∣buchadnezer and Pharaoh for the time were Kings to the people of God, and forraigne Kings are no lesse essentially Kings, then Kings native are.

6. Those who are given of God as gifts for the preservation of the people, to be Nurse-fathers to them;* 1.332 those must be of lesse worth before God, then those to whom they are given, since the gift, as the gift, is lesse then the party on whom the gift is bestowed. But the King is a gift for the good and preservation of the people, as is cleare, Esa 1.26. And from this that God gave his people a King in his wrath, we may conclude, that a King of himselfe, except God be angry with his people, must be a gift.

7. That which is eternall, and cannot politically die,* 1.333 yea which must continue as the dayes of heaven, because of Gods promise; That is more excellent then that which is both accidentall, tempo∣rarie and mortall. But the People is both eternall, as People, be∣cause

Eccles. 1.4. one generation passeth away,* 1.334 and another generation commeth: And as a people in covenant with God, Ier. 32.40, 41. in respect that a People and Church, though mortall in the individuals, yet the Church, remaining the Church, cannot dye; but the King, as King, may, and doth dye: It is true, where a Kingdome goeth by succession, the Politicians say, the man who is King, dyeth; but the King never dyeth, because some other, either by birth or free electi∣on, succeedeth in his roome. But I answer, 1. People by a sort of necessity of nature succeedeth to People, generation to generation, except Gods judgement, contrary to nature, intervene to make Ba∣bylon no people, and a land that shall never be inhabited, (which I both believe and hope for, according to Gods word of Prophecie) But a King by a sort of contingencie succeedeth to Kings: for na∣ture doth not ascertaine us there must be Kings to the worlds end; because the essence of Governours is kept safe in Aristocracie and Democracie, though there were no Kings. And that Kings should necessarily have been in the world,* 1.335 if man had never fallen in sinne, I am not, by any cogent argument, induced to beleeve. I conceive there should have been no Government but these of Fathers & Chil∣dren, Husband and Wife; and (which is improperly Government) some more gifted with supervenient additions to nature, as gifts and excellencies of Engines. Now in this point, Althusius polit. c. 38. n. 114. saith, the King in respect of office is worthier then the peo∣ple; (but this is but an accidentall respect) but as the King is a man, he is inferior to the people.

But, 8. he who by office is obliged to expend himselfe, and to give his life for the safety of the people,* 1.336 he must be inferior to the people.* 1.337 So Christ saith, the life is more then rayment or food, be∣cause both these give themselves to corruption for mans life: so the beasts are inferiour to man, because they die for our life, that they may sustaine our life: And Caiaphas prophesied right, that it was better that one man die, then that the whole Nation perish, Joh. 11. v. 50. and in nature, Elements against their particular inclination de∣fraud themselves of their private and particular ends, that the Com∣monwealth of Nature may stand, as heavy elements ascend, light descend, lest nature should perish by a vacuitie. And the good shep∣herd, Ioh. 10. giveth his life for his sheep. So Saul and David both were made Kings to fight the Lords battels, and to expose their lives to hazard for the safetie of the Church and people of God. But the

King by office is obliged to expend his life for the safety of the people of God; he is obliged to fight the Lords battels for them, to goe betwixt the Flock and death, as Paul was willing to be spent for the Church. It may be objected, Jesus Christ gave himselfe a Ransome for his Church, and his life for the life of the World, and was a gift given to the world, Ioh. 3.16. & 4.10. and he was a meane to save us: And so what arguments we have before produ∣ced to prove that the King must be inferior to the people, because he is a ransome, a meane, a gift; are not concludent. I answer:* 1.338 Consider a meane reduplicatively, and formaliter, as a meane, and secondly, as a meane materially, that is, the thing which is a meane. 2. Consider that which is only a mean, and ransome, and gift, and no more; and that which, beside that it is a meane, is of a higher nature also. So Christ formally as a meane, giving, 1. his temporall life; 2. for a time; 3. according to the flesh: For, 1. the eternall life; 2. of all the Catholike Church to be glorified eternally; 3. not his blessed Godhead and glorie, which, as God, he had with the Father from eternitie. In that respect Christ hath the relation of a servant, ransome, gift, and some inferioritie in comparison of the Church of God: and his Fathers glory, as a meane, is inferior to the end, but Christ materially, in concreto: Christ is not only a meane to save his Church, but as God,* 1.339 (in which consideration he was the immor∣tall Lord of life) he was more then a meane, even the author, efficient and Creator of heaven and earth: and so there is no ground to say that he is inferiour to the Church; but the absolute head, King, the chiefe of ten thousand, more in excellencie and worth then ten thousand millions of possible worlds of men and Angels. But such a consideration cannot befall any mortall King; because, consider the King materially as a mortall man, he must be inferior to the whole Church, for he is but one, and so of lesse worth then the whole Church, as the thumbe, though the strongest of the fingers, yet it is inferior to the hand, and far more to the whole body, as any part is inferior to the whole. 2. Consider the King reduplicative, and formally as King, and by the officiall relation he hath, he is no more then but a Royall servant, an officiall meane, tending, ex officio, to this end, to preserve the people, to rule and governe them; and a gift of God, given, by vertue of his office, to rule the people of God: and so any way inferiour to the people.

9. Those who are before the King, and may be a People with∣out

a King,* 1.340 must be of more worth then that which is posteriour, and cannot be a King without them. For thus Gods selfe suf∣ficiency is proved, in that he might be, and eternally was blessed for ever, without his Creature, but his creature cannot subsist in being without him. Now the people were a people many yeares, before there was any government (save domestick) and is a people where there is no King, but only an Aristocracy, or a Democracy; but the King can be no King without a people. It is vaine that some say, the King and Kingdome are relatives, and not one is before ano∣ther; for its true in the naked relation, so are father and sonne, Master and servant, Relata simul natura; but sure there is a prio∣rity of worth and independency for all that, in the father above the sonne, and in the master above the servant, and so in the people a∣bove the King, take away the people, and Dyonisius is but a poore Schoole-master.

* 1.3412. Asser. The people in power are superiour to the King, 1. be∣cause every efficient and constituent cause is more excellent then the effect. Every meane is inferiour in power to the end, so Iun. Brutus, q. 31. Bucher l. 1. c. 16. Author. Lib. De offic. Magistr. q. 6. He∣naenius disp. 2. n. 6. Ioan. Roffensis Epist. De potest. pap. l. 2. c. 5. Spa∣lato de Repu. Ecclesiast. l. 6. c. 2. n. 31. but the people is the efficient and constituent cause, the King is the effect, the people is the end; both intended of God to save the people, to be a healer and a Physi∣cian to them, Esay 3. v. 7. and the people appoint and create the King out of their indigence, to preserve themselves from mutuall violence. Many things are objected against this, 1. That the effici∣ent and constituent cause is God, and the people is only the instru∣mentall cause; and Spalato saith, that the people doth indirectly only give Kingly power, because God, at their act of election, ordinarily giveth it. Ans. The Scripture saith plainly, as we heard before, the people made Kings, and if they doe, as other second causes produce their effects, it is all one that God as the principall cause maketh Kings, else we should not argue from the cause to the effect amongst the creatures. 2. God by that same action that the people createth a King,* 1.342 doth also, by them, as by his instruments create a King, and that God doth not immediatly, at the naked presence of the act of popular election, conferre Royall dignity on the man, without any action of the people, as they say by the Churches act of conferring Orders, God doth immediatly without any act of the Church, in∣fuse

from Heaven supernaturall habilities on the man, without any active influence of the Church, is evident by this,* 1.343 1. The Royall power to make Lawes with the King, and so a power eminent in their states representative to governe themselves, is in the people, for if the most high act of Royalty be in them, why not the power also? and so what need to fetch a Royall power from Heaven, to be immediatly infused in him, seeing the people hath such a power in themselves at hand? 2. The people can, and doth limite, and bind Royall power in elected Kings,* 1.344 ergo they have in them Royall po∣wer to give to the King; those who limit power, can take away so many degrees of Royall power, and those who can take away po∣wer, can give power; and it is unconceiveable, to say that people can put restraint upon a power immediatly comming from God,* 1.345 if Christ immediatly infuse an Apostolick spirit in Paul, mortall men cannot take from him any degrees of that infused spirit; if Christ in∣fuse a spirit of nine degrees, the Church cannot limit it to six degrees only; but Royalists consent that the people may choose a King, upon such conditions to raigne, as he hath Royall power of ten degrees, whereas his Ancester had by birth a power of foureteen degrees. 3. It is not intelligible that the Holy Ghost should give Commande∣ment to the people to make such a man King,* 1.346 Deut. 17.15, 16. and forbid them to make such a man King, if the people had no active influence in making a King at all, but God solely and immediately from Heaven did infuse Royalty in the King without any action of the people, save a naked consent only, and that after God had made the King, they should approve only with an after-act of naked ap∣probation. 4. If the people by other Governours,* 1.347 as by heads of fa∣milies, and other choise men, governe themselves, and produce these same formall effects of Peace, Justice, Religion, on themselves, which the King doth produce, then is there a power of the same kind, and as excellent as the Royall power in the people, and no reason, but this power should be holden to come immediatly from God, as the Royall Power, for it is every way of the same nature and kind, and as I shall prove, Kings and Iudges differ not in nature and spece, but it is experienced that people doe, by Aristocraticall guides, governe themselves, &c. so then, if God immediatly infuse Royalty, when the people chooseth a King, without any action of the people, then must God immediatly infuse a beame of governing on a Provost and a Bailiffe, when the people choose such, and that

without any action of the people, because all Powers are, in ab∣stracto, from God, Rom. 13.2. and God as immediatly maketh inferi∣our Iudges, as superiour, Prov. 8.16. and all promotion, even to be a Provost or Major, commeth from God only, as to be a King, ex∣cept Royalists say, all promotion commeth from the East, and from the West, and not from God, except promotion to the Royall Throne, the contrary whereof is said, Ps. 75.6, 7. 1 Sam. 2.7, 8. not only Kings, but all Judges are Gods, Ps. 82.1, 2. and therefore all must be the same way created and moulded of God, except by Scripture Royalists can shew us a difference.* 1.348 An English Prelate gi∣veth Reasons, why People, who are said to make Kings as efficients, and Authors, cannot unmake them: the one is, because God as chief and sole supreame Moderator maketh Kings, but I say, Christ as the chiefe Moderator, and head of the Church, doth immediatly conferre abi∣lities to a man to be a Preacher, and though by industry the man acquire abilities, yet in regard the Church doth not so much as in∣strumentally conferre those abilities, they may be said to come from God immediatly, in relation to the Church, who calleth the man to the ministery,* 1.349 yea Royalists, as our excommunicated Prelate learned from Spalato, say that God, at the naked presence of the Churches call, doth immediatly infuse that from Heaven, by which the man is now in Holy Orders, and a Pastor, whereas he was not so before; and yet Prelates cannot deny, but they can unmake Ministers, and have practised this in their unhallowed Courts: and therefore though God immediatly without any action of the people make Kings, this is a weake reason, to prove they cannot unmake them. As for their undeleble character, that Prelates cannot take from a Minister, it is nothing, if the Church may unmake a Minister, though his character goe to prison with him:* 1.350 we seeke no more but to anull the reason. God immediatly maketh Kings and Pastors, ergo no power on earth can unmake them; this consequence is as weake as water. 2. The other cause is, because God hath erected no Tribunall on earth higher then the Kings Tribunall, ergo no power on earth can unmake a King; the Antecedent and consequence is both de∣nyed, and is a begging of the question: for the Tribunall that made the King is above the King. 2. Though there be no Tribunall for∣mally regall and Kingly above the King, yet is there a Tribunall vertuall eminently above him in the case of tyranny, for the States and Princes have a Tribunall above him.

3. To this the constituent cause is of more power and dignity then the effect, and so the people is above the King.* 1.351 The P. Prelate bor∣rowed an answer from Arnisaeus, and Barclay, and other Royalists, and saith, If we knew any thing in Law, or were ruled by reason; Every constituent (saith Arnisaeus and Barclay more accurately then the P. Prelate had a head to transcribe their words) where the con∣stituent hath resigned all his power in the hand of the Prince whom h•• constitutes, is of more worth, and power, then he in whose hand they re∣signe the power: so the proposition is false. The servant who hath consti∣tuted his Master Lord of his liberty, is not worthier then his Master whom he hath made his Lord, and to whom he hath given himselfe a•• a slave; for after he hath resigned his liberty he cannot repent, he must keepe covenant though to his hurt: yea such a servant is not only not a∣bove his Master, but he cannot move his foot without his Master. The Governour of Britaine (saith Arnisaeus) being despised by King Philip▪ resigned himselfe as Vassall to King Edward of England, but did not for that make himselfe superiour to King Edward: indeed he who con∣stituteth another under him as a Legat, is superiour; but the people do•• constitute a King above themselves, not a King under themselves, and therefore the people are not by this made the Kings superiour, but his inferiour.

Ans. 1. It is false that the people doth, or can by the Law of nature resigne their whole liberty in the hand of a King, 1. they cannot resigne to others that which they have not in themselves, Nemo po∣test dare quod non habet, but the people hath not an absolute power in themselves to destroy themselves, or to exercise those tyrannous acts spoken of, 1 Sam. 8.11, 12, 13, 14, 15, &c. for neither God, nor Natures Law hath given any such power. 2. He who constitu∣teth himselfe a slave is supposed to be compelled to that unnaturall fact of alienation of that liberty, which he hath from his Maker, from the wombe, by violence, constraint, or extreame necessity, and so is inferiour to all free men, but the people doth not make them∣selves slaves when they constitute a King over themselves, be∣cause God giving to a people a King, the best and excel∣lentest Governour on earth, giveth a blessing and speciall fa∣four, Esay 1.26. Hosea 1. v. 11. Esay 3.6, 7. Ps. 79.70, 71, 72. but to lay upon his people the state of slaverie, in which they re∣nounce their whole libertie, is a curse of God, Gen. 9.25. Gen. 27.29. Deut. 28.32.36. But the people having their liberty to make any

of ten or twenty,* 1.352 their King, and to advance one from a private state to an honorable throne, whereas it was in their libertie to advance another, and to give him Royall power of ten degrees, whereas they might give him power of twelve degrees, and of eight, or sixe, must be in excellencie and worth above the man, whom they consti∣tute King, and invest with such honour: as Honour in the fountain, and honos participans & originans, must be more excellent and pure then the derived honour in the King, which is honos participatus & originatus. 2. If the servant give his libertie to his master, ergo, he had that libertie in him; and in that act, libertie must be in a more excellent way in the servant, as in the Fountaine, then it is in the master: and so this libertie must be purer in the people then in the King: and therefore in that, both the servant is above the master, and the People worthier then the King: and when the people give themselves conditionally and Covenant-wise to the King, as to a Publique servant, and Patron, and Tutour, as the Governour of Bri∣taine, out of his humour, gave himselfe to King Edward; there is even here a note of superioritie; Every giver of a benefit, as a giver, is superior to him to whom the gift is given; though after the servant hath given away his gift of libertie, by which he was superiour, he cannot be a superior, because by his gift he hath made himselfe infe∣rior. 3. The People constituteth a King above themselves, I distin∣guish, supra se, above themselves, according to the fountaine power of Royaltie, that is false; for the fountaine-power remaineth most eminently in the people, 1. because they give it to the King, ad mo∣dum recipientis, and with limitations, ergo, it is unlimited in the peo∣ple, and bounded and limited in the King, and so lesse in the King then in the people. 2. If the King turne distracted, and an ill spirit from the Lord come upon Saul, so as reason be taken from a Nebu∣chadnezzar, it is certaine the people may put Curators and Tutors over him, who hath the Royall power. 3. If the King be absent, and taken captive, the People may give the Royall power to one, or to some few to exercise it as custodes regni. And 4. if he die, and the Crown goe by election, they may create another with more or lesse power: all which evinceth, that they never constituted over them∣selves a King, in regard of fountaine-power; for if they give away the fountaine, as a slave selleth his libertie, they could not make use of it. Indeed they set a King above them, quoad potestatem legum executi∣vam, in regard of a power of executing lawes and actuall govern∣ment,

for their good and safetie: but this proveth only that the King is above the people, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in some respect; but the most eminent and fountaine-power of Royaltie remaineth in the people, as in an immortall spring,* 1.353 which they communicate by succession to this or that mortall man, in the manner and measure that they thinke good: And Vlpian and Bartolus, cited by our Prelate out of Barclaius, are only to be understood of the derived▪ secondary and borrowed pow∣er of executing lawes, and not of the fountaine power, which the people cannot give away, no more then they can give away their ra∣tionall nature; for it is a power naturall, to conserve themselves, essentially adhering to every created Being: For, if the People give all their power away, 1. What shall they reserve to make a new King, if this man dye? 2. What if the Royall line surcease? there be no Prophets immediately sent of God, to make Kings. 3. What if he turne Tyrant, and destroy his Subjects with the sword? The Royalists say, they may flie: but when they made him King, they resigned all their power to him, even their power of flying; for they bound themselves by an oath (say Royalists) to all passive and law∣full active obedience: and, I suppose, to stand at his Tribunal, if he summoned the three Estates, upon Treason, to come before him, is conteined in the oath, that Royalists say, bindeth all, and is contra∣dictorie to flying.

Arnisaeus, a more learned Iurist and Divine then the P. Prelate, answereth the other Maxime,* 1.354 The end is worthier then the meane lea∣ding to the end, because it is ordained for the end. These meanes, saith he, which referre their whole nature to the end, and have all their ex∣cellencie from the end, and have excellencie from no other thing but from the end, are lesse excellent then the end; that is true, such an end as medicine is for health. And Hugo Grotius, l. 1. c. 3. n. 8. Those meanes which are only for the end, & for the good of the end, and are not for their own good, also are of lesse excellencie, and inferior to the end. But so the assumption is false. But those meanes which beside their relation to the end, have an excellencie of nature in themselves, are not alwayes infe∣rior to the end. The Disciple, as he is instituted, is inferior to the Ma∣ster; but as he is the sonne of a Prince, he is above the Master. But by this reason, the shepherd should be inferior to bruit beasts, to sheep. And the master of the familie is for the familie, and referreth all that he hath for the entertaining of the familie: but it followeth not therefore the fa∣milie is above him. The forme is for the action, therefore the action is

more excellent then the forme, and an accident then the subject or sub∣stance? And Grotius saith; Every government is not for the good of an∣other, but some for its own good, as the government of a master over the servant, and the husband over the wife.

Ans. I take the answer thus: Those who are meere meanes, and only meanes referred to the end, they are inferior to the end: but the King as King,* 1.355 hath all his officiall and relative goodnesse in the world, as relative to the end. All that you can imagine to be in a King, as a King, is all relative to the safety and good of the people, Rom. 13.4. He is a minister for thy good. He should not, as King, make himselfe, or his own gaine and honour, his end. I grant, the King, as a man, shall dye as another man, and so he may secondarily intend his own good; and what excellencie he hath as a man, is the excellencie of one mortall man, and cannot make him amount in dignitie, and in the absolute consideration of the excellencie of a man, to be above many men and a whole Kingdome: for the moe good things there be, the better they are, so the good things be multiplicable, as a hundred men are better then one: Otherwise, if the good be such as cannot be multiplied,* 1.356 as one God, the multiplication maketh them worse, as many Gods are inferiour to one God. Now if Royalists can shew us any more in the King then these two, we shall be obliged to them; and in both, he is inferiour to the whole.

The Prelate and his followers would have the Maxime to lose credit; for then (say they) the shepherd should be inferior to the sheep: But in this the Maxime faileth indeed. 1. Because the shepherd is a reasonable man, and the sheep bruit beasts, and so must be excellen∣ter then all the flocks of the world. Now as he is a reasonable man, he is not a shepherd, nor in that relation referred to the sh••ep and their preservation, as a mean to the end; but he is a shepherd by accident, for the unrulinesse of the creatures, for mans sinne, with∣drawing themselves from that naturall dominion that man had over the creatures, before the fall of man: in that relation of a meane to the end, and so by accident, is this officiall relation put on him; and according to that officiall relation, and by accident, man is put to be a servant to the bruitish creature, and a meane to so base an end. But all this proveth him, through mans sinne, and by accident, to be under the officiall relation of a meane, to baser creatures then him∣selfe, as to the end, but not as a reasonable man. But the King, as King, is an officiall and Royall meane to this end, that the people

may lead a godly and peaceable life under him. And this officiall rela∣tion being an accident, is of lesse worth then the whole people, as they are to be governed. And I grant, the Kings sonne, in relation to blood and birth, is more excellent then his Teachers: but as he is taught, he is inferiour to his Teacher: but in both considerations the King is inferior to the people; for though he cōmand the people, and so have an executive power of law above them, yet have they a fountain power above him, because they made him King, and in Gods intention he is given as King for their good, according to that, Thou shalt feed my people Israel: & that, I gave him for a leader of my people.

4. Saith the P. Prelate: The constituent cause is excellenter then the effect constituted, where the constitution is voluntary,* 1.357 and dependeth upon the free act of the will, as when the King maketh a Vice-Roy or a Iudge, durante beneplacito, during his free will: but not when a man maketh over his right to another; for then there should be neither faith nor truth in covenants, if people might make over their power to their King, and retract and take back what they have once given.* 1.358

Ans. This is a begging of the question: for it is denyed that the people can absolutely make away their whole power to the King: It dependeth on the people that they be not destroyed. They give to the King a politique power for their own safetie, and they keepe a naturall power to themselves, which they must conserve, and can∣not give away; and they doe not breake their covenant, when they put in act that naturall power to conserve themselves; for though the people should give away that power, and sweare, though the King should kill them all, they should not resist, nor defend their own lives; yet that being an oath against the sixth Command, which enjoyneth naturall selfe-preservation, it should not oblige the con∣science; for it should be intrinsecally sinfull; and it's all one to sweare to non-self-preservation, as to sweare to selfe-murther.

5. If the people (saith the Prelate, begging the answer from Barclay) the constituent be more excellent then the effect, and so the people above the King, because they constitute him King. Then the Counties and Corporations may make voyd all the Commissions gi∣ven to the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Commons,* 1.359 and send others in their place, and repeal their Orders, therefore Buchanan saith, that Orders and Lawes in Parliament were but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 pre∣paratorie consultationis, and had not the force of a Law, till the peo∣ple give their consent, and have their influence authoritative, upon the

Statutes and Acts of Parliament. But the observator holdeth that the legislative power is whole and intire in the Parliament. But when the Scots were preferring Petitions and Declarations, they put all power in the collective body, and kept their distinct tables. Ans. There is no consequence here, the Counties and Incorporations that send Com∣missioners to Parliament, may make voyd their Commissions and anull their Acts, because they constitute them Commissioners; if they be unjust acts, they may disobey them, and so disanull them, but it is presumed God hath given no morall power to doe ill, nor can the Counties and Corporations give any such power to evill, for they have not any such f••om God, if they be just acts, they are to obey them,* 1.360 and cannot retract Commissions to make just Orders. Illud tantum possumus quod ••ure possumus, and therefore as power to governe justly is irrevocably committed by the three est••tes who made the King, to the King, so is that same power committed by the Shires and Corporations to their Commissio∣ners, to decree in Parliament, what is just and good irrevocably, and to take any j••st power from the King which is his due, is a great sin; but when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, it is lawfull to throw a sword out of a mad-mans hand, though it be his owne proper sword, and though he have due right to it, and a just power to use it for good, for all fiduciary power a∣bused may be repealed;* 1.361 and if the Knights and Burgesses of the House of Commons abuse their fiduciary power to the destruction of these Shires and Corporations, who put the trust on them, the observator did never say that Parliamentary power was so intire and irrevocably in them, as that the people may not resist them, anull their Commissions, and rescind their acts, and denude them of fidu∣ciary power, even as the King may be denuded of that same power by the three estates, for particular Corporations are no more to be de∣nuded of that fountain-power of making Commissioners, and of the self preservation, then the three estates are. 2. The P. Prelate com∣meth not home to the mind of Buchanan, who knew the fundamental Lawes of Scotland, & the power of Parliaments, for his meaning was not to deny a legislative power in the Parliament, but when he cal∣leth their Parliamentary declarations 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 his mea∣ning is only that which Lawyers and Schoole-men both say,* 1.362 Leges non promulgatae non habent vim legis actu completo obligatoriae, Lawes not promulgated doe not oblige the subject while they be promulgated,

but he falsifies Buchannan, when he saith, Parliamentary Lawes must have the authoritative influence of the people, before they can be formall Lawes, or any more then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or preparatory notions. And it was no wonder,* 1.363 when the King denyed a Parlia∣ment, and the supreme Senate of the secret Counsell was corrup∣ted, then that the people did set up Tables, and extraordinary ju∣dicatures of the three estates, seeing there could not be any other government for the time.

6. Barclay answereth to that, The meane is inferiour to the end, it holdeth not, the Tutor and Curator is for the minor, as for the end,* 1.364 and given for his good; but it followeth not that therefore the Tutor in the administration of the minor or Pupils inheritance is not superiour to the minor. Ans. 1. It followeth well that the Minor virtu∣ally, and in the intention of the Law is more excellent then the Tu∣tor, though the Tutor can exercise more excellent acts then the Pupill, by accident, for defect of age in the Minor, yet he doth ex∣ercise those acts with subordination to the Minor, and with cor∣rection, because he is to render an account of his doings to the Pu∣pill comming to age: so the Tutor is only more excellent, and supe∣riour in some respect, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but not simply, and so is the King in some respect above the people.

The P. Prelate beggeth from the Royalists another of our Ar∣guments, Quod efficit tale, est magis tale.* 1.365 That which maketh ano∣ther such, is farre more such it selfe; if the people give Royall Power to the King, then farre more is the Royall Power in the people. By this (saith the Prelate) it shall follow if the observator give all his goods to me, to make me rich, the observator is more rich; if the people give most part of their goods to foment the Rebellion, then the people are more rich, having given all they have upon the Publicke Faith. Ans. 1. This greedy Prelate was made richer then ten poore Pur∣sevants, by a Bishopricke, it will follow well; ergo the Bishopricke is richer then the Bishop, whose goods the curse of God blasteth. 2. It holdeth in efficient causes, so working in other things as the vertue of the effect remaineth in the cause, even after the producti∣on of the effect. As the Sunne maketh all things light, the Fire all things hot, therefore the Sun is more light, the Fire more hot; but where the cause doth alienate and make over, in a corporall man∣ner, that which it hath to another, as the hungry Prelate would have the Observators goods, it holde••h not; for the effect may

exhaust the vertue of the cause,* 1.366 but the people doth, as the fountaine, derive a streame of Royalty to Saul, and make him King, and yet so as they keepe Fountain-power of making Kings in themselves; yea when Saul is dead to make David King at Hebron, and when he is dead to make Solomon King, and after him, to make Rehoboam King: and therefore in the people there is more fountaine power of making Kings then in David, in Saul, in any King of the world; as for the Prelates jeere about the peoples giving of their goods to the good cause, I hope it shall by the blessing of God inrich them more, whereas Prelates by the Rebellion in Ireland (to which they assent, when they counsell His Majesty to sell the blood of some hundred thousands of innocents killed in Ireland) are brought from thou∣sands a yeare, to begg a morsell of bread.

The Prelate answereth that Maxime, Quod ef••icit tale, id ipsum est magis tale.* 1.367 That which maketh another such, it is it selfe more such. It is true, De principio formali effectivo (as I learned in the Vni∣versity) of such an Agent as is formally such in it selfe, as is the effect produced. Next, it is such as is effective and productive of it selfe, as when fire heateth cold water, so the quality must be formally inherent in the Agent, as Wine maketh drunke, it followeth not, Wine is more drunke because Drunkennesse is not inherent in the Wine, nor is it capa∣ble of drunkennesse; and therefore Aristotle qualifieth the Maxime with this, Quod efficit tale est magis tale, modo utrique insit. And it holdeth not in Agents, who operate by donation, if the right of the King be transferred from the people to the King. The donation devest∣eth the people totally of it, except the King have it by way of loane, which to my thinking, never yet any spoke— Soveraignty never was, never can be in the Community; Soveraignty hath power of life and death, which none hath over himselfe, and the community conceived without government, all as equall, endowed with Natures and native liberty, of that community can have no power over the life of another. And so the Argument may be turned home, if the people be not tales, such by nature (as hath formally Royall power, he should say) they cannot give the King Royall Power. Also none hath power of life and death either eminenter or formally, the people either singly or col∣lectively have not power over their owne life, much lesse over their neighbours.

Ans. 1. The Prelate would make the maxime true of a for∣mall cause, and this he learned in the University of St. Andrewes,

he wrongeth the University, he rather learned it while he kept the Calves of Craile, the wall is white from whitenesse,* 1.368 ergo whitenesse is more white by the Prelates learning; never such thing was taught in that learned University. 2. Principium formale effectivum is as good Logick, as principium effectivum materiale, formale, finale. The Prelate is in his acuracy of Logick now, he yet maketh the causality of the formall cause all one with the causality of the efficient, but he is weake in his Logicks. 3. He confoundeth a cause equivocall, and a cause univocall, and in that case the Maxime hol∣deth not. Nor is it necessary to make true the maxime, that the qua∣lity be inherent in the cause, the same way. For a City maketh a Major, but to be a Major is one way in the City, and another way in him who is created Major; and the Prelates Maxime would helpe him, if we reasoned thus: The people maketh the King, ergo the people is more a King, and more formally a Soveraigne then the King. But that is no more our Argument, then the simile that Maxwell used, as neere heart and mouth both. Wine maketh drunk the Pre∣late, ergo Wine is more drunk. But we reason this, the Fountaine-power of making six Kings is in the people, ergo there is more fountain-power of Royalty in the people then in any one King; for we read that Israel made Saul King, and made David King, and made Abimelech King; but never that King Saul made another King, or that an earthly King made another Absolute King. 4. The Prelate will have the Maxime false, where the Agent worketh by do∣nation, which yet holdeth true by his owne grant, c. 9. pag. 98. The King giveth power to a Deputy, ergo there is more power in the King. 5. He supposeth that which is the Basis and foundation of all the question, that people devesteth themselves totally of their Foun∣taine power, which is most false. 6. Either they must devest them∣selves totally (saith he) of their power, or the King hath power from the people, by way of loane, which to my thinking never any yet spake. But the P. Prelates thinking is short, and no rule to Divines and Lawyers, for to the thinking of the learnedst Jurists this power of the King is but fiduciary, and that is (whether the Prelate thinke it, or thinke it not) a sort of power by trust, pawn'd or loane. Rex di∣rector Regni, non proprietarius,* 1.369 Molinae. in consuet. Parisi. Tit. 1.9.1. Glos. 7. n. 9. The King is a life-renter, not a Lord, or proprieter of his Kingdome. So Novel. 85. in princip. &c. 18. Quod magistratus sit nudus dispensator & defensor jurium regni, non proprietarius, con∣stat

ex eo quod non posset alienare imperium, oppida, urbes, regionésve, vel res subditorum, bonàve regni. So Gregory, l. 3. c. 8. de Repub. per c. 1. Sect. praeterea, de propo. feud. Hottoman. quest. illust. 1. Ferdinan▪ Vasquez. l. 1. c. 4. Bossius de princip. & privileg. illius, n. 290. The King is only a steward, and a defender of the lawes of the Kingdome, not a proprietor, because he hath not power to make away the Impire, Cities, Townes, Countries, and goods of the Subjects: and, bona com∣missa Magistratui, sunt subjecta restitutioni, & in prejudicium suc∣cessorum alienari non possunt, per l. ult. Sect. sed nost. C. Comment. de leg. l. peto 69. fratrem de leg. 2. l. 32. ult. d. t. All the goods committed to any Magistrate, are under Restitution•• for he hath not power to make them away to the prejudice of his successors. The Prelates thoughts reach not the secrets of Jurists, and therefore he speaketh with a warrant; he will say no more then his short-travel'd thoughts can reach; and that is but at the doore. 7. Soveraigntie is not in the Communitie (saith the P. Prelate.* 1.370) Truly it neither is, nor can be, more then ten, or a thousand, or a thousand thousands, or a whole Kingdome can be one man; for Soveraigntie is the abstract, the Soveraigne is the concrete: Many cannot be one King or one Soveraigne: a Soveraigne must be essentially one; and a multitude cannot be one: but what then? may not the Soveraigne power be eminently, fontaliter; originally and radically in the people? I thinke it may, and must be. A King is not an under-Iudge, he is not a Lord of Councell or Session formally, because he is more: The people is not King formally, because the people is eminently more then the King; for they make David King, and Saul King. And the power to make a Lord of Councell and Session, is in the King (say Royalists.) 8. A Communitie hath not power of life and death. A King hath power of life and death, (saith the Prelate) What then? ergo, a Com∣munitie is not King. I grant all. But (poore man!) Ergo, the power of making a King, who hath power of life and death, is not in the people. It is like Prelates logick. Samuel is not a King; ergo, he cannot make David a King. It followeth not, by the Prelates ground.* 1.371 So the King is not an in inferiour Iudge: What? ergo, he cannot make an inferiour Iudge. 9. The power of life and death is eminently and virtually in the people, collectively taken, though not formally. And though no man can take away his own life, or hath power over his own life formally; yet a man, and a body of men hath power over their own lives, radically and virtually; in

respect they may render themselves to a Magistrate, and to Lawes, which if they violate, they must be in hazard of their lives, and so they virtually have power of their own lives, by putting them un∣der the power of good lawes for the peace and safety of the whole. 10. This is a weake consequence: None hath power of his owne life, Ergo, far lesse of his neighbours (saith the Prelate.) I shall de∣nie the consequence. The King hath not power of his own life, that is, according to the Prelates mind, he can neither by the law of na∣ture, nor by any Civill law. kill himselfe: Ergo, the King hath far lesse power to kill another. It followeth not: for the Iudge hath more power over his neighbours life, then over his own. 11. But, saith the P. Prelate, The Communitie conceived without government,* 1.372 all as equall, endowed with natures and native libertie, hath no power of life and death, because all are borne free, and so none is borne with dominion and power over his neighbours life. Yea but so, Mr. P. Prelate, a King considered without government, and as born a free man, hath not power of any mans life, more then a Commu∣nitie hath: for King and Begger are borne both alike free. But a Communitie in this consideration, as they come from the wombe, have no Politique consideration at all. If you consider them as with∣out all policie, you cannot consider them as invested with policie: yea if you consider them so as they are by nature, voyd of all poli∣cie, they cannot so much as adde their after-consent and approbati∣on to such a man to be their King, whom God immediately from heaven maketh a King: for to adde such an after-consent, is an act of government. Now as they are conceived to want all government, they cannot performe any act of government. And this is as much against himselfe, as against us.

2. The power of a part, and the power of the whole is not alike. Royaltie never advanceth the King above the place of a member: And Lawyers say, The King is above the subjects, in sensu diviso, in a divisive sense he is above this or that subject: but he is inferiour to all the subjects collectively taken, because he is for the whole Kingdome, as a meane for the end. Object. If this be a good reason, that he is a meane for the whole Kingdome, as for the end; that he is therefore inferiour to the whole Kingdome: then is he also inferior to any one subject; for he is a meane for the safety of every subject, as for the whole Kingdome. Answ. Every meane is inferior to its com∣pleat, adequate and whole end: and such an end is the whole King∣dome

in relation to the King: but every man is not alwayes inferi∣our to its incompleat, inadequate and partiall end. This or that sub∣ject is not adequate, but the inadequate and incompleat end in re∣lation to the King. The Prelate saith, Kings are Dii Elohim, Gods; and the manner of their propagation is by filiation,* 1.373 by adoption, sonnes of the most high, and Gods first borne. Now the first borne is not above every brother severally:* 1.374 but if there were thousands, millions, number∣lesse numbers, he is above all in precedencie and power. Answ. Not only Kings, but all inferiour Iudges are Gods, Psal. 82. God standeth in the congregation of the Gods, that is not a congregation of Kings. So Exo. 22.8. the master of the house shall be brought, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to the Gods, or to the Judges. And that there were more Iudges then one, is cleare by vers. 9. and if they shall condemne 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 jar∣shignur, condemnarint, Joh. 10.35. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He called them Gods. Exod. 4.16. Thou shalt be to Aaron 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as a God. They are Gods analogically only. God is infinite, not so the King. 2. Gods will is a law, not so the Kings. 3. God is an end to himselfe, not so the King.* 1.375 The Iudge is but God by office, and representation, and conservation of the people. 2. It is denyed that the first-borne is in power before all his brethren, though there were millions. That is but said. One, as one, is inferior to a multitude: as the first-borne was a Politick Ruler to his brethren, he was inferiour to them po∣litically.

Object. 3. The collective Vniversitie of a Kingdome are sub∣jects, sonnes, and the King their father, no lesse then this or that sub∣ject is the Kings subject. For the universitie of Subjects are either the King, or the King subjects: for all the kingdome must be one of these two; but they are not the King, Ergo, they are his subjects.

Answ. All the Kingdome in any consideration is not either King or Subjects. I give a third: The Kingdome collective is nei∣ther properly King nor Subject: but the Kingdome embodied in a State, having collaterall or coordinate power with the King.

Object. 4. The universitie is ruled by lawes, Ergo, they are inferior to the King who ruleth all by law.

Answ. The Universitie properly is no otherwise ruled by lawes, then the King is ruled by lawes. The Universitie formally is the compleat Politick body, indued with a nomothetick facultie, which cannot use violence against it selfe, and so is not properly under a Law.

QUEST. XX. Whether or no inferiour Judges be univocally and essentially Judges, and the immediate Vicars of God, no lesse then the King, or if they be onely the Deputies and Vicars of the King?

IT is certain that in one and the same Kingdom, the power of the King is more in extension, then the power of any inferiour Iudge: but if these powers of the King, and the inferiour Iudges differ intensivè and in spece, and nature, is the question, though it be not all the question.

Assert. Inferiour Iudges are no lesse essentially Iudges, and the immediate Vicars of God, then the King.* 1.376 1. These who judge in the room of God, and exercise the judgement of God, are essential∣ly Iudges, and the Deputies of God, as well as the King: but in∣feriour Iudges are such. Ergo, The proposition is clear, the formall reason, why the King is univocally and essentially a Iudge is, because the Kings throne is the Lords throne, 1 Chron. 29.23. And Solomon sate on the throne of the Lord, as King, instead of David his father, 1 King. 1.13. It is called Davids throne, because the King is the Deputy of Iehovah, and the judgement is the Lords: I prove the assumption. Inferiour Iudges appointed by King Iehoshaphat have this place, 2 Chro. 19.6. The King said to the Iudges, Take heed what ye do, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for ye judge not for man, but for the Lord: then they were Deputies in the place of the Lord, and not the Kings Deputies in the formall and officiall acts of judging. 7. Wherefore now let the fear of the Lord be upon you, take heed and do it, for there is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, or taking of gifts.

Hence I argue, If the Holy Ghost in this good King, forbid in∣riour Judges wresting of judgement, respecting of persons, and taking of gifts, because the judgement is the Lords; and if the Lord him∣self were on the Bench, he would not respect persons, nor take gifts; then he presumeth, that inferiour Iudges are in the stead and place of Jehovah: and that when these inferiour Iudges should take gifts, they make (as it were) the Lord, whose place they represent, to take gifts, and to do iniquitie, and to respect persons: but that the holy Lord cannot do. 2. If the inferiour Iudges in the act of judging, were the Vicars, and Deputies of King Jehoshaphat, he would have said, Judge righteous judgement; Why? For the judge∣ment

is mine, and if I the King were on the Bench, I would not re∣spect persons, nor take gifts; and you judge for me the supreme Judge, as my Deputies: but the King saith, They judge not for man, but for the Lord. 3. If by this they were not Gods immediate Vicars, but the Vicars and Deputies of the King, then being meer servants, the King might command them to pronounce such a sentence, and not such a sentence as I may command my servant and deputy, in so far, as he is a servant and deputie, to say this, and say not this: but the King cannot limit the conscience of the inferiour Iudge, because the judgement is not the Kings, but the Lords. 4. The King cannot command any other to do that, as King; for the doing whereof, he hath no power from God himself, but the King hath no power from God to pronounce what sentence he pleaseth, because the judgement is not his own,* 1.377 but Gods: And though inferiour Iudges be sent of the King, and appointed by him to be Iudges, and so have their externall call from Gods deputy, the King; yet because judging is an act of conscience, as one mans conscience cannot properly be a deputy for another mans conscience, so neither can an inferior Iudge, as a Iudge, be a deputy for a King: therefore the inferiour Iudges have designation to their office from the King; but if they have from the King, that they are Iudges, and be not Gods deputies, but the Kings, they could not be commanded to execute judgement for God, but for the King: and Deut. 1.17. Moses appointed Iudges, but not as his deputies to judge and give sentence, as subordinate to Moses: For the judgement (saith he) is the Lords, not mine. 6. If all the inferiour Iudges in Israel,* 1.378 were but the deputies of the King, and not immediately subordinate to God, as his deputies, then could neither inferiour Iudges be admonished, nor condemned in Gods word for unjust judgement, because their sentence should be nei∣ther righteous, nor unrighteous judgement, but in so far, as the King should approve it, or disapprove it; and indeed, that Royalist Hugo Grotius saith so, That an inferiour Iudge can do nothing against the will of the supreme Magistrate, if it be so: When ever God com∣mandeth inferiour Iudges to execute righteous judgement, it must have this sense, Respect not persons in judgement, except the King command you, crush not the poor, oppresse not the fatherlesse, except the King command you. I understand not such policie: Sure I am, The Lords commandments, rebukes, and threats, oblige in conscience the inferiour Iudge as the superiour, as is manifest in these Scrip∣tures,

Jerem. 5.1. Isai. 1.17, 21. and 5.7. and 10.2. and 59.14. Jere. 22.3. Ezek. 18.8. Amos 5.7. Micah 3.9. Habak. 1.4. Le∣vit. 19.15. Deut. 17.11. and 1.17. Exod. 23.2.

Grotius saith, It is here as in a Categorie:* 1.379 the middle Spece is in respect of the Superiour a Spece, in respect of the inferiour a Genus; so inferiour Magistrates in relation to these who are inferiour to them, and under them, they are Magistrates or publike persons, but in relati∣on to superiour Magistrates, especially the King, they are private per∣sons, and not Magistrates.

Answ. Jehoshaphat esteemed not Iudges appointed by himself private men, 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. Yee judge not for men, but for the Lord. 2. We shall prove, that under Iudges are powers ordained of God. 3. In Scotland the King can take no mans inheritance from him, because he is King: But if any man possesse Lands belonging to the Crown, the King by his Advocate must stand before the Lord-Iudges of the Session, and submit the matter to the Laws of the Land; and if the King for propertie of Goods, were not under a Law, and were not to acknowledge Iudges as Iudges, I see not how the subject in either Kingdoms have any proprietie. 4. I judge it blasphemie to say, That a sentence of an inferiour Iudge must be no sentence, though never so legall, nor just, if it be contrary to the Kings will, as Grotius saith.

He citeth that of Augustine: If the Consul command one thing,* 1.380 and the Emperour another thing, you contemn not the power, but you choose to obey the highest: Peter saith, He will have us one way to be subject to the King, as to the supreme, sine ulla exceptione, without any exception, but to these who are sent by the King, as having their power from the King.

Answ. When the Consull commandeth a thing lawfull, and the King that same thing lawfull, or a thing not unlawfull, we are to obey the King, rather then the Consull: so I expone Augustine. 2. We are not to obey the King and the Consull the same way,* 1.381 that is with the same degree of reverence and submission; for we owe more submission of spirit to the King, then to the Consul; but magis & minus non variant speciem, more or lesse varieth not the natures of things: but if the meaning be that we are not to obey the in∣feriour Iudge commanding things lawfull, if the King command the contrary, this is utterly denyed: But saith Grotius, The inferiour Judge is but the Deputie of the King, and hath all his power from him;

therefore we are to obey him for the King. Answ. The inferiour Iudge may be called the Deputy of the King, (where it is the Kings place to make Iudges) because he hath his externall call from the King, and is Iudge, in foro Soli, in the name and authority of the King;* 1.382 but being once made a Iudge in foro poli, before God, he is as essentially a Iudge, and in his officiall acts no lesse immediately subjected to God, then the King himself.

Argum. 2. These powers to whom we are to yield obedience, because they are ordained of God; these are as essentially Iudges, as the supreme Magistrate the King; but inferiour Iudges are such. Ergo, Inferiour Iudges are as essentially Iudges, as the supreme Magistrate. The proposition is Rom. 13.1. For that is the Apostles Arguments; whence we prove, Kings are to be obeyed, because they are powers from God: I prove the assumption. Inferiour Ma∣gistrates are powers from God, Deut. 1.17. and 19.6, 7. Exod. 22.7. Jere. 5.1. and the Apostle saith, The powers that are, are ordained of God.

3. Christ testified, that Pilate had power from God as a Iudge (say Royalists) no lesse then Caesar the Emperour, Iohn 19.11. and 1 Pet. 2.12. We are commanded to obey the King, and these that are sent by him,* 1.383 and that for the Lords sake, and for conscience to God, and Rom. 13 5. We must be subject to all powers that are of God, not onely for wrath, but for conscience.

4. These, who are rebuked, because they execute not just judge∣ment, as well as the King, are supposed to be essentially Iudges, as well as the King; but inferiour Iudges are rebuked, because of this, Ierem. 22.15, 16, 17. Ezek. 45.9, 10, 11, 12. Zeph. 3.3. Amos 5.6, 7. Eccles. 3.16. Micah 3.2, 3, 4. Jerem. 5.31. Ierem. 5.1.

5. He is the Minister of God for good, and hath the sword not in vain,* 1.384 but to execute vengeance on the evil doers; no lesse then the King, Rom. 13.2, 3, 4. He to whom agreeth, by an Ordinance of God, the specifick acts of a Magistrate, he is essentially a Magi∣strate.

6. The resisting of the inferiour Magistrate in his lawfull com∣mandments,* 1.385 is the resisting of Gods Ordinance, and a breach of the fifth Commandment, as is disobedience to parents, and not to give him tribute, and fear, and honour, is the same transgression, Rom. 13.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

7. These stiles of Gods, of Heads of the people, of Fathers, of Physi∣cians, and healers of the sonnes of the most High, of such as Raign and Decree by the wisedome of God, &c. that are given to Kings, for the which Royalists make Kings onely Iudges, and all inferiour Iudges, but deputed, and Iudges by participation, and at the second hand, or given to inferiour Iudges, Exod. 22.8, 9. Ioh. 10.35. These who are appointed Iudges under Moses,* 1.386 Deut. 1.16. are called in Hebrew or Chaldee, 1 Kings 8.1, 2. Chap. 5.2. Mic. 3.1. Iosh. 23.2. Num. 1.16. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 rasce, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 fathers, Act. 7.2. Iosh. 14.1. c. 19.51. 1 Chro. 8, 28. Healers, Esai. 3.7. Gods, and sonnes of the most High, Psal. 82.1.2.6.7. Prov, 8.16, 17. I much doubt, if Kings can infuse Godheads in their Subjects. I conceive they have from the God of Gods these gifts, whereby they are inhabled to be Iudges, and that Kings may appoint them Iudges, but can do no more, they are no lesse essentially Iudges then themselves.

8. If inferiour Iudges be Deputies of the King, not of God, and have all their authority from the King, then may the King limit the practise of these inferiour Iudges. Say that an inferiour Iudge hath condemned to death an Paricide, and he be conveying him to the place of execution, the King commeth with a force to rescue him out of his hand, if this inferiour Magistrate beare Gods sword for the terrour of ill doers, and to execute Gods vengeance on mur∣therers, he cannot but resist the King in this, which I judge to be his Office: for the inferiour Iudge is to take vengeance on ill doers, and to use the coactive force of the sword, by vertue of his Office, to take away this Paracide, now if he be the Deputy of the King, he is not to breake the jawes of the wicked, Iob 29.17. not to take venge∣ance on evill doers, Rom. 13.4. nor to execute judgement on the wicked,* 1.387 Ps. 149, 9. nor to execute judgment for the fatherlesse, De. 10.18. ex∣cept a mortall man his Creator, the King say, Amen. Now truly then God, in all Israel, was to rebuke no inferiour Iudge for perverting judgement, As he doth, Exod. 23.2.6. Mic. 3.2, 3, 4. Zach. 3.3. Numb. 25.5. Deut. 1.16. For the King onely is Lord of the conscience of the inferiour Iudge, who is to give sentence, and execute sentence righ∣teously upon condition, that the King the onely univocall and pro∣per Iudge, first, decree the same, as Royalists teach.

Heare our Prelate: How is it imaginable that Kings can be said to Iudge in Gods place, and not receive the power from God? but Kings Iudge in Gods place, Deut. 1.17. 2 Chro. 19.6. Let no man stumble,

(this is his Prolepsis) at this, that Moses in the one place, and Iehosa∣phat in the other speake to subordinate Iudges under them, this weake∣neth no waies our Argument, for it is a ruled case in Law; Quod quis facit per alium, facit per se; all Iudgements of inferiour Iudges are in the name, authority, and by the power of the supreme, and are but com∣municatively, and derivatively from the Soveraigne power.

Ans. How is it possible that inferiour Iudges, Deut. 1.17. 2. Chron. 19.6. can be said to judge in Gods place, and not receive the power from God immediatly, without any consent or covenant of men? So the Prelate. But inferiour Iudges judge in the Gods place, as both the P. Prelate and Scripture teach, Deut. 1.17. 2. Chro. 19.6. Let the Prelate see to the stumbling conclusion, for so he feareth it proves to his bad cause. 2. He saith the places, Deut. 1.17. 2 Chro. 19.6. prove that the King judgeth in the Roome of God, because their Deputies judge in the place of God. The Prelate may know, we would deny this stumbling and ••••me consequence; for 1. Moses and Iehosaphat are not speaking to themselves, but to other inferi∣our Iudges, who doth publickly exhort them. Moses and Iehosaphat are perswading the regulation of the personall actions of other men, who might pervert Iudgement. 2. The Prelate is much upon his Law, after he had forsworne the Gospell, and Religion of the Church,* 1.388 where he was baptized. What the King doth by another, that he doth by himselfe; but were Moses and Jehosaphat feared that they should pervert Iudgement in the unjust Sentence pronoun∣ced by under Iudges, of which Sentence they could not know any thing? And doe inferiour Iudges so judge in the name, authority, and power of the King, as not in the Name, Authority and Power of the Lord of Lords, and King of Kings? or is the Iudgement the Kings? no, the Spirit of God saith no such matter, the Iudgement executed by those inferiour Iudges, is the Lords, not a mortall Kings, ergo a mortall King may not hinder them to execute Iudgement. Obj. He cannot suggest an unjust Sentence, and command an inferi∣our Iudge to give out a sentence absolvatory on cut-throates, but he may hinder the execution of any sentence against Irish cut-throates. Ans. It is all one to hinder the execution of a just sentence, and to suggest or command the inferiour Iudge to pronounce an unjust one, for inferiour Iudges by conscience of their Office, are both to judge righteously, and by force and power of the sword given to them of God, Rom. 23.2, 3, 4. to execute the sentence, and so God

hath commanded inferiour Iudges to execute Iudgement, and hath forbidden them to wrest Iudgement, to take gifts, except the King Command them so to doe.

Master Symmon••, The King is by the Grace of God,* 1.389 the inferiour Iudge is Iudge by the grace of the King, even as the man is the image of God, and the woman the mans image. Ans. This distinction is neither true in Law, nor conscience; not in Law, for it distingui∣sheth not betwixt Ministros regis, & ministros regni. The servants of the King are his domesticks, the Iudges are Ministri regni, non regis; the Ministers and Iudges of the Kingdome, not of the King. The King doth not show grace, as he is a man, in making such a man a Iudge, but Iustice as a King, by a Royall Power received from the people, and by an Act of Iustice, he makes Iudges of deserving men, he should neither for favour, nor bribes make any Iudge in the Land.* 1.390 2. It is the grace of God that men are to be advanced from a private condi••ion to be inferiour Iudges, as Royall Dignity is a free gift of God, 1 Sam. 2.7. The Lord bringeth low, and lifteth up, Ps. 757. God putteth downe one, and seteth up another. Court flat∣terers take from God, and give to Kings; but to be a Iudge inferi∣our, is no lesse an immediate favour of God, then to be King; though the one be a greater favour then the other. Magis honos, and Ma∣jo•• honos are to be considered.

9. Arg. Those powers which d••ffer gradually,* 1.391 and per magis & minus, by more and lesse only, differ not in nature and spece,* 1.392 and constitute not Kings and inferiour Iudges different univocally. But the power of Kings and inferiour Iudges are such, there∣fore Kings and inferiour Iudges differ not univocally. That the powers are the same in nature, I prove 1. by the specifice acts, and formall object of the power of both, for 1. both are pow∣er ordained of God, Rom. 13.1. to resist either, is to resist the ordi∣nance of God, v. 2. both are by Office a terrour to evill workes,* 1.393 v. 3. 3. both are the Ministers of God for good. 2. Though the King send and give a call to the inferiour Iudge, that doth no more make the inferiour Iudges powers in nature and spece different, then Mini∣sters of the Word called by Ministers of the Word, have Of∣fices different in nature. Timotheus Office to be Preacher of the Word differeth not in specie, from the Office of the Presbytery, which layed hands on him, though their Office by extension, be more then Timothies Office. 3. The peoples power is put forth in

those same acts, when they choose one to be their King and supreame Governour, and when they set up an Aristocraticall Government, and choose many, or more then one, to be their Governours; for the formall object of one or many Governours is Iustice and Religion, as they are to be advanced. 2. The forme and manner of their op∣peration is▪ brachio seculari, by a coactive power, and by the sword. 3. The formall acts of King and many Iudges in Aristocracy, are these same, the defending of the poore and needy from violence, the conservation of a Community in a peaceable and a godly life, 1 Tim. 2. 2 Iob 29.12, 13. Esay 1.17. 4.* 1.394 These same Lawes of God that regulateth the King in all His Acts of Royall Govern∣ment, and tyeth and obligeth his conscience, as the Lords Deputy to execute Iudgement for God, and not in the stead of men, in Gods Court of Heaven, doth in like manner tye, and oblige the conscience of Aristocraticall Iudges, and all inferiour Iudges, as is cleare and evident by these places, 1 Tim. 2.2. not only Kings, but all in authority 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are obliged to procure that their subjects leade a quiet and peaceable life, in all godlinesse and honesty. All in conscience are obliged, Deut. 1.16. to judge righte∣ously between every man and his brother, and the stranger that is with them. 17. Neither are they to respect persons in judgement, but are to heare the small as well as the great, nor to be affraid of the face of men, the judgement administred by all, is Gods. 2. Chro. 19.6. All are obliged to feare God, Deut. 17.19.20. to keepe the words of the Law, not to be lifted up in heart above their brethren, Esay 1.17. Ier. 22.2, 3. Let any man show me a difference according to Gods Word, but in the extention that what the King is to doe as a King in all the Kingdome, and whole Dominions, (if God give to him many) as he gave to David and Solomon, and Ioshua, that the inferiour Iudges are to doe in such and such Circuits, and limited places, and I quit the cause, so as the inferiour Iudges are little Kings, and the King a great and delated Iudge, as a compressed hand or fist, and the hand stretched out in fingers and thumbe, are one hand, so here. 4. God owneth inferiour Iudges as a congregation of Gods, Ps. 82.1.2. for that God sitteth in a congregation or Senate of Kings or Mo∣narches I shall not beleeve, till I see Royalists shew to me a Common-wealth of Monarches convening in one Iudicature; all are equally called Gods, Ioh. 10.35. Exod. 22.8. if for any cause, but because all Iudges even inferiour are the immediate Deputies of the King of

Kings, and their sentence in Iudgement as the sentence of the Iudge of all the earth, I shall be informed by the P. Prelate when he shall answer my reasons, if his interdicted Lordship may cast an eye to a poore Presbyter below,* 1.395 and as wisedome is that by which Kings raigne, Prov. 8.15. so also v. 16. by which Princes Rule, and No∣bles, even all the Iudges of the earth; all that is said against this is: That the King hath a Prerogative Royall, by which he is differen∣ced from all Iudges in Israel, called jus regis 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for (saith Bar∣clay) The King as King essentially hath a Domination and power a∣bove all, so as none can c••nsure him, or punish him but God, because ••here be no thrones above his, but the throne of God. The Iudges of Israel, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Samuel, Gedeon, &c. had no domination, the dominion was in Gods hand. 2. Wee may resist an inferior Iudge (saith Arnisaeus) otherwise there were no appeale from him, and the wrong we suffer were irre∣parable, as saith Marantius. And all the Iudges of the earth (saith Edw. Symmons) are from God more remotely, namely (mediante Rege) by the mediation of the Supreame, even as the lesser starres have their light from God by the mediation of the Sun. To the first I an∣swer, There was a difference betwixt the Kings of Israel and their Iudges, no question: but if it be an essentiall difference, it is a question: for, 1. The Iudges were raised up in an extraordinary manner, out of any Tribe, to defend the people, and vindicate their libertie, God remaining their King: the King by the Lords appoint∣ment was tyed, after Saul, to the Royall tribe of Judah, till the Messiahs comming. God tooke his own blessed libertie to set up a succession in the ten tribes. 2. The Iudges were not by succession from father to sonne: the Kings were, as I conceive, for the typi∣call eternitie of the Messiahs throne, presignified to stand from ge∣neration to generation. 3. Whether the Iudges were appointed by the election of the people, or no, some doubt, because Iepthah was so made Iudge: but I thinke it was not a law in Israel that it should be so: but the first mould of a King, Deut. 17. is by electi∣on. But that God gave power of domineering, that is, of Tyran∣nizing, to a King, so as he cannot be resisted, which he gave not to a Iudge, I thinke no Scripture can make good: For by what Scrip∣ture can Royalists warrant to us that the people might rise in armes to defend themselves against Moses, Gideon, Eli, Samuel, and other Iudges, if they should have tyrannized over the people: and that it is unlawfull to resist the most Tyrannous King in Israel and Iudah?

Yet Barclay and others must say this, if they be true to that principle of Tyranny, That the jus Regis, the law or manner of the King, 1 Sam. 8.9, 11. & 1 Sam. 10.25, doth essentially difference betwixt the Kings of Israel, and the Iudges of Israel: but we thinke God gave never any power of Tyranny to either Iudge or King of Israel; and domination in that sense was by God given to none of them. 2. Arnisaeus hath as little for him, to say the inferior Magi∣strate may be resisted, because we may appeale from him: but the King cannot be resisted, quia sanctitas Majestatis id non permittit, the sanctitie of Royall majestie will not permit us to resist the King. Ans. That is not Pauls argument, to prove it unlawfull to resist Kings, as Kings, and doing their office, because of the sanctitie of their Majestie, that is, as the man intendeth, because of the supreme absolute and illimited power that God hath given him. But this is a begging of the question, and all one as to say, the King may not be resisted, because he may not be resisted: for sanctitie of Majestie, if we beleeve Royalists, includeth essentially an absolute supremacie of power, whereby they are above the reach of all thrones, lawes, powers, or resistance on Earth. But the Argument is, Resist no••, be∣cause the Power is of God. But the inferiour Magistrates power is of God. 2. Resist not, because you resist Gods ordinance, in resisting the Iudge: But the inferior Iudge is Gods ordinance, Rom. 13.1. Deut. 1.17. 2 Chro. 19.6. 3. Mr. Symmons saith, all Iudges on earth are from the Kings, as starres have their light from the Sun. I an∣swer, 1. Then Aristocracie were unlawfull, for it hath not its power from Monarchie.* 1.396 Had the Lords of the Philistims, have the States of Holland no power but from a Monarchie? Name the Mo∣narch. Have the Venetians any power from a King? Indeed our Prelate saith from Augustine, Confess. lib. 3. cap. 8. Generale pactum est societatis humanae, obedire Regibus suis: It is an universall covenant of humane societie, and a dictate of nature, that men obey their Kings. I beg the favour of Sectaries (saith he) to shew as much for Aristocracie and Democracie. Now all other governments to bellies borne at Court, are the inventions of men. But I can shew that same warrant for the one as for the other, because it is as well the dictate of nature, that People obey their Iudges and Rulers, as it is that they obey their Kings. And Austin speaketh of all Iudges, in that place, though he name Kings; for Kingly government is no more of the law of nature, then Aristocracie or Democracie: nor

are any borne Iudges, or Subjects at all: There is a naturall apti∣tude in all to either of these, for the conservation of nature, and that is all. Let us see that men naturally inclining to Government, in∣cline rather to Royall Government, then to any other.* 1.397 That the P. Prelate shall not be able to show. For fatherly government be∣ing in two, is not Kingly, but nearer to Aristocracy; and when many families were on earth, every one independent within them∣selves, if a commune enemy should invade a tract of Land governed by families, I conceive, by natures light they should incline to de∣fend themselves, and to joyne in one politique body for their owne safety, as is most naturall; but in that case they having no King, and there we••e no reason of many fathers all alike loving their own families and selfe preservation, why one should be King over all, ra∣ther then another, except by voluntary compact; so it is cleare that Nature is nearer to Aristocracy before this contract, then a Mo∣narchy: and let him shew us in multitudes of families dwelling to∣gether before there was a King, as cleare a warrant for Monarchy, as here is for Aristocracy, though to me both be lawdable and law∣full ordinances of God, and the difference meerely accidentall, being one and the same power from the Lord, Rom. 13.1. which is in di∣vers subjects in one, as a Monarchy, in many as in Aristocracy, and the one is as naturall as the other: and the subjects are accidentall to the nature of the power. 2. The Starrs have no light at all, but in actuall aspect toward the Sun, and they are not lightsome bodies by the free will of the Sunne, and have no immediate light from God formally, but from the Sun, so as if there were no Sun, there should be no Starres. 3. for actuall shining and sending out of beames of light actu secundo, they depend upon the presence of the Sun, but for inferiour Iudges though they have their call from the King,* 1.398 yet have they gifts to governe from no King on earth, but only from the King of Kings. 4. When the King is dead the Iudges are Iudges, and they depend not on the King for their second acts of judging, and for the actuall emission and putting forth their beames and raies of justice, upon the poore and needy, they depend on no voluntary aspect, information or commandement of the King, but on that im∣mediate subjection of their conscience to the King of Kings. And their Iudgement which they execute is the Lords immediatly, and not the Kings▪ and so the comparison halteth.

Arg. Our 10th. Arg. If the King dying,* 1.399 the Iudges inferiour re∣maine

powers from God, the Deputies of the Lord of Hoasts ha∣ving their power from God, then are they essentially Iudges; yea and if the estates in their prime representators, and leaders, have power in the death of the King, to choose and make another King, then are they not Iudges and Rulers by derivation and participati∣on,* 1.400 or unproperly, but the King is rather the Ruler by derivation and participation, then these who are called inferiour Iudges. Now if these Iudges depend in their Sentences upon the immediat will of him who is supposed to be the only Iudge, when this only Iudge dyeth, they should cease to be Iudges: for Expirante mandatore ex∣pirat mandatum, because the Fountaine Iudge drying up, the streames must dry up. Now when Saul dyed, the Princes of the Tribes remaine by Gods institution Princes, and they by Gods Law and Warrant, Deut. 17. choose David their King.

* 1.40111. If the King through absolute power doe not send inferiour Iudges, and constitute them, but only by a power from the people; and if the Lord have no lesse immediate influence in making inferi∣our Iudges, then in making Kings, then is there no ground that the King should be sole Iudge,* 1.402 and the inferiour Iudge only Iudge by derivation from him, and essentially his Deputy, and not the imme∣diate Deputy of God. But the former is true, ergo so is the latter. And first that the Kings absolute Will maketh not inferiour Iudges, is cleare, from Deut. 1.15. Moses might not follow his owne will in making inferiour Iudges whom he pleased: God tyed him to a Law▪ v. 13. that he should take wise men, known amongst the people, and fearing God, and hating covetousnesse. And these qualifications were not from Moses, but from God; and no lesse immediatly from God then the inward qualification of a King, Deut. 17. and therefore it is not Gods Law that the King may make inferiour Iudges only, Durante beneplacito, during his absolute will; for if these Divine qualifications remaine in the seventy Elders, Moses at his will could not remove them from their places. 2. That the King can make heritable Iudges more then he can communicate faculties and parts of judging, I doubt, riches are of fathers, but not promotion, which is from God,* 1.403 and neither from the East, nor the West. That our Nobles are borne Lords of Parliament, and Iudges by blood, is a positive Law. 3. It seemeth to me from Esay 3.1, 2, 3, 4. that the inferiour Iudge is made by consent of the people, nor can it be cal∣led a wronging of the King, that all cities and Burroughs of Scotland

and England, have power to choose their owne Provests, Rulers, and Majors. 4. If it be warranted by God, that the lawfull Call of God to the Throne, be the election of the people, the call of inferi∣our Iudges must also be from the people, mediatly or immediatly: So I see no ground to say that, the inferiour Iudge is the Kings Vicegerent, or that he is in respect of the King, or in relation to supreme Authority, only a private man.

12. These Iudges cannot but be univocally and essentially Iudges, no lesse then the King, without which in a Kingdome Iustice is Phy∣sically unpossible: and Anarchie and violence and confusion must follow, if they be wanting in the Kingdome. But without inferiour Iudges, though there be a King, Iustice is Physically unpossible, and Anarchie and confusion must follow, &c.

Now this Argument is more considerable, that without inferiour Iudges, though there be a King in a Kingdome, Iustice and safety are unpossible, and if there be inferiour Iudges, though there be no King, as in Aristocracy, and when the King is dead, and another not Crowned, or the King is Minor, or absent, or a captive in the enemies Land, yet justice is possible, and the Kingdome preserved; the Medium of the Argument is grounded upon Gods Word, Num. 11.14, 15. when Moses is unable alone to judge the peo∣ple, seventy Elders re-joyned with him,* 1.404 16.17. so were the Elders adjoyned to helpe him, Exo. 24.1. Deut. 5.23. c. 22.16. Iosh. 23.2. Iudg. 8.14. Iudg. 11.5. Iudg. 11.11. 1 Sam. 11.3. 1 King. 20.7. 2 King. 6.32. 2 Chro. 34.29. Ruth 4.4. Deut. 19.12. Ezech. 8.1 Lament. 1.19. then were the Elders of Moab thought they had a King. 2. The end naturall of Iudges hath been indigence and weaknesse, because men could not in a society defend themselves from violence, therefore by the light of nature they gave their power to one, or more, and made a Iudge, or Iudges to obtaine the end of selfe preservation. But Nature useth the most efficacious meanes to obtaine its end, but in a great society and Kingdome the end is more easily attained by many Governours, then by one only; for where there is but one, he cannot minister Iustice to all, and the farther that the children are removed from their father and tutor, they are the nearer to violence and unjustice. Iustice should be at as easie a rate to the poore, as a draught of water. Samuel went yeare∣ly through the Land to Bethell, Gilgall, Mizpeh, 1 Sam. 7.16. and brought Iustice to the doores of the poore. So were our Kings of

Scotland obliged to doe of old; but now justice is as deare as gold▪ it is not a good argument to prove inferior Iudges to be only Vi∣cars and Deputies of the King, because the King may censure and punish them when they pervert judgement. 1. Because the King, in that, punisheth them not as Iudges, but as men. 2. That might prove all the Subjects to be Vicars and Deputies of the King,, be∣cause he can punish them all, in the case of their breach of lawes.

QUEST. XXI. What power the People and States of Parliament have over the King, and in the State?

IT is true, the King is the head of the Kingdome; but the States of the Kingdome are as the temples of the head,* 1.405 and so as essenti∣ally parts of the head, as the King is the crown of the head.

Assert. 1. These Ordines Regni, the States, have been in famous Nations: so there were fathers of families, and Princes of Tribes amongst the Jewes: The Ephori amongst the Lacedemonians, Polyb. hist. l. 6. The Senate amongst the Romanes: The sorum Superbi∣ense amongst the Arragonians: The Parliaments, in Scotland, Eng∣land, France, Spaine. 2 Sam. 3.17. Abner communed with the El∣ders of Israel, to bring the King home. And there were Elders in Is∣rael, both in the time of the Judges, and in the time of the Kings; who did not only give advice and counsell to the Judges and Kings, but also were Iudges, no lesse then the Kings, and Iudges; which I shall make good by these places: Deut. 21.19. The rebellious Son is brought to the Elders of the Citie,* 1.406 who had power of life and death, and caused to stone him. Deut. 22.18. The Elders of the Citie shall take that man, and chastise him. Iosh. 20.4. But beside the Elders of every Citie, there were the Elders of Israel, and the Princes, who had al∣so judiciall power of life and death, as the Iudges and King had. Josh. 22.30. Even when Ioshua was Iudge in Israel, the Princes of the Congregation, and heads of the Thousands of Israel, did judicially cognosce whether the Children of Reuben, of Gad, and of halfe the tribe of Manasseh, were apostates from God, and the Religion of Israel. 2 Sam. 5.3. All the Elders of Israel made David King at Hebron: and Num. 11. They are appointed by God not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses, but, v. 14, 17. to beare a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased. Jeremiah is accused, c. 26.10. upon his life, before the Prin∣ces,

Iosh. 7.4. The Princes sit in judgement with Ioshua, Iosh. 9.15. Ioshua and the Princes of the Congregation sware to the Gibeonites, that they would not kill them. The Princes of the house of Israel could not be rebuked for oppression in judgement, Mic. 3.1, 2, 3. if they had not had power of judgement. So Zeph. 3.3. And Deut. 1.17. 2. Chron. 19.6, 7. They are expresly made Iudges in the place of God. And 1 Sam. 8.2. without advise or knowledge of Samuel the supreme Iudge, they conveene and ask a King: and without any head or superior, when there is no King, they conveene a Parlia∣ment, and make David King at Hebron: And when David is ba∣nished, they conveen to bring him home againe: when Tyrannous Athalia reigneth, they conveene and make Ioash King, and that without any King. And Iosh. 22. there is a Parliament conveened, and, for any thing we can read, without Ioshua, to take cognisance of a new Altar. It had been good that the Parliaments both of Scot∣land, and of England, had conveened, though the King had not in∣dicted and summoned a Parliament; without the King, to take or∣der with the wicked Clergie, who had made many idolatrous Altars: And the P. Prelate should have brought an argument to prove it unlawfull, iu foro Dei, to set up the Tables and Conventi∣ons in our Kingdome, when the Prelates were bringing in the gros∣sest idolatrie into the Church, a service for adoring of Altars, of Bread, the worke of the hand of the Bake••;* 1.407 a God more corrupti∣ble then any god of silver and gold.

And against Achabs will and minde, 1 King 18, 19. Elias causeth to kill the Priests of Baal, according to Gods expresse law. It is true, it was extraordinary; but no otherwise extraordinary then it is at this day. When the supreme Magistrate will not execute the judge∣ment of the Lord, Those who made him supreme Magistrate under God, who have, under God, soveraigne libertie to dispose of crownes and kingdomes, are to execute the judgement of the Lord, when wicked men make the law of God of none effect. 1 Sam. 15.32. so Samuel killed Hagage, whom the Lord expresly commanded to be killed; because Saul disobeyed the voyce of the Lord. I deny not but there is necessitie of a cleere warrant that the Magistrate neglect his duty, either in not conveening the States, or not executing the judgement of the Lord. 3. I see not how the conveening of a Parli∣ament is extraordinarie to the States; for none hath power ordi∣nary when the King is dead, or when he is distracted, or captive in

another land, to conveene the Estates and Parliament, but they on∣ly; and in their defect, by the law of Nature, the people may con∣veene. But, 4. If they be essentially Iudges no lesse then the King. as I have demonstrated to the impartiall Reader, in the former Chapter; I conceive, though the State make a positive law, for Orders cause, that the King ordinarily conveene Parliaments; Yet, if we dispute the matter in the court of Conscience, the Estates have intrinsecally (because they are the Estates, and essentially Iudges of the Land) ordinary power to conveene themselves: 1. Because when Moses, by Gods rule, hath appointed seventie men to be Ca∣tholike Iudges in the Land, Moses upon his sole pleasure and will, hath not power to restraine them in the exercise of judgment gi∣ven them of God:* 1.408 for as God hath given to any one Iudge power to judge righteous judgement, though the King command the contra∣ry; so hath he given to him power to sit down in the gate, or the bench, when and where the necessitie of the oppressed people cal∣leth for it: For, 1. the expresse commandement of God, which saith to all Iudges, Execute judgement in the morning; involveth essenti∣ally a precept to all the Physicall actions, without which it is im∣possible to execute judgement: As namely, if by a divine precept the Iudge must execute judgement; ergo, he must come to some publique place, and he must cause partie and witnesses come before him, and he must consider, cognosce, examine in the place of judge∣ment, things, persons, circumstances: and so God who comman∣deth positive acts of judgeing, commandeth the Iudges locomotive power, and his naturall actions of compelling by the sword the par∣ties to come before him: even as Christ who commandeth his ser∣vants to preach, commandeth that the Preacher and the People goe to Church, and that he stand or sit in a place where all may heare, and that he give himselfe to reading and meditating, before he come to preach. And if God command one Iudge to come to the place of judgement, so doth he command seventie, and so all Estates to con∣veen in the place of judgement. It is objected, That the Estates are not Iudges ordinary and habitually, but only Iudges at some certaine occasions, when the King, for cogent and weighty causes, calleth them, and calleth them not to judge, but to give him advise and counsell how to judge. Ans. 1. They are no lesse Iudges habitually then the King, when the common affaires of the whole Kingdome necessita∣teth these Publique Watchmen to come together: for even the King

judgeth not actually, but upon occasion. 2. This is to beg the que∣stion, to say that the Estates are not Iudges, but when the King cal∣leth them, at such and such occasions: for the Elders, Princes and Heads of families and Tribes, were Iudges ordinarie, because they made the King. And 2. the Kingdome, by God, yea, and Church, Iustice and Religion, so far as they concerne the whole Kingdome, are committed not to the keeping of the King only, but to all the Iudges, Elders, and Princes of the Land: And they are rebuked as e∣vening wolves, lyons, oppressors, Ezech. 22.27. Zaca. 3.3. Esa. 3.14, 15. Mic. 3.1, 2, 3. when they oppresse the people in judgement, So are they, Deut. 1.15, 16, 17. 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. made Iudges, and therefore they are no more to be restrained not to conveene, by the Kings power, (which is in this, accumulative and auxiliarie, not privative) then they can be restrained in judgement, and in pronouncing such a sentence, as the King pleased, and not such a sentence:* 1.409 Because as they are to answer to God for unjust sentences, so also for no just sentences, and for not conveening to judge, when Religion and Iustice, which are fallen in the streets, calleth for them. 3. As God in a law of nature, hath given to every man the keeping and selfe-preservation of himselfe, and of his brother; Cain ought in his place to be the keeper of Abel his brother. So hath God committed the keeping of the Commonwealth, by a positive law, not to the King only, because that is impossible,* 1.410 Num. 11.14, 17. 2 Chron. 19.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. 1 Chron. 27. 4. If the King had such a power as King, and so from God, he should have power to breake up the mee∣ting of all Courts of Parliament, Secret Councell, and all inferior Iudicatures: And when the Congregation of gods, as Ps. 82. in the midst of which the Lord standeth, were about to pronounce just judgement for the oppressed and poere, they might be hindred by the King; and so they should be as just as the King maketh them, and might pervert judgement, and take away the righteousnesse of the righteous from him, Esa. 5.23. because the King commandeth: And the cause of the poore should not come before the Iudge, when the King so commandeth. And shall it excuse the Estates, to say, We could not judge the cause of the poore, nor crush the Priests of Baal, and the idolatrous Masse-Preltes, because the King forbad us. So might the King breake up the meeting of the Lords of Session, when they were to decerne that Naboths vineyard should be restored to him; and hinder the States to represse Tyranny: And this were as

much as if the States should say, We made this man our King, and with our good will we agree, he shall be a Tyrant. For if God gave it to him as a King, we are to consent that he enjoy it. 5. If Barclay and other flatterers have leave to make the Parliament but Counsellers and Advisers of the King;* 1.411 and the King to be the only and sole Iudge: 1. The King is, by that same reason, the sole Iudge, in re∣lation to all Iudges; the contrary whereof is cleere, Num. 11.16. Deut, 1.15, 16, 17. 2 Chron. 19.6. Rom. 13.1, 2. 1 Pet. 2.13, 14. Yea but (say they) the King; when he sendeth an Ambassadour, he may tye him to a written Commission; and in so far as he exceedeth that, he is not an Ambassadour: and cleare it is, that all inferiour Iudges, 1 Pet. 2.13, 14. are but sent by the King, ergo, they are so Iudges, as they are but messengers, and are to adhere to the Royall pleasure of the Prince that sent them.

* 1.412Ans. 1. The Ambassadour is not to accept an unjust Ambassage, that fighteth with the Law of nature. 2. The Ambassadour and the Iudge differ, the Ambassadour is the King and States Deputy, both in his call to the Ambassage, and also in the matter of the Ambassage; for which cause he is not to transgresse what is given to him in Writ, as a Rule; but the inferiour Iudges, and the high Court of Parliament, though they were the Kings Deputies (as the Parlia∣ment is in no sort his Deputy, but he their Deputy Royall) yet it is only in respect of their call, not in respect of the matter of their Com∣mission, for the King may send the Iudge to judge in generall accor∣ding to the Law, and Iustice and Religion, but he cannot depute the sentence, and command the conscience of the Judge to pronounce such a sentence, not such, the inferiour Iudge in the act of judging is as independent, and his conscience as immediatly subject to God, as the King, therefore the King owes to every sentence his appro∣bative suffrage as King, but not his either directive suffrage, nor his imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, 6. If the King should sell his Country, and bring in a forraigne Army, the estates are to convene, to take course for the safety of the Kingdome. 7. If Da∣vid exhort the Princes of Israel to helpe King Solomon in governing the Kingdome,* 1.413 in building the Temple, 2 Chron. 32.3. Ezechiah tooke counsell with his Princes, and his mighty men in the matter of holding off the Assyrians, who were to invade the Land, if David 1 Chron. 13.1, 2, 3, 4. consult with the Captaines of thou∣sands, and hundreds to bring the Arke of God to Kireath joarim, if

Solomon 1 King. 8.1. Assemble the Elders of Israel, and all the Heads of the Tribes, and the chief of the fathers to bring the Arke of the Tabernacle, to the congregation of the Lord. And Achab gather to∣gether the States of Israel, in a matter that nearely concerned Reli∣gion. If the Elders and people, 1 King. 20.8. counsell and decree, that King Achab should hearken to Benhadad King of Syria, and if Ahasuerus make no Decrees, but with consent of his Princes, Ester, 1.21. nor Darius any Act without his Nobles and Princes, if Hamor and Schechem, Genes. 34.20. would not make a Covenant with Iacobs Sons, without the consent of the men of the City, and Ephron the Hittite would not sell Abraham a buriall place in his Land without the consent of the children of Heth, Gen. 23.10. Then must the estates have a power of judging with the King or Prince in matters of Religion, Iustice, and Government, which concerne the whole Kingdome; but the former is true by the Re∣cords of Scripture, ergo, so is the latter.

8. The men of Ephraim complaine that Iephtah had gone to warre against the children of Ammon without them,* 1.414 and hence rose warre betwixt the men of Ephraim, and the men of Gilead, Iud. 12.1, 2, 3. and the men of Israel fiercely contend with the men of Iudah, because they brought King David home againe without them, pleading that they were therein dispised, 2 Sam. 19.41, 42, 43. which evinceth that the whole States have hand in matters of pub∣lick government, that concerne all the Kingdome; and when there is no King, Iudg. 20. The chiefe of the people, and of all the Tribes goe out in battell, against the children of Benjamin.

9. These who make the King, and so have power to unmake him in the case of Tyranny,* 1.415 must be above the King in power of Go∣vernment; but the Elders and Princes made both David and Saul Kings.

10. There is not any who say that the Princes and people, 1 Sam. 14. did not right in rescuing innocent Ionathan from death,* 1.416 against the Kings Will, and his Law.

11. The speciall ground of Royalists is to make the King the ab∣solute supreame,* 1.417 giving all life and power to the Parliament and States, and of meere grace convening them. So Ferne, the Author of Ossorianum, p. 69. but this ground is false, because the Kings power is fiduciary, and put in his hand upon trust, and must be mi∣nisteriall, and borrowed from these who put him in trust, and so his

power must be lesse, and derived from the Parliament: but the Parliament hath no power in trust from the King, because the time was, when the man who is the King, had no power, and the Parlia∣ment had the same power that they now have; and now when the King hath received power from them, they have the whole power that they had before. That is, to make Lawes, and resigned no po∣wer to the King, but to execute Lawes, and his convening of them is an Act of Royall Duty, which he oweth to the Palia∣ment by vertue of his Office, and is not an act of grace, for an act of grace is an act of free Will, and what the King doth of free Will, he may not doe, and so he may never convene a Parliament. But when David, Salomon, Asa, Ezekiah, Iehosaphat, Achas convened Parliaments, they convened Parliaments as Kings, and so Ex debito & virtute officii, out of debt and Royall Obligation, and if the King as the King, be Lex animata, a breathing and living Law, the King as King must doe by obligation of Law, what he doth as King, and not from spontaneous and Arbitrary grace. 2. If the Scripture holds forth to us a King in Jsrael, and two Princés and Elders who made the King, and had power of life and death, as we have seene; then is there in Israel Monarchy tempered with Aristocracy; and if there were Elders and Rulers in every City, as the Scripture saith, here was also Aristocracy and Democracy. And for the warrant of the power of the Estates I appeale to Iurists, and to approved Authors. Argu. l. aliud. 160. §. 1. De Iur. Reg. l. 22. Mortuo de fidei. l. 11.14. ad Mum. l. 3.1.4. Sigonius De Rep. Iudaeor. l. 6. c. 7. Cornelius Bertramo, c. 12. Iunius Brutus Vindic. contra. Tyran. §. 2. Author Libelli de jur Magistrat. in subd. q. 6. Althus. Politic. c. 18. Calvin Institut. l. 4. c. 20. Pareus Coment. in Rom. 13. Pet. Martyr in Lib. Iudic. c. 3. Ioan. Marianus de rege Lib. 1. c. 7. Hottoman de jure Antiq. Regni Gallici l. 1. c. 12. Buchanan De jure Regni apud Scotos.

Obj. The King after a more noble way representeth the people, then the Estates doth; for the Princes and Commissioners of Parliament have all their power from the people, and the peoples power is concen∣tricated in the King.

Ans. The Estates taken collectively doe represent the people both in respect of Office, and of persons, because they stand Iudges for them; for many represent many, ratione numeri & officii, better then one doeth. The King doth unproperly represent the people,

though the power for actuall execution of Lawes, be more in the King, yet a legislative power is more in the Estates. Neither will it follow, that if the Estates of a Kingdome doe any thing but counsell a King, they must then command him; for a legall and judiciall ad∣vice hath influence in the effect to make it a Law, not on the Kings Will, to cause him give the being of a Law to that, which without his Will is no Law, for this supponeth that he is only Iudge.

Obj. What power the people reserveth, they reserve it to them∣selves in unitate, as united in a Parliament; and therefore what they doe out of a Parliament is tumultous.

Ans. I deny the consequence, they reserve the power of selfe pre∣servation out of a Parliament, and a power of convening in Parlia∣ment for that effect, that they may by Common Counsell defend themselves.

QUEST. XXII. Whether the power of the King as King be absolute, or dependent and limited by Gods first mould and paterne of a King?

DOctor Ferne sheweth us it was never his purpose to plead for absolutenesse of an Arbitrary commandement,* 1.418 free from all Morall restraint laid on the power by Gods Law; but only he stri∣veth for a power in the King that cannot be resisted by the subject. But truely we never disputed with Royalists of any absolute power in the King, free from Morall subjection to Gods Law 1. Because any bond that Gods Law imposeth on the King, it commeth wholly from God, and the nature of a Divine Law,* 1.419 and not from any volun∣tary contract, or covenant, either expresse, or tacito, betwixt the King and the people who made him King, for if he faile against such a covenant, though he should exceed the cruelty of a King, or a man, and become a Lion and a Nero, a Mother-killer, he should in all his inhumanity and breach of covenant be countable to God, not to any man on earth. 2. To dispute with Royalists, if Gods Law lay any Morall restraint upon the King, nor to dispute whether the King be a rationall man, or no; and whether he can sin against God, and shall cry in the day of Gods wrath (if he be a wicked Prince) Hills fall on us, and cover us, as it is Revel. 6.15, 16. and whether Tophet be prepared for all workers of iniquity; and cer∣tainly I justifie the Schoole-men in that question: Whether or no God could have created a rationall creature, such a one as by na∣ture

is impeccable, and not naturally capable of sinne before God? if Royalists dispute this question of their absolute Monarch, they are wicked Divines.

2. We plead not at this time (saith the Prelate stealing from Gro∣tius,* 1.420 Barclaius, Arnisaeus, who spake it with more sinewes of rea∣son) for a (masterly, or) despoticall, or rather a slavishing Sove∣raignty, which is Dominium herile, an absolute power, such as the great Turke this day exerciseth over his subjects, and the King of Spaine hath over, and in his territories without Europe: we maintain only regiam potestatem, quae fundatur in paterna, such royall fatherly So∣veraignty as we live under, blessed be God, and our predecessors. This (saith he) as it hath its Royall Prerogative inherent to the Crowne naturally, and inseparable from it, so it trencheth not upon the liberty of the person, or the property of the goods of the subject, but in, and by the lawfull and just acts of jurisdiction.

Ans. 1. Here is another absolute power disclaimed to be in the King, he hath not such a masterly and absolute liberty as the Turke hath. Why? Iohn P. P. in such a tender and high point as con∣cerneth soule and body of subjects in three Christian Kingdomes, you should have taught us 1. What bonds and fetters any covenant or paction betwixt the King and people layeth upon the King, why he hath not as King the power of the great Turke. I will tell you. The Great Turke may command any of his subjects to leape into a mountaine of fire, and burne himselfe quick, in conscience of obe∣dience to his Law. And what if the subject disobey the Great Turk? if the Great Turke be a lawfull Prince, as you will not deny. And if the King of Spaine should command forraine conquered slaves to doe the like. By your Doctrine neither the one, nor the other were obliged to resist by violence,* 1.421 but to pray, or fly, which both were to speake to stones, and were like the man, who in case of ship-wrack, made his devotion of praying to the waves of the sea, not to enter the place of his bed and drowne him. But a Christian King hath not this power; Why, and a Christian King (by Royalists doctrine) hath a greater power then the Turke (if greater can be) he hath power to command his subjects to cast themselves into Hell∣fire; that is, to presse on them a service wherein it is written. (Adore the worke of mens hands in the place of the living God) and this is worse then the Turkes commandement of bodily burning quick. And what is left to the Christian Subjects, in this case, is the

very same, and no other then is left to the Turkish and forraigne Spanish subject; Either flee, or make prayers: There is no more left to us. 2. Many Royalists maintaine, that England is a conque∣red Nation. Why then, see what power, by law of Conquest,* 1.422 the King of Spaine hath over his slaves, the same must the King of Eng∣land have over his subjects. For, to Royalists, a title by Conquest to a Crown, is as lawfull as a title by birth or election. For lawful∣nesse, in relation to Gods law, is placed in an indivisible point, if we regard the essence of lawfulnesse: And therefore there is nothing left to England, but that all Protestants who take the oath of a Pro∣testant King, to defend the true Protestant Religion, should, after prayers, conveyed to the King through the fingers of Prelates and Papists; leave the Kingdome empty to Papists, Prelates and A∣theists.

3. All power restrained,* 1.423 that it cannot arise from ten degrees to foureteen, from the Kingly power of Saul, 1 Sam. 8.9, 11. to the Kingly power of the Great Turke, to fourteen; 1. must either be restrained by Gods law; 2. or by Mans law; or 3. by the innate goodnes and grace of the Prince; or 4. by the providence of God. A restraint from Gods law is vaine: for it is no question between us and Royalists, but God hath laid a morall restraint on Kings, and all men, that they have not morall power to sinne against God. 2. Is the restraint laid on by mans law? What law of man? 1. The Roy∣alist saith, 1. The King, as King, is above all law of man. Then (say I) no law of man can hinder the Kings power of ten, to arise to the Turkish power of foureteen. 2. All law of man, as it is mans law, is seconded either with Ecclesiasticall and spirituall coaction, such as Excommunication;, or with Civill and temporall coaction, such as is the Sword, if it be violated. But Royalists deny, that either the sword of the Church in Excommunication, or the Civill sword, should be drawn against the King. 3. This law of man should be produced by this profound Iurist, the P. Prelate, who mocketh at all the Statists and Lawyers of Scotland. It is not a covenant be∣twixt the King and People, at his Coronation: for though there were any such covenant, yet the breach of it doth binde before God, but not before man: nor can I see, or any man else, how a law of man can lay a restraint on the Kings power of two degrees, to can∣cell it within a Law, more then on a power of ten, or fourteene de∣grees. If the King of Spaine, the lawfull Soveraigne of those over-European

people, (as Royalists say) have a power of foureteene de∣grees over those conquered Subjects, as a King; I see not how he hath not the like power over his own Subjects of Spaine, to wit, even of Foureteen: for what agreeth to a King, as a King, (and Kingly power from God he hath as King) he hath it in relation to all Subjects, except it be taken from him in relation to some Sub∣j••cts, and given by some law of God; or in relation to some other Subjects. Now, no man can produce any such law. 4. The nature of the goodnesse and grace of the Prince, cannot lay bonds on the King, to cancell his power, that he should not usurpe the power of the King of Spaine toward his over-Europeans. 1. Royalists plead for a power due to the King, as King, and that from God; such as Saul had, 1 Sam. 8.9, 11. 1 Sam. 10.25. But this power should be a power of grace and goodnesse in the King, as a good man; not in the King, as a King, and due to him by law: And so the King should have his Legall power from God, to be a Tyrant. But if he were not a Tyran••, but should lay limits on his own power, through the goodnesse of his own nature; No thankes to Royalists that he is not a Tyrant: For, actu primo, and as he is a King, (as they say) he is a Tyrant, having from God a Tyrannous power of ten degrees, as Saul had, 1 Sam. 8. and why not of foureteen degrees, as well as the Great Turke, or the King of Spaine? if he use it not, it is his own personall goodnesse, not his officiall and Royall power. 4. The rastraint of Providence laid by God upon any power to doe ill, hin∣dreth only the exercise of the power not to breake forth in as Ty∣rannous acts as ever the King of Spaine, or the great Turke can exercise toward any. Yea, Providence layeth Physicall restraint, and possibly morall, sometimes, upon the exercise of that power that Devils, and the most wicked men of the world hath: but Royalists must shew us that Providence hath laid bounds on the Kings power, and made it fatherlie, and not masterly; so that if it the power ex∣ceed bounds of fatherly power, and passe over to the dispoticall and masterly power, it may be resisted by the Subjects. But that they will not say. 4. This paternall and fatherly power that God hath given to Kings, as Royalists teach, it trencheth not upon the libertie of the Subjects, and propertie of their goods; but in, and by lawfull and just acts of Jurisdiction (saith the P. Prelate:) Well; Then it may trench upon the libertie of soule and body of the Subjects; but in, and by lawfull and just acts of of jurisdiction: But none are to judge

of these acts of Iurisdiction, whether they be just or not just, but the King, the only Iudge of supreme and absolute authoritie and power. And if the King command the idolatrous service in the obtruded Service-booke, it is a lawfull and a just act of jurisdiction: For to Royalists, who make the Kings power absolute, all acts are so just to the Subject, though he command Idolatrie and Turcisme, that we are to suffer only, and not to resist. 5. The Prelate presumeth that Fatherly power is absolute: But so if a father murther his childe, he is not comptable to the Magistrate therefore; but being absolute over his children, only the Judge of the World, not any power on earth can punish him. 6. We have proved that the Kings power is pa∣ternall or fatherly only, by analogie, and improperly. 7. What is this Prerogative Royall, we shall heare by and by, 8. There is no restraint on Earth, laid upon this fatherly power of the King, but Gods law, which is a morall restraint. If then the King challenge as great a power as the Turke hath, he o••ly sinneth against God; but no mortall man on earth may controll him, as Royalists teach: and who can know what power it is that Royalists plead for, whether a dispoticall power of Lordly power, or a fatherly power? If it be a power above law, such as none on earth may resist it; it is no matter whether it be above law of two degrees, or of twenty, even to the Great Turkes power.

These goe for Oracles, at Court. Tacitus. Principi summum re∣rum arbitrium Dii dederunt, subditis obsequii gloria relicta est. Sene∣ca. Indigna digna habenda sunt, Rex quae facit. Salustius. Impunè quidvis facere, id est, Regem esse. As if to be a King, and to be a God, who cannot erre, were all one. But certainly, these Authors are taxing the Licence of Kings, and not commanding their power.

But that God hath given no absolute and unlimited power to a King, above the law, is evident by this:

Arg. 1. He who in his first institution, is appointed of God, by office, even when he sitteth on the throne,* 1.424 to take heed to read on a written copie of Gods law, that he may learne to feare the Lord his God, and keep all the words of this law, &c. He is not of absolute power above law. But, Deut. 17.18, 19. the King, as King, while he sitteth on the Throne, is to doe this; Ergo, the Assumption is cleare: for this is the law of the King, as King; and not of a man, as a man. But as he sitteth on the Throne, he is to read on the booke of the Law: and ver. 20. Because he is King, his heart is not to be lifted up

above his brethren. And as King, v. 16. he is not to multiply horses, &c. So Polititians make this argument good: They say, Rex est lex viva, animata. & loquens lex: The King, as King, is a living, brea∣thing,* 1.425 and speaking Law. And there be three reasons of this: 1. If all were innocent persons, and could doe no violence one to ano∣ther; the Law would rule all, and all men would put the Law in execution, agendo sponte, by doing right of their own accord; and there should be no need of a King to compell men to do right. But now, because men are, by nature, averse to good lawes, therefore there was need of a Ruler, who by office should reduce the Law in∣to practice: and so is the King the Law reduced in practice. 2. The Law is ratio five mens, the reason or minde, free from all perturba∣tions of anger, lust, hatred, and cannot be tempted to ill; and the King, as a man, may be tempted by his own passions; and therefore as King, he commeth by office out of himselfe to reason and law; and so much as he hath of Law, so much of a King; and in his re∣motest distance from Law and Reason, he is a Tyrant. 3. Abstracta concretis sunt puriora & perfectiora. Iustice is perfecter then a just man, Whitenes perfecter then the white wall: so the neerer the King comes to a Law, for the which he is a King, the neerer to a King; Propter quod unumquodque tale, id ipsum magis tale. Therefore Kings throwing lawes to themselves, as men, whereas they should have conformed themselves to the Law, have erred. Cambyses the sonne of Cyrus, because he loved his own sister, would have the ma∣riage of the brother with the sister, lawfull. Anaxarchus said to Ale∣xander, grieved in minde that he had killed Clytus: Regi ac Iovi Themin atque Iustitiam assidere: Iudgement and Righteousnesse did alway accompanie God and the King in all they doe. But some to this purpose say better; The Law, rather then the King, hath power of life and death.

* 1.426Arg. 2. The power that the King hath (I speak not of his gifts) he hath it from the people, who maketh him King, as I proved be∣fore: but the people have neither formally nor virtually any power absolute to give the King, all the power they have, is a legall and naturall power to guide themselves in peace and godlinesse, and save themselves from unjust violence, by the benefit of Rulers. Now an absolute power above a Law is a power to doe ill, and to destroy the people, and this the people have not themselves, it being repugnant to nature, that any should have a naturall power in themselves to

destroy themselves, or to inflict upon themselves an evill of punish∣ment to destruction. Though therefore it were given, which yet is not granted, that the people had resigned all power that they have into their King, yet if he use a Tyrannicall power against the peo∣ple for their hurt and destruction, he useth a power that the people never gave him; and against the intention of nature: for they in∣vested a man with power to be their father, and defender for their good, And he faileth against the peoples intention in usurping an over power to himselfe, which they never gave, never had, never could give, for they cannot give what they never had, and power to destroy themselves they never had.

3. Arg. All Royall Power, whereby a King is a King,* 1.427 and differenced from a private man, armed with no power of the sword, is from God.

But absolute power to Tyranize over the people,* 1.428 and to destroy them, is not a power from God: Ergo there is not any such royall power absolute. The proposition is evident, because that God who maketh Kings, and disposeth of Crownes, Prov. 8.15, 16. 2 Sam. 12.7. Daniel 4.32. must also create and give that Royall and Offi∣ciall power, by which a King is a King, 1. Because God created man, he must be the Author of his reasonable soule; if God be the Author of things, he must be the Author of their formes, by which they are, that which they are. 2. All power is Gods. 1 Chro. 29.11 Matth. 6.13. Ps. 62.11. P••. 68.35. Dan. 2.37. And that absolute power to Tyrannize, is not from God.* 1.429 1. Because if this Morall power to sinne be from God, it being formally wickednesse, God must be the Author of sinne. 2. What ever Morall power is from God, the exercises of that power, and the acts thereof must be from God, and so these acts must be Morally good and just; for if the Morall power be of God, as the Author, so must the acts be. Now the acts of a Tyrannicall power are acts of sinfull unjustice and oppression, and cannot be from God. 3. Polititians say, There is no power in Rulers to doe ill, but to helpe and defend the people, as the power of a Physitian to destroy; of a Pilot to cast away the ship on a Rock, the power of a Tutor to wast the inheritance of the Orphan, and the power of father and mother to kill their children, and of the mighty to defraud and oppresse, are not powers from God. So Ferdinand Vasquez illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 26. c. 45. Pruckman d. c. 3. §. Soluta potestas. Althus. pol. cap. 9. n. 25.

* 1.430Barclaius, Grotius, Doct. Ferne, (The P. Prelates wit could come up to it) say, That absolute power to do ill, so as no mortall man can lawfully resist it is from God; and the King hath this way power from God as no subject can resist it, but he must resist the Ordinance of God, and yet the power of tyranny is not simply from God.

Answ. The Law saith, Illud possumus quod jure possumus, Papinus F. filius,* 1.431 D. de cond. Just. The Law saith, It is no power which is not lawfull power. The Royalists say, power of Tyranny in so farre as it may be resisted, and is punishable by men, is not from God; but what is the other part of the distinction; it must be, that Tyranni∣call power is simpliciter from God, or in it self it is from God, but as it is punishable or restrainable by subjects, it is not from God: now to be punishable by subjects, is but an accident and tyrannicall power is the subject, yea, and it is an separable accident; for many Tyrants are never punished, and their power is never restrained, such a Tyrant was Saul, and many persecuting Emperours: Now if the Tyrannicall power it self was from God, the argument is yet valid, and remaineth unanswered; and shall not this fall to the ground as false, which Arnisaeus de autho. princ. c. 2. n. 10. Dum contra officium facit. Magistratus non est Magistratus, quippe a quo non injuria, sed jus nasci debeat, l. meminerint. 6. C. unde vi. din. in C. quod quis, 24. n. 4, 5.—Et de hoc neminem dubitare aut dissentire scribit, Ma∣rant. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1. num. 14. When the Magistrate doth by violence, and without law any thing▪ in so farre doing against his Office, he is not a Magistrate; then say I, that power by which he doth, is not of God. 2. None doeth then resist the Ordinance of God, who resist the King in Tyrannous acts. 2. If the power, as it cannot be punished by the subject, nor restrained, be from God. Ergo, the Tyrannicall power itself, and without this accident (that it can be punished by men) it must be from God also; but the conclusion is absurd, and denied by Royalists. I prove the connexion: For if the King have such a power above all restraint, the power it self, to wi••, King Davids power to kill innocent Vriah, and defloor Bath∣shebah, without the accident, of being restrained or punished by men, is either from God, or not from God; if it be from God, it must be a power against the sixth and seventh Commandment, which God gave to David, and not to any subject, and so David lied when he confessed this sin, and this sin cannot be pardoned because it was no sin; and Kings because Kings, are under no tye of duties

of mercy and truth, and j••stice to their subjects, contrary to that which Gods Law requireth of all Judges, Deut. 1.15, 16, 17. and 17.15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. 2 Chro. 19.6, 7. Rom. 13.3, 4. If this power be from God, as it is unrestrainable and unpunishable by the subject, it is not from God at all; for how can God give a power to do ill, that is unpunishable by men, and not give that power to do ill; it is unconceiveable: For in this very thing that God giveth to David, a power to murther the innocent, with this respect. That it shall be punishable by God onely, and not by men, God must give it as a sinfull power to do ill, which must be a power of dispensati∣on to sin, and so not to be punished by either God, or man, which is contrary to his revealed will in his word: If such a power as not restrainable by man, be from God, by way of permission, as a power to sin in divels, and men is, then it is no Royall power, nor any Ordinance of God, and to resist this power, is not to resist the Or∣dinance of God.

Argum. 4. That power which maketh the benefit of a King,* 1.432 to be no benefit, but a judgement of God,* 1.433 as a making all the people slaves, such as were slaves amongst the Romans and Jews, is not to be asserted by any Christian: but an absolute power to do ill, and to Tyrannize, which is supposed to be an essentiall and constitutive of Kings, to difference them from all Judges, maketh the benefit of a King no benefit, but a judgement of God, as making all the people slaves. That the major may be clear, It is evident to have a King, is a blessing of God, because to have no King is a judgement, Judg. 17.6. Every man doth what seemeth good in his own eyes, Judg. 18.1. and 19.1. and 21.25. 2. So it is a part of Gods good providence to provide a King for his people, 1 Sam. 16.1. so 2 Sam. 5.12. And David perceived that the Lord had established him King over Israel, and that he had exalted his Kingdom, for his people Israels sake, 2 Sam. 15.2, 3, 6. 2 Sam. 18.3. Rom. 13.2, 3, 4. If the King be a thing good in it self, then can he not actu primo, be a curse and a judgement, and essentially a bondage and slavery to the people: also the genuine and intrinsecall end of a King is the good, Rom. 13.4. and the good of a quiet a peaceable life in all godlinesse and honesty, 1 Tim. 2.2. and he is by Office, custos utrius∣que tabulae, whose genuine end is to preserve the law from violence, and to defend the subject; he is the peoples debtor for all happy∣nesse possible to be procured by Gods sword, either in peace or

war, at home or abroad. For the assumption, it is evident. An ab∣solute and Arbitrary power is a King-law, such as Royalists say God gave to Saul, 1 Sam. 8.9, 11. and 10.25. to play the Tyrant, and this power Arbitrary and unlimited above all Laws, is that which 1. Is given of God. 2. Distinguisheth essentially the Kings of Israel from the Iudge, saith Barclay, Grotius, Arnisaeus. 3. A constitutive form of a King, therefore it must be actu primo a bene∣fit, and a blessing of God: but if God hath given any such power absolute to a King, as 1. His will must be a law, either to do or suffer all the Tyranny and cruelty of a Tyger, Leopard, or a Nero, and a Julian, then hath God given actu primo, a power to a King as King, to inslave the people and flock of God, redeemed by the blood of God, as the slaves among the Romans and Iews, who were so under their masters, as their bondage was a plague of God, and the lives of the people of God under Pharaoh, who compelled them to work in brick and clay. 2. Though he cut the throats of the people of God, as the Lionnesse Queen Mary did, and command an Army of souldiers to come and burn the Cities of the Land, and kill man, wife, and children; yet in so doing, he doth the part of a King, so as you cannot resist him as a man, and obey him as a King, but must give your necks to him, upon this ground, because this absolute power of his is ordained of God; and there is no power, even to kill, and destroy the innocent, but it is of God, so saith Paul, Rom. 13. If we beleeve Court-Prophets, or rather Lying-Spi∣rits, who perswade the King of Britain, to make war against his three Dominions. Now it is clear, that the distinction of bound and free, continued in Israel even under the most tyrannous Kings, 2 Kings 4.1. yea, even when the Iews were captives under Aha∣suerus, Esther 7.4. And what difference should there be between the people of God under their own Kings, and when they were captives under Tyrants, serving wood and stone, and false gods, as was threatned, as a curse in the Law, Deut. 28, 25, 36, 64, 68. If their own Kings by Gods appointment have the same absolute power over them; and if he be a Tyrant, actu primo, that is, if he be indued with absolute power, and so have power to play the Ty∣rant, then must the people of God be actu primo, slaves, and under absolute subjection, for they are relatives, as lord and servant, con∣querour and captive. It is true, they say, Kings by office are fathers, they cannot put forth in action their power to destroy: I answer, it is

their goodnesse of nature, that they put not forth in action, all their absolute power to destroy, which God hath given them as Kings; and therefore thanks are due to their goodnesse, for that they do not actu secundo play the Tyrant; for Royalists teach that by vertue of their office, God hath given to them a Royall power to destroy. Ergo, The Lords people are slaves under them, though they deal not with them as slaves, but that hindereth not, but the people by condition are slaves: so, many Conquerours of old, did deal kindely with these slaves whom they took in war, and dealt with them as sons, but as Conquerours they had power to sell them, to kill them, to put them to work in brick and clay: so say I here, Royall power and a King, cannot be a blessing,* 1.434 and actu primo a favour of God to the people; for the which they are to pray, when they want a King, that they may have one, or to praise God when they have one. But a King must be a curse and a judgement, if he be such a creature as essentially, and in the intention and nature of the thing it self, hath by office a Royall power to destroy, and that from God; for then the people praying (Lord give us a King) should pray (make us slaves, Lord, take our Libertie and power from us, and give a power illimited and absolute to one man, by which he may (if he please) waste us and destroy us, as all the bloody Emperours did the people of God.) Surely, I see not but they should pray for a temp∣tation, and to be led in temptation when they pray God to give them a King, and therefore such a power is a vain thing.

Argum. 5. A power contrary to justice. 2. To peace and the good of the people. 3. That looketh to no law as a rule,* 1.435 and so is unreasonable, and forbidden by the Law of God,* 1.436 and the Civill Law, L. 15. filius de condit. Instit. cannot be a lawfull power, and cannot constitute a lawfull Iudge; but an absolute and unlimited power is such: How can the Iudge be the Minister of God for good to the people, Rom. 13.4? If he have such a power as a King given him of God to destroy and waste the people?

Argum. 6. An absolute power is contrary to nature,* 1.437 and so un∣lawfull;* 1.438 for it maketh the people give away the naturall power of defending their life against illegall and cruell violence, and maketh a man who hath need to be ruled and lawed by nature, above all rule and law; and one who by nature can sin against his brethren,* 1.439 such a one as cannot sin against any, but God onely, and maketh him a Lion and an unsociall man. What a man is Nero, whose life is

poesie & paintry, Domitian only an Archer. Valentinian only a Pain∣ter, Charles the 9••h. of France only an Hunter, Alphonsus Dux Ferra∣riensis only an Astronomer, Philippe of Macedo only a Musitian, and all because they are Kings? This our King denyeth when he saith, Art. 13. There is power legally placed in the Parliament, more then sufficient to prevent and restraine the power of Tyranny. But if they had not power to play the Lions, it is not much that Kings are Musitians, Hunters, &c.

* 1.4407. God in making •• King to preserve his people, should give li∣berty without all politick restraint,* 1.441 for one man to destroy many; which is contrary to Gods end in the fift Commandement, if one have absolute power to destroy soules and bodies of many thousands.

* 1.4428. If the Kings of Israel and Iudah were under censures and rebukes of the Prophets,* 1.443 and sinned against God and the people in rejecting these rebukes, and in persecuting the Prophets, and were under this Law not to take their neighbours wife, or his Vine∣yard from him against his will, and the inferiour Iudges were to accept the persons of none in Iudgement, small or great; and if the King yet remaine a brother, notwithstanding he be a King, then is his power not above any Law nor absolute: for what reason? 1. He should be under one Law of God to be executed by men, and not under another Law? Royalists are to shew a difference from Gods Word. 2. His neighbours, brother, or subjects may by vio∣lence keepe back their Vineyards, and chastity from the King: Na∣both may by force keepe his owne Vineyard from Achab; by the Lawes of Scotland, if a subject obtaine a Decree of the King of vio∣lent possession of the Heritages of a subject, he hath by Law, power to cast out, force, apprehend and deliver to prison these who are Tenants, brooking these Lands by the Kings personall Commande∣ment.* 1.444 If a King should force a Damsell, she may violently resist, and by violence, and bodily opposing of violence to violence, defend her owne chastity. Now that the Prophets have rebuked Kings is evident Samuel rebuked Saul, Nathan David, Elias King Achab. Ieremiah is commanded to Prophesie against the Kings of Iudah, Ier. 1.18. and the Prophets practised it, Ier. 19.3. c. 21.2. c. 22.13, 14, 15. Hos. 5.1. Kings are guilty before God, because they submitted not their Royall power and greatnesse to the rebukes of the Prophets, but persecuted them.

2 Deut. 17.20. The King on the Throne remaineth a Brother, Psal. 22.22. and so the Iudges or three Estates are not to accept of the Person of the King, for his greatnesse, in Iudgement, Deut. 1.16, 17. and the Iudge is to give out such a sentence in Iudgement as the Lord, with whom there is no iniquity, would give out, if the Lord himselfe were sitting in Iudgement; because the Iudge is in the very stead of God, as his Lievtenant, 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. Ps. 82.1, 2. Deut. 1.17. And with God there is no respect of persons, 2 Chro. 19.7. 1 Pet. 1.17. Act. 10.34. I doe not intend that, any inferiour Iudge sent by the King, is to judge the King, but these who gave him the Throne, and made him King are truely above him, and to judge him without respect of persons, as God would judge himselfe, if he himselfe were sitting in the Beanch.

3. God is the Author of Civill Lawes and Government, and his intention is therein the externall peace and quiet life,* 1.445 and godli∣nesse of his Church and people, and that all Iudges according to their places be Nurse-fathers to the Church, Esay 49.23. Now God must have appointed sufficient meanes for this end; but there is no sufficient meanes at all, but a meere Anarchy and confusion, if to one man an absolute and unlimited power be given of God, whereby at his pleasure he may obstruct the fountaines of Iustice, and command Lawyers and Lawes to speake not Gods mind, that is Iustice, righte∣ousnesse, safety, true Religion, but the sole lust and pleasure of one man. And 2. this one having absolute and irresistible influence on all the inferiour Instruments of Iustice, may by this power turne all into Anarchy, and put the people in a worse condition, then if there were no Iudge at all in the Land. For that of Polititians, that Ty∣ranny is better then Anarchy, is to be taken Cum grano salis; but I shall never beleeve, that absolute power of one man, which is actu primo. Tyranny is Gods sufficient way of peaceable government. Therefore Barclaius saith nothing for the contrary, when he saith, The Athenians made Draco and Solon absolute Law-givers, For,* 1.446 a facto ad jus non valet consequentia. What if a roving people trusting Draco and Solon to be Kings above mortall men, and to be gods, gave them power to make Lawes written, not with Inke, but with blood: Shall other Kings have from God the like Tyrannicall and bloody power from that, to make bloody Lawes? Chytreus, Lib. 2. and Sleidan citeth it. l. 1. Sueton. Sub paena periurii non tenentur fiden∣sevare regi degeneri.

* 1.4479. He who is regulated by Law, and sweareth to the three E∣states to be regulated by Law, and accepteth the Crown Covenant-wise, and so as the Estates would refuse to make him their King, if either he should refuse to sweare, or if they did beleeve certainly that he would breake his oath; he hath no illimited and absolute power from God or the People: for, faedus conditionatum, aut pro∣missio conditionalis mutua, facit jus alteri in alterum: A mutuall conditionall Covenant giveth law and power over one to another. But from that which hath been said; The King sweareth to the three-Estates, to be regulated by Law; He accepteth the Crowne upon the tenor of a mutuall covenant, &c. for if he should, as King, sweare to be King, that is, one who hath absolute power above a Law; and also to be regulated by a Law: he should sweare things contradictorie, that is, that he should be their King, having abso∣lute power over them, and according to that power to rule them: and he should sweare, not to be their King, and to rule them, not according to absolute power, but according to Law. If therefore this absolute power be essentiall to a King, as a King; no King can lawfully take the oath to governe according to Law: for then he should sweare not to reigne as King, and not be their King; For how could he be their King, wanting that which God hath made es∣sentiall to a King, as a King?

QUEST. XXIII. Whether the King hath any Royall prerogative, or a power to dis∣pence with Lawes? And some other grounds against absolute Monarchie.

* 1.448A Prerogative Royall, I take two wayes: 1. Either to be an act of meere will and pleasure, above, or beside Reason or Law: Or, an act of dispensation, beside, or against the letter of the Law.

Assert. 1. That which Royalists call the Prerogative Royall of Princes, is the salt of Absolute Power; and it is a supreme and highest power of a King, as a King, to doe above, without, or con∣trary to a Law, or Reason: which is unreasonable.

1. When Gods word speaketh of the power of Kings and Iudges, Deut. 17.15, 16, 17. Deut. 1.15, 16, 17. and elsewhere, there is not any footstep, or ground for such a power: and therefore (if

we speake according to conscience) there is no such thing in the world: And because Royalists cannot give us any warrant,* 1.449 it is to be rejected.

2. A Prerogative Royall must be a power of doing good to the people, and grounded upon some reason or law: but this is but a branch of an ordinarie limited power, and no prerogative above or beside law. Yea, any power not grounded on a reason different from meere will or absolute pleasure, is an irrationall and brutish power; and therefore it may well be jus personae, the power of the man who is King; it cannot be jus coronae,* 1.450 any power annexed to the Crown: for this holdeth true of all the actions of a King, as a King. Illud potest Rex, & illud tantum quod jur•• potest. The King, as King, can doe no more, then that which upon right and law he may doe.

3. To dispute this question,* 1.451 Whether such a Prerogative agree to any King, as King; is to dispute whether God hath made all un∣der a Monarch, slaves, by their own consent: which is a vaine que∣stion. 2. Those who hold such a Prerogative, must say, the King is so absolute and illimited a God on earth, that either by law, or his sole pleasure beside law, he may regularly and rationally move all wheeles in Policie; and his uncontrolled will shall be the axeltree on which all the wheeles are turned.

4. That which is the garland and proper flower of the King of Kings, as he is absolute above his creatures, and not tyed to any law,* 1.452 without himselfe, that regulateth his will; That must be given to no mortall man, or King, except we would communicate that which is Gods proper due, to a sinfull man; which must be idolatrie. But to doe Royall acts out of an absolute power above Law and Reason, is such a power as agreeth to God, as is evident in positive lawes, and in acts of Gods meere pleasure, where we see no reason with∣out the Almightie, for the one side, rather than for the other; as Gods forbidding the eating of the tree of knowledge, maketh the ea∣ting, sinne, and contrary to reason;* 1.453 but there is no reason in the ob∣ject: for if God should command eating of that tree, not to eat, should be also sinne. So Gods choosing Peter to glory, and his re∣fusing Judas, is a good and a wise act, but not good or wise from the object of the act, but from the sole wise pleasure of God; because, if God had chosen Judas to glory, and rejected Peter, that act had been no lesse a good and a wise act, then the former. For when there

is no law in the object, but only Gods will, the act i•• good and wise, seeing infinite wisdome cannot be separated from the perfect will of God: but no act of a mortall King, having sole and only will, and neither law nor reason in it, can be a lawfull, a wise, or a good act.

Assert. 2. There is something which may be called a Prerogative by way of dispensation.* 1.454 There is a threefold dispensation; one of power, another of justice, and a third of grace. A dispensation of power, is, when the will of the Law-giver maketh that act to be no sinne, which without that will would have been sinne: As if Gods commanding Will had not interveened, the Israelites borrow∣ing the eare-rings and jewels of the Egyptians, and not restoring them, had been a breach of the 8 Commandement: and in this sense no King hath a Prerogative to dispence with a Law.

* 1.4552. There is a dispensation of law and justice, not flowing from any Prerogative, but from the true intent of the Law. And thus the King, yea the inferiour Judge, is not to take the life of a man, whom the letter of the Law would condemne; because the Justice of the Law, is the intent and life of the Law: and where nothing is done against the intent of the Law, there is no breach of any Law.

The Third is not unlike unto the Second, when the King expo∣neth the Law by Grace:* 1.456 and this is twofold; 1. Either when he exponeth it of his wisdome and mercifull nature, inclined to mercy and justice; yet according to the just intent, native sense and scope of the Law, considering the occasion, circumstances of the fact, and comparing both with the Law: and this dispensation of grace I grant to the King; As when the tribute is great, and the man poor, the King may dispense with the custome.* 1.457 2. The Law saith, In a doubtfull case the Prince may dispense, because it is presumed, the Law can have no sense against the principall sense and intent of the Law.

But there is another dispensation that Royalists doe plead for, and that is, a power in the King, ex mera gratia absolutae potestatis regalis; Out of meere grace of absolute Royall power, to pardon crimes, which Gods law saith, should be punished by death. Now this they call a power of Grace; but it is not a power of meere Grace.

But, 1. Though Princes may doe some things of Grace, yet not of meere Grace: because, what Kings doe, as Kings, and by vertue

of their Royall office, that they do ex debito officii,* 1.458 by debt and right of their office; and that they cannot but do, it not being arbitrarie to them to doe the debtfull acts of their office: But what they doe of meere grace, that they doe as good men, and not as Kings: and that they may not doe. As for example: Some Kings, out of their pretended prerogative, have given foure pardons to one man, for foure murthers: Now this the King might have left undone with∣out sinne; But of meere grace he pardoned the murtherer, who killed foure men. But the truth is, the King killed the three last; because he hath no power in point of Conscience, to dispute with blood, Num. 35.31. Gen. 9.6. These pardons are acts of meere grace to one man; but acts of blood to the Communitie.

2. Because the Prince is the Minister of God for the good of the subject; and therefore the Law saith, He cannot pardon, and free the guilty, of the punishment due to him. Contra l. quod favore, F. de leg. l. non ideo minus. F. de proc. l. legata inutiliter. F. de lega. 1. And the reason is cleare; He is but the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evill. And if the Judgement be the Lords,* 1.459 not mans, not the Kings, as it is indeed, Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6. he cannot draw the sword against the innocent, nor absolve the guil∣tie,* 1.460 except he would take on himselfe to carve and dispose of that which is proper to his master. Now certaine it is, God only, univo∣cally and essentially, as God, is the Judge, Ps. 75.7. and God only and essentially King, Ps. 97.1. Ps. 99.1. and all men in relation to him, are meere ministers, servants, legates, deputies: and in relation to him equivocally and improperly, Iudges or Kings, and meere cre∣ated and breathing shadowes of the power of the King of Kings.* 1.461 And looke as the Scribe, following his own device, and writing what sentence he pleaseth, is not an officer of the Court in that point, nor the pen and servant of the Iudge: so are Kings, and all Iudges, but forged intruders, and bastard Kings and Iudges, in so far as they give out the sentences of men, and are not the very mouthes of the King of Kings, to pronounce such a sentence as the Almighty himselfe would doe, if he were sitting on the Throne or Bench.

3. If the King from any supposed prerogative Royall, may doe acts of meere grace, without any warrant of Law, because he is a∣bove Law, by office: then also may he doe acts of meere rigorous Iustice, and kill and destroy the innocent, out of the same supposed

Prerogative;* 1.462 For Gods word equally tyeth him to the place of a meere minister in doing good, as in executing wrath on evill doers, Rom. 13.3, 4. And reason would say, he must be as absolute in the one, as in the other, seeing God tieth him to the one, as to the o∣ther, by his office and place: yea by this, acts of Iustice to ill-doers, and acts of reward to well-doers, shall be arbitrary morally, and by vertue of office to the King, and the word Prerogative Royall saith this; for the word Prerogative is a supreme power absolute, that is loosed from all Law, and so from all reason of Law, and de∣pending on the Kings meer and naked pleasure and will; and the word Royall or Kingly, is an Epithete of office, and of a Iudge, a created and limited Iudge, and so it must tye this supposed Prero∣gative to Law, Reason, and to that which is debitum legale officii, and a legall duty of an office; and by this our masters the Royalists make God to frame a rationall creature, which they call a King, to frame acts of Royalty, good and lawfull, upon his own meer pleasure, and the super-dominion of his will, above a Law and Reason. And from this it is that deluded Counsellours, made King James (a man not of shallow understanding) and King Charls, to give pardons to such bloody murtherers, as James a Grant, and to go so far on, by this supposed Prerogative Royall, that King Charls in Parliament at Edinburgh, 1633. did command an high point of Religion, That Ministers should use in officiating in Gods service, such Habits and Garments as he pleaseth; that is, all the Attire and Habits of the idolatrous Masse-Priests, that the Romish Priests of Baal useth in the oadest point of idolatry (the adoring of Bread) that the earth has; and by this Prerogative, the King commanded the Service Book in Scotland, An. 1637. without or above Law and Reason.* 1.463 And I desire any man to satisfie me in this, If the Kings Prerogative Royall, may over-leap Law and Reason in two degrees, and if he may as King, by a Prerogative Royall, command the body of Popery in a Popish Book; If he may not by the same reason, over-leap Law and Reason by the elevation of twenty de∣grees; And if you make the King a Iulian (God avert, and give the spirit of revelation to our King) may he not command all the Al∣caron, and the Religion of the Heathen and Indians? Royalists say, The Prerogative of Royalty excludeth not reason, and maketh not the King to do as a brute beast without all reason; but it giveth a power to a King to do by his Royall pleasure, not fettered to the dictates of a

Law; for in things which the King doth by his Prerogative Royall, he is to follow the advice and counsell of his wise counsell, though their counsell and advice doth not binde the Royall will of the King. I answer, it is to me, and I am sure to many Learneder, a great question; If the will of any reasonable creature, even of the damned angels, can will, or chose any thing which their reason corrupted, as it is, doth not dictate, hic & nunc to be good.* 1.464 For the object of the will of all men is good, either truely, or apparently good to the doer; for the devill could not suite in marriage souls, except he war in the cloths of an Angel of light; sin as sin cannot sell, or obtrude it self upon any, but under the notion of good. I think it seemeth good to the great Turk, to command innocent men, to cast themselves over a precipie two hundreth fadom high in the Sea, and drown them∣selves to pleasure him: So the Turks reason (for he is rationall, if he be a man) dictateth to his vast pleasure, that that is good which he commandeth.

2. Counsellours to the King, who will speak what will please the Queen, are but naked empty Titles, for they speak que placent, non que prosunt; what may please the King whom they make glad with their lies, not what law and reason dictateth.

3. Absolutenesse of an unreasonable Prerogative, doth not deny Counsell and Law also; for none more absolute, de facto, I cannot say de jure then the Kings of Babylon, and Persia: for Daniel saith of one of them, Dan. 5.19. Whom he would, he slew, and whom he would, he kept alive, and whom he would, he set up, and whom he would, he put down; and yet these same Kings did nothing, but by advice of their Princes and Counsellors, yea, so as they could not alter a decree and law, as is clear, Ester 1.14, 15, 16, 17, 21. Yea Darius de facto an absolute Prince, was not able to deliver Daniel, because the Law was passed, that he should be cast into the Lions den, Dan. 6.14, 15, 16.

4. That which the spirit of God condemneth as a point of Ty∣ranny in Nebuchadnezzar, that is no lawfull Prerogative Royall:* 1.465 but the spirit of God condemneth this as Tyranny in Nebuchad∣nezzar, That he slew whom he would, he kept alive whom he would, he set up whom he would, he put down, this is too God-like, Deut. 32.39. So Polanus, Rollocus, on the place, say, he did these things, Vers. 19. Ex abusu legitimae potestatis; for Nebuchadnezzars will in matters of death and life, was his Law, and he did what pleased

himself above all Law beside, and contrary to it: and our flatterers of Kings draw the Kings Prerogative out of Vlpians words, who saith, ••hat is a Law which seemeth good to the Prince; but Vlpian was far from making the Princes will a rule of good and ill, for he saith the contrary, That the Law ruleth the just Prince.

* 1.4665. It is considerable here, that Sanches defineth the absolute power of Kings to be a plenitude and fulnesse of power, subject to no necessity, and bounded with rules of no publick Law, and so did Bal∣dus before him: but all Politicians condemn that of Caligula (as Suetonius saith) which he spake to Alexander the Great, Remember that thou maist do all things, and that thou hast a power to do to al men, what thou pleasest: And Lawyers say, that this is Tyranny: Chilon one of the seven wise of Greece (as Rodigi) saith better, Princes are like gods, because they onely can do that which is just. And this power being meerly Tyrannicall, can be no ground of a Royall Prerogative: There is another power (saith Sanches) absolute, by which a Prince dispenseth without a cause in a humane law; and this power, saith he, may be defended: but he saith, What the King doth by this absolute power, he doth it validè, but not jure by Law; but by valid acts the Iesuite must mean Royall Acts, but no acts void of Law and Reason (say we) can be Royall Acts; for Royall Acts are acts performed by a King, as a King, and by a Law, and so cannot be Acts above, or beside a Law. It is true, a King may dispence with the breach of an humane Law, as a humane Law, that is, If the Law be death to any, who goeth up on the Walls of the Citie, the King may pardon any, who going up, discovereth the enemies ap∣proach, and saveth the Citie. But, 1. The inferiour Iudge accord∣ing to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that benigne interpretation that the soul and in∣tent of the Law requireth, may do this as well as the King. 2. All acts of independent Prerogative are above a Law, and acts of free∣will having no cause or ground in the Law, otherwayes it is not founded upon absolute power, but on power ruled by Law and Reason: but to pardon a breach of the letter of the Law of man, by exponing it, according to the true intent of the Law and benign∣ly, is an act of legall obligation, and so of the ordinary power of all Iudges; and if either King or Iudge kill a man for the violation of the Letter of the Law, when the intent of the Law contradicteth the rigid sentence,* 1.467 he is guilty of innocent blood. If that learned Ferdin. Vasquez be consulted, he is against this distinction of a

power ordinary and extraordinary in men; and certainly, if you give to a King a Prerogative above a Law, it is a power to do evill, as well as good; but there is no lawfull power to do evill, and Doct. Ferne is plunged in a contradiction by this, for he saith, Sect. 9. pag. 58.* 1.468 I ask when these Emperours took away lives and goods at pleasure, Was that power ordained by God? No. But an illegall will and Tyranny: But, Pag. 61. The power though abused to execute such a (wicked) commandment, is an Ordinance of God.

It is objected 1. For the lawfulnesse of an absolute Monarchy.* 1.469 The Easterne, Persian, and Turkes Monarchy, maketh absolute Mo∣narchy lawfull, for it is an Oath to a lawfull obligatory thing, and judgment, Ezech. 17.16, 18. is denounced against Iudah, for breaking the Oath of the King of Babylon, and it is called the Oath of God, and doubtlesse was an Oath of absolute subjection, and the power, Rom. 13. was absolute, and yet the Apostle calleth it an Ordinance of God. The soveraignty of Masters over servanes was absolute, and the Apostle exhorteth not to renounce that title as to ridged, but exhorteth to mode∣ration in the use of it,

Ans. That the Persian Monarchy was absolute, is but a facto ad jus, and no rule of a lawfull Monarchy, but that it was absolute, I beleeve not. Darius who was an absolute Prince (as many think) but (I thinke not) would gladly have delivered Daniel from the power of a Law, and Dan. 6.14.* 1.470 And he set his heart on Daniel to deliver him, and he laboured till the going downe of the Sun to deliver him, and was so sorrowfull, that he could not breake through a Law, that he interdicted himselfe of all pleasures of Musi••ians, and if ever he had used the absolutenesse of a Prerogative Royall, I con∣ceive he would have done it in this, yet he could not prevaile: But in things not established by Law, I conceive Darius was absolute, as to me is cleare, Daniel 6. v. 24. but absolute not by a Divine Law, but, De facto, quod transierat in jus humanum, by fact, which was now become a lrw.

2. It was Gods Oath, and God tyed Iudah to absolute subjection, ergo people may tye themselves. It followeth not,* 1.471 exeept you could make good this inference, God is absolute, ergo the King of Babylon may lawfully be absolute; this is a blasphemous consequence. 2. That Iudah was to sweare the Oath of absolute subjection in the lati∣tude of the absolutenesse of the Kings of Chaldea, I would see pro∣ved;

their absolutenesse by the Chaldean Lawes was to command murther, Idolatry, Daniel 3.4, 5. and to make wicked Lawes, Dan. 6. v. 7, 8. I beleeve Ieremiah commanded not absolute subjection in this sence. But the contrary, Ier. 10. v. 11. They were to sweare the Oath in the point of suffering; but what if the King of Chaldea had commanded them all, the whole holy Seed, men, women and children▪ out of his Royall power, to give their neckes all in one day to his sword, were they obliged by this Oath to prayers and ••eares, and only to suffer? and was it against the Oath of God to defend themselves by Armes? I beleeve the Oath did not oblige to such absolute subjection, and though they had taken Armes in their owne lawfull defence, according to the Law of Nature, they had not broken the Oath of God. The Oath was not a tye to an absolute subjection of all and every one, either to worship Idols, or then to sly, or suffer death. Now the Service-booke commanded in the Kings absolute authority all Scotland to commit grosser Idolatry, in the intention of the work, if not in the intention of the Comman∣der, then was in Babylon. (We read not that the King of Babylon pressed the consciences of Gods people to Idolatry) or that all should either sly the Kingdome, and leave their inheritances to Pa∣pists and Prelates, or then come under the mercy of the sword of Papists and Atheists by sea or land. 3. God may command against the Law of Nature; and Gods Commandement maketh subjection lawfull; so as men may not now, being under the Law of God, defend themselves. What then? Ergo we owe subjection to absolute Princes, and their power must be a lawfull power, it no waies is consequent. Gods Commandement by Ieremiah made the subjecti∣on of Iudah lawfull, and without that Commandement they might have taken Armes against the King of Babylon, as they did against the Philistines, and Gods Commandement maketh the Oath law∣full. As suppone Ireland would all rise in Armes, and come and de∣stroy Scotland, the King of Spain leading, then we were by this Ar∣gument not to resist. 4. It is denyed, that the power, Rom. 13. as abso∣lute, is Gods ordinance. And I deny utterly that Christ and his A∣postles did sweare non-resistence absolute to the Roman Emperour.

Obj. 2. It sesmeth, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19. if well doing be mistaken by the reason and judgement of an absolute Monarch for ill doing, and we punished, yet the Magistrates will is the command of a reasonable will, and so to be submitted unto, because such a one suffereth by Law,

where the Monarches Will is a Law, and in this case some power must judge. Now in an absolute Monarchy all judgement resolveth in the Will of the Monarch, as the supreame Law: and if Ancestors have submitted themselves by Oath, there is no repeale, or redresment.

Ans. Who ever was the Author of this Treatise, he is a bad de∣fender of the defensive warres in England, for all the lawfulnesse of warres then must depend on this. 1. Whether England be a conquered Nation at the beginning? 2. If the Law-will of an ab∣solute Monarch, or a Nero be a reasonable Will, to which we must submit in suffering ill, I see not but we must submit to a reasonable will; if it be reasonable will in doing ill, no lesse then in suffering ill. 3. Absolute Will in absolute Monarches is no Iudge De jure, but an unlawfull and a usurping Iudge. 4. 1 Pet. 2.18, 19. Servants are not commanded simply to suffer (I can prove suffering formally not to fall under any Law of God, but only patient suffering. I except Christ, who was under a peculiar commandement to suffer.) But servants,* 1.472 upon supposition that they are servants, and buffeted unjustly by their Masters, are by the A∣postle Peter commanded, v. 20. to suffer patiently. But it doth not bind up a servants hand, to defend his owne life with weapons, if his Master invade him, without cause to kill him: otherwise if God call him to suffer, he is to suffer in the manner and way as Christ did, not reviling, not threatning. 4. To be a King and an absolute Master, to me are contradictory; a King essentially is a living Law. An absolute man is a creature, that they call a Tyrant, and no law∣full King; yet doe I not meane, that any that is a King, and usur∣peth absolutenesse, leaveth off to be a King: but in so far as he is ab∣solute, he is no more a King, then in so far as he is a Tyrant. But further, the King of England saith in a Declaration.* 1.473 1. The Law is the measure of the Kings Power. 2. Parliaments are essentially Lord Iudges to make Lawes essentially, as the King is, ergo the King is not above the Law. 3. Magna Charta saith the King, can doe nothing,* 1.474 but by Lawes, and no obedience is due to him, but by Law. 4. Prescrip∣tion taketh away the title of conquests.

Obj 3. The King, not the Parliament is the Anoynted of God, Ans. The Parliament is as good, even a Congregation of Gods. Psalme 82.1.

Obj. 4. The Parliament is the Court, in their Acts, they say,* 1.475 with consent of our Soveraigne Lord.

Ans. They say not, at the Commandement, and absolute pleasure of our Soveraigne Lord. 2. He is their Lord materially, not as they are formally a Parliament, for the King made them not a Parlia∣ment, but sure I am, the Parliament had power before he was King, and made him King, 1 Sam. 10.17, 18.

* 1.476Obj. 5. In an absolute Monarchy there is not a resignation of men to any will as will, but to the reasonable will of the Mo∣narch, which having the law of reason to direct it, is kept from in∣jurious acts.

Ans. If reason be a sufficient restraint, and if God hath laid no other restraint upon some lawfull King, yee reason, Then is Magistra∣cy a lame, a needlesse ordinance of God, for all Mankind hath reason to keepe themselves from injuries, and so there is no need of Iudges or Kings to defend them from either doing or suffering inju∣ries. But certainly this must be admirable. If God as Author of na∣ture should make the Lyon King of all beasts, the Lyon remaining a devouring beast, and should ordaine by nature all the sheepe and Lambs to come and submit their corps to him, by instinct of nature, and to be eaten at his will, and then say, The nature of a beast in a Lyon is a sufficient restraint to keepe the Lyon from devouring Lambs. Certainly a King being a sinfull man, and having no re∣straint on his power, but reason, he may thinke it reason to allow rebells to kill, drowne, hang, torture to death an hundred thou∣sand Protestants, men, women, infants in the wombe, and sucking babes, as is clere in Pharaoh, Manasseh and other Princes.

Obj. 6. There is no Court or Iudge above the King, ergo he is ab∣solutely supreame.

Ans. The Antecedent is false. The Court that made the King of a private man, a King, is above him; and here are limitations laid on him at his Coronation. 2. The States of Parliament are above him, to censure him. 3. In case of open Tyranny, though the States had not time to conveen in Parliament, if he bring on his people an hoast of Spaniards or forraine Rebells, his owne conscience is above him, and the conscience of the people farre more, called conscientia terrae, may judge him in so farre, as they may rise up and defend themselves.

Obj. 7. Here the Prelate borrowing from Grotius, Barclay, Arnisaus;* 1.477 (or its possible he be not so farre travelled) for Doct. Ferne hath the same. Soveraignty weakned in Aristocracy cannot doe

its worke, and is in the next place to Anarchy and confusion. When Zedekiah was over Lorded by his Nobles, he could neither save him∣selfe, nor the people, nor the Prophet the servant of God Ieremiah; nor could David punish Ioab, when he was over-awed by that power he himselfe had put in his hand. To weaken the head, is to distemper the whole body, if any good Prince or his Royall Antecessors be cheated of their sacred right by fraud or force, he may at his fittest opportu∣nity, resume it. What a sinne is it to rob God, or the King of their due?

Ans. Aristocracy is no lesse an ordinance of God, then Royalty, for Rom. 13.1. and 1 Tim. 2.1. All in Authority are to be acknow∣ledged as Gods Vice-gerents, the Senate, the Consuls as well as the Emperour: And so one ordinance of God cannot weaken another, nor can any but by a lawlesse Animall say, Aristocracy bordereth with confusion; but he must say, Order and Light are sister Germanes to confusion and darknesse. 2, Though Zedekiah, a man voyd of God, were over-awed with his Nobles, and so could not help Ieremiah; it followeth not, that because Kings may not do this and this good, therefore they are to be invested with power to doe all ill: if they doe all the good that they have power to doe, they'l finde way to helpe the oppressed Jeremiahes: and because power to doe both good and evill is given by the Divell to our Scottish Witches, its a poore consequent, that the States should give to the King power absolute to be a Tyrant.* 1.478 3. A State must give a King more power then ordinary, especially to execute Laws, which re∣quireth singular wisdom, when a Prince cannot alwayes have his great Councell about with him to advise him. But, 1. That is power borrowed, and by loan, and not properly his own; and therefore, it is no sacriledge in the States, to resume what the King hath by a fiduciary Title, and borrowed from them. 2. This power was gi∣ven to do good, not evill. David had power over Joab, to punish him for his murther, but he executed it not upon carnall fears, and abused his power to kill innocent Vriah, which power neither God nor the States gave him. But how proveth he the States took power from David, or that Ioab took power from David, to put to death a murtherer, that I see not. 3. If Princes power to do good, be taken from them, they may resume it, when God giveth oppor∣tunity; But this is to the Prelate Perjury, that the people by Oath give away their power to their King, and resume it when he abuseth

it to Tyranny: But it is no perjurie in the King to resume a taken away power, which if it be his own, is yet lis sub judice, a great controversie, Quod in Cajo licet, in Nevio non licet. So he teacheth the King, That Perjurie and Sacriledge is lawfull to him. If Princes power to do ill, and cut the whole Land off, as one neck (which was the wicked desire of Caligula) be taken from them by the States. I am sure, 1. This power was never theirs, and never the peoples, and you cannot take the Princes power from him, which was never his power. 2. I am also sure, the Prince should never resume an unjust power, though he were cheated of it.

P. Prelate. It is a poor shift to acknowledge no more for the Royall Prerogative, then the Municipall Law hath determined, as some smat∣terers in the Law say. They cannot distinguish betwixt a Statute Declarative, and a Statute Constitutive: but the Statutes of a King∣dom do declare onely, what is the Prerogative Royall, but do not constitute or make it, God Almightie hath by himself constituted it: It is laughter to say, the Decalogue was not a Law, till God wrote it.

Answ. Here a profound Lawyer calleth all smatters in the Law, who cannot say, that non ens, a Prerogative Royall, that is, a power contrary to God and mans Law, to kill and destroy the innocent, came not immediately down from Heaven: but I professe my self no Lawyer, but do maintain against the Prelate, that no Municipall Law can constitute a power to do ill; nor can any Law, either just∣ly constitute, or declare such a fancie as a Prerogative Royall; so far is it from being like the Decalogue, that is, a Law before it be writ∣ten, that this Prerogative is neither Law, before it be written, nor after Court Placebo's have written for it: for it must be eternall as the Decalogue, if it have any blood from so noble a house. 2. In what Scripture hath God Almightie spoken of a fancied Preroga∣tive Royall?

P. Prelate. Prerogative resteth not in its naturall seat, but in the King.* 1.479 God saith, Reddite, not, Date, render to Kings that which is Kings, not give to Kings; it shall never be well with us, if his annoin∣ted, and his Church be wronged.

Answ. The Prelate may remember a Countrey Proverb. He and his Prelates, called the Church, (the scum of men, not the Church) are like the Tinkers dogs, they like good company, they must be ranked with the King. And 2. Here a false Prophet, It shall never

be well with the Land, while Arbitrary power, and Popery be erected, saith he, in good sense.

P. ••••elate. The King hath his right from God, and cannot make it away to the people. Render to Caesar, the things that are Caesars.* 1.480 Kings persons, their Charge, their Right, their Authority, their Pre∣rogative are by Scriptures, Fathers, Iurists, Sacred, inseparable Or∣dinances inherent in their Crowns, they cannot be made away; and when they are given to inferiour Judges, it is not ad minuendam majestatem, sed solicitudinem, to lessen Soveraign Majesty, but to ease them.

Answ. The King hath his right from God: What then, not from the people? I read in Scripture, The people made the King; Never: That the King made the people. 2. All these are inseparably in the Crown, but he stealeth in Prerogative Royall in the clause which is now in question? Render to Caesar all Caesars: And there∣fore saith he, Render to him a Prerogative,* 1.481 that is an absolute power to pardon and sell the blood of thousands. Is power of blood, either the Kings; or inherent inseparably in his Crown? Alas, I fear Pre∣lates have made blood an inseparable accident of his Throne. 3. When Kings by that publike power given to them, at their Co∣ronation, maketh inferiour Iudges, they give them power to judge for the Lord, not for men, Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6. Now they cannot both make away a power, and keep it also; for the inferi∣our Iudges conscience hangeth not at the Kings girdle, he hath no lesse power to judge in his sphere, then the King hath in his sphere, though the Orb and circle of Motion be larger in compasse in the one, then in the other; and if the King cannot give himself Royall Power, but God and the people must do it, how can he communicate any part of that power to inferiour Judges, except by trust? Yea, he hath not that power that other men have in many respects.

1. He may not marry whom he pleaseth,* 1.482 for he might give his body to a Leper woman, and so hurt the Kingdom.

2. He may not do, as Solomon and Achab, marry the daughter of a strange god, to make her the mother of the heir of the Crown. He must in this follow his great Senate. 2. He may not expose his person to hazard of Warres.

3. He may not go over Sea, and leave his Watch-Tower, without consent.

4. Many Acts of Parliament of both Kingdoms, discharge Pa∣pists to come within ten miles of the King.

5. Some pernicious Counsellours have been discharged 〈◊〉〈◊〉 com∣pany, by Laws.

6. He may not eat what Meats he pleaseth.

7. He may not make Wasters his Treasurers.

8. Nor Delapidate the Rents of the Crown.

9. He may not dis-inherit his eldest son of the Crown, at his own pleasure.

10. He is sworn to follow no false gods, and false religions, nor is it in his power to go to Masse.

11. If a Priest say Masse to the King, by the Law, he is hanged drawn and quartered.

12. He may not write Letters to the Pope, by Law.

13. He may not by Law pardon seducing Priests and Iesuites.

14. He may not take Physick for his health, but from Physitians sworn to be true to him.

15. He may not educate his heir, as he pleaseth.

16. He hath not power of his children, nor hath he that power that other fathers have, to marry his eldest son, as he pleaseth.

17. He may not befriend a Traytor.

18. It is high Treason for any woman to give her body to the King, except she be his married wife.

19. He ought not to build sumptuous Houses, without advice of his Councell.

20. He may not dwell constantly where he pleaseth.

21. Nor may he go to the Countrey to Hunt; farlesse, to kill his subjects, and desert the Parliament.

22. He may not confer honours and high places without his Councell.

23. He may not deprive Iudges at his will.

24. Nor is it in his power to be buried where he pleaseth, but amongst the Kings.

Now in most of these twenty four points, private persons have their own liberty, far lesse restricted then the King.

QUEST. XXIV. What power hath the King in relation to the Law, and the people? And how a King and a Tyrant differ?

M^r. Symmons saith, That Authoritie is rooted rather in the Prince,* 1.483 then in the Law; for as the King giveth Being to the inferiour Iudge, so he doth to the Law it self, making it authorizable; for propter quod unum-quodque tale, id ipsum magis tale, and therefore the King is greater then the Law: others say, That the King is the Foun∣tain of the Law, and the sole and onely Law-giver.

Assert. 1. The Law hath a twofold consideration,* 1.484 1. Secundum esse paenale, in relation to the punishment to be inflicted by man. 2. Secundum esse legis, as it is a thing legally good in it self: In the former notion, it is this way true,* 1.485 Humane Laws take life and be∣ing, inway to be punished, or rewarded by men, from the will of Princes and Law-givers, and so Symmons saith true, Because men can∣not punish or reward Laws, but where they are made; and the will of Rulers putteth a sort of stamp on a Law, that it bringeth the Common-wealth under guiltinesse, if they break this Law. But this maketh not the King greater then the Law; for therefore do Rulers put the stamp of relation to punishment on the Law, because there is in∣trinsecall worth in the Law, Prior to the Act of the will of Law-givers, for which it meriteth to be inacted; and therefore,* 1.486 because it is authorizable as good and just, the King puteth on it this stamp of a Politique Law. God formeth Being, and morall Aptitude to the end in all Laws, to wit, the safetie of the people; and the Kings will is neither the measure, nor the cause of the goodnesse of things.

2. If the King be he who maketh the Law good and just, because he is more such himself, then as the Law cannot crook, and erre, nor sin; neither can the King sin, nor break a Law. This is blasphemy, Every man is a lyer; a Law which deserveth the name of a Law, cannot lie.

3. His ground is, That there is such majesty in Kings,* 1.487 that their will must be done either in us, or on us: A great untruth. Achabs will must neither be done of Elias, for he commandeth things unjust; nor yet on Elias, for Elias fled, and lawfully we may flie Tyrants: and so Achabs will in killing Elias was not done on him▪

* 1.488Assert. 2. Nor can it be made good, that the King only hath power of making Lawes; because his power were then absolute, to inflict penalties on Subjects, without any consent of theirs; and that were a dominion of Masters, who command what they please, and under what paine they please. And the people consenting to be ruled by such a man, they tacitely consent to penaltie of laws, because naturall reason saith, An ill-doer should be punished. Florianus in l. inde. Vasquez, l. 2. c. 55. n. 3. Therefore they must have some power in making these lawes.

2. Jer. 26. It is cleare, The Princes judge with the people: A nomothetick power differeth gradually only from a judiciall power, both being collaterall meanes to the end of Government, the peo∣ples safetie. But Parliaments judge, ergo, they have a nomothetick power with the King.

3. The Parliament giveth all supremacie to the King; ergo, to prevent Tyrannie, it must keep a coordinate power with the King, in the highest acts.

4. If the Kingly line be interrupted, if the King be a Childe, or a Captive, they make Lawes, who make Kings; Ergo, this nomo∣thetick power recurreth into the States, as to the first sub∣ject.

Obj. The King is the fountaine of the law, and Subjects cannot make Lawes to themselves,* 1.489 more then they can punish themselves. He is only the Supreme.

Answ. The People being the fountaine of the King, must rather be the fountaine of Lawes. 2. It is false, that no man maketh lawes to himselfe. Those who teach others, teach themselves also, 1 Tim. 2.12. 1 Cor. 14.34. though Teaching be an act of authoritie. But they agree to the penaltie of the Law secondarily only; and so doth the King, who, as a father, doth not will evill of punishment to his children, but by a consequent will. 3. The King is the only Supreme, in the power ministeriall of executing lawes: but this is a derived power, so as no one man is above him; but in the fountaine-power of Royaltie, the States are above him.

5. The Civil law is cleare, that the laws of the Emperor have force only from this fountaine, because the People have transferred their power to the King. Lib. 1. digest. tit. 4. de constit. Princip. leg. 1. sic Vlpian. Quod Principi placuit, (loquitur de Principe formaliter, qua Princeps est, non qua est homo) legis habet vigorem, utpote cum lege

Regia, quae de imperio ejus lata est. populus ei, & in eum, omne suum imperium & potestatem conferat. Yea, the Emperour himselfe may be conveened before the Prince Elector. Aurea Bulla Carol. 4. Im∣per. c. 5. The King of France may be conveened before the Senate of Paris. The States may resist a Tyrant, as Bossius saith, de Princi∣pe, & privileg. jus, n. 55. Paris de puteo, iu tract. syno. tit. de excess. Reg. c. 3. Divines acknowledge that Elias rebuked the halting of Israel betwixt God and Baal, that their Princes permitted Baals Priests to converse with the King. And is not this the sinne of the Land, that they suffer their King to worship Idols? and therefore the Land is punished for the sinnes of Manasseh, as Knox observeth in his Dispute with Lethington, where he proveth that the States of Scotland should not permit the Queen of Scotland to have her abo∣minable Masse: Hist. of Scotland, l. 4. p. 379. edit. an. 1644. Surely the power or Sea-Prerogative of a sleepie or mad Pilot to split the ship on a rock, as I conceive, is limited by the Passengers.* 1.490 Suppose a father, in a distemper, would set his own house on fire, and burne himselfe, and his ten sonnes; I conceive, his Fatherly prerogative, which neither God nor Nature gave, should not be looked to in this; but they may binde him. Yea, Althusius, polit. c. 39. n. 60. answering that, That in Democracie the people cannot both com∣mand and obey; saith, It is true, secundum ideus, ad idem, & eodem tempore: But the people may (saith he) choose Magistrates by suc∣cession. Yea, I say, 1. they may change Rulers yearely, to remove envie: A yearely King were more dangerous, the King being al∣most above envie; Men incline more to flatter then to envie Kings. 2. Aristotle saith, polit. l. 4. c. 4. l. 6. c. 2. The people may give their judgement of the wisest.

Obj. Williams B. of Ossorie, Vindic. Reg. [A Looking-glasse for Rebels] saith, p. 64. To say the King is better than any one, doth not prove him to be better then two: and if his supremacie be no more, then any other may challenge as much: for the Prince is singulis ma∣jor: A Lord is above all Knights; a Knight above all Esquires: and so the People have placed a King under them, not above them.

Ans. The reason is not alike:* 1.491 for all the Knights united cannot make one Lord; and all the Esquires united, cannot make one Knight; but all the People united, made David King at Hebron. 2. The King is above the people, by eminencie of derived authoritie, as a Watchman; and in actuall supremacie; and he is inferior to

them in fountaine-power, as the effect to the cause.

* 1.492Object. 2. The Parliament (saith Williams) may not command the King: Why then make they supplications to him, if their Vote be a Law?

Ans. They supplicate, ex decentia, of decencie and connvenien∣cie for his place; as a Citie doth supplicate a Lord Major: but they supplicate not ex debito, of obligation, as beggars seeke almes: then should they be cyphers. 2. When a Subject oppressed, supplicateth his Soveraigne for justice; the King is obliged by office to give ju∣stice: And to heare the oppressed, is not an act of grace and mercie, as to give almes, though it should proceed from mercie in the Prince, Psal. 72.13. but an act of Royall debt.

3. The P. Prelate objecteth: The most you claime to Parliaments, is a coordinate power,* 1.493 which in law and reason run in equall tearmes. In Law, par in parem non habet imperium; an equall cannot judge an equall, much lesse may an inferiour usurpeto judge a superiour. Our Lord knew, gratiâ visionis, the woman taken in adulterie, to be guilty; bat he would not s••ntence her: to teach us, not improbably, not to be both Judge and Witnesse. The Parliament are Judges, accusers, and witnesses against the King in their owne cause, against the Imperiall lawes.

Ans. 1. The Parliament is coordinate ordinarily with the King, in the power of making Lawes:* 1.494 but the coordination on the Kings part, is by derivation; on the Parliaments part, originaliter & fon∣taliter, as in the fountaine. 2. In ordinarie there is coordination: but if the King turne Tyrant, the Estates are to use their fountaine-power. And that of the Law, Par in parem, &c. is no better from his Pen, that stealeth all he hath, then from Barclaius, Grotius, Ar∣nisaeus, Blackwood, &c. It is cold and sowre. We hold the Parlia∣ment that made the King at Hebron, to be above their own creature the King. Barclaius saith more acurately, l. 5, cont. Monarch. p. 129. It is absurd, that the People should both be subject to the King, and com∣mand the King also.

Ans. It is not absurd, that a Father naturall, as a private man, should be subject to his Sonne; even that Jesse, and his elder bro∣ther, the Lord of all the rest, be subject to David their King. Roy∣alists say, Our late Queen, being supreme Magistrate, might by Law have put to death her own husband, for adulterie or murther.

2. The Parliament should not be both Accuser, Iudge, and Wit∣nesse

in their own cause. 1. It is the Cause of Religion, of God, of Protestants, and of the whole people. 2. The oppressed accuse: there is no need of Witnesses in raising armes against the Subjects. 3. The P. Prelate could not object this, if against the Imperiall laws the King were both Partie and Iudge in his own cause, and in these acts of arbitrarie power, which he hath done, through bad counsell, in wronging Fundamentall lawes, raising armes against his subjects, bringing in forraigne enemies into both his Kingdomes, &c. Now this is properly the cause of the King, as he is a man; and his owne cause, not the cause of God, and by no Law of nature, reason, or Imperiall Statutes can he be both Iudge and party.

4. If the King be sole supreame Iudge without any fellow sha∣rers in power, 1. He is not obliged by Law to follow Counsell, or hold Parliaments; for Counsell is not Command. 2. It is unpos∣sible to limit him even in the exercises of his power, which yet Dr. Ferne saith cannot be said: for if any of his power be retrinched, God is robbed, saith Maxwell. 3. He may by Law play the Ty∣rant, gratis.

Ferne objecteth. §. 7. pag. 26. The King is a fundamentall with the Estates, now foundations are not to be stirred or removed.* 1.495

Ans. The King as King inspired with Law is a fundamentall, and his power is not to be stirred, but as a man wasting his people, he is a destruction to the house, and community, and not a fundamen∣tall in that notion.

Some object, The three Estates as men, and looking to their owne ends, not to Law, and the publick good, are not fundamentalls, and are to be judged by the King.

Ans. By the people, and the conscience of the people they are to be judged.

Obj. But the people also doe judge as corrupt men, and not as the people, and a Politique Body, providing for their owne safety.

Ans. I grant all, when God will bring a vengeance on Jerusa∣lem, Prince and people both are hardened to their owne destructi∣on. Now God hath made all the three, in every Government where there is Democracy, there is some chosen ones resembling an Ari∣stocracy, and some one for order presiding in Democraticall courts, resembling a King. In Aristocracy as in Holland, there is somewhat of Democracy, the people have their Commissioners, and one Duke or Generall, as the Prince of Orange is some umbrage of

Royalty, and in Monarchy there are the three Estates of Parliament, and these containe the three Estates, and so somewhat of the three formes of Government, and there is no one Government just that hath not some of all three; powre and absolute Monarchy is Tyran∣ny, unmixed Democracy, is confusion, untempered Aristocracy is factious Dominion, and a limited Monarchy hath from Democracy respect to publick good without confusion. From Aristocracy safety in multitude of Counsells without factious emulation,* 1.496 and so a barre laid on Tyranny, by the joynt powers of many; and from Soveraignty union of many children in one father: and all the three thus contempered have their owne sweet fruits through Gods blessing, and their owne diseases by accident, and through mens corruption; and neither reason nor Scripture shall warrant any one in its rigid purity without mixture: And God having chosen the best government to bring men fallen in sinne to happinesse, must warrant in any one a mixture of all three, as in mixt bodies the foure Elements are reduced to a fit temper resulting of all the foure, where the acrimony of all the foure first qualities is broken, and the good of all combined in one.

* 1.497The King as the King is an unerring and living Law, and by grant of Barclay, of old was one of excellent parts, and noble through vertue and goodnesse; and the goodnesse of a father as a father, of a tutor as a tutor, of a head as a head, of a husband as a husband doe agree to the King as the King, so as King he is the Law it selfe, com∣manding, governing, saving. 2. His Will as King, or his Royall Will is reason, conscience, Law. 3. This Will is politickly present (when his person is absent) in all Parliaments, Courts, and inferi∣our Iudicatures. 4. The King as King cannot doe wrong or vio∣lence to any. 5. Amongst the Romanes the name King and Tyrant were common to one thing. 1. Because de facto, some of their Kings were Tyrants, in respect of their Dominion, rather then Kings. 2. Because he who was a Tyrant De facto, should have been, and was a King too de jure. 6. It is not lawfull to either disobey or resist a King as a King, no more then it is lawfull to disobey a good Law. 7. What violence, what unjustice, and excesse of passion the King mixeth in, with his Acts of Government, are meerely acci∣dentall to a King as King! for because men by their owne innate goodnesse will not, yea Morally cannot doe that which is lawfull, and just one to another, and doe naturally, since the fall of man,

violence one to another; therefore, if there had not been sin, there should not have been need of a King, more then there should have beene need of a Tutor to defend the child, whose father is not dead, or of a Physitian to cure sicknesse where there is health; for remove sinne, and there is neither death nor sicknesse, but because sinne is entered into the world, God devised, as a remedy of vio∣lence and unjustice, a living, rationall breathing Law called a King,* 1.498 a Iudge, a Father: now the aberrations, violence, and oppression of this thing which is the living, rationall, breathing Law is no Medium, no meane intended by God, and nature to remove vio∣lence. How shall violence remove violence? Therefore an unjust King, as unjust, is not that genuine ordinance of God, appointed to remove unjustice, but accidentall to a King. So we may resist the unjustice of the King, and not resist the King. 8, If then any cast off the nature of a King, and become habitually a Tyrant, in so farre he is not from God, nor any ordinance which God doth owne: If the Office of a Tyrant (to speake so) be contrary to a Kings Offices, it is not from God, and so neither is the power from God. 9. Yea Lawes (which are no lesse from God, then the Kings are) when they begin to be hurtfull, Cessant materialiter, they leave off to be Lawes; because they oblige Non secundum vim verborum, sed in vim sensus, not according to the force of words, but according to sense, l. Non figura literarum F. de actione & obligatione, l. ita sti∣pulatus. But who (saith the Royalists) shall be judge betwixt the King and the people, when the people alledge that the King is a Tyrant.

Ans. There is a Court of necessity,* 1.499 no lesse then a Court of Justice; and 2. The fundamentall Lawes must then speake, and it is with the people in this extremity, as if they had no Ruler.

Obj. 1. But if the Law be doubtsome, as all humane, all Civill, all municipall Lawes may endure great dispute, the peremptory person exponing, the Law must be the supreame Iudge. This cannot be the people, ergo, it must be the King.

Ans. 1. As the Scriptures in all fundamentalls are cleare,* 1.500 and expone themselves, and Actu primo condemne Heresies, so all Lawes of men in their fundamentals, which are the Law of Nature, and of Nations are cleare. And 2. Tyranny is more visible and in∣telligible then Heresie, and its soone decerned. If a King bring in upon his native subjects twenty thousand Turks armed, and the King

lead them. It is evident, they come not to make a friendly visite to salute the Kingdom, and depart in peace: the people have a natu∣rall throne of policie in their conscience to give warning, and ma∣terially sentence against the King, as a Tyrant, and so by nature are to defend themselves: Where Tyranny is more obscure, and the thred small, that it escape the eye of men, the King keepeth possessi∣on; but I deny that Tyranny can be obscure long.

* 1.501Object. 2. Doct. Ferne. A King may not, or cannot easily alter the frame of fundamentall Laws, he may make some actuall invasi∣on, in some transient, and not fixed acts; and it is safer to bear these, then to raise a civill Warre of the Body, against the Head.

Answ. 1. If the King as King, may alter any one wholesome Law, by that same reason he may alter all. 2. You give short wings to an Arbitrary Prince,* 1.502 if he cannot over flie all Laws to the subversi∣on of the Fundamentalls of a State, if you make him as you do. 1. One who hath the sole Legislative power, who allanerly by him∣self, maketh Laws, and his Parliament and Councell are onely to give him advice, which by Law he may as easily reject, as they can speak words to him. He may in one transient act (and it is but one) cancell all Laws made against idlolatry and Popery, and com∣mand, through bad Counsell, in all his Dominions; the Pope to be acknowledged as Christs Vicar, and all his doctrine to be establish∣ed as the Catholike true Religion. It is but one transient act to seal a pardon to the shedding of the blood of two hundred thousand, killed by Papists. 2. You make him a King, who may not be re∣sisted in any case; and though he subvert all Fundamentall Laws, he is countable to God onely, his people have no remedy, but pray∣ers, or flight.

Object. 3. Ferne. Limitations and mixtures in Monarchies do not imply a forceable restraining power in subjects,* 1.503 for the prevent∣ing of the dissolution of the State, but onely a legall restraining power; and if such a restraining power be in the subjects, by reservation, then it must be expressed in the constitution of the Government, and in the Covenant betwixt the Monarch and his people: but such a condition is unlawfull, which will not have the Soveraign power secured, is unpro∣fitable for King, and people; a seminary for seditions and jea∣lousies.

Answ. I understand not a difference betwixt forceable restrain∣ing and legall restraining: For he must mean by (legall) mans Law,

because he saith, It is a Law in the Covenant betwixt the Monarch, and his people. Now if this be not forceable, and physicall,* 1.504 it is onely Morall in the conscience of the King, and a Cypher, and a meer vanitie, for God, not the people putteth a restraint of con∣science on the King, that he may not oppresse his poor subjects; but he shall sin against God, that is a poor restraint: the goodnesse of the King a sinfull man inclined from the womb to all sin, and so to Tyranny, is no restraint. 2. There's no necessitie, that the re∣serve be expressed in the Covenant between King, and people, more then in contract of marriage between a husband and a wife, beside her joynter; you should set down this clause in the con∣tract, that if the husband attempt to kill the wife, or the wife the husband, in that case it shall be lawfull to either of them to part companies: For Doct. Ferne saith, That personall defence is lawfull in the people, if the Kings assault be 1. Suddain. 2. Without colour of Law. 3. Inevitable: Yet the reserve of this power of defence, is not necessarily to be expressed in the contract, betwixt King and people. Exigences of the Law of nature cannot be set down in positive Covenants, they are presupposed. 3. He saith, A reser∣vation of power, whereby soveraigntie is not secured, is unlawfull. Lend me this Argument: The giving away of a power of defence, and a making the King absolute, is unlawfull, because by it the peo∣ple is not secured;* 1.505 but one man hath thereby the sword of God put in his hand, whereby ex officio, he may as King cut the throats of thousands, and be countable to none therefore, but to God onely: now if the non-securing of the King, make a condition unlawfull, the non-securing of a Kingdom and Church, yea, of the true re∣ligion (which are infinitely in worth above one single man) may far more make the condition unlawfull. 4. A legall restraint on a King, is no more unprofitable, and a seminary of jealousies between King and people, then a legall restraint upon people; for the King out of a non-restraint, as out of seed, may more easily educe tyran∣ny, and subversion of religion: If outlandish women tempt even a Solomon to idolatry, as people may educe sedition out of a legall restraint laid upon a King, to say nothing, that Tyranny is a more dangerous sin, then sedition; by how much more the lives of many, and true religion, are to be preferred to the safetie of one, and a false peace.

Object. 4. An absolute Monarch is free from all forceable restraint,* 1.506

and so far, as he is absolute from all legall restraint of positive Laws: now in a limited Monarch there is onely sought a legall restraint, and limitation cannot infer a forceable restraint, for an absolute Monarch is limited also, not by civill compact, but by the Law of nature and nations, which he cannot justly transgresse; if therefore an absolute Monarch being exorbitant, may not be resisted, because he transgresseth the Law of nature; how shall we think a limited Monarch may be resisted, for transgressing the bounds set by civill agreement.

Answ. A legall restraint on the people, is a forceable restraint: For if Law be not backed with force, it is onely a Law of reward∣ing weldoing, which is no restraint, but an incouragement to do evil. If then there be a legall restraint upon the King, without any force, it is no restraint, but onely such a request as this, Be a just Prince, and we will give your Majestie two Subsidies in one yeer. 2. I utter∣ly deny, that God ever ordained such an irrationall creature, as an absolute Monarch. If a people unjustly, and against natures dictates make away, irrevocably, their own libertie, and the libertie of their posteritie, which is not their's to dispose off, and set over themselves, as base slaves, a sinning creature with absolute power, he is their King, but not as he is absolute, and that he may not be forceably resisted;* 1.507 notwithstanding, the subjects did swear to his absolute power (which oath in the point of absolutenesse, is unlawfull, and so not obligatory) I utterly deny. 3. An absolute Monarch (saith he) is limited, but by Law of nature: That is, Master Doctor, he is not limited as a Monarch, not as an absolute Monarch, but as a son of Adam, he is under the limites of the Law of nature, which he should have been under, though he had never been a King, all his dayes, but a slave. But what then? Therefore he cannot be re∣sisted. Yes, Doctor, by your own grant he can be resisted: If he invade an innocent subject (say you) 1. Suddenly. 2. Without colour of Law. 3. Inevitably: And that because he transgresseth the Law of nature. 4. You say, a limited Monarch can lesse be resisted for transgressing the bounds set by civill agreement. But, 1. What if the thus limited Monarch transgresse the Law of nature, and subvert Fundamentall Lawes, he is then, you seem to say, to be resisted; it is not for simple transgression of a civill agreement, that he is to be resisted. 2. The limited Monarch is as essentially the Lords anointed, and the power ordained of God, as the absolute Monarch. Now resistance by all your grounds, is unlawfull, be∣cause

of Gods power and place conferred upon him, not because of mens positive covenant made with him.

To finde out the essentiall difference betwixt a King and a Ty∣rant: We are to observe, that it is one thing to sin against a man,* 1.508 another thing against a Stat••. David killing Vriah, committed an act of murther: But on this supposition, that David is not punish∣ed for that murther, he did not so sin against the State, and Catho∣like good of the State, that he turneth Tyrant, and ceaseth to be a lawfull King. A Tyrant is he who habitually sinneth against the Catholike good of the Subjects and State, and subverteth Law. Such a one should not be, as Jason, of whom it is said by Aeneas Silvius, Graviter ferebat, si non regnaret, quasi nesciret esse privatus.* 1.509 When such as are monstrous Tyrants, are not taken away by the Estates, God pursueth them in wrath.* 1.510 Domitian was killed by his own Family, his wife knowing of it. Aurelianus was killed with a thunder-bolt. Darius was drowned in a River. Dioclesian fearing death, poysoned himself. Salerius died eaten with Worms: The end of Herod, and Antiochus. Maxentius was swallowed up in a standing River. Iulian died, being stricken through with a Dart thrown at him by a man, or an Angel, it is not known. Valens the Arian was burnt with fire in a little Village by the Gothes. Anastasius the Eutychian Emperour, was stricken by God with thunder. Gundericus Vandalus, when he rose against the Church of God, being apprehended by the Divell, died. Some time the State have taken order with Tyrants. The Empire was taken from Vitellius, Heliogabalus, Maximinus, Didius, Iulianus: So was the two Childerici of France served: So were also Sigebertus, Dagabertus, and Lodowick the 11. of France. Christiernus of Denmark, Mary of Scotland, who killed her husband, and raised Forces against the Kingdom: So was Henricus Valesius of Pol, for fleeing the Kingdom. Sigismundus of Pol, for violating his faith to the States.

QUEST. XXV. What force the Supreme Law hath over the King? even that Law of the Peoples safetie, called, Salus Populi.

THe Law of the 12. Tables, is, Salus populi, Suprema lex. The safetie of the People is the supreme and Cardinall law, to which all Lawes are to stoope. And that from these Reasons:

* 1.5111. Originally: Because, if the People be the first Author, Foun∣taine, and Efficient, under God, of Law and King, then their own safetie must be principally sought, and their safetie must be farre above the King, as the safetie of a Cause, especially of an universall Cause, such as is the People, must be more then the safetie of one, as Aristotle saith, l. 3. polit. alias l. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The part cannot be more excellent then the whole: nor the effect above the cause.

2. Finaliter. This Supreme law must stand; for if all Law, Po∣licie, Magistrates and Power be referred to the peoples good, as the end, Rom. 13.4. and to their quiet and peaceable life in godlinesse and honestie: then must this Law stand, as of more worth then the King, as the end is of more worth then the meanes leading to the end; for the end is the measure and rule of the goodnesse of the meane: and, finis ultimus in influxu est potentissimus. The King is good, because he conduceth much for the safetie of the People; Ergo, the safetie of the people must be better.

3. By way of limitation: Because no Law, in its letter, hath force, where the safetie of the Subject is in hazard: and if Law, or King be destructive to the people, they are to be abolished. This is cleare in a Tyrant, or a wicked man.

4. In the desires of the most holy: Moses, a Prince, desired for the safetie of Gods people; and rather then God should destroy his people, that his name should be razed out of the booke of life. And David saith, 1 Chron. 21.17. Let thine hand, I pray thee, O Lord my God, be on me, and on my fathers house; but not on thy people, that they should be plagued. This being a holy desire of these two publick Spirits,* 1.512 the object must be in it selfe true; and the safetie of Gods people, and their happinesse, must be of more worth then the salvation of Moses, and the life of David, and his Fathers house.

The Prelate borroweth an answer to this,* 1.513 (for he hath none of his own) from D. Ferne. The safetie of the Subjects is the prime end of the constitution of Government: but it is not the sole and adequate end of government in Monarchie; for that is the safetie of both King and People. And it beseemeth the King to proportion his lawes for their good; and it becommeth the People to proportion all their obedience, actions and endeavours, for the safetie, honour, and happinesse of the King. It's impossible the people can have safetie, when Soveraigntie is weakened.

Ans. The Prelate would have the other halfe of the end, why a King is set over a People, to be the safetie and happinesse of the King, as well as the safetie of the People.* 1.514 This is new Logick in∣deed, that one and the same thing should be the meane, and the end. The question is, For what end is a King made so happy, as to be exalted King? The Prelate answereth; He is made happy, that he may be happy; and made a King, that he may be made a King. Now is the King, as King, to intend this halfe end? that is, Whether or no accepteth he the burden of setting his head and shoulders un∣der the Crowne, for this end, that he may not only make the peo∣ple happy, but also that he may make himselfe rich and honorable above his brethren, and enrich himselfe? I beleeve not: but that he feed the people of God. For if he intend himselfe, and his own honour, it is the intention of the man who is King, and intentio operantis; but it is not the intention of the King, as the King, or intentio operis. The King, as a King, is formally and essentially the Minister of God for our good, Rom. 13.4. 1 Tim. 2.2. and cannot come under any notion as a King, but as a mean, not as an end, nor as that which he is, to seeke himselfe. I conceive, God did forbid this, in the mould∣ing of the first King, Deut. 17.18, 19, 26. He is a minister by office, and one who receiveth honour and wages for this worke, that ex officio, he may feed his people. But the Prelate saith, the people are to intend his riches and honour. I cannot say but the people may intend to honour the King: but that is not the question, whether the people be to referre the King and his government as a meane to honour the King? I conceive not. But that end which the people in obeying the King in being ruled by him, may intend, is, 1 Tim. 2.2. That under him they may lead a quiet and a peaceable life, in all Godlinesse and honestie. And Gods end in giving a King, is the good and safetie of his people.

* 1.515P. Prelate. To reason from the one part and end of Monarchicall government, The safetie of the Subjects; to the destruction and weak∣ning of the other part of the end of the power of Soveraigntie, and the Royall prerogative: is a caption à divisis. If the King be not happy, and invested with the full power of a Head, the Body cannot be well. By Anti-Monarchists; The people at the beginning were necessitated to commit themselves, lives and fortunes to the government of a King, because of themselves they had not wisedome and power enough to doe it: and therefore they enabled him with honour and power, without which he could not doe this, being assured that he could not choose but most earnestly and carefully endeavour this end, to wit, his own, and the peoples happines. Ergo, the safetie of the people issueth from the safetie of the King, as the life of the naturall body from the soule. Weake Go∣vernment is neare to Anarchie. Puritans will not say, Quovis modo esse, etiam poenale, is better then non esse: The Scripture saith the contrary; It were better for some never to have been borne, then to be. Tyranny is better then no Government.

Ans. 1. He knowes not Sophismes of Logick, who calleth this Argument, à divisis: for the Kings Honour is not the end of the Kings Government: He should seeke the safetie of State and Church, not himself; Himselfe is a private end, and a step to Ty∣ranny.

2. The Prelate lyeth, when he maketh us to reason from the safe∣tie of the Subject to the destruction of the King. Ferne, Barclay, Groti∣us, taught the hungry Scholler to reason so. Where read he this? The People must be saved; That is the Supreme law: Ergo, destroy the King. The Devill and the Prelate both, shall not fasten this on us. But thus we reason: When the man who is the King, endeavo∣reth not the end of his Royall place, but, through bad counsell, the subversion of Lawes, Religion, and bondage of the Kingdome; The free Estates are to joyne with him for that end of Safetie, according as God hath made them heads of Tribes, and Princes of the people: And if the King refuse to joyne with them, and will not doe his dutie; I see not how they are in conscience liberated, before God, from doing their part.

3. If the P. Prelate call resisting the King by lawfull defensive wars, the destruction of the Head; He speaketh with the mouth of one excommunicated, and delivered up to Sathan.

4. We endeavour nothing more then the safetie and happinesse

of the King, as King: but his happinesse is not to suffer him to de∣stroy his Subjects, subvert Religion, arme Papists, who have slaugh∣tered above two hundred thousand innocent Protestants, only for the profession of that true Religion which the King hath sworne to maintaine. Not to rise in armes to helpe the King against these, were to gratifie him as a Man, but to be accessarie to his soules destructi∣on, as a King.

5. That the Royall Prerogative is the end of a Monarchie ordained by God; neither Scripture, Law, nor Reason can admit.

6. The people are to intend the safetie of other Iudges, as well as the Kings. If Parliaments be destroyed, whose it is to make Lawes and Kings; the People can neither be safe, free to serve Christ, nor happy.

7. It is a lie, that people were necessitated, at the beginning, to commit themselves to a King: for we read of no King, while Nimrod arose: Fathers of families (who were not Kings) and o∣thers, did governe till then.

8. It was not want of wisedome, (for in many, and in the peo∣ple, there must be more wisdome then in one man:) but rather cor∣ruption of nature, and reciprocation of injuries, that created Kings, and other Iudges.

9. The King shall better compasse his end, to wit, the safetie of the people, with limited power, (placent mediocria) and with other Iudges added to helpe him, Num. 11.14, 16. Deut. 1.12, 13, 14, 15. then to put in one mans hand absolute power: for a sinfull mans head cannot beare so much new wine, such as exorbitant pow∣er is.

10. He is a base flatterer, who saith, The King cannot choose but earnestly and carefully endeavour his own, and the peoples happinesse: that is, the King is an Angel, and cannot sinne, and decline from the duties of a King. Of the many Kings of Judah and Israel, how ma∣ny chose this? All the good Kings that have been, may be written in a gold ring.

11. The peoples safetie dependeth indeed on the King, as a King and a happy Governour; but the people shall never be fattened to eat the winde of an imaginarie Prerogative Royall.

12. Weake Government, that is, a King with a limited power, who hath more power about his head, nor within his head; is a

strong King, and farre from Anarchy.

* 1.51613. I know not what he meaneth, but Arminius, his Masters way and words are here, for Arminians say, That being in the damned eternally tormented is no benefit, it were better they never had being, then to be eternally tormented; and this they say to the defiance of the Doctrine of eternall Reprobation, in which we teach, That though by accident, and because of the Damned their abuse of being and life, it were to them better not to be; as is said of Iudas, yet simpliciter comparing being with non-being, and considering the eternity of miserable being in relation to the abso∣lute liberty of the Former of all things, who maketh use of the sinfull being of Clay-vessells for the illustration of the glory of his Iustice and power, Rom. 9.17, 22. 1 Pet. 2.8. Iude v. 4. It is a censuring of God, and his unsearchable Wisedome, and a condemning of the Almighty of cruelty (God avert blasphemy of the unspotted and holy Majesty) who by Arminian grounds, keepeth the Damned in life, and being to be fuell eternally for Tophet, to declare the glo∣ry of his Iustice. But the Prelate behoved to goe out of his way to salute and gratifie, a proclaimed enemy of free Grace Arminius, and hence he would inferre, That the King wanting his Preroga∣tive Royall, and fulnesse of absolute power to doe wickedly, is in a penall and miserable condition, and that it were better for the King to be a Tyrant, with absolute liberty to destroy, and save alive at his pleasure, as is said of a Tyrant, Dan. 5. v. 19. then to be no King at all. And here consider a Principle of Royalists Court faith.

* 1.5171. The King is no King, but a lame and miserable Iudge, if he have not irresistable power to wast and destroy.

2. The King cannot be happy, nor the people safe; nor can the King doe good in saving the needy, except he have the uncontrol∣lable and unlimited power of a Tyrant, to crush the poore and needy, and lay wast the mountaine of the Lords inheritance: such Court-ravens, who feede upon the soules of living Kings, are more cruell then Ravens and Vultures, who are but dead carcasses.

* 1.518Williams B. of Ossarie answereth to the Maxime, Salus populi, &c. No wise King but will carefully provide for the peoples safety, because his safety and honour is included in theirs, his destruction in theirs. And it is, saith Lipsius, egri animi proprium nihil diu pati. Absolom per∣swaded there was no justice in the Land, when he intendeth Rebellion.

And the poore Prelate following him,* 1.519 spendeth pages to prove that Goods, Life, Chastity and Fame dependeth on the safety of the King, as the breath of our nostrills, our Nurse-father, our Head, corner∣stone, and Judge, c. 17.6.18.1. The reason why all disorder was in Church and State, was not because there was no Iudge, no Govern∣ment; none can be so stupid as to imagine that. But because 1. They wanted the excellentest of Governments. 2. Because Aristocracy was weakened so, as there was no right. No doubt Priests there were, but Hos. 4. either they would not serve, or were over-awed, no doubt in those daies they had Iudges, but Priests and Iudges were stoned by a rascally multitude, and they were not able to rule; therefore it is most consonant to Scripture to say, Salus regis suprema populi salus. The safety of the King and his Prerogative Royall is the safest sanctuary for the people. So Hos. 3.4. Lament. 2.9.

Ans. 1. The question is not of the Wisedome, but of the Power of the King, if it should be bounded by no Law.

2. The flatterer may know, there be more foolish Kings in the world then wise, and that Kings misled with Idolatrous Queenes, and by name Achab ruined himselfe, and his posterity and Kingdome.

3. The salvation and happinesse of men standing in the exalting of Christs Throne and the Gospell, ergo every King, and every man will exalt the Throne, and so let them have an incon∣trollable power without constraint of Law, to doe what they list, and let no bounds be set to Kings over subjects; by this Argument their owne wisedome is a law to leade them to Heaven.

4. It is not Absoloms mad Male-contents in Britane, but there were really no justice to Protestants, all indulgence to Papists, Popery, Arminianisme, Idolatry printed, Preached, professed, re∣warded by Authority, Parliaments, and Church Assemblies, the Bulwarkes of Iustice and Religion were denyed, dissolved, crushed, &c.

5. That by a King he understandeth a Monarch, Iudg. 17. and that such a one, as Saul, of Absolute power, and not a Iudge, cannot be proved, for there were no Kings in Israel in the Iudges daies, the Government not being changed till neare the end of Samuels Government.

6. And that they had no Iudges, he saith, It is not imaginable, but I rather beleeve God then the Prelate, Every one did what was

right in his owne eyes, because there was none to put ill doers to shame. Possible the Estates of Israel governed some way for meere necessity, but wanting a supreme Iudge which they should have, they were loose: but this was not because where there is no King, as P. P. would insinuate, there was no Government, as is cleare.

7. Of tempered and limited Monarchy, I thinke as honourably as the Prelate, but that absolute and unlimited Monarchy is excel∣lenter then Aristocracy, I shall then beleeve when Royalists shall prove such a Government, in so farre it is absolute, to be of God.

8. That Aristocracy was now weakened I beleeve not, seeing God so highly commendeth it, and calleth it his own reigning over his people, 1 Sam. 8.7. The weakening of it through abuse, is not to a purpose, more then the abuse of Monarchy.

9. No doubt (saith he) Hos. 4. They were Priests and Iudges, Hos. 4. but they were over-awed as they are now. J thinke he would say, Hos. 3.4. otherwise he citeth Scripture sleeping. That the Priests of Antichrist be not only over-awed, but out of the earth; I yeeld, that the King be limited, not over-awed, I thinke Gods Law, and mans Law alloweth.

10. The safety of the King as King, is not only safety, but a bles∣sing to Church and State, and therefore this P. Prelate and his fellowes deserve to be hanged before the Sun, who have led him on a warre to destroy him, and his Protestant subjects. But the safety and flourishing of a King in the exercises of an Arbitrary, unlimited power against Law, and Religion, and to the destruction of his subjects, is not the safety of the people, nor the safety of the Kings soule, which these men, if they be the Priests of the Lord, should care for.

The Prelate commeth to refute the learned and worthy Observa∣tor.* 1.520 The safety of the people is the supreme Law, ergo the King is bound in duty to promote all and every one of his subjects to all happi∣nesse. The Observator hath no such inference, the King is bound to promote some of his subjects even as King, to a Gallowes, especially Irish Rebells, and many bloudy Malignants. But the Prelate will needs have God rigorous (hallowed be his name) if it be so, for it is unpossible to the tenderest-hearted father to doe so: actuall pro∣motion of all is unpossible, that the King intend it of all his subjects,

as good subjects, by a Throne established on righteousnesse and judgement, is that which the worthy Observator meaneth; other things here are answered.

The summe of his second answer is, a repetition of what he hath said; I give my word in a Pamphlet of one hundred ninety and foure pages, I never saw more idle repetitions, of one thing twenty times before said. But page one hundred sixty and eight, he saith, The safety of the King and his subjects in the Morall notion may be esteemed Morally the same, no lesse then the soule and the body make one personall subsistence.

Ans. This is strange Logick, the King and his subjects are Ens per aggregationem; and the King as King hath one Morall subsistence, and the people another. Hath the Father and the sonne, the Master and the servant one Morall subsistence? but the man speaketh of their well being: and then he must meane that our Kings Govern∣ment that was not long agoe, and is yet, to wit, the Popery, Armi∣nianisme, Idolatry, cutting of mens eares, and noses, banishing, im∣prisonment, for speaking against Popery, arming of Papists to slay Protestants, pardoning the bloud of Ireland, that I feare, shall not be soone taken away, &c. are identically the same with the life, safe∣ty, and happinesse of Protestants, then life and death, justice and un∣justice, Idolatry and sincere worship are identically one, as the soule of the Prelate and his body are one.

The third is but a repitition.* 1.521 The Acts of Royaltie (saith the Ob∣servator) are Acts of dutie and obligation; Ergo, not acts of grace properly so called. Ergo, We may not thank the King for a courtesie. This is no consequence. What fathers do to children, are acts of naturall dutie, and of naturall grace; and yet children owe grati∣tude to parents, and subjects to good Kings, in a legall sense. No, but in way of courtesie onely. The Observator said, The King is not a father to the whole collective body, and its well said, he is son to them, and they his maker. Who made the King? Policy answereth, The State made him, and Divinitie: God made him.

4. The Observator said well:* 1.522 The peoples weaknesse is not the Kings strength. The Prelate saith, Amen: He said, That that perish∣eth not to the King, which is granted to the people. The Prelate deny∣eth. Because, What the King hath in trust from God, the King can∣not make away to another, nor can any take it from him, without sacriledge.

Answ. True indeed, If the King had Royalty by immediate trust, and infusion by God, as Elias had the spirit of prophecie, that he cannot make away: Royalists dream that God immediate∣ly from heaven, now infuseth facultie and right to Crowns, without any word of God. Its enough to make an Euthysiast leap up to the Throne, and kill Kings. Judge if these Fanaticks be favourers of Kings: But if the King have Royaltie mediately by the peoples free consent from God, there is no reason, but people give as much power even by ounce weights (for power is strong Wine, and a great mocker) as they know a weak mans head will bear, and no more; power is not an immediate inheritance from heaven: But a birth-right of the people borrowed from them, they may let it out for their good, and resume it when a man is drunk with it. 2. The man will have it conscience on the King to fight and destroy his three Kingdoms, for a dream, his prerogative above Law. But the truth is, Prelates do engage the King, his house, honour, subjects, Church, for their cursed Mytres.

* 1.523The Prelate vexeth the Reader with Repetitions, and saith, The King must proportion his Government, to the safety of the people on the one hand, and to his owne safety and power on the other hand.

Ans. What the King doth as King, he doth it for the happinesse of his people, the King is a relative, yea even his owne happinesse that he seeketh, he is to referre to the good of Gods people. He saith farther,* 1.524 The safety of the people includeth the safety of the King, be∣cause the word populus is so taken, which he proveth by a raw sickly rabble of words, stollen out of Passerats Dictioner. His father the Schoole-master may whip him for frivolous Etymologies.

This supreame Law (saith the Prelate) is not above the Law of Prerogative Royall, the highest Law, nor is Rex above Lex. The De∣mocracie of Rome had a supremacie above Lawes, to make and un∣make Lawes: and will they force this power on a Monarch, to the de∣struction of Soveraigntie?

Answ. This, which is stollen from Spalato, Barclay, Grotius, and others,* 1.525 is easily answered. The supremacie of People, is a Law of natures selfe-preservation, above all positive Lawes, and above the King; and is to regulate Soveraigntie, not to destroy it. 2. If this supremacie of Maj••stie was in people, before they have a King, then 1. they lose it not by a voluntary choise of a King; for a King is chosen for good, and not for the peoples losse, ergo they must retain

this power in habite, and potency, even when they have a King. 2. Then supremacy of Majesty is not a beame of Divinity proper to a King only. 3. Then the people having Royall soveraignty ver∣tually in them, make, and so unmake a King, all which the Prelate denyeth.

This supreme Law (saith the Prelate, begging it from Spalato, Arnisaeus, Grotius) advance the King, not the people:* 1.526 and the sense is, The Kingdome is really some time in such a case, that the So∣veraigne must exercise an Arbitrary Power, and not stand upon private mens interests, or transgressing of Lawes, made for the private good of individualls, but for the preservation of it selfe, and the publicke, may break through all Lawes. This he may, in the case when suddaine for∣raine invasion threatneth ruine inevitably to King and Kingdome; a Physitian may rather cut a Gangreened member, then suffer the whole body to perish. The Dictator in case of extreame dangers (as Livie and Dion. Halicarnass. shew us) had power according to his owne Arbitra∣ment, had a soveraigne Commission in peace and war of life, death, per∣sons, &c. not co-ordinate, not subordinate to any.

Ans. It is not an Arbitrary power, but naturally tyed and fette∣red to this same supreame Law, Salus populi, the safety of the peo∣ple, that a King breake through, not the Law, but the letter of the Law for the safety of the people; as the Chyrurgion, not by any prerogative that he hath above the Art of Chyrurgery,* 1.527 but by ne∣cessity, cutteth off a Gangreened member, thus its not Arbitrary to the King to save his people from ruine, but by the strong and im∣perious Law of the peoples safety he doth it; for if he did it not, he were a murtherer of his people. 2. He is to stand upon transgression of Lawes according to their genuine sense of the peoples safety, for good Lawes are not contrary one to another, though when he breaketh through the letter to the Law, yet he breaketh not the Law, for if twenty thousand Rebells invade Scotland, he is to com∣mand all to rise, though the formality of a Parliament cannot be had to indict the war, as our Law provideth; but the King doth not command all to rise, and defend themselves by a Prerogative Royall, proper to him as King, and incommunicable to any but to himselfe.

1. There is no such dinne and noise to be made for a King, and his incommunicable Prerogative, for though the King were not at all, yea though he command the contrary (as he did when he came

against Scotland with an English Army) the law of Nature teacheth all to rise without the King.

2. That the King command this as King, it is not a particular po∣sitive Law; but he doth it as a man, and a member of the Kingdom; The law of Nature, (which knoweth no dreame of such a Preroga∣tive) forceth him to it, as every member is, by Natures indictment, to care for the whole.

3. It is poore hungry skill in this New Statist, (for so he nameth all Scotland) to say, that any Lawes are made for private interests, and the good of some individuals.* 1.528 Lawes are not Lawes, if they be not made for the safetie of the people.

4. It is false, that the King in a publike danger is to care for him∣selfe as a man, with the ruine and losse of any: Yea, in a publike ca∣lamitie, a good King, as David, is to desire he may die, that the Publique may bee saved, 2 Samuel, 24.17. Exodus 32.32. It is commended of all, that the Emperour Otho, yea and Richard the 2. of England, as M. Speed saith, Hist. of England, p. 757. resigned their Kingdomes to eschew the effusion of blood. The Prelate ad∣viseth the King to passe over all lawes of Nature, and slay thousands of innocents, and destroy Church and State of three Kingdomes, for a straw, and supposed Prerogative Royall. Now certainly, Preroga∣tive, and Absolutenes to doe good and ill, must be inferior to a Law, the end whereof is the safetie of the People. For David willeth the pestilence may take him away, and so his Prerogative, that the People may be saved, 2 Sam. 24.17. for Prerogative is cumulative, to doe good, not privative to doe ill; and so is but a meane to de∣fend both the Law and the People.

2. Prerogative is either a power to doe good, or ill, or both: If the first be said, it must be limited by the End, and Law, for which it is ordained. A meane is no farther a meane, but in so far as it conduceth to the end; the safetie of all. If the second be admitted, it is Licence and Tyrannie, not power from God. If the third be said, both reasons plead against this, that Prerogative should be the King•• end in the present warres.

3. Prerogative being a power given by the mediation of the peo∣ple; yea, suppose (which is false) that it were given immediately of God; yet it not a thing for which the King should raise war against his Subjects: for God will aske no more of the King, then he gi∣veth to him: The Lord reapeth not, where he soweth not. If the Mi∣litia,

and other things, be ordered hitherto for the holding off Irish and Spanish invasion by Sea, and so for the good of the Land, seeing the King, in his own person, cannot make use of the Militia; he is to rejoyce that his Subjects are defended. The King cannot answer to God for the justice of warre on his part: It is not a case of con∣science that the King should shed blood for, to wit, because the under-Officers are such men, and not others of his choosing; seeing the Kingdome is defended sufficiently, except where Cavaliers de∣stroy it. And to me, this is an unanswerable argument, that the Ca∣valiers destroy not the Kingdomes for this Prerogative Royall, as the principall ground; but for a deeper designe, even for that which was working by Prelates and Malignants, before the late trou∣bles in both Kingdomes.

4. The King is to intend the safetie of his People; and the safety of the King, as a Governour, but not as this King, and this man, Charles: that is a selfe end: a King David is not to looke to that: for when the people was seeking his life and crown, he saith, Ps. 3.8. Thy blessing upon thy People. He may care for, and intend that the King and Government be safe: for if the Kingdome be destroyed, there cannot be a new Kingdome and Church on earth againe to serve God, in that generation, Psal. 89.47. but they may easily have a new King againe: and so the safetie of the one, cannot in reason be intended, as a collaterall end, with the safetie of the other: for there is no imaginable comparison betwixt one man, with all his accidents of Prerogative and Absolutenesse, and three Nationall Churches and Kingdomes: Better the King weep for a Childish trifle of a Prerogative, than Poperie be erected, and three King∣domes be destroyed by Cavaliers, for their own ends.

5. The Dictators power is, 1. a fact, and proveth not a point of Conscience.* 1.529 2. His power was in an exigence of extreme danger of the Commonwealth. The P. Prelate pleadeth for a constant absolutenesse above Lawes, to the King at all times, and that jure Divino. 3. The Dictator was the Peoples creature; ergo, the Crea∣tor, the People, had that soveraigntie over him. 4. The Dictator was not above a King: but the Romanes ejected Kings. 5. The Dictators power was not to destroy a State: 2. He might be, and was resisted. 3. He might be deposed.

Prelate. The safetie of the People is pretended as a Law, that the Jewes must put Christ to death; and that Saul spared Agag.* 1.530

Ans. No shadow for either, in the word of God. Caiaphas pro∣phecied, and knew not what he said. But that the Iewes intended the salvation of the Elect, in kil••ing Christ: or that Saul intended a publick good in sparing Agag, shall be the Prelates Divinitie, not mine.

2. What, howbeit many should abuse this Law of the peoples safety, to wrong good Kings, it ceaseth not therefore to be a Law, and licenseth not ill Kings, to place a Tyrannicall Prerogative above a just Dictate of nature.

* 1.531In the last Chapter, the Prelate hath no reasons, onely he would have Kings holy, and this he proveth from Apocrypha Books, be∣cause he is ebbe in holy Scripture; but it is Romish holinesse, as is cleer.

2. He must preach something to himself, that the King adore a tree-Altar. Thus Kings must be most reverend in their gestures, pag. 182.

3. The King must hazard his sacred life and three Kingdoms, his Crown, Royall posterity, to preserve sacred things, that is, Anti∣christian Romish Idols, Images, Altars, Ceremonies, Idolatry, Popery.

4. He must upon the same pain maintain sacred persons, that is, greasie Apostate Prelates. The rest I am weary to trouble the Rea∣der withall, but know ex ungue leo••em.

QUEST. XXVI. Whether the King be above the Law or no?

* 1.532WE may consider the question of the Laws supremacie over the King, either in the supremacie of constitution of the King, 2. or of direction, or 3. of limitation, or 4. of coaction and punishing. Those who maintain this, [The King is not subject to the Law] if their meaning be [The King as King is not subject to the Laws direction] They say nothing;* 1.533 for the King as the King is a living Law; then they say [The Law is not subject to the Laws dire∣ction] a very improper speech; or, The King as King, is not subject to the coaction of the Law; that is true, for he who is a living Law, as such, cannot punish himself, as the Law saith.

1. Assert. The Law hath a supremacy of constitution above the King;

1. Because the King by nature is not King, as is proved; Ergo, he must be King by a politique constitution and Law, and so the Law in that consideration is above the King, because it is from a civil Law, that there is a King, rather then any other kinde of Go∣vernour.

2. It is by Law, that amongst many hundred men, this man is King, not this man; and because, by the which a thing is constituted, by the same thing it is, or may be dissolved; therefore,

3. As a Community finding such and such qualifications as the Law requireth to be in a King, in this man, not in this man; there∣fore upon Law-ground,

5. They make him a King, and upon Law-grounds and just de∣merit, they may unmake him again; for, what men voluntarily doe upon condition, the condition being removed, they may undoe again.

2. Assert. It is denyed by none; but the King is under the dire∣ctive power of the Law, though many liberate the King from the coactive power of a civil Law. But I see not what direction a civil Law can give to the King, if he be above all obedience, or disobe∣dience to a Law, seeing all Law-direction is in ••rdine ad obedientiam, in order to obey; except thus far, that the light that is in the civil Law, is a morall or naturall guide to conduct a King in his walking; but this is the morality of the Law which inlightneth and informeth, not any obligation that aweth the King; and so the King is under Gods and Natures Law, this is nothing to the purpose.

3. Assert. The King is under the Law, in regard of some coer∣cive limitation:

1. Because there is no absolute power given to him to do what he listeth, as a man. And because,

2. God, in making Saul a King, doth not by any Royall stamp give him a power to sin, or to play the Tyrant; for which cause I expone these of the Law, Omnia sunt possibilia Regi,* 1.534 Imperator omnia potest. Baldus in §. F. de no. for. fidel. in F. & in prima con∣stitut. C. col. 2. Chassanaeus in Catalog. gloriae mundi. par. 5. consi∣derat. 24. & tanta est ejus celsitudo, ut non posset ei imponi lex in regno suo. Curt. in consol. 65. col. 6. ad. F. Petrus Rebuff. Notab. 3. repet. l. unicae. C. de sentent. quae pro eo quod nu. 17. pag. 363. All these go no otherwise but thus, The King can do all things which by Law he can do, and that holdeth him: id possumus quod jure pos∣sumus.

And therefore the King cannot be above the Covenant and Law made betwixt him and his people, at his Coronation-oath; for then the Covenant and Oath should binde him onely, by a natu∣rall obligation, as he is a man, not by a civil or politique obligation, as he is a King.

So then, 1. it were sufficient that the King should swear that Oath in his Cabinet-chamber, and it is but a mocking of an Oath, that he swear it to the people.

2. That Oath given by the Representative-Kingdom, should also oblige the Subjects naturally, in foro Dei, not politically, in foro hu∣mano, upon the same reason.

3. He may be resisted as a man.

4. Assert. The fourth case is, if the King be under the obliging politique coaction of civil Laws, for that he in foro Dei, be under the morality of civil Laws, so as he cannot contraveen any Law in that notion, but he must sin against God, is granted on all hands, Deut. 17.20. Iosh. 1.8. 1 Sam. 12.15. That the King binde himself to the same Law that he doth binde others, is decent, and obligeth the King as he is a man;

1. Because, Matth. 7.12. It is said to be the Law and the Pro∣phets, All things, whatsoever ye would men should do unto you, do ye even so to them.

2. It is the Law, Jmperator L. 4. digna v••x. C. de lege & tit. Quod quisque juris in alium statuit, eodem & ipse utatur. Iulius Caesar commanded the youth who had defloured the Emperours daughter, to be scourged, above that which the Law allowed. The youth said to the Emperour,* 1.535 Dixisti legem Caesar; You appointed the Law, Caesar. The Emperor was so offended with himself, that he had failed against the Law, that for the whole day he refused to taste meat.

Assert. 5. The King cannot but he subject to the coactive power of Fundamentall Laws:* 1.536 Because this is a Fundamentall Law, that the free Estates lay upon the King, that all the power that they give to the King as King, is for the good and safety of the people; and so what he doth to the hurt of his subjects, he doth it not as King.

2. The Law saith, Qui habet potestatem constituendi etiam & jus adimendi. l. nemo. 37. l. 21. de reg. jure. Those who have power to make, have power to unmake Kings.

3. What ever the King doth as King, that he doth by a power

borrowed from, (or by a fiduciary power which is his by trust) the Estates, who made him King. He must then be nothing but an eminent servant of the State, in the punishing of others. If therefore he be unpunishable, it is not so much because his Royall power is above all Law-coaction, as because one & the same man cannot be both the punisher and the punished, and this is a Physicall incongruity rather then a Morall absurdity. So the Law of God layeth a duty on the inferiour Magistrate, to use the sword against the murtherer, and that by vertue of his Office, but I much doubt it for that, he is to use the sword against himselfe in the case of Murther▪ for this is a truth I purpose to make good;* 1.537 that suffering as suffering according to the substance and essence of passion, is not commanded by any Law of God or nature to the sufferer, but only the manner of suffe∣ring: I doubt if it be not, by the Law of Nature, lawfull even to the ill doer who hath deserved death by Gods Law, to fly from the sword of the lawfull Magistrate; only the manner of suffering with patience is commanded of God. I know the Law saith here, That the Magistrate is both Iudge, and the Executor of the sentence a∣gainst himselfe, in his owne cause, for the excellency of his Office. Therefore these are to be distinguished, whether the King Ratione demeriti & jure, by Law be punishable, or if the King can actually be punished corporally by a Law of man, he remaining King; and since he must be a punisher himselfe, and that by vertue of his Of∣fice. In matters of goods the King may be both Iudge and punisher of himselfe, as our Law provideth that any subject may plead his owne heritage from the King before the inferiour Iudges, and if the King be a violent possessour, and in Mala fide for many yeares, by Law he is obliged upon a Decree of the Lords, to execute the sen∣tence against himselfe, Ex officio, and to restore the Lands, and re∣pay the dammage to the just owner, and this the King is to doe a∣gainst himselfe, ex officio. I grant here the King as King punisheth himselfe as an unjust man, but because bodily suffering is meere vio∣lence to nature, I doubt if the King ex officio, is to doe or inflict any bodily punishment on himselfe: Nemo potest a seipso cogi. l. ille a quo. 13. §.

Assert. 6. There be some Lawes made in favour of the King as King, as to pay tribute. The King must be above this Law as King.* 1.538 True, but if a Noble man of a great rent be elected King, I know not, if he can be free from paying to himselfe as King, tribute, seeing

this is not allowed to the King by a Divine Law, Rom. 13.6. as a reward of his worke; and Christ expresly maketh tribute a thing due to Caesar as a King, Matth. 22. v. 21. There be some solemni∣ties of the Law from which the King may be free, Prickman. D. c. 3. n. 78. and he relateth what they are, they are not Lawes, but some circumstances belonging to Lawes, and Prickman answereth to many places alledged out of the Lawyers, to prove the King to be above the Law, Maldorus in 12. Art. 4, 5, 9, 96. will have the Prince under that Law,* 1.539 which concerneth all the Common-wealth equally in regard of the matter, and that by the Law of nature, but he will not have him subject to these Lawes which concerneth the subjects as subjects, as to pay tribute. He citeth Francis••. a Vict. Covarruvia, and Turrecremata. He also will have the Prince under positive Lawes, such as not to transport victualls, not because the Law bind∣eth him as a Law. But because the making of the Law bindeth him, Tanquam conditio sine qua non, even as he who teacheth another that he should not steale, he should not steale himselfe, Rom. 2. But the truth is, this is but a branch of the Law of Nature, that I should not commit Adultery, and Theft, and Sacriledge, and such sinnes as nature condemneth, if I shall condemne them in others, and doth not prove that the King is under the coactive power of Civill Lawes.

* 1.540Vlpianus, l. 31. F. de regibus saith, The Prince is loosed from Lawes, Bodine de Repub. l. 7. c. 8. Nemo imperat sibi, No man commandeth himselfe. Tholosanus saith, Ipsius est dare, non accipere leges. The Prince giveth Lawes, but receiveth none, De Rep. l. 7. c. 20. Donellus Lib. 1. Comment. c. 17. distinguisheth betwixt a Law, and a Royall Law proper to the King. Trentlerus Volum. 1.79.80. saith, The Prince is freed from Laws▪ and that he obeyeth Laws, de honestate,* 1.541 non de necessitate, Vpon honesty, not of necessity. Thomas P. 1. q. 96. Art. 5. and with him Soto, Gregorius de Valentia, and other Schoole-men, subject the King to the directive power of the Law, and liberate him of the coactive power of the Law.

Assert. 7. If a King turne a Paricide, a Lyon, and a waster and destroyer of the people, as a man he is subject to the Coactive power of the Lawes of the Land. If any Law should hinder that a Tyrant should not be punished by Law, it must be, because he hath not a su∣periour but God; for Royalists build all upon this, but this ground is false: because the Estates of the Kingdome who gave him the

Crowne, are above him, and they may take away what they gave him; as the Law of Nature and God saith, If they had knowne he would turne Tyrant, they would never have given him the sword•••• and so how much ignorance is in the contract they made with the King, as little of will is in it, and so it is not every way willing, but being conditionall is supposed to be against their will. 2. They gave the power to him only for their good, and that they make the King, is cleare, 2 Chron. 23.11. 1 Sam. 10.17, 24. Deut. 17.14, 15, 16, 17. 2 King. 11. v. 12. 1 King. 16.21. 2 King. 10.5. Iud. 9.6.2. 2 Chron. 26.18. fourescore valiant men of the Priests withstood Vzziah in a corporall violence, and thrust him out, and cut him off from the house of the Lord. And,

2. If the Princes place doe not put him above the Lawes of Church-Discipline, (Matth. 18. for Christ excepteth none,* 1.542 and how can men except?) and if the rod of Christs lips smite the earth, and slay the wicked, Esay 11.4. and the Prophets Elias, Nathan, Iere∣miah, Esaiah, &c. Iohn Baptist, Iesus Christ▪ and his Apostles have used this rod of censure and rebuke, as servants under God, against Kings, this is a sort of spirituall coaction of Lawes put in execution by men, and by due proportion corporall coaction being the same ordinance of God, though of another nature, must have the like power over all, whom the Law of God hath not excepted, but Gods Law excepteth none at all.

3. It is presumed that God hath not provided better for the safe∣ty of the part, then of the whole,* 1.543 especially when he maketh the part a meane for the safety of the whole.

But if God have provided that the King, who is a part of the Common-wealth, shall be free of all punishment, though he be a habituall destroyer of the whole Kingdome, seeing God hath given him to be a Father, Tutor, Saviour, Defender thereof, and destina∣ted him as a meane for their safety, then must God have worse, not better provided, for the safety of the whole, then of the part. The Proposition is cleare in that God, Rom. 13.4. 1 Tim. 2.2. hath ordained the Ruler, and given to him the sword to defend the whole Kingdome and City; but we read no where, that the Lord hath given the sword to the whole Kingdome, to defend one man a King, though a Ruler come going on in a Tyrannicall way of de∣stroying all his subjects.

The assumption is evident: for then the King, turning Tyrant, might

set an Army of Turkes,* 1.544 Jewes, cruell Papists, to destroy the Church of God, without all feire of L••w or punishment. Yea, this is con∣trary to the doctrine of Royalists: for, Winzetus adversus Bucha∣na••um, p. 275. s••ith of Nero, that he seeking to destroy the Senate and people of Rom••, and seeking to m••ke new lawes for himselfe, ex∣cidit jure Regni, lost right to the Kingdome. And Barclaius advers. Monarcho-Machous, l. 3. c. ult. p. 212, 213. saith, A Tyrant, such as Caligula, spoliare se jure Regni, spoileth himselfe of the right to the Crown.* 1.545 And in that same place: Regem, si regnum suum alienae di∣tioni manciparit, regno cadere: If the King sell his Kingdome, he loseth the title to the Crown. Grotius de jure belli & pacis, l. 1. c. 4. n. 7, Si Rex hostili animo in totius populi exitium feratur, amittit regnum: If he turne Enemie to the Kingdome, for their destructi∣on, he loseth his Kingdome, because (saith he) Voluntas imperandi, & voluntas perdendi, simul consistere non possunt: A will or minde to governe, and to destroy, cannot consist together in one. Now if this be true, that a King turning Tyrant, loseth title to the Crown; this is either a falling from his Royall title only in Gods court; or it is a losing of it before men, and in the court of his Subjects. If the for∣mer be said, 1. He is no King, having before God lost his Royall ti∣tle: and yet the people is to obey him as the Minister of God, and a power from God, when as he is no such thing. 2. In vaine doe these Authors provide remedies to save the people from a Tyrannous wa∣ster of the people, if they speake of a Tyrant who is no King in Gods court only, and yet remaineth a King to the people in regard of the Law: for the places speake of Remedies that God hath pro∣vided against Tyrants cum titulo, such as are lawfull Kings, but turn Tyrants. Now by this they provide no remedie at all, if only in Gods court, and not in Mans court also, a Tyrant lose his title. As for Tyrants sine titulo, such as usurpe the throne, and have no just claime to it: Barclaius adver. Monarcho-Ma. l. 4. c. 10. p. 268. saith, Any private man may kill him, as a publike enemie of the State: but if he lose his title to the Crown in the court of Men, then is there, 1▪ a Court on Earth to judge the King, and so he is under the co∣active power of a Law. 2. Then a King may be resisted, and yet those who resist them, doe not incurre damnation; the contrary whereof Royalists endeavour to prove from Rom. 13.3. Then the people may un-king one who was a King. But 4. I would know who taketh that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from him, whereby he is a King, that beame

of Divine majestie? Not the people; because Royalists say, they neither can give, nor take away Royall dignitie, and so they can∣not un-king him.

4. The more Will be in the consent▪ (saith Ferd. Vasquez▪:* 1.546 l. 1. c 41.) the obligation is the stricter. So, doubled words (saith the Law,* 1.547 l. 1. §. 13. n. 13.) oblige more strictly. And all lawes of Kings, who are rationall fathers, and so lead us by Lawes, as by rationall meanes to peace and externall happinesse; are contracts of King and Peo∣ple. Omnis lex sponsio & contractus Reip. §. 1. Iust. de ver. relig. Now the King at his Coronation-covenant with the people, giveth a most intense consent, an Oath, to be a keeper and preserver of all good Laws: and so hardly he can be freed from the strictest obligati∣on that Law can impose: And if he keep Lawes by office, he is a meane to preserve Lawes; and no meane can bee superior and above the end, but inferior thereunto.

5. Bodine proveth, de Rep. l. 2. c. 5. p. 221. that Emperors at first were but Princes of the Commonwealth:* 1.548 and that Soveraign∣tie remained still in the Senate and people. Marius Salomonius,* 1.549 a learned Romane Civilian, wrote sixe bookes de Principatu, to re∣fute the supremacie of Emperors above the State. Ferd. Vasq. illust. quest. part. 1. l. 1. n. 21. proveth, that the Prince, by Royall dignitie, leaveth not off to be a Citizen, a member of the Politique body; and not a King, but a Keeper of Lawes.

Hence, 6. The Prince remaineth, even being a Prince, a sociall creature, a Man, as well as a King; one who must buy, sell, promise, contract, dispose: Ergo, he is not Regula regulans, but under rule of law: for impossible it is, if the King can, in a politicall way, live as a member of a societie, and doe and performe acts of policie, and so performe them, as he may by his office, buy, and not pay; promise, and vow, and sweare to men, and not performe, nor be obliged to men to render a reckoning of his Oath, and kill and destroy, and yet in Curia politicae societatis, in the Court of humane policie, be free: and that he may give inheritances, as just rewards of vertue and well-doing, and take them away againe. Yea, seeing these sinnes that are not punishable before men, are not sinnes before men: If all the sinnes and oppressions of a Prince be so above the punish∣ment that men can inflict, they are not sinnes before men, by which meanes the King is loosed from all guiltinesse of the sinnes against the Second Table: for, the ratio formalis, the formall reason, why

the Iudge, by warrant from God, condemneth, in the Court of men, the guilty man, is, because he hath sinned against humane societie, either through the scandall of blasphemie, or through other hey∣nous sinnes he hath defiled the Land. Now this is incident to the King, as well as to some other sinfull man.

* 1.550To these, and the like, heare what the excommunicated Prelate hath to say; 1. They say (he meaneth the Jesuites) Every societie of men is a perfect Republick, and so must have within it selfe a power to preserve it selfe from ruine, and by that to punish a Tyrant. He an∣swereth, A societie without a Head, is a disorderly rout, not a Politique body; and so cannot have this power.

Ans. 1. The Pope giveth to every Societie, Politick power to make away a Tyrant, or hereticall King, and to un-king him, by his brethren the Jesuites way. And observe, how Papists (of which number I could easily prove the P. Prelate to be, by the Popish doctrine that he delivered, while the iniquitie of time, and domini∣on of Prelates in Scotland, advanced him, against all worth of true learning and holinesse, to be a Preacher in Edinborough) and Iesu∣ites agree, as the builders of Babylon. It is the purpose of God to de∣stroy Babylon.

2. This answer shall inferre, that the Aristocraticall Governors of any free State, and that the Duke of Venice, and the Senate there, is above all Law, and cannot be resisted, because without their Heads they are a disorderly Rout.

3. A Politicall societie, as by Natures instinct, they may appoint a Head, or Heads to themselves: so also if their Head, or Heads become ravenous Wolves, the God of Nature hath not left a perfect Societie remedilesse; but they may both resist, and punish the Head or Heads, to whom they gave all the power that they have, for their good, not for their destruction.

4. They are as orderly a body Politique, to unmake a Tyrannous Commander, as they were to make a just Governour. The Prelate saith, It is alike to conceive a Politique body without a Governour, as to conceive the naturall body without a Head. He meaneth, None of them can be conceivable. I am not of his minde. When Saul was dead, Israel was a perfect Politique body: and the Prelate, if he be not very obtuse in his head, (as this hungry peece stollen from o∣thers, sheweth him to be) may conceive a visible Politicall societie performing a Politicall action, 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. making David King

at a visible and conceivable place, at Hebron; and making a Cove∣nant with him. And that they wanted not all Governors, is nothing to make them Chymera's unconceivable: For when so many fami∣lies before Nimrod, were governed only by fathers of families, and they agreed to make either a King, or other Governors, a Head, or Heads over themselves: though the severall families had govern∣ment, yet these consociated families had no government; and yet so conceivable a Politique body, as if Maxwell would have compeared amongst them, and called them a disorderly rout, or an unconceivable Chymera, they should have made the Prelate know, that Chymera's can knock down Prelates. Neither is a King the life of a Politique body, as the soule is of the naturall body: The body createth not the soule: but Israel created Saul King; and when he was dead, they made David King, and so, under God, many Kings, as they succee∣ded, till the Messiah came. No naturall body can make soules to it selfe by succession; Nor can Seas create new Prelates al∣wayes.

P. Prelate. Jesuites and Puritans differ infinitely; We are hopefull God shall cast down this Babel. The Iesuites, for ought I know, seat the superintendent power in the Communitie: Some Sectaries follow them, and warrant any individuall person to make away a King in case of de∣fects, and the worke is to be rewarded as when one killeth a ravenous Wolfe. Some will have it in a collective body, but how? not met toge∣ther by warrant, or writ of Soveraigne Authoritie, but when fancie of reforming Church and State calleth them. Some will have the power in the Nobles and Peeres; some in the three Estates assembled by the Kings Writ; some in the inferior Iudges. I know not where this power to curbe Soveraigntie is, but in Almighty God.

Ans. 1. Iesuites and Puritans differ infinitely: true. Jesuites deny the Pope to be Antichrist, hold all Arminian doctrine, Christs locall descension to hell: all which the Prelate did preach. We de∣ny all this.

2. We hope also the Lord shall destroy the Jesuites Babel; the suburbs whereof, and more, are the Popish Prelates in Scotland and England.

3. The Jesuites, for ought he knoweth,* 1.551 place all superintendent power in the Communitie. The Prelate knoweth not all his brethren the Iesuites wayes: but it is ignorance, not want of good will. For Bellarmine, Beucanus, Suarez, Gre••gor, de Valentia, and others his

deare fellowes say, That all superintendent power of policy, in or∣dine ad spiritualia is in the man, whose foot Maxwell would kisse for a Cardinals Hat.

4. If these be all the differences, it is not much, the Community is the remote and l••st subject, the representative body the nearest subject, the Nobles a partiall subject; the Iudges as Iudges sent by the King, are so in the game, that when an Arbitrary Prince at his pleasure setteth them up, and at command that they judge for men, and not for the Lord, and accordingly obey, they are by this power to be punished, and others put in their place.

5. A true cause of convening Parliaments the prelate maketh a Fancie at this time▪ it is as if the theeves and robbers should say a Iustice Court were a fancie; but if the Prelate might compeare before the Parliament of Scotland (to which he is an out-law, like his father, 2 Thess: 2.4.) such a fancie I conceive should hang him, and that deservedly.

P. Prelate. The subject of this superintending power must be secured from errour,* 1.552 in judgement and practise, and the community and States then should be infallible.

Ans▪ The consequence is nought, no more then the King the absolute independent is infallible. 2. It is sure the people are in lesse hazard of Tyranny and selfe destruction, then the King is to subvert Lawes, and make himselfe absolute, and for that cause there must be a superintendent power above the King; and God Almighty also must be above all.

P. Prelate. The Parliament may erre, then God hath left the state remedilesse except the King remedy it.

Ans. There's no consequence here, except the King be impecca∣ble. 2. Posteriour Parliaments may correct the former. 3. A State is not remedilesse, because Gods remedies, in sinfull mens hands may miscarry. But the question is now, whether God hath given power to one man to destroy men, subvert Lawes, and Religion, without any power above him to coerce, restraine or punish.

P. Prelate. If when the Parliament erreth, the remedy is left to the Wisedome of God,* 1.553 why not when the King erreth?

Ans. Neither is Antecedent true, nor the consequence valid, for the founder part may resist; and it is easier to one to destroy many, having a power absolute, which God never gave him, then for many to destroy themselves. Then if the King Vzza•• in∣trude

himselfe and sacrifice, the Priests doe sin in remedying thereof.

P. Prelate. Why might not the people of Israell,* 1.554 Peers or Sanedrim have convened before them, judged, and punished David, for his Adul∣tery and Murther? Romanists and new Statists acknowledge no case lawfull, but Heresie, Apostacy, or Tyranny; and tyranny they say must be universall, 2. Manifest as the Sunne. 3. And with obstinacy, and invincible by prayers; as is recorded of Nero, whose wish was ra∣ther a transported passion, then a fixed resolution, this cannot fall in the attempts of any but a Mad-man. Now this cannot be proved of our King; but though we grant in the foresaid case, that the community may resume their power, and rectifie what is amisse, which we canno grant, but this will follow by their doctrine in every case of male ad∣ministration.

Ans. The Prelate draweth me to speake of the case of the Kings unjust Murther, confessed Ps. 51. to which I answer,* 1.555 He taketh it for confessed, that it had been treason in the Sanedrin and States of Israel to have taken on them to judge and punish David for his Adultery and his Murther; but he giveth no reason for this, nor any word of God; and truely though I will not presume to goe before others in this, Gods Law, Gen. 9.6. compared with Num. 35.30.31. seemeth to say against them.

Nor can I thinke that Gods Law, or his Deputy the Iudges are to accept the persons of the great, because they are great,* 1.556 Deut. 1.17. 2 Chro. 19.6, 7. and we say, We cannot distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not, The Lord speaketh to under Iudges, Levit. 19.15. Thou shalt not respect the person of the poore, nor honour the person of the mighty, or of the Prince, for we know what these names 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 meaneth. I grant, it is not Gods meaning that the King should draw the sword against himselfe, but yet it followeth not, that if we speake of the demerit of blood, that the Law of God accepteth any Iudge, great or small, & if the Estate be above the King, as I conceive they are, though it be a humane politicke constitution, that the King be free of al coaction of Law, because it conduceth for the peace of the Common-wealth, yet if we make a matter of conscience, for my part I see no exception that God maketh it, if men make,* 1.557 I crave leave to say, A facto ad jus non sequitur. And I easily yeeld that in every case the Estates may coerce the King, if we make it a case of conscience. And for the place Ps. 51.4. Against thee only have I

sinned. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 flatterers alleadge it to be a place that proveth that the King is above all earthly Tribunals, and all Lawes, and that there was not on earth any who might punish King David; and so they cite Clemens Alexandrin. Strom. l. 4. Arnobi. Psal. 50. Dydimus, Hieronim. But Calvine on the place giveth the meaning that most of the Fathers give. Domine, etiam si me totus mundus ab∣solvat, mihi tamen plusquam satis est, quod te solum judicem sentio. It is true, Beda, Euthymius, Ambrosius, Apol. David, c. 4. &. c. 10. do all acknowledge from the place, De facto, there was none above David to judge him, and so doth Augustine, Basilius, Theodoret say, and Chrysostomus, and Cyrillus, and Hyeronim. Epist. 22. Ambrose Sermo. 16. in Psal. 118. Gregorius, and Augusti. Ioan. 8. saith, he meaneth no man durst judge or punish him, but God only. Lorinus the Iesuit observeth eleven interpretatiōs of the Fathers all to this sense, since Lyra, saith he, sinned only against God, because God only could pardon him; Hugo Cardinalis, because God only could wash him, which he asketh in the Text. And Lorin. Solo Deo conscio peccavi. But the simple meaning is, Against thee only have I sinned, as my eye witnesse and imediate beholder; and therfore he addeth, and have done this evill in thy sight. 2. Against thee only, as my Iudge, that thou maist be justi∣fied when thou judgest,* 1.558 as cleare from all unrighteousnesse, when thou shalt send the sword on my house. 3. Against thee, O Lord only, who canst wash me, and pardon me, v. 1, 2. And if this (thee only) exclude all together, Vriah, Bathsheba, and the Law of the Iudges, as if he had sinned against none of these in their kind, then is the King be∣cause a King free, not only from a punishing Law of man, but from the duties of the second Table simply, and so a King cannot be un∣der the best and largest halfe of the Law, Thou shalt love thy neigh∣bour as thy selfe. 2. He shall not need to say, Forgive us our sinnes, as we forgive them that sin against us; for there is no reason from the nature of sin, and the nature of the Law of God, why we can say more the subjects and sonnes sin against the King and Father, then to say the Father and King sin against the sonnes and subjects. 3. By this, the King killing his Father Iesse, should sin against God, but not breake the fift Command, nor sinne against his father. 4. God should in vaine forbid fathers to provoke their children to wrath.

1. And Kings to doe unjustice to their subjects, because by this the superiour cannot sinne against the inferiour, for as much as

Kings can sin against none, but those who have power to judge and punish them; but God only, and no inferiours, and no subjects have power to punish the Kings, therefore Kings can sin against none of their subjects, and where there is no sin, how can there be a Law? neither Major or Minor can be denyed by Royalists.

2. We acknowledge Tyra••ny must only unking a Prince. The Prelate denyeth it, but he is a green Statist. Barclay, Grotius, Win∣zetus, as I have proved granteth it.

3. He will excuse Nero as of infirmity, wishing all Rome to have one necke, that he may cut it off. And is that charitable of Kings▪ that they will not be so mad as to destroy their owne Kingdome? But when Stories teach us there have been more Tyrants then Kings, the Kings are more obliged to him for flattery, then for State-wit, except we say that all Kings who eate the people of God, as they doe bread, owe him little, for making them all madde and franticke.

4. But let them be Nero's, and madde, and worse, there is no coercing of them, but all must give their neckes to the sword, if the poore Prelate be heard; and yet Kings cannot be so madde as to destroy their subjects. Mary of England was that madde, the Romish Princes who have given, Revel. 17.13. their power and strength to the beast, and doe make warre with the Lambe; and Kings inspired with the spirit of the beast, and drunke with the wine of the Cup of Babells fornications, are so madde, and the ten Empe∣rours are so madde, who wasted their faithfullest subjects.

P. Prelate. If there be such a power in the Peeres, resumable in the ex••gent of necessity, as the last necessary remedy for safety of Church and State, God and nature not being deficient in things necessary, it must be proved out of the Scripture, and not taken on trust, for Affir∣manti incumbit probatio.

Ans. Mr. Bishop, what better is your Affirmanti incumbit, &c, then mine? for you are the affirmer. I can prove a power in the King, limited onely to feed, governe, and save the people; and you affirme that God hath given to the King, not only a power officiall and Royall to save, but also to destroy and cut off, so as no man may say, Why doest thou this? Shall we take this upon the word of an excommunicated Prelate? Profer tabulas, Iohn P. P. I beleeve you not, Royall power is Deut. 17.18. Rom. 3.14. I am sure there is there a power given to the King to doe good, and that

from God: Let John P.P. prove a power to doe ill, given of God to the King.

2. We shall quickly prove that the States may represse this pow∣er, and punish the Tyrant, not the King: when he shall prove that a Tyrannous power is an Ordinance of God, and so may not be resisted. For the law of Nature teacheth, If •• give my sword to my fellow to defend me from the murtherer, if he shall fall to, and murther me with my own sword, I may (if I have strength) take my sword from him.

Prelate. It is infidelitie, to thinke that God cannot helpe us; and impatience, that we will not wait on God. When a King oppresseth us, it is against Gods wisdome, that he hath not provided another meane for our safetie, than intrusion on Gods right. 2. It is against Gods power▪ 3. his Holinesse, 4. Christian Religion, that we necessitate God to so weake a meane, to make use of sinne: and we cast the aspersion of Treason on Religion, and deterre Kings to professe Reformed Ca∣tholike Religion. 5. We are not to justle God out of his right.

Ans. I see nothing but what D. Ferne, Grotius, Barclay, Black∣wood have said before, with some colour of proving the consequence. The P. Prelate giveth us other mens arguments, but without bones. All were good, if the States coercing and curbing a power which God never gave to the King, were a sinne, and an act of impatience, and unbelief: And, if it were proper to God only, by his immediate hand, to coerce Tyrannie.

2. He calleth it not Protestant Religion, either here, or else∣where; but cautelously giveth a name that will agree to the Roman Catholique Religion: For the Dominicans, Franciscans, and the Pa∣risian Doctors and Schoolemen, following Occham, Gerson, Alma••••, and other Papists, call themselves Reformed Catholiques. 2. He lay∣eth this for a ground, in 3 or 4 pages, where these same Arguments are againe and againe repeated in terminis, as his second Reason, p. 149. was handled ad nauseam, p. 148. his 3. Reason is repeated in his 6. Reason, p. 151. He layeth (I say) down this ground, which is the begged Conclusion, and maketh the Conclusion the Assumpti∣on, in 8 raw and often repeated Arguments: to wit, That the Par∣liaments coercing and restraining of Arbitrarie power, is rebellion, and resisting the Ordinance of God. But he dare not looke the place Rom. 13. on the face: other Royalists have done it with bad successe. This I desire to be weighed, and I retort the Prelates argument.

But it is indeed the triviall Argument of all Royalists, especially of Barclay, obvious in his 3. Booke. If Arbitrarie and Tyrannicall power above any Law that the lawfull Magistrate commandeth un∣der the paine of death, (Thou shalt not murther one man) (Thou shalt not take away the vineyard of one Naboth violently) be lawfull and warrantable by Gods word; then an Arbitrarie power above all Divine lawes, is given to the keeping of the Civill Magistrate. And it is no lesse lawfull Arbitrarie, or rather Tyrannicall power, for David to kill all his Subjects, and to plunder all Jerusalem, (as I beleeve, Prelates, and Malignants, and Papists would serve the three Kingdomes, if the King should command them) then to kill one Vriah, or for Achab to spoile one Naboth. The essence of ••inne must agree alike to all, though the degrees varie.

Of Gods remedie against Arbitrary power, hereafter, in the Que∣stion of Resistance: but the confused ingine of the Prelate bring∣eth it in here, where there is no place for i••.

His 7. Argument is: Before God would authorize Rebellion, and give a bad president thereof for ever, he would rather worke extraor∣dinary and wond••rfull miracles, and therefore would not authorize the people to deliver themselves from under Pharaoh, but made Moses a Prince, to bring them out of Egypt with a str••tched-out arm••: nor did the Lord deliver his people by the wisdome of Moses, or strength of the people, or any act that way of theirs, but by his own immediate hand and power.

Ans. I reduce the Prelates confused words to a few: for I speake not of his Popish tearme of Saint Steven, and others the like: because all that he hath said in a book of 149 pages, might have been said in three sheets of paper. But, I pray you, what is this Argument to the Question in hand, w••••ch is, Whether the King be so above all Lawes, as People and Peeres, in the case of Arbitrarie power, may re∣sume their power, and punish a Tyrant? The P. Pr••late draweth in the Question of Resistance by the haire. Israels not rising in armes against K. Pharaoh, proveth nothing against the power of a Free Kingdome against a Tyrant.

1. Moses, who wrought miracles destructive to Pharaoh, might pray a vengeance against Pharaoh, God having revealed to Moses, that Pharaoh was a Reprobate▪ But may Ministers and Nobles pray so against King Charles? God forbid.

2. Pharaoh had not his Crown from Israel.

3. Pharaoh had not sworne to defend Israel, nor became he their King upon condition he should maintaine and professe the Religion of the God of Israel: Therefore Israel could not, as free Estates, chal∣lenge him in their supreme Court of Parliament, of breach of oath: and upon no termes could they un-king Pharaoh; He held not his Crown of them.

4. Pharaoh was never circumcised, nor within the Covenant of the God of Isr••el, in profession.

5. Israel had their lands by the meere gift of the King. I hope the King of Britaine standeth to Scotland and England in a foure-fold contrary relation.

All Divines know, that Pharaoh his Princes, and the Egyptians, were his Peeres and People; and that Israel were not his native Subjects, but a number of strangers, who by the lawes of the King and Princes, by the meanes of Joseph, had gotten the land of Goshen for their dwelling, and libertie to serve the God of Abraham, to whom they prayed in their bondage, Exod. 2.23, 24. and they were not to serve the Gods of Egypt, nor were of the Kings Religion: And therefore his Argument is thus: A number of poore exiled stran∣gers under King Pharaoh, who were not Pharaohs Princes and Peeres, could not restraine the Tyrannie of King Pharaoh: Ergo, the three Estates in a free Kingdome may not restraine the Arbitrarie power of a King.

2. The Prelate must prove that God gave a Royall and Kingly power to King Pharaoh, due to him by vertue of his Kingly calling, (according as Royalists expone 1 Sam. 8.9, 11.) to kill all the male children of Israel, to make slaves of themselves, and compell them to worke in brick and clay, while their lives were a burden to them: And that if a Romish Catholique, Mary of England, should kill all the male Children of Protestants, by the hands of Papists, at the Queenes commandement, and make bondslaves of all the Peeres, Iudges, and three Estates, who made her a free Princesse: yet not∣withstanding that Mary had sworne to maintaine the Protestant Religion; they were to suffer, and not to defend themselves. But if God give Pharaoh a power to kill all Israel, so as they could not controll it; then God giveth to a King a Royall power by office to sinne: only the Royalist saveth God from being the author of sinne, in this, that God gave the power to sinne, but yet with this limitati∣on, that the Subjects should not resist this power. 2. He must prove

that Israel was to give their Male-child••en to Pharaohs Butchers, for to hide them, was to resist a Royall power, and to disobey a Royall power given of God, is to disobey God. 3. The Subjects may not resist the Kings Butchers coming to kill them, and their Male-children, For to resist the servant of the King in that, wherein he is a servant, is to resist the King, 1 Sam. 8.7. 1 Pet. 2.14. Rom. 13.1. 4. He must prove that upon the supposition, That Israel had been as strong as Pharaoh and his people; that without Gods speciall commandment (they then wanting the written Word) they should have fought with Pharaoh; and that we now for all wars, must have a word from Heaven, as if we had not Gods per∣fit Will in his Word, as at that time Israel behoved to have in all wars, Judg. 18.5. 1 Sam. 14.37. Esa. 30.2. Iere. 38.37. 1 King. 22.5. 1 Sam. 30.5. Iudg. 20.27. 1 Sam. 23.2. 2 Sam. 16.23. 1 Chron. 10.14. But because God gave not them an answer to fight against Pharaoh, therefore we have no warrant now to fight ag••inst a forraign Nation, invading us; the consequence is null, and therefore this is a vain Argument, The Prophets never reprove the people for not performing the duty of defensive wars against Tyra••∣nous Kings. Ergo▪ There is no such dutie enjoyned by any Law of God to us; For the Prophets never rebuke the people for non-per∣forming the dutie of offensive wars against their enemies; but where God gave a speciall command, and responce, from his own Oracle, that they should fight: And if God was pleased never to command the people to rise against a Tyrannous King, they did not sin where they had no commandment of God: but I hope we have now a more sure word of prophecie to inform us. 5. The Prelate conjectureth Moses his mira••les, and the deliverance of the people, by dividing the Red Sea, was to forbid, and condemn, defensive wars of people against their King; but he hath neither Scripture, nor Reasons to do it. The end of these miracles, was to Seal to Pharaoh the Truth of Gods calling of Moses and Aaron, to deliver the people, as is clear, Exod. 4.1, 2, 3, 4. compared with Chap. 7. vers. 8, 9, 10. And that the Lord might get to himself a name on all the earth, Rom. 9.17. Exod. 9.16. and 13.13, 14. and 15. 1, 2, 3. & seq. But of the Prelates conjecturall end, the Scripture is silent, and we cannot take an excommunicated mans word. What I said of Pharaoh, who had not his Crown from Israel, that I say of Nebuchadnezzar, and the Kings of Persia, keeping th•• people of God captive.

* 1.559P. Prelate. So in the Book of the Judge••, when the people were de∣livered over to the hand of their enemies, because of their sins; h•• never warranted the ordinary Iudges, or Communitie, to be their own deliverers,* 1.560 but when they repented, God raised up •• Iudge. The peo∣ple had no hand in their own deliverance out of Babylon, God effected it by Cyrus, immediately and totally. Is not this a reall proof, God will not have inferiour Iudges, to rectifie what is amisse; but we must waite in patience till God provide lawfull means, some Soveraign power immediately sent by himself, in which course of his ordinary providence, he will not be deficient.

Answ. All this is beside the question, and proveth nothing lesse, then that Peers and Communitie, may not resume their power to curbe an Arbitrary power: For in the first case, there is neither Arbitrary, nor lawfull supreme Iudge. 2. If the first prove any thing, it proveth, That it was rebellion in the inferiour Iudges▪ and Communitie of Israel, to fight against forraign Kings, not set over them by God; and that offensive wars against any Kings whatsoever, because they are Kings, though strangers, are unlaw∣full. Let Socinians and Anabaptists consider, if the P. Prelate help not them in this, and may prove all wars to be unlawfull. 3. He is so Malignant to all inferiour Iudges, as if they were not powers sent of God, and to all Governours, that are not Kings, and so up∣holders of Prelates, and of himself as he conceiveth, that by his arguing, he will have all deliverance by Kings onely, the onely lawfull means in ordinary providence: and so Aristocracy and De∣mocracy except in Gods extraordinary providence, and by some divine dispensation must be extraordinary, and ordinarily unlawfulh 2. The Acts of a State, when a King is dead, and they choos•• another, shall be an Anticipating of Gods providence. 3. If the King be a childe, a captive, or distracted, and the Kingdom oppres∣sed with Malignants, they are to waite, while God immediately from Heaven, create a King to them, as he did Saul long ago. But have we now Kings immediately sent as Saul was? 1. How is the spirit of Prophecie and Government infused in them, as in King Saul? Or are they by propheticall inspiration, anointed as David was: I conceive their calling to the throne on Gods part, do differ as much from the calling of Saul and David, in some respect, as the calling of ordinary Pastors, who must be gifted by industry and learning, and called by the Church, and the calling of Apostles.

4. God would deliver his people from Babylon, by moving the heart of Cyrus immediately, the people having no hand in it, not so much as supplicating Cyrus. Ergo, The People and Peers who made the King, cannot curb his Tyrannicall power, if he make captives and slaves of them, as the Kings of Chaldea made slaves of the people of Israel. What? Because God useth another mean. Ergo, This mean is not lawfull. It followeth in no sort; If we must use no means, but what the captive people did under Cyru••, we may not lawfully flie, nor supplicate, for the people did neither.

P. Prelate. You read of no Covenant in Scripture made without the King, Exod. 34. Moses King of Iesurum: neither Tables nor Parliament framed it. Joshua another, Iosh. 24. and Asa, 2 Chron. 15. and 2 Chron. 34. and Ezra 10. The Covenant of Iehojada in the non-age of Ioash, was the High Priests Act, as the Kings Gover∣nour. There is a covenant with Hell, made without the King, an•• a false Covenant, Hos. 10.3, 4.

Answ. We argue this negatively; This is neither commanded, nor practised, nor warranted by promise. Ergo, It is not lawfull. But this is not practised in Scripture: Ergo, It is not lawfull. It followeth it. Shew me in Scripture the killing of a Goaring Ox who killed a man; the not making battlements on an house; the putting to death of a man lying with a Beast; the killing of sedu∣cing Prophets, who tempted the people to go a whoring, and serve another God, then Jehovah: I mean, a god made by the hand of the Baker, such a one as the excommunicated Prelate is known to be, who hath Preached this Idolatry in three Kingdoms, yet Deut. 13. This is written, and all the former Laws are divine Precepts; shall the Precept make them all unlawfull, because they are not practised by some in Scripture? By this? I ask, Where read yee, that the people entered in a Covenant with God, not to worship the Golden Image, and the King; and these who pretend they are the Priests of Iehovah, the Church-men and Pelates refused to enter in Covenant with God? By this argument, the King and Pre∣lates in non-practising with us, wanting the precedent of a like practice in Scripture, are in the fault. 2. This is nothing to prove the conclusion in question. 3. All these places prove it is the Kings dutie, when the people under him, and their fathers, have corrupted the worship of God, to renew a Covenant with God, and to cause

the people to do the like,* 1.561 as Moses, Asa, Iehoshaphat did•• 4. If the King refuse to do his dutie, where is it written. That the people ought also to omit their dutie, and to love to have it so, because the Rulers corrupt their wayes, Ierem. 5.31? To renew a Covenant with God, is a point of service due to God, that the people are ob∣liged unto; whether the King command it, or no. What if the King command not his people to serve God; or, What if he forbid Daniel to pray to God? Shall the people in that case serve the King of Kings, onely at the nod, and Royall command of an earthly King? Clear this from Scripture. 5. Ezra ch. 5. had no command∣ment in particular from Artaxerxes King of Persia, or from Da∣rius, but a generall, that Ezr. 7.23. Whatsoever is commanded by the God of Heaven, let it be diligently done for the house of the God of Heaven: But, the Tables in Scotland, and the two Parliaments of England and Scotland, who renewed the Covenant, and entered in Covenant not against the King (as the P. P. saith) but to restore Religion to its ancient Puritie, have this expresse Law from King James and King Charles both, in many Acts of Parliament, that Religion be kept pure. Now as Artaxerxes knew nothing of the Covenant, and was unwilling to subscribe it, and yet gave to Ezra and the Princes a warrant in generall, to do all that the God of Heaven required to be done▪ for the Religion, and house of the God of Heaven, and so a generall warrant, for a Covenant without the King; and yet Ezra, and the people, in swearing that Covenant▪ failed in no dutie against their King: to whom, by the fifth Com∣mandment, they were no lesse subject then we are to our King, just so we are, and so have not failed; but they say, The King hath committed to no Lievtenant and Deputie under him, to do what they please in Religion, without his Royall consent in particular, and the direction of his Clergy, seeing he is of that same Religion with his people; whereas Artaxerxes was of another Religion, then were the Iews, and their Governour. Answ. Nor can our King take on him∣self, to do what he pleaseth, and what the Prelates (amongst whom these who ruled all, are known before the World and the Sun, to be of another Religion, then we are) pleaseth in particular. But see what Religion and Worship the Lord our God, and the Law of the Land (which is the Kings revealed will) alloweth to us, that we may swear, though the King should not swear it; otherwayes, we are to be of no Religion, but of the Kings, and to swear no Cove∣nant,

but the Kings, which is to joyn with Papists against Prote∣stants. 6. The strangers of Ephraim and Manasseh, and out of Simeon fell out of Israel in abundance to Asa, when they saw that the Lord his God was with him, 2 Chron. 15.9, 10. And sware that Covenant without their own Kings consent, their own King being against it; If a people may swear a Religious Covenant, without their King, who is averse thereunto, far more may the Nobles, Peers, and Estates of Parliament do it without their King: And here is an example of a practise, which the P. Prelate requireth. 7. That Jehojadah was Governour and Vice-Roy, during the non-age of Joash, and that by this Royall Authoritie the Covenant was sworn, is a dream, to the end he may make the Pope, and the Arch-Prelate, now Vice-Royes and Kings, when the throne varieth. The Nobles were Authors of the making of that Covenant, no lesse then Iehojadah was; yea, and the People of the Land, when the King was but a childe, went unto the house of Baal, and brake down his Images, &c. Here is a Reformation made without the King by the people. 8. Grave Expositors say, That the Covenant with death and hell, Esay 28. was the Kings Covenant with Egypt. 9. And the Cove∣nant, Hos. 10. is by none exponed of a Covenant made without the King. I heard say, this Prelate Preaching on this Text before the King, exponed it so, But he spake words (as the Text is) falsly. The P. Prelate, to the end of the Chapter, giveth instance of the ill-successe of Popular Reformation, because the people caused Aaron to make a Golden Calf, and they revolted from Rehoboam to Ieroboam, and made two Golden Calves, and they conspired with Absolom against David. Answ. If the first example make good any thing, neither the High-Priest, as was Aaron, nor the P. Prelate, who claimeth to be descended of Aarons house, should have any hand in Reforma∣tion at all, for Aaron erred in that; and to argue from the peoples sins, to deny their power, is no better then to prove Achab, Ierobo∣am, and many Kings in Israel and Judah, committed Idolatry. Ergo, They had no Royall power at all. In the rest of the Chapter, for a whole Page, he singeth over again his Mattens in a circle, and giveth us the same Arguments we heard before; of which you have these three notes; 1. They are stoln, and not his own. 2. Re∣peated again and again to fill the field. 3. All hang on a false supposition, and a begging of the question: That the people with∣out the King, have no power at all.

QUEST. XXVII. Whether or no the King be the sole supreme and finall interpreter of the Law?

THis Question conduceth not a little to the clearing of the doubts concerning the Kings absolute power, and the supposed sole nomothetick power in the King. And I thinke it not unlike to the question, whether the Pope and Romish Church havt a sole and peremptory power of exponing Lawes, and the Word of God? We are to consider that therr is a twofold exposition of Lawes, one specu∣lative in a Schoole way, so exquisite Iurists have a power to expone Lawes.* 1.562 2. Practicall, in so farre as the sense of the Law falleth un∣der our Practice, and this is twofold; either private and common to all, or judiciall and proper to Iudges, and of this last is the question.

For this Publicke, the Law hath one fundamentall rule, Salus po∣puli, like the King of Planets the Sunne, which lendeth Star-light to all Lawes, and by which they are exponed; whatever interpretation swarveth either from fundamentall Lawes of policy, or from the Law of Nature,* 1.563 and the Law of Nations, and especially from the safety of the publick, is to be rejected as a perverting of the Law: and therefore, Conscientia humani generis, the naturall conscience of all men, to which the oppressed people may appeale unto, when the King exponeth a Law unjustly, at his owne pleasure, is the last rule on earth, for exponing of Lawes. Nor ought Lawes to be made so obscure, as an ordinary wit cannot see their connexion with funda∣mentall truths of policy, and the safety of the people, and there∣fore I see no inconvenience, to say that, The Law it selfe is Norma & regula juduicandi, the Rule and directory to square the Iudge, and that the Iudge is the publicke practicall▪ interpreter of the Law▪

Assert. 1. The King is not the sole and finall interpreter of the Law.

* 1.5641. Because then inferiour Iudges should not be interpreters of the Law, but inferiour Iudges are no lesse essentially Iudges, then the King•• Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6. 1 Pet. 2.14. Rom. 13.1, 2. and so by Office must interpret the Law, else they cannot give sen∣tence according to their conscience and equity, now exponing of

the Law judicially is an act of judging, and so a personall and in∣communicable act, so as I can no more judge and expone the Law according to another mans conscience, then I can beleeve with another mans soule,* 1.565 or understand with another mans under∣standing, see with another mans eye: The Kings pleasure therefore cannot be the rule of the inferiour Iudges con∣science, for he giveth an immediate accompt to God the Iudge of all, of a just or an unjust sentence. Suppone Caesar shall expone the Law to Pilate, that Christ deserveth to dye the death, yet Pilate is not in conscience to expone the Law so. If therefore inferiour Iudges judge for the King, they judge only by power borrowed from the King, not by the pleasure, will, or command of the King thus and thus exponing the Law, ergo the King cannot be the sole interpreter of the Law.

2. If the Lord say not to the King only, but also to other inferi∣our Iudges, Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not, search out; then the King is not the only interpreter of the Law. But the Lord saith not to the King only, but to other Iudges also, Be wise, understand, and the cause that you know not search out, ergo the King is not the sole Law-giver. The Major is cleare from Ps. 2.10. Be wise now therefore, O yee Kings, be instructed yee Iudges of the earth. So are commands and rebukes for unjust judgement given to others then to Kings, Ps. 82.1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Ps. 58.1, 2. Esay 1.17, 23 25▪ 26. Esay 3.14. see Iob. 29.12, 13, 14, 15. c. 31. v. 21.22.

3, The King is either the sole interpreter of Law, in respect▪ he is to follow the Law as his Rule, and so he is a ministeriall interpre∣ter of the Law, or he is an interpreter of the Law according to that super-dominion of absolute power, that he hath above the Law. If the former be holden, then it is cleare that the King is not the only interpreter, for all Iudges, as they are Iudges, have a ministeriall power to expone the Law by the Law: but the second is the sense of Royalists.

Hence our second Assertion is, That the Kings power of exponing the Law, is a meere ministeriall power,* 1.566 and he hath no dominion of any absolute Royall Power, to expone the Law as he will, and to put such a sense and meaning of the Law as he pleaseth.

1. Because Saul maketh a Law, 1 Sam. 14.24. Cursed be the man that tasteth any food till night, that the King may be avenged on his enemies, the Law according to the letter was bloudy,* 1.567 but accor∣ding

to the intent of the Law-giver, and substance of the Law profi∣table, for the end was that the enemies should be pursued with all speed. But King Sauls exponing the Law after a Tyrannicall way, against the intent of the Law, which is the Diamond and Pearle of all Lawes, the safety of the innocent people, was justly resisted by the people, who violently hindered innocent Jonathan to be killed. Whence it is cleare, that the people and Princes put on the Law its true sense and meaning, for Ionathans tasting of a little honey, though as it was against that sinfull and precipitate circumstance a rash oath, yet it was not against the substance and true intent of the Law, which was the peoples speedy pursuite of the enemy. Whence it is cleare, that the people including the Princes, hath a ministeriall power to expone the Law aright, and according to its genuine intent, and that the King as King hath no absolute power to expone the Law as he pleaseth.

* 1.5682. The Kings absolute pleasure can no more be the genuine sense of a just Law,* 1.569 then his absolute pleasure can be a Law, because the genuine sense of the Law is the Law it selfe, as the formall essence of a thing differeth not really, but in respect of reason from the thing it selfe. The Pope and Romish Church cannot put on the Scripture, Ex plenitudine potestatis, what ever meaning they will, no more then they can, out of absolute power, make Canonicke Scripture. Now so it is, that the King by his absolute power cannot make Law no Law.

* 1.5701. Because he is King by, or according to Law, but he is not King of Law. Rex est Rex secundum legem, sed non est Dominus & Rex legis.

2. Because although it have a good meaning, which Vlpian saith, Quod principi placet legis vigorem habet The Will of the Prince is the Law, yet the meaning is not that any thing is a just Law, because it is the Princes Will, for its rule formally: for it must be good and just before the Prince can will it, and then he finding it so, he put∣eth the stampe of a humane Law on it▪

* 1.5713. This is the difference between Gods Will, and the will of the King, or any mortall creature. Things are just and good, because God willeth them, especially things positively good (though I conceive it hold in all things) and God doth not will things, because they are good and just; But the creature, be he King, or any never so eminent, doe will things, because they are good and just, and the

Kings willing of a thing, maketh it not good and just: for only Gods will, not the Creatures will, can be the cause why things are good and just. If therefore it be so, it must undeniably hence fol∣low, that the Kings will maketh not a just Law to have an unjust and bloody sense: and he cannot, as King, by any absolute super-dominion over the Law, put a just sense on a bloody and unjust Law.

4. The advancing of any man to the Throne and Royall dignitie, putteth not the man above the number of rationall men: But no ra∣tionall man can create, by any act of power, never so transcendent or boundlesse, a sense to a Law, contrary to the Law. Nay, give me leave to doubt if Omnipotencie can make a just Law to have an un∣just and bloody sense, aut contra: because it involveth a contradicti∣on; the true meaning of a Law, being the essentiall forme of the Law. Hence judge what bruitish, swinish flatterers they are, who say, That it is the true meaning of the Law, which the King, the only su∣preme and independent expositor of the Law, saith is the true sense of the Law. There was once an Animal, a Foole of the first magni∣tude, who said, He could demonstrate by invincible reasons, that the Kings dung was more nourishing food, then bread of the floore of the finest wheat. For my part, I could wish it were the Demon∣strators only food for seven dayes; and that should be the best de∣monstration he could make for his proofe.

5. It must follow,* 1.572 that there can be no necessitie of written laws to the Subjects; against Scripture, and naturall reason,* 1.573 and the law of Nations, in which all accord, That Lawes not promulgated and published, cannot oblige as Lawes: Yea, Adam, in his innocencie, was not obliged to obey a Law not written in his heart by Nature, except God had made known the Law; as is cleare, Gen. 3.11. Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat? But if the Kings absolute Will may put on the Law what sense he pleaseth, out of his independent and irresistable Supremacie; The Lawes promulgated and written to the Subjects, can declare no∣thing, what is to be done by the Subjects, as just, and what is to be avoyded as unjust: because the Lawes must signifie to the Subjects, what is just, and unjust, according to their genuine sense. Now, their genuine sense, according to Royalists, is not only uncertaine and impossible to be known, but also contradictorious: for the King obligeth us without gainsaying, to believe that the just Law hath

this unjust sense. Hence this of flattering Royalists, crueller to Kings, than Ravens, (for these ear but dead men, and they devoure living men) when there is a controversie between the King and the E∣states of Parliament, who shall expone the Law, and render its native meaning? (say Royalists) not the Estates of Parliament, for they are Subjects, not Iudges to the King, and only Counsellers and advisers of the King. The King therefore must be the only judiciall and finall ex∣positor. As for Lawyers (said Strafford) the Law is not inclosed in a Lawyers Cap. But I remember this was one of the Articles laid to the charge of Richard the Second, that he said, The Law was in his head and breast.* 1.574 And indeed it must follow, if the King, by the ple∣nitude of absolute power, be the only supreme, uncontrollable Ex∣positor of the Law, that is not Law which is written in the Acts of Parliament, but that is the Law which is in the Kings breast and head: which Iosephus, lib. 19. Antiq. c. 2. objected to Caius. And all justice, and injustice should be finally and peremptorily resolved on the Kings will and absolute pleasure.

* 1.5756. The King either is to expone the Law by the Law it selfe; or, by his Absolute power loosed from all Law, he exponeth it; or ac∣cording to the advise of his Great Senate. If the first be said, he is nothing more then other Iudges. If the second be said, he must be omnipotent, and more. If the third be said, he is not absolute, if the Senate be only Advisers, and he yet the only Iudiciall expositor. The King often professeth his ignorance of the Lawes; and he must then both be absolute above the Law, and ignorant of the Law, and 2. the sole and finall Iudiciall exponer of the Law: And by this, all Parliaments, and their power of making Lawes, and of judging, i•• cryed down.

They object, Prov. 16.10. A Divine sentence is in the lips of the King, His mouth transgresseth not in judgement, ergo, he only can ex∣pone the Law.

Ans. 1. Lavater saith, (and I see no reason on the contrary) by a King, he meaneth all Magistrates. 2. Aben Ezra, and Isidorus read the words imperatively. The Tigurine version: They are Ora∣cles which proceed from his lips: let not therefore his mouth transgresse in judgement. Vatabulus: When he is in his prophecies, he lyeth not. Iansenius: Non facile errabit in judicando. Mich. Iermine: If he pray. Calvine: If he read in the booke of the Law, as God commandeth him, Deut. 17. But why stand we on the place? He speaketh of

good Kings, saith Cornel, à Lapide. Otherwise, Ieroboam, Achab, Manasseh, erred in judgement. And except, (as Mercerus exponeth it) We understand him to speake of Kings according to their office, not their facts and practice, we make them Popes, and men who cannot give out grievous and unjust sentences on the Throne: against both the Word, and experience.

Object. 2. Sometimes all is cast upon ou•• mans voice, why may not the King be this one man?

Answ. The Antecedent is false, the last Voter in a Senate, is not the sole Iudge, else why should others give suffrages with him. 2. This were to take away inferiour Iudges, contrary to Gods Word, Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. Rom. 13.1, 2, 3.

QUEST. XXVIII. Whether or no, Wars raised by the Subjects and Estates, for their own just defence against the Kings bloody Emissaries, be law∣full?

A Ruisaeus perverteth the question; he saith, The question is, Whether or no, the Subjects may according to their power,* 1.576 judge the King, and dethrone him; that is, Whether or no, is it lawfull for the Subjects in any case, to take arms against their lawfull Prince, if he degenerate, and shall wickedly use his lawfull power?

The state of the question is much perverted, for these be diffe∣rent questions, Whether the Kingdom may dethrone a wicked and Tyrannous Prince? And whether may the Kingdom take up arms against the man who is the King, in their own innocent defence: For the former is an Act offensive, and of punishing, the latter is an Act of Defence.

2. The present question is not of Subjects onely, but of the Estates, and Parliamentary Lords of a Kingdom; I utterly deny these as they are Iudges, to be subjects to the King; for the questi∣on is, Whether is the King, or the representative Kingdom greatest, and which of them be subject one to another: I affirm, Amongst Iudges as Iudges, not one is the Commander or Superiour, and the other, the commanded or subject. Indeed, one higher Iudge may correct and punish a Iudge, not as a Iudge, but as an erring man.

3. The question is not so much concerning the authoritative Act

of War, as concerning the power of naturall Defence, upon sup∣position, That the King be not now turned an habituall Tyrant, but that upon some acts of mis-information, he come in arms against his Subjects.

* 1.5772. Arnisaeus maketh two sort of Kings, Some Kings integra Majestatis, of intire power and Soveraignty; some Kings by pactions or voluntary agreement, between King and people. But I judge this a vain distinction: For the limited Prince, so he be limited to a power onely of doing just and right; by this is not a Prince inte∣grae Majestatis of entire Royall Majestie, whereby he may do both good, and also play the Tyrant; but a power to do ill, being no wayes essentiall, yea, repugnant to the absolute Majestie of the King of Kings, cannot be an essentiall part of the Majestie of a lawfull King; and therefore the Prince limited by voluntary and positive paction onely, to rule according to law and equity, is the good, lawfull, and entire Prince, if he have not power to do every thing just and good in that regard, onely he is not an intire and compleat Prince. So the man will have it lawfull to resist the limited Prince, not the absolute Prince; by the contrary, it is more lawfull to me to resist the absolute Prince, then the limited, in as much, as we may with safer consciences resist the Tyrant, and the Lyon, then the just Prince and the Lamb. Nor can I assent to Cun∣nerus de officio princip. Christia. c. 5. & 17. Who holdeth, that these voluntary pactions betwixt King and people, in which the power of the Prince is diminished, cannot stand, because their power is given to them by Gods Word, which cannot be taken from them, by any volun∣tary paction, lawfully; and from the same ground, Winzetus in v••lit. contr. Buchan. p. 32. will have it unlawfull to resist Kings, because God hath made them unresistable.* 1.578 I answer, If God by a divine in∣stitution make Kings absolute, and above all Laws (which is a blas∣phemous supposition, the holy Lord can give to no man a power to sin, for God hath not himself any such power) then the Cove∣nant betwixt the King and people, cannot lawfully remove and take away what God by institution has given; but because God, Deut. 17. hath limited the first lawfull King, the mould of all the rest, the people ought also to limit him by a voluntary Covenant; and because the lawfull power of a King to do good, is not by divine Institution placed in an indivisible point. It is not a sin for the people to take some power, even of doing good from the King, that

he solely, and by himself, shall not have power to pardon an invo∣luntary homicide, without advice, and the judiciall suffrages of the Councell of the Kingdom, least he, insteed of this, give pardons to Robbers, to abominable Murtherers, and in so doing, the people robbeth not the King of the power that God gave him as King, nor ought the King to contend for a sole power in himself, of mini∣string justice to all; for God layeth not upon Kings, burdens un∣possible, and God by Institution, hath denied to the King, all power of doing all good, because it is his Will that other Iudges be sha∣rers with the King in that power, Num. 14.16. Deut. 1.14, 15, 16, 17. 1 Pet. 2.14. Rom. 13.1, 2, 3, 4. And therefore the Duke of Venice to me cometh neerest to the King, moulded by God, Deut. 17. in respect of power, de jure, of any King I know in Europe. And in point of conscience, the inferiour Iudge discern∣ing a murtherer, and bloody man to die, may in foro conscientiae, de∣spise the Kings unjust pardon, and resist the Kings force by his sword and coactive power that God hath given him, and put to death the bloody murtherer, and he sinneth, if he do not this; for to me it is clear, The King cannot judge so justly and understandingly of a murtherer in Scotland, as a Iudge, to whom God hath committed the sword in Scotland: Nor hath the Lord laid that unpossible burden on a King to judge so of a murther four hundreth miles, removed from the King, as the Iudge nearer to him, as is clear by Num. 14.16. 1 Sam. 7.15, 16, 17. The King should go from place to place, and judge; and whereas it is unpossible to him, to go thorow three Kingdoms, he should appoint faithfull Iudges, who may not be resisted, no not by the King.

2. The question is, If the King command A. B. to kill his father, his pastour; the man neither being cited nor convicted of any fault, may lawfully be resisted.

3. Queritur, If in that case in which the King is captived, im∣prisoned, and not sui juris, and awed or over-awed by bloody Papists, and so is forced to command a barbarous and unjust War; and if being distracted Physically or Morally through wicked Coun∣sell, he command that which no father in his sober wits would command, even against Law and Conscience, That the sons should yeild obedience and subjection to him, in maintaining with lives and goods, a bloody Religion, and bloody Papists: If in that case, the King may not be resisted in his person, because the power law∣full

and the sinfull person cannot be separated? We hold the King using, contrary to the oath of God, and his Royall Office, violence in killing against Law and Conscience his Subjects, by bloody Emis∣saries, may be resisted by defensive Wars, at the commandment of the Estates of the Kingdom.

* 1.579But before I produce Arguments, to prove the lawfulnesse of re∣sistance, a little of the case of resistance. 1. Doct. Ferne, part. 3. sect. 5. pag. 39. granteth resistance by force to the King to be law∣full. 1. When the assault is sudden. 2. Without colour of a Law, and Reason. 3. Inevitable. But if Nero burn Rome, he hath a colour of Law and Reason; yea, if all Rome, and his mother, in whose Womb he lay, were one neck. A man who will with reason go mad, hath colour of Reason, and so of Law, to invade and kill the inno∣cent.

* 1.5802. Arnisaeus saith, If the Magistrate proceed extra-judicialiter, without order of Law by violence, the Laws giveth every private man power to resist, if the danger be irrecoverable; yea, though it be re∣coverable. L. prohibitum, C. de jur. fisc. l. quemadmodum. 39. §. Magistratus ad l. Aquil. l. nec Magistratibus,* 1.581 32. de injur. Because while the Magistrate doth against his office, he is not a Magistrate, for Law and right, not injury, should come from the Magistrate. L. meminerint. 6. C. unde vi. Yea, if the Magistrate proceed judi∣cially, and the losse be irrecoverable. Jurists say, That a private man hath the same Law to resist, Marantius, dis. 1. n. 35. And in a recoverable losse, they say, every man is holden to resist, si evidenter constet de iniquitate; If the iniquity be known to all, D. D. Iason. n. 19. dec. n. 26. ad l. ut vim de just. & jur.

* 1.5823. I would think it not fit, easily to resist the Kings unjust Ex∣actors of custome or tribute; 1. Because Christ payed tribute to Tiberius Caesar, an unjust usurper, though he was free from that, by Gods Law, least he should offend. 2. Because we have a greater dominion over Goods, then over our Lives and Bodies; and it is better to yield in a matter of Goods, then to come to Arms; for of sinlesse evils, we may choose the least.

4. A Tyrant without a Title may be resisted by any private man. Quia licet vim vi repellere; Because we may repell violence by vio∣lence, yea, he may be killed. Vt l. & vim. F. de iustit. & jure, ubi plene per omnes. Vasquez, l. 1. c. 8. n. 33. Barcla. contra. Mo∣narcho▪ l. 4▪ c. 10. pag. 268.

For the lawfulnesse of resistance in the matter of the Kings unjust invasion of life and Religion, we offer these Arguments.* 1.583

1. That power which is obliged to command and rule justly and religiously, for the good of the subjects, and is only set over the people on these conditions, and not absolutely,* 1.584 cannot tye the peo∣ple to subjection without resistance, when the power is abused to the destruction of Lawes, Religion, and the subjects. But all power of the Law is thus obliged, Rom. 13.4. Deut. 17. vers. 18, 19, 20. 2 Chron. 19.6. Ps. 132.11, 12. Ps. 89.30, 31. 2 Sam. 7.12. Ier. 17.24, 25. and hath, and may be abused by Kings, to the destruction of Lawes, Religion, and Subjects.

The Proposition is cleare, for the powers that tye us to subjecti∣on, only are of God. 2. Because to resist them, is to resist the ordi∣nance of God. 3. Because they are not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 4. Because they are Gods Ministers for our good, but a∣bused powers are not of God, but of men, or not ordinances of God: they are a terrour to good workes, not to evill; they are not Gods Ministers for our good.

2. That power which is contrary to Law,* 1.585 and is evill and Tyran∣nicall, can tye none to subjection, but is a meere Tyrannicall power and unlawfull; and if it tye not to subjection, it may lawfully be resisted. But the power of the King abused to the destruction of Lawes, Religion, and subjects, is a power contrary to Law, evill and Tyrannicall, and tyeth no man to subjection; wickednesse by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. Obligation to suffer of wicked men, falleth under no Commandement of God, except in our Saviour. A Passion, as such, is not formally commanded, I meane a Physicall Passion, such as to be killed. God hath not said to me in any Morall Law, Be thou killed, tortured, beheaded; but only, be thou patient, if God deliver thee to wicked mens hands, to suffer these things.

3. There is not a stricter Obligation Morall betwixt King and people, then betwixt Parents and Children, Master and servant,* 1.586 Pa∣tron and Clients, Husband and Wife, the Lord and the Vassell; be∣tween the Pilot of a Ship and the Passengers, the Physitian and the sick, the Doctor and the schollars: but the Law granteth l. Minime 35. De Relig. & sumpt. funer. If these betray their trust committed to them▪ they may be resisted; if the father turne distracted, and arise to kill his sonnes, his sonnes may violently apprehend him, and

bind his hands, and spoile him of his Weapons: for in that he is not a father, Vasquez, Lib. 1. Illustr. question. c. 8. n. 18. Si dominus sub∣ditum enormiter & atrociter oneraret, princeps superior vassallum pos∣set ex toto e••imere a sua jurisdictione, & etiam tacente subdito & nihil petente. Quid papa in suis decis. Parliam. grat. decis. 62. si quis Baro. abutentes dominio privari possunt. The servant may resist the Master, if he attempt unjustly to kill him; so may the Wife doe to the Husband: if the Pilot should wilfully run the ship on a Rock to destroy himselfe and his Passengers, they might violently thrust him from the Helme. Every Tyrant is a furious man, and is morally di∣stracted, as Althusius saith, Politi. c. 28. n. 30. & seq.

4. That which is given as a blessing and a favour, and a Scrine be∣tweene the peoples liberty and their bondage,* 1.587 cannot be given of God, as a bondage, and slavery to the people. But the power of a King is given as a blessing, and favour of God to defend the poore and needy, to preserve both Tables of the Law, and to keepe the people in their liberties from oppressing and treading one upon another. But so it is, that if such a power be given of God to a King, by which, Actu primo, he is invested of God, to doe acts of Tyranny, and so to doe them, that to resist him in the most innocent way, which is selfe defence, must be a resisting of God, and Rebellion a∣gainst the King, his Deputy, then hath God given a Royall power as incontrollable by mortall men, by any violence, as if God himselfe were immediatly and personally resisted, when the King is resisted, and so this power shall be a power to wast and destroy irresistably, and so in it selfe a plague and a curse; for it cannot be ordained both according to the intention and genuine formall effect, and intrinse∣call operation of the power to preserve the Tables of the Law, Religion and Liberty, Subjects and Lawes, and also to destroy the same; but it is taught by Royalists that this power is for Tyranny, as well as for peaceable Government, because to resist this Royall Power put forth in Acts either waies, either in acts of Tyranny, or just Government, is to resist the Ordinance of God, as Royalists say, from Rom. 13.1, 2, 3. And we know to resist Gods ordinances and Gods Deputy, formaliter, as his Deputy, is to resist God him∣selfe, 1 Sam. 8.7. Mat. 10.40. as if God were doing personally these Acts, that the King is doing, and it importeth as much as the King of Kings doth these Acts in, and through the Tyrant. Now it is blasphemy to thinke or say, that when a King is drinking the

blood of innocents, and wasting the Church of God, that God, if he were personally present, would commit these same acts of Tyranny, (God would avert such blasphemy) and that God in, and through the King, as his lawfull Deputy, and Vicegerent in these acts of Tyranny, is wasting the poore Church of God. If it be said in these sinfull acts of Tyranny, he is not Gods formall Vicegerent, but only in good and lawfull acts of Government, yet he is not to be resisted in these acts, not because the acts are just and good, but because of the dignity of his Royall Person. Yet this must prov•• that these who resist the King in these acts of Tyranny, must resist no ordinance of God, but only that we resist him, who is the Lords Deputy, though not as the Lords Deputy; what absurd is there in that more then to disobey him, refusing active obedience to him who is the Lords Deputy, but not as the Lords Deputy, but as a man commanding, beside his Masters Warrant?

5. That which is inconsistent with the care and providence of God in giving a King to his Church, is not to be taught.* 1.588 Now Gods end in giving a King to his Church, is the feeding, safetie, preserva∣tion, the peaceable and quiet life of his Church, 1 Tim. 2.2. Esa. 49.23. Psal. 79.71. But God should crosse his own end in the same act of giving a King, if he should provide a King, who, by office, were to suppresse Robbers, Murtherers, and all oppressors and wasters in his holy Mount: and yet should give an irresistible power to one crowned Lyon, a King, who may kill a thousand thousand Protestants for their Religion, in an ordinary Providence, and they are by an ordinary law of God to give their throats to his Emissaries and bloody executioners. If any say, The King will not be so cruell: I beleeve it; because, actu secundo, it is not possibly in his power to be so cruell.

2. We owe thanks to his good will, that he killeth not so many; but no thanks to the nature and genuine intrinsecall end of a King, who hath power from God to kill all these, and that without resistance made by any mortall man. Yea, no thanks (God avert blasphemie) to Gods ordinary providence, which (if Royalists may be beleeved) put∣teth no barre upon the illimited power of a man inclined to sinne, and abuse his power to so much crueltie. Some may say, the same absur∣ditie doth follow, if the King should turne Papist, and the Parlia∣ment all were Papists; in that case there might be so many Martyrs for the truth put to death: and God should put no bar of providence

upon this power, then, more then now: and yet in that case, the King and Parliament, should be Iudges given of God, actu primo, and by vertue of their office obliged to preserve the people in Peace and Godlinesse. But I answer: If God gave a lawfull officiall power to King and Parliament to worke the same crueltie upon millions of Martyrs, and it should be unlawfull for them by armes to defend themselves; I should then think that King and Parliament were both ex officio, by vertue of their office, and actu primo, Iudges and Fa∣thers, and also by that same office, Murtherers and Butchers. Which were a grievous aspersion to the unspotted Providence of God.

* 1.5896. If the Estates of a Kingdome give the power to a King, it is their own power in the fountaine; and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it it used against themselves, and for their evill; and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave. Now that they may take away this power, is cleare in Athaliahs case. It is true, she was a Tyrant without a Title, and had not the right of Heaven to the Crown; yet she had, in Mens Court, a title. For supposing all the seed Royall to be killed, and the peoples Consent; we cannot say, That for these sixe yeares, or thereabout, she was no Magistrate. 2. That there were none on the Throne of David at this time. 3. That she was not to be obeyed as Gods Deputie. But grant that she was no Magistrate: yet when Iehoash is brougbt forth to be crowned, it was a controversie to the States, to whom the Crown should belong. 1. Athaliah was in possession. 2. Iehoash himselfe being but seven yeares old, could not be Iudge. 3. It might be doubted, if Ioash was the true sonne of Ahaziah, and if he was not killed with the rest of the blood Royall.

Two great Adversaries say with us: Hugo Grotius, de jur. belli & pacis, l. 1. c. 4. n. 7. He saith, He dare not condemne this, if the lesser part of the People, and every one of them indifferently, should de∣fend themselves against a Tyrant, ultimo necessitatis praesidio. The case of Scotland, when we were blocked up by Sea and Land, with Armes: The case of England, when the King, induced by Prelates, first attempted to bring an Army to cut off the Parliament, and then gathered an Army, and fortified Yorke, and invaded Hull, to make the Militia his own, sure is considerable. Barclay saith, The People hath jus se tuendi adversus immanem saevitiem. Advers. Mo∣narchomach.

l. 3. c. 8. A power to defend themselves against prodi∣gious crueltie. The case of England and Ireland, now invaded by the bloody Rebels of Ireland, is also worthy of consideration. I could cite hoasts more.

QUEST. XXIX. Whether, in the case of Defensive warre, the distinction of the person of the King, as a man, who can commit acts of hostile Tyrannie against his Subjects: and of the Office and Royall power that he hath from God, and the People, as a King; can have place?

BEfore I can proceed to other Scripture-proofes for the lawful∣nesse of Resistance; this Distinction, rejected by Royalists,* 1.590 must be cleered. This is an evident and sensible distinction: The King in concreto, the Man who is King; And the King in abstracto, the Royall office of the King. The ground of this distinction we desire to be considered from, Rom. 13. we affirme with Buchanan, that Paul, Rom. 13, speaketh of the office and duty of good Magistrates, and that the text speaketh nothing of an absolute King, nothing of a Tyrant; and the Royalists distinguish where the Law distin∣guisheth not, against the Law, l. pret. 10. gl. Bart. de pub. in Rem. and therefore we move the question here, Whether or no to resist the illegall and Tyrannicall will of the man, who is King, be to resist the King, and the ordinance of God, we say no: Nor doe we deny the King, abusing his power in unjust acts, to remaine King, and the Minister of God, whose person for his royall office, and his Royall Office both are to be honoured, reverenced and obeyed. God for∣bid that we should doe so as the sonnes of Belial, imputing to us the doctrine of Anabaptists, and the doctrine falsely imputed to Wicliffe, That Dominion is founded upon supernaturall grace, and that a Magi∣strate being in the state of mortall sin, cannot be a lawfull Magistrate; we teach no such thing. The P. Prelate sheweth us his sympathy with Papists, and that he buildeth the Monuments and Sepulchres of the slaine and murthered Prophets, when he refusing to open his mouth in the Gates for the righteous, professeth he will not purge the Witnesses of Christ, the Waldenses and Wicliffe,* 1.591 and Husse of these notes of disloyalty, but that these acts proceeding from this roote of bitternesse, the abused power of a King should be acknow∣ledged with obedience active or passive, in these unjust acts, we deny.

1. Assert. It is evident from Rom. 13. That all subjection and

obedience to higher powers commanded there is subjection to the power and office of the Magistrate in abstracto, or (which is all one) to the person using the power lawfully, and that no subjection is due by that text, or any Word of God, to the abused and Tyrannicall power of the King, which I evince from the Text, and from other Scriptures. 1. Because the Text saith, Let eve∣ry soule be subject to the higher powers. But no powers commanding things unlawfull, and killing the innocent people of God, can be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 higher powers, but in that lower powers. 1. He that commandeth not what God commandeth, and punisheth and killeth where God is personally and immediatly present, would neither command nor punish, is not in these acts to be subjected unto, and obeyed as a superiour power, though in habit he may remaine a supe∣riour power, for all habituall, all actuall superiority is a formall par∣ticipation of the power of the most high.* 1.592 2. Arnisaeus well saith, That of Aristotle must be true, It is against nature, that better and wor∣thier men should be in subjection to unworthier, and more wicked men: but in this when Magistrates command wickednesse, and killeth the innocent, the non-obeyers eatenus in so far, are worthier the commanders (whatever they be in habite and in office) actually, or in these wicked acts are unworthier and inferiour, and the non-obeyers are in that worthier, as being zealous adherents to Gods Command, and not to mans will. I desire not to be mistaken, if we speake of habituall excellency, godly and holy men as the Witnesses of Christ in things lawfull, are to obey wicked and Infidell Kings and Emperours, but in that these wicked Kings have an excellency in respect of office above them;* 1.593 but when they command things un∣lawfull, and kill the innocent, They doe it not by vertue of any of∣fice, and so in that they are not higher powers, but lower and weak ones. Laertius doth explain Aristotle well, who defineth a Tyrant by this,* 1.594 That he commandeth his subjects by violence, and Arnisaeus condemneth Laertius for this, Because one Tyrannicall action doth no more constitute a Tyrant, then one unjust action doth constitute an un∣just man. But he may condemne (as he doth indeed) for this also Covarruvias pract. quest. c. 1. and Vasquez Illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 47. n••. 1.12. for this is essentiall to a Tyrant, to command and rule by violence. If a lawfull Prince doe one, or more acts of a Tyrant, he is not a Tyrant for that, yet his action in that is Tyrannicall, and he doth not that as a King, but in that act as a sinfull man, having some∣thing

of Tyrannie in him. 2. The Powers, Rom. 13.1. that are, are ordained of God, as their author and efficient; But Kings com∣manding unjust things, and killing the innocent, in these acts, are but men, and sinfull men; and the power by which they doe these acts, a sinfull and an usurped power, and so far they are not powers ordained of God, according to his revealed Will, which must rule us. Now the authoritie and officiall power, in abstracto, is ordained of God, as the Text saith, and other Scriptures doe evidence. And this Polititians doe cleare, while they distinguish betwixt jus Personae, and jus Coronae, the power of the Person, and the power of the Crown and Royall office. They must then be two different things. 3. He that resisteth the power, that is, the officiall power, and the King, as King, and commanding in the Lord, resisteth the Ordinance of God, and Gods lawfull constitution, v. 2. But he who resisteth the Man, who is the King, commanding that which is against God, and killing the innocent; resisteth no ordinance of God, but an ordinance of Sin and Sathan: for a man commanding unjustly, and ruling Ty∣rannically, hath, in that, no power from God. 4. They that resist the power and Royall office of the King in things just and right, shall receive to themselves damnation, ver. 3. but they that resist, that is, refuse, for Conscience, to obey the man who is the King, and choose to obey God rather then men, as all the Martyrs did, shall receive to themselves salvation. And the 80 valiant men, the Priests, who used bodily violence against King Vzzahs person, and thrust him out of the house of the Lord, from offering incense to the Lord, which be∣longed to the Priest only: received not damnation to themselves, but salvation in doing Gods will, and in resisting the Kings wicked will.

Arg. 5. The lawfull Ruler, as a Ruler, and in respect of his of∣fice, is not to be resisted, because he is not a terrour to good workes,* 1.595 but to evill; and no man who doth Good, is to be afraid of the Office, or the Power, but to expect praise, and a reward of the same, v. 3. But the man who is a King, may command an idolatrous and super∣stitious Worship, send an Army of Cut-throats against them, because they refuse that Worship: and may reward Papists, Prelates, and other corrupt men, and may advance them to places of State and Honour, because they kneele to a Tree-Altar, pray to the East, a∣dore the letters and sound of the word [Jesus] teach and write Ar∣minianisme: And may imprison, deprive, confine, cut the eares, and

rip the noses, and burne the faces of those who speake, and preach, and write the truth of God: and may send Armies of Cut-throats, Irish Rebels, and other Papists, and malignant Atheists, to destroy and murther the Iudges of the Land, and innocent defenders of the Reformed Religion, &c. The Man (I say) in these acts, is a terrour to Good workes, an incouragement to Evill: And those that doe Good, are to be afraid of the King, and to expect no praise, but pu∣nishment and vexation from him; Ergo, this reason in the Text will prove that the Man, who is the King, in so far as he doth these things that are against his offi••e, may be resisted; and that in these we are not to be subject, but only we are to be subject to his power and Royall authori••ie, in abstracto, in so farre as according to his office, he is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 6. The lawfull Ruler is the minister of God, or the servant of God, for Good to the Commonwealth: And to resist the servant in that wherein he is a servant, and using the power that he hath from his Master, is to re∣sist the Lord his Master, v. 4. But the man who is the King, com∣manding unjust things, and killing the innocent; in these acts▪ is not the minister of God, for the Good of the Commonwealth: he serveth himselfe, and Papists and Prelates, for the destruction of Religion, Lawes and Commonwealth: therefore the Man may be resisted, by this Text, when the office and power cannot be resisted. 7. The Ruler, as the Ruler, and the nature and intrinsecall end of the office is, that he beare Gods sword, as an avenger to execute wrath on him that doth evill, v. 4. and so cannot be resisted without sinne. But the man who is the Ruler, and commandeth things unlawfull, and kil∣leth the innocent; carieth the Papists and Prelates sword, to exe∣cute, not the righteous judgement of the Lord, upon the ill-doer; but his own private revenge, upon him that doth well: Ergo, the Man may be resisted, the Office may not be resisted: and they must be two different things. 8. We must needs be subject to the Royall office, for ••onscience, v. 5. by reason of the fifth Commandement. But we must not needs be subject to the man who is King, if he command things unlawfull: for D. Ferne warranteth us to resist, if the Ruler invade us sodainly; 2. Without colour of Law or Reason; 3. Vn∣avoydably. And Winzetus, and Barclay, and Grotius, as before I cited, give us leave to resist a King, turning a cruell Tyrant. But Paul, Rom. 13. forbiddeth us to resist the Power, in Abstracto; Ergo, it must be the Man, in concreto, that we must resist. 9. Those

we may not resist, to whom we owe tribute, as a reward of the one∣rous worke, on which they, as Ministers of God, doe attend conti∣nually. But we owe not tribute to the King as a man; for then should we be addebted tribute to all men: but as a King, to whom the wages of tribute is due, as to a Princely workman, a King as a King: ergo, the Man and the King are different. 10. We owe fear and honour as due, to be rendred to the man who is King, because he is a King, not because he is a man; for it is the highest feare and honour due to any mortall man, which is due to the King, as King. 11. The Man, and the inferiour Judge are different: and we can∣not, by this Text, resist the inferiour Iudge, as a Iudge, but we re∣sist the ordinance of God, as the Text proveth. But Cavaliers resist the inferior Iudges as men, and have killed divers members of both Houses of Parliament: but they will not say, that they killed them as Judges, but as Rebels. If therefore to be a Rebell, as a wicked Man, and to be a Iudge, are differenced thus: then, to be a Man, and to commit some acts of Tyrannie; and to be the supreme Iudge and King, are two different things. 12. Mr. Knox, Hist. of Scotland, l. 2. The Congregation, in a letter to the Nobilitie, say:* 1.596 There is great difference betwixt the Authoritie, which is Gods Ordinance, and the Persons of those who are placed in authoritie. The Authoritie, and Gods ordinances can never doe wrong; for it commandeth that Vice and wicked men be punished, and Vertue, with vertuous men and just. be maintained: But the corrupt Person placed in this Authoritie, may offend, and most commonly doe contrary to this Authoritie: and is then the corruption of Man to be followed, by reason that it is clothed with the name of Authoritie? And they give instance in Pharaoh and Saul, who were lawfall Kings, and yet corrupt Men. And certainly, the Man, and the Divine authoritie, differ as the Subject and the Accident; as that which is under a Law, and can offend God; and that which is neither capable of Law, nor sinne. 13. The King, as King, is a j••st creature, and by office a living and breathing Law: His Will, as he is King, is nothing but a just Law: But the King, as a sinfull man, is not a just creature, but one who can sinne, and play the Tyrant: and his Will, as a private sinfull man, is a private Will, and may be resisted. So the Law saith, The King, as King, can doe no wrong: but the King, as a Man, may doe a wrong. While as then the Parliaments of both Kingdomes resist the Kings private will, as a Man, and fight against his illegall Cut-throats, sent out by him,

to d••stroy his native subjects, they fight for him as a King, and obey his publick Legall will, which is his Royall will, de jure, and while he is absent from his Parliaments as a man, he is Legally and in his Law-Power present, and so the Parliaments are as Legall, as if he were personally present with them.

Let me answer Royalists. The P. Prelate saith it is Solomons word,* 1.597 By me Kings raign. Kings in concreto, with their Soveraignty, he saith not, By me Royalty or Soveraignty raigneth. And elsewhere he saith, that Barclay saith, Paul writing to the Romans, keepeth the Roman usuall diction in this, who expresse by Powers in abstracto, the persons authorized by Power, and it is the scriptures Dialect; By him were created thrones, Dominions, Principalities, that is Angels, to say Angels, in abstracto, were created, 2 Pet. 2.10. They speak ill of dig∣nities,* 1.598 Iud. 8. dispise dominion. That is, they speak ill of Cajus, Cali∣gula, Nero; our Levites rail against the Lords Anoynted, the best of Kings in the world. Nero, Rom. 13.4. in concreto beareth not the sword in vain. Arnisaeus saith it better th••n the Prelate, (he is a wit∣lesse theef. Rom. 13.4. the Royall Power in abstracto, doth not bear the sword, but the Person, not the Power but the Prince himself bear∣eth the sword. And the Prelate poor man following Doctor Fern saith,* 1.599 Its absurd to pursue the Kings Person with a canon-bullet at Edge-hill, and preserve his authority at London, or elsewhere. So saith Fern 16. sect. 10. pag. 64. The concret Powers here are purposed as objects of our obedience, which cannot be directed, but upon power in some person, for it is said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Powers that are, are of God, now Power cannot be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 existent, but in some person; and Pag. 69. saith Fern, can Power in the abstract have praise? Or is tribute payed to the Power in the abstract. Yea the Power is the reason why we yeeld obedience to the person, &c. and the Prelate hath as much learning as to coppy out of Fern, and Barclay, Arniseus, and others these words and the like, but hath not wit to adde the sinewes of these Authors reason, and with all this he can in his Preface call it his own, and provoke any to answer him if they dare, whereas while I answer this excommunicated Pamphletter.

I answer these learned Authors, from which he stealeth all he hath, and yet he must perswade the King, he is the onely man can defend his Majesties Cause, and the importunity, forsooth, of friends extorted this peece, as if it were a fault, that this Delphick Oracle (giving out railings, and lies for responses) should be silent. 2. Not

we onely, but the Holy Ghost, in terminis, hath this distinction, Act. 4.19. and 5.29. We ought to obey God rather then men. Them Rulers (for of Rulers sitting in judgement is that speech uttered) commanding and tyrannizing over the Apostles, are men contradi∣stinguished from God; and as they command and punish unjustly, they are but men, otherwise commanding for God, they are Gods, and more then men. 2. From Theophylact also, or from Chryso∣stome, on Rom. 13. we have this; The Apostle speaketh not (say they) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 3. So∣veraigntie or Royaltie, doth not properly reign or bear the sword, or receive praise, and this accident doth not bear a sword; nor do we think, or Paul speak, Rom. 13. of the abstracted Jew of power and Royaltie, subsisting out of its subject; nor dream we, that the naked accident of Royall Authority, is to be feared and honoured as the Lords anointed; the person or man who is the King, and beareth the Crown on his head, and holdeth the scepter in his hand, is to be obeyed; accidentes are not persons, but they speak non-sense, and like brute beasts, who deny that all the kingly honour due to the King, must be due to him as a King, and because of the Roy∣all dignity that God hath given to him, and not because he is a man; for a Pursevants son is a man, and if a Pursevants son would usurpe the throne, and take the Crown on his head, and the scepter in his hand, and command that all souls be subject to such a superior Power, because he is a man, the Lawes of Scotland would hang a man for a lesse fault, we know: and the P. Prelate was wont to edi∣fie women, and converted souls to Christ, with such a distinction as objectum quod, and objectum quo, in the Pulpits of Edenburgh, and it hath good use here, we never took abstract Royalty to be the King. The Kings of Scotland of old were not second notions, and we ex∣clude not the person of the King, yet we distinguish with leave of the P. Prelate betwixt the person in linea physica, we must take (phy∣sica) largly heer and in linea morali, obedience, fear, tribute, honour is due to the person of the King, and to the man who is King, not because of his person, or because he is a man (the P. Prelate may know in what notion, we take the name (Person) but because God by the peoples election, hath exalted him to Royall dignity, and for this cause illdoers are to subject their throats and necks to the sword of the Lords Annoynteds executioner or hangman with patience, and willingly, because in taking away the head of ill doers, for ill doing,

he is acting the Office of the Lord, by whom he Raigneth; but if he take away their heads, and send out the long-tusked Vultures and Boares of Babylon, the Irish Rebells to execute his wrath, as he is in that act a mis-informed man, and wanteth the authority of Gods Law, or mans Law, he may be resisted with Armes. For 1. If Royalists say against this, then if a King turne an habituall Tyrant, and conduce an hundred thousand Turkes to destroy his subjects upon meere desire of revenge, they are not to resist, but to be subject,* 1.600 and suffer for conscience. I am sure Grotius saith, If a King sell his subjects, he loseth all title to the Crowne, and so may be resisted, and Winzetus saith, A Tyrant may be resisted, and Bar∣clay, It is lawfull for the people in case of Tyranny to defend them∣selves Adversus immanem saevetiam, against extreame cruelty: and I desire the Prelate to answer how people are subject in suffering such cruelty of the higher power, because he is Gods ordinance, and a power from God, except he say, as he selleth his people, and barba∣rously destroyeth by Cut-throat Irishes, his whole subjects refusing to worship Idolls, he is a man and a sinfull man, eatenus, and an infe∣riour power inspired by wicked counsell, not a King, eatenus, not a higher power, and that in resisting him thus, the subjects resist not the ordinance of God. Also suppone King David defend his Kingdome and people against Iesse his naturall father, who we suppose cometh in against his sonne and Prince, King David, with a huge army of the Philistimes, to destroy him and his Kingdome, if he shall kill his owne native father, in that warr at some Edge-hill, how shall he pre∣serve at Ierusalem that honour, & love that he oweth to his father, by vertue of the fifth Commandement, Honour thy father and thy mother, &c. Let them answer this, except King David consider Iesse in one relation, in abstracto, as his father, whom he is to obey, and as he is a wicked man, and a perfidious subject, in another relation, and except King David say, he is to subject himselfe to his father as a father, ac∣cording to the fifth Commandement,* 1.601 and that in the act of his fa∣thers violent invasion, he is not to subject himselfe to him, as he is a violent invader, and as a man. Let the Royalist see how he can an∣swer the Argument, and how Levie is not to know his father and mo∣ther as they are sinfull men, Deut. 33.9. and yet to know and ho∣nour them as Parents; and how an Israelite is not to pitty the wife that lyeth in his bosome, when she inticeth him to goe a whooring af∣ter strange Gods, but is to kill her, Deut. 13.6, 7, 8. and yet the hus∣band

is to love the wife as Christ loved his Church, Eph. 5.25. If the husband take away his wives life in some mountaine in the holy Land, as Gods Law commandeth, let the Royalists answer us, where is then the maritall love he owes to her, and that respect due to her as she is a wife and a helper. But let not the Royalist infer, that I am from these examples pleading for the killing of Kings, for lawfull resistance is one thing, and killing of Kings is another; the one de∣fensive and lawfull, the other offensive and unlawfull, so long as he remaineth a King, and the Lords Anoynted: But if he be a murthe∣rer of his father, who doth counsell his father to come to a place of danger, where he may be killed, and where the King ought not to be, as Abner was worthy of death, who watched not carefully King Saul, but slept when David came to his bed side, and had opportu∣nity to kill the King, they are Traitors and murtherers of the King, who either counselled his Majesty to come to Edge-hill, where the danger was so grett, or did not violently restraine him from com∣ming thither, seeing Kings safety and lives are as much, yea more in the disposing of the people then in their owne private will, 2 Sam. 18.2, 3. for certainly the people might have violently restrained King Saul from killing himselfe, and the King was guilty of his own death, and sinneth against his Office and subjects, who commeth out in person to any such battles where he may be killed, and the con∣trary party free of his blood. And here our Prelate is blind, if he see not the cleare difference between the Kings Person, and the Office as he is King, and between his private Will, and his publicke and Royall Will. 3. The Angels may be named Thrones and Dominions in abstracto, and yet created, in concreto, and we may say the Angell and his power are both created at once; but David was not both borne the Son of Iesse, and a King at once: and the P. Prelate, by this may prove it is not lawfull to resist the Divell (for he is of the number of these created Angells, Col. 1.) as he is a Divell, because in resisting the Divell as a Divell, we must resist an Angell of God, and a Principality. 4. To speake ill of dignities, 2 Pet. 2. and Iud. 8. Piscator insinuateth is, to speake evill of the very Office of Rulers, as well as of their manners▪ and Theodat. saith, on 2 Pet. 2. that these Raylers spake evill of the place of Governours and Masters, as unbe∣seeming beleevers. All our Interpreters, as Beza, Calvin, Luther, Bucer, Marloratus from the place saith, It is a speciall reproofe of Anabaptists and Libertines, who in that time maintained, that we are all free men in Christ, and that there should not be Kings, Ma∣sters, nor any Magistrates; however the abstract is put for the con∣crete,

its true, and it saith we are not to raile upon Nero, but to say Nero was a persecutor of Christians, and yet obey him commanding what is just, are very consistent. 5. The persons are proposed, Rom. 13. to be the object of our obedience, saith D. Ferne, it is very true; but he is ignorant of our mind in exponing the word Person: we never meant that feare, honour, royalty, tribute, must be due to the abstra∣cted accident of Kingly Authority, and not to the man who is King. Nor is it our meaning that Royalty in abstracto is Crowned King, and is anoynted, but that the Person is crowned and anoynted. But againe by a person we meane nothing lesse then the man Nero wasting Rome, burning, crucifying Paul, and torturing Christians, and that we owe subjection to Nero, and to his person in concreto as to Gods ordinance, Gods Minister, Gods sword-bearer in that noti∣on of a Person; is that only that we deny. Nay in that Nero in concreto to us, is no Power ordained of God, no Minister of God, but a Minister of the Divell, and Sathans armour-bearer, and therefore we owe not feare,* 1.602 honour, subjection, and tribute to the Person of Nero. But the Person thus far is the object of our obedience; that feare, honour, sub∣jection, and tribute must be due to the man in concreto, to his Person who is Prince; but not because he is a man, or a person simply, or a sword-bearer of Papists, but for his office, for that eminent place of royall dignity that God hath conferred on his Person. We know the light of the Sun, the heate of fire, in abstracto, doe not properly give light and heat, but the Sun and fire, in concreto; yet the principium quo, ratio qua, the principles of these operations in Sun and fire be light & heate, and we ascribe illuminating of dark bodies, heating of cold bodies to Sun and fire in concreto, yet not to the subjects simply, but to them as affected with such accidents: so here we honour and sub∣mit to the man who is King, not because he is a man, that were trea∣son; not because he useth his sword against the Church, that were impiety: but because of his Royall Dignity, and because he useth it for the Lord. It is true, Arnisaeus, Barclay, Ferne, say, That Kings leave not off to be Kings, when they use their power and sword against the Church and Religion. And also it is considerable, that when the worst of Emperors bloody Nero did raigne, the Apostle presseth the duty of subjection to him, as to a power appointed of God, and condemneth the resisting of Nero, as the resisting of an ordinance of God. And cer∣tainely if the cause and reason in point of duty-Morall, and of consci∣ence before God remaine in Kings, to wit, that while they are enemies and persecutors as Nero was▪ their Royall Dignity given them of God

remaineth, then subjection upon that ground is lawfull, and resistance unlawfull. Ans. It is true so long as Kings remaine Kings, subjection is due to them because Kings, but that is not the question. But the question is, if subjection be due to them,* 1.603 when they use their power unlawfully and Tyrannically. What ever David did, though he was a King, he did it not as King, he deflowred not Bathsheba as King, and Bathsheba might with bodily resistance and violence lawfully have resisted King David, though Kingly Power, remained in him, while he should thus attempt to commit Adultery; else David might have said to Bathshba, Because I am the Lords Anoynted, it is rebelli∣on in thee a subject to oppose any bodily violence to my act of forcing of thee, it is unlawfull to thee to cry for helpe, for if any shall offer violent∣ly to rescue thee from me, he resisteth the ordinance of God. Subjection is due to Nero as an Emperour, but not any subjection is due to him in the burning of Rome, and torturing of Christians, except you say that Nero's power abused in these acts of cruelty was, 1. A power from God. 2. An ordinance of God. 3. That in these, he was the Minister of God for the good of the Common-wealth. Because some beleeved Christians were free from the yoake of Magistracy, and that the dignity it selfe was unlawfull. And 2. because, ch. 12. he had set downe the lawfull Church Rulers, and in this and the following chapter the duties of brotherly love of one toward another. So here ch. 13. he teacheth that all Magistrates, suppose Heathen, are to be obeyed and submitted unto in all things, so far as they are Ministers of God. Arnisaeus objecteth to Buchan. If we are by this place to subject our selves to every power in abstracto, then also to a power contrary to the truth, and to a power of a King exceeding the limits of a King, for such a power is a power,* 1.604 and we are not to distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not.

Ans. The Law clearely distinguisheth we are to obey Parents in the Lord, and if Nero command Idolatry, this is an excessive po∣wer; are we obliged to obey, because the Law distinguisheth not? 2. The text saith, we are to obey every power, 1. from God, 2. That is Gods ordinance, 3. by which the man is a Minister of God for good; but an unjust and excessive power is none of these three. 3. The text in words distinguisheth not obedience active in things wicked, and lawfull: yet we are to distinguish.

Mr. Symmons. Is authoritie subjected solely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Person, though put upon him both by God and Man?* 1.605 Or, is Authoritie only the subject; and the Person exercising the Au∣thoritie,

a bare accident to that, being in it only more separably, as pride and folly are in a man: Then if one in Authoritie command, out of his own Will, and not by Law: if I neithr actively, nor passively obey, J doe not so much as resist abused Authoritie: and then must the Prince by his disorderly Will have quite lost his authoritie, and become like an∣other man; and yet his Authoritie has not fled from him.

Ans. If we speake acurately, neither the Man solely, nor his Power only is resisted: but the Man clothed with lawfull habituall power, is resisted, in such and such acts flowing from an abused power. 2. It is an ignorant speech, to ask, Is Authoritie subjected solely in the Kings Law, and no whit in his Person? for the Autho∣ritie hath all its power by Law, not from the Mans person; The Au∣thoritie hath nothing from the Person, but a naked inherencie in the Person, as in the subject: and the Person is to be honored for the Authoritie, not the Authoritie for the Person. 3. Authoritie is not so separable from the person, as that for every act of lawlesse Will, the King loseth his Royall authoritie, and ceaseth to be King: no, but every act of a King, in so far can claime subjection of the infe∣riour, as the act of commanding and ruling, hath law for it; and in so far as it is lawlesse, the Person in that act repugnant to Law, loseth all due claime of actuall subjection in that act, and in that act, power actuall is losed, as is cleare, Act. 4.19. & 5.29. The Apostles say to Rulers, It is safer to obey God than Men. What? were not these Rulers lawfull Magistrates, armed with power from God? I answer, habitually they were Rulers, and more then men, and to obey them in things lawfull, is to obey God: But actually in these unlawfull commandements, especially being commanded to speake no more in the name of Iesus; the Apostles doe acknowledge them to be no more but Men: and so their actuall authoritie is as separa∣ble from the person, as pride and folly from men.

Symmons. The distinction holdeth good of inferior Magistrates, That they may be considered as Magistrates,* 1.606 and as Men: because their authoritie is only sacred, and addeth veneration to their persons; and is separable from the person; The Man may live, when his Authoritie is extinguished: but it holdeth not in Kings. King Sauls person is vene∣rable as his authoritie, and his authoritie commeth by inheritance, and dyeth, and liveth inseparably with his person: and Authoritie and Per∣son adde honour each one to another.

Ans. 1. If this be true, Manasseh, a King, did not shed innocent blood, and use ••orcerie▪ he did not these great wickednesses as a man,

but as a King. Salomon played the Apostate as a King, not as a man: if so, the man must make the King more infallible then the Pope; for the Pope, as a man, can erre; as a Pope he cannot erre, say Pa∣pists. But Prophets, in their persons, were anoynted of God, as Saul and David were: then must we say, Nathan and Samuel er∣red not as men, because their persons were sacred and anointed: and they erred not as Prophets, sure; Ergo, they erred not all. A King, as a King, is an holy Ordinance of God, and so cannot doe injustice, Ergo, they must doe acts of Iustice, as men. 2. The inferi∣or Iudge is a Power from God. 2. To resist him, is to resist an ordi∣nance of God. 3. He is not a terrour to good workes, but to evill. 4. He is the minister of God for good. 5. He is Gods Sword-bearer; his officiall power to rule, may by as good right come by birth, as the Crown: and the Kings person is sacred only for his office, and is annointed only for his office. For then the Chaldeans dishonored not inferior Iudges, Lam. 5.12. when they hanged the Prince, & ho∣nored not the faces of Elders. It is in questiō, if the Kings actual autho∣rity be not as separable frō him, as the actuall authority of the Iudge.

Symmons, p. 24. The King himselfe may use this distinction. As a Christian, he may forgive any that offendeth against his person: but as a Iudge, he must punish, in regard of his office. Ans. Well then, Flat∣terers will grant the distinction, when the King doth good, and pardoneth the blood of Protestants, shed by bloody Rebels: But when the King doth acts of injustice, he is neither man, nor King, but some independent absolute God.

Symmons, p. 27. Gods Word tyeth me to every one of his personall commandements, as well as his legall commandements: nor doe I obey the Kings law, because it is established, or because of its known penaltie; nor yet the King himselfe, because he ruleth according to Law. But I obey the Kings law, because I obey the King: and I obey the King, be∣cause I obey God: I obey the King, and his Law▪ because I obey God and his Law. Better obey the Command, for a reverent regard to the Prince, then for a penaltie. Ans. It is hard to answer a sick man. It is blasphemie, to seek this distinction of Person and Office, in the King of Kings; because by (Person) in a mortall King, we under∣stand a Man that can sinne. 1. I am not obliged to obey his perso∣nall commandement, except I were his domestick: nor his unlaw∣full personall commandements, because they are sinfull. 2. It is false that you obey the Kings Law, because you obey the King: for then you say but this, I obey the King, because I obey the King. The truth is,

Obedience is not formally terminated on the person of the King; O∣bedience is relative to a precept: and it is Men-service, to obey a Law, not because it is good and just; but upon this formall motive, because it is the will of a mortall man to command it. And Reve∣rence, Love, Feare, being acts of the Affection, are not terminated on a Law, but properly on the Person of the Iudge: and they are modifications, or laudable qualifications of acts of obedience; not motives, not the formall reason why I obey, but the manner how I obey. And the Apostle maketh expresly, Rom. 13▪4. feare of punish∣ment, a motive of obedience, while he saith, He beareth not the sword in vaine; Ergo, Be subject to the King. And this hindreth not per∣sonall resistance to unjust commandements.

Symmons, p. 27, 28, 29. You say, To obey the Princes Personall commandement against his Legall will, is to obey himselfe against him∣selfe. So say I, To obey his Legall will against his Personall will, is to obey himselfe against himselfe: for I take his Person to be himselfe

Ans. To obey the Kings personall will, when it is sinfull, (as we now suppose) against his legall will, is a sinne, and a disobedience to God, and the King also, seeing the Law is the Kings will, as King: but to obey his Legall will against his sinfull personall will (as it must be sinfull, if contrary to a just Law) is obedience to the King as King, and so obedience to God. 2. You take the Kings person to be him∣self; but you take quid pro quo, for his person here, you must take not Physically for his suppost of soul and body; but morally, it is the King, as a sinning man doing his worst will, against the Law which is his just and best will, and the rule of the Subjects: and the Kings personall will is so far just, and to regulate the Subjects, in so far, as it agreeth with his legall Will, or his Law, and this will can sinne, and therefore may be crossed without breach of the fifth Commandement: but his Legall Will cannot be crossed without disobedience both to God and the King.

Symmons, p. 28. The Kings Personall will doth not alwayes pre∣suppone passion: and if it be attended with passion, yet we must beare it for conscience sake. Ans. We are to obey the Kings Personall will, when the thing commanded, is not sinne; but his Subjects as Sub∣jects, have little to do with his personall will in that notion. It concerneth his domestick servant, and is the Kings will as he is the master of servants, not as he is King in relation to Subjects; but we speak of the Kings personall will, as repugnant to Law, and contrary to the Kings will as King, and so contrary to the fifth

Commandment; and this is attended often, not onely with Passion, but also with prejudice; and we owe no subjection to prejudice, and Passions, or to Actions commanded, by these misordered powers, because they are not from God, nor his Ordinances, but from men, and the flesh, and we owe no subjection to the flesh.

Doct. Ferne, Sect. 9. pag. 58. The distinction of personall and legall will, hath place in evill actions, but not in resistance, where we cannot sever the person, and the dignitie, or authority, because we can∣not resist the power, but we must resist the person who hath the power. Saul had lawfully the command of Arms, but that power he useth unjustly, against innocent David. I ask when these Emperours took away lives and goods at their pleasure; was that a power ordained of God? No, but an Illegall will, a Tyranny, but they might not resist: nay, but they cannot resist: for that power and soveraigntie imployed to compasse these illegall commandments, was ordained and settled in them. When Pilate condemned our Saviour, it was an illegall will, ye•• our Saviour acknowledgeth in it Pilates power, that was given him from above. Answ. 1. Here we have the distinction, denyed by Roy∣alists, granted by D. Fern; but if when the King commands us to do wickednesse, we may resist that personall will, and when he com∣mandeth us to suffer unjustly we cannot resist his will, but we must resist also his Royall person. What? Is it not still the King, and his person sacred, as his power is sacred, when he commandeth the subjects to do unjustly, as when he commandeth them to suffer un∣justly? It were fearfull to say, when Kings command any one act of idolatry, they are no longer Kings; if for conscience I am to suffer unjustly, when Nero commandeth unjust punishment, because Nero commanding so, remaineth Gods Minister. Why? But when Nero commandeth me to worship an Heathen God, I am upon the same ground to obey that unjust will in doing ill: For Nero in commanding Idolatry, remaineth the Lords Minister, his person is sacred in the one commandment of doing ill, as in inflicting ill of punishment. And do I not resist his person in the one, as in the other? His power and his person are unseparably conjoyned by God in the one, as in the other, 2. In bodily thrusting out of Vz∣zah from the Temple, these fourscore valiant men did resist the Kings person, by bodily violence, as well as his power. 3. If the power of killing the Martyrs in Nero, was no power ordained of God, then the resisting of Nero, in his taking away the lives of the Martyrs, was but the resisting of Tyranny: And certainly, if that

power in Nero was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a power ordained of God, and not to be resisted, as the place, Rom. 13. is alleaged by Royalists, then it must be a lawfull power, and no Tyranny; and if it cannot be re∣sisted, because it was a power ordained and settled in him, it is either setled by God, and so not Tyranny; except God be the Author of Tyranny, or then settled by the devill, and so may well be resisted; but the Text speaketh of no power, but of that which is of God. 4. We are not to be subject to all powers in concreto, by the Text; for we are not to be subject to powers lawfull, yet commanding active obedience to things unlawfull. Now subjection includeth active obedience of honour, love, fear, paying tribute, and there∣fore of need force, some powers must be excepted. 5. Pilates power is meerly a power by divine permission, not a power ordained of God, as are the powers spoken of Rom. 13. Gregori. mor. l. 3. c. 11. ex∣presly saith, This was Satans power given to Pilate, against Christ. Manibus Satanae pro nostra redemptione se traddit. Lyra. A Principi∣bus Romanorum & ulterius permissum a Deo, qui est potestas, superior. Calvin, B••za, Diod••tus, saith the same, and that he cannot mean of Legall power from Gods regulating will is evident; 1. Because Christ is answering Pilate,* 1.607 John 19.10. Knowest thou not, that I have power to crucifie thee? This was an untruth. Pilate had a command to worship him, and beleeve in him; and whereas Ferne saith, Sect. 9. pag. 59. Pilate had power to judge any accused before him: It is true, but he being obliged to beleeve in Christ, he was obliged to be perswaded of Christs innocency; and so neither to judge, nor receive accusation against him: and the power he saith, he had to crucifie, was a Law-power in Pilates meaning, but not in very deed any Law-power; because a Law-power is from Gods regulating will in the fifth Commandment; but no creature hath a lawfull or a Law-power to crucifie Christ. 2. A Law-power is for good, Rom. 13.4. A power to crucifie Christ, is for ill. 3. A Law-power is a terrour to ill works, and a praise to good. Pilates power to crucifie Christ, was the contrary. 4. A Law-power is to execute wrath on ill-doing, a power to crucifie Christ is no such. 5. A Law-power conciliateth honour, fear, and veneration to the person of the Judge, a power to crucifie Christ, conciliateth no such thing, but a disgrace to Pilate. 6. The Genuine Acts of a lawfull power, are lawfull Acts; for such as is the Fountain-power, such are the Acts flowing therefrom; good Acts slow not from bad powers, neither hath God given a power to sin, except by way of permission.

QUEST. XXX. Whether or no Passive Obedience be a meane to which we are subjected in conscience by vertue of a Divine Commandement, and what a meane Resistance is. That Flying is Resistance.

MUch is built, to commend patient suff••ring of ill, and con∣••emne all r••sistance of Superiors, by Royalists, on the place 1 Pet. 2.18. Where we are commanded, being servants, to suffer buffets, not onely for ill doing, of good masters, but also undeser∣vedly, and when we do•• well, we a••e to suffer of these masters that are evi••l; and so much more are we patiently, without Resistance, to suffer of Kings. B••t it is cleare, the place is nothing against Re∣sistance, as in these Assertions I cleare.

Assertion 1. Pati••nt suff••ring of wicked men, and violent resisting are not incompatible, but they may well stand together: So this consequence is the basis of the argument, and it is just nothing. To wit, Servants are to suff••r u••j••stly wounds and ••u••••••ting of their wicked Masters, and they a••e to bear i•• patiently; Ergo, Servants are in conscience obliged to non-resistance. Now Scripture maketh this cl••ar; The Church of God is to bear with all patience,* 1.608 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Lord, because she hath sinned, and to suffer of wicked enemies, which were to be troden as mire in the streets, Micah 7.9, 10, 11, 12. but withall they were not obliged to non-resistance, and not to fight against these enemies, yea they were obliged to fight against them also. If these were, Babilon, Iudah might have resisted and fought, if God had not giv••n a speciall commandement of a positive law, that they should not fight, if these were the Assy∣rians and other enemies, or rather both, the people were to resist by fighting, and yet to endure patiently the indignation of the Lord. David did bear most patiently the wrong that his own son Abso∣lon and Achitophel, and the people inflicted on him in pursuing him to take his life and the kingdom from him: as is cleare by his gracious expressions, 2 Sam. 15.25, 26. chap. 16. ver. 10, 11, 12. Psal. 3.1, 2, 3. Yea he prayeth for a blessing on the people, that con∣spired against him. Psal. 3.8. Yet did he lawfully resist Absalom, and the conspiratours, and sent out Ioab and a huge army in open battel against them. 2. Sam. 18.1, 2, 3, 4, &c. and fought against them. And were not the people of God patient to endure the vio∣lence done to them in the wildernes, by Og king of Bashan, Sihon

king of Heshbon, by the Ammorites, Moabites, &c? I think Gods law tyeth all men, especially his people, to as patient a suffering in wars, Deut. 8.16. God then trying and humbling his people, as the ser∣vant is to endure patiently, unjustly inflicted buffets, 1 Pet. 2.18. And yet Gods people at Gods command did resist these Kings and people, and did fight and kill them, and possesse their land, as the history is cleare. See the like Iosh. 11. ver. 18, 19. 2. One act of grace and vertue is not contrary to another. Resistance is in the Children of God an innocent act of self-preservation, as is patient suffering, and therefore they may well subsist in one. And so saith Amasa by the spirit of the Lord. 1 Chro. 12.18. Peace, peace be unto thee, and peace to thy helpers, for God helpeth thee. Now David in that, and all his help••rs were resisters of King Saul. 3. The scope of the place 1 Pet. 2. is not to forbid all violent resisting, as is clear,* 1.609 he speaketh nothing of violent resisting either one way or other, but onely he forbiddeth revengefull resisting of repay∣ing one wrong with another, from the example of Christ, who when he was reviled, reviled not again, when he suffered he threatned not. T••erefore the argument is a falacy, ab ••o quod docitur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ad illud quod dicitur 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Though therefore the master should attempt to kill an innocent servant, and invade him with a weapon of 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1. Suddenly. 2. Without all reason or cause. 3. Vnavoidably, Do∣ctor Ferne in that case doth free a Subject from guiltynesse,* 1.610 if he violently resist his Prince: Ergo the servant who should violently resist his Master in the aforesaid case, should, and might patiently suffer, and violently resist, notwithstanding any thing that Royalists can conclude on the contrary. 4. No Prince hath a Masterly or he∣rile dominion over his subjects, but onely a free, ingenious, paternall and tutorly over-sight for the good of the people, Rom. 13.4. The Master, especially in the Apostle Peters time, had a dominion over servants, as over their proper goods.

2. Assertion. Neither suffering formally as suffering, and so nei∣th••r can non-resisting passive fall under any morall law of God, ex∣cept in two conditions:* 1.611 1. In the point of Christs passive obedi∣ence, he being the eternall God, as well as Man, and so Lord of his owne blood and life, by vertue of a speciall commandement impo∣sed on him by his Father, was commanded to lay downe his life, yea and to be an Agent as well as a Patient in dying. Ioh. 10.18. Yea and actively he was to contribute somthing for his own death,

and ••ffer himself willingly to death, Mat. 28.20. And knowing the houre that he was to depart out of this world unto the Father,* 1.612 Iohn 13.1. would not onely not flee, which is to Royalists lawfull, to us a speciall point of resistance, Ioh. 14.31. Ioh. 18.4, 5, 6, 7. and but upbraided Peter, as the Agent of Sathan, who would disswade him to die, Mat. 16.22, 23. and would fight for him. And he doth not fetch any argument against Peters drawing of his sword, from the unlawfulnesse of self-defence, and innocent resistance, (which he should have done, if Royalists plead with any colour of reason from his example, against the lawfulnesse of Resistance and self-defence) but from the absolute power of God. 2. From Gods positive wil▪ w••o commanded him to die, Mat. 26.53, 54. if therefore Roya∣lists p••ove any thing against the lawfulnesse of resisting Kings, when they offer (most unjustly) violence to the life of Gods servants, from thi•• one meerly extraordinary and rare example of Christ, the like wh••reof was never in the world, they may from the same example prove it unlawfull to flee; for Christ would not flee, Psal. 40.6, 7. Heb. 10.6.7, 8, 9. Ioh. 14.31. Ioh. 18.4, 5, 6, 7. 2. They may prove that people sought by a Tyrant to be crucifyed for the Cause of God, or to reveale and discover themselves to an Armie of men who come to seek them, Ioh. 13.1, 2. Ioh. 18.4, 5, 6, 7. 3. That Martyrs are of purpose to goe to the place where they know they shall be apprehended and put to death, for this Christ did, and are willingly to offer themselves to the enemies Armie, for so did Christ,* 1.613 Ioh. 14.3. Mar. 14.41, 42. Mat. 26.46, 47. and so by his example, all the Parliament, all the Innocents of the Citie of Lon∣don, and Assemblie of Divines, are obliged to lay downe Armes, and to goe to their owne death to Prince Rupert, and the bloody Irish Rebels. 4. By this example it is unlawfull to resist the cut∣throats of a King, for Cesar in his owne Royall person, the High Priest in person came not out against Christ. Yea it is not lawfull for the Parliament to resist a Iudas, who hath ••led as a traiterous Apo∣state from the Truth and the Temple of Christ. 5. It is not lawful for innocents to defend themselves by any violence against the in∣vasion of superiours in D. Fernes three cases, in which he alloweth resistance. 1. When the Invasion is sudden. 2. Vnavoidable. 3. With∣out all colour of Law and Reason. In the two last cases,* 1.614 Royalists defend the lawfulnes of self-defence. 6. If the example be pressed, Christ did not this and this, he resisted not with violence to save his

owne life, therefore we are to abstaine from resistance, and such and such meanes of self-preservation, then because Christ appealed not from inferiour Judges to the Emperour Caesar; who, no doubt, would have shewne him more favour, then the Scribes and Phari∣sees did, and because Christ conveyed not a humble supplication to his Soveraigne and Father Caesar, then because he proffered not a humble petition to Prince Pilate for his life, he being an innocent man, and his cause just, because he neither conduced an Orator to pleade his owne just cause, nor did he so plead for himselfe, and give in word and writ, all lawfull and possible defences for his own safety, but answered many things with silence, to the admiration of the Judge, Marke 15.3, 4 5. and was thrice pronounced by the Judge to be innocent, Luke 22. ver. 23. because▪ I say, Christ did not all these for his owne life, therefore it is unlawfull for Scotland and England to appeale to the King, to supplicate, to give in Ap∣pol••g••••s, &c. I thinke Royalists dare not say so. But if they say, he would not resist, and yet might have done all these lawfully, be∣cause these be lawfull meanes, and resistance with the sword un∣lawfull; bec••use, He that taketh the sword, shall perish by the sword. Let me Answer then, 1. They leave the argument from Christs example, who was thus farre subject to higher powers, that he would not r••sist, and plead from the unlawfulnesse of resistance; this is petitio principii. 2. He that taketh the sword without Gods warrant, which Peter had not, but the contrary, he was himselfe a Sathan to Christ, who would but councell him not to die; but there is no shadow of a word to prove that violent resisting is unlawfull, when the King and his I••ish cut-throats pursue us unjustly; onely Christ saith, when God may deliver extraordinarily by his Angels, except it be his absolute will, that his Son should drink the cup of death, then to take the sword, when God hath declared his will on the contrary, is unlawfull; and that is all: Though I doe not que∣stion but Christs asking for swords, and his arresting all his ene∣mies to the ground, Ioh. 18.6. backward, is a justifying of selfe-de∣fence. But hitherto it is cleare by Christs example, that he onely was commanded to suffer. Now the second case in which suffering falleth under a Commandement, is indirectly and comparatively, when it commeth to the election of the witnesse of Jesus, that it is referred to them, either to deny the truth of Christ and his name, or then to suffer death, the choise is apparently evident, and this

choise that persecuters referre us unto, is to us a Commandement of God, that we ••ust choose suffering for Christ, and refuse sin∣ning against Christ: but the supposition must stand, that this alter∣native is unavoydable, that is not in our power to decline either suffering for Christ, or denying of Christ b••fore men; otherwayes no man is to expect the reward of a witnesse of Iesus, who having a lawfull possible meanes of eschewing suffering, doth yet cast him∣selfe into suffering ne••dlesly. But I prove that suffering by men of this world, falleth not formally and directly under any divine po∣sitive Law, for the Law of nature, what ••ver Arminians in their De∣claration, or this Arminian excommunicate think with them, (for they teach that God gave a Commadement to Adam,* 1.615 to abstaine from such and such fruit with paine and trouble to sinlesse nature) doth not command suffering, or any thing contrary to nature as na∣ture is sinlesse: I prove it thus,* 1.616 1. What ever falleth under a posi∣tive Commandem••nt of God, I may say here, und••r any Com∣mandement of God, is not a thing under the freewill and power of others, from whom we are not discended necessarily by naturall ge∣neration, but that men of the world kill me, even these from whom I am not d••scended by naturall generation (which I speake to ex∣clude Adam, who killed all his posterity) is not in my free will, either as if they had my common nature in that act, or as if I wer•• accessory by counsell, consent, or approbation to that act, for this is under the free-will and power of others, not under my owne free-will: Ergo, that I suffer by others is not under my free-will, and cannot fall under a Commandement of God: And certainly, it is an irrationall Law, (glorified be his name) that God should com∣mand Antipas either formally to suffer, or formally not to suffer death by these of the Synagogue of Sathan, Revel. 2.13. because if they be pleased not to kill him, it is not in his free-will to be killed by them; and if they shall have him in their power (except God extraordinarily deliver) it is not in his power, in an ordinary pro∣vidence, not to be killed. 2. All these places of Gods word, that recommendeth suffering to the followers of Christ, do not com∣mand formally that we suffer; Ergo, suffering falleth not formally under any Commandement of God; I prove the Antecedent, be∣cause i•• they be considered, they prove onely that comparatively we are to choose rather to suffer, then to deny Christ before men, Mat. 10.28, 32. Revel. 2.13. Mat. 10.37. Mat. 16.24. c. 19.29.

or then they command not suffering according to the substance of the passion,* 1.617 but according to the manner, that we suffer willingly, cheerfully, and patiently. Hence Christs word to take up his Crosse, which is not a meere passion, but commendeth an act of the vertue of patience. Now no Christian vertue consisteth in a meer passion, but in laudable habits, and good and gracious acts, and the Text we are now on, 1 Pet. 2.18, 19. doth not recommend suffering from the example of Christ, but patient suffering, and so the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not simply enjoyned, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in all feare, ver. 18. and the words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to suffer with patience, as 2 Tim, 3.11. 1 Cor. 10.13. and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is to suffer patiently, 1 Cor. 13.7. Love, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, suffereth all things, Heb. 12.17. if you suffer correction, 1 Tim. 5.5. She continueth patiently in pray∣ers, Heb. 12.2. Christ endured the Crosse (patiently) & Rom. 15.5. Rom. 8.25. Luk. 8.15. & 21.29. the derivats hence signifie patience, so doe all our Inter••reters, Beza, Calvin, Marlorat, and Popish expositors, as Lorinus, Estius, Carthusian, Lyra, Hugo Cardinali•• expound it of patient suffering, and the text is clear, it is suffering like Christ, without rendring evil for evil, and reviling for revi∣ling. 3. Suffering simply according to substance of the passion (I cannot say action) is common to good and ill, and to the wicked, yea to the damned in hell, who suff••r against their will, and that can∣not be joyned according to its substance as an act of formall obedi∣••nce and subjection to higher powers, Kings, Fathers, Masters, by force of the fifth commandement, and of the place Rom. 13.1, 2. Which according to its substance,* 1.618 wicked men suffer, and the dam∣ned in hell also against their will. 4. Passive obedience to wicked Emperours can but be enjoyned, Rom. 13. but onely in the manner, and upon supposition, that we must be subject to them, and must suffer against our wills, all the ill of punishment, that they can in••lict, we must suffer patiently; and because it is Gods permissive will that they punish us unjustly; for it is not Gods ruling and ap∣proving will (called voluntas signi) that they should against the law of God and man kill us, and persecute us, and therefore neither Rom. 13. nor 1 Pet. 2. nor any place in Gods word, nor any com∣mon Divin••, naturall, of nations, or any municipal Law commandeth formally obedience passive, or subjection passive, or non-resistance under the notion of passive obedience, yea to me obedience passive, (if we speak o•• obedience properly called as relative essentially to

a law) is a chymera, a dream, and repugnantia in adjecto, and there∣fore I utterly deny that resistance passive or subjection passive, doth formally fal under either commandment of God affirmative, or ne∣gative, onely the unlawfull manner of resistance by way of revenge, or for defence of Popery and false Religion, and out of impatient tolleration of Monarchy or any Tyranny is forbidden in Gods word, and certainly all the words used Rom. 13. as they fall under a formal commandement of God, or words of action, not of any Chymericall passive obedi••nce, as we are not to resist actively Gods ordinance, as his ordinance, ver. 1.2. that is, to resist God actively. 2. We are to do good works, not evil, if we would have the ruler no terror to us, ver. 3. 3. We must not do ill, if we would be free of vengean∣ces sword: ver. 7. we are to pay tribute and to give fear and honour to the ruler, ver. 7. ••ll which are evidently actions, not passive sub∣jection, and if any passive subjection be commanded, it is not here, nor in the first commandement, commanded, but in the first com∣mandement under the hand of patience and submission under Gods hand in sufferings, or in the third commandement under the hand of rather dying for Christ, or denying his truth before men; hence I argue here Rom. 13. and 1 Pet. 2. and Tit. 3. is nothing else, but an exposition of the fifth commandement, but in the fifth commande∣ment onely active obedience is formally commanded, and the sub∣ordination of inferiours to superiours is ordained, and passive obe∣dience is no where commanded, but onely modus rei, the manner of suffering, and the occasion of the commandement, here it is thought that the Iewes converted under this pretext, that they were Gods people, beleeved that they should not be subject to the Ro∣mans. A certaine Galilean made the Galileans beleeve that they should not pay tribute to Strangers, and that they should call none Lord, but the God of heaven, as Ioseph, saith, Antiq. Iudaic. l. 20. c. 2. and De bell. Iudaic. l. 7. c. 29. yea and Hieron. Com. in 3. Tit. saith, At this time the sect of the Galileans were on foot. It is like the Jews were thought to be Galileans, and that their liberty purchased in Christ could not consist with the order of master and servant, King and subject. And to remove this, Paul establisheth Magistracie, and commandeth obedience in the Lord; and he is more to prove the office of the Magistrate to be of God, then any other thing; and to shew what is his due, then to establish absolutenesse in Nero to be of God; yea to me, every word in the Text speaketh limitednesse of

Princes, and cryeth downe absolutenesse: 1. No power of God, 2. No ordinance of God, 3. Who is a terror to evill, but a praise to good works, 4. No mini••ter of God for good, &c. can be a power to which we submit our selves on earth, as next unto God, with∣out controlment. 5. That passive obedience falleth formally under no commandement of God, I prove thus: All obedience lyable to a divine commandement, doth commend morally the performer of obedience, as having a will conformed to Gods morall Law, and deformity betwixt the will of him who performeth not obedience, involveth the non-obedient in wrath and guiltinesse. But non-pas∣sive subjection to the sword of the Judge doth not morally com∣mend him that suff••reth not punishm••nt, for no man is formally a sinner against a morall law, because he suffereth not the ill of pu••ish∣ment; nor is he morally good, or to be commended, bec••use hee suffereth ill of punishment, but be••ause he doth the ill ••f sin. And all evil of punishment u••justly inflicted hath Gods volun••as bene∣placiti, the instrumen••all and hidden d••cree o•• God, which order••th both good and ill, Ephes. 1.11. for its rule and cause, and hath not Gods will of approbation called, voluntas signi, for its rule, both is contrary to that will; I am sure Epiphanius li. 1. tom. 3. heres. 40. Basilius in Psal. 32. Nazianzen Orat. ad subd. & imperat. Hilar. li. ad Constant. August. citeth these words, and saith the same. If then passive subj••ction be not commanded, non subj••ction pas∣sive cannot be forbidden, and this text, Rom. 13. and 1 Pet. 2. cannot a whit help the bad cause of Royalists; All then must be reduced to some action of resisting, arguments for passive subjection though there were ship-fulls of them, they cannot help us.

* 1.619Assert. 3. By the place 1 Pet. 2. The servant unjustly buffeted is not to buffet his master again, but to bear patiently as Christ did, who when he was reviled, did not revile again. Not because the place condemneth resistance for self-defence, but because buffeting again is formally re-offending, not defending; defending is properly a warding of a blow or stroak: if my neighbour come to kill me, and I can by no means save my life by flight, I may defend my self, and all Divines say, I may rather kill, ere I be killed, because I am nearer by the law of natur••, and dearer to my self, and my own life then to my brother: but if I kill him out of malice, or hatred, the act of de∣fending, by the unlawfull manner of doing, becometh an act of of∣fending, and murther, whence the mind of the blood-shedder will

vary the nature of the action, from whence this corolarie doth na∣turally issue, that the physicall action of taking away the life ma∣keth not murther, nor homicide,* 1.620 and so the physical action of offend∣ing my neighbour is not murther: Abraham may kill his son, he for whom the cities of refuge were ordained, and did kill his bro∣ther, yet not hating him, he was not, by Gods law, judged a mur∣therer. And 2. It necessarily hence followeth, that an act which is physically an act of offending my brother, yea even to the taking a∣way of his life is often morally and legally an act of lawfull self-de∣fence: an offending of another necessitated from the sole invention of self-defence is no more but an act of innocent self defence: if Da∣vid with his men had killed any of Sauls men, in a set battel, David and his men onely intending self defence, the war ••n Davids part was meere defensive, for physicall actions of killing, indifferent of themselves, yet imp••rated by a principle of naturall self-defence, and clothed with this formall end of self-defence, or according to the substance of the action, the act is of self-defence. If therefore one shall wound me deadly, and I know it is my death, after that, to kill the killer of my selfe, I being onely a private man, must be no act of self-defence, but of homicide, because it cannot be imperated by a sinlesse dictate of a naturall conscience, for this end of self-defence, after I know I am killed. Any mean not used for preventing death, must be an act of revenge, not of self-defence, for it is physically un∣su••able for the intended end of self-defence. And so for a servant buffeted, to buffet againe, is of the same nature: the second buffet not being a conducible meane to ward the first buffet, but a meane to procure heavier stroakes and possibly killing, it cannot be an act of self defence, for an act of self defence must be an act destinated ex natura rei, onely for defence, and if it be known to be an act of sole offending, without any known necessary relation of a mean to self-defence as the end, it cannot be properly an act of self-defence.

Assert. 4. When the matter is lighter, as in paying tribute, or suf∣fering a buffet of a rough master, though unjustly, we are not to use any act of re-offending.* 1.621 For though I be not absolute Lord of my owne goods, and so may not at my sole pleasure give tribute and expend monies to the hurting of my children, where I am not by Gods Law or Mans Law obliged to pay tribute; and though I be not an absolute Lord of my members, to expose face, and cheeks, and back to stripes and whips at my owne meere will, yet have

we a comparative dominion given to us of God in matters of goods, and disposing of our members, (I think I may except the case of mutilation, which is a little death) for buffets, because Christ no doubt to teach us the like, would rather give of his goods, and pay tribute, where it is not due, then that this scandall lay on the way of Christ, that Christ was no loyall subject to lawfull Emperors and Kings. And 1 Cor. 9. Paul would rather not take stipend, though it was due to him, then hinder the course of the Gospel. And the like is 1 Cor. 6. where the Corinthians were rather to suffer losse in their goods, then to goe to Law before Infidel Judges, and by the like to prevent greater inconveniences, and mutilation, and death; the Christian servant hath that dominion over his members, rather to suffer buff••ts, then to ward off buffets with violent resistance. But it is no consequent that innocent subjects should suffer death of ty∣rants, and servants be killed by masters, and yet that they shall not be allowed by the law of nature to defend themselves, by re-offend∣ing, when on••ly self-defence is intended, because we have not that dominion over life and death. And therefore as a man is his bro∣thers murther••r, who, with froward Cain, will not be his brothers keeper, and may preserve his brothers life, without losse of his owne life, when his brother is unjustly preserved; so when he may pre∣serve his owne life, and doth not that which Natures Law alloweth h••m to doe, rather to kill ere he be killed, he is guilty of self-mur∣ther; because he is deficient in the duty of lawfull self-defence. But I grant to offend or kill is not of the nature of defensive warre, but accidentall ther••unto, and yet killing of cut-throats sent forth by the illegal commandement of the King may be intended, as a mean and a lawfull mean of self-defence. 2. Of two ills of punishment, we have a comparative dominion over our selves, a man may cast his goods in the sea to redeeme his life. So for to redeeme peace, we may suffer buffets, but because death is the greatest ill of punish∣ment, God hath not made it eligible to us, when lawfull self defence is at hand; But in defending our own life against Tyrannicall power, though we do it by offending and killing, we resist no ordi∣nance of God, onely I judge killing of the King in self-defence not lawfull, because self-defence must be national, on just causes. Let here the reader judge, Barcley l. 3. c. 8. pag. 159. con. Monar. If the King (saith he) shall vex the Common-wealth or one part thereof, with great and intollerable cruelty; what shall the people do? they have

(saith he) in that case a power to resist and defend themselves from injury, but onely to defend themselves, not to invade the Prince,* 1.622 nor to resist the injury, or to recede from reverence due to the Prince. I an∣swer 1. Let Barclay or the prelate (if he may carry Barclayes books) or any, difference these two, the people may resist a Tyrant, but they may not resist the injuries inflicted by a Tyrants officers & cut-throats. I cannot imagine how to conciliate these two: for to resist the cruelty of a King, is but to hold off the injurie by resistance. 2. If this Nero waste the Common-wealth unsufferably with his cruelty, and re∣maine a lawful King, to be honoured as a King, who may resist him, according to Royalists way? but from Rom. 13. they resist the Ordi∣nance of God. 3. Resisting is not a meere suffering, nor is it a mo∣rall resisting by alledging l••wes to be broken by him. We had ne∣ver a question with Royalists about such resisting. 2. Nor is this resisting non-obedience to unjust commandements; that resisting was never yet in question, by any, except the Papists, who in good ••arnest, by consequent, say, It is better to obey men, then God. 3. It is then resisting by bodily violence; but if the King have such an absolute power given him by God, as Royalists fancie from Rom. 13.1, 2. 1 Sam. 8▪9, 11. I know not how Sujects have any power gi∣ven them of God, to resist the power from God, and Gods Ordi∣nance. And if this resisting extend not it selfe to defensive wars,* 1.623 how shall the people defend themselves from injuries and the grea∣test injuries imaginable, from an Armie of Cut-throats and Idola∣ters in war comming to destroy Religion, set up Idolatry, and root out the name of Gods people, and lay waste the mountaine of the Lords house? And if they may defend themselves by defensive wars, how can wars be without offending? 3. The law of Nature teacheth to repell violence with violence, when one man is oppres∣sed, no lesse then when the Common-wealth is oppressed. Barclay should have given either Scripture, or the law of Nature for his warrant here. 4. Let us suppose a King can be perjured, how are the Estates of the Kingdome, who are his Subjects, by Barclays way, not to challenge such a Tyrant of his perjurie? He did swear, he should be meek and clement, and he is now become a furious Lyon, shall the flock of God be committed to the keeping of a fu∣rious Lyon?

D. Ferne, p. 3. sect. 2. pag. 9. addeth, Personall defence is lawfull against sudden and illegall invasion, such as Elisha practiced, even if it

were against the Prince to ward blowes, and to hold the Princes hand, but not to returne blowes,* 1.624 but generall resistance by Armes, cannot be without many unjust violences, and doth immediatelie strike at the order, which is the life of the Common-wealth.

Answ. If it be naturall to one man to defend himself against the personall invasion of a Prince, then is it naturall and warrantable to ten thousand, and to a whole Kingdome; and what reason to de∣fraud a Kingdome of the benefit of self-defence, more then one man? Neither grace nor policy destroyeth nature: and how shall ten or twenty thousand be defended against Cannons and Musquets that killeth afar off, except they keepe Townes against the King, which D. Ferne and others say had beene treason in David, if he had kept Keilah against King Saul, except they be armed to offend, with weapons of the like nature to kill rather then be killed, as the Law of nature teacheth. 3. To hold the hands of the Prince is no lesse resisting vi••lence, then to cut the lap of his garment, which Royalists think unlawfull, and is an opposing of externall force to the Kings person.* 1.625 4. It is true, warres meerely defensive cannot be but they must be off••nsive, but they are offensive by accident, and in∣tended for meere defence, and they cannot be without warres sin∣fully offensive, nor can any warres be in rerum naturâ now, (I ex∣cept the warres commanded by God, who onely must have beene sinfull in the manner of doing) but some innocent must be killed; but warres cannot for that be condemned. 5. Neither are offen∣sive warres against these who are no powers and no ordinances of God, such as are cut-throate Irish, condemned Prelates and Pa∣pists now in Armes, more destructive to the order established by God, then acts of lawfull war are, or the punishing of robbers; and by all this Protestants in Scotland and England, should remaine in their houses unarmed, while the Papists and Irish come on them armed and cut their throats, and spoyle and plunder at will.

* 1.626Nor can we think that resistance to a King in holding his hands can be naturall, if he be stronger, it is not a naturall meane of selfe-preservation: Nature hath appoynted innocent and offending vio∣lence, against unjust violence, as a meanes of selfe-preservation. Goliahs sword is no naturall meanes to hold Sauls hands, for a sword hath no fingers; and if Saul, 1. suddainly, 2. without colour of Law or reason, 3. inevitably should make personall invasion on David to kill him; Dr. Ferne saith he may resist, but resisting is es∣sentially

a reaction of violence; shew us Scripture or reason for vio∣lent holding a Kings hands in an unjust personall invasion, without any other reaction of offence: Walter Torrils killed King W. Ru∣fus, as he was shooting at a Deere; the Earle of Suffolk killed Henrie the 8. at Tilting; there is no treasonable intention here, and so no homicide: Defensive wars are offensive, ex eventu & effectu, not ex causa, or ex intentione.

But it may be asked, if no passive subjection at all be comman∣ded as due to Superiours? Rom. 13. Answ. None properly so cal∣led, that is, purely passive, onely we are for feare of the sword to doe our duety. 2. We are to suffer ill of punishment of Tyrants, ex hypothesi, that they inflict that ill on us, some other way, and in some other notion then we are to suffer ill of equals, for we are to suffer of equals not for any paternall authority that they have over us, as certainly wee are to suffer ill inflicted by Superiours. I de∣mand of Royalists, if Tyrants inflicting evill of punishment upon Subjects unjustly, be powers ordained of God. 2. If to resist a pow∣er in Tyrannicall acts be to resist God. 3. Since wee are not to yi••ld active obedience to all the commandements of Superiours, whether they be good, or ill, by vertue of this place, Rom. 13. how is it that we may not deny passive subjection to all the Acts of vio∣lence exercised whether of injustice, whether in these Acts of vio∣lence, wherein the Prince in actu ex cito, and formally punisheth not in Gods stead, or in these wherein he punish••th Tyrannically in no formall or actuall subordination to God we owe passive sub∣jection: I desire an answer to these.

Assert. 5. Flying from the tyranny of abused Authority,* 1.627 is a plaine resisting of Rulers in their unlawfull oppression and pervert∣ing of judgement.

All Royalists grant it lawfull, and ground it upon the Law of Na∣ture, that those that are persecuted by tyrannous Princes may flee, and it is evident from Christs Commandment, If they persecute you in one City, flee to another, Mat. 10.23. and by Mat. 23.34. Christ fled from the fury of the Jewes, till his houre was come; Elias, Vriah, Ier. 26.20. Ioseph and Mary fled; the Martyres did hide themselves in caves and dens of the earth, Heb. 11.37, 38. Paul was let downe through a window in a basket at Damascus; this certain∣ly is resistance: For looke what legall power God hath given to a tyrannous Ruler, remaining a power ordained of God, to summon

legally, and set before his tribunall the servants of God, that he may kill them and murther them unjustly, that same legall power he hath to murther them: For if it be a legall power to kill the inno∣cent, and such a power as they are obliged in conscience to submit unto, they are obliged in conscience to submit to the legall power of citing; for it is one and the same power: Now if resistance to the one power be unlawfull, resistance to the other must be unlaw∣full also, and if the law of self-defence, or command of Christ war∣••ant me to disobey a tyrannous power, commanding me to compei•• to receive the sentence of death, that same Law farre more shall warrant me to resist and deny passive subjection, in submitting to the un-unj••st sentence of death. 2. When a murtherer self-convi∣cted sleeth from the just power of a Judge lawfully citing him, he resisteth the just power ordained of God. Rom. 3. Ergo, by the same ••eason if we flee from a tyrannous power, we resist that tyrannous power, and so by Royalists ground we resist the ordinance of God by flying. Now to be disobedient to a just power summoning a ma∣••••factor, is to hinder that lawfull power, to be put forth in lawfull Acts, for the Judge cannot purge the land of blood, if the murtherer slee. 3. When the King of Israel sendeth a Captaine, and fifty ••ictors to f••tch Elisha, these come instructed with legall power from the King, if I may lay fetters on their power by flight upon the ground of self-preservation, the same warrant shall allow me to oppose harmelesse violence, for my owne safety. 4. Royalists hold it unlawfull to keepe a strong hold against the King, though the Fort be not the Kings house; and though that David should not have offended, if he had kept Keilah against Saul, Dr. Ferne and Royalists say, it had beene unlawfull resistance. What more re∣sistance is made to Royall power by wals interposed, then by Seas and miles of earth interposed? Both are physicall resistance, and vi∣olent in their kinde.

QUEST. XXXI. Whether or no self-defence against any unjust violence offered to the life, be warranted by Gods Law, and the Law of Nature and Na∣tions?

SElfe-preservation in all creatures in which is nature, is in the creatures sutable to their nature: The Bull defendeth it selfe by its hornes,* 1.628 the Eagle by her clawes and bill, it will not follow

that a Lambe will defend it selfe against a Wolfe any other way, then by flying. So men, and Christian men doe naturally defend themselves; but the manner of self-defence in a rationall creature, is rationall, and not alwayes meerely naturall: therefore a politique communitie, being a combination of many natures, as neither grace, farre lesse can policy destroy nature, then must these many natures be allowed of God to use a naturall self-defence. If the King bring in an Army of forraigners, then a politique community must defend it selfe in a rationall way; Why? Self-defence is na∣turall to Man, and ••a••urall to a Lamb, but not the same way; A Lamb or a Dove naturally defend themselves against beasts of ano∣ther kinde, onely by flight, not by re-action and re-offending: But it followeth not that a man defendeth himselfe from his enemy on∣ly by flight; If a robber invade me, to take away my life and my purse, I may defend my s••lfe by re-action; for reason and grace both may determine the way of self-preservation: Hence Royalists say, a private man against his Prince, hath no way to defend himselfe, but by flight; Ergo, a community hath no other way to defend thems••lv••s, but by flight. 1. The antecedent is false.* 1.629 Dr. Ferne al∣loweth to a private man supplications, and denying of Subsidies, and Tribute to the Prince, when he imployeth Tribute to the de∣struction of the Common-wealth; which by the way, is a cleere resistance, and an active resistance made against the King, Rom. 13.6, 7. and against a Commandement of God, except Royalists grant tyrannous powers may be resisted. 2. The consequence is naught, for a private man may defend himselfe against unjust violence, but not any way he pleaseth; The first way is by supplications and a∣pologies, he may not presently use violence to the Kings servants before he supplicate, nor may he use re-offending, if flight may save. David used all the three in order;* 1.630 1. He made his defence by words, by the mediation of Ionathan; when that prevailed not, he tooke himselfe to flight, as the next; but because he knew flight was not safe every way, and nature taught him self-preservation, and reason and light of grace taught him the meanes, and the religi∣ous order of these meanes for self-preservation. Therefore he addeth a third, He took Goliahs sword, and gathered six hundred armed men, and after that made use of an hoast. Now a sword and armour are not horsing and shipping for flight, but contrary to flight; so re-of∣fending, is Policies last refuge. A godly magistrate taketh not away

the life of a subject, if other means can compasse the end of the Law; and so he is compelled and necessitated to take away the life:* 1.631 so the private man, in his naturall self-defence, not to use re-action, or violent re-offending, in his self-defence against any man, farre lesse against the servants of a King, but in the exigence of the last and most inexorable necessity.* 1.632 And it is true that M. Symmons saith, Sect. 11. pag. 35. Self-defence is not to be used, where it cannot be with∣out sinne. It is certaine, Necessity is but a hungry plea for sinne, Luke 14.18. but it is also true, re-offending comparatively, that I kill rather then I be killed,* 1.633 in the sinlesse Court of Natures spotlesse and harmelesse necessity, is lawfull and necessary, except I be guil∣ty of self-murd••r, in the culpable omission of s••lf-defence. Now a private man may flie, and that is his second necessity, and viol••nt re-offending is the third meane of self-preservation. But with leave, violent re-offending is necessary to a private man, when his second meane, to wit, flight, is not possible, and cannot attaine the end, as in the case of David: if flight doe not prevaile, Goliahs sword and an host of armed men are lawfull: So to a Church and a community of Protestants, men, women, aged, sucking children, sick, and dis∣eased, who are pressed either to be killed, or forsake Religion and Jesus Christ, flight is not the second meane, nor a meane at all be∣cause 1. not possible, and therefore not a naturall meane of preser∣vation: For 1. the aged, the sick, the sucking infants, and sound Religion in the posteritie cannot flee,* 1.634 flight here is physically and by natures necessity unpossible, and therefore no lawfull mean. What is to nature physically unpossible, is no lawfull mean. 2. If Christ have a promise that the ends of the earth, Psal. 2.8. and the Isles shall be his possession, Esa. 49.1. I see not how naturall de∣fence can put us to flee, even all Protestants, and their seed, and the weak and sick, whom we are obliged to defend as our selves, both by the Law of nature and grace. I read that seven wicked nations and idolatrous were cast out of their land to give place to the Church of God,to dwell there, but shew me a warrant in natures Law and in Gods word that three Kingdomes of Protestants, their seed, aged, sick, sucking children, should flee out of England, Scotland, Ireland, and leave Religion and the Land to a King and to Papists, Prelates and bloody Irish, and Atheists: and therefore to a Church and community having Gods right and mans law to the land, violent re-offending is their second mean (next to supplications and decla∣rations,

&c.) and flight is not required of them, as of a private man. Yea flight is not necessarily required of a private man, but where it is a possible mean of self-preservation, violent and unjust invasi∣on of a private man, which is unavoidable may be obviated with violent re-offending. Now the unjust invasion made on Scotland in 1640. for refusing the Service-book, or rather the idolatry of the Masse, therein intended, was unavoidable, it was unpossible for the Protestants, their old and sick, their women and sucking children to flee over sea, or to have ship∣ping betwixt the Kings bringing an army on them at Duns-law, and the Prelates charging of the Ministers to receive the masse-book; Althusius saith well, Pol. c. 38. n. 78. Though private men may flee; but the estates if they flee, they do not their duty to com∣mit a country, religion and all to a Lion. L••t not any object, we may not devise a way to fulfill the prophecy, Psal. 2.8, 9. Isa. 49.1. it is true, if the way be our own sinfull way; nor let any object, a Colony went to New-England and fled the persecution. Answer, True, but if fleeing be the onely mean after supplication, there was no more reason that one Colony should go to New-England, then it is necessary & by a divine law obligatory, that the whole Protestants in the three kingdomes according to Royalists Doctrine, are to leave th••ir native country, & religion to one man & to popish Idolators & Atheists willing to worship idols with them, and whethere then shall the Gospel be, which we are obliged to defend with our lives?

2. There is Tutela vitae proxima, & remota.* 1.635 A meer and imme∣diat defence of our life, and a remote or mediat defence; when there is no actuall invasion made by a man seeking our life, we are not to use violent re-offending. David might have killed Saul, when he was sleeping, and when he cut off the lap of his garment, but it was unlawfull for him to kill the Lords Anointed, because he is the Lords Annoited, as it is unlawfull to kill a man, because he is the I∣mage of God, Gen. 9 6. except in case of necessity; The magistrate in case of necessity may kill the malefector, thought his malefices do not put him in that case, that he hath not now the image of God;* 1.636 now prudency and light of grace determineth, When we are to use violent re-offending for self-preservation, it is not left to our pleasure. In a remote posture of self-defence, we are not to use vio∣let re-offending, David having Saul in his hand was in a remote posture of defence, the unjust invasion then was not actuall, not ina∣voidable,

not a necess••ry mean in human prudence for self-preserva∣tion, for King Saul was then in a habituall, not in an actuall pursuit of the whole Princes, Elders and judges of Israel, or of a whole community and Church; Saul did but seek the life of one man, David, and that not for religion, or a nationall pretended offence, and therefore he could not in conscience put hands on the Lords a∣noynted; but if Saul had actually invaded David for his life, David might in that case make use of Goliahs sword, (for he took not that weapon with him as a Cypher to boast Saul, it is no lesse un∣lawfull to thr••atten a King then to put hands on him) and rather kill or be killed by Sauls emissaries: Because then he should have been in an immediate and nearest posture of actuall self-defence. Now the case is farre otherwayes between the King, and the two Parliaments of England, and Scotland, for the King is not 1. Sleep∣ing in his emissari••s, for he hath armies in two kingdomes, and now in thre•• kingdomes,* 1.637 by sea and land, night and day in actuall pursuit, not of one David, but of the estates, and a Christian community in England and Scotland, and that for Religions, Lawes and Liberties, for the question is now betweene Papist and Protestant, between Arbitr••ry or Tyranicall government, and law-government, and Therefore by both the Lawes of the politique societies of both Kingdomes, and by the Law of God and nature, we are to use violent re-off••nding for s••lf-preservation, and put to this necessity when armies are in actuall pursuit of all the Protestant Churches of the suff••r ••awes, and Religion to be undone. But saith the Royalist, Davids argument, God forbid that I stretch out my hand against the Lords Anno••nted, my Master the King, concludeth universally, that the King in his most Tyrannous acts, still remaining the Lords A∣noynted, cannot be resisted. Ans. 1. David speaketh of stretching out his ha••d against the person of King Saul: no man in the three Kingdomes, did so much as attempt to do violence to the Kings person.* 1.638 But this argument 2. is inconsequent, for a King invading in his own Royall person, the innocent subject, 1. Suddainly. 2. Without col••ur of Law and reason. 3. Unavoidably, may be personally resist••d, and that with opposing a violence bodily, yet in that invasion he remaineth the Lords Annoynted. 2. By this argu∣ment the life of a murtherer cannot be taken away by a Judge, for he r••maineth one endued with Gods image, and keepeth stil the nature

of a man under all the murthers that he doth, but it followeth no wayes, that because God hath indowed his person with a sort of Royalty, of a Divine image, that his life cannot be taken; and cer∣tainly, if to be a man endued with Gods image, Gen. 6.9, 10. and to bee an ill doer worthy of evill punishment are different; to be a King, and an ill doer may be distinguished.

The grounds of self-defence are these; A woman or a young man may violently oppose a King, if he force the one to adultery and in∣cest, and the other to Sodomy; Though Court-flatterers should say, the King in regard of his absolutenesse is Lord of life and death; yet no man ever said, that the King is Lord of chastity, faith, and oath that the wife hath made to her husband.

2. Particular nature yeelds to the good of universall nature,* 1.639 for which cause heavie bodies ascend, aerie and light bodies descend; If then a wilde Bull or a goaring Oxe, may not be let loose, in a great market-confluence of people; and if any man turne so distra∣cted, as he smite himselfe with stones and kill all that passe by him, or come at him; in that case the man is to be bound, and his hands fettered, and all whom he invadeth may resist him, were they his owne sons, and may save their owne lives with weapons; much more a King turning a Nero: King Saul vexed with an evill spirit from the Lord, may be resisted; and fa••re more if a King indued with use of reason, shall put violent hands on all his subjects, kill his son and heire; yea, any violently invaded, by natures law, may de∣fend themselves, and the violent restraining of such an one is but the hurting of one man, who cannot be virtually the Common-wealth; but his destroying of the community of men sent out in warres, as his bloody emissaries, to the dissolution of the Common-wealth.

3. The cutting off of a contagious member, that by a Gangrene, would corrupt the whole body, is well warranted by nature, be∣cause the safety of the whole is to be preferred to the safety of a part: Nor is it much that Royalists say the King being the head, de∣stroy him, & the whole body the Common-wealth is dissolved; as cut off a mans head, & the life of the whole man is taken away; Because, 1. God cutteth off the spirits of tyrannous Kings, and yet the Common-wealth is not dissolved,* 1.640 no more then when a Leopard or a wilde Boare, running through children is killed, it can be the destruction of all the children in the land. 2. A king indefinitely is referred to the Common-wealth as an adequat head to a Monarchicall King∣dome,

and remove all Kings and the politique body as Monarchi∣call, in its frame, is not Monarchicall, but it leaveth not off to be a politique body, seeing it hath other Judges, but the naturall body without the head cannot live. 2. This or that tyrannous King, be∣ing a transient mortall thing, cannnot be referred to the immortall Common-wealth, as it is adequat correlate. They say, the King never dieth, yet this King can dye; an immortall politique body, such as the Common-wealth, must have an immortall head, and that is a King as a King; not this or that man, possibly a tyrant, who is for the time (and eternall things abstract from time) onely a King.

4. The reason of Fortunius Garcias a skilfull Lawyer in Spaine is consid••rable, Coment. in l. ut vim vi ff. de justit. & jure. God hath impl••nted in every creature naturall inclinations, and motions to preserve it selfe, and we are to love our self for God, and have a love to preserve our selves rather then our neighbour, and Natures law teacheth every man to love God best of all, and next our selves more then our neighbour; for the Law saith, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe; then (saith Malderus com. in 12. q. 26. tom. 2. c. 10. concl. 2.) The love of our selfe, is the measure of the love of our neigh∣bour. But the rule and the measure is more perfect, simple, and more principall then the thing that is measured: It is true, I am to love the salvation of the Church, it comming neerer to Gods glory, more then my owne salvation,* 1.641 as the wishes of Moses and Paul do prove; and I am to love the salvation of my brother, more then my owne temporall life; but I am to love my owne temporall life, more then the life of any other, and therefore I am rather to kill,* 1.642 then to be killed, the exigence of necessity so requiring; Na∣ture without sin aimeth this as a truth, in the case of losse of life; Proximus sum egomet mihi. Ephes. 5.28, 29. He that loveth his wife, loveth himselfe; for no man ever yet hated his owne flesh, but nourisheth it, and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church. As then nature ty∣eth the dam to defend the young birds, and the Lyon her whelps, and the husband the wife,* 1.643 and that by a comparative re-offending, rather then the wife or children should be killed; yea, hee that is wanting to his brother, (if a robber unjustly invade his brother) and helpeth him not, is a murtherer of his brother so farre, Gods spirituall law requiring both conservation of it in our person, and preservation in others. The forced Damsell was commanded to

cry for help, and not the Magistrate onely, but the neerest private man or woman was to come, by an obligation of a divine Law of the seventh Commandement, to rescue the Damsell with violence; even as a man is to save his enemies Oxe or his Asse out of a pit: And if a private man may inflict bodily punishment of two de∣grees, to preserve the life and chastity of his neighbour, far rather then suffer his life and chastity to be taken away, then he may inflict violence of foure degrees even to killing, for his life, and much more for his owne life. So when a Robber, with deadly weapons invadeth an innocent traveller to kill him, for his goods, upon the supposition that if the Robber be not killed, the innocent shall be killed; Now the question is, which of the two, by Gods morall Law and revealed will in point of conscience, ought to be killed by his fellow; for we speake not now of Gods eternall decree of permitting evill, according to the which murtherers may crucifie the innocent Lord of glory: by no morall Law of God, should the u••just robber kill the innocent traveller, therefore in this exigence of providence, the traveller should rather kill the robber. If any say, by Gods morall Law not one should kill his fellow; and it is a sin against the morall Law in either to kill other; I answer: If a third shall come in when the robber and the innocent are invading each other for his life, all acknowledge by the sixt Commande∣ment, the third may cut off the robbers arme to save the innocent; but by what Law of God he may cut off his arme, he may take his life also to save the other; for it is murther to wound unjustly, and to dismember a man by private authority, as it is to take away his life: If therefore the third may take away the robbers member, then also his life, so hee doe it without malice or appetite of re∣venge, and if he may doe it out of this principle, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe; because a man is obliged more to love his owne flesh, then his neighbours, Ephes. 5.28. and so more to defend himselfe, then to defend his neighbour,* 1.644 then may he oppose violence to the robber; As two men drowning in a water, the one is not obliged by Gods Law, to expose himselfe to drowning to save his neighbour; but by the contrary, hee is obliged rather to save himselfe, though it were with the losse of his neighbours life: As in war, if souldiers in a strait passage be pursued on their life, nature teacheth them to flee; if one fall, his fellow in that exigence is not onely not obliged to lift him up, but he and the rest flying,

though they trample on him and kill him, they are not guilty of murther, seeing they hated him not before. Deut. 19.4.6. so Chem∣nit. loc. com. de vindic. q. 3. alloweth private defence. 1. When the violence is suddaine, And the 2. Violence manifestly inevitable. 3. When the Magistrate is absent and cannot help. 4. When modera∣tion is kept as Lawyers require. 1. That it be done incontinent, if it be done after the injury, it is revenge, not defence. 2. Not of Desire of revenge. 3. With proportion of armor. If the violent invader in∣vade not with deadly weapons, you must not invade him with dead∣ly weapons, and certainly the law, Exod. 22. of a mans defending his house is clear. 1. If he come in the night, it is presumed he is a robber. 2. If he be taken with a weapon breaking the house, he cometh to kill, a man may defend himself, wife, and children, but he is 3. but to wound him, and if he die of the wound, the defender is free, so the defender is not to intend his death, but to save himself.

5. It were a mighty defect in providence to man, if dogs by nature may defend themselves against Wolves,* 1.645 Bulls against Lyons, Doves, against Haukes, if man in the absence of the lawfull Magi∣strate, should not defend himself against unjust violence, but one man might raise armies of Papists sick for blood to destroy innocent men. They object, When the King is present in his person, and his invaders, he is not absent, and so though you may rather kill a private man, then suffer your self to be killed, yet, because prudence determineth the means of self-defence, you are to expose your life to hazard for justice of your King, and therefore not to do violence to the life of your King, nor can the body in any self-defence, fight against the head, that must be the destruction of the whole. Ans. Though the King be present as an unjust invader in Warres against his innocent subjects, he is absent as a King, and a father and defender, and present as an unjust grassa∣tor, and therefore the innocent may defend themselves, when the King neither can, nor will defend him. Nature maketh a man (saith the law. l. Gener. c. de decur. l. 10. l. si alius. ••. Bellissimè ubique Gloss. in vers. ex magn. not. per. il••um. text. ff. quod vi aut clam. l. ait praetor. §. si debitorem nicum. ff. de hisque in fraud. credito.) even a privat man his own judge, magistrate and defender, quando co∣piam judicis, qui sibi jus reddat, non habet. When he hath no judge, to give him justice and law. 2. The subjects are to give their lives, for the King, as the King▪ because the safety of the King as King is the safety of the common-wealth. But the King as offering unjust

violence to his innocent subjects is not King. Zoannet. part. 3. defens. n. 44. transgrediens notoriè officium suum judex, agit velut privatus aliquis, non ut magistratus. ff. de injur. est bonus in simili in. l. qui fun∣dum. §. si. tutor. ff. pro emptore. 3. If the politick body fight a∣gainst this head in particular, not as head, but as an oppressor of the people. There is no fear of dissolution, if the body rise against all magistracy, as magistracy and lawes: dissolution of all must follow, Parliaments and inferiour judges are heads. Num. 1.16. Num. 10.4. Deut. 1.15. Iosh. 22.21. Mic. 3.1. ver. 9.11. 1 King. 8.1. 1 Chron. 5.25. 2 Chro. 5.2. No lesse then the King, and it is unlaw∣full to offer violence to them, though I shall rather thinke a private man is to suffer the King to kill him, rather then he kill the King; because he is to preferre the life of a private man, to the life of a publique man.

6. By the law of nature a ruler is appointed to defend the inno∣cent. Now by nature an infant in the wombe d••fendeth it self first, before the parents can defend it, then when parents and magistrates are not, (and violent invading magistrates are not in that magi∣strates) nature hath commended every man to self-def••nce.

7. The Law of nature excepteth no violence, whether inflicted by a magistrate, or any other unjust violence from a ruler is twice injustice. 1. He doth unjustly as a man. 2. As a member of the common-wealth. 3. He committeth a speciall kind of sin of in∣justice, against his office, but it is absurd to say we may lawfully de∣fend our selves from smaller injuries, by the law of nature; and not from the greater. If the Pope (saith Fer. Vasquez. illust. quest. l. 1. c. 24. n. 24, 25.) command to take away benefices from the just owner, these who are to execute his commandement, are not to obey, but to write back that that mandat came not from his holinesse, but from the ava∣rice of his Officers; but if the Pope still continue and presse the same unjust Mandat, the same should be written againe to him: and though there be none above the Pope, yet there is naturall self-defence patent for all. Defensio vitae nece aria est, & à jure naturali profluit: L. ut vim. ff. de just. & jure 16. Nam quod quisque ob tutelam corporis sui fecerit, jure fecisse videatur. C. jus naturale. 1. distinc. l. 1. ff. de vi & vi armata. l. injuriarum. ff. de injuria. C. significa∣sti. 2. de hom. l. scientiam. sect. qui non aliter ff. ad leg. Aquil. C. si vero 1. de sent. excom. & l. sed etsi ff. ad leg. Aquil. etiamsi se∣quatur homicidium. Vasquez. l. 1. c. 17. n. 5. etiam occidere licet ob

defensionem rerum. Vim vi repellere omnia jura permittunt in C. signisicasti. Garcias Fortunius Comment. in l. ut vim. ff. de instit. & jur. n. 3. defendere se est juris naturae & gentium. A jure civili fuit additum moderamen inculpatae tutelae. Iac. Novel. defens. n. 101. Occidens Principem vel alium Tyrannidem exercentem, à poena homi∣cidii excusatur. Grotius de jure belli & pacit▪ l. 2. c. 1. n. 3. Si corpus impetatur vi presente, cum periculo vitae non aliter vitabili, tunc bellum est licitum etiam cum interfectione periculum inferentis, ra∣tio, natura quemque sibi commendat. Barcl. advers. Monar. l. 3. c. 8. est jus cuilibet se tenendi adversus immanem sevitiam.

But what ground (saith the Royalist) is there to take Arms against a King? Ielousies and suspitions are not enough.

Ans. The King sent first an Armie to Scotland, and blocked us up by sea, before we took Armes. 2. Papists were armed in Eng∣land, they have professed themselves in their Religion of Trent to ••e so much the holyer,* 1.646 that they root out Protestants. 3. The King declared we had broken loyalty to him, since the last Parliament. 4. He d••clared both Kingdoms Rebels. 5. Attempted in his Emis∣saries to destroy the Parliament. 6. And to bring in a forraigne e∣nemie. And the Law saith, An imminent danger, which is a suffici∣ent warrant to take up Armes, is not strokes, but either the terrour of Armour, or threatning. Glossator. in d. l. 1. C. Vnde vi. ait non esse verbera expectanda, sed vel terrorem armorum sufficere, vel minas, & hoc esse imminens periculum. L. Sed & si quemcunque in princ. ff. ad leg. Aquil. l. 3. quod qui armati ff. de vi & vi armata is qui ag∣gressorem. C. ad legem C. ad legem Corneli.

In most hainous sinnes, conatus, the endeavour and aime (etiamsi effectus non sequatur, puniri debet) is punishable. Bartoln. in l. Si quis non dicam rapere.

The King hath aimed at the destruction of his Subjects, through the power of wicked counsellors, and we are to consider not the in∣tenton of the workes, but the nature and intention of the work; Papists are in armes, their religion, the Conspiracy of Trent, their conscience (if they have any) their malice against the covenant of Scotland which abjureth their Religion to the full, their ceremonies, their Prelates lead, and necessitate them to root out the name of Protestant, Religion, yea and to stab a King who is a Protestant. Nor is our King remaining a Protestant, and adhering to his oath made at his Coronation in both kingdomes, Lord of his own person,

master of himself, nor able as King to be a King over Protestant sub∣jects, if the Papists now in armes under his standard, shall prevail.

The King hath been comp••lled to go against his own oath and the Lawes which he did swear to maintaine: The Pope sendeth to his popish armies both dispensations, bulls, mandats, incouragements: The King hath made a cessation with the bloody Irish, and hath put arms in the hands of Papists. Now he being under the oath of God, tied to maintain the Protestant Religion, he hath a metaphysically subtle, pearcing faith of miracles, who beleeveth armed Papists, and Prelates shall defend Protestants, their Religion, and these who have abjured Prelats as the lawful sons of the Pope, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and as the law saith, Quilibet in dubio praesumitur bonus. L. merito praesumi. L. non omnes § à Barbaris de re milit. Charity beleeveth not ill: So Charity is not a foole to beleeve all things. So saith the Law, Semel malus, semper praesumitur malus, in eodem genere. C. semel malus de jure gentium in 6. Once wicked is alwayes wicked in that kind. Marius Salamonius I. C. in L. ut vim atque injuriam ff. de just. & jure. We are not to wait on strokes, the terrour of armour, omnium consensu, by consent of all is sufficient. n. 3. If I see (saith he) the enemy take an arrow out of the Quiver, before he bend the bow, it is lawfull to prevent him with a blow—cunctatio est periculo∣sa. The Kings comming with armed men, to demand the Five Members, into the House of Commons, is very symbolicall, and Warre was printed on that fact, he that runneth may reade. His comming to Hull with an Armie, saith not he had no errand there, but aske what it was in the clock. See Novellus that learned Vene∣tian Lawyer, in a Treatise for defence, he maketh continuatam ri∣xam, a continued upbraiding a sufficient ground of violent defence. He citeth Doctores Comniter. in L. ut vim. ff. de just. & jure. Yea he saith, Drunkennesse, defens. n. 44. Error, n. 46. Madnesse, n. 49, 50. Ignorance, n. 51, 52. Impudence, n. 54. Necessity, n. 56. Lasciviousnesse, 58. Continuall reproaches, 59. The fervour of an∣ger, 64. Threatning, 66. Feare of imminent danger, 67. Iust grief doe excuse a man from homicide, and that in these he ought to be more mildly punished, Quia obnubilatum & mancum est consilium, Reason in these being lame and clogged. Ambros. l. 1. offic. Qui non repellit injuriam à socio, cum potest, tam est in vitio, quam ille quifa∣cit. And as Nature, so the Law saith, When the losses are such as can never be repaired, as Death, Mutilation, l••sse of Chastity, Quoniam

facta infecta fieri nequeunt, things of that kinde once done, can never be undone, we are to prevent the enemy, l. Zonat. tract. defens. par. 3. l. in bello §. factae de capit. notat. Gloss. in l. si quis provocatione. If the King send an Irish Rebell to cast me over a bridge, and drowne me in a water, I am not to do nothing, while the Kings emissary first cast me over, and then in the next room I am to defend my self; but nature and the law of self-defence warranteth me (if I know certainly his ayme) to horse him first over the bridge, and then con∣sult how to defend my s••lfe at my own leasure.

Royalists object that David in his defence never invaded and per∣secuted Saul; yea, when he came upon Saul and his men sleeping, hee would not kill any; but the Scottish and Parliaments Forces not onely defend, but invade, offend, kill and plunder; and this is cleerely an of∣fensive, not a defensive warre.

* 1.647Answ. There is no defensive warre different in spece and nature from an offensive warre, if we speake physically, they differ onely in the event and intention of the heart, and it is most cleare that the affection and intention doth make one and the same action of taking away the life, either homicide, or no homicide: If a man out of ha∣tred deliberat••ly take away his brothers life, he is a murtherer cate∣nus, but if that same man had taken away that same brothers life, by th•• ••lying off o•• an Axe he••d of•• the staffe, while he was hew∣ing timber, he neither hating him before, nor intending to hurt his brother, he is no murtherer, by Gods expresse Law, Deut. 4.42. Deut. 19 4. Ioshua 20.5. 2. The cause betweene the King and the two Parliaments, and betweene Saul and David, are so different in this, as it is much for us: Royalists say, David might if he had seene of∣fending to conduce for s••lfe-preservation, have invaded Sauls men, and say they, the case was extraordinary, and bindeth not us to selfe-defence; and thus they must say; for offensive weapons, such as Go∣liahs sword, and an hoast of armed men, cannot by any rationall men be assumed (and David had the wisdome of God) but to of∣fend, if providence should so dispose; and so what was lawfull to David, is lawfull to us in self-defence, he might offend lawfully, and so may we.

2. If Saul and the Philistims ayming (as under an oath) to set up Dagon in the land of Israel, should invade David, and the Princes and Elders of Israel who made him King; and if David with an hoast of armed men, he and the Princes of Israel, should come in

that case upon Saul and the Philistims sleeping, if in that case Da∣vid might not lawfully have cut oft the Philistims, and as he de∣fended in that case Gods Church, and true Religion, if he might not then have lawfully killed (I say) the Philistims, I remit to the conscience of the Reader. Now to us Papists and Prelates under the K••n••s banner, are Philistims, introducing the Idolatry of Bread-worship and Popery, as hatefull to God, as Dagon-worship.

3. Saul intended no arbitrary government, nor to make Israel a conquered people, nor yet to cut off all that professed the true worship of God; nor came Saul against these Princes, Elders and people who made him King, only Davids head would have made Saul lay downe Arms; but Prelates, and Papists, and Malignants under the King, int••nd to make the Kings sole will a Law, to de∣stroy the Court of Parliament, which putteth Lawes in execution against their Idolatry; and their ayme is that Protestants be a con∣quered people, and their attempt hath been hitherto to blow up King and Parliament, to cut off all Protestants, and they are in Armes in divers parts of the Kingdome, against the Princes of the Land, who are no lesse Judges and deputies of the Lord, then the King himselfe; and would kill, and do kill, plunder and spoyle us, if we kill not them. And the case is every way now betweene Armies and Armies, as betweene a single man unjustly invaded for his life, and an unjust invader: neither in a naturall action, such as is self-defence, is that of policy to be urged; none can be Judge in his owne cause, when oppression is manifest;* 1.648 one may be both agent and patient, as the fire and water conflicting; there is no need of a judge, a community casts not off nature; when the judge is want∣ing, nature is judge, actor, accused and all.

Lastly, no man is Lord of his owne members, of his body, m. l. liber homo ff. ad leg. Aqui. nor Lord of his owne life, but is to be accoun∣table to God for it.

QUEST. XXXII. Whether or no the lawfulnesse of defensive warres hath its warrant in Gods word, from the example of David, Elisha, the eighty Priests who resisted Uzziah, &c?

* 1.649DAvid defended himselfe against King Saul, 1. by taking Go∣liahs sword with him, 2. by being Captaine to six hundred men, yea, it is more then cleare, 1 Chron. 12. that there came to David a hoast like the hoast of God, v. 22. to help against Saul, ex∣ceeding foure thousand, v. 36. Now that this hoast came warran∣tably to help him against Saul, I prove, 1. because it is said, ver. 1. Now these are they that came to David to Ziglag, while he kept him∣selfe close, because of Saul the son of Kish; and they were amongst the mighty men, helpers of the warre: and then so many mighty Captains are rec••o••ed out, v. 16. There came of the children of Benjamin and Iudah to the hold of David, v. 19. And there fell some of Manasseh to David. 20. As he went to Ziglag there fell to him of Manasseh; Ke∣n••h, and Jozabad, Jediel and Michael, and Jozabad, and Elihu, and Zilthai Captaines of the thousands that were of Manasseh. 21. And they helped David against the band (of the rovers.) 22. At that time day by day there came to David, untill it was a great hoast, like the hoast of God. Now the same expression that is ver. 1. where it is said, they came to help David against Saul, which ver. 1. is repeated, ver. 16. ver. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23. 2. That they warrantably came, is evident; because, 1. the Spirit of God commendeth them for their valor and skill in war, ver. 2. ver. 8. ver. 15. ver. 21. which the Spi∣rit of ••od doth not in unlawfull wars. 2. Because Amasai, v. 18. The Spirit of the Lord comming on him, saith, Thine are we, David, and on thy side, thou son of Jesse; peace, peace unto thee, and peace to thy helpers, for thy God helpeth thee. The Spirit of God inspireth no man to pray peace, to those who are in an unlawfull warre. 3. That they came to Davids side onely to be sufferers, and to flee with Da∣vid, and not to pursue and offend, is ridiculous. 1. It is said, ver. 1. They came to David to Ziglag, while he kept himselfe close, because of Saul the son of Kish. And they were amongst the mighty men, helpers of the warre. It is a scorne to say, that their might, and their help∣ing in warre, consisted in being meere patients with David, and such as fled from Saul: for they had beene on Sauls side before; and to come with armour to flee, is a mocking of the word of God. 2. It

is cleare, the scope of the Spirit of God is to shew how God help∣ed his innocent servant David against his persecuting Prince and Master King Saul, in moving so many mighty men of warre to come in such multitudes, all in Armes, to help him in warre. Now to what end would the Lord commend them, as fit for Warre, men of might, fit to handle shield & buckler, whose faces are as the faces of Lyons, as swift as the Roes on the Mountaines, ver. 8. and commend them as helpers of David, if it were unlawfull for David, and all those mighty men, to carry Armes to pursue Saul and his follow∣ers, and to doe nothing with their armour but flee? Judge if the Spirit of God in reason could say, All these men came armed with bowes, ver. 2. and could handle both the right hand and the left in slinging stones, and shooting of arrowes, and that ver. 22. all these came to David, being mighty men of valour, and they came as Captains over hundreds and thousands, & they put to slight all them of the valleyes, both toward the East, and toward the West, ver. 14, 15. and that Da∣vid received them, and made them Captains of the band, if they did not come in a posture of warre, and for hostile invasion, if need were? For if they came on••ly to suffer and to flee, not to pursue, Bowes, Captaines, and Captaines of Bands made by David and Davids helpers in the warre, came not to help David by ••lying, that was a hurt to David, not a help. It is true, M. Symmons saith, 1 Sam. 22.2. Those that came out to David, strengthened him,* 1.650 but he strengthened not them; and David might easily have revenged him∣selfe on the Ziphites, who did good will to betray him to the hands of Saul, if his conscience had served him.

Answ. 1. This would inferre that these armed men came to help David against his conscience, and that David was a patient in the businesse, the contrary is in the Text, 1 Sam. 26.2. David became a Captaine over them: and 1 Chron. 12.17. If ye come peaceably to help me, my heart shall be knit to you. ver. 18. Then David received them, and made them Captains of the band. 2. David might have revenged himselfe upon the Ziphites: True, but that Conscience hindred him, cannot be proved. To pursue an enemie is an act of a Councell of Warre; and he saw it would create more enemies, not help his Cause. 3. To David to kill Saul sleeping, and the people who out of a mis-informed conscienc•• came out, many of them to help their lawfull Prince against a Traitor (as was supposed) see∣king to kill their King, and to usurp the throne, had not been wis∣dome

nor justice, because to kill the enemie in a just self-defence, must be, when the enemie actually doth invade, and the life of the defendant cannot be otherwise saved. A sleeping enemie is not in the act of unjust pursuit of the innocent; but if an Armie of Papists, Philistims were in the fields sleeping, pursuing not one single Da∣vid onely for a supposed personall wrong to the King, but lying in the fields and campe against the whole Kingdome and Religion, & labouring to introduce arbitrary Government,* 1.651 Popery, Idolatry, and to destroy Lawes and Liberties, and Parliaments, then David were obliged to kill these murtherers in their sleep.

If any say, The case is all one in a naturall self-defence, what ever be the cause, and who ever be the enemy, because the self-defender is not to offend▪ except the unjust Invader be in actuall pursuit, now Armies in their sleep are not in actuall pursuit.

Answ. Wh••n one man with a multitude invadeth one man, that one man may pursue, as he seeth most conducible for self-defence. Now the Law saith, Threatnings and terror of Armour maketh im∣minent danger, and the case of pursuit in self-defence lawfull; i•• therefore an Armie of Irish Rebels and Spanyards were sleeping in their Camp, and our King in a deep sleep in the midst of them, and these R••b••ls actually in the Camp besieging the Parliament, and the Citie of London, most unjustly to take away Parliament, Laws, and Liberties of Religion, it should follow that Generall Essex ought not to kill the Kings Majesty in his sleep, for he is the Lords Anointed, but 1. will it follow that Generall Essex may not kill the Irish Rebels sleeping about the King? and that he may not re∣scue the Kings Person out of the hands of the Papists and Rebels, ensnaring the King, and leading him on to Popery, and to employ his Authority to defend Popery, and trample upon Protestant Par∣liaments, and Lawes? Certainly from this example this cannot be concluded. For Armies in actuall pursuit of a whole Parliament, Kingdome, Lawes, and Religion, (though sleeping in the Camp) because in actuall pursuit, may be invaded, and killed, though slee∣ping. And David useth no argument from conscience, why hee might not kill Sauls Armie, (I conceive he had not Armes to doe that) and should have created more enemies to himselfe, and hazard his owne life, and the life of all his men, if he had of purpose killed so many sleeping men; yea the inexpedience of that, for a private wrong to kill Gods mis-led people, should have made all Israel ene∣mies

to David. But David useth an Argument from Conscience onely, to prove it was not lawfull for him to stretch forth his hand against the King; and for my part, so long as he remaineth King,* 1.652 and is not dethroned by those who made him King at Hebron, to put hands on his person, I judge utterly unlawfull: one man slee∣ping cannot be in actuall pursuit of another man; so that the self-defender may lawfully kill him in his sleep; but the case is farre o∣therwise in lawfull wars, the Israelites might lawfully kill the Phi∣listims encamping about Jerusalem to destroy it, and Religion, and the Church of God, though they were all sleeping; even though we suppose King Saul had brought them in by his Authority, & though he were sleeping in the midst of the uncircumcised Armies; and it is evident, that an hoast of armed enemies, though sleeping, by the law of self-defence may be killed, lest they awake and kill us; whereas one single man, and that a King, cannot be killed. 2. I think certainly, David had not done unwisely, but hazarded his owne life, and all his mens, if he, and Ahimelech, and Ab••shai should have killed an host of their enemies sleeping, that had been a work, as impossible to three, so hazard some to all his men.

D. Ferne, as Arnisaeus did before him, saith,* 1.653 The example of Da∣vid was extraordinary, because he was anointed and designed by God as successor to Saul, and so he must use an extraordinary way of guar∣ding himselfe. Arnisaeus citeth Alberic. Gentilis, that David was now exempted from amongst the number of Subjects.

Answ. There were not two Kings in Israel now, both David and Saul. 2. David acknowledgeth his subjection in naming Saul the Lords Anointed, & his Master, Lord & King; and therefore David was yet a subject. 3. If David would have proved his title to the Crowne by extraordinary wayes, he who killed Goliah ex∣traordinarily, might have killed Saul by a miracle; but David go∣eth a most ordinary way to work, for self-defence, and his com∣ming to the Kingdom was through persecution, want, eating shew-bread in case of necessity, defending himself with Goliahs sword. 4. How was any thing extraordinary, and above a Law, seeing Da∣vid might have killed his enemie Saul, and according to Gods Law he spared him? and hee argueth from a morall duty, he is the Lords annoynted, therefore I will not kill him? was this extraoardinary above a law? then according to Gods law he might

have killed him. Royalists cannot say so, what ground to say one of Davids acts in his deportment toward Saul was extraordinary, and not all? was it extraordinary that David fled? no: or that David con∣sulted the oracle of God, what to do when Saul was coming against him? 5. in an ordinary fact something ••ay be extraordinary, as the dead sleep from the Lord upon Saul, and his men. 1. Sam. 26. and yet the fact according to its substance ordinary. 6. Nor is this extra∣ordinary, that a distressed man, being an excellent warriour as David was, may use the help of six hundred men, who by the law of charity are to help to deliver the innocent from death; yea, all Israel were obliged to defend him, who killed Goliah. 7. Royalists make Davids act of not putting hands on the Lords annointed an ordi∣nary morall reason against resistance, but his putting on of armour, they will have extraordinary, and this 〈◊〉〈◊〉 (I confesse) a short way to an adversary to cull out something t••at is for his cause, and make it ordinary, and something that is against his cause, must be extraor∣dinary. 8. These men by the law of nature were obliged to joyne in armes with David, ergo the non-helping of an oppressed man, must be Gods ordinary law: a blasphemous tenet. 9. If David by an extraordinary spirit killed ••ot King Saul, then the Jesuits way of killing must be Gods ordinary Law.

2. David certainly intended to keep Keilah against King Saul, for the Lord would not have answered David in an unlawfull fact, for that were all one, as if God should teach David how to play the Traitor to his King; for if God had answ••red, They will not deli∣ver thee up, but they shall save thee from the hand of Saul, As David beleeved he might say this, as well as its contradicent, then David behoved to keep the city, for certainly Davids question pre-suppo∣seth he was to keep the city.

* 1.654The example of Elisha the Prophet is considerable, 2 Kings 6.32. But Elisha sate in his house, and the Elders with him: And the King sent a man before him; but ••re the messengers came to him, he said to the Elders, See now the sonn•• of a murtherer, hath sent to take away mine head. Here is unjust violence offered by King Ioram to an innocent man. Elisha keepeth the house violently against the Kings Messenger, as we did keep Castles against King Charles his unlawfull messengers. Look (saith he) when the messenger commeth, shut the doore. 2. There is violence also commanded, and resistence

to be made, Hold him fast at the doore. In the Hebrew it is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Arias Montan. Claudite ostium, & opprimetis eum in ostio: Violently presse him at the doore: And so the Chaldee Paraphrase, Ierom. Ne sinatis eum introir••. The LXX. Interpreters, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, illidite eum in ostio, Presse him betwixt the doore and the wall. It is a word of bodily vio∣lence, according to Vatablus, Yea Theodoret will have King Ioram himselfe holden at the doore. And 3. It is no Answer that D. Ferne and other Royalists give, that Elisha made no personall resistance to the King himselfe, but onely to the Kings cut-throat, sent to take away his head. Yea they say, It is lawfull to resist the Kings cut-throats. But the text is cleere, that the violent resistance is made to the King himselfe also, for he addeth, Is not the sound of his Masters feet be∣hinde him? And by this answer, it is lawfull to keep Townes with iron gates and barres, and violently to oppose the Kings cut-throats, comming to take away the heads of the Parliaments of both Kingdomes, and of Protestants in the three Kingdomes.

Some Royalists are so impudent, as to say that there was no vio∣lence here, and that Elisha was an extraordinary man, and that it is not lawfull for us to call a King the son of a murtherer, as the Pro∣phet Elisha did: but Ferne sect. 2. pag. 9. forge••ting himselfe, saith from hence, It is lawfull to resist the Prince himselfe, thus farre, as toward his blowes, and hold his hands: But let Ferne answer, if the violent binding of the Princes hands, that he shall not be able to kill, be a greater violence done to his Royall person, then Davids cut∣ting off the lap of Sauls garment; for certainly, the Royall body of a Prince is of more worth then his cloathes. Now it was a sinne, I judge, that smote Davids conscience, that he being a subject, and not in the act of naturall self-defence, did cut the garment of the Lords Annointed. Let Ferne see then how he will save his owne princi∣ples, for certainly hee yeeldeth the cause for me; I judge that the person of the King, or any Judge, who is the Lords Deputy, as is the King, is sacred, and that remaining in that honourable case, no sub∣ject can without guiltinesse before God, put hands in his person, the case of naturall self-defence being excepted: for because the Royall dignity doth not advance a King above the common con∣dition of men, and the Throne maketh him not leave off to bee a man, and a man that can do wrong; and therefore as one that doth manifest violence to the life of a man, though his subject, he may

be resisted with ••od••ly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the case of u••j••st and violent in∣vasion. It is a vaine thing to say, Who shall be judge betweene the King and his subj••cts? The ••ubject cannot judge the King, because none can be judge in his owne cause, and an inferiour or equall cannot judge a superiour or equall. But I answer, 1. This is the Kings owne cause also, and he doth unjust violence as a man, and not as a King, and so he cannot be judge more then the subject. 2. Every one that doth unjust violence as he is such, is inferiour to the inno∣cent, and so ought to be judged by some. 3. There is no need of the formality of a judge in things evident to natures eye, such as are manifestly unjust violences: Nature in acts naturall of self-defence, is judge, party, accuser, witnesse, and all; for it is supposed the Judge is absent, when the Judge doth wrong. And for the plea of Elisha's extraordinary spirit;* 1.655 it is no thing extraordinary to the Prophet to call the King the sonne of a murtherer, when hee complaineth to the Elders for justice of his oppression, no more then it is for a plaintiffe to libell a true crime against a wicked person; and if Elisha's resistance came from an extra∣ordinary spirit, then it is not naturall for an oppressed man to close the doore upon a murtherer, then the taking away of the innocent Prophets head must be extraordinary, for this was but an ordinary and most naturall remedy against this oppression; and though to name the King the sonne of a murtherer, be extraordinary, (and I should grant it without any hurt to this cause) it followeth no wayes that the self-defence was extraordinary. 3. 2. Chron. 26.17. Foure score of Priests, with Azariah are commended as va∣liant men. LXX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Arias Montan. filii virtutis, Men of courage and valour, for that they resisted Vz∣ziah the King, who would take on him to burne Incense to the Lord,* 1.656 against the Law. M. Symmons pag. 34. sect. 10. They with∣stood him not with swords and weapons, but onely by speaking, and one but spake. I answer; It was a bodily resistance: for beside that, Ierome turneth it,* 1.657 Viri fortissimi, Most valiant men; And it is a speech in the Scripture, taken for men valorous for warre; As 1 Sam. 14.25. 2 Sam. 17.10. 1 Chron. 5.18. And so doth the phrase 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Potent in valour. And the phrase, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 2 Sam. 24.9. 2 Sam. 11.16. 1 Sam. 31.12. and therefore all the 80. not onely by words, but violently expelled the King out of the Temple. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Arias Mont. & ••••••eterunt

contra a Huzzi-Iahu. the LXX. say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. They resisted the King, so Dan. 11.17. The armies of the south shall not stand. Dan. 8 25.* 1.658 It is a word of violence. 3. The text saith ver. 20. and, they thrust him out. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Ar. Mont. & fecerunt eum festinare. Hy••rony. festi∣natò expulerunt eum. The LXX. say, The Priest 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so Vatablus, they cast him out. And 4. it is said ver. 21. he was cut off from the house of the Lord. Doctor Ferne saith sect. 4. pag. 50. They are valiant men who dare withstand a King in an evil way, by a home reproofe, and by withdrawing the holy things from him, especially since by the law the leper was to be put out of the congregation.

Ans. 1. He contradicteth the text, it was not a resistance by words, for the text saith they withstood him, and they thrust him out violently. 2. He yeeldeth the cause, for to withdraw the holy things of God, by corporall violence, and violently to pull the censer out of his hand, that he should not provoke Gods wrath, by offering in∣cense to the Lord is resistance, and the like violence may, by this ex∣ample, be used, when the King useth the sword and the Militia to bring in an enemy to destroy the kingdom: it is no lesse in justice against the second table, that the King useth the sword to destroy the innocent, then to usurpe the censor against the first table. But Doctor Ferne yeeldeth that the censor may be pulled out of his hand, lest he provoke God to wrath. Ergo, by the same very reason, à fortiore, the Sword, the Castles, the Sea-ports, the Militia may be violently pulled out of his hand, for if there was an expresse Law that the leper should be put out of the congregation, and therefore the King also should be subject to his Church-censor, then he sub∣jecteth the King to a punishment to be inflicted by the subjects, upon the King, Ergo the King is obnoxious to the coactive power of the law. 2. Ergo, subjects may judge him and punish him. 3. Ergo he is to be subject to all Church-censors, no lesse then the people. 4. There is an expresse law that the leper should be put out of the congregation. What then? flattering court Divines say the King is above all these lawes, for there is an expresse law of God as expresse as that ceremoniall on touching lepers, and a more binding law, that the murtherer should die the death. Will Royalists put no exception upon a ceremoniall law of expelling the leper, and yet put an exception upon a Divine morall law, concerning the punishing of murtherers given before the law on Mount Sinai. Gen. 6.9. They so declare that they accept the persons of men. 5. If

a leper King could not actually sit upon the throne, but must be cut off from the house of the Lord, because of an expresse law of God, these being inconsistent, that a King remaining amongst Gods peo∣ple, ruling and raigning, should keep company with the Church of God, and yet be a leper who was to be cut off, by a Divine law from the Church, now I perswade my self that far lesse can he actual∣ly raigne in the full use of the power of the sword, if he use the sword to cut off thousands of innocent people, because murthering the innocent and fatherles, and Royall governing in Righteousnesse and Godlinesse are more inconsistent, by Gods law, being morally opposite, then remaining a governour of the people, and the disease of leprosie, are incompatible. 6. I think not much that Barcley saith cont. Monar. l. 5. c. 11. Vzziah remained King, after he was re∣moved from the congregation for leprosie. 1. Because that touch∣eth the question of dethroning Kings, this is an argument brought for violent resisting of Kings, and that the people did resume all power from Vzziah, and put it in the hand of Iotham his son, who was over the Kings house, judging the people of the land. ver. 21. And by this same reason the Parliaments of both Kingdomes may re∣sume the power once given to the King, when he hath proved more unfit to governe morally, then Vzziah was ceremonially, that he ought not to judge the people of the land in this case. 2. If the pri••sts did execute a ceremoniall law upon King Vzziah, Far more may the three estates of Scotland,* 1.659 and the two houses of Parliament of England execute the morall law of God on their King.

If the people may covenant by oath to rescue the innocent and unjustly condemned, from the sentence of death notoriously known to be tyranous and cruel, then may the people resist the King in his unlawfull practises. But this the people did in the matter of Ionathan. M. Symmons saith pag. 32. and Doctor Ferne §. 9.49. That with no violence, but by prayers and teares the people saved Jonathan, as Peter was rescued out of prison by the prayers of the Church, King Saul might easily be intreated to break a rash vow to save the life of his eldest son. Ans. 1. I say not the common people did it, but the people including proceres regni, the Princes of the land, and captaines of thousands. 2. The text hath not one word or syllable of either prayers, supplications or teares, but by the contrary. They bound themselves by an oath, contrary to the oath of Saul. 1 Sam. 14.44. and swear. ver. 45. God forbid, as the Lord liveth,

there shal not one hair of his head fall to the ground, so the people rescued Ionathan.* 1.660 The Church prayed not to God for Peters deliverance with an oath, that they must have Peter saved whether God will or no.

2. Though we read of no violence used by the people, yet an oath upon so reasonable a ground. 1. without the Kings consent. 2. con∣trary to a standing law, that they had agreed unto, ver. 24. 3. con∣tradictory to the Kings sentence and unjust oath. 4. spoken to the King in his face, all these prove that the people meaned, and that the oath ex conditione operis, tended to a violent resisting of the King in a manifestly unjust sentence. Chrysostom. hom. 14. ad Pop. Anti∣och. accuseth Saul as a murtherer in this sentence, and praiseth the people. So Iunius, Peter Martyr, (whom Royalists impudently cite) so Cor. à lap. Zanch. Lyra, and Hug. Cardinalis say it was Ty∣ranny in Saul, and laudable that the people resisted Saul, and the same is asserted by Iosephus l. 6. antiquit. c. 7. so Althus. Polyt. c. 38. n. 109.

We see also 2 Chron. 21.10. That Libnah revolted from under Ie∣horam, because he had forsaken the Lord God of his fathers. It hath no ground in the text that Royalists say, that the defection of Lyb∣nah is not justified in th•• ••ex••, but the cause is from the demerit of wicked Iehoram, because he made defection from God, Libnah made defection from him, as the ten tribes revolted from Rehoboam for Solomons idolatry, which before the Lord procured this defection, yet the ten tribes make defection for oppression. I answer, where the literall meaning is simple and obvious, we are not to go from it. The text sheweth what cause moved Libnah to revolt, it was a town of the Levites, and we know they were longer sound in the truth then the ten tribes, 2. Chron. 13.8 9, 10. Hos. 11.12. Lavater saith Ie∣horam hath pressed them to idolatry, and therefore they revolted. Zanch. Cor. à Lap. saith, this was the cause that moved them to revolt, and it is cleare ver. 13. he caused Judah and the inhabitants of Jeru∣salem to go a whoring from God, and no doubt tempted Libnah to the like.

Yea the city of Abel 2 Sam. 20. did well to resist Ioab, Davids Generall, for he came to destroy a whole city for a traitors sake, for Sheba, they resisted and defended themselves, the wise woman cal∣leth the city a mother in Israel, and the inheritance of the Lord. ver. 19. and Ioab professeth ver. 20. far be it from him to swallow up

and destroy Abel. The woman saith ver. 18. They said of old, they shall surely ask counsell at Abel,* 1.661 and so they ended the matter, that is, the city of Abel was a place of Prophets and Oracles of old where they asked responses of their doubts, and therefore peace should be first offered to the City before Ioab should destroy it; as the law saith, Deut. 20.10. from all which it is evident, that the city, in de∣fending it self did nothing against peace, so they should deliver Sheba the traitour to Ioabs hand, which accordingly they did: and Ioab pursued them not as traitors for keeping the city against the King, but professeth in that they did no wrong.

QUEST. XXXIII. Whether or no the place Rom. 13.1. prove that in no case it is lawfull to resist the King?

THe speciall ground of Royalists from Rom. 13. against the law∣fulnesse of defensive Wars,* 1.662 is to make Paul, Rom. 13. speake onely of Kings. Hugo Grotius de jure belli & pac. l. 1. c. 4. num. 6. Barclay cont. Monarch. l. 3. c. 9. saith, Though Ambrose expound the place Rom. 13. de solis Regibus, of Kings onely, (this is false of Kings onely, he doth not, but of Kings principally) Yea it followeth not that all Magistrates, by this place, are freed from all lawes, because (saith he) there is no Iudge above a King on earth, and therefore he cannot be punished; but there is a Iudge above all inferiour Iudges, and therefore they must be subject to Lawes. So D. Ferne followeth him, sect. 2. pag. 10. and our poore Prelate must be an accident to them, Sacr. San. Maj. cap. 2. pag. 29. for his learning cannot subsist per se.

1. Assert. In a free Monarchie (such as Scotland is known to be) by the higher power Rom. 13. is the King principally in respect of dignity understood;* 1.663 but not solely and onely, as if inferiour Judges were not higher powers. 1. I say in a free Monarchie: For no man can say, that where there is not a King, but onely Aristocracie, and government by States, as in Holland, that there the people are obli∣ged to obey the King; and yet this Text, I hope, can reach the con∣sciences of all Holland, that there every soul•• must be subject to the higher powers, and yet not a subject in Holland is to be subject to any King: for non entis nulla sunt accidentia. 2. I said the King in a free Monarchie is here principally understood in regard of dig∣nity, but not in regard of the essence of a magistrate, because the es∣sence

of a Magistrate doth equally belong to all inferiour Magi∣strates, as to the King, as is already proved,* 1.664 (let the Prelate answer if he can) for though some Judges be sent by the King, and have from him authority to judge, yet this doth no more prove that infe∣riour Judges are unproperly Judges, and onely such by analogie, & not essentially; Then it will prove a Citizen is not essentially a Ci∣tizen, nor a Church-officer essentially a Church-officer, nor a sonne not essentially a living creature, because the former have authority from the Incorporation of Citizens, and of Church-officers, and the latter hath his life by generation from his father, as Gods instru∣ment. For though the Citizen and the Church-officers may be judged by their severall Incorporations that made them, yet are they also essentially Citizens and Church-officers, as those who made them such.

2. Assert. There is no reason to restrain the higher powers to Monarchs onely, or yet principally,* 1.665 as if they onely were essential∣ly powers ordained of God, 1. Because he calleth them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, higher powers. Now this will include all higher powers, as Pisca∣tor observeth on the place. And certainly Rome had never two or three Kings to which every soule should be subject, if Paul had in∣tended that they should have given obedience to one Nero, as the onely essentiall Judge he would have designed him by the nowne in the singular number. 2. All the reasons that the Apostle bringeth to prove that subjection is due, agreeth to inferiour Judges, as well as to Emperours, for they are powers ordained of God, and they beare the sword, and we must obey them for conscience sake, and they are Gods deputies, and their judgement is not the judgement of men, but of the Lord, 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. Deut. 1.16. Numb. 11.16, 17. Tribute and wages be no lesse due to them, as ministers and servants, for their work, then to the King, &c. 3. The Apostle could not omit obedience to the good Civill Lawes enacted by the Senate, nor could he omit to command subjection to Rulers, if the Romanes should change the Government, and abolish Monarchie, and erect their ancient forme of Government before they had Kings. 5. This is Canonicall Scripture, and a cleare exposition of the first Com∣mandement, and so must reach the consciences of all Christian Re∣publicks, where there is no Monarchie. 5. Parallel places of Scrip∣ture prove this. Paul, 1 Tim. 2.1, 2. will have prayers made to God, for Kings, and for all that are in authority, and the intrinse∣call

••nd of all is, a godly, honest, and peaceable life. And 1 Pet. 2.13. Submit to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake. Tit. 3.1. It is true, subjection to Nero, of whom Tertullian said, Apol. 5. Nihil nisi grande bonum à Nerone damnatum, is commanded here, but to Nero as such an one as he is obliged, de jure, to be, (whether you speak of the office, in abstracto, or of the Emperour, in concret••, in this notion, to me it is all one) but that Paul commandeth subje∣ction to Nero, and that principally and solely, as he was such a man, de facto, I shall then beleeve, when Antichristian Prelats turn Pauls Bishops, 1 Tim. 2. which is a miracle. 6. Inferiour Judges are not necessarily sent by the King, by any divine Law, but chosen by the people, as the King is; and de facto, is the practise of creating all Magistrates of Cities in both Kingdomes.* 1.666 7. Augustin. expos. Prop. 72. on Epist. Rom. Irenaeus l. 5. c. 24. Chrysostom. in Psal. 148. and on the place, Hieron. Epist. 53. advers. vigilant, ex∣pound it of Masters, Magistrates; so do Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Pi∣s••ator, Rollocu. Marlorat. So do Popish Writers, Aquinas, Lyra, Hugo Cardinal.* 1.667 Carthus. Pirerius, Toletus, Cornel. à Lapide, Salmeron, Estius, expound the place; And therefore there is no ar∣gument, that Royalists hence draw against resisting of the King by the Parliaments; but they do strongly conclude against the Caval∣liers unlawfull warres against the Parliaments and Estates of two Kingdomes: Here what P. P. saith to the contrary. 1. They are called eminent powers. Ergo, Kings only. Answ. It followeth not, for these can be no other then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 1 Tim. 2.2. But these are not Kings, but in the Text contradivided from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Kings, and they can be no other then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Prin∣cipalities and powers. 2. The reason of the Apostle proveth clearely, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 cannot meane Kings onely, for Paul addeth of that same 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, For there is no power but of God: It must be there is no supereminent Royall power, but it is of God, and the powers Roy∣all onely (so he must meane) that are, are ordained of God. Now this latter is manifestly false, for inferiour powers are of God; The power of the Roman Senate, of a Master, of a Father, are of God. P. Prelate. Peter must expound Paul, and Pauls higher powers must be, 1 Pet. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. More reason that Paul expound Paul: Now 1 Tim. 2.2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All in authority are not Kings. P. Prelate. (Are of God) or (ordained of God) can∣not so properly be understood of subordinate powers, for that is not

by immediate derivation from God, but immediately from the higher power the King, and mediately from God.

Answ. It is most false that King David is so immediatly a King from God, as that he is not also by the mediation of the peopl••, who made him King at Hebron. 2. The inferiour Magistrat••s are also immediate vicars and ministers of God as the King, for their throne and judgement is not the Kings, but the Lords, Deut. 1.16. 2 Chron. 19.6. 3. Though they were mediatly from man, it fol∣loweth not that they are not so properly from God, for Wisdome Prov. 8. saith as properly, ver. 16. By me Princes rule, and No∣bles, even all the Iudges of the earth, as ver. 15. By me Kings reigne; and promotion is as properly from God, and not from the East, and the West, Psal. 75.6, 7. Though God promote Ioseph by the thank∣full munificence of Pharaoh, and Mordecai by Ahasuerus, Daniel by Darius, as if he gave them power and honour immediately from Heaven.

Prelat. Learned Interpreters expound it so. Answ. It is an un∣truth, for none expound it onely and principally of Kings. Produce one Interpreter for that conceit. Prelat. Paul wrote this when Ne∣ro was Monarch. Answ. Then must the Text be expounded of Ne∣ro only. 2. He wrote this when Nero played the Tyrant, and per∣secuted Christians: Ergo, We are not to disobey Nero's now. 3. He wrote it when the Senate of Rome had power to declare Nero an enemy, not a Father; as they did. P. Prelat. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 must be referred to the Antecedent 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and this, There is no power, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but of God; must undeniably inferre, there is no supreme power but of God; and so Soveraignty relates to God as his immediate author; so Sectaries reason, Gal. 2.16. Not justified by works, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) but by faith onely. Then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, must be a perfect exclusive, else their strong hold for Iustification is overthrowne. Answ. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hath a neerer Antecedent, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it is alone without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And this Grammer is not so good as Beza's, which hee rejected. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, will referre to God alone, as the onely cause, In genere causae primae. God alone giveth raine: but not for that immediatly, but by the mediation of vapours and clouds. God alone killeth and maketh alive, Deut. 32.39. That is, excluding all strange gods, but not immediatly; for by his peoples fighting, he slew Og King of Bashan, and cast out seven Nations, yet they used bow and sword, as it is in the booke of Ioshua; and therefore God killed not Og imme∣diately.

God hath an infinite, eminent, transcendent way of work∣ing, so that in his kinde he onely worketh his alone: Deus solus ope∣ratur solitudine primae causae, non solus solitudine omnis causae, God onely giveth learning and wisdome, yet not immediatly alwayes; often he doth it by teaching, and industry. God onely maketh rich, yet the Prelates make themselves rich also with the fat of the flock, and God onely maketh poore; yet the P. Prelates Courts mediately also under God, ••ade many men poore. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is not such an exclusive Particle when we ascribe it to God, as when we ascribe it to two created c••uses, workes, and faith; and the Protestants forme of arguing, Gal. 2. to prove we are justified by faith, he calleth our strong hold: Ergo. It is not his strong hold. In this point then hee must be a Papist, and so he refuses to owne Protestant strong holds, for justification by faith alone.

D. Ferne s••ct. 2. pag. 10. As many as have soules must be subject to the higher powers spoken of here; but all inferiour Iudges have soules. Answ. If the word (soules) be thus pressed, none shall be understood by higher powers, but the King onely. 2. Certainly, he that commandeth as he commandeth, must be excepted, except, because the King ha••h a soule, you must subject the King to himself, and to his owne commandements Royall; and so to penall Lawes.

3. Inferiour Judges, as Judges by this text, must either be subject to themselves as Judges, and by the same reason, the King must be subject to himselfe, as he is a Judge: Or Judges as men, or as erring men are to be subject; which I would grant, but they are not subject as Judges, no more then one as he commandeth, can also obey as he command••th. These are contradictory; I am not put off that opini∣on since I was at Schools, Species subjicibilis qua subjicibilis non est praedicabilis.

4. ••f Nero make fathers rulers over their mothers and children, and command them, by his publique sword of justice, to kill their own•• children and mothers; if a Senate of such fathers disobey, and if with the sword they defend their own children and mothers, which some other Do••gs as Judges are to kill, in the name and com∣mandement of Nero: Then they resisting Neroes bastard-command∣ment, by ••his doct••ine resist the ordinance of God, and resist the Minister of God. I have not a faith stretcht out so farre to the Pre∣lates Court-divinity. Yet Ferne saith, there was never more cause to resist higher powers, for their wicked Nero was Emperour, when

he now forbideth resistance Rom. 13. under the paine of damnation.

I desire to be informed, whether to resist the Kings servants be to resist the King. Doctor Ferne p. 3. §. 2. p. 10. and par. 3. §. 9. p. 59. allow us in unavoidable assaults, where death is imminent, personall defence without offending, as lawfull, whether the King or his emissa∣ries invade, without law or reason. Well then, the resisting then of the Kings cut-throats, though they have a personall command of the King to kill the innocent, yet if they want a legall, is no resisting of the King, not as King, and the servant hath no more then the Master giveth, but the King in lawlesse commandements gave nothing royall to his cut-throates, and so nothing legall.

QUEST. XXXIIII. Whether Royalists by cogent reasons do prove the unlawfulnesse of de∣fensive warres?

WHat reasons have already been discussed, I touch not.

Obj. 1. Arnisaeus de authorit princ••p. c. 2. num. 2. If we are to obey our parents, not if they be good,* 1.668 but simply whether they be good or ill (so Iust. saith of the King, Quamvis legum contemptor, quamvis impius, tamen pater §. si vero in ff. vos. 12.) then must we submit to wicked Kings.

Ans. Valeat totum, we are to submit to wicked Kings, & wicked parents, because Kings, and parents: but when it cometh to actuall submission, we are to submit to neither but in the Lord; the questi∣on is not touching subjection to a Prince, let him be Nero, but if in acts of Tyranny we may not deny subjection: there be great odds betwixt wicked rulers, and rulers commanding or punishing unjustly.

Obj. 2. Arnisaeus c. 3. n. 9. We may resist an inferior magistrate. Ergo, we may resist the supreame, it followeth not, for an inferiour judge hath a Majesty in fiction onely, not properly: treason is, or can onely be committed against the King, the obligation to inferiour judges is onely for the prince, the person of none is sacred and inviolable but the Kings.

Ans. We obey parents, masters, kings, upon this formall ground, because they are Gods deputies, and set over us, not by man, but by God: So that not onely are we to obey them because what they command is good and just (such a sort of obedience an equall owes to the counsell of either equall or inferiour) but also by vertue of

the fift commandement, because of their place of dignity: now this Majesty which is the formall reason of subjection is one and the same in spece and nature in King and Constable, and onely different gradually in the King and in other judges, and it is denyed that there is any incommunicable sanctity in the Kings person which is not in some degree in the inferiour judge, all proceedeth from this false ground, that the King and inferiour judges differ in nature, which is denied: and treason inferiour may be committed against an in∣feriour judge, and it is a fiction that the inferiour judge doth not re∣semble God, as the King doth, yea there is a sacred Majesty in all in∣feriour judges, in the aged, in every superiour, wherefore they deserve honour▪ feare and reverence. Suppose there were no King on earth, as is cleare in Scripture. Exod. 20.12. Levit. 19.32. Esther 1.20. Psal. 149.9. Prov. 3.16. Math. 13.57. Heb. 5.4. Isa. 3 3. Lam. 5.12. Mal. 1.6. Psal. 8.5. and this honour is but united in a speciall manner in the King, because of his high place.

Obj. 3. A King elected upon conditions may be resisted.

Ans. He is as essentially a King, as a hereditary, yea as an absolute Prince, and no lesse the Lords annoynted then another prince, if then one, also another may be resisted.

Obj. 4. The oath of God bindeth the subjects. Ergo, they must obey, not resist.

Ans. Obedience and resistance are very consistent. 2. No doubt the people gave their oath to Athaliah, but to her as the onely heir of the crown, they not knowing, that Ioash the lawfull heir was live∣ing, so may conditionall oaths (all of this kinde are conditionall) in which there is interpretative and virtuall ignorance, be broken, as the peopl•• swear loyalty to such a man conceived to be a father, he after that turneth Tyrant, may they not resist his Tyranny? they may. Also no doubt Israel gave their oath of loyalty to Iabin, (for when Nebuchadnezer subdued Iudah he took an oath of loyalty of their King.) Yet many of Zabulon, Nepthali, and Isachar, Barack leading them, conspired against Iabin.

Obj. 5. There is no law to take a Kings life, if he turne a Nero, we never read that Subjects did it.

Ans. The treatise of unlimited prerogative saith, p. 7. We read not that a father killing his children, was killed by them, the fact being abhominable. 2. The law Gen. 6.9. Levit. 24.16. ••xcepteth none. See Deut. 13.6. the dearest that nature knoweth, are not excepted.

Obj. 6. Vengeance pursued Core, Dathan and Abiram who resisted Moses.

Ans. From resisting of a lawfull magistrate, in a thing lawfull, it followeth not, it must be unlawfull to resist Kings, in Tyrannous acts.

Obj. 7. Exod. 22.28. Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the Ruler of the people. Exod. 10.20. Curse not the King, no not in thy thought, nor the rich in thy bed-chamber.

Ans. 1. The word Elohim signifieth all judges, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nasi signifieth one lifted up above the people, saith Rivetus in loc. whe∣ther a monarch, or many rulers. All cursing of any is unlawfull, even of a private man, Rom. 12.14. Ergo we may not resist a pri∣vate man by this: the other text readeth, contemne not the King. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in scientiâ tuâ. Aria. Mon. or in thy conscience or thought: and it may prove resisting any rich man to be unlawfull. Nothing in word or deed tending to the dishonour of the King may be done, now to resist him in self-defence, being a commandment of God in the law of nature cannot fight with another commandment to ho∣nour the King, no more then the fift commandement can fight with the six••h, for all resistance is against the judge, as a man exce••ding the limits of his office, in that, wherein he is resisted, not as a judge.

Obj. 8. Eccles. 8.3.4. Where the word of a King is, there is power: and who may say to him, what dost thou? Ergo, the King cannot be resisted.

Ans. 1. Tremel. saith well, that the scope is that a man go not from the Kings lawfull command in passion and rebellion. Vatab. If thou go from the King in disgrace, strive to be reconciled to him quickly. Ca∣jetan. Vse not Kings too familiarly, by comming too quickly to them, or going too hastily from them. Plutarch, Cum rege agendum ut cum rogo, neither too neere this fire, nor too farre off. Those have smarted who have been too great in their favour, Ahasuerus slew Haman, Alexander so served Clitus, and Tiberius Sejanus, and Nero Seneca. But th•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is cleare, rebellion is forbidden, not resistance, so the hebrew, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 stand not in an evil matter, or in a re∣bellion. And he dehorteth from rebellion against the King, by an ar∣gument taken from his power. 3. For he doth whatsoever pleaseth him. 4. Where the word of a King is, there is power, And who may say unto him, What doest thou? The meaning is in way of justice, he is armed with power that cannot be resisted, other wayes Samuel

said to King Saul, 1 Sam. 13.13. Thou hast done foolishly. Eliah said more to Ahab then What hast thou done? And the Prophets were to rebuke sinne in Kings, 2 King. 3.14. Ier. 1.28. Chap. 22.3. Hos. 5.1, 2. And though Solomon here give them a power, he speak∣eth of Kings as they are de facto; but de jure they are under a Law, Deut. 17.18.

If the meaning be, as Royalists dreame, he doth whatsoever hee will or desireth,* 1.669 as a Prince, by his royall, that is, his legall will, by which he is lex animata, a breathing law; we shall owne that as truth, and it is nothing against us. But if the meaning be, that De jure, as King, he doth whatsoever he will, by the absolute suprema∣cie of Royall will above all law and reason; then Ioram should by law as King, take Elisha's head away, and Elisha resisted God, in saying, What doth the King? and he sinned in commanding to deal rougbly with the Kings messenger, and hold him at the doore: then the foure••core valiant Priests, who said to King Vzziah, What dost thou? resisted him, in burning incense, which he desired to doe, sinned; Then Pharaoh, who said, Ezech. 29.3. The river Nilus is mine, I have made it for my selfe: and the King of Tyrus, Ezek. 28.2. I am God, I sit in the seat of God, should not be controlled by the Prophets, and no man should say to them, What sayest thou? Did Cyrus as a King, with a Royall power from God, and jure regio, be angry at the river Gyndes, because it drowned one of his horses, and punish it, by dividing it in 130. Channels? Sen. l. 3. de ira, c. 21. And did Xerxes, jure regio, by a Royall power given of God,* 1.670 when Hellespontus had cast downe his bridges, command that three hundred whips should be inflicted on that little sea, and that it should be cast in fetters? And our Royalists will have these mad fooles, doing these acts of blasphemous insolencie against heaven, to be honoured as Kings, and to act those acts by a regall power. But heare, flatterers, a Royall power is the good gift of God, a law∣full and just power. A King acting and speaking as a King, speak∣eth and acteth Law and Justice. A power to blaspheme is not a lawfull power; they did and spake thes•• things with a humane and a sinfull will, if therefore this be the Royali••ts meaning, as Kings, 1. They are absolute, and so the limited and elected King is no King. 2. The King as King is above Gods Law, put on him by God, Deut. 17. 3. His will is the measure of good and ill. 4. It were un∣lawfull to say to the King of Cyrus, What sayest thou? Thou art not

God, according to this vaine sense of Royalists.

Obj. 9. Elihu saith, Iob 34.18. Is it (fit) to say to a King, (Thou art) wicked, and to Princes, (Ye are) ungodly? Ergo, You may not resist Kings.

Ans. 1. This Text no more proveth that Kings should not be re∣sisted, then it proveth that rich men, or liberall men, or other Jud∣ges in••eriour, should not be resisted, for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth all that, and it signifieth liberall, Isa. 32.5. And ver. 8. the same word is. 2. Deodat. and Calvin say, the meaning is, Learne from the respect that is due to earthly princes, the reverence due to the Soveraign Lord, Mal. 1.8. for it is not convenient to reproach earthly Kings, and and to say to a Prince, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Beliel, a word of reproach, signi∣fying extreme wickednesse. And you may not say to a man of place, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an extreamly wicked man, so are the words taken, as signify∣ing most vile and wicked men, 1 Sam. 2.12. 1 Sam. 10.27. 2 Sam. 24.6. Psal. 1.1, 6. Psal. 11.5. Psal. 12.8. Prov. 16.4. Psa. 146.9. and in infinite places. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a word of extreme re∣proach, comming from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sine, non, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 profuit, Iud. 19.22. a most naughtie and a lewd man, or from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 jugum, a lawlesse man, who hath cast off all yokes of Gods or Mans Law.* 1.671 So then the meaning is, It is unlawfull to reproach earthly Princes and men of place, farre more is it unlawfull to reproach the Judge of the whole earth with injustice. And what then? We may not re∣proach the King, as Shimei cursed King David, Ergo, it is unlaw∣full to resist the King in any tyrannous act: I shall deny the conse∣quence. Nay, as Pineda observeth, if the Royalist presse the words literally, it shall not be lawfull for Prophets to reprove Kings of their sins. Christ called Herod a Fox, Elias Ahab,* 1.672 one that trou∣bled Israel.

Obj. 10. Act. 23. Paul excuseth himselfe that he called Ananias the High-priest a whited wall.

Answ. Rivetus, Exo. 22. learnedly discussing the place, thinketh Paul, professing he knew him not to be the High-Priest, speaketh ironically, that he could not acknowledge such a man for a Judge. Piscator answereth, he could not then cite Scripture, It is written, Exod. &c. Ans. But they may well consist, in that act of smiting Paul unjustly, he might be reproached, otherwise it is not lawfull to reproach him; and surely it is not like that Paul was ignorant that he was a Judge. Yea it is certain he knew him to be a Judge.

1. He appeared before him as a Judge, to answer for himselfe. 2. Paul saith expresly he was a Judge, ver. 3. Sittest thou to judge me after the Law? &c. and therefore the place is for us, for even according to the mind of all, the fault was (if there were any) in calling him a whited wall: and he resisted him in judgement, when he said, Commandest thou me to be smitten against the Law? 2. Though Royalists rather put a fault on the Apostle Paul now in the act of prophecying judgement against Ananias, which after fell out, then upon their God the King; yet the consequence amounteth but to this, We may not revile the High Priest, Ergo we may not resist the Ki••g in his illegall commandments. It followeth not. Yea it should prove, if a Prelate come in open war to kill the innocent A∣postle Paul, the Apostle might fly or hold his hands, but might not re-offend: Now the Prelate is the High Priests successor, and his base person so is as sacred as the person of the Lords Anoin∣ted, the King. Hence the Cavalliers had in one of their Colours which was taken by the Scots at the battle of Marston, Iul. 2. An. 1644 the Crowne and the Prelates Mitre painted with these words, Nolite tangere Christos meos, as if the Antichristian Mitre were as sacred as the lawfull Crowne of the King of Brita••ne.

Obj. 11. Ferne, sect. 9.56. If the Senate and people of Rome, who a little before had the supreme Government over the th••n Emperors, that of Subjects had made them Lords, might not resist their Empe∣rours, much lesse can the peopl•• of England have power of resistance, against the succession of this Crowne, descending from the Conqueror, who by force of Armes, but in justice, conquered the Kingdom.

Answ. 1. Though the Roman Emperours were absolute (of which I much doubt) and th••ugh the Senate had made them abso∣lute, I deny that therefore they cannot be resisted. T••e unlawfull resistance condemned by Paul Rom. 13. is not upon the ground of Absol••tenesse, which is in the Court of God nothing, being never ordained of God, but upon reasons of conscience, b••cause the pow∣ers are of God, and ordained of God. But some may say, Volenti non fit injuria, If a people totally resigne their power, and swear non-resistance to a Conqueror, by compact, they cannot resist. I answer, neither doth this follow, because it is an unlawfull compact, and none is obliged to what is unlawfull. For 1. it is no more lawfull for me to resigne to another my power of naturall self-defence, then I can resigne my power to defend the innocent drawne to death, and

the wives, children and posterity that God hath tyed me unto. 2. The people can no more resigne power of self-defence, which Nature hath given them, then they can be guilty of self-murther, and be wanting in the lawfull defence of Kingdome and Religion. 3. Though you make one their King with absolutenesse of power, yet when he use that transcendent power, not for the safety, but for the destruction of the State, it is knowne they could not resigne to another that power which neither God nor nature gave them, to wit, a power to destroy themselves. 2. I much doubt if the Ro∣man Emperour was absolute, when Paul wrote this. Iustinian saith so, Digest. l. 2. tit. 2. but he is partiall in this cause. Bodine de repub. l. 2. c. 5. pag. 221. proveth that the Roman Emperours were but Princes of the Common-wealth, and that the Soveraignty remai∣ned still in the Senate and people. Marius Salamon. writeth sixe Books, De Principatu, on the contrary. How could they make their Emperours absolute? Livie saith, The name of a King was con∣trary to a Senate liberty. Florus, Nomen Regis invidiosum, They in∣stituted a yearly Feast, February 23. called Regifugium. Cicero, as Augustine observeth, Regem Romae post haec nec Dii, nec homines esse patiantur. The Emperours might doe something de facto, but Lex Regia was not before Vespasians time. Augustus took on him to be Tribune of the people, from ten yeares to ten. Suetonius and Ta∣citus say, The succeeding Kings encroached by degrees upon the peo∣ples liberty. For speedier execution of Law, the Kings in time of Warre were forced to doe many things without the Senate, and af∣ter the reigne of Emperours, though there were no Plebescita, yet there were Senatusconsulta, and one great one is, that the Senate declard Nero to be an enemie to the State. It is thought, Iulius Cae∣sar in the warre against Pompey, subdued the Romans, and the Se∣nate, and they were subdued againe in the battaile of Octavius, a∣gainst Cassius and Brutus. But Tacitus saith, that was de facto, not de jure, Anal. l. 1. s. 2. Rome ruere in servitium, Consules, Patres, Eques. Caligula intended to assume Diadema, the Ensigne of a King, but his friends disswaded him. 3. England is obliged to D. Ferne, who maketh them a subdued Nation. The contrary of which is known to the world.

Obj. M. Simmons Loyall Subj. Beliefe, sect. 6. pag. 19. God is not honoured by being resisted, no more is the King.

Answ. I deny the consequence. Those who resist the Kings

personall will, and will not suffer him to ruine his Crowne and po∣sterity in following Papists, against his Oath at the Coronation, do honour him and his Throne and Race as a King, though for the time they displease him. 2. Vzz••ah was not dishonoured in that he was resisted. 3. Nor doe we honour the King, when we flee from him and his Law. Yet that resistance is lawfull, according to the way of Royalists; and in truth also.

Object. 12. Supreme power is not to be resisted by subordinate pow∣ers, because they are inferiour to the supreme.

Answ. The bloody Irish Rebels then being inferiour to the Parlia∣ment, cannot resist the Parliament. 2. Inferiour Judges as Judges are immediately subordinate to God as the King, and must be guilty of blood before God, if they use not the sword against bloody Ca∣valliers, and Irish cut-throats, except you say, inferiour Judges are not obliged to execute judgement, but at the Kings commandment.

Object. As the Irish Rebels are armed with the Kings power, they are superiour to the Parliament.

Answ. So an Armie of Turks and Spaniards, armed with the Kings power, and comming against the two Kingdomes, at the Kings commandement, though they be but Lictors in a lawlesse cause, are superiour to the highest Courts of Parliament in the two Kingdomes. But the King and the Law gave power to the Parlia∣ment, first to resist Rebels; now he giveth power to Rebels to resist the Parliament: here must be contradictory wils, and contradi∣ctory powers in the King; Which of them is the Kings will, and his power? the former is legall and Parliamentary; Then, because Law is not contrary to Law, the latter cannot be legall also, nor can it be from God; and to resist it then is not to resist God.

Object. 13. If resistance bee restrained to legall commandements, What shall we say to these arguments, that Paul forbiddeth resistance under these tyrannous governours, and that from the end of their go∣vernment, which is for good, and which their subjects did in some sort enjoy under them?

Answ. 1. This proveth nothing, but that we are to cooperate with these governours, though tyrannous, by subjecting to their Laws, so farre, as they come up to this end, the morall good and peace of their government; but Paul no where commandeth absolute sub∣jection to tyrannous governours in tyrannous act••; which is still the question.

Object. 14. Hee that hath the supreme trust next to God, should have the greatest security to his person and power; but if resi∣stance be lawfull, he hath a poore security.

Answ. He that hath the greatest trust, should have the greatest security to his person and power, in the ••••eping his power, and using it according to his trust, for its owne native end, for justice, peace, and godlinesse. God alloweth security to no man, nor that his Angels shall guard them, but on••ly when they are in their wayes, and the service of God; else, There is no peace to the wicked.

2. It is denyed that one man having the greatest trust should have the greatest security; the Church and people of God, for whose safety he hath the trust, as a meanes for the end, should have a grea∣ter security; the City ought to have greater security then the watch∣ers, the Armie then the leaders; The good Shepherd giveth his life for his sheepe.

3. A power to doe ill, without resistance, is not security.

Object. 15. If God appoint Ministers to preach, then the sheep can∣not seeke safety elsewhere. Ergo.

Answ. The wife is obliged to bed and board with her husband, but not if she feare he will kill her in the bed. The obedience of po∣sitive duties that subjects owe to Princes, cannot loose them from Natures law of self-preservation, nor from Gods Law, of defending Religion against Papists in Armes; nor are the sheep obliged to in∣trust themselves, but to a saving shepherd.

Object. 16. If self-defence, and that by taking up Armes against the King, he an unlawfull duty, how is it that you have no practise, no precept, no promise for it in all the word of God? 1. You have no practise; Ahab sold himselfe to do evill, he was an Idolater, and kil∣led the Prophets; and his Queene a bloody Idolatresse, stirred him up to great wickednesse: Elias had as great power with the people as you have, yet hee never stirred up the people to take Armes against the King. Why did God at this time rather use an extraordinary meanes of saving his Church? Arnisaeus de autho. Princ. c. 8. but Elias only fled. Nebuchadnezer, Ahab, Manassah, Julian were Tyrants and Idolaters, the people never raised an Armie against them. B. Williams of Osso∣rie, p. 21. Deut. 14. If brother, son, daughter, wife or friend intice thee to follow strange gods, kill them, not a word of the father: Chil∣dren are to love Fathers, not to kill them.* 1.673 Christ (saith John P.P.) in the cradle, taught by practise to flee from Herod; and all Christs

acts and sufferings are full of mysteries, and our instructions: Hee might have had legions of Angels to defend him, but would rather worke a miracle, in curing Malchus eare, as use the sword against Cae∣sar. If Sectaries give us a new Creed, it will concerne them neere with expunging Christs descent into hell, and the communion of Saints, to raze out this, He suffered under Pontius Pilate—My resolution is (for this sin of yours) to dissolve in teares and Prayers, and with my Master say daylie and hourely, Father forgive them, &c. Christ thought it an uncouth spirit, to call for fire from heaven to burne the Samaritans, because they refused him lodging. 2. The Prophets cried out against Idolatry, blasphemy, murther, adultery, &c. and all sins; never against the sin of neglect, and murtherous omission to defend Church and Religion against a tyrannous King. 3. No promise is made to such a rebellious insurrection in Gods word.

Answ. It is a gr••at non-cons••quence; this duty is not practised by any examples in Gods word. Ergo. It is no duty. Practice in Scripture is a narrow rule of faith:* 1.674 Shew a practice when a husband stoned his wife, because she inticed him to follow strange Gods. Yet it is commanded, Deut. 13.6. when a man lying with a beast is put to death: Yet it is a Law, Exod. 22.19. infinite more Lawes are, the practise of which we finde not in Scripture. 2. Iehu and the Elders of Israel rooted out Ahabs posterity for their Idolatry; and if Iehu out of sincerity, and for the zeale of God, had done what God commanded, he should have beene rewarded: for say that it was extraordinary to Iehu, that he should kill Ahab, yet there was an expresse Law for it, that he that stirreth up others to Idolatry should die the death, Deut. 13.6. and there is no exception of King, or Father in the Law, and to except father or mother in Gods mat∣ters, is expresly against the zeale of God, Deut. 33.9. And many grave Divines think the people to be commended in making Iehu King, and in killing King Nabad, and smiting all the house of Iere∣boam for his Idolatry; they did that which was a part of their ordi∣nary duty, according to Gods expresse Law, Deut. 13.6, 7, 8, 9. though the facts of these men be extraordinary. 3. Ahab and Ieza∣bel ••ais••d not an Armie of Idolaters, Malignants, such as are Papists, Prelates, and Cavalliers, against the three Estates, to destroy Par∣liaments, Lawes and Religion, and the people conspired with A∣hab in the persecution and Idolatry, to forsake the Covenant throw dowwe the Altars of God, and slay his Prophets, so as in the estimati∣on

of Elias, 1 King. 19.9, 10, 11. there was not one man, but they were Malignant Cavalliers, and hath any Elias now power with the Cavalliers, to exhort them to rise in Armes against themselves, and to shew them it is their duty to make warre against the King and themselves, in the defence of Religion? when the Prophets had much adoe to convince the people, that they sinned in joyning with the King, what place was there to shew them their sin, in not using their owne lawfull defence? And in reason any may judge it un∣reasonable, for Elias to exhort, of thousand thousands in Israel; poore seven thousand (of which many no doubt were women, aged, weake, young) to rise in Armes against Ahab and all Israel, except God had given a positive and extraordinary Commandement, and with all miraculous courage and strength in war against the whole Land;* 1.675 and God worketh not alwayes by miracles to save his Church, and therefore the naturall mandate of self-preservation in that case doth no more oblige a few weake ones to lawfull resi∣stance, then it obliged one Martyre to rise against a persecuting Ne∣ro and all his forces. Arnisaeus should remember wee are not to tye our Lord to miracles.

2. Elias did not onely flee, but denounced wrath against the King, and Cavalliers, who joyned with them in Idolatry, and when God gave oportunity, he shewed himself, and stirred the people up to kill Baals Iesuits and seducing idolatours, when the Idolatrous King refu••ed to do it, and Eliah with his own hand took them not, but all Israel being gathered together, 1 King. 18.19. The Princes and Judges did apprehend them, ver. 40. which is a warrant, when the King refuseth to draw the sword of justice against armed Papists, that other judges are to do it. 2. For Nebuchadnezzer, Ieremiah from the Lord, expresly forbad to fight against him, shew us the like for no defending our selves against bloody Papists and Irish cut-throats: for that example may as well prove (if it be a binding law to us) that our King should not raise his Subjects, to fight a∣gainst a Spanish Armado, and a forraigne Pri••ce; for before ever Nebuchadnezzer subdued the Kingdom of Iudah Ier. 27.1. In the beginning of the raigne of Iehoiakim, ver. 12, 13, 14. chap. 36. chap. 37. the King of Iudah is from the Lord commanded, not to draw a sword against the King of Babylon; I hope this will not tye us, and our King, not to fight against forraigne Princes, or against the great Turk, if they shall injustly invade us and our King, and this example

is against the Kings resisting of a forraigne Prince unjustly invading him, as much, as against us, for Nebuchadnezzar was a Tyrannous invader, and the King of Iudah the Lords Annoynted. 3. The people also conspired with Manasseh, as with Ahab, Ier. 15.4. 4 Of Em∣p••rours persecuting Christians we shall heare anon. 5. Deut. 13. None are excepted, by a synecdoche, the dearest are expressed, sonne, daughter, brother, the friend that is as thine own soul. Ergo, fathers also. And husbands are to love their lives. Ephes. 5.25. Yet to execute judgement on them, without pitty, Deut. 13.8.9. The father is to love the son, yet if the son prophecy falsely in the name of the Lord, to kill him. Zach. 13.3. Hence love, fear, reverence toward the King may be commanded, and defensive warres also. 6. Christ fled from Herod, and all his actions and sufferings are mysteries and instru∣ctions, saith the poor Prelate. 1. Christ kissed the man that to his knowledge came to betray him, Christ fled not, but knowing where, and when his enemy should apprehend him, came willingly to the place.* 1.676 Ergo, we should not flee. 2. His actions are so my∣sterious that Iohn P. P. in imitation of Christs fourty dayes fast, will fast from flesh in lent, and the Prelate must walk on the sea, and work miracles, if all Christs actions be our instructions. 7. He might with more then twelve L••gions of Angels defend himself, but he would not, not because resistance was unlawfull, no shadow for that in the text, but because it was Gods will, that he should drink the cup his Father gave him, & because to take the sword with∣out Gods warrant, subjecteth the usurper of Gods place to perish with the sword. Peter had Gods revealed wil, that Christ behoved to suffer, Math. 26.52, 53. Math. 16.21, 22, 23. & Gods positive command that Christ should die for sinners, Iohn 10.24. may well restraine an act of lawfull s••lf-preservation, hic & nunc, and such an act as Christ lawfully used, at another time, Luk. 4.29▪30. Ioh. 11.7, 8. we give no new creed, but this apostate hath forsaken his old creed, & the religion of the Church of Scotland, in which he was Baptised. 9. Nor do we expu••ge out of the Creed Christs descension into hell, & the communion of Saints, as the apostate saith, but the Popish locall descension of Christ, & the Popish advancing of the Churches power above the Scriptures▪ & the intercession & prayers to the saints, or of the saints for us, we deny, & this Prelate, though he did swear the doctrine of the Church of Scotland, preached expresly all these & many other poynts of Popery in the Pulpits of Edenburgh. 10. We beleeve that

Christ suffered under Pontius Pilat, but that Pilat had any legal power to condemne Christ, (but onely a power by a permissive Decree, Act. 4.27, 28. Such as Devils had by Gods permission, Luke. 22.53.) we utterly deny. 11. The Prelat saith it is his resolution, for our sin of naturall selfe defence, to dissolve in tears, because his Bishopricke (I conceive) by which he was wont to dissolve in cups, (being drunk on the Lords day, after he (with other Prelates) had been at the Lords Supper, while the Chamber wherein they were, was dissolved in vomitting,) was taken from him. 12. The prophets cry against all sins, but never against the sin of non-resistance, and yet they had very Tyrannous and Idolatrous Kings. 1. This is but a weak argument. 1. The Prophets cry not out against all sins, they cry not out against men-stealers, and killers of father and mother in expresse tearmes, yet do they by consequence condemne all these sins, and so do they condemne non-resistance in wars, by consequence, when they cry out Ier. 5.31. The Prophets prophesie falsly, and the Priests beare rule by their meanes, and my people love to have it so. And when they complaine, Ezek. 22.26, 27, 28. That the Prophets and Priests vio∣late the Law, her Princes are like wolves ravening the prey, to shed blood, and the people use oppression, and exercise robbery, and vexe the poore. And when they say, Ier. 22.2. not to the King onely, but al∣so to his servants, and the people that enter in by the gates, 3. Exe∣cute judgement and righteousnesse, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressour. I pray you, who are the oppressors? I ans∣wer, The murthering Judges, Esa. 1.21. And Esa. 3.12. As for my people, children are their oppressors, and women rule over them:* 1.677 And ver. 14, 15. The ancients of the people grind the faces of the poore: and when they are not valiant for the truth upon the earth. And Prov. 24.11. the Lo••d shal render to these men according to their works, which forbeare to help men that are drawn to death, and those that be ready to be slaine, if they shift the businesse, and say, Behold, we know not, doth not he that pondereth the heart, consider it? When there∣fore the Lords Prophets complaine that the people execute not judge∣ment, relieve not the oppressed, help not and rescue not those that are drawn to death unjustly by the King, or his murthering Judges, they expresly cry out against the sin of non-resistance. 2. The Prophets cannot expresly and formally cry out against the Judges for non-resisting the King, when they joyne as ••avening wolves with the King in these same acts of oppression, even as the Judge cannot for∣mally

impannell 24▪ men sent out to guard the travellers from an arch robber, if these men joyne with the robber, and rob the tra∣vellers, and become cut-throats as the arch robber is, he cannot ac∣cuse them for their omission in not guarding the innocent travellers, but for a more hainous crime, that not onely they omitted what was their duty, in that they did not rescue the oppressed out of the hands of the wicked, but because they did rob and murther, and so the lesser sinne is swallowed up in the greater. The under-Judges are watchmen, and a guard to the Church of God; if the King turn a bosome robber, their part is, Ier. 22.3. to deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressour, to watch against domestick and forraine enemies, and to defend the flock from wolves, Ezek. 23.2, 3, 4. Ier. 50.6. to let the oppressed goe free, and to break every yoak, Esay 58.6. to break the jawes of the wicked, and pluck the spoile out of his teeth, Job 29.17. Now if these Judges turne Lyons, and ravening Wolves, to prey upon the flock, and joyne with the King, as al∣wayes they did when the King was an oppressor, his Princes made him glad with their lies, and joyned with him, and the people with both. Ier. 1.18. Ier. 5.1. Ier. 9.1. Mic. 7.1. Ezek. 22.24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31. Ier. 15.1, 2, 3. It is no wonder if the Prophets condemne and cry out against the hugest and most bloody crime of positive oppression formally and expresly, and in that their nega∣tive murthers in not releeving the oppressed must also be cryed out against. 13. The whole Land cannot formally be accused for non-resistance, when the whole Land are oppressors, for then they should be accused for not resisting themselves. 14. The King ought to re∣sist the inferiour judges in their oppression of the people, by the con∣fession of Royalists, then this argument cometh with the like force of strength on themselves, let them shew us practice, precept or promise in the Word,* 1.678 where the King raised an Armie for defence of Religion, against Princes and people who were subverting Re∣ligion, and we shall make use of that same place of Scripture, to prove that the Estates and people who are above the King, (as I have proved) and made the King, may and ought to resist the King, with the like force of Scripturall truth, in the like case. 16. Roya∣lists desire the like president of practice and precept for defensive warres: but I answer, let them shew us a practice where any King of Israel or Judah raised an Armie of Malignants, of Phylistims, Sy∣donians, Ammonites, against the Princes of Israel and Judah, con∣veened

in an Assemblie, to take course for bringing home the cap∣tived Arke of God, and vindicating the Lawes of the Land, and rai∣sed an Armie contrary to the knowledge of the Elders, Princes, and Judges, to set up Dagon, or tollerate the worship of the Sydonian gods, and yet Princes, Elders, Judges and the whole people were obliged, all to flee out of Gods land, or then onely to weep and re∣quest that the King would not destroy souls and bodies of them and their innocent posterities, because they could not in conscience, im∣brace the worship of Dagon and the Sydonian gods: when the Royalist can parallel this with a precedent, we can answer, there was as smal apparency of precedency in Scripture, (except you flee to the law of nature) that 80 Priests the Subjects of King Vzziah should put in execution a penall Law against the Lords Annoynted, and that the inferiours, and subjects should resist the Superiour, and that these Priests with the Princes of the land should remove the King from actuall government, all his dayes, and crown his son, at least make the father their Prince and superiour (as Royalists say) as good as a Cypher? Is not this a punishment inflicted by inferiours upon a superiour, according to the way of Royalists? Now it is clear a worshipping of bread and the Masse commanded, and against law obtruded upon Scotland, by influence of the counsell of known Pa∣pists, is to us, and in it self as abominable as the worshiping of Da∣gon or the Sydonian Gods, and when the Kingdom of Scotland did but conveen, supplicat, and protest against that obtruded Idolatry, they were first declared rebels by the King, and then an army raised against them, by Prelates and Malignants, inspired with the spirit of Anti-christ, to destroy the whole land, if they should not submit soul and conscience to that wicked service.

QUEST. XXXV. Whether or no the sufferings of the Martyrs in the Primitive Church militate against the lawfulnesse of defensive wars?

ROyalists think they burden our Cause much with hatred, when they bring the Fathers and ancient Martyrs against us. So the P. Prelate extracted out of other Authors, testimonies for this,* 1.679 and from I. Armagh, in a Sermon on Rom. 13. pag. 20, 21. So the Do. of Aberdeene. The Prelat proveth from Clem. Alexand. l. 7. c. 17. That the King is constituted by the Lord. So Ignatius.

Answ. 1. Except he prove from these Fathers that the King

is from God onely and immediately, he proveth nothing.

Obj. 2. Iren. l. 5. adv. haer. c. 20. proveth that God giveth King∣domes, and that the devill lied▪ Luk. 4. and we make the people to make Kings, and so to be the children of the Devill.

Answ. If we denyed God to dispose of Kingdomes, this man might alledge the Church of God in England and Scotland, to be the sons of Satan. But Gods Word, Deut. 17.18. and many other pla∣ces make the people to make Kings, and yet not devils. But to say that Prelates should crowne Kings, and with their foule fingers anoint him; and that as the Popes substitutes, is to make him that is the sonne of perdition, a Donor of Kingdoms, also to make a man with his bloodie sword to ascend to a throne, is to deny God to be the disposer of Kingdoms, and Prelats teach both these.

Obj. 3. Tertul. Apol. c. 30. Inde est Imperator, unde & homo, antequam imperator, inde potestas illi, unde & spiritus: God is no lesse the Creator of Soveraigntie, then of the soul of man.

Answ. God onely maketh Kings, by his absolute soveraignty, as he onely maketh high and low, and so onely he maketh Mayors, Provosts, Bailiffes, for there is no power but of him, Rom. 13. Ergo, Provosts and Bailiffes are not from men. The Reader shall not be troubled with the rest of the testimonies of this poore Plagiarie, for they prove what never man denyed, but Prelats and Royalists, to wit, that Kings are not from Gods approving and regulating will; which they oppose, when they say, Sole Conquest is a just title to the Crowne.

But they deserve rather an answer which Grotius, Barclay, Ar∣nisaeus, and Spalato alledge, as

Obj. 1. Cyprian Epist. 1. Non est fas Christianis, armis, ac vi tueri s•• adversus impetum persecutorum, Christians cannot by vio∣lence defend themselves against persecutors.

Answ. If these words be pressed literally, it were not lawfull to defend our selfe against murtherers; but Cyprian is expresly con∣demning in that place, the seditious tumults of people against the lawfull Magistrate.

Obj. 2. The Ancients say he was justly punished who did rend and teare the Edict of Dioclesian and Maximinus, Euseb. l. 7. Hist. Ec∣cles. c. 5.

Answ. To rend an Edict is no act of naturall self-defence, but a breach of a positive commandment of the Emperors, and could not

be lawfully done, especially by a private man.

Object. 3. Cyprian Epist. 56. Incumbamus gemitibus assiduis & depr••cationibus crebris, haec enim sunt munimenta spiritualia & tela divina quae protegunt: And Ruffinus, l. 2. c. 6. Ambrosius adversus reginae (Iustinae Arianae) ••urorem non se manu defensabat aut telo, sed jejuniis continuatisque vigiliis sub altari positus.

Answ. It is true, Cyprian reputed prayers his armour, but not his onely armour. Though Ambrose, de facto, used no other against Iustina; the places say nothing against the lawfulnesse of selfe-de∣fence. Ambrose speaketh of that armour and these meanes of d••∣fence, that are proper to Pastors, and these are prayers and teares, not the sword; because Pastors carry the Arke, that is their charge, not the sword, that is the Magistrates place.

Object. 4. Tertullian Apolog. c. 37. saith expresly, that the Chri∣stians might for strength and number have defended themselves a∣gainst their persecutors, but thought it unlawfull. Quando vel una nox pauculis faculis largitatem ultionis po et operari, si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceret, sed absit ut igni humano vindicetur divina secta, aut doleat pati, in quo probetur. Si enim hostes extran••••s, non tantum vindices occultos agere vellemus, deesset nobis vis numerorum & copiarum?

Answ. I will not goe about to say that Tertullian thought it law∣full to raise Armes against the Emperour; I ingeniously confesse Ter∣tullian was in that errour. But, 1. something of the man.* 1.680 2. Of the Christians. Of the man. Tertullian after this turned a Monta∣nist. 2. Pamelius saith of him, in vit. Tertul. inter Apocrypha nu∣meratur—excommunicatus. 3. It was Tertullians error in a fact, not in a question, that he believed Christians were so numerous, as that they might have fought with the Emperours. 4. M. Pryn doth judiciously observe, 3. part. soveraigne power of Parl. pag. 139, 140. He not onely thought it unlawfull to resist, but also to flee, and therefore wrote a booke de fuga, and therefore as some men are excessive in doing for Christ, so also in suffering for Christ; Hence I inferre, that Tertullian is neither ours, nor theirs in this point; and we can cite Tertullian against them also, Iam sumus ergo pares. Yea Fox in his Monum. saith, Christians ranne to the stakes to be burnt, when they were neither condemned, nor cited. 4. What if wee cite Theodoret, fol. 98. De provid. Who about that time say that evill men reigne, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 through the cowardlinesse of the sub∣jects;

as the Prelate saith of Tertullian, I turne it, if Theodoret were now living,* 1.681 he would goe for a Rebell. About that time Christi∣ans sought help from Constantine the Great, against Lycinius their Emperour, and overthrew him in battaile. And the Christians be∣ing oppressed by the King of Persia their owne King, sent to Theo∣dosius to help them against him. 2. For the man▪ Tertullian in the place cited, saith, The Christians were strangers under the Emperour. Externi sumus, and therefore they had no Laws of their owne, but were under the Civill Laws of Heathen, till Constantines time; and they had sworne to Iulian as his souldiers, and therefore might have, and no doubt had, scruples of conscience to resist the Empe∣rour. 2. It is knowne Iulian had huge numbers of Heathen in his Armie, and to resist had beene great danger. 3. Wanting Leaders and Commanders, (many prime men doubting of the lawfulnesse thereof) though they had beene equall in number, yet number is not all in warre, skill in valorous Commanders is required. 4. What if all Christians were not of Tertullians minde. 5. If I would go to humane testimonies, which I judge not satisfactory to the consci∣ence, I might cite many; The practice of France, of Holland: The Divines in Luthers time, as Sleidan. 8. c. 8.22. resolved resistance to be lawfull. Calvin. Beza, Pareus; the German Divines, Bucanus, and an hoast might be produced.

QUEST. XXXVI. Whether the power of Warre be onely in the King?

IT is not hard to determine this question: The Sword in a con∣stitute Common-wealth is given to the Judge supreme, or sub∣ordinate, Rom. 13.4. He beareth not the sword in vaine, in the Em∣pire; the use of Armour is restricted to the Emperour by a positive Law; so the Law saith, Armorum officia nisi jussu Principis sunt in∣terdi••••a, lib. de Cod. de Lege. 1. Imperat Valentinian. nulli, nobis inconsultis, usus armorum tribuatur, ad 1. Jul. Mai. l. 3. Warre is a species, and a particular, the sword is a generall.

Assert. 1. The power of the sword by Gods Law is not proper & p••culiar to the King only,* 1.682 but given by God, to the inferiour Judges. 1. Because the inferiour Judge is essentially a Judge no lesse then the ••ing, as is proved, and therefore he must beare the sword, Rom. 13.4. 2 Not Moses onely, but the Congregation of Israel had power of life and death, and so of the sword, Numb. 35.12. The

manslayer shall not die, untill he stand before the Congregation in judgement, ver. 24. Then the Congregation shall judge betweene the slayer and the avenger of blood, Deut. 22.18. The Elders of the City shall take that man and chastise him. 21. The men of the Citie shall stone her with stones, Deu. 17.5. Deu. 19.12, 13. v. 18, 19, 20, 21. Deu. 21.19. Then shall his father and his mother bring him to the Elders of his City. 21. And the men of the City shall stone him with stones. 1 King. 21.11. The Elders and Nobles that were inhabitants in his City stoned Naboth. 3. Inferiou•• Judges are condemned as murtherers, who have shed innocent blood, Esay 1.21. Psal. 94.5.6. Ier. 22.3. Ezek. 22.12. ver. 27. Hosea 6.8. Zephan. 3.1, 2, 3. Ergo, they must have the power of the sword, hence upon the same grounds.

Assert. 2. That the King onely hath the power of warre, and raising Armies must be but a positive civill Law. For, 1. by divine right, if the inferiour Judges have the sword given to them of God, then have they also power of Warre, and raising Armies. 2. All power of warre that the King hath is cumulative, not privative, and not distructive, but given for the safety of the Kingdome, as there∣fore the King cannot take from one particular man the power of the sword for naturall self-preservation, because it is the birth-right of life; neither can the King take from a community and Kingdome a power of rising in Armes for their owne defence: If an Armie of Turks shall suddenly invade the Land, and the Kings consent ex∣presse cannot be had (for it is essentially involved in the office of the King as King, that all the power of the swo••d that he hath, be for their safety) or if the King should as a man refuse his consent, and interdict and discharge the Land to rise in Armes, yet they have his Royall consent, though they want his personall consent, in respect that his office obligeth him to command them to rise in Armes. 2. Because no King, no Civill power can take away Natures birth-right of self-defence from any man, or a community of men.* 1.683 2. Be∣cause if a King should sell his Kingdome, and invite a bloody Con∣querour to come in with an Armie of men to destroy his people, impose upon their conscience an Idolatrous Religion, they may lawfully rise against that Armie, without the Kings consent, for though Royalists say, they need not come in asinine patience, and offer their throats to cut-throats but may flee, yet two things hinde∣reth a flight. 1. They are obliged by vertue of the first Commande∣ment to re-man, and with their sword defend the Cities of the

Lord, and the King. 2 Sam. 10.12. 1 Chron. 19.13. for if to de∣fend our Country and children, and the Church of God from unjust invaders and cut-throats by the sword, be an act of charity, that God and the Law of Nature requireth of a people, as is evident, Prov. 24.11. and if the fift Commandement oblige the Land to defend their aged Parents and young children from these invaders, and i•• the sixt Commandement lay on us the like bond, all the Land are to act works of mercy and charity, though the King un∣justly command the contrary; except Royalists say, that we are not to performe the duties of the second Table commanded by God, if an earthly King forbid us; and if we exercise not acts of mercy to∣ward our brethren, when their life is in hazard, to save them, wee are murtherers, and so men may murther their neighbour, if the King command them so to doe;* 1.684 this is like the Court-faith. 2. The Kin••s power of warres is for the safety of his people; if he deny his conse••t to their raising of Armes till they be destroyed, he playeth the Tyrant, not the King, and the law of Nature will necessi••ate them, either to defend themselves (seeing slight of all in that case is harder then death) else they must be guilty of self-murther. Now the Kings commandement of not rising in Armes, at best is positive and against the nature of his Office, and it ••loweth then from him as from a man, and so must be farre inferiour to the naturall Com∣mandement of God, which commandeth self-preservation, if wee would not be guilty of self-murther, and of obeying men, rather then God. So Althusius Polit. c. 25. n. 9. Halicarnas. l. 4. Antiq. Rom. Aristo. Pol. l. 3. c. 3. 3. David tooke Goliahs sword, and became a Captaine, a Captaine to an hoast of armed men in the battaile, and fought the battailes of the Lord, 1 Sam. 25.28. (and this Abigal by the spirit of prophecy, as I take it, saith, ver. 29, 30, 31.) 1 Sam. 22.2. 1 Chron. 12.1.2.3.17.18.21.22. not onely without Sauls consent, but against King Saul as he was a man, but not against him as hee was King of Israel. 4. If there be no King, or the King be minor, or an usurper, as Athalia be on the Throne, the Kingdome may law∣fully make war without the King,* 1.685 as Iudges cap. 20. The children of Israel, foure hundred thousand footemen that drew sword went out to warre against the children of Benjamin. Iudah had the power of the sword when Iosiah was but eight yeares old, in the beginning of his reigne, 2 King. 22.1, 2. and before Iehoash was crowned King, and while he was minor, 2 King. 11. there were Captaines of hundreds

in armes raised by Iehoiada and the people of Iudah to defend the young King. It cannot be said, that this is more extraordinary, then that it is extraordinary for Kings to die, and in the interregnum, warres, in an ordinary providence, may fall out in these Kingdoms, where Kings goe by election; and for Kings to fall to be Minors, Captives, Tyrannous. And I shall be of that opinion that M^r Sym∣mons, who holdeth, That Royall birth is equivalent to divine unction, must also hold, that election is not equivalent to divine unction; for both election and birth cannot be of the same validity, the one being naturall, the other a matter of free choise, which shall in∣fer that Kings by election are lesse properly, and analogically onely Kings; and so Saul was not properly a King, for he was King by election; but I conceive that rather Kings by birth must be lesse pro∣perly Kings, because the first King by Gods institution, being the mould of all the rest, was by election. Deut. 17.18.19.20.

5. If the estates create the King, and make this man King, not this man, as is clear Deut. 17.18. and 2 Chron. 5.1, 2, 3,* 1.686 4. they give to him the power of the Sword, and the power of War, and the Militia, and I shall judge it strange and reasonlesse, that the power given to the King, by the Parliament or estates of a free King∣dom, (such as Scotland as acknowledged to be, by all) should create, regulate, limit, abridge, yea and anull that power that created it self, hath God ordained a Parliamentary power to create a Royal power of the sword and war to be placed in the King, the Parliaments creature, for the safety of Parliament and Kingdome, which yet is destructive of it selfe? D. Ferne saith that the King summoneth a Parliament, and giveth them power to be a Parliament, and to advise and counsell him; and in the meane time Scripture saith, Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. 1 Sam. 10▪20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3, 4. that the Parliament createth the King, heir's admirable reciprocation of creation in policie, and shall God make the mother to destroy the daughter? The Parliamentarie power that giveth Crown, Mi∣litia, sword and all to the King, must give power to the King to use sword and war for the destruction of the Kingdome, and to annull all the power of Parliaments, to make, unmake Parliaments, and all Parliamentary power; what more absurd?

Obj. 1. Symmons Loyall Subj. Pag. 57. These phrases, 2. Sam. 9.1. When Kings goe forth to warre, and Luk. 14.31. What King going forth to warre? speak to my conscience, that both offensive

and defensive warre are in the Kings hand.

Answ. It is not much to other men what is spoken to any mans conscience by Phrase and customes; for by this no States where there be no Kings, but government by the best, or the people, as in Holland, or in other Nations, can have power of war, for what time of yeare shall Kings goe to war who are not Kings? and be∣cause Christ saith, A certaine housholder delivered talents to his ser∣vants, will this infer to any conscience, that none but a housholder may take usurie? And when he saith, If the good man of the house knew at what houre the thiefe would come, he would watch; shall it follow, the sonne or servant may not watch the house, but onely the good man?

Obj. 2. Ferne, pag. 95. The naturall Bodie cannot move, but up∣on naturall Principles; and so neither can the Politique Bodie move in Warre, but upon Politique reasons from the Prince, which must di∣rect by Law.

Answ. This may well be retorted, the Politique Head cannot then move, but upon politique reasons; and so the King cannot move to wars, but by the Law, and that is by consent of Parlia∣ment, and no Law can principle the head to destroy the members. 2. If an Armie of cut-throats rise to destroy the Kingdome, because the King is in lacking, in his place, to doe his duty, how can the o∣ther Judges, the States and Pa••liament, be accessorie to murther committed by them, in not raising armies to suppresse such robbers? Shall the inferiour Judges be guilty of innocent blood, because the King will not doe his duty? 3. The politique body ceaseth no more to renounce the principles of sinlesse nature, in self-defence, be∣cause it is a politique body, and subject to a King, then it can leave off to sleep, eat and drink; and there is more need of politique prin∣ciples to the one, then the other. 4. The Parliaments and Estates of both Kingdoms move in these wars by the Kings Lawes, and are a formall politique body in themselves.

Obj. 2. The ground of the present wars against the King (saith D. Ferne, sect. 4. pag. 13.) is false, to wit, that the Parliament is coor∣dinate with the King, but so the King shall not be supreme, the Parli∣aments consent is required to an act of supremacie, but not to a denyall of that act. And there can no more (saith Arnisaeus de jure majestatis, c. 3. in quo consistat essen▪ majest. c. 3. n. 1. and c. 2. an jur. majest. se∣par. &c. n. 2.) be two equall and coordinate supreme powers, then

there can be two supreme Gods, and multitudo deorum est nullitas deorum, many gods infer no gods.

Ans. 1. If we consider the fountaine-power,* 1.687 the King is subordi∣nate to the Parliament, and not coordinate; for the constituent is above that which is constituted. If we regard the derived and exe∣cutive power in Parliamentarie acts, they make but a totall and compleat soveraigne power, yet so as the soveraigne power of the Parliament being habitually and underived, a prime and fountaine power, (for I doe not here separate people and Parliament) is per∣fect without the King, for all Parliamentarie acts, as is cleare, in that the Parliament make Kings. 2. Make Lawes, raise Armies, when either the King is minor, captived, tyrannous, or dead, but Royall power Parliamentarie without the Parliament is null, be∣cause it is essentially but a part of the Parliament, and can work no∣thing separated from the Parliament, no more then a hand cut off from the body, can write; and so here we see two supremes coor∣dinate: Amongst infinite things there cannot be two, because it in∣volveth a contradiction, that an infinite thing can be created, for then should it be finite; but a royall power is essentially a derived and created power and supreme, secundum quid, onely in relation to single men, but not in relation to the Communitie; it is alwayes a creature of the communitie with leave of the Royalist. 2. It is false, that to an act of Parliamentarie supremacie the consent of the King is required, for it is repugnant that there can be any Parliamen∣tarie judiciall act without the Parliament, but there may be without the King. 3. More false it is, that the King hath a negative voice in Parliament, then he shall be sole Judge▪ and the Parliament, the Kings Creator and Constituent, shall be a cypher.

Obj. 3. Arnesaeus de jur. Maj. de potest. armorum, c. 5. n. 4. The Peo∣ple is mad and furious, therefore supreme Majestie cannot be secured, and Rebels suppressed, and publike Peace kept, if the power of Ar∣mour be not in the Kings hand only.

Answ. To denude the people of Armour, because they may abuse the Prince, is to expose them to violence and oppression, unjustly; for one King may easilier abuse armour, then all the people; one man may more easily fail, then a Community. 2. The safety of the peo∣ple is far to be preferred before the safety of one man▪ though he were two Emperours, one in the East, another in the West, because the Emperour is ordained of God, for the good and safety of the people,

1 Tim. 2.2. 3. There can be no inferiour Judges to bear the sword, as God requireth, Rom. 13 4. Deut. 1.15, 16. 2 Chron. 19.6, 7. and the King must be sole Judge, if he onely have the sword, and all armour monopolized to himselfe.

* 1.688Obj. 4. The causes of Warre (saith M. Simmons, sect. 4. pag. 9.) should not be made knowne to the Subjects, who are to look more to the lawfull call to Warre from the Prince, then to the cause of the War.

* 1.689Answ. The Parliament and all the Judges and Nobles are Sub∣jects to Royalists, if they should make war and shed blood upon blind obedience to the King, not inquiring either in causes of Law, or fa••t, they must resigne their consciences to the King. 2. The King cannot make unlawfull warre to be lawfull by any authority Royall, exc••pt he could raze out the sixt Commandement: there∣fore Subj••cts must look more to the causes of Warre, then to the au∣thority of the King; and this were a faire way to make Parliaments of both Kingdomes set up Popery by the sword, and root out the Reformed Religion upon the Kings Authority, as the lawfull call to warre, not looking to the causes of warre.

QUEST. XXXVII. Whether or no it be lawfull that the Estates of Scotland help their op∣pressed brethren the Parliament and Protestants in England a∣gainst Papists and Prelates now in Armes against them, and kil∣ling them, and ••ndevouring the establishment of Poperie, though the King of Scotland should inhibit them?.

MArianus saith, one i•• obliged to help his brother, non vinculo efficace,* 1.690 not with any efficacious band, because in these (saith he) non est actio aut poena, one may not have action of law against his brother, who refuseth to help him; yet (saith he) as man he is ob∣liged to man nexu civilis societatis, by the bond of humane society. Others say,* 1.691 one nation may indirectly defend a neighbour nation against a common enemie, because it is a self-defence; and it is pre∣sumed that a forraigne enemie having overcome the neighbour na∣tion, shall invade that nation it selfe who denyeth help and succour to the neighbour nation, this is a self-opinion, and to me it looketh not like the spirit••a••l law of God.

3. Some say it is lawfull, but not alwayes expedient, in which opinion there is this much truth, that if the neighbor nation have an evil cause, neque licet, neque expedit, it is neither lawfull, nor expedient.

But what is lawful in the case of necessity so extreame, as is the losse of a brothers life or of a nation, must be expedient,* 1.692 because necessity of non-sinning maketh any lawfull thing expedient. As to help my brother in fire or water, requiring my present and speedy help though to the losse of my goods must be as expedient, as a negative commandement (Thou shalt not murther.)

4. Others think it lawfull in the case that my brother seek my help only, other wayes I have no calling thereunto: to which opi∣nion, I cannot universally subscribe, it is holden both by reason, and the soundest divines, that to rebuke my brother of sinne is (actus mi∣sericordiae, & charitatis,) an act of mercy and charity to his soul,* 1.693 yet I hold I am obliged to rebuke him by Gods law. Levit. 19.17. otherwise I hate him. 1 Thes. 5.14. Col. 4.17. Math. 18 15. Nor can I think in reason, that my duty of love to my brother, doth not oblige me but upon dependency on his free consent, but as I am to help my neighbours oxe out of a ditch, though my neighbour know not, and so I have onely his implicit and virtuall consent, so is the case here. I go not farther in this case of conscience, if a neighbour nation be jealous of our help, and in an hostile way should oppose us in helping, (which blessed be the Lord, the honourable houses of the Parliament of England hath not done, though Malignant spirits tempted them to such a course,) what in that case we should owe to the afflicted members of Christs body, is a case may be determined easily.

The fift and last opinion is of those who think if the King com∣mand Papists and Prelates to rise against the Parliament and our dear brethren in England in warres, that we are obliged in consci∣ence, and by our oath and covenant, to help our native Prince against them, to which opinion with hands and feet I should accord, if our Kings cause were just and lawfull, but from this it followeth that we must thus far judge of the cause, as concerneth our consciences in the matter of our necessary duty, leaving the judiciall cognizance to the honourable Parliament of England. But because I cannot re∣turne to all these opinions particularly, I see no reason but the Civil Law of a Kingdom doth oblige any Citizen to help an inno∣cent man against a murthering robber, & that he may be judicially ac∣cused as a murtherer who faileth in his duty, & that Solon said well, beatam remp. esse illam, in quâ quisque injuriam alterius suam estimet.* 1.694 It is a blessed society in which every man is to repute an injury done a∣gainst

a brother, as an injury done against himself. As the Egyptians had a good law, by which, he was accused upon his head, who helped not one that suffered wrong; and if he was not able to help, he was holden to accuse the injurer,* 1.695 if not, his punishment was whips, or three dayes hunger, it may be upon this ground it was that Moses slew the Egyptian. Ambrose commendeth him for so doing.

Assert. We are obliged, by many bands, to expose our lives, goods, children, &c. in this cause of religion and of the unjust oppression of enemies, for the safety and defence of our deare brethren and true religion in England. 1. Prov. 24.11. If thou for∣bear to deliver them, that are drawn to death, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 taken as captives to be killed, and those that are ready to be slaine. 12. If thou say, behold we know it not, doth not he that pondereth the heart consider it? and he that keepeth thy soul, doth he not know it? and shall he not render to every man, according to his work? Master Iermin on the pl••ce, is too narrow, who co••menting on the place, restricteth all to these two, that the priest should deliver, by interceding for the in∣noc••nt,* 1.696 and the King by pardoning only. But 1. to deliver is a word of violence,* 1.697 as 1 Sam. 30.18. David by the sword rescued his wives, Hos. 5 14. I will take away, and none shall rescue. 1 Sam. 17.35. I rescued the lambs out of his mouth, out of the Lyons mouth, which be∣hov••d to be done with great violence. 2 King. 18.34. They have not delivered 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Samaria out of my hand. So Cornel. à Lapid••, Charitas suad••t, ut vi & armis eruamus injuste ductos ad mortem. Am••ros. lib. 1. offic. c. 36. citeth this same text, and com∣mendeth Moses who killed the Egyptian in defending a Hebrew man. 2. It is an act of Charity and so to be done, though the judge for∣bid it, when th•• innocent is unjustly put to death.

* 1.698Object. But in so doing private men may offer violence to the law∣full magistrate, when he unjustly putteth an innocent man to death, and rescue him out of the hands of the magistrate, and this were to bring in anarchy and confusion, for if it be an act of charity to deliver the in∣nocent out of the hand of the Magistrate, it is homicide to a private man not to do it, for our obedience to the law of nature tyeth us abso∣lutely, though the Magistrate forbid these acts, for it is known, that I must obey God rather then man.

Answ. The law of nature tyeth us to obedience in acts of charity, yet not to perf••rme these acts after any way and manner, in a meere naturall way, impetu naturae, but I am to performe acts of naturall

charity in a rationall and prudent way, and in looking to Gods law, else if my brother or father were justly condemned to die, I might violently deliver him out of the Magistrates hand, but by the contrary, my hand should be first on him, without naturall compas∣sion. As if my brother or my wife have been a blasphemer of God, Deut. 13.6, 7, 8. and therefore am I to do acts naturall, as a wise man observing (as Solomon saith Eccles. 8.5.) both time and judgement. Now it were no wisdom for one private man to hazard his own life, by attempting to rescue an innocent brother, because he hath not strength to do it, and the law of nature obligeth me not to acts of charity, when I in all reason, see them unpossible, but a multitude who had strength did well to rescue innocent Ionathan out of the hands of the King, that he should not be put to death: yet one man was not tyed by the law of nature to rescue Ionathan, if the King and Prince had condemned him, though unjustly.

2. The hoast of men that helped David against King Saul, 1 Sam. 22.2. entered in a lawfull war, and 1 Chron. 12.18. Amasa by the spirit of the Lord blesseth his helpers, peace, peace be unto thee, and peace be to thy helpers, for thy God helpeth the. Ergo, Peace must be to the Parliament of England, and to their help••rs their brethren of Scotland.

3. Numb. 32.1.2.3.16.17.18.19. Iosh. 1.12.13.14. The chil∣dren of Gad, and of Reuben, and the half tribe of Manasseh, though their inheritance fell to be in this side of Iordan, yet they were to goe over the river armed to fight for their brethren, while they had also poss••ssion of the land, at the commandement of Moses and Joshua.

4. So Saul and Israel h••lped the men of Iabesh Gilead conjoyn∣ed in blood with them, against Nahash the Ammonite, and his unjust conditions in plucking out their right eyes, 1 Sam. 11.

5. Iephtha Iudg. 12.2. justly rebuketh the men of Ephraim be∣cause they would not help him and his people, against the Am∣monit••••.

6. If the communion of Saints be any bound, that England and we have one Lord, one faith, one Baptisme, one head and Saviour Iesus Christ, then are we obliged to help our bleeding sister Church, a∣gainst these same common enemies Papists and Prelates, but the former is undenyably true, for 1. We send help to the Rotchel, if there had not been a secret betraying of our brethren, we send help to the recovery of the Palatinate, and the aide of the confederat

Princes against Babels strength and power, and that lawfully, but we did it at great leisure and coldly. Q. Elizabeth helped Holland against the King of Spain. And beside the union in Religion. 1. We sayle in one ship together, being in one Iland, under one King; and now by the mercy of God, have sworne one Covenant, and so must stand or fall together.

7. We are obliged by the union betwixt the Kingdomes con∣cluded to be by the Convention of the Estates of Scotland, An. 1585. at the desire of the Generall Assembly, 1583. to joyne forces toge∣ther at home, and enter in League with Protestant Princes, and E∣states abroad, to maintaine the Protestant Religion, against the bloody confederacy of Trent; and accordingly this League be∣tweene the two Crownes was subscribed at Berwick, An. 1586. and the same renewed, An. 1587, 1588. as also the confession of Faith subscribed, when the Spanish Armado was on our coasts.

8. The Law of God, commanding that we love our neighbour as our selfe, and therefore to defend one another against unjust vio∣lence. l. ut vim. ff. de just. & jur. obligeth us to the same, except we thinke God can be pleased with lipp••-love in word onely, which the Spirit of God condemneth, 1 Ioh. 2.9, 10. cap. 3.16. and the summe of Law and Prophets, is that as we would not men should refuse to help us, when we are unjustly oppressed, so neither would we so serve our afflicted brethren. l. in facto ff. de cond. & demonstr. § Si uxor. Iustit. de nupt.

9. Every man is a keeper of his brothers life, there is a voluntary homicide, when a man refuseth food or physick necessary for his owne life, and refuseth food to his dying brother; and men are not borne for themselves. And when the King defendeth not subjects against their enemies, all fellow-subjects, by the law of Nature, of Nations, the Civill, and cannon Law, have a naturall priviledge to defend one another, and are mutuall Magistrates to one another, when there be no other Magistrates. If an Army of Turks or Pa∣gans would come upon Britaine, if the King were dead, as he is ci∣villy dead in this juncture of time, when he refuseth to helpe his subjects, one part of Britaine would help another: As Iehoshaphat King of Iudah did right in helping Ahab and Israel, so the Lord had approved of the warre. If the left hand be wounded, and the left eye put out, nature teacheth that the whole burden of naturall acts is devolved on the other hand and eye, and so are they obliged to helpe one another.

10. As we are to beare one anothers burthens, and to help our enemies, to compassionate strangers; so far more these, who make one body of Christ with us.

11. Meroz i•• under a curse, who helpeth not the Lord, one part of a Church another. A woe lieth on them that are at ease in Zion, and helpeth not afflicted Ioseph, so farre as they are able.

12. The law of Gratitude obligeth us to this: England sent an Armie to free both our soules and bodies from the bondage of Po∣pery, and the fury of the French, upon which occasion a Parliament at Leith, Anno 1560. established Peace and Religion, and then af∣ter they helped us against a faction of Papists, in our owne bosome; for which we take Gods name in a prayer, seeking grace never to forget that kindnesse.

13. When Papists in Armes, had undone England (if God give them victory) they should next fall on us, and it should not be in the Kings power to resist them. When our enemies within two dayes journey are in Armes, and have the person of our King, and his judgement, and so the breathing Law of the two Kingdomes under their power, we should but sleepe to be killed in our nest, if we did not arise and fight for King, Church, Countrey, and Bre∣thren.

Object. By these and the like grounds, when the Kings Royall Person and life is in danger, he may use Papists as subjects, not as Pa∣pists in his owne naturall self-defence.

Answ. Hell and the Devill cannot say, that a thought was in any heart, against the Kings person: He sleeped in Scotland safe, and at Westminster in his owne Palace, when the Estates of both King∣domes, would not so much as take the water-pot from his bed-side, and his Speare; and Satan instilled this traiterous lye, first in Pre∣lates, then in Papists. 2. The King professeth his maintenance of the true Protestant Religion, in his Declarations, since he tooke Armes; but if Saul had put Armes in the hands of Baals Priests, and in an Armie of Sidonians, Philistims, Ammonites, professing their quarrell against Israel was not to defend the King, but their Dagon and false gods; cleere it were, Sauls Armie should not stand in relation of helpers of the Kings, but of advancers of their owne Religion. Now Irish Papists and English in Armes, presse the King to cancell all Lawes against Popery, and make Laws for the

free liberty of Masse, and the full power of Papists, then the King must use Papists as Papists in these warres.

QUEST. XXXVIII. Whether Monarchy be the best of governments?

NOthing more unwillingly doe I write then one word of this question. It is a darke way; circumstances in falne nature may make things best to be, hic & nunc, evill: Though to me it is probable, that Monarchy in it selfe, 2. Monarchy, de jure, that is, lawfull and limited Monarchy is best; even now in a Kingdome, under the fall of sin, if other circumstances be considered.

* 1.699But observe I pray you, 1. That M. Symmons, and this poore Pre∣late, do so extoll Monarchy, that there is not a government save Monarchy onely, all other governments are deviations; and therefore M. Symmons saith, pag. 8. If I should affect another government then Monarchy, I should neither feare God, nor the King, but associate my selfe with the seditious: and so the question of Monarchy is, 1. Which is the choisest government in it selfe; or, which is the choisest govern∣ment in policie, and in the condition of man falne in the state of sinne. 2. Which is the best government, that is, the most profitable, or the most pleasant,* 1.700 or the most honest? For wee know that there bee these three kinds of good things; things usefull and profitable, bona, utilia; things pleasant, jucunda; things honest, honesta; and the question may be of every one of the three. 3. The question may be, which of these governments be most agreeable to nature? that is, either to nature in it selfe, as it agreeth, communiter, to all natures of elements, birds, beasts, Angels, Men, to lead them, as a gover∣nour doth, to their last end, or which government is most agreeable to men, to sinfull men, to sinfull men of this, or this Nation; for some Nations are more ambitious, some more factious; some are better ruled by one, some better ruled by many, some by most and by the people. 4. The question may be in regard of the facility or difficulty of loving, fearing, obeying and serving; and so it may be thought easier to love, feare and obey one Monarch then many Rulers, in respect that our Lord saith, it is difficult to serve two Ma∣sters, and possibly more difficult to serve twenty or an hundred. 5. The question may be in regard of the power of commanding, or

of the justice and equity of commanding; hence from this last I shall set downe the first Thesis.

Assert. 1.* 1.701 An absolute and unlimited Monarchy is not onely not the best forme of Government, but it is the worst, and this is against our Petty Prelat, and all Royalists. My reasons be these, 1. Be∣cause it is an unlawfull Ordinance, and God never ordained it; and I cannot ascribe the superlative degree to any thing, of which I de∣ny the positive: Absolute government in a sinfull and peccable man is a wicked government, and not a power from God, for God never gave a power to sin. Plenitudo potestatis ad malum & injuri∣am non extenditur. Soz••nus Iunior cons. 65. in causa occurrenti, l. 2. Ferdinand. Loazes in suo cons. pro March. de Velez. pag. 54. n. 65. And so that learned Senator Ferdin. Vasquez. pag. 1. lib. 1. cap. 5. n. 17. 2. It was better for the State that Epiminondas could not sleepe, then that he could sleepe, when the people was dancing,* 1.702 be∣cause, said he, I wake that you may have leave to sleepe and be se∣cure; for he was upon deepe cogitations, how to doe good to the Common-wealth, when the people were upon their pleasures. Because all Kings since the fall of the Father-King Adam, are in∣clined to sin and injustice, and so had need to be guided by a Law, even because they are Kings, so they remaine men. Omnipotency in one that can sin, is a cursed power. With reason all our Divines say, the state of saving grace in the second Adam, where there is non posse deficere, they cannot fall a way from God,* 1.703 is better then the state of the first Adam, where there was posse non deficere, a power not to fall away; and that our free-will is better in our countrey in Heaven, where we cannot sin, then in the way to our countrey on earth, where we have a power to sin, and so Gods people is in •• bet∣ter case, Hos. 2.6, 7. Where her power to overtake her lovers is closed up with an hedge of thornes that she cannot finde her paths; then the condition of Ephraim, of whom God saith, Hos. 4.17. Ephraim is joyned to Idols, let him alone. So cannot that be a good government when the supreme power is in a sinfull man, as inclinable to in∣justice by nature as any man, and more inclinable to injustice by the condition of his place then any: and yet by office he is one that can doe no injustice against his subjects; he is a King, and so may destroy Vriah, kill his subjects, but cannot sinne; and this is to flat∣tering Royalists the best government in the world. As if an un∣chained Lion were the best governour, because unchained, to all

the beasts, sheepe and lambs and all others, which with his teeth and pawes he may reach, and that by vertue of an ordinance of God. 3. What is on man under no restraint, but made a God on earth, and so drunk with the graunder of a sinning-God, here under the Moone and Clouds? who may heare good counsell, from men of his owne choosing, yet is under no restraint of Law to follow it, being the supreme power absolute, high, mighty, and an impeccable god on earth: Certainly this man may more easily erre, and break out in violent acts of injustice, then a number of Rulers, grave, wise, under a Law. One being a sinfull man, shall sooner sin and turne a Nero (when he may goe to hell, and leade thousands to hell with him gratis) then a multitude of sinfull men, who have lesse power to doe against Law: and a tyrannous killing of innocents, and a sub∣version of Lawes, Liberties and Religion, by one who may by of∣fice, and without resistance of mortall men, doe all ill, is more dange∣rous and hurtfull, then division and fraction incident to Aristocracy. 4. Caesar is great, but Law and reason is greater: by an absolute Mo∣narchy all things are ruled by will and pleasure above Law; then this government cannot be so good, as Law and Reason in a govern∣ment by the best, or by many. 5. Under absolute Monarchy a free people is, actu primo, and in themselves inslaved, because though the Monarch so absolute should kill all, hee cannot be controlled; there is no more but flight, prayers and teares remaining, and what greater power hath a Tyrant? none at all, so may we say. An abso∣lute Monarch is, actu primo, a sleeping Lion, and a Tyrant is a waking and a devouring Lion, and they differ in accidents onely. 6. This is the Papists way, Bellarmine de Pontif. l. 1. c. 1. and Sa••∣derus de visibili Monarchia, l. 3. c. 3. Turr••re in sum. de Eccles. l. 2. c. 2. prove that the government of the Church is by an absolut•• Monarch and Pope, because that is the best government, which yet is in question. So Royalists prove Common-wealths must be best governed by absolute Monarchs, because that is the best govern∣ment, but the Law saith, it is contrary to nature, even though peo∣ple should paction to make a King absolute: Conventio procurato∣ria ad dilapidandum & dissipandum juri naturali contraria nulla est, l. filius 15. de cond. Iust. l. Nepos. procul. 125. de verb. signif. l. 188. ubi. de jure Regu•• l. 85. d. tit.* 1.704

Assert. 2. Monarchy in its latitude as heaven and earth and all the hoast therein are Citizens, is the best government absolutely,

because Gods immediate government must be best, but that other governments are good or best so farre as they come neere to this, must prove that there is a Monarchy in Angels, if there be a govern∣ment, and a Monarchy amongst Fishes, Beasts, Birds, &c. and that, if Adam had never sinned there should be one Monarchy amongst all mankinde. I professe I have no eye to see what Government could be in that State, but paternall, or maritall; and by this reason there should be one Catholique Emperour over all the Kings of the ••arth; A position holden by some Papists, and Interpreters of the cannon Law, which maketh all the Princes of the earth to be usur∣pers, except these who acknowledge a Catholique dominion of the whole earth in the Emperour, to whom they submit themselves as Vassals. If Kings were Gods and could not sin, and just as Solo∣mon in the beginning of his reigne, and as David, I could say Mo∣narchy so limited must be better then Aristocracy, or Democracy. 1. Because it is farthest from injustice, neerest to peace and godli∣nesse; m. l. 3. §. aparet. ff. de administrat. tutor. l. 2. §. novissime. ff. de Orig. jur. Aristot. pol. l. 8. c. 10. Bodin. de Rep. l. 6. c. 4. 2. Be∣cause God ordained this government in his people. 3. By experi∣ence it is knowne to be lesse obnoxious to change, except that some think the Venetian Common-wealth best; but with reverence, I see small difference betweene a King, and the Duke of Venice.

Assert. 3. Every government hath some thing wherein it is best.* 1.705 1. Monarchy is honorable and glorious-like before men. Aristocra∣cie for counsell is surest. Democracie for liberty, and possibly for riches and gaine▪ best. Monarchy obtaineth its end with more con∣veniency. 1. Because the ship is easilier brought to land, when one sitteth at the helme, then when ten move the helme. 2. Wee more easily feare, love, obey, and serve one, then many. 3. He can more easily execute the Lawes.

Assert. 4. A limited and mixed Monarchy,* 1.706 such as is in Scotland and England, seeme to me the best government, when Parliaments with the King, have the good of all the three. This government hath, 1. glory, order, unitie from a Monarch, from the government of the most and wisest it hath safety of counsell, stability, strength; from the influence of the Commons▪ it hath liberty, privi∣ledges, promptitude of obedience.

Object. 1. There is more power, terrour, and love in one, then in many.

Answ. Not more power, 2. terrour cometh from sin, and so to nature fallen in sin, in circumstances a Monarchy is best.

Object. 2. It is more convenient to nature, that one should be Lord then many.

Answ. To sinlesse nature, true, as in a father to many children.

* 1.707Object. 3 Monarchies for invention of counsels, execution, conceal∣ing of secrets, is above any other government.

Answ. That is in some particulars, because sin hath brought dark∣nesse on us; so are we all dull of invention, slow in execution, and by reason of the falsnesse of men, silence is needlesse, but this is the ac∣cidentary state of nature, & otherways there is safety in a multitude of counsellers: one commanding all without following counsell trusteth in his own heart, and is a foole.

Object. 4. A Monarch is above envy, because he hath no equall.

Answ. Grant all; in many things a Monarchy is more excellent, but that is nothing to an absolute Monarchy, for whom Royalists contend.

Object. 5. In a multitude there be more fooles then wise men, and a multitude of vices,* 1.708 and little vertue is in many.

Answ. Meere multitude cannot governe in either Democracy or Aristocracy, for then all should be rulers, and none ruled, but many eyes see more then one, by accident one may see more then hundreds, but accidents are not rules.

* 1.709Object. 6. Monarchy is most perfect, because most opposite to A∣narchy, and most agreeable to nature, as is evident in Plants, Birds, Bees.

Answ. Government of sinlesse nature void of reason, as in bi••ds, bees, is weak to conclude politique civil government amongst men in sin, and especially absolute government, a King-Bee is not abso∣lute, nor a King-Eagle, if either destroy its fellowes, by nature all rise and d••stroy their King. 2. A King-Bee doth not act by counsell borrowed from fellow Bees as a King must do, and communication of counsels lesseneth absolutenesse of a man. 2. I see not how a Mo∣narchy is more opposite to Anarchy and confusion, then other go∣vernments, a Monarch as one, is more opposite to a multitude, as many; but there is no lesse order in Aristocracy then in Monarchy: for a government essentially includeth order of commanding and subjection. Now one is not, for absolutenesse, more contrary to A∣narchy then many, for that one now who can easily slip from a King

to a Tyrant, cannot have a negative voice in acts of justice, for then should he have a legall power to oppose justice, and so for his ab∣solutenesse he should be most contrary to order of justice, and a Mo∣narch because absolute, should be a door-neighbour to disorder and confusion.

Object. But the Parliament hath no power to deny their voices to things just, or to crosse the law of God, more then the King.

Answ. It is true, neither of them hath a negative voice against law and reason, but if the Monarch by his exorbitant power may de∣ny justice, he may by that same legall power do all injustice; and so there is no absolutenesse in either.

Object. Who should then punish and coerce the Parliament in the case of exorbitance?

Answ. Posterior Parliaments.

Object. Posterior Parliaments and people both may erre.

Answ. All is true, God must remedy that onely.

QUEST. XXXIX. Whether or no any Prerogative at all above the law be due to the King? or if jura Majestatis be any such Prerogative Royall?

I Conceive Kings are conceived to have a threefold supreme pow∣er. 1. Strictly absolute, to do what they please,* 1.710 their will being simply a law; this is Tyranicall, some Kings have it, de facto, ex con∣suetudine, but by a divine law none have it; I doubt if any have it by a human positive law, except the great Turk, and the King of Spaine over his conqu••st without the borders of Europe, and some few other conquerours. There is another 2. power limited to Gods law, the due proper right of Kings, Deut. 17.18.19.20. There is 3. a potestas intermedia, a middle power, not so vast as that which is absolute and tyrannicall, which yet is some way humane: this I take Iurists call jus regium, lex regia, jura Regalia regis,* 1.711 Cicero jura Majestatis, Livius, jura imperii, and these Royall priviledges are such common and high dignities, as no one particular magistrate can have, seeing they are common to all the kingdom, as that Cesar on∣ly should coyne money in his own name. Hence the penny ••••ven to Christ, because it had Cesars image and superscription. Mat••▪ 22.20, 21. Infer by way of argumentation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. give there∣fore tribute to Cesar, as his due, so the Magazine and Armory for the safety of the Kingdom is in the Kings hand, the King hath the like of

these priviledges, because he is the common▪ supreame, publick offi∣cer and Minister of God for the good of the whole Kingdom, and amongst these Royall priviledges, I reckon that power that is given to the King, when he is made King, to do many things without warrant of the letter of the law, without the expresse consent of his counsell, which he cannot alwayes carry about with him, as the law saith. The King shall not raise armes without consent of the Par∣liament, but if an army of Irish, or Danes, or Spanyards should sud∣denly land in Scotland, he hath power without a formally conveened Parliament, to command them all to rise in armes against these in∣vade••s, and defend themselves, this power to inferiour Magistrate hath as he is, but such a Magistrate. And in many such exigences, when the necessity of justice or grace requireth an extemporall ex∣position of Lawes, Pro re natâ, for present necessary execution, some say onely the Emperour, others all Kings have these priviledges. I am of the minde of Arnisaeus,* 1.712 that these priviledges are not rewards given to Princes for their great paines. For the King is not obliged to governe the Common-wealth, because he receiveth these Royall Priviledges as his reward, but because by office he is obliged to gov••rne the common-wealth, therefore these priviledges are given to him, and without them he could not so easily governe. But I am utterly against Arnisaeus, who saith, these are not essentiall to a King, Because (saith he) he createth Marquesses, Dukes, &c. and Nobles, constituteth, Magistrates, not because of His Royall Dignity, but by reason of his absolute power, for many Princes have supreame power, and cannot make Nobles, and therefore to him they are jura majestatis, non ••ura potestatis. But 1. The King, suppose a limited King, may ••nd ought to make nobles, for he may conferre honours as a reward of vertue;* 1.713 none can say Pharoah by his absolute authority, and not as a King advanced Ioseph to be a noble Ruler, we cannot say that, for there was merit and worth in him deserving that honour, and Dari∣us not by absolute authority, but on the ground of well-deserving (the rule by which Kings are obliged in justice to confer honours) promoted Daniel, to be the first president of all his kingdomes, be∣cause D••n. 6.3. An excellent spirit was in him: and in Justice the King could nobilitate none, rather then Daniel, except he should fail against the rule of conferring honours. It is acknowledged by all, that honos est proemium virtutis, honour is founded upon vertue, and therefore Darius did not this out of his absolute Majesty, but as King.

2. All Kings as Kings, and by a Divine Law of God, and so by no absolutenesse of Majesty, are to make men of wisdome, fearing God, hating covetousnesse, Judges under them, Deut. 1.13. 2 Chro. 19.6, 7. Psal. 101.6, 7, 8.

3. If we suppose a King to be limited as Gods King is Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. Yet is it his part to confer honours upon the worthiest. Now if he have no absolutenesse of Majesty, he cannot confer ho∣nours out of a principle that is none at all, unum quodque sicut est, ita operatur, and if the people confer honours, then must Royalists grant that there is an absolute Majesty in the people, why then may they not derive Majesty to a King? and why then do Royalists talk to us of Gods immediate creating of Kings, without any inter∣veening action of the people?

4. By this absolutnesse of Majesty, Kings may play the Tyrant as Samuel 1 Sam. 8.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14. foretelleth Saul would do. But I cannot beleeve that Kngs have the same very officiall absolute power, from whence they do both acts of grace, goodnesse and justice, such as are to expone Laws extemporally in extraordinary cases, to confer honours upon good and excellent men of grace to pardon offenders upon good grounds, and also doe acts of extreme Tyrannie: For out of the same fountaine doth not proceed both sweet water and bitter. Then by this absolutenesse, Kings cannot doe acts of goodnesse, justice and grace, and so they must doe good as Kings, and they must doe acts of tyrannie, as men, not from ab∣solutenesse of majesty.

5. Inferiour Magistrates, in whom there is no absolutenesse of Majesty, according to Royalists, way, may expound laws also ex∣temporally, and doe acts of justice, without formalities of civill or municipall laws, so they keep the genuine intent of the Law, as they may pardon one that goeth up to the wall of a City, and discovereth the approach of the enemie, when the watchmen are sleeping, though the Law be, That any ascending to the wall of the Citie shall die. Also the inferiour Judge may make Judges and Deputies un∣der himselfe.

6. This Distinction is neither grounded upon Reason or Lawes, nor on any Word of God. Not the former, as is proved before, for there is no absolute power in a King to do above, or against law; all the officiall power that a King hath, is a Royall power to do good▪ for the safety and good of his subjects, and that according to law and

reason, and there is no other power given to a King as a King, and for Scripture Arnisaeus, ibid. alledgeth 1 Sam. 8. The manner or law of the King. ver. 9.11. And he saith, it cannot be the custome and man∣ner of the King, but must be the law of absolute Majesty. 1. Because it was the manner of inferiour judges, as Tyberius said of his judges, to flea the people, when they were commanded to shear them onely. 2. Samuels sons who wrested judgment and perverted the law, had this manner and custome to oppresse the people, as did the sons of Eli: and therefore without reason is it called the law of Kings, jus regum, if it was the law of the judges, for if all this law be Tyrannicall and but an a∣buse of Kingly power,* 1.714 the same law may agree to all other Magistrates, who by the same unjust power may abuse their power, but Samuel (as Brentius observeth homi. 27. in 1 Sam. in princ.) doth meane here a greater license then Kings can challenge, if at any time they would make use of their plenitude of absolute power, and therefore, nomine juris, by the word [law] here he understandeth a power granted by law, jure, or right to the King, but pernitious to the people, which Gregory calleth jus regium Tyrannorum, the Royall law of Tyrants.—So Se∣neca 1 de clem. c. 11. hoc interest inter regem & Tyrannum, Species ipsa fortunae ac licentiae par est, nisi quod Tyranni ex volutate saeviunt, Reges non nisi ex causa & necessitate? quid ergo? non Reges quoque accidere solent? sed quoties fieri publica utilitas persuadet, Tirannis saevitia cordi est. A Tyran (saith Arnisaeus) in this differeth from a King, Qui ne ea quidem vult, quae sibi licent, that a King will not do these things which are lawfull; a Tyran doth quae libet, what he pleaseth to do.

Answ. Arnisaeus bewrayeth his ignorance in the Scriptures, for the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth a custome,* 1.715 and a wicked custome, as by many Scriptures I have proved already, his reasons are poor. It is the manner of inferiour judges, as we see in the sons of Eli, and Samuel, to pervert judgment, as well as King Saul did, but the King may more oppresse, and his Tyranny hath more colour, and is more catholick then the oppression of inferiour judges, it is not Samuels purpose thus to distinguish the judges of Israel and the kings, in that the judges had no power granted them of God to oppresse, because the people might judge their judges and resist them, and there was pow∣er given of God to the king, so far to play the Tyrant, that no man could resist him, or say, what dost thou? the text will not beare any such difference, for it was as unlawfull to resist Moses, Ioshua,

Samuel, as Royalists prove from the judgement of God that came upon Core, Dathan and Abiram, as to resist King Saul and King Da∣vid, Royalists doubt not to make Moses a King. It was also no lesse sin to resist Samuels sons, or to do violence to their persons, as judg∣ing for the Lord, and sent by the supreme judge their father Samuel, then it was sin to resist many inferiour Judges that were Lyons, and even Wolves under the Kings of Israel and Iudah, so they judged for the Lord, and as sent by the Supreme Magistrate; But the difference was in this, that judges were extraordinarily raised up of God out of any tribe, as he pleased, and were beleevers, Heb. 11.32. Saved by faith, and so used not their power to oppresse the people, though inferiour judges, as the sons of Eli and of Samuel perverted judg∣ment, and therefore in the time of the judges,* 1.716 God who gave them saviours and judges, was their King, but Kings were tied to a certaine tribe, especially the line of David to the Kingdom of Iudah.

2. They were hereditary, judges not so.

3. They were made and chosen by the people, Deut. 17.14.15. 1 Sam. 10.17, 18, 19, 20. 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. as were the Kings of the nations, and the first King (though a King be the lawfull ordinance of God) was sought from God in a sinfull imitation of the nations, 1 Sam. 8.19, 20. and therefore were not of Gods peculiar election, as the judges, and so they were wicked men, and many of them, yea all for the most part, did evil in the sight of the Lord, and their law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 their manner and custome was to oppresse the people, and so were their inferiour judges little Tyrants, and lesser Lyons, Leopards, evening Wolves. Ezech. 22.27. Mic. 3.1, 2, 3. Esa. 3.14, 15. And the Kings and inferiour judges are onely distinguished, de facto, that the King was a more Catholick oppressour, and the old Lyon, and so had more art and power to catch the prey then the inferiour judges who were but whelps, and had lesse power, but all were op∣pressors (some few excepted, and Samuel speaketh of that which Saul was to be, de facto, not de jure, and the most part of the Kings after him) and this Tyranny is well called jus regis, the manner of the King, and not the manner of the jugdes, because it had not been the practice, custome and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the beleeving judges, before Sauls Reigne, and while God was his peoples King, 1 Sam. 8.7. to op∣presse. 3. We grant that all other inferiour judges after the people cast off Gods government, and in imitation of the nations, would have a King, were also lesser Tyrants, as the King was a greater

Tyrant, and that was a punishment of their rejecting God and Sa∣muel to be their King and judge. 4. How shall Arnisaeus prove that this manner or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the King w••s potestas concessa, a power granted, I hope, granted of God; and 〈…〉〈…〉 abuse of Kingly power, for then he and Royalists must say, that all the acts of Tyranny ascribed to King Saul, 1 Sam. 8.11, 12, 13, 14. by reason of which they did cry out, and complaine to God because of their oppression, was no abuse of power given to Saul. Ergo, it was an use and a law∣full use of power given of God to their King, for there is no medium or mids betwixt a lawfull power used in morall acts, and a lawfull power abused, and indeed Arnisaeus so distinguisheth a King and a Tyrant, that he maketh them all one in nature and spece. He saith, a Tyrant doth quod licet, that which by Law he may do, and a King doth not these things, quae licent, which by Law he may do, but so to me it is clear, a Tyrant acting as a Tyrant, must act according to this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 law of the King▪ and that which is lawfull, and a King act∣ing as a King and not doing these things that are lawfull, must sin against his office, and the power that God hath given to him, which were to commend and praise the Tyrant, and to condemne and dis∣praise the King. 3. If this Law of the King be a permissive Law of God, which the king may out of his absolutenesse, put in execution to oppress•• the people, such as the law of a bill of divorcement, as Ar∣nisaeus, Barcklay, and other Royalists say, then must God have given a Law to every King to play the Tyrant,* 1.717 because of the hardnesse of the Kings heart, but we would gladly see some word of God for this. The Law of a bill of Divorcement is a meere positive Law permitted in a particular exigent, when a husband out of levity of heart and affection cannot love his wife, therefore God by a Law permitted him out of indulgence to put her away, that both he might have a seed (the want whereof, because of the blessed seed, to be borne of woman, was a reproach in Israel) and though this was an affliction to some particular women, yet the intent of the Law, and the soul thereof was a publique benefit to the Common-wealth of Israel, of which sort of Lawes I judge the hard usage permitted by God to his people, in the Master toward the servant, and the people of God toward the stranger of whom they might exact usury, not toward their brethren to be; But that God should make a permissive Law that Ieroboam might presse all Israel to sinne and worship the Golden Calves, and that a King by Law may kill, as a

bloody Nero, all the people of God, by a Divine permissive Law, hath no warrant in Gods word: Judge reader, if Royalists make God to confer a benefit on a land, when he giveth them a King, if by a Law of God, such as the Law for a bill of Divorcement, the King may kill and devour as a lawfull absolute Lion, six kingdoms of nations that professe Christ and beleeve in his name. For if the King have a divine law to kill an innocent Ionathan, so as it be un∣lawfull to resist him, he may by that same law turne bloodier then either Nero, Iulian, or any that ever sucked the paps of a Liones, or of any of whom it may be said,

Quaeque dedit nutrix ubera, Tigris erat.

and he shall be given as a plague of God, ex conditione doni, to the people, and the people, inasmuch as they are gifted of God with a King, to feed them in a peaceable and godly life, must be made slaves; now it wanteth reason that God will have a permissive Law of murthering the Church of Christ, a Law so contrary to the pub∣lique good and intrinsecall intention of a King, and to the immu∣ta••le and eternall law of Nature, that one man because of his pow∣er, may by Gods permissive Law murther millions of innocents: Some may say, It is against the duty of love, that by Nature and Gods Law the husband owes to the wife, Ephes. 5.25. that the husband should put away his wife; for God hateth putting away, and yet God made a Law, that a husband might give his wife a bill of divorce, and so put her away; and by the same reason, God may make a Law, though against nature, that a King should kill and murther, without all re∣sistance.

Answ. The question is not if God may make permissive Laws to oppresse the innocent; I grant he may doe it, as he may command Abraham to kill his son Isaac▪ and Abraham by Law is obliged to kill him, except God retract his Commandement, and whether God retract it, or no, he may intend to kill his son, which is an act of love and obedience to God; but this were more then a permissive Law. 2. We have a cleere Scripture for a permissive Law of di∣vorce,* 1.718 and it was not a Law tending to the universall destruction of a whole Kingdome, or many Kingdomes, but onely to the grie∣vance of some particular wives: but the Law of divorce gave not power to all husbands to put away their wives, but onely to the husband, who could not command his affection to love his wife. But this law of the King, is a Catholique law to all Kings, (for

Royalists will have all Kings so absolute, as it is sin and disobedi∣ence to God to resist any) that all Kings have a divine law to kill all their subjects; surely, then it were better for the Church to want such nurse-fathers, as have absolute power to suck their blood: and for such a perpetuall permissive Law continuing to the end of the world, there is no word of God. Nor can we think that the hard∣nesse of one Princes heart, can be a ground for God to make a Law so destructive to his Church and all mankinde: such a permissive Law, being a positive Law of God, must have a word of Christ for it, else we are not to receive it. 2. Arnisaeus cap. 4. distru. Ty∣ran. & princ. n. 16. thinketh a Tyrant, in excercito, becomming a notorious Tyrant, when there is no other remedy may be removed from government, sine magno scel••re, without great sin. But I aske how men can annull any divine Law of God, though but a permissive Law. For if Gods permissive Law warrant a Tyrant to kill two innocent men, it is tyranny more or lesse, and the Law distinguisheth not. 3. This permissive Law is expressely contray to Gods Law, limiting all Kings Deut. 17.16, 17, 18. How then are we to be∣leeve, that God would make an universall Law contray to the Law that he established before Israel had a King? 4. What Brentius saith is much for us, for he calleth this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Law a licence, and so to use it must be licentiousnesse. 5. Arnisaeus desireth that Kings may use sparingly the plenitude of their power, for publique good; there must be (saith he) necessity to make it lawfull to use the plenitude of this power justly; therefore Ahab sinned, in that he unjustly possessed Naboths vineyard, though he sinned specially in this, that he came to the possession by murther, and it was peculiar to the Iewes, that they could not transfer their possessions from one tribe to another. But if it be so, then this power of absolutenesse is not given, by permissive Law, by which God permitted putting away of wives, for the object of a per∣missive Law is sinne, but this plenitude of power may be justly put forth in act (saith he) if the publique good may be regarded: I would know what publique good can legittimate Tyranny and kil∣ling of the innocent, the intentions of men can make nothing intrin∣secally evil to become good. And 6. How can that be a permissive Law of God, and not his approveing Law by which Kings create inferiour judges? for this is done by Gods approving will. 7. It is evident that Arnisaeus his minde is, that Kings may take their sub∣jects vineyards, and their goods, so they erre not in the manner, and

way of the act, so be like, if there had not been a peculiar Law that Naboth should not sell his vineyard, and if the King had had any pub∣lique use for it, he might have taken Naboths vineyard from him, but he specially sinned (saith he) in eo maxime culpatur, &c. that he took away the mans vineyard by murthering of him, therefore saith Arnisaeus c. 1. de potest. maj. in bona privato. 2. that by the Kings Law 1 Sam. 8. There is given to the King, a dominion over the peoples sons, daughters, fields, vineyards, olive-yards, servants and flockes. So he citeth that that Daniel putteth all places, the Rocks of the Moun∣taines, the birds of the heaven Dan. 2. under the Kings power. So all is the Kings in dominion, and the subjects in use onely.

But 1. This law of the King then can be no ground for the Kings absolutenesse above Law, and there can be no permissive Law of God here, for that which assert••th the Kings Royall Dominion over per∣sons and things, that must be the Law of Gods approving, not his permiting evil, but this is such a Law as Arnisaeus saith.

2. The text speaketh of no Law or lawful power, or of any absolute∣nesse of King Saul; but of his wicked custome, and his rapine and Tyranny, He will take your sons, your daughters, your fields, and your vineyards from you. Saul took not these through any power of do∣minion by Law, but by meere Tyranny.

3. I have before cleared that the subjects have a propriety, and an use also, else how could we be obliged by vertue of the fift com∣mandement to pay tribute to the King, Rom. 13.7. for that which we pay, was as much the Kings before we payed, as when we have paied it.

4. Arnisaeus sai••h all are the Kings in respect of the universall ju∣risdiction, that the King hath in governing and ordering all to the universall end, the good of the Common-wealth, for as universall nature careth for the conservation of the spece and kind, so doth par∣ticular nature care for the conservation of individuals, so do men care for their private good, and the King is to refer every mans private goods, to the good of the publick, but the truth is, this taketh not a∣way propriety of goods from private men, retaining onely the use to private men, and giving the dominion to the King, because this power that the King ••ath of mens goods, is not power of dominion, that the King hath over the goods of men, as if the King were Do∣minus, Lord and owner of the fields and monyes of the private sub∣ject, but it is a power to regulate the goods for a publique use, and

supposeth the abuse of goods, when they are Monopolized to, and for private ends.* 1.719 2. The power that the King hath over my bread is not a power of dominion, so as he may eat my bread, as if it were his own bread, and he be Lord of my bread as I was sometimes my self, before I abused it, but it is a dominion unproperly, and abusively so called, and is a meere fiduciary, and dispensatory power, because he is set over my bread not to eat it, nor over my houses to dwel in them, but onely with a ministeriall power as a publique, though a honour∣able servant and w••tchman app••inted by the community, as a mean for an end to regulate my bread, houses, moneys, fields for the good of the publique. Dominion is defined a faculty to use a thing as you please, except you be hindered by force, or by Law. ••ustin. tit. c. de legibus in l. digna vox. &c. So have I a dominion over my own garments, house, money, to use them for us••s not forbidden by the Law of God, and man, but I may not lay my corne field wast that it shall neither bear grass•• nor corne, the King may hinder that, because it is a hurt to the publique: but the King as Lord and Soveraigne hath no such dominion over Naboths vi••eyard. H••w the King is lord of all goods, ratione jurisdictionis, & tuitionis s••. Anton. de paudrill. in l. Altius. n. 5. c. de servit. Hottom. illust. quest. q. 1. ad fin. Conc. 2. Lod. Molin. de just. & jur. dis. 25. Soto. de justiti•• & jur. l. 4. q. 4. art. 1.

QUEST. XL. Whether or no the people have any power over the King, either by his oath, covenant, or any other way?

ARistotle saith, Ethic. 8. c. 12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A Tyrant seeketh his owne, a King the good of the Subjects, for he is no King who is not content, and excelleth in goodnesse.* 1.720 The former part of these words distin∣guish essentially the King by his office, from the Tyrant. Now e∣very office r••qu••reth essentially a duty to be performed by him that is in office; and where there is a duty required, there is some obli∣gation; if it be a politique duty, it is a politique obligation. Now amongst politique duties betwixt equall and equall, superiour and inf••riour, that is not, de facto, required coaction for the performance ther••••f, but de jure, there is, for two neighbour Kings and two neigh∣bour Nations, both being equall and independent, the one toward the other, the one owe a duty to the other, and if the Ammonites do a

wrong to David and Israel, as they are equall de facto, the one can∣not punish the other, though the Ammonites do a disgrace to Da∣vids messengers, yet de jure, David and Israel may compell them to politique duties of politique cons••ciation; (for betwixt indepen∣dent kingdomes there must be some politique government, and some politique and civil Lawes, for two or three making a society, cannot dwell together without some policy) and David and Israel as by the Law of nature they may repell violence with violence,* 1.721 so if the lawes of neighbour-hood and nations be broken, the one may punish the other, though there be no relation of superiority and inferiority betwixt them. 2. Where ever there is a covenant and oath be∣twixt equals, yea or superiours and inferiours, the one hath some co∣active power over the other; if the father give his bond to pay to his son ten thousand pounds, as his patrimony to him, though before the giving of the bond the father was not obliged, but onely by the Law of nature to give a patrimony to his son, y••t now by a politique ob∣ligation of promise, covenant and writ he is obliged so to his son to pay ten thousand pounds, that by the Law of Nations and the civil Law, the son hath now a coactive power by Law to compell his father, though his superiour, to pay him no lesse then ten thousand pounds of patrimony. Though therefore the King should stand simply superiour to his kingdom and estates (which I shall never grant) yet if the King come under covenant with his kingdom, as I have proved at length c. 13. he must, by that same, come under some coactive power to fulfill his covenant, for omne promissum (saith the Law) cadit in debitum. What any doth promise falleth under debt, if the covenant be politique and civil, as is the covenant be∣tween King David and all Israel, 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. and between King Iehoash and the people, 2 King. 11.17, 18.* 1.722 Then the King must come under a civil obligation to performe the covenant, and though their be none superiour to King, and the people on earth to compell them both to performe what they have promised, yet de jure, by the Law of Nations, each may compell the other to mutuall perform∣ance. This is evident,

1. By the Law of nations, if one nation break covenant to ano∣ther, though both be independent, yet hath the wronged nation a coactive power, de jure (by accident, because they are weaker, they want stength to compell, yet they have right, and jus to compell them) to force the other to keep covenant, or then to punish them,

because nature teacheth to repel violence by violence, so it be done without desire of revenge and malice.

2. This is proved from the nature of a promise or covenant, for Solomon saith, Prov. 6.1. My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou hast stricken thy hand with a stranger, 2. Thou art snared with the words of thy mouth, & art taken with the words of thy mouth. But whence is it that a man free is now snared as a beast in a gin or trap? Certainly Solomon saith it is by a word and striking of hands, by a word of promise and covenant. Now the Creditor hath coa∣ctive power, though he be an equall or an inferiour to the man who is surety, even by Law to force him to pay, and the Judge is obli∣ged to give his coactive power to the Creditor, that he may force the surety to pay. Hence it is cleare that a Covenant maketh a free man under the coactive power of law to an equall and to weaker, and the stronger is by the law of fraternity to help the weaker, with his coactive power, to cause the superiour fulfill his covenant. If then the King (giving, and not granting, he were superiour to his whole Kingdome) come under a covenant to them, to seek their good, not his owne, to defend true Protestant Religion, they have power to compell him to keep his covenant, and Scotland (if the King be stronger then England, and break his covenant to them.) is obliged by Gods law, Prov. 24.11. to adde their forces and coa∣ctive power to help their brethren of England.

3. The Law shall warrant to loose the vassal from the Lord, when the Lord hath broken his covenant. Hippolitus in l. Si quis viduam col. 5. & dixit de quest. l. Si quis major. 41. & 161. Bartol. n. 41. The Magdeburgens. in libel. de offic. magistrat. Imperatores & reges esse primarios vasallos imperii, & regni, & proinde si feloni∣am contra imperium aut regnum committant, fewdo privari, proinde ut alios vasallos.

Arnisaeus q. 6. An princeps qui jurat subditis, &c. n. 2. saith, This occasioneth confusion and sedition. The Egyptians (saith he) cast off Ptolomeus, because he affected too much the name of a King of the Romans his own friend, Dion. l. 9. The States punished Archidanius because he married a wife of a low stature, Plutarch. in Agos. in pris. The ancient Burgundions thought it cause enough to expell their King, if matters went not well in the State, Marcel. l. 27. The Goths in Spain gave no other cause of expelling their King, nisi quod sibi displice∣ret, because he displeased them. Aimon. l. 2. c. 20. l. 4. c. 35.

Ans. All these are not to be excused in people, but neither every abuse of power in a King exautorateth a King, nor every abuse in people, can make null their power.

Arnisaeus maketh three kinds of oathes: the first is,* 1.723 when the King sweareth to defend true Religion, and the Pope, and he denyeth that this is an oath of fidelitie, or by paction or covenant made to th•• Pope or Clergie, he saith it is onely on oath of protection, nor doth the King receive the Crown from the Pope or Clergie.

Answ. 1. Arnisaeus divideth oathes that are to be conjoyned, we read not that Kings sweare to defend Religion in one oath, and to administrate judgement and justice in another: for David made not two Covenants, but onely one with all Israel. 2. The king was not King while he did swear this oath, and therefore it must be a pa∣ctionall oath between him and the Kingdom, and it is true the King receiveth not a Crown from the Church, yet David received a Crowne from the Church, for this end, to feed the Lords people, and so conditionally. Papir Masse l. 3. Chron. Gal. saith,* 1.724 The King was not king before the oath. 2. That he did sweare to be a keeper not onely of the first, but also of the second Table of the Law. Ego N. Dei gratia, mox futuras rex Francorum, in die ordinationis mea coram Deo, & sanctis ejus polliceor, quod servabo privilegia canoni∣ca, justitiamque & jus unicuique Praelato debitum, vosque defendam, Deo juvante, quantum potero, quemadmodum Rex ex officio in suo regno defendere debet, unumquemque Episcopum ac Ecclesiam, & ad∣ministrabo populo justitiam & leges, uti jus postulat. And so is it or∣dained in the Councel of Tolet. 6. c. 6. Quisquis deinceps regni sorti∣tus fuerit apicem, non ante conscendat Regiam sedem, quam inter reli∣quas conditiones sacramento policitus fuerit, quod non sinet in regno suo degere cum qui non sit Catholicus. All these by Scripture are oath••s of Covenant, Deut. 17. ver. 17, 18. 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3, 4. 2 Kings 11.17, 18.

Arnisaeus maketh a second oath of absolute Kings, who sweare they shall raigne according to equitie and justice; and he saith, There is no need of this oath, a promise is enough, for an oath encreaseth not the obligation. L. fin. de non num. pec. Onelie it addeth the bound of Re∣ligion, for there is no use of an oath, where there is no paction of law against him that sweareth, if he violate his oath. There followeth onelie the punishment of Perjurie. And the word of a Prince is as good as his oath, onelie he condescendeth to sweare to please the people, out of

indulgence, not out of necessitie. And the King doth not therefore sweare because he is made King, but because he is made King he swea∣reth. And he is not King because he is crowned, but he is crowned be∣cause he is King. Where the Crowne goeth by succession, the King ne∣ver dieth; and he is King by nature before he be crowned.

Answ. 1. This oath is the very first oath spoken of before, in∣cluded in the covenant that the King maketh with the people, 2 Sam. 5.2, 3, 4. For absolute Princes, by Arnisaeus his grant, doth swear to do the duties of a King, as Bodinus maketh the oath of France, de Rep. l. 1. c. 8. Iuro ego, per deum, ac promitt•• me justè reg∣naturum▪ judicium, equitatem, ac misericordiam facturum. And pa∣pir. Mass. l. 3. Chron. hath the same expresly in the particulars. And by this a King sweareth he shall not be absolute, and if he swear this oath, he bindeth himself not to governe by the Law of the King, whereby he may play the Tyrant as Saul did, 1 Sam. 8.9, 10, 11, 12, &c. As all Royalists expound the place.

2. It is but a poor evasion to distinguish betwixt the Kings pro∣mise and his oath,* 1.725 for the promise and covenant of any man, and so of the King doth no lesse bring him under a civil obligation and po∣litique coaction, to keep his promise, then an oath, for he that becom∣eth surety for his friend doth by no civil Law, sweare he shall be good for the sonne, or performe in liew and place of the friend, what he is to performe, he doth onely covenant and promise, and in law and politique obligation he is taken and snared by that promise, no lesse then if he had sworne. Reuben offereth to be caution to bring Benjamin safe home to his old father, Gen. 42.37. & Iudah also, Gen. 43.9. but they do not swear any oath, & it is true that an oath adeth no∣thing to a contract and promise, but onely it laies on a religious tie be∣fore God, yet so as consequently, if the contractor violate both pro∣mise and oath, he cometh under the guilt of perjury, which a law of men may punish. Now that a covenant bringeth the King under a politique obligation, as well as an oath is already proved, and far∣ther confirmed by Gal. 3.15. Though it be a mans testament or cove∣nant no man disanulleth and addeth thereunto; No man even by mans law can anull a confirmed covenant, and therefore the man that made the covenant bringeth himself under law to fulfill his own covenant; and so must the King put himself under mens law, by a covenant at his Coronation. Yea and David is reputed by Royal∣lists, an absolute Prince, yet he cometh under a covenant before he be

made King. 3. It is but a weak reason to say, that an oath is needlesse, where no action of law can be against the King who sweareth, if it have any strength of reason. I retort it, a legall and solemne promise then is needlesse also, for there is no action of law against a King (as Roy∣alists teach) if he violate his promise. So then King David need∣lesly made a Covenant with the people at his Coronation; for though David should turne as bloody an enemie to the Church as Nero or Iulian, the people have no Law-action against David; and why then did Ieremiah seek an oath of the King of Iudah, that he would not kill him, nor deliver him into the hands of his enemies? and why did David seek an oath of Ionathan? It is not like Ieremiah and Dav∣id could have law-action against a King and a Kings son, if they should violate the oath of God. And farther, it is a begging of the question, to say that the States can have no action against the king, if he should violate his oath.* 1.726 Hugo Grotius putteth seven cases in which the people may have most reall action against the King to ac∣cuse and punish him.

1. They may punish the King to death, for matters capitall,* 1.727 if so it be agreed on betwixt the King and the people, as in Lacedemonia.

2. He may be punished as a private man.

3. If the King make away a Kingdome given to him by succession, his act is null, and he may be resisted, because the Kingdome is a life∣rent onely to him. Yea saith Barclay, He loseth the Crown.

4. He loseth his Kingdom, if with a hostile mind he seek the destru∣ction of the Kingdome.

5. If such a clause be put in, that if he commit felonie, or doe such oppressions, the Subjects shall be loosed from the bonds of subjection; then the King failing thus, turneth a private man.

6. If the King have the one halfe or part of the Kingdome, and the people or Senate the other halfe; if the King prey upon that half which is not his owne, he may violently be resisted, for in so farre he hath not the Empire.

7. If when the Crowne was given, this be declared, that in some cases he may be resisted; then some naturall liberty is free from the Kings power, and reserved in the peoples hand.

It is then reason that the King sweare an oath. 4. That the Kings oath is but a ceremonie to please the people, and that because he is king, and king by birth; therefore he sweareth, and is crown∣ed, is in question, and denyed. No man is borne a king, as no man

is borne a subject, and because the people maketh him King, there∣fore he is to swear. The councel of Toledo saith, non antea conscendat regiam sedem quam iuret. 2 An oath is a religious obligation, no arbitrary ceremony. 3. He may swear in his cabinet chamber, not covenanting with the people, as David and Iehoash did. 4. So he maketh promises that he may be King,* 1.728 not because he is King, it were ridiculous, he should promise or swear to be a just King, be∣cause he is a just King, and by the same reason the estates swear the oath of loyalty to the new King, not that they may be loyall in all time coming, but because they are loyall Subjects already, for if the one half of the covenant on the Kings part be a ceremony of indul∣gence, not of necessity, by the same reason, the other half of the co∣venant must be a ceremony of indulgence also to the people.

Object. Arnisaeus saith, a contract cannot be dissolved in law, but by consent of two parties contracting, because both are obliged. l. ab emp∣tione 58. in pr. de pact. l. 3. de rescind. vend. l. 80. de solu. Therefore if the subjects go from the covenant, that they have made to be loyall to the King, they ought to be punished.

Answ. A contract, the conditions whereof are violated, by nei∣ther side, cannot be dissolved, but by the joynt consent of both; and in buying and selling, and in all contracts unviolated, the sole wil of nei∣ther side can violate the contract, of this speaketh the law. But I ask the Royalist, if the contract betwixt the spies sent to view Iericho and Rahab the harlot, had not been null, and the spies free from any obligation, if Rahab had neglected to keep within doors, when Ieri∣cho was taken, though Rahab and the spies had never consented ex∣presly to break the covenant? We h••ld that the law saith with us, that vassals lose their farme, if they pay not what is due: Now what are Kings but vassals to the State,* 1.729 who if they turne Tyrants, fall from their Right?

Arnisaeus saith in the councell of Toledo 4. c. 74. The subjects ask from the King, that Kings would be meek and just, not upon the ground of a voluntarie Contract and Paction, but because God shall rejoice in King and People, by so doing.

Answ. These two do no more fight one with another, then that two Marchants should keep faith one to another, both because God hath said he shall dwell in Gods mountaine who sweareth and co∣venanteth, and standeth to his oath & covenant, though to his losse & hurt, Psa. 15. and also, because they made their covenant and contract thus and thus.

Arnisaeus. 16. Every Prince is subject to God, but not as a vassal: for a Master may commit felonie, and lose the proprietie of his farme; can God do so? The Master cannot take the farme from the vassal without an expresse cause legally deduced, but cannot God take what he hath given, but by a law-Processe? a vassall can intitle to himself a farme against the Masters will, as some jurists say, but can a Prince intitle a kingdom to himself, against the God of heavens will? though we grant the comparison, yet the subjects have no law over the Kings, because the coercive power of the vassal is in the Lord of the manner, the punishing of Kings belongeth to God.

Answ. We compare not the lord of a mannor and the Lord of Heaven together, all these dissimilitudes we grant, but as the King is Gods vassal, so is he a noble and Princely vassal to the Estates of a kingdom, because they make him. 2. They make him rather then a∣nother their noble servant. 3. They make him for themselves, and their own Godly, quiet, and honest life. 4. They, in their first electi∣on, limit him to such a way, to governe by law, and give to him so much power for their good, no more, in these four acts they are a∣bove the Prince, and so have a coercive power over him.

Arnisaeus n. 9. It is to make the Princes fidelity doubtfull to put him to an oath. Lawyers say there is no need of an oath, when a person is of approved fidelitie.

Answ. Then we are not to seek an oath of an inferiou r Magi∣strate, of a Commander in wars, of a pastor, it is presumed these are of approved fidelity, and it maketh their integritie obnoxious to sland••rs, to put them to an oath. 2. David was of more approved fidelity then any King now adayes, and to put him to a covenant seemed to call his fidelity in question; Ionathan sought an oath of David to deal kindly with his seed, when he came to the throne, Ieremiah sought an oath of the King of Iudah, did they put any note of false-hood on them therefore?

Arnisaeus. You cannot prove that ever any King gave an oath to their subjects in Scriptures.

Answ. What more unbeseeming Kings is it to swear to do their duty, then to promise covenant wayes to do the same? and a cove∣nant you cannot deny. 2. In a covenant for religious duties there was alwayes an oath. 2 Chro. 15.12, 13, 14. hence the right of cut∣ting a calf, and swearing in a covenant Ier. 34.18. 3. There is an oath that the people giveth to the King to obey him, Eccles. 8.2. and a

covenant 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. mutuall between the king and people, I leave it to the juditious, if the people swear to the king obedience in a covenant mutuall, and he swear not to them.

Arnisaeus sheweth to us a third sort of oath that limited Princes do swear, this oath in Denmarke, Suecia, Polonia, Hungaria, is sworne by the kings, who may do nothing without consent of the Senat, and according to order of Law, this is but the other two oathes specified, and a Prince cannot contraveen his own contract, the law saith in that the Prince is but as a private man, in l. digna vox C. de ll. Rom. cons. 426. n. 17. And it is known that the Emperour is constituted and created by the Princes Electors, subject to them, and by Law may be dethroned by them.

* 1.730The B. of Rochester saith from Barclay, none can denude a King of his power, but he that gave him the power, or hath an expresse com∣mandement so to do, from him that gave the power.

But God onely and the people gave the King his power. Ergo, God with the people having an expresse commandement from God, must de∣nude the King of power.

Answ. 1. This shall prove that God onely by an immediat acti∣on, or some having an expresse commandement from him, can de∣prive a preacher for scandals, Christ onely, or those who have an ex∣presse commandement from him can excommunicate, God only or the magistrate with him can take away the life of man; and Numb. 11.14, 15, 16. No inferiour Magistrates, who also have their power from God immediatly, Rom. 13.1. If we speak of the immediation of the office, can devide inferiour judges of their power. God only by the husbandmans paines maketh a fruitfull vineyard, Ergo, the husbandman cannot make his vineyard grow over with nettles and briars.

2. The argument must run thus, else the assumption shall be false. God onely by the action of the people, as his instrument, and by no other action make a lawfull King. God onely by the action of the people as his instrument can make a King, God onely by the action of the people as his instrument can dethrone a King, for as the peo∣ple making a King, are in that doing what God doth before them, and what God doth by them in that very act, so the people un∣making a King, doth that which God doth before the people, both the one and the other according to Gods rule obligeth, Deut. 17.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.

The Prelate, whose tribe seldom saith truth, addeth, As a fatherly power, by God and natures law, over a family,* 1.731 was in the father of a family, before the children could either transfer their power, or consent to the translation of that power to him, so a Kingly power (which suc∣ceedeth to a paternal or fatherly power) to governe many families, (yea & a Kingdom) was in that same father, in relation to many families, be∣fore these many families can transfer their power. The Kingly power floweth immediately from God, & the people doth not transfer that pow∣er, but doth onely consent to the person of the King, or doth onely choose his person at some time. And though this power were principally given to the people, it is not so given to the people as if it were the peoples power, & not Gods▪ for it is Gods power, neither is it any other waies given to the people, but as to a streame, a beam, and an instrument which may confer it to another. M. Anton. de domini. l. 6. c. 2. n 22.23. doth more subtilly illustrate the matter, if the King should confer honour on a sub∣ject, by the hand of a servant, who had not power or freedom to confer that honour, or not to confer it, but by necessity of the Kings command∣ment must confer it, nothing should hinder us to say, that such a subject had his honour immediately from the King: so the earth is immediately illuminated by the sun, although light be received in the earth, but by the interveening mediation of many inferiour bodies and elements, be∣cause by no other thing, but by the sun only, is the light as an efficient cause in a nearest capacity to give light, so the Royall power in whom∣soever it be is immediatly from God onely, though it be applyed by men to this, or this person, because from God onely, and from no other the Kingly power is formally and effectively that which it is, and worketh that which it worketh, and if you ask by what cause is the tree imme∣diatly turned in fire, none sound in reason would say, it is made fire, not by the fire, but by him that laid the tree on the fire. Iohn P. P. would have stollen this argument also, if he had been capable thereof.

Ans. 1. A fatherly power is in a father, not before he have a child, but indeed before his children by an act of their free-will consent that he be their father, yea & whether the children consent or no, from a phy∣sical act of generation he must be the father; & let the father be the most wicked man & let him be made by no moral requisite, is he made a father, nor can heever leave off physically to be a father, he may leave off morally to do the duty of a father, & so be non pater officio, but he cannot but be pater naturae generantis vi. So there never is nor can be any need, that childrens fre consent interveen to make Kish the Father

of Saul because he is by nature a father, to make Saul a King & a moral father by analogy and improperly,* 1.732 a father by ruling, governing, guiding, defending Israel, by good laws, in peace and godlinesse, I hope there is some act of the peoples free-will required even by Spalatoes way, the people must approve him to be King, yea they must King him, or constitute him King, say we, no such act is re∣quired of naturall sons to make a physicall father, and so here is a great halt in the comparison, and it is most false that there is a King∣ly power to governe many families in the same father, before these ma∣ny families can transfer their power to make him King. Put Royal∣lists to their Logick, they have not found out a medium to make good, that there is a formall Kingly power, whereby Saul is King and fa∣ther morally over all Israel before Israel chose him and made him, as Kish was Sauls father formally, and had a fatherly power to be his father, before Saul had the use of free-will to consent, that he should be his father. Royalists are here at a stand; The man may have Roy∣all gifts before the people make him King, but this is not (regia pote∣stas) a Royall power, by which the man is formally King. Many have more Royal gifts then the man that beareth the Crown, yet are never Kings, nor is there formally, (regia potestas) kingly power in them. In this meaning Petrarcha said, Plures sunt reges quam regna.

3. He saith, The people doth not confer royall power, but onely con∣sent to the person of the man, or choise of his person. This is non-sense, for the peoples choosing of David at Hebron to be King, and their refusing of Sauls seed to be King, what was it but an act of God, by the free suffrages of the people, conferring royall power on David, and making him King? whereas in former times, David even a∣nointed by Samuel at Bethleem, 1 Sam. 16. was onely a private man, the subject of King Saul, and never tearmed by the Spirit of God, a King; nor was he King, till God, by the peoples consent, made him King at Hebron; for Samuel neither honoured him as King, nor bowed to him as King, nor did the people say, God save King David, but after this David acknowledged Saul as his Master, and King. Let Royalists shew us any act of God making David King, save this act of the people making him formally King at Hebron, and therefore the people as Gods instrument transferred the power, and God by them in the same act transferred the power, and in the same they chose the person; the Royalists affirm these to be different actions; affirmanti incumbit probatio.

4. This power is the peoples radically, naturally, as the Bees (as some think) have a power naturall to choose a King-Bee, so hath a communitie a power naturally, to defend and protect themselves; and God hath revealed in Deut. 17.14, 15. the way of regulating the act of choosing Governours and Kings, which is a speciall mean of defending and protecting themselves; and the people is as principally the subject and fountain of Royall power, as a fountain is of water. I shall not contend, if you call a Fountain Gods In∣strument to give water, as all creatures are his Instruments. 5. For Spalato's comparison, he is far out, for the people choosing one of ten to be their King, have freewill to choose any, and are under a Law, Deut. 17.14, 15. In the manner of their choosing, and thought, they erre and make a sinfull choice; yet the man is King, and Gods King, whom they make King; but if the King command a servant to make A. B. a Knight, if the servant make C. D. a Knight, I shall not think C. D. is a valid Knight at all; and in∣deed, the honour is immediately here from the King, because the Kings servant by no innate power maketh the Knight, but Nations by a radicall and naturall and innate power maketh this man a King, not this man: and I conceive, the man chosen by the people, oweth thanks, and gratefull service to the people, who rejected o∣thers, that they had power to choose, and made him King. 6. The light immediately and formally, is light from the Sun, and so is the Office of a King, immediately instituted of God, Deut. 17.14. Whether the institution be naturall, or positive, it is no matter. 2. The man is not King, because of Royall indowments, though we should say these were immediately from God, to which instructi∣on and education may also conferre not a little; but he is formally King, ratione 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in regard of the formall essence of a King, not immediately from God, as the light is from the Sun, but by the mediation of the free consent of the people, 2 Sam. 5.1, 2, 3. nor is the people in making a King, as the man who onely casteth Wood in the fire; the Wood is not made fire formally, but by the fire, not by the approach of fire to Wood, or of Wood to fire; for the people do not apply the Royaltie, which is immediately in, and from God to the person: explicate such an application; for to me it is a Fiction unconceiveable, because the people hath the Royaltie radically in themselves, as in the Fountain and Cause, and conferreth it on the man who is made King; yea, the people by making David

King, confer the Royall power on the King: this is so true, that Royalists forgetting themselves, inculcate frequently in asserting their absolute Monarch from Vlpian, but misunderstood, that the people have resigned all their power, libertie, right of life, death, goods, chastitie, a potency of rapine, homicides, unjust wars, &c. upon a creature called an absolute Prince, even, saith Grotius, as a man may make himself a slave, by selling his liberty to a master. Now if the people make away this power to the King,* 1.733 and this be nothing but the transcendent absolutenesse of a King: certainly, this power was in the people; for how can they give to a King, that which they have not themselves? As a man cannot make away his liberty, to a master, by becoming a slave to him, if his libertie were immediately in God, as Royalists say, Soveraigntie is imme∣diately in God, and people can exercise no Act about Soveraignty, to make it over to one man, rather then to another. People onely have an after-approbation, that this man to whom God hath given it immediately, shall have it. Furthermore, they say, people in making a King, may make such conditions, as in seven cases a King may be dethroned, at least resisted, saith Hu. Grotius. Ergo, people may give more, or lesse, half or whole, limited or absolute Royall power to the Prince; but if this power were immediately in God, and from God; how could the people have the husbanding of it, at their need to expend it out in ounce weights, or pound weights, as they please? And that the people may be Taverners of it, to sell, or give it, is taught by Grotius de jur. bel & pac. l. 1. c. 4. Barclai. advers. Monarch. l. 4. c. 6. Arnisae. cap. 6. de majest. an princeps qui jurat subditis, &c. n. 10. n. se Aventiun. Anal. l. 3. Chytreus, l. 23. l. 28. Saxon Sleid. lib. 1. in fi; yet Arnisaeus is not ashamed to cite Arist. po. c. 12. l. 3. That he is not a true and absolute King, who ruleth by Laws: The point black contrary of which Aristotle saith.

QUEST. XLI. Whether doth the P. Prelate upon good grounds, ascribe to us the doctrine of Jesuites in these Questions of lawfull defensive Wars?

THe P. Prelate without all ground, will have us all Iesuites in this point; but if we make good, that this Truth was in Scrip∣ture before a Iesuite was in the earth, he falleth fron his Cause.

P. Prelate. The Begardi saith, There was no Government,* 1.734 no Law given to the just. It f••••reth me, this age fancieth to it self, some such thing, and have learned of Core, Dathan, &c.

Ans. This Calumniator in the next words belieth himself, when he saith, We presuppose, that these with whom we are to enter in Lists, do willingly grant, That Government is not onely lawfull and just, but necessary both for Church and Common-wealth: then we fancie no such thing as he imputeth to us.

P. Prelate. Some said, that the right of Dominion is founded on grace; whether the Waldenses and Hus, held any such Tenet, I cannot now insist to prove, or disprove. Gerson and others held, that there must be a new Title and Right to what men possesse: Too many too confidently hold these, or the like.

Answ. 1. That Dominion is founded upon Grace, as its essen∣tiall Pillar; so as wicked men be no Magistrates, because they are in mortall sin, was falsly imputed to ancient Protestants, the Wal∣denses, Wickcliff, and Hus, by Papists; and this day by Iesuites, Suarez, Bellarmine, Becan. The P. Prelate will leave them under this Calumny, that he may offend Papists and Iesuites as little as he can, but he would lay it on us; but if the P. Prelate think, that Dominion is not founded on Grace, de jure, that Rulers should have that spirit that God put on the seventy Elders for their Cal∣ling, and that they ought not to be men fearing God, and hating covetousnesse, as Gerson and others did, he belieth the Scripture.

2. It is no errour of Gerson, that beleevers have a spirituall Right to their civill possessions, but by Scripture, 1 Cor. 4.21. Revel. 21.7.

P. Prelate. The Iesuites are ashamed of the errour of Casuists, who hold that, directum imperium, the direct and primary power, Supreme, Civill, and Ecclesiasticall, is in the Pope; and therefore, they give an indirect directive, and coercive power to him, over Kings and States, in ordine ad spiritualia: So may he King and un-King Princes at his pleasure. Our Presbyterians, if they run not fully this way, are very neer to it.

Answ. The Windy man would seem versed in School-men, he should have named some Casuists, who hold any like thing.

2. The Presbyterians must be Popes, because they subject Kings to the Gospel, and Christs Scepter in Church Censures, and think Christian Kings may be rebuked for blasphemy, blood-shed,

&c. Whereas Prelates, in ordine ad diabolica, murther souls of Kings.* 1.735 2. Prelates do King Princes. An P. Arch-Prelate, when our King was crowned, put the Crown on King Charls Head, the Sword and Scepter in his hand, anointed him in his hands, Crown, shoulders, arms, with sacred Oyl: The King must kisse the Arch∣bishop, and Bishops; is not this to King Prince••, in ordine ad spiri∣tualia: And these that Kingeth may unking, and judge what relation the P. Arch-Bishop Spotwood had, when he proffered to the King, The Oath that the Popish Kings sweareth to maintain, the professed Religion (not one word of the true Protestant Religion) and will carefully root out all Hereticks, and enemies (that is Protestants as the expone it,) to the true Worship of God, that shall be convicted by the true Church of God of the foresaid crimes. And when the Prelates professed, they held not their Prelacies of the King, but of the Pope indeed: Who are then nearest to the Popes power, in ordine ad spiritualia? 3. How will this black mouthed Calumniator, make Presbyterians to dethrone Kings? He hath written a Pamphlet of the inconsistency of Monarchie and Presbyterian Government, consisting of lies, invented Calumnies of his Church, in which he was baptized. But the truth is, all his Arguments prove the incon∣sistencie of Monarchs and Parliaments, and transform any King in a most absolute Tyrant; for which Treason he deserveth to suffer as a Traytor.

P. Prelate. Q. 1. c. 1. The Puritan saith, That all power Civill, is radically and originally seated in the Communitie; he here joyneth hands with the Jesuite.

Answ. In six pages he repeateth the same things. 1. Is this such an Heresie, that a Colonie casted into America by the Tyranny of P. Prelates, have power to choose their own Governours; all Is∣rael was Hereticall in this, for David could not be their King, though designed and anointed by God, 1 Sam. 16. till the people, 2 Sam. 5. put forth in act, this power, and made David King in Hebron. 2. Let the Prelate make a Syllogisme, it is but ex utraque affirmante in secunda figura, Logick like the bellies of the Court, in which men of their own way is disgraced and cast out of Grace and Court, because in this controversie of the King with his two Parlia••ents, they are like Erasmus in Gods matters, who said, Lutherum nec accuso, nec defendo. 1. He is discourted who ever he be, who is in shape like a Puritan, and not fire and sword against

Religion and his Countrey, and Oath and Covenant with God, and so it is this. The Iesuite teacheth, that power of Government is in the Communitie originally. The Puritan teacheth, that power of Govern∣ment is in the Communitie originally. Ergo, The Puritan is a Iesuite. But so the Puritan is a Iesuite, because he and the Iesuite teacheth, that there is one God, and three persons; And if the Prelate like this reasoning, we shall make himself and the Prelates, and Court-Di∣vines, Iesuites upon surer grounds.

Jesuites teach, The Pope is not the Antichrist. 2. Christ locally discended to Hell, to free some out of that prison. 3. It was sin to se∣parate from Babylonish Rome. 4. We are justified by works. 5. The merit of fasting is not to be condemned. 6. The Masse is no idolatry. 7. The Church is the judge of controversies. 8. All the Arminian points are safer to be beleeved, then the contrary; yea, and all the substantials of Popery are true, and Catholick doctrine to be preach∣ed and Printed: The Prelates and Court-Divines, and this Prelate conspireth, in all these with the Iesuites, as is learnedly and invin∣cibly proved in the Treatise, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Canterburian self-conviction: to which no man of the Prelaticall and Romish Faction durst ever make answer for their hearts: and see then who are Iesuites. 3. This doctrine was taught by Lawyers, Protestants, yeilded to by Papists before any Iesuite was whelped in rerum naturâ. Never learned man wrote of policy, till of late; but he held power of Government, by the light of nature must be radically and originally, in a Communitie: the P. Prelate saith, Iesuites are not the father of this opinion, Cap. 1. pag. 12. How then can the Liar say, that the Puritan conspireth with the Iesuite? Suarez the Iesuite de primat. sum. pontifi. l. 3. c. 2. n. 10. Non est novum, aut a Cardinali Bellarmino inventum. The Iesuite Tannerus will not have their Family the mother of this opi∣nion, Tom. 2. disp. 5. de leg. q. 5. in 12. q. 95, 96. Dubi. 1. n. 7. Sine dubio communis omnium Theologorum & Iurisperitorum senten∣tia, &c. The Iesuite Tolet, in Rom. 13. taketh it for a ground, That the Civill powers are from God, by the naturall mediation of men, and Civill Societies. 4. Iesuites teach, That there is no lawfull Christian society truely politick that hath a neer and formall power, to choose and ordain their own Magistrates, but that which ac∣knowledgeth subjection, and the due regulation of their creating of Magistrates, to be due and proper to the Pope of Rome. We ac∣knowledge

no wayes the Bishop of Rome, for a lawfull Bishop and Pastor at all: But this Popish Prelate doth acknowledge him, for he hath these words, Cap. 5. pag. 58. It is high presumption in the Pope, to challenge to himself, the Title or Right of Christs universall Vicar on earth, by Divine right. The Pope, the Bishop of Rome, hath no more by Divine right, (what he may have by positive Ecclesiasti∣call right, is not pertinent for us now to examine and discusse) no higher priviledge (except it be in extent) then the meanest Bishop of the world in his Diocesse. And amongst all proofes, he passing by Scriptures, which should prove, or improve a Divine right, he will content himselfe with one proofe of Cyprian, de unitat. Eccles. And endeth with these words: Would God, both sides, in this, and other contro∣versies, would submit to the judgement of the holy Fathers.

Hence the P. Prelate, in his 4. Article, (the other two I shall touch anon) maketh Puritans grosser then Jesuites, in dethroning Kings; because, if the King be deficient, the People may resume their power, and governe for him, and so dethrone the King. But Bellar∣mine, l. 3. q. de laic. holdeth, the people cannot dethrone the King, but,* 1.736 in certis casibus, in some cases, that is, (as Suarez saith) si Rex sua potestate iu manifestam (Civitatis ceu Regni) perniciem abutatur. But I will demonstrate, that if Papists hold that the Pope may de∣throne Kings, this Prelate is of their mind: for, 1. the words I ci∣ted, make good that he is for the Popes Supremacie; (now it is a joynt or lith of his supremacie, to King and un-King Princes.) 2. They make good that he is a Papist: for, 1. It is presumption in the Pope to challenge to himselfe, that he is Christs Vniversall Vicar on Earth by Divine right.* 1.737 Why saith he not, by no right at all, but on∣ly he is not Christs Vicar by Divine right: for it is evident that Papists make him Christs Vicar, only by Ecclesiasticall right; for they professe, succession of Popes to this day, cannot be proved but by Tradition, not by Scripture.

2. The Popes supremacie, by Papists, is expresly reckoned amongst unwritten Traditions, and so there is no necessitie that the right of it be proved from Scripture.

3. The Prelate expresly saith, He will not discusse the Ecclesiasti∣call right that the Pope hath to be Christs Vicar. And by that he clearely insinuateth, that he hath a right to be Christs Vicar, beside a Scripturall and Divine right: only, for offending Papists, he will not discusse it.

4. He hath no higher priviledge (saith he) then other Bishops, except in extent, by Divine right. Now other Bishops, as officers in nature dif∣ferent from Presbyters, (for of such the P. Prelate must speak in his own dialect) have their office by Divine right: and this the Prelates words must include, else he saith non-sense to the matter in hand. And in extent the Pope hath by Divine right more then other Bi∣shops have. Now what is the Pope of Rome his extent? All knowes it is the whole Catholike visible Church on earth. If then all Bishops be particular Ambassadours in Christs stead, 2 Cor. 5.20. and so Legates and Deputies of Christ; He who by Divine right is a Bishop in extent over the whole world, is as like one that calleth himselfe the universall Vicar of Christ, as one egge is like another. 2. The doctrine taught by this Prelate, so Popish, & hints, yea are more then evidences of grosse Poperie in this book, and his other Pamphlet against Presbyteries; And his desire that the Controversie concer∣ning the Popes supremacie, and others, were determined with sub∣mission to the judgement of the Fathers: doe cry, that he is but a rot∣ten Papist. For why will he submit all other controversies to the judgement of the Fathers? Why not to the Prophets and Apostles? Can Fathers decide Controversies better then the Word of God? A reason cannot be dreamed of, why the Fathers should be Iudges, and not the Scriptures, except that Scriptures are obscure. 2. Their authoritie and light cannot determine and judge controversies, ex∣cept in so far as they have authoritie from Fathers and the Church: and we know this to be proprium 4 ^to modo, proper to Jesuites and Papists, to cry Fathers, Fathers, in all controversies, though the Fa∣thers be more for us, then for them, except two things; 1. What Fathers speake for us, are corrupted by them: 2. What were but errors in Fathers, when children adde contumacie to error, becomes the heresies of the sonnes.

And it is most false, that we joyne with Jesuites.* 1.738 1. We teach no more against Tyrants, in exercitio, then Grotius, Barclay, Winzetus, in the matter of deposing Kings. And in this, Royalists conspire with Jesuites. 2. We deny that the Pope may loose Subjects from the oath of Fidelitie, when a King turneth Hereticall; 3. That People at the Popes commandement, are to dethrone Kings, for Heresie, So doe the Prelates, and their fellowes the Papists teach. So Grego∣rie the 7. practised: so Aquinas taught, 22 q. 12. ar. 2. Antonin. sum. par. 3. t. 22. c. 3. §. 7. Thou hast put all things under the Popes feet:

oves, id est, Christianos; boves, Iudaeos & Hereticos; pecora, Pa∣ganos. So Navar. l. 1. c. 13. Pagans have no jurisdiction. Iaco. Sy∣manca, de Catho. Instit. tit. 45. n. 25. Catholica uxor heretico viro debitum reddere non tenetur. Item. Constat Haereticum privatum esse omni dominio, naturali, civili, politico, naturali quod habet in filios, nam propter haeresin patris efficiuntur filii sui iuris, civili, quod habet in servos, ab eo enim servi liberantur, politico, quod rerum domini habent in subditos, ita Bannes 22. q. 12. art. 10. Gregor. de valent▪ 22. dis. 1. q. 12. p. 2. lod. Mol. to. 1. De just. & jur. tract. 2. dis. 29. v. 3. 2. Papists hold that Generatio clerici est corruptio subditi, Church∣men are not subjects under the Kings Law. It is a Canonicall privi∣ledge of the Clergy, that they are not subject to the Kings Civill Lawes. Now this Prelate and his fellowes made the King sweare, at his Coronation, to maintaine all Canonicall Priviledges of the Prelaticall Clergy, the very Oath and words sworne by all the Popish Kings.

P. Prelate. Power is given by the multitude to the King immediat∣ly, and by God mediately, not so much by collation, as by approbation, how the Iesuite and Puritane walke all along in equall pace. See Bel∣larmine l. 1. de liac. c. 6. Zuarez cont. sect. Angl. l. 3. c. 3.

Answ. It is a Calumnie, that we teach that the power of the King is from God mediatly, by meere approbation; indeed a fellow of his, a Papist writing against the Kings Supremacy, Anthony Ca∣pell Cont. 1. c. 5. saith, Saul was made King, and others also by Gods permission,* 1.739 and Deo invito & irato, God being angry, that is not our Doctrine; but with what reall efficiencie God hath made men, and communities, rationall and sociall men, with the same hath he made them by instinct of nature, by the mediation of reason, to create a King; and Bellarmine and Suarez say, Not God maketh Kings by approbation only.

P. Prelate. The people may change Monarchy into Aristocracy or Democracy, or Aristocracy into Monarchy; for ought I know, they differ not in this neither.

Ans. The P. Prelate knoweth not all things, the two Iesuites, Bel∣larmine and Suarez are produced only, as if they were all Iesuites; and Suarez saith, De prim. po. l. 3. n. 4. Donationem absolutam semel valide factam revocari non posse, neque in totum, neque ex parce, maxime quando onerosa fuit. If the people once give their power to the King, they cannot resume it without cause, and laying downe

the grounds of Suarez and other Iesuites, that our Religion is He∣resie, they doe soundly collect this consequence, That no King can be Lord of the consciences of their subjects, to compell them to an Here∣ticall Religion. We teach that the King of Spaine hath no power over the consciences of Protestant Subjects, to force them to Ido∣latry, and that their soules are not his subjects, but only their per∣sons, and in the Lord. 2. It is no great crime, that if a King dege∣nerate in a Tyranny, or if the Royall Line faile, that we thinke the people have liberty to change Monarchy into Aristocracy, aut contra. Iesuites deny that the people can make this change without the Popes consent. We judge neither the great Bishop the Pope, nor the little Popes ought to have hand in making Kings.

P. Prelate. They say the power is derived to the King from the peo∣ple, Cumulativè, or Communicativé, non Privativé, by way of com∣munication, not by way of privation, so as the people denude not them∣selves of this soveraignty. As the King maketh a Lieutenant in Ire∣land, not to denude himselfe of his Royall power, but to put him in trust for his service. If this be their mind, the King is in a poore case. The principal authority is in the Deligate, and so the people is still Iudge, and the King their Deputy.

Ans. The P. Prelate taketh on him to write he knoweth not what, this is not our opinion. The King is King, and hath the peo∣ples power not as their Deputy.

1. Because the people is not principall Iudge, and the King subordinate. The King in the executive power of Lawes, is really a Soveraigne above the people, a Deputy is not so.

2. The people have irrevocably made over to the King, their power of governing, defending, and protecting themselves, I ex∣cept the power of selfe preservation, which people can no more make away, it being sinlesse natures birth-right then the liberty of eating, drinking, sleeping; and this the people cannot resume, ex∣cept in case of the Kings Tyranny, there is no power by the King so irrevocably resigned to his Servant or Deputy, but he may use it himselfe.

3. A Delegate is comptable for all he doth to those that put him in trust, whether he doe ill or well. The King in acts of Iustice is not comptable to any, for if his acts be not lyable to high suspitions of Tyranny, no man may say to him What dost thou? onely in acts of unjustice, and those so tyrannous, that they be inconsistent with the

habituall fiduciary repose and trust put on him, he is to render ac∣counts to the Parliament, which representeth the people.

4. A Delegate in esse, in fieri, both that he may be a Delegate, and that he may continue a Delegate, whether he doe ill or well, de∣pendeth on his pleasure who delegateth him; but though a King depend in fieri, in regard of his call to the Crowne, upon the suffra∣ges of his people, yet that he may be continued King, he dependeth not on the people simply, but only in case of Tyrannicall admini∣stration, and in this sense Suarez and Bellarmine spake with no more honesty, then we doe, but with more then Prelates doe, for they professe any Emissary of Hell may stab a Protestant King▪ We know the Prelates professe the contrary, but their judgement is the same with Iesuites in all points; and since they will have the Pope Christs Vicar, by such a Divine right as they themselves are Bishops, and have the King under Oath to maintaine the Clergie, Bishops, and all their Canonicall priviledges, amongst which the Bishops of Rome his indirect power in ordine ad spiritualia, and to dethrone Kings who turne Heritickes, is one principall right. I see not how Prelates are not as deepe in treason against Kings as the Pope himselfe, and therefore P. Prelate, take the beame out of your owne eye.

The P. Prelate taketh unlearned paines, to prove that Gerson, Occam, Iac. de almaine, Parisian Doctors maintained these same grounds a nent the peoples power over Kings in the case of Tyranny, and that before Luther and Calvine was in the world, and this is to give himselfe the lye, that Luther, Calvin, and we have not this Doctrine from Iesuites, and what is Calvines mind, is evident, In∣stit. l. 4. c. all that the estates may coerce, and reduce in order a Tyrant,* 1.740 else they are deficient in their trust that God hath given them over the Common-wealth and Church; and this is the Do∣ctrine for which Royalists cry out against Master Knox of blessed memory, Buchanan, Iunius Brutus, Bouchier, Rossaeus, Althusius, and Luther, in scripto ad pastorem, to 7. German. fol. 386. bringeth two examples for resistance; the people resisted Saul, when he was willing to kill Ionathan his sonne, and Ahikam and other Princes rescued Ieremiah out of the hands of the King of Iudah: and Gerar∣dus citeth many Divines, who second Luther in this, as Bugenlia∣gius, Iustus Ionas, Nicholas Ambsderffius, George Spalatinus, Iustus Menius, Christopher Hofmanus. It is knowne what is the mind of

Protestant Divines, as Beza, Pareus, Melancthon, Bucanus, Polanus Chamer, all the Divines of France, of Germany, of Holland. No wonder then Prelates were upon the plot of betraying the City of Rochel, and of the Protestant Church there, when they then will have the Protestants of France, for their defensive warres to be Rebels, and siders with Iesuites, when in these warres Iesuites sought their blood and ruine.

The P. Prelate having shewn his mind concerning the deposing of Childericke by the Pope (of which I say nothing, but the Pope was an Antichristian Usurper, and the poore man never fit to beare a Crowne) he goeth on to set downe an opinion of some mute Au∣thors, he might devise a thousand opinions that way, to make men beleeve he had been in a wood of learned mens secrets, and that ne∣ver man saw the bottome of the controversie, while he, seeing the e∣scapes of many Pens (as supercilious Bubo praiseth) was forced to appeare a Star new risen in the firmament of Pursevants, and re∣veale all dreames, and teach all the New-Statists, the Gamaliels, Bu∣chanan, Iunius Brutus, and a world who were all sleeping, while this Lucifer the sonne of the night did appeare, this new way of Lawes, Divinity and casuists Theologie.

They hold (saith P. P.) Soveraigne power is primarily and na∣turally in the multitude, from it derived to th•• King,* 1.741 immediatly from God. The reason of which order is, because we cannot reape the fruites of government, unlesse by compact we submit to some possible and acci∣dentall inconveniences.

Ans. 1. Who speaketh so the P. Prelate cannot name. That So∣veraigne power is primarily and naturally in the multitude. Vertually (it may be) Soveraignty is in the multitude, but primarily and naturally, as heat is in the fire, light in the Sun; I thinke the P. Pre∣late dreamed it, no man said it but himselfe: for what attribute is naturally in a Subject, I conceive may directly and naturally be predicated thereof. Now the P. Prelate hath taught us of a very naturall predication. (Our Dreadful and Soveraign Lord the multi∣tude commandeth this and this.)

2. This is no more a reason for a Monarchy, then for a Demo∣cracy, for we can reape the fruites of no government, except we submit to it.

3. We must submit in Monarchy (saith he) to some possible and accidentall inconveniences. Here be soft words, but is subversion of

Religion, Lawes, and Liberties of Church and State, introducing of Popery, Arminianisme, of Idolatry, Altar-worship, the Masse pro∣ved by a learned Treatise, The Canterburian selfe conviction, prin∣ted the 3. edit. an 1641. never answered, couched under the name of inconveniency? The pardoning of the innocent blood of hun∣dreds of thousand Protestants in Ireland, the killing of many thou∣sands, Nobles, Barons, Commons, by the hands of Papists in Armes ag••inst the Law of the Land, the making of England a field of blood, the obtruding of an Idolatrous Service-Booke, with Armies of men, by Sea and Land, to blocke up the Kingdome of Scotland, are all these inconveniences only?

4. Are they only possible and accidentall? but make a Monarch absolute, as the P. Prelate doth, and tyranny is as necessary and as much intended by a sinfull man, inclined to make a God of himselfe, as it is naturall to men to sinne, when they are tempted, and to be drunken and giddy with honour and greatnesse; witnesse the Kings of Israel and Iudah, though de jure they were not absolute. Is it ac∣cidentall to Nero, Iulian, to the ten hornes that grew out of the womans head, who sate upon the scarlet colloured beast, to make warre against the Lambe, and his followers, especially the spirit of Sathan being in them?

P. Prelate, They inferre, 1. They cannot without violation of a Divine ordinance, and breach of faith resume the authority, they have placed in the King. 2. It were high sin to rob authority of its essen∣tials. 3. This ordinance is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and hath urgent reasons.

Ans. 1. These namelesse Authors cannot inferre that an Oath is broken, which is made conditionally; all authority given by the people to the King is conditionall, that he use it for the safety of the people, if it be used for their distruction, they breake no faith to re∣sume it, for they never made faith to give up their power to the King upon such tearmes, and so they cannot be said to resume what they never gave.

2. So the P. Prelate maketh power to act all the former mis∣chiefes, the essentialls of a King. Balaam he is not worthy his wa∣ges, for Prophecying thus, that the Kings essentialls is a power of blood, and destructive to people, Law, Religion and liberties of Church and State, for otherwise we teach not, that people may resume from the King Authority and power of disarme Papists, to

roote out the bloody Irish, and in justice serve them, as they have served us.

3. This ordinance of the people giving lawfull power to a King, for the governing of the people in peace and godlinesse, is Gods good pleasure, and hath just reasons and causes. But that the people make over a power to one man, to act all the inconveniences above na∣med, I mean the bloody and destructive inconveniences, hath no∣thing of God, or reason in it.

P. Prelate. The reasons of this opinion are. 1. If Power soveraigne were not in one, he could not have strength enough to act all necessary parts and acts of government. 2. Nor to prevent divisions which at∣tend multitudes, or many indowed with equall power; and the Au∣thors say, They must part with their native right entirely, for a greater good, and to prevent greater evills. 3. To resume any part of this po∣wer, of which the people have totally devested themselves, or to limit it, is to disable Soveraignty from government, loose the sinewes of all society, &c.

Ans. 1. I know none for this opinion,* 1.742 but the P. Prelate him∣selfe. The first Reason may be made rhyme, but never reason: for though there be not absolute power to good and ill, there may be strength of limited power in abundance in the King, and sufficient for all acts of just Government, and the adequate end of Govern∣ment, which is, salus populi, the safetie of the people. But the Roya∣list will have strength to be a Tyrant, and act all the Tyrannicall and bloody inconveniences of which we spake, an essentiall part of the power of a King; As if weaknesse were essentiall to strength; and a King could not be powerfull as a King, to doe good, and save and protect, except he had power also as a Tyrant to doe evill, and to destroy and waste his people, This power is weaknesse, and no part of the image of the greatnesse of the King of Kings, whom a King representeth.

2. The second Reason condemneth Democracie and Aristocracie, as unlawfull, and maketh Monarchie the only Physick to cure these; as if there were no Government an ordinance of God, save only ab∣solute Monarchie, which indeed is no ordinance of God at all, but contrary to the nature of a lawfull King, Deut. 17.3.

3. That people must part with their native right totally, to make an absolute Monarch; is, as if the whole members of the Body would part with their whole nutritive power, to cause the Milt to swell;

which would be the destruction of the Body.

4. The people cannot divest themselves of power of defensive Warres, more then they can part with Nature, and put themselves in a condition inferior to a slave, who, if his master, who hath power to sell him, invade him unjustly, to take away his life, may oppose violence to unjust violence. And the other Consequences are null.

QUEST. XLII. Whether all Christian Kings are dependent from Christ, and may be called his Vicegerents?

* 1.743THe P. Prelate taketh on him to prove the truth of this: but the question is not pertinent: it belongeth to another head, to the Kings power in Church matters. I therefore only examine what he saith, and follow him.

P. Prelate. Sectaries have found a Quere of late, that Kings are Gods, not Christs Lieutenants on earth. Romanists and Puritans erect two Soveraignes in every State; The Jesuite, in the Pope; the Puri∣tan, in the Presbyterie.

Ans. We give a reason why God hath a Lieutenant, as God; Be∣cause Kings are Gods, bearing the sword of vengeance against se∣ditious and bloody Prelates, and other ill-doers. But Christ, God-Man, the Mediator and Head of the body the Church, hath neither Pope nor King to be head under him. The sword is communicable to men; but the Headship of Christ is communicable to no King, nor to any created shoulders. 2. The Iesuite maketh the Pope a King: and so this P. Prelate maketh him, in extent, the Bishop of Bishops, and so King, as I have proved. But we place no Sove∣raigntie in Presbyteries, but a meere ministeriall power of servants, who doe not take on them to make Lawes and Religious Ceremo∣nies, as Prelates doe, who indeed make themselves Kings and Law∣givers in Gods house.

P. Prelate. We speake of Christ as Head of the Church. Some think that Christ was King by his Resurrection, jure acquisito, by a new title, Right of merit. I think he was a King from his conception.

* 1.744Ans. You declare hereby, that the King is a ministeriall Head of the Church, under the head Christ. All our Divines disputing a∣gainst the Popes headship, say, No mortall man hath shoulders for

so glorious a head. You give the King such shoulders. But why are not the Kings, euen Nero, Iulian, Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazer, Vice∣gerents of Christ, as Mediator, as Priest, as Redeemer, as Prophet, as Advocate, presenting our prayers to God his Father? What acti∣on, I pray you, have Christian Kings, by office, under Christ, in dy∣ing, and rising from the dead for us, in sending down the Holy Ghost, preparing mansions for us? Now it is as proper and incom∣municably reciprocall with the Mediator, to be the only Head of the body the Church, Col. 1.18. as to be the only Redeemer and Advocate of his Church.

2. That Christ was King from his conception, as Man borne of the Virgin Mary, ••uteth well with Papists, who will have Christ, as Man, the visible Head of the Church; that so as Christ-man, is now in heaven, he may have a visible Pope to be Head in all Ecclesiasti∣call matters. And that is the reason why this P. Prelate maketh him head of the Church by an Ecclesiasticall right, as we heard: and so he followeth Becanus the Iesuite, in this, and others his fel∣lowes.

P. Prelate. 1. Proofe. If Kings reigne by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 per, in and through Christ, as the Wisdome of God, and the Mediator: then are Kings the Vicegerents of Christ, as Mediator. But the former is said, Prov. 8.15, 16. as D. Andrewes, of blessed memorie.

Ans. 1. Denies the major:* 1.745 All beleevers living the life of God ingrafted in Christ as branches in the tree, Ioh. 15.1.2. should by the same reason be Vicegerents of the Mediator: so should the An∣gels, to whom Christ is a head, Col. 2.10. be his Vicegerents; and all the Iudges and Constables on earth, should be under-Mediators, for they live and act in Christ: yea, all the Creatures, in the Medi∣ator, are made new, Rev. 21.5. Rom. 8.20, 21, 22.

2. D. Andrewes name is a curse on the earth, his writings prove him to be a Popish Apostate.

P. Prelate. 2. Christ is not only King of his Church; but in order to his Church, King over the Kings and Kingdomes of the earth, Ps. 2.5.8.

3. Math. 21.18. To him is given all power in heaven and earth; ergo, all Soveraigntie over Kings.

Ans. 1. If all these be Christs vicegerents, over whom he hath ob∣tained power; then, because the Father hath given him power o∣ver all flesh, to give them life eternall, Ioh. 17.1.2. then are all be∣leevers

his Vicegerents, yea and all the damned men and Devils, and Death and Hell are his Vicegerents: for Christ, as Mediator, hath all power given to him, as King of the Church, and so power Kingly over all his enemies, to reigne while he make them his footstoole, Ps. 110.1.2. to break them with a rod of iron, Ps. 2.9. 1 Cor. 15.24, 25, 26, 27. Revel. 1.18.20. v. 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. And by that same reason, the P. Prelates 4. and 5. Argument fall to the ground, He is heire of all things, ergo, all things are his Vicegerents. What more vaine? He is Prince of the Kings of the earth, and King of Oggs, of Kings, of his Enemies; ergo, Sea and Land are his Vice∣gerents.

* 1.746P. Prelate. Kings are nurse-fathers of the Church, ergo, they hold their crowns of Christ: 3. Divines say, that by men in sacred Orders Christ doth rule his Church mediately, in those things which primely concerne salvation; and that by Kings their scepter and power, he doth protect his Church, and what concerneth externall pompe, order and decencie. Then, in this latter sense, Kings are no lesse the immediate Vicegerents of Christ, than Bishops, Priests and Deacons, in the former.

Ans. Because Kings hold their Crownes of Christ, as Mediator and Redeemer, it followeth by as good consequence, Kings are submediators and under-Priests, and Redeemers, as Vicegerents. Christ, as King, hath no visible Royall Vicegerents under him.

* 1.7472. Men in holy Orders sprinkled with one of the Papists five blessed Sacraments, such as Antichristian Prelates, unwashed Priests to offer sacrifices, and Popish Deacons, are no more admit∣ted by Christ to enter into his sanctuary as governours, then the Leaper into the Campe of old, and the Moabite and Ammonite were to enter into the congregation of the Lord, Deut. 23.3. therefore we have excommunicated this P. Prelate, and such Moabites out of the Lords house. 2. What be the things that doe not primely concerne salvation, the P. Prelate knoweth, to wit, Images in the Church, Altar worship, Antichristian Ceremonies, which primely concerne damnation.

* 1.7483. I understand not what the P. Prelate meaneth, that the King preserveth externall Government in order and decency, in Scotland, in our Parliament, 1633. the prescribed Surplice, and he commanded the Service-booke, and the Masse-worship. The Prelate degradeth

the King here, to make him onely keep, or preserve the Prelates Masse-Clothes: they intended indeed to make the King but the Popes servant, for all they say and do for him now.

4. If the King be vicegerent of Christ in prescribing Laws for the externall ordering of the worship, and all their decent symbo∣licall Ceremonies: What more doth the Pope, and the Prelate in that kinde? He may, with as good warrant Preach and Admini∣strate the Sacraments.

P. Prelate. Kings have the sign of the Crosse on their Crowns.

Answ. Ergo, Baculus est in angulo. Prelates have put a crosse in the Kings heart, and crossed Crown and Throne to Really. Some Knights, some Ships, some Cities and Burroughes, do carry a crosse; are they made Christs vice-gerents of late? By what antiquity doth the Crosse signifie Christ? Of old it was a badge of Christians, no Religious Ceremony; and is this all. The King is the vicegerent of Christians. The Prelates we know, adore the Crosse with Re∣ligious worship: so must they adore the Crown.

P. Prelate. Grant that the Pope were the Vicar of Christ in spiri∣tuall things, it followeth not: Ergo, Kings Crowns are subject to the Pope; for Papists teach, that all power that was in Christ, as man, as power to work miracles, to institute Sacraments, was not transmitted to Peter and his successors.

Answ. This is a base consequence, Make the Pope head of the Church: the King, if he be a mixed person, that is, half a Church∣man, and Christs Vice-gerent; both he and Prelates must be mem∣bers of the head. Papists teach, that all in Christ as man, cannot be transmitted to Peter, but a Ministeriall Catholike Headship (say Batcanus and his fellows) was transmitted from Christ as man, and visible head, to Peter and the Pope.

P. Prelate. I wish the Pope,* 1.749 who claimeth so neer alliance with Christ, would learn of him to be meek and humble in heart; so should he finde rest to his own soul, to Church and State.

Answ. The same was the wish of Gerson, Occam, the Doctors of Paris, the fathers of the Concels of Constance and Basil; yet all make him head of the Church.

2. The Excommunicate Prelate is turned Chaplain to Preach to the Pope: the Soul-rest that Protestants wish to the Pope is, That the Lord would destroy him by the Spirit of his mouth, 2 Thes. 2.8. But P. Prelates, This wish is a Reformation of accidents,

with the safety of the subject, the Pope, and is as good as a wish, That the Devill remaining a Devill, may finde rest for his soul, all we are to pray for; as having place in the Church, are supposed members of the Church. The Prelate would not pray so for the Presbytery, by which he was ordained a Pastour, 1 Tim. 4.14. though he be now an Apostate: It is gratitude to pray for his lucky father the Pope. What ever the Prelate wish, we pray for, and beleeve, that desolation shall be his Soul-rest, and that the venge∣ance of the Lord, and of his Temple, shall fall upon him, and the Prelates his sons.

P. Prelate. That which they purpose, by denying Kings to be Christs Vice-gerents, is to set up a Soveraignty Ecclesiasticall in Presbyteries, to constrain Kings, repeal his Laws, correct his Satutes, reverse his Judgements, to cite, convent, and censure Kings; and if there be not power to execute, what Presbyteries decrees, they may call and com∣mand the help of the people, in whom is the underived Majstie; and promise, and swear, and covenant to defend their fancies, against all mortall men, with their Goods, Lands, Fortunes, to admit no divisive motion; and this Soveraign Association maketh every private man an armed Magistrate.

* 1.750Answ. You see the Excommunicate Apostats tusses against the Presbytery of a Reformed Church, from which he had his baptism, faith, ministery.

1. We deny the King to be the head of the Church.

2. We assert, that in the Pastors, Doctors, and Elders of the Church, there is a Ministeriall power, as servants under Christ, in his authority, and name, to rebuke and censure Kings; that there is revenge in the Gospel against all disobedience, 2 Cor. 2.6. and 10.6. The rod of God, 1 Cor. 4.21. The rod of Christs lips, Isai. 11.4. The Scepter and Sword of Christ, Revel. 1.16. and 19.15. The Keyes of his Kingdom, to binde and loose, open and shut, Matth. 18.17, 18. and 16.19. 1 Cor. 5.1, 2, 3. 2 Thes. 3.14, 15. 1 Tim. 1.19. and 5.22. and 5.17. And that this power is committed to the Offi∣cers of Christs house, call them as you will.

* 1.7513. For reversing of Laws made for the establishing of Popery, we think the Church of Christ did well to declare all these unjust grievous decrees; and that woe is due to the Iudges, even the Queen, if they should not repent, as Isai. 10.1. And this P. must shew his teeth in this, against our Reformation in Scotland, which

he once commended in Pulpit, as a glorious work of Gods right arm. And the Assemble of Glaskow, 1637. declared, That Bishops though established by Acts of Parliament, procured by Prelates onely, Commissioners, and Agents, for the Church, who betrayed their trust, were unlawfull, and did supplicate, That the ensuing Parliament would annull these wicked Acts. They think God pri∣viledgeth neither King, nor others from Church-Censures: the P. Prelates imprisoned, and silenced the Ministers of Christ, who preached against the publike sins, the blood, oppressions, unjustice, open swearing, and blasphemy of the holy Name of God, the coun∣tenancing of Idolaters, &c. in King and Court.

4. They did never sought the help of the people, against the most unjust standing Law of authority.

5. They never swear and covenant, to defend their own fancies, For the Confession and Covenant of the Protestant Religion, trans∣lated in Latin to all the Protestants in Europe and America, being termed a fancie, is a clear evidence, That this P. Prelate was justly excommunicated for Popery.

6. This Covenant was sworn by King James, and his house, by the whole Land, by the Prelates themselves. And to this fancy, this P. Prelate by the Law of our Land was obliged to swear, when he received degrees in the Universitie.

7. There is reason our Covenant should provide against divisive motions. The Prelates moved the King to command all the Land to swear our Covenant, in the Prelaticall sense, against the intent thereof, and onely to devide, and so command. Iudge what Reli∣gion Prelates are of, who will have the Name of God prophaned by a whole Nation, by swearing fancies.

8. Of making private men Magistrates, in defending themselves against cut-throats. Enough already: Let the P. Prelate answer if he can.

P. Prelate.* 1.752 Let no man imagine me to priviledge a King from the direction, and just power of the Church, or that like Uzzah he should intrude upon sacred actions, ex vi ordinis, in foro interno conscientiae, to Preach or Administrate Sacraments, &c.

Answ. Vzzah did not burn Incense, ex vi ordinis, as if he had been a Priest, but because he was a King, and Gods anointed. Prelates sit not in Councell and Parliament, ex vi ordinis, as tempo∣rall Lords. The Pope is no temporall Monarch, ex vi ordinis; yet

all are intruders. So the P. P. will licence Kings to administer Sa∣craments, so they doe it not Ex vi ordinis.

P.P. Men in sacred Orders in things intrinsecally spirituall, have immediatly a directive and authoritative power, in order, to all what∣soever, although ministeriall only, as related to Christ; but that gi∣veth them no coercive civill power over the Prince, per se, or per ac∣cidens, directly or indirectly, that either the one way or the other, any or many in sacred Order, Pope, or Presbytery, can cite and censure Kings, associate, Covenant or sweare to resist him, and force him to sub∣mit to the Scepter of Christ. This power over man God Almighty useth not, much lesse hath he given it to man, Ps. 110. His people are a wil∣ling people, Suadenda non cogenda religio.

* 1.753Ans. 1. Pastors have a ministerial power (saith he) in spirituall things, but in order to Christ, ergo in order to others it is not ministe∣riall, but Lordly. So here a Lordly power Pastors have over Kings, by the P. P. way. We teach it is ministeriall in relation to all, because Ministers can make no Lawes as Kings can doe, but only as Heralds, declare Christs Lawes.

2. None of us give any coercive Civill power to the Church, over either Kings, or any other, it is Ecclesiasticall; a power to rebuke and censure was never civill.

3. A religious Covenant to sweare to resist that is, to defend our selves is one thing, and a lawfull Oath, as is cleare in those of Israel, that did sweare Asa's Covenant, without the authority of their owne King, 2 Chron. 15.9, 10, 11, 12. and to sweare to force the King to submit to Christs Scepter is another thing; the Presby∣tery never did sweare or covenant any such thing: nor doe we take Sacrament upon it, to force the King. Prelates have made the King sweare, and take his Sacrament upon it, that he shall roote out Puritanes, that is Protestants, whereas he did sweare at his Coro∣nation to roote out Heretickes; that is, (if Prelates were not traiterous in administring the Oath) Arminians and Papists, such as this P. P. is knowne to be; but I hold that the Estates of Scotland have power to punish the King, if he labour to subvert Religion and Lawes.

4. If this Argument, that Religion is to be perswaded, not forced, which▪ P. P. useth, be good, it will make much against the King, for the King then can force no man to the externall profession, and use of the ordinances of God, and not only Kings, but all the people should be willing.

P. Prelate. Though the King may not preach,* 1.754 &c. yet the exercise of these things freely within his Kingdome, what concerneth the decent and orderly doing of all, and the externall man, in the externall go∣vernment of the Church, in appointing things arbitrary ând indifferent, and what else is of this straine, are so due to the prerogative of the Crowne as that the Priests without highest Rebellion, may not usurpe upon him a King in the State and Church is a mixed person, not simply civill, but sacred too. They are not only professors of truth, that they have in the capacity of Christians, but they are defenders of the faith as Kings, they are not sonnes only, but Nurse-fathers, they serve God, as Augustine saith, as men, and as Kings also.

Ans. If yee give the King power of the exercises of Word and Sacraments in his Kingdome,* 1.755 this is deprivation of Ministers in his Kingdome (for sure he cannot hinder them in another Kingdome) you may make him to give a Ministeriall calling, if he may take it away. By what word of God can the King close the mouth of the man of God, whom Christ hath commanded to speake in his name? 2. If the King may externally governe the Church, why may he not excommunicate, for this is one of the speciall acts of Church Go∣vernment, especially seeing he is a mixed person, that is halfe a Church-man, and if he may prescribe Arbitrary teaching Ceremo∣nies, Surplice to instruct men in the duties of holinesse required of Pastors, I see not, but he may teach the Word.* 1.756 3. Dr. Ferne and o∣ther Royalists deny Arbitrary Government to the King in the State, and with reason, because it is Tyranny over the people, but Prelates are not ashamed of commanding a thing Arbitrary and indifferent in Gods Worship, shall not Arbitrary Government in the Church be tyranny over the conscience? But (say they,) Church-men teacheth the King what is decent and orderly in Gods Worship, and he commandeth it.

Ans. Solomon by no teaching of Church-men deposed Abiather, David by no teaching of Church-men appointed the forme of the Temple. 2. Hath God given a Prerog••tive Royall to Kings, where∣by they may governe the Church, and as Kings they shall not know how to use it, but in so farre, as they are taught by Church-men? 4. Certainely we shall once be informed by Gods Word, what is this Prerogative, if according to it, all the externall worship of God may be ordered. Lawyers and Royalists teach, that it is an abso∣lutenesse of power, to doe above, or against a Law, as they say from

1 Sam. 8. v. 9.11. and whereby the King may oppresse,* 1.757 and no man may say, What dost thou? Now, Good P. Prelate, if by a plenitude of tyranny the King prescribe what he will in the externall worship and government of Gods House, who can rebuke the King, though he command all the Antichristian Ceremonies of Rome, and of Turkey, yea and the sacrificing of children to Molech? (for absolutenesse Royall will amount to shedding of innocent blood) for if any op∣pose the King, or say, Sir, What doe you? he opposeth the Preroga∣tive Royall, and that is highest Rebellion, saith our P. Prelate.

5. I see not how the King is a mixt person, because he is Defen∣der of the ••aith, as the Pope named the King of England, Henry the eighth: he defendeth it by his Sword, as he is a Nurse-father, not by the sword that commeth out of his mouth.

6. I would know how Iulian, Nebuchadnezzar, Og, and Sihon, were mixed persons, and did all in the externall government of the Church; and that by their office, as they were Kings.

7. All the instances that Augustine bringeth to prove that the King is a mixt person, proveth nothing but Civill acts in Kings; as Hezekiah cast down the high places, the King of Nineve compelled to obey the Prophet Ionah; Darius cast Daniels enemies to the Lyons.

P. Prelate. If you make two Soveraignes, and two Independents, there is no more peace in the State, then in Rebeckahs wombe, while Jacob and Esau strove for the prerogative.

Ans. 1. What need Israel strive, when Moses and Aaron are two Independents? If Aaron make a golden Calfe, may not Moses pu∣nish him? If Moses turne an Achab, and sell himselfe to doe wicked∣ly, ought not 80 valiant Priests and Aarons both rebuke, censure, and resist?

2. p. 65. The P.P. said, Let no man imagine we priviledge the King from the direction and power of the Church, so he be no intruding Vzzah. I pray, P. P. what is this Church power? Is it not supreme in its kinde of Church power? or is it subordinate to the King? If it be supreme,* 1.758 see how P. P. maketh two Supremes, and two So∣veraignes. If it be subordinate to the King, as he is a mixt person, the King is priviledged from this power, and he may intrude as Vzzah; and by his prerogative, as a mixed person, he may say Masse, and offer a sacrifice, if there be no power above his preroga∣tive to curbe him. If there be none, the P.P. his imagination is reall,

The King is priviledged from all Church power. Let the P.P. see to it; I see no inconvenience for reciprocations of subjections in two Supremes; and that they may mutually censure and judge one an∣other.

Object. Not in the same cause; that is impossible. If the King say Masse, shall the Church judge and censure the King for intrusion? and because the King is also Soveraigne and Supreme in his kinde, he may judge and punish the Church for their act of judging and censuring the King; it being an intrusion on his prerogative, that any should judge the highest Judge.

Ans. The one is not subiect to the other, but in the case of male-administration: the innocent, as innocent, is subject to no higher punishing; he may be subject to a higher, as accusing, citing, &c. Now the Royalist must give instance in the same cause, where the Church faileth against the King and his Civill law; and the King in the same cause faileth against the Church-canon; and then it shall be easie to answer.

P. Prelate. Religion is the bottome of all happinesse, if you make the King only to execute what a Presbyterie commandeth,* 1.759 he is in a hard case, and you take from him the chiefest in Government. Ecclesiasticall power hath the soule in subjection; the Civill Soveraigntie holdeth a dead dominion ever the body. Then the Pope and Presbyterie shall be in better condition then the King. Cic. in Ver. Omnes Religione mo∣ventur: Superstition is furious, and maddeth people, that they spare neither Crown nor Mitre.

Ans. Cold and dry is the P. P. when he spendeth foure pages in declamation for the excellencie of Religion; The madnesse of Su∣perstition, nothing to the purpose.

1. The King hath a chiefe hand in Church affaires, when he is a Nurse-father, and beareth the Royall sword to defend both the Ta∣bles of the Law, though he doe not spin and weave Surplices, and other base Masse-cloaths, to Prelates, and such Priests of Baal: They dishonour his Majestie, who bring his Prerogative so low.

2. The King doth not execute with blind obedience, with us,* 1.760 what the Pope commandeth, and the Prelates; but with light of knowledge what Synods discernes: and he is no more made the servant of the Church by this, then the King of Iudah, and Nebuchad∣nezzar are servants to Ieremiah and Daniel, because they are to obey the Word of the Lord in their mouth. Let them shew a reason of

this, why they are servants in executing Gods will in Discipline, and in punishing what the Holy Ghost by his Apostles and Elders de∣cree, when any contemne the Decree concerning the abstinence from blood, things strangled, &c. Act. 15. rather then when they punish murther, idolatrie, blasphemie, which are condemned in the Word preached by Pastors of Christ: and farther, this objection would have some more colour (realitie it hath not) if Kings were only to execute what the Church ministerially in Christs name, commandeth to be done in Synods: but Kings may, and doe command Synods to conveen, and doe their duty, and command many duties never Synodically decreed; as they are to cast out of their Court apo∣state Prelates, sleeping many yeares in the Devils armes, and are to command Trencher-Divines, neglecting their flock, and lying at Court, attending the falling of a dead Bishop, as Ravens doe an old dying horse; To goe and attend the flock, and not the Court, as this P. P. did.

3. A King hath greater outward glory, and may doe much more service to Christ in respect of extension, and is excellenter then the Pastor, who yet, in regard of intension, is busied about nobler things, to wit, the Soule, the Gospel, Eternitie, than the King.

4. Superstition maddeth men; but it followeth not, that true Religion may not set them on work to defend soule and body against Tyrannie of the Crown, and Antichristian Mitres.

P. Prelate. The Kingdome had peace, and plentie in Prelates time.

Ans. A belly-argument. We had plenty, when we sacrificed to the Queen of Heaven. 2. If the Traveller contend to have his purse againe, shall the Robber say, Robberie was blessed with peace? The rest, to the end, are lies, and answered already. Only his inve∣ctives against ruling Elders, falsly called Lay-Elders, are not to purpose. Parliament-Priests, and Lay and Court-Pastors, are Lay-Prophets.

* 1.7612. That Presbyteries meddle with Civill businesse, is a slander; They meddle with publike scandals that offendeth in Christs King∣dome. But the Prelate, by office, was more in two elements, in Church and State, then any Frogs even in the Kings Leaven••tubs ordinarily,

3. Something he saith of Popes usurping over Kings; but only of one of his fathers, a great uncleane spirit, Gregorie the Great: But

if he had refuted him by Gods Word, he should have thrown stones at his own Tribe; for Prelates, like him, doe, ex officio, trample up∣on the neck of Kings.

4. His testimonies of one Councell, and one Father, for all Anti∣quitie, proveth nothing. Athanasius said, God hath given Davids Throne to Kings: What, to be Head of the Church? No, to be the Minister of God, without 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to tutour the Church. And because Kings reigne by Christ, as the Councell of Arimin saith; therefore it may follow, a Baily is also Head of the Church. It is taken from Prov. 8. and answered.

5. That Presbyteries have usurped upon Kings, more then Popes, since Hildebrand, is a lie: all stories are full of the usurpation of Prelates, his own tribe; The Pope is but a swelled fat Prelate; and what he saith of Popes, he saith of his own house.

6. The Ministers of Christ in Scotland, had never a contest with King Iames, but for his sinnes, and his conniving with Papists, and his introducing Bishops, the usher of the Pope.

QUEST. XLIII. Whether the King of Scotland be an absolute Prince, having Pre∣rogatives above Parliament and Laws? The Negative is as∣serted by the Lawes of Scotland, the Kings Oath of Coronation, the Confession of Faith, &c.

THe negative part of this, I hold, in these Assertions.

Assert. 1. The Kings of Scotland have not any Prerogative distinct from Supremacie above the Lawes.* 1.762 1. If the People must be governed by no Lawes, but by the Kings own Lawes, that is, the Lawes and Statutes of the Realme acted in Parliament, under paine of disobedience; then must the King governe by no other Lawes, and so by no Prerogative above Law. But the former is an evident truth, by our Acts of Parliament; ergo, so is the latter. The Propo∣sition is confirmed; 1. Because what ever Law enjoyneth passive obedience no way but by Lawes; that must injoyne also the King actively to command no other way but by Law: for to be governed by Law, essentially includeth, to be governed by the Supreme Go∣vernour, only by Law. 2. An act of Regall governing, is an act of Law, and essentially an act of Law; an act of absolute Prerogative is no act of Law, but an act above Law, or of pleasure loosed from

Law; and so they are opposed as acts of Law, and non acts of Law. If the Subjects, by command of the King and Parliament, cannot be governed but by Law; How can the King but be under his own, and the Parliaments Law, to governe only by Law? I prove the Assumption from Parl. 3. of K. Iames the 1. Act 48. Ordaines, That all and sundry the Kings Lieges be governed under the Kings Laws and Statutes of the Realme allanerly, and under no particular Lawes, or speciall Priviledges, nor by any Lawes of other Countries or Realmes. Priviledges doe exclude Lawes: Absolute pleasure of the King, as a Man, and the Law of the King as King, are opposed by way of contradiction: and so in Parl. 6. K. James 4. Act. 79. and ratified Parl. 8. K. Iames 6. Act. 131.

2. The King, at his Coronation, 1. Par. K. James 6. Act. 8. swea∣reth to maintaine the true Kirk of God,* 1.763 and Religion now presently pro∣fessed, in puritie; And to rule the People according to the Lawes and Constitutions received in the Realme; causing Justice and equitie to be ministred without partialitie. This did King Charles sweare at his Coronation, and ratified Parl. 7. K. Iam. 6. Act. 99. Hence he who by the Oath of God is limited to governe by Law, can have no Pre∣rogative above the Law. If then the King change the Religion, Confession of Faith, authorised by many Parliaments, especially by Parliament, 1. K. Charles, An. 1633. He goeth against his Oath 3. The Kings Royall Prerogative, or rather Supremacie, enacted Parl. 8. K. James 6. Act. 129. and Parl. 18. Act. 1. and Parl. 21. Act. 1. K. Iames, and 1 Parl. K. Charles, Act. 3. cannot, 1. be con∣trary to the Oath that K. Charles did sweare at his Coronation, which bringeth down the Prerogative, to governing according to the standing Lawes of the Realme. 2. It cannot be contrary to these for∣mer Parliaments and Acts, declaring that the Lieges are to be gover∣ned by the Lawes of the Realme, and by no particular Lawes and spe∣ciall Priviledges: (but absolute Prerogative is a speciall Priviledge above, or without Law) which Acts stand unrepealed to this day: and these Acts of Parliaments stand ratified, An. 1633. the 1 Parl. K. Charles.

3. Parl. 8. K. Iames 6. in the first three Acts thereof, the Kings Supremacie, and the power and authoritie of Parliaments, are e∣qually ratified, under the same paine: Their jurisdictions, power and judgements in Spirituall or Temporall causes, not ratified by His Ma∣jestie, and the three Estates conveened in Parliament, are discharged.

But the Absolute Prerogative of the King above Law, Equity, and Iustice, was never ratified in any Parliament of Scotland to this day.

4. Parliam. 12. K. Iames 6. Act. 114. All former Acts in fa∣vour of the true Church and Religion, being ratified, Their power of making Constitutions concerning 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Order and Decency; the Priviledges that God hath given to spirituall Office-bearers, as well of Doctrine and Discipline, in matters of Heresie, Excommunication, Collation, Deprivation, and such like, warranted by the Word of God, and also to Assembles and Presbyteries, are ratified. Now in that Par∣liament, in Acts so contiguous, we are not to think, That the King and three Estates, would make Acts for establishing the Churches power in all the former heads of Government; in which, Royalists say, The soul of the Kings Absolute Prerogative doth consist: And therefore it must be the true intent of our Parliament, to give the King a Supremacy and a Prerogative Royall (which we also give) but without any Absolutenesse of boundlesse and transcendent power above Law; and not to obtrude a Service-Book, and all the Superstitious Rites of the Church of Rome, without Gods Word, upon us.

5. The former Act of Parliament ratifieth the true Religion, according to the Word of God, then could it never have been the intent of our Parliament, to ratifie an Absolute supremacy, accord∣ing to which, a King might govern his people, as a Tyrannous Lion, contrary to Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. And 'tis true: The 18. P. of King James 6. Act. 1. and Act. 2. upon personall qualifications, giveth a Royall Prerogative to King James over all causes, persons, and estates, within His Majesties Dominion; whom they humbly acknowledge, to be Soveraign Monarch, Absolute Prince, Judge, and Governour over all Estates, Persons, and Causes.

These two Acts, for my part I acknowledge, spoken rather in Court-expressions, then in Law-termes.

1. Because personall vertues cannot advance a limited Prince (such as the Kings of Scotland, Post hominum memoriam, ever were) to be an Absolute Prince: Personall graces make not Da∣vid absolutely supreme Judge over all persons and causes; nor can King James, advanced to be King of England, be for that, made more King of Scotland, and more supreme Iudge, then he was, while he was onely King of Scotland. A wicked Prince is as essen∣tially supreme Iudge, as a godly King.

2. If this Parliamentary figure of speech which is to be imputed to the times, exalted King James to be Absolute in Scotland, for his personall indowments, there was no ground to put the same on King Charls. Personall vertues are not alway Hereditary, though to me the present King be the best.

3. There is not any Absolutenesse above Law in the Act. 1. The Parliament must be more absolute themselves. King James 6. had been divers yeers before this 18. Parl. King of Scotland; then if they gave him by Law an Absolutenesse, which he had not before, then they were more Absolute. These who can adde Absolutenesse, must have it in themselves, Nemo dat quod non habet, if it be said, King James had that before the Act, the Parliament legally declared it to be his power, which before the Declaration, was his power. I answer, All he had before this Declaration was, to govern the people according to Law and Conscience, and no more; and if they declare no other Prerogative Royall to be due to him, there is an end, we grant all. But then this which they call Prerogative Royall is no more, then, a power to govern according to Law, and so you adde nothing to King James, upon the ground of his personall vertues, onely you make an oration to his praise in the Acts of Parliament.

4. If this Absolutenesse of Prerogative, be given to the King, the subjects swearing obedience, swear, That he hath power from themselves, to destroy themselves: this is neither a lawfull oath, nor though they should swear it, doth it oblige them.

6. A Supreme Iudge, is a supreme father of all his children, and all their causes; and to be a supreme Father, cannot be con∣trary to a supreme Iudge: but contrary it must be, if this supremacy make over to the Prince, a power of devouring as a Lyon, and that by a regall priviledge, and by office, whereas he should be a father to save; or if a Iudge kill an ill-doer, though that be an act destructive to one man, yet is it an act of a father to the Common-wealth. An act of supreme and absolute Royaltie is often an act of destruction to one particular man, and to the whole Common-wealth. For example, when the King out of his Absolute Preroga∣tive, pardoneth a murtherer, and he killeth another innocent man, and out of the same ground, the King pardoneth him again, and so till he kill twenty (for by what reason the Prerogative giveth one pardon, he may give twenty, there is a like reason above Law for all.) This act of Absolute Royaltie, is such an act of murther, as if

a shepherd would keep a Woolf in the fold with the sheep, he were guilty of the losse of these sheep. Now an act of destroying, can∣not be an act of judging, far lesse of a supreme Iudge, but of a supreme Murtherer; 7. Whereas he is called Absolute Prince, and Su∣preme Judge, in all Causes, Ecclesiasticall and Civill. It is to be con∣sidered, 1. That the Estates professe in these acts,* 1.764 not to give any new Prerogative, but onely to continue the old power, and that onely with that amplitude, and freedom, which the King and his Predecessors did enjoy and exerce of before: the extent whereof, is best known from the Acts of Parliament, Histories of the time, and the Oaths of the Kings of Scotland. 2. That he is called Abso∣lute Prince, not in any relation of freedom, from Law, or Preroga∣tive above Law; whereunto as unto the norma, regula, ac mensura potestatis suae, ac subjectionis meae, He is tyed by the Fundamentall Law, and his own Oath, but in opposition to all forraign Iurisdicti∣on or principalitie above him, as is evident, by the Oath of Supre∣macie set down, for acknowledging of his power in the first Act of Parliament 21. K. Iam. 6. 3. They are but the same expressions, giving onely the same power before acknowledged in the 129. Act. Parl. 8. K. Iam. 6. And that onely over Persons or Estates, con∣sidered Separatim, and over Causes; but neither at all over the Laws, nor over the Estates, taken Conjunctim, and as convened in Parliament, as is clear, both by the two immediately subsequent Acts of that Parliament 8. K. Iam. 6. Establishing the Authority of Parliaments, equally with the Kings, and discharging all Iuris∣dictions (al••eit granted by the King) without their Warrant; as also by the Narrative Depositive words, and certification of the Act it self: otherwayes, the Estates convened in Parliament, might by vertue of that Act, be summoned before, and censured by the Kings Majestie or His Councell a Iudicatory substitute be, subordi∣nate to, and censurable by themselves, which were contrary to sense and reason. 4. The very termes of Supreme Iudge, and in all Causes, according to the nature of Correlates, presupposeth Courts, and judiciall Proceedings and Laws, as the ground work and rule of all, not a freedom from them. 5. The sixth Act of the twenty Parliament, K. Iac. 6. Cleerly interpreteth what is meant by the Kings Iurisdiction in all Spirituall and Ecclesiastick Causes: to wit, to be onely in the Consistoriall Causes of Matrimony, Testaments, Bastardy, Adulteries, abusively called Spirituall Causes, because

handled in Commissary Courts, wherin the King appoints the Com∣missary, his Deputies, and makes the Lords of the Session his great Consistory in all Ecclesiasticall Causes, with reservation of his Su∣premacy and Prerogative therein.

7. Supreame Iudge in all causes, cannot be taken Quoad actus elicitos, as if the King were to judge between two Sea-men, or two Husband-men, or two Trades-men, in that which is proper to their Art; or between two Painters: certainly the King is not to Iudge which of the two draweth the fairest Picture, but which of the two wasteth most gold on his Picture, and so doth interest most of the Common-wealth. So the King cannot judge in all Ecclesiasticall Causes, that is, he cannot, Quoad actos elicitos, prescribe this Worship: for example, the Masse, not the Sacrament of the Lords Supper. Therefore the King hath but Actus imperatos, some Royall Politicall Acts about the Worship of God to command God to be Worshipped according to his Word, to punish the superstitions or neglectors of Divine Worship; therefore cannot the King be sole Iudge in matters that belong to the Colledge of Iudges by the Lawes of Scotland, the Lords of Session onely may judge these maters. K. Iames, 1. Parl. 2. Act. 45. K. Iames 3. Par. 8. Act 62. K. Iames 3. Par. 4. Act. 105. K. I. 1. Parl. 6. Act. 83. K. I. 1. Par. 6 Act. 86. K. I. 5. Par. 7. Act. 104. and that only according to Law, without any remedy of appellation to King or the Parliament, Act 62, and 63. Par. 14. K. I. 2. And the King is by Act of Parliament inhibited to send any private letter to stay the Acts of Iustice; or if any such letter be procured, the Iudges are not to acknowledge it, as the Kings Will, for they are to proceed unpartially according to Iustice, and are to make the Law, which is the King and Parliaments pub∣lick revealed will, their rule, King I. 5. Parl. 5. Act. 68. K. Ia. 6. Part. 8. Act. 139. and K. I. 6. Par. 6. Act. 92. most lawfull. Nor may the Lords suspend the course of Iustice, or the sentence or execution of Decrees upon the Kings private letter. King I. 6. Parl. 11. Act 79. and K. Iam. 6. Par. 11. Act 47. and so if the Kings Will or desire, as he is a man, be opposite to his Law, and his Will as King, it is not to be regarded. This is a strong Argument, that the Parlia∣ments never made the King supreame Iudge, Quoad actus elicitos, in all causes, nay not if the King have a Cause of his owne that concerneth Lands of the Crowne; farre lesse can the King have a will of Prerogative above the Law by our Lawes of Scotland:

And therefore, when in the eighth Parliament King Ia. 6. the Kings Royall Power is established in the first Act, the very next act immediatly subjoyned thereunto declareth the authority of the su∣preame Court of Parliament continued past all memory of man un∣to this day, and constitute of the free voices of the three estates of this ancient Kingdome, which in the Parliament 1606. is called, The ancient and fundamentall policy of this Kingdome; and so fundamen∣tall, as if it should be innovate, such confusion would ensue, as it could no more be a free Monarchy, as is exprest in the Parliaments printed Commission, 1604. by whom the same under God hath been upholden, rebellious and traiterous subjects punished, the good and faithfull preserved and maintained, and the Lawes and Acts of Parliament (by which all men are governed) made and established, and appointeth the Honour, Authority, and Dignity of the Estates of Parliament to stand in their owne integrity, according to the ancient and laudable custome by past, without alteration or dimi∣nution, and therefore dischargeth any to presume or take in hand, To impugne the dignity, and the authority of the said Estates, or to seeke, or procure the innovation, or diminution of their power or autho∣rity under the paine of Treason: and therefore in the next Act, they discharge all Iurisdictions, or Judicatories (albeit appointed by the Kings Majesty, as the High Commission was,) without their War∣rant and approbation; and that as contrary to the fundamentall Laws, above titled, 48. Act. Parl. 3. K. Ia. 1. and Act. 79. Parl. 6. King Ia. 4. whereby the Lieges should only be ruled by the Lawes or Acts, past in the Parliament of this Kingdome. Now what was the ancient Dig∣nity, Authority, and power of the Parliaments of Scotland, which is to stand without diminution, that will be easily and best known from the subsequent passages, or Historians, which can also be very easily verified, by the old Registers, whensoever they should be produced; In the meane time remember that in Parliament and by Act of Parl. K. Ia. 6. for observing the due order of Parliament, pro∣miseth, never to doe, or command any thing, which may directly or in∣directly prejudge the libertie of free reasoning or voting of Parliament. K. Ia. 6. Parl. 11. Act. 40. And withall, to evidence the freedome of the Parliament of Scotland, from that absolute unlimited Prero∣gative of the Prince; and their libertie to resist his breaking of Co∣venant with them, or Treaties with forraigne Nations; Ye shall consider, 1. That the Kings of Scotland are obliged▪ before they be in∣augurate,

to sweare and make their faithfull Covenant to the true Kirk of God, that they shall maintaine, defend, and set forward the true Religion confessed and established within this Realme; even as they are obliged and astricted by the Law of God, aswell in Deuteronomie, as in the 11 chap. of the 2. book of the Kings; and as they crave obedi∣ence of their subjects. So that the bond and contract shall be mutuall and reciprocall, in all time comming, between the Prince and the People, according to the Word of God; as is fully exprest in the Register of the convention of Estates, Iuly 1567.

2. That important Acts and Sentences at home, (whereof one is printed, 112 Act. Parl. 14. K. Ia. 3.) and in Treaties with Forraigne Princes, the Estates of Parliament did append their severall Seales with the Kings Great Seale,* 1.765 (which to Grotius, Barclaius, and Ar∣nisaeus, is an undeniable argument of a limited Prince, as well as the stile of our Parliament, that the Estates with the King, ordaine, rati∣fie, rescind, &c.) as also they were obliged, in case of the Kings brea∣king these Treaties, to resist him therein, even by armes, and that without any breach of their allegiance, or of his Prerogative; as is yet extant in the records of our old Treaties with England and France, &c. But to goe on, and leave some high mysteries unto a rejoynder.

And to the end I may make good, that nothing is here taught, in this Treatise, but the very Doctrine of the Church of Scotland, I desire that the Reader may take notice of the larger Confession of the Church of Scotland, printed with the Syntagme and body of the Confessions, at Geneva, anno MDCXII. and authorized by King Iames the 6. and the three Estates in Parliament; and printed in our Acts of Parliament, Parl. 15. K. Iames 6. An. 1567. Amongst good works of the Second Table, saith our Confession, art. 14. are these: To honour Father, Mother, Princes, Rulers, and superiour Powers: To love them, to support them, yea to obey their Charge, (not repugning to the commandement of God) to save the lives of inno∣cents, to represse Tyrannie, to defend the oppressed, to keep our bodies cleane and holy, &c. The contrary whereof is, To disobey or resist any that God hath placed in Authoritie, (while they passe not over the bounds of their office) to murther, or to consent thereunto, to beare ha∣tred, or to let innocent blood be shed, if we may withstand it, &c. Now the Confession citeth in the margin, Ephes. 6.1.7. and Ezek. 22.1, 2, 3, 4, &c. where it is evident, by the name of Father and Mother,

all inferiour Iudges as well as the King, and especially the Princes, Rulers, and Lords of Parliament are understood. 2. Ezek. 22. The bloody City is to be judged, because they releeved not the oppressed out of the hand of bloody Princes, v. 6. who every one of them were to their power to shed innocent blood. 3. To resist superiour powers, and so the Estates of Parliament, as the Cavaliers of Scotland doe, is resistance forbidden, Romans 13.1. the place is also cited in the confession. And the Confession exponeth the place, Romans 13. according to the interpretation of all sound Expositers; as is evi∣dent in these words, Art. 24. And therefore we confesse and avouch, that such as resist the supreame power, doing that thing which apper∣taineth to his charge, doe resist Gods ordinance, and therefore cannot be guiltlesse. And further we affirme, that whosoever denyeth unto them aide, their counsell and comfort, while as the Princes and Rulers vigilantly travell in execution of their Office, that the same men deny their helpe, support and counsell to God, who by the presence of his Lieu∣tenant craves it of them. From which words we have cleare:

1. That to resist the King or Parliament, is to resist them, while as they are doing the thing that appertaineth to their charge, and while they vigilantly travell in the execution of their office. But while King and Parliament doe acts of Tyranny against Gods Law, and all good Lawes of men, they doe not the things that appertaine to their charge and the execution of their Office; ergo by our confession, to resist them in Tyrannicall acts is, not to resist the ordinance of God.

2. To resist Princes and Rulers, and so inferiour Iudges, and to de∣ny them counsell and comfort, is to deny helpe, counsell, and comfort to God. Let then Cavaliers, and such as refuse to helpe the Princes of the Land against Papists, Prelates, and Malignants know, that they resist Gods ordinance, which rebellion they unjustly impute to us.

3. Whereas it is added in our Confession, that God by the pre∣sence of his Lieutenant craveth support and counsell of the people. It is not so to be taken, as if then only we are to ayde and helpe inferi∣our Iudges and Parliaments, when the King personally requireth it, and not other waies.

1. Because the King requireth helpe, when by his Office he is obliged to require our helpe and counsell against Papists and Ma∣lignants, though as misled, he should command the contrary: so if the Law require our helpe, the King requireth it ex officio.

2. This should expresly contradict our confession, if none were

obliged to give helpe and counsell to the Parliament and Estates, except the King in his own person should require it, because Art. 14. it is expresly said, That to save the lives of innocents, or represse Ty∣ranny, to defend the oppressed, —not to suffer innocent blood to be shed; or workes pleasing to God, which he rewardeth. Now we are not to thinke in reason, if the King shall be induced by wicked Counsell, to doe tyrannicall workes, and to raise Papists in Armes against Protestants, that God doth by him as by his Lieutenant, require our helpe, comfort and counsell, in assisting the King in acts of Tyranny, and in oppression, and in shedding innocent blood; yea our con∣fession tyeth us to deny helpe and comfort to the King in these wic∣ked acts, and therefore our helpe must be in the things that per∣taineth to his Royall Office, and duty only; otherwise we are to represse all tyranny, art 14.

4 To save the lives of innocents, to represse Tyranny, to defend the oppressed, are by our confession good workes, well pleasing to God, and so is this a good worke, not to suffer innocent blood to be shed, if we may withstand it. Hence it is cleare as the Sunne, that our confession according to the Word of God, to which King Charles did sweare at his Coronation, doth oblige and tye us in the presence of God, and his holy Angels to rise in Armes, to save the innocent, to represse Tyranny, to defend the oppressed. When the King induced by ill counsell sent Armies by Sea and Land, to kill and de∣stroy the whole Kingdome who should refuse such a Service-booke, as they could not in conscience receive, except they would disobey God, renounce the confession of Faith, which the King and they had sworne unto, and prove perfidious Apostates to Christ and his Church, what could we doe, and that the same Confession, consi∣dering our bonds to our deare Brethren in England, layeth bonds on us, to this as a good worke also, not to suffer their innocent blood to be shed, but to defend them; when they against all Law of God, of men, to State, of Nations, are destroyed and killed. For my part, I judge, it had been a guiltinesse of blood upon Scotland, if we had not helped them, and risen in Armes to defend our selves, and our innocent brethren against bloody Cavaliers. Adde to this what is in the 24. Article of the same Confession.

We confesse—whosoever goeth about to take away, or to confound the whole state of Civill Polity, now long established; we affirme the same men, not only to be enemies to mankind, but also wickedly to fight

against Gods Will. But these who have taken Armes against the Estates of Scotland, and the Princes and Rulers of the Land, have laboured to take away Parliaments, and the fundamentall Lawes of this Kingdome, ergo &c.

The Confession addeth, 16. We farther confesse and acknowledge, that such persons as are placed in authority, are to be loved, honoured, feared, and holden in most reverent estimation; because that they are Lieutenants of God, in whose Sessions God himselfe doth sit and Iudge: yea even the Iudges and Princes themselves, to whom by God is given the sword, to the praise and defence of good men, and to revenge and punish all open malefactors. Ergo the Parliament, and Princes, and Rulers of the Land are Gods Lieutenants on earth, no lesse then the King by our Confession of Faith, and those who resist them, resist the ordinance of God. Royalists say, They are but the Depu∣ties of the King, and when they doe contrary to his Royall Will, they may be resisted, yea and killed, for in so farre they are private men, though they are to be honoured as Iudges, when they act accor∣ding to the Kings Will whose Deputies they are. But I answer:

1. It is a wonder that inferiour Judges should be formally Iudges, in so far as they act conforme to the will of a mortall King, and not in so far as they act conforme to the will of the King of Kings, seeing the judgement they execute is the King of Kings, and not the Iudgement of a mortall King, 2 Chro. 19.6.

2. Royalists cannot indure the former distinction as it is ap∣plyed to the King, but they receive it with both hands, as it is ap∣plyed to inferiour Iudges; and yet certaine it is, that it is as ordi∣nary for a King being a sinfull man, to act sometimes as the Lieu∣tenant of God, and sometimes as an erring and misinformed man, no lesse then the inferiour Iudge acteth sometimes according to the Kings will and Law, and sometimes according to his owne private way; and if we are to obey the inferiour Iudge as the Deputy of the King, what shall become of his Person, when Cavaliers may kill him at some Edge-hill? for so they mock this distinction, as ap∣plyed to the King in regard of his Person, and of his Royall Of∣fice; and for this point our Confession citeth in the Margin. Rom. 13.7. 1 Pet. 2.17. Psal. 82.1. which places doe clearely prove: 1. That inferiour Magistrates are: 1. Gods ordinances. 2. Gods on earth, Psal. 82. 3. Such as beare the Lords sword. 4. That they are not only (as the Confession saith) appointed for Civill

policie, but also for maintenance of true Religion, and for suppressing of idolatrie and superstition. Then it is evident, to resist inferior Ma∣gistrates, is to resist God himselfe, and to labour to throw the sword out of Gods hands. 5, Our Confession useth the same Scriptures cited by Junius Brutus, to wit, Ezek. 22.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. and Ier. 22.3. where we are, no lesse then the Iewes, commanded to execute judgement and righteousnesse, and deliver the spoyled out of the hands of the oppressour. For both the Law of God, and the Civill Law saith, Qui non impedit homicidium, quum potest, is homicidii reus est. I will cast in a word of other Confessions, lest we seeme to be Iesuites alone.

The Confession of Helvetia saith, c. 30. de Magistratu.—Viduas, pupillos, afflictos asserat: Every Magistrate is to defend the widow, the orphan, and the oppressed. The French Confession saith, art. 40. Affirmamus ergo parendumesse Legibus & Statutis, solvenda Tributa, subjectionis denique jugum voluntariè tolerandum, etiamsi infideles fuerint Magistratus, dummodo Dei summum imperium integrum & illibatum maneat. So cleare it is, that all active obedience, is due to all Magistrates, and that that yoake of passive obedience is to be tolerated, but conditionally, with a dummodo, so as the Magistrate violate not the supreme commandement of the King of Kings. And we know accordingly,* 1.766 Protestants of that Church have taken de∣fensive armes against their King. But our P. Prelate can say, The Confessions of Scotland, Helvetia, France, and all the Reformed Churches, are Jesuiticall: when as it was the doctrine of the Wal∣denses, Protestants, and Luther, Calvin and others, while as there was no Iesuite on earth.

The 37. Art. of the Church of Englands Confession, is so far from erecting an absolute power in the King, that they expresly bring down the Royall Prerogative from the high seat and transcendent superlative power above the Law; and expone the Prerogative to be nothing but meere Law-power. We only (say they) ascribe that Pre∣rogative to the King, which the Scripture doth ascribe to all Godly Princes, that is, that they cause all committed to their trust, whether Ecclesiasticall or Civill persons, doe their duty; and punish with the Civill sword, all disobedient offenders. In syntag. Confess. And this they say in answer to some, who beleeved, the Church of England made the King the Head of the Church. The Prelates Convocation must be Iesuites to this P. P. also.

So the 36. Article of the Belgick Confession, saith of all Magi∣strates, no lesse then of a King, (We know, for Tyrannie of Soule and Body, they justly revolted from their King.) Idcirco Magistra∣tus ipsos gladio armavit, ut malos quidem plectant paenis, probos vero tueantur. Horum porro est, non modo de Civili politia conservanda esse solicitos, verum etiam dare operam ut sacrum Ministerium conser∣vetur, omnis, Idololatria & adulterinus Dei cultus è medio tollatur, regnum Antichristi diruatur, &c. Then all Magistrates, though in∣feriour, must doe their duty, that the Law of God hath laid on them, though the King forbid them. But by the Belgick Confession, and the Scripture, it is their duty to relieve the oppressed, to use the sword against murthering Papists, and Irish Rebels, and destroying Cava∣liers. For, shall it be a good plea in the day of Christ, to say, Lord Iesus, we would have used thy sword against bloody Murtherers, if thy Anoynted, the King, had not commanded us to obey a mortall King rather than the King of ages; and to execute no judgement for the op∣pressed, because he judged them faithfull Catholike subjects. Let all Ox∣ford, and Cavalier Doctors in the three Kingdomes, satisfie the con∣sciences of men in this, that inferior Iudges are to obey a Divine Law, with a proviso, that the King command them so to doe; and otherwise they are to obey Men rather then God. This is evidently holden forth in the Argentine Confession, exhibited by foure Cities to the Emperour Charles the Fifth, An. M.D.XXX. in the same very cause of innocent Defence, that we are now in, in the three King∣domes of Scotland, England, and Ireland.

The Saxonick Confession, exhibited to the Councell of Trent, An. M.D.LI. art. 23, maketh the Magistrates office essentially to consist in keeping of the two Tables of Gods Law: and so what can follow hence, but in so far as he defendeth Murtherers: or if he be a King, and shall with the sword, or Armies, impede inferior Magi∣strates (for the Confession speaketh of all) to defend Gods law, and true Religion, against Papists, Murtherers, and bloody Cavaliers; and hinder them to execute the judgement of the Lord against evill doers: He is not, in that, a Magistrate; and the denying of obedi∣ence active or passive to him, in that, is no resistance to the Ordi∣nance of God: but by the contrary, the King himselfe must resist the ordinance of God.

The Confession of Bohemia is clear, art. 16. Qui publico munere magistratu{que} funguntur, quemcun{que}gradū teneant, se non suum, sed Dei

opus agere sciant. Hence all inferior, or the supreme Magistrate, what ever be their place, they doe not their own work, nor the work of the King, but the work of God, in the use of the sword, Ergo, they are to use the sword against bloody Cavaliers, as doing Gods worke: suppose the King should forbid them to doe Gods worke. And it saith of all Magistrates: Sunt autem Magistratuum partes ac munus, om∣nibus ex aequo jus dicere, in communem omnium usum, sine personarum acceptatione, pacem ac tranquilitatem publicam tueri ac procurare de malis ac facinorosis, hanc inter turbantibus poenas sumere, alios{que} omnes ab eorum vi & injuria vindicare. Now this Confession was the faith of the Barons and Nobles of Bohemia, who were Magistrates, and exhibited to the Emperor, An. 1535. in the cause not unlike unto ours now: and the Emperor was their Soveraigne: yet they pro∣fesse they are obliged in conscience to defend all under them from all violence and injuries, that the Emperor, or any other could bring on them; and that this is their office before God, which they are obliged to performe as a worke of God: and the Christian Magistrate is not to doe that worke, which is not his own, but Gods, upon condition that the King shall not inhibite him. What if the King shall inhibite Parliaments, Princes and Rulers, to relieve the oppressed, to defend the Orphan, the Widow, the Stranger, from unjust violence? Shall they obey man rather than God?

To say no more of this: Prelates, in Scotland, did what they could to hinder his Majestie to indict a Parliament. 2. When it was in∣dicted, to have its freedome destroyed by prelimitations. 3. When it was sitting, their care was to divide, impede, and anull the course of Iustice. 4. All in the P. Prelates booke tendeth to abolish Par∣liaments, and to enervate their power. 5. There were many wayes used to break up Parliaments in England; And to command Iudges not to judge at all, but to interrupt the course of Iustice, is all one as to command unrighteous judgement, Ier. 22. v. 3. 6. Many wayes have been used by Cavaliers, to cut off Parliaments, and the present Parliament in England.

The paper found in William Lauds Studie, touching feares and hopes of the Parliament of England,* 1.767 evidenceth that Cavaliers hate the Supreme seat of Iustice, and would it were not in the World; which is the highest rebellion and resistance made against superior Powers.

1. He feareth, this Parliament shall begin where the last left.

Ans. What ever ungrate Courtier had hand in the death of King Iames, deserved to come under Tryall.

2. He feareth they sacrifice some man.

Ans. If Parliaments have not power to cut off Rebels, and cor∣rupt Iudges, the root of their being is undone. 2. If they be law∣full Courts, none needeth feare them, but the guilty.

3. He feareth their Consultations be long, and the supply must be present.

Ans. Then Cavaliers intend Parliaments for Subsidies to the King, to foment, and promote the warre against Scotland, not for Iustice. 2. He that feareth long and serious consultations, to rip up and launce the wounds of Church and State, is affraid that the wounds be cured.

4. He feareth they deny Subsidies, which are due by the Law of God, Nature, and Nations, whereas Parliaments have but their deliberation and consent for the manner of giving, otherwise this is to sell Subsidies, not to give them.

Ans. Tribute, and the standing Revenues of the King, are due by the Law of God and Nations; but Subsidies are occasionall Rents, given upon occasion of Warre, or some extraordinary necessity; and they are not given to the King as Tribute, and standing Reve∣nues, which the King may bestow for his House, Family, and Royall Honour, but they are given by the Kingdome, rather to the King∣dome, then to the King for the present warre, or some other neces∣sity of the Kingdome, and therefore are not due to the King as King, by any Law of Nature or Nations, and so should not be gi∣ven but by deliberation and judiciall sentence, of the States; and they are not sold to the King, but given out by the Kingdome, by Statute of Parliament, to be bestowed on the Kingdome, and the King should sell no Acts of Justice for Subsidies.

5. He dare not speake of the consequences, if the King grant Bills of Grace, and part with the flowers of the Crowne. Ans. He dare not say, The people shall vindicate their liberty by selling Subsidies, to buy branches of the Prerogative Royall, and diminishing the Kings fancied absolutenesse: so would Prelates have the King absolute, that they may ride over the soules, purses, persons, estates, and Re∣ligion of men upon the horse of pretended absolutenesse.

6. He feareth the Parliament fall upon Church businesse; but 1. The Church is too weake already, if it had more power, the King

might have more, both obedience and service. 2. The Houses can be no competent Iudges in point of Doctrine. 3. For the King, Clergy, and Convocation are Iudges in all causes Ecclesiasticall.

Ans. 1. This striketh at the root of all Parliamentary power, 1. The P. P. giveth them but a poore deliberative power in Subsidies, and that is, to make the Kings Will a Law, in taking all the subjects goods from them, to foment warre against the subjects. 2. He ta∣keth all jurisdiction from them ••ver Persons, though they were as black Traitors as breathe. 3. And spoileth them of all power in Church matters, to make all Iudges, yea and the King himselfe yield blind obedience to the Pope and Prelate, and their illuminated Cler∣gie. Sure I am, P. Maxwell imputeth this, but most unjustly, to Presbyteries. What essentiall and fundamentall priviledges are left to Parliaments? David, and the Parliament of Israel are imperti∣nent Iudges in the matter of bringing home the Ark of God. And for the Churches weaknesse, that is, the weaknesse of the damned Pre∣lates, shall this be the Kings weaknesse? Yes, the P.P. must make it true, No Bishop, no King.

7. He feareth, factious spirits will take heart to themselves, if the King yield to them without any submission of theirs.

Ans. The Princes and Iudges of the Land are a company of facti∣ous men, and so no Parliament, no Court, but at best some good ad∣visers of a King to breake up the Parliament, because they refuse Subsidies, that he may be a lawlesse way extort Subsidies.

8. He desireth the Parliament may sit a short time, that they may not well understand one another.

Ans. He loveth short, or no justice from the Parliament, he fea∣reth they reforme Gods house, and execute justice on men like him∣selfe. But I returne to the Scotish Parliament.

Assert. 2. The Parliament is to regulate the power of the King. The heritable Sheriffes complaine,* 1.768 that the King granteth Commis∣sions to others, in cases perteining to their office. Whereupon, the Estates, Par. 6. K. Iam. 5. Act. 82. dischargeth all such Commissions, as also appointeth that all Murtherers be judged by the Iustice gene∣rall only. And in severall Acts the King is inhibited to grant pardons to malefactors. K. Ia. 6. Act. 75. P. 11.

It is to be considered, that King Iames in his Basilicon Doron, lay∣eth down an unsound ground, that Fergus the first father of 107 Kings of Scotland, conquered this Kingdom. The contrary whereof

is asserted by Fordome, Major, Boethius, Buchannan, Hollanshed; who run all upon this Principle, That the Estates of the Kingdome did, 1. Choose a Monarchie, and freely, and no other Government. 2 That they freely elected Fergus to be their King. 3. King Fergus frequently conveened the Parliament, called, In••ulanorum Duces,* 1.769 Tribuum Rectores, Majorum consessus, Conventus Ordinum, conven∣tus Statuum, Communitatum Regni, Phylarchi, Primores, Principes, patres, and as Hollanshed saith, they made Fergus King, therefore a Parliament must be before the King; yea and after the death of King Fergus, Philarchi coeunt concione advocatâ, the Estates conve∣ned without any King, and made that fundamentall Law Regni electivi, That when the Kings Children were minores, any of the Fer∣gusian Race might be chosen to Reigne: and this indured to the daies of Kennethus: and Redotha, Rex. 7. resigneth and maketh over the Government into the hands of the Parliament,* 1.770 and Philarchi & Tribuum Gabernatores ordained Therius the 8. King. Buchanan, l. 4. Rer. Scot. calleth him Reutha, and said he did this, Populo egrè permittente, then the Royall Power recurred to the fountaine. Therius the 8. a wicked man, filled the Kingdome with Roberies fearing that the Parliament should punish him, fled to the Britaines, and thereupon the Parliament choose Connanus to be Prorex, and protector of the Kingdome.

Finnanus R. 10. Decreed; Ne quid Reges, quod majoris esset mo∣menti, nisi de publici consilii authoritate juberent, & ne domestico con∣silio remp. administrarent, regia publicaque negotia non sine patrum consultatione ductu{que} tractarentur, nec bellum pacem aut faedera re∣ges per se patrum, Tribuumve, Rectorum injussu facerent, deme∣rentue. Then it is cleare, that Parliaments were consortes imperii, and had Authority with, and above the King. When a Law is made that the Kings should doe nothing, Injussu rectorum tribuum, without commandement of the Parliament, a Cabinet Counsell was not lawfull to the Kings of Scotland. So Durstus Rex XI. sweareth to the Parliament, Se nihil nisi de primorum consilio acturum. That he shall doe nothing but by counsell of the Rulers and Heads of the King∣dome.

The Parliament rejecting the lawfull sonne of Corbredus the 20, King, because he was young, created Dardanus the sonne of Me∣tellanus King, which is a great argument of the power of the Scot∣tish Parliament of old for elective, rather then hereditary Kings.

* 1.771Corbredus secundus, called Galdus, the 21, King, at his Corona∣tion renouncing all negative voices, did sweare, So majorum consi∣liis acquieturum, That he should be ruled by the Parliament; and it is said, Leges quasdam tollere non potuit, adversante mul∣titudine.

* 1.772Lactatus R. 22. is censured by a Parliament, Quod spreto majo∣rum consilio, He appointed base men to publick Offices.

Mogaldus R. 23. Ad consilia seniorum omnia ex prisco more rev••∣cavit, did all by the Parliament, as the ancient custome was.

Conarus 24. K. was cast in Prison by the Parliament, Quod non expectato decreto patrum, quod summa orat potestatis, privatis consiliis administrasset, Because he did the weightiest businesse that concerned the Kingdome, by private advice, without the judiciall Ordinance of Parliament, that was of greatest authority. Where is the negative voice of the King here?

Ethodius 2. the sonne of Ethodius the 1. the 28. King. (The Par∣liament passing by his son of the first Bed, because he was a child, had created Satrael his Brother King before) a simple ignorant man,* 1.773 yet for reverence to the race of Fergus, kept the name of a King, but the Estates appointed Tutors to him, he was the 28. King.

Nathalocus the 30. K. corrupting the Nobles with buds and faire promises, obtained the Crowne.

Romachus, Fethelmachus, and Angusianus, or as Buchanan cal∣leth him Aenneannus, contended for the Crowne, the Parliament convened to judge the matter, was dissolved by tumult, and Rom∣machus chosen King, doing all, Non adhibito, de more, consilio ma∣jorum, was censured by the Parliament.

Fergus the 2. was created King by the States, De more.

Constantine 43. K. a most wicked man, was punished by the States.

Aidanus 49. K. by the counsell of Sanctus Columba, governed all in peace, by three Parliaments every yeare.

Ferchardus 52. K. and Ferchardus 2. the 54. King, were both censured by Parliaments.

Eugenius 62. K. a wicked Prince, was put to death by the Par∣liament, Omnibus in ejus exitium, consentientibus.

Eugenius 7. the 59. K. was judicially accused, and absolved by the States, of killing his Wife Spondan••.

Donaldus the 70. K. is censured by a Parliament which convened

Pro salute Reipublica, for the good of the Land. So Ethus the 72. K. Ne unius culpâ, regnum periret.

Gregorius the 73. K. sweareth to maintaine Kirk and State in their liberties; the Oath is ordained to be sworne by all Kings at their Coronation.

The Estates complaine of Duffus 78. K. because contemning the counsell of the Nobles, Saerificulorum consiliis abduceretur, and that neither the Nobility must depart the Kingdome, or another King must be made.

Culenus the 79. King, was summoned before the Estates, so be∣fore him Constantine the 3. the 75. K. did by Oath resigne the Kingdome to the States, and entered in a Monastery at Saint Andrewes.

Kenethus the 70. K. procured almost, per vim, saith Buchanan,* 1.774 that the Parliament should change the elective Kings in hereditary; observe the Power of Parliaments.

After this Grimus, and then Macbethus,* 1.775 R. 85. is rebuked for governing by private counsell, in his time the King is ordained by the States, to sweare to maintaine the community of the Kingdome.

When Maccolumbus the 92. King would have admitted a Treaty to the hurt of the Kingdome; the Nobles said, Non jus esse Regi, the King had no right to take any thing from the Kingdome, Nisi om∣nibus Ordinibus consentientibus. In the time of Alexander the 94. K. is ordained, Acta regis oporteri confirmari decreto ordinum regni, quia ordinibus regni non consultis, aut adversantibus, nihil quod ad ••otius regnistatum attinet, Regi agere liceret. So all our Historians ob∣serve, by which it is cleare, that the Parliament, not the King hath a negative voyce.

The States answer to K. Edwards Legates concerning Balzees conditions in his contest with Bruce is, That these conditions were made a solo Rege, by the King only, without the estates of the King∣dome, and therefore they did not oblige the Kingdome.

In Robert the Bruce his Raigne,* 1.776 the K. 97. the succession to the Crowne is appointed by Act of Parliament, and twice changed; and in the League with France, Quod quando de successuro rege am∣bigeretur apud Scot••s, ea controversia ab Ordinum de creto decide∣retur.

Robert the ••00. K. in a Parliament at Sc••••ne moved the States,

to appoint the Earle of Carick his eldest sonne, of the second Mari∣age to the Crowne, passing his children of the first Mariage; and when he would have made a Treatie, he was told, That he could not inducias facere nisi ex sententia conventus publici; he could not make Truces but with the consent of the Estates of Parliament.

K. James the 1. could not doe any thing in his Oath in England. The Parliaments approbation of the Battell at Stirling against King Iames the 3. is set downe in the printed Acts, because he had not the consent of the States.

To come to our first Reformation, Queene Regent breaking her promise to the States, said, Faith of promise should not be sought from Princes; the States answered, That they then were not obliged to obey, and suspended her government as inconsistent with the duty of Princes, by the Articles of pacification at Leith, Anno 1560. Iunii 16. No peace or warre can be without the States.

In the Parliament thereafter, Anno 1560. the Nobility say fre∣quently to the Queene, Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium, nec unquam adunius libidinem, sed ad legum praescriptum & nobili∣tatis consensum regi solitum.

So it is declared, Parliament at Stirling, 1578. and Parl. 1567, concerning Queene Mary, I need not insist here. K. James the 6. Anno 1567. Iul. 21. was Crowned, the Earle of Morton and Humne, jurarunt pro ••o, & ejus nomine, in leges, eum doctrinam & ritus religionis, quae tum docebantur, publicè quoad posset, servatu∣rum, & contrarios oppugnaturum. Buch. Rer. Scot. Hist. l. 18. The three Estates revoke all alienations made by the King without consent of the Parliament. Parliam. K. Iames, 2. cap. 2. K. Iames, 4, 5, 6.

Three Parliaments of K. Iames the 2. are holden without any men∣tion of the King, as Anno 1437. Anno 1438. Anno 1440. and the 5. and 6. Act of Parl. 1440. the Estates ordaine the King to doe such and such things, to ride through the country for doing of Iustice. And Parl. 1. K. Iames 1. Act. 23. the Estates ordained the King to mend his money. But shew any Parliament where ever the King doth prescribe Lawes to the States, or censure the States.

In the 1. Parl. of K. Iames the 6. the Confession of Faith being ratified, in Acts made by the three Estates, that the Kings must sweare at their Coronation. In the presence of the eternall God, that they shall maintaine the true Religion, right Preaching, and admini∣stration

of the Sacraments now received and preached within this Realme: and shall abolish and gain-stand all false Religions contrary to the same: and shall rule the people committed to their charge, ac∣cording to the will of God, laudable Lawes and Constitutions of the Realme, &c.

The 1. Parl. of K. Iames the 6. 1567. approveth the Acts, Parl. 1560. conceived only in name of the States, without the King and Queen, who had deserted the same. So saith the Act, 2.5.4.20.28. And so this Parliament, wanting the King and Queenes authori∣tie, is confirmed, Parl. 1572. Act. 51. K. Ia. 6. and Parl. 1581. Act. 1. and Parl. 1581. Act. 115. in which it is declared, That they have been Common lawes from their first Date: and all are ratified, Parl. 1587. and Parl. 1592. Act. 1. and stand ratified to this day, by K. Charles his Parliament, An. 1633. The Act of the Assemblie, 1566. com∣mendeth that Parliament, 1560. as the most lawfull and free Parli∣ament that ever was in the Kingdome.

Yea, even Parl. 1641. King Charles himselfe being present, an Act was passed upon the occasion of the Kings illegall imprisoning of the Laird of Langtoune, That the King hath no power to imprison any Member of the Parliament, without consent of the Parliament: Which Act, to the great prejudice of the libertie of the Subject, should not have been left unprinted: for, by what Law the King may imprison one Member of the Parliament, by that same reason he may imprison two, and twenty, and a hundreth: and so may he clap up the whole Free Estates; and where shall then the highest Court of the Kingdome be?

All Polititians say, The King is a limited Prince, not absolute; where the King giveth out Lawes, not in his own name, but in the name of himselfe, and the Estates judicially conveened.

Pag. 33. of the old Acts of Parliament, Members are summoned to treat and conclude.

The duty of Parliaments, and their power, according to the Laws of Scotland, may be seen in the Historie of Knox, now printed at London, An. 1643. in the Nobles proceeding with the Queen, who killed her Husband, and maried Bodwell, and was arraigned in Parlia∣ment, and by a great part condemned to death, by many, to perpe∣tuall imprisonment.

King Charles received not Crown, Sword, and Scepter, while first he did sweare the Oath, that King Iames his Father did sweare.

2. He was not crowned, till one of every one of the three Estates came and offered to him the Crown. 3. With an expresse condition of his duty, before he be crowned.

After, King Charles said, I will by Gods assistance bestow my life for your defence, wishing to live no longer, then that I may see this King∣dome flourish in happinesse. Thereafter the King shewing himselfe on a Stage to the people, the P. Archbishop said; Sir, I doe present unto you, King Charles, the right descended inheritor, the Crown, and dignitie of this Realme; appointed by the Peeres of the Kingdome: And, Are ye not willing to have him for your King, and become subject to him? The King turning himselfe on the stage, to be seen of the People, They declare their willingnesse, by crying, God save King Charles! Let the King live!

QUEST. XLIV. Generall results of the former Doctrine, in some few Corollaries, or straying Questions, fallen off the Road-way: answered briefly.

QUest. 1. Whether all Governments be but broken Governments, and deviations from Monarchie?] Answ. It is denyed; There is no lesse somewhat of Gods authoritie in Government, by many, or some of the choisest of the People, than in Monarchie: nor can we judge any Ordinance of Man unlawfull▪ for we are to be subject to all, for the Lords sake, 1 Pet. 2.13. Tit. 3.1. 1 Tim. 2.1, 2, 3.2. Though Monarchie should seeme the rule of all other Govern∣ments, in regard of resemblance of the supreme Monarch of all: Yet is it not the morall rule, from which, if other Governments shall erre, they are to be judged sinfull deviations.

* 1.777Quest. 2. Whether is Royaltie an immediate issue and spring of Na∣ture?] Answ. No; For man, fallen in sinne, knowing naturally he hath need of a Law and a Government, could have, by reason, de∣vised Governors, one or moe; and the supervenient institution of God, comming upon this Ordinance, doth more fully assure us, that God, for mans good, hath appointed Governours: but if we consult with Nature, many Iudges and Governors, to fallen Nature, seeme nearer of blood, to Nature, then one only: for two, because of mans weaknesse, are better then one. Now Nature seemeth, to me, not to teach, that one onely sinfull man should be the sole and onely Ruler

of a whole Kingdome. God, in his Word,* 1.778 ever joyned with the Su∣preme Ruler, many Rulers, who, as touching the essence of a Iudge, (which is, to rule for God) were all equally Iudges: some reserved Acts, or a longer cubite of power, in regard of extent, being due to the King.

Quest. 3. Whether Magistrates, as Magistrates, be naturall?] Answ. Nature is considered, as whole and sinlesse, or as fallen and broken. In the former consideration, that either man should stand in need of any, to compell him with the sword to doe his duty, and not oppresse; was no more naturall to man, than to stand in need of Lictors and Hangmen, or Physitians for the body, which in this state was not in a capacitie of sicknesse or death: And so Govern∣ment by Parents and Husbands was only naturall, in the latter con∣sideration. Magistrates as Magistrates, are two wayes considered; 1. According to the knowledge of such an Ordinance; 2. Accor∣ding to the actuall erection of the practice of the office of Magi∣strates. In the former notion, I humbly conceive, that by Natures light, Man, now fallen and broken, even under all the fractions of the powers and faculties of the soule, doth know, that promises of reward, feare of punishment, and the coactive power of the Sword, as Plato said, are naturall meanes to move us, and wings to promote obedience, and to doe our duty. And that Go∣vernment by Magistrates is naturall: But, in the second relation, it is hard to determine, that Kings, rather then other Governours, are more naturall.

Quest. 4. Whether Nature hath determined, that there should be one supreme Ruler a King, or many Rulers in a free Commnitie? Answ. It is denyed.

Quest. 6. Whether every free Commonwealth hath not in it a su∣premacie of Majestie, which it may formally place in one, or many?] Answ. It is affirmed.

Quest. 6. Whether absolute and unlimited power of Royaltie, be a ray and beame of Divine Majestie, immediately derived from God?] Answ. Not at all: Such a creature is not in the world of Gods cre∣ation: Royalists, and flatterers of Kings, are parents to this prodi∣gious birth. There is no shadow of power, to doe ill, in God: An absolute power is, essentially, a power to do without or above Law, and a power to doe ill, to destroy: and so it cannot come from God, as a Morall power, by institution; though it come from God by a

flux of permissive providence: but so things unlawfull and sinfull come from God.

Quest. 7. Whether the King may, in his actions, intend his owne Prerogative and Absolutenes?] Answ. He can neither intend it as his nearest end, nor as his remote end. Not the former: for if he fight, and destroy his People for a Prerogative, he destroyeth his People, that he may have a power to destroy them, which must be meere Tyranny, nor can it be his remote end; for granting that his supposed absolute Prerogative were lawfull, he is to referre all law∣full Power, and all his actions to a more noble end, to wit, to the safetie and good of the People.* 1.779

Quest. 8. Doe not they that resist the Parliaments power, resist the Parliament? And they that resist the Kings power, resist the King? God hath joyned King and Power: who dare seperate them?] Answ. If the Parliament abuse their power, we may resist their abused power,* 1.780 and not their power Parliamentarie. Mr. Bridges doth well distinguish, in his Annot. on the [Loyall Convert] be∣twixt the Kings power, and the Kings will. 2. The Resisters doe not separate King and Power; but the King himselfe doth separate his lawfull Power from his Will, if he worke and act Tyrannie, out of this principle, Will, Passion, Lust; not out of the Royall princi∣ple of Kingly power: So far we may resist the one, and not the o∣ther.

Quest. 9. Why, if God might work a miracle in the three Childrens resistance active; why doth he evidence omnipotencie in the passive obedience of these Witnesses? The Kingdome of Iudah was Christs birthright, as man, and Davids sonne: why did he not, by legions of Men & Angels, rather vindicate his own flesh and blood, than triumph by non-resistance, and the omnipotencie of glorie to shine in his meere suffering?] Ans. Who art thou that dispu∣test with God? He that killeth with the jaw-bone of an Asse, thou∣sands;* 1.781 and he that destroyed the numberlesse Midianites by only three hundred, should no more put the three Children to an unlaw∣full fact in the one, if they had by three men killed Nebuchadnezzar and all his Subjects, than in the other. But nothing is said against us in a Sophisme à non-causa pro causa; except it be proved, God would neither deliver his three Children, nor Christ from death, and the Iewes from bondage, by miraculous resistance, because resistance is unlawfull. What? patient suffring is lawfull; Ergo resistance is

unlawfull. It is a poor consequent, and a begging of the question, both must be lawfull to us. And so we hold, of ten lawfull meanes fit to compasse Gods blessed end, he may choose one, and let goe nine: shall any inferre, ergo, These other nine meanes are unlawfull, because God chose a mean, d••fferent from those nin••, and refused them. So may I answer by retortion. The three hundred sinned in resisting Midian, and defeating them: Why? Because it should be more honour to God, if they had, by suffering patiently the sword of Midian, glorified God in Martyrdome. So Christ and the Apostles, who could have wrought miracles, might have wrought Reforma∣tion by the sword, and destroyed Kings and Emperors, the opposers of the Lambe: and they did reforme by suffering; Ergo, the sword is unlawfull in Reformation. It followeth not. The meane Christ used, is lawfull; Ergo, all other meanes that he used not, are un∣lawfull, It is vaine Logick.

Quest. 10. Whether is the Coronation of a King any other thing but a Ceremonie?] Ans. In the Coronation there is, and may be,* 1.782 the Ceremonie of a shout and an Acclamation, and the reaching of a Scepter in his right hand who is made King; and the like: But the Coronation in concreto, according to the substance of the act, is no Ceremonie, nor any accidentall ingredient in the constitution of a King; 1. Because Israel should have performed a meere ceremoni∣all action on Saul, when they made him King, which we cannot say: for as the Peoples act of Coronation is distinctive, so is it con∣stitutive; it distinguished Saul from all Israel, and did constitute him in a new relation, that he was changed from no King, to be a King. 2. The people cannot by a Ceremonie make a King; they must really put some honour on him, that was not on him before. Now this Ceremonie which Royalists doe fancie Coronation to be, is only symbolicall and declarative, not really dative, it placeth no∣thing in the King.

Quest. 11. Whether may Subjects limit the power that they gave not to the King, it being the immediate result (without intervening of Law, or any act of man) issuing from God only?] Ans. Though we should give (which in reason we cannot grant) that Royall power were a result of the immediate bounty of God,* 1.783 without any act of man; Yet it may be limited by men that it over-swell not its banks, though God immediatly make Peter an Apostle, without any act of men, yet Paul by a sharpe rebuke, Gal. 2. curbeth and limiteth

his power, that he abuse it not to Iudaizing; Royalists deny not, but they teach, That the 80. Priests that restrained Vzziah his power, from burning incense to the Lord, gave no Royall power to Vzziah. Doe not subjects by flight lay restraint upon a Kings po∣wer, that he kill not the subjects without cause? yet they teach, That subjects gave no power to the King; certainly this is a proofe of the immense power of the King of Kings, that none can fly from his pursuing hand, Ps. 139.1, 2, 3. Amos 9.1, 2, 3, 4. whereas men may fly from earthly Kings. Nebuchadnezzar, (as Royalists teach) might justly conquer some Kingdomes, for conquest is a just title to the Crowne, (say they) now the Conquerour then justly not only limiteth the Royall Power of the conquered King, but wholly remo∣veth his Royalty and unkingeth him, yet we know, the conquerour gave no Royall power to the conquered King. Ioshua and David tooke away Royall power which they never gave, and therefore this is no good reason, The people gave not to the King Royall Po∣wer, ergo, they could not lawfully limit it, and take it away.

2. We cannot admit that God giveth Royall power immediatly, without the intervention of any Act of Law, for it is an Act of Law, that Deut. 17. the people chooseth such a King, not such a King, that the people by a legall covenant make Saul, David, and Joash Kings, and that God exerciseth any politicall action of making a King, over such subjects, upon such a condition, is absurd, and in∣conceivable; for how can God make Saul and David Kings of Jsrael, upon this politicall and legall condition, that they rule in Iustice and Judgement, but there must intervene a politicall action, and so they are not made Kings immediatly. If God feed Moses, by bread, and Manna, the Lords act of feeding is mediate, by the mediation of second causes; if he feed Moses 40. dayes without eating any thing, the act of feeding is immediate. If God made David King, as he made him a Prophet, I should thinke God immediatly made him King; for God asked consent of no man, of no people, no not of David himselfe, before he infused on him the Spirit of Pro∣phecy; but he made him formally King, by the politicall and legall Covenant betwixt him and the people. I shall not thinke that a Covenant and Oath of God is a Ceremony, especially a Law-covenant, or a politicall paction between David and the people, the contents whereof behoved to be De materia gravi & onerosa, concerning a great part of obedience to the fifth Commandement of

Gods Morall Law, the duties Morall concerning Religion, and Mercy, and Justice, to be performed reciprocally, between King and people. Oathes (I hope) are more then Ceremonies.

Quest. 12. Whether or no is not the Common-wealth ever a Pupill, never growing to age, as a minor under nonage doth come not to need a Tutor, but the Common-wealth being still in need of a Tutor, a Go∣vernour, or King, must alwaies be a Tutor, and so the Kingdome can never come to that condition, as to accuse the King, it alwaies being minor?] Ans. 1. Then can they never accuse inferiour Iudges, for a Kingdome is perpetually in such a nonage, as it cannot want them, when sometime it wanteth a King. 2. Can the Common-wealth un∣der Democracy and Aristocracy being perpetually under nonage, ever then quarrell at these Governments, and never seeke a King? by this reason they cannot. 3. The King in all respects is not a Tutor, every comparison in something beareth a Leg; for the Common-wealth, in their owne persons doe choose a King. 2. Com∣plaine of a King. 3. Resist an Vzziah. 4. Tye their elective Prince to a Law; a Pupill cannot choose his Tutor, either his dying Father, or the living Law doth that service for him; he cannot re∣sist his Tutor, he cannot tye his Tutor to a Law, nor limit him, when first he chooseth him. Pupillo non licet postulare Tutorem sus∣pecti, quamdiu sub tutela est, & manet impubes. l. Pietatis 6. in fin. C. de susp. Tutor. l. impuberem. 7. & §. Impuberes. Iust. eod.

Quest. 13.* 1.784 Whether or no are subjects more obnoxious to a King then Clients to Patrons, and servants to Masters, because the Pa∣tron cannot be the Clients Judge? but some superiour Magistrate must judge both, and the slave had no refuge against his Master, but only flight. And the King doth conferre infinite greater benefits on the sub∣jects, then the Master doth on the slave, because he exposeth his life, pleasure, ease, credit, and all for the safety of his subjects?* 1.785] Ans. Its denyed; for to draw the case to Fathers, and Lords in respect of Children and Vassals; the reason why Sons, Clients, Vassals can neither formally judge, nor judicially punish Fathers, Patrons, Lords and Masters, though never so Tyrannous, is a Morall impo∣tency, or a politicall incongruity, because these relations of Pa∣tron and Client, Fathers and Children are supposed to be in a Com∣munity, in which are Rulers and Iudges, above the Father and Sonne, the Patron and the Client; but there is no Physicall incon∣gruity that the politique inferiour punish the superiour, if we sup∣pone

there were no Iudges on the earth, and no relation, but Pa∣tron and Client; and because, for the father to destroy the children, is a troubling of the harmony of Nature, and the highest degree of violence, therefore one violence of selfe defence, and that most j••st, though contrary to nature, must be a remedy against another violence: but in a Kingdome there is no politicall Ruler above both King and People; and therefore though Nature have not formally appointed the politicall relation of a King, rather then many Go∣vernours, and subjects, yet hath Nature appointed a Court and Tri∣bunall of necessity, in which the people may by innocent violence, re∣presse the unjust violence of an injuring Prince; so as the people in∣jured in the matter of selfe defence, may be their owne Iudge. 2. I wonder that any should teach, That oppressed slaves had of old no re∣fuge against the tyranny of Masters, but only flight: for 1. The Law expresly saith, That they might not only fly, but also change Ma∣sters, which we all know was a great dammage to the Master, to whom the servant was as good as mony in his purse.* 1.786 2. I have de∣monstrated before by the Law of Nature, and out of divers learned Iurists, that all inferiours may defend themselves by opposing vio∣lence against unjust violence; to say nothing, that unanswerably I have proved, that the Kingdome is superiour to the King. 3. It is true, Qui plus dat, plus obligat, as the Scripture saith, Luke 7. He that giveth a greater benefit, layeth a foundation of a greater obligati∣on. But 1. If benefit be compared with benefit, it is disputable; if a King give a greater benefit then an earthly father, to whom under God the sonne is debtor for life and being, if we regard the compensation of eminency of honour and riches, that the People put∣eth upon the King; but I utterly deny that a power to act Tyran∣nous acts, is any benefit or obligation, that the People in reason can lay upon their Prince, as a compensation or hire for his great paines, he taketh in his Royall Watch-Tower: I Iudge it no benefit, but a great hurt, dammage, and an ill of nature, both to King and people, that the people should give to their Prince any power to destroy themselves, and therefore that people doth reverence and honour the Prince most, who lay strongest chaines and Iron fetters on him, that he cannot tyrannize.

* 1.787Quest. 14. But are not Subjects more subject to their Prince (see∣ing the subjection is naturall, as we see Bees and Cranes) to obey him, then servants to their Lord. C. in Apib. 7.9.1. ex Hiero. 4. ad Ru∣stic.

Monarch. Plin. n. 17. For Jurists teach, that servitude is beside or a∣gainst nature. l. 5. de stat. homi. §. 2. just, & jur. pers. c. 3. §. & sicut Nov. 89. quib. med. nat. eff. sui.

Ans. There is no question,* 1.788 in active subjection to Princes and Fathers commanding in the Lord, we shall grant as high a measure as you desire. But the question is, if either active subjection to ill and unjust mandates, or passive subjection to penall inflictions of Tyrannie and abused power, be naturall, or most naturall? or if Sub∣jects doe renounce naturall subjection to their Prince, when they oppose violence to unjust violence. This is to beg the question. And for the Commonwealth of Bees and Cranes, and Crown and Scep∣ter amongst them, Give me leave to doubt of it. To be subject to Kings, is a Divine morall Law of God; but not properly naturall to be subject to coaction of the Sword. Government and subjection to Parents, is naturall: But that a King is juris naturae strictim, I must crave leave to doubt. I hold him to be a Divine morall Ordi∣nance, to which, in conscience, we are to submit in the Lord.

Quest. 15. Whether was King Uzzah dethroned by the People?* 1.789] Ans. Though we should say, he was not formally unkinged and dethroned; yet if the Royall power consist in an indivisible point, as some Royalists say: and if Vzzah was removed to a private house, and could not reigne, being a Leper; Certainly, much Roy∣all power was taken from him. 'Tis true, Arnisaeus saith, he neither could be compelled to resigne his power,* 1.790 nor was he compelled to resigne his Royall authoritie; but he willingly resigned actuall go∣vernment, and remained King, as Tutors and Curators are put upon Kings that are mad, stupid, and Children, who yet governe all by the authoritie of lawfull Kings. But that Vzzah did not denude himselfe of the Royall power voluntarily, is cleare. The reason, 2 Chro. 26.21. why he dwelt in an house apart, and did not actu∣ally reigne; is, because he was a Leper; for, He was cut off (saith the Text) from the house of the Lord; and Jotham his sonne was over the Kings house, judging the people of the Land. Whereby it is cleare by the expresse law of God, he being a Leper, and so not, by Law, to enter into the Congregation, he was cut off from the house of the Lord: and he being a patient, is said to be cut off from the Lords house. Whe∣ther then Vzzah turned necessitie to a vertue, I know not: It is e∣vident that Gods Law removed the actuall exercise of his power. If we obteine this, which Gods Word doth give us, we have enough

for our purpose, though Vzzah kept the naked title of a King, as in∣deed he tooke but up roome in the Catalogue of Kings. Now if, by Law, he was cut off from actuall governing; Whether he was wil∣ling, or not willing to denude himselfe of Reigning, it is all one. And to say, that furious men, ideots, stupid men, and Children, who must doe all Royall acts by Curators and Tutors, are Kings jure, with correction, is petitio principii: for then hath God infused im∣mediately from heaven, (as Royalists teach us) a Royall power to go∣verne a Kingdome, on those, who are as capable of Royaltie, as blocks. I conceive that the Lord, Deut. 17.14, 15, 16, 17. commandeth the people, to make no blocks Kings: and that the Lord hath not done that himselfe in a binding Law to us, which we have no commande∣ment from him to doe. I conceive that God made Josiah and Joash Kings typicall, and in destination, for his promise sake to David, while they were Children, as well as he made them Kings; but not actu completo ratione officii, to be a rule to us now, to make a Childe of sixe yeares of age, a King by office. I conceive, Children are to us, only Kings in destination and appointment: And for Idiots and Fooles, I shall not believe, (let Royalists breake their faith upon so rocky and stony a point, at their pleasure) that God hath made them Governors of others, by Royall office, who can scarce number their own fingers; Or that God tyeth a people to acknowledge stupid blocks for Royall Governours of a Kingdome, who cannot governe themselves. But far be it from me to argue with Bellarmine; From Vzziah his bodily leprosie,* 1.791 to inferre, that any Prince spiritually Le∣prous, and turned Hereticall, is presently to be dethroned. Nothing can dethrone a King, but such Tyrannie as is inconsistent with his Royall office. Nor durst I inferre, that Kings, now adayes, may be removed from actuall Government, for one single transgression. It is true, 80 Priests, and the whole Kingdome so serving King Vzzah, (their motives, I know, were Divine) proveth well that the Sub∣jects may punish the transgression of Gods expresse law, in the King, in some cases, even to remove him from the Throne: but as from Gods commanding to stone the man that gathered sticks on the Sab∣bath day, we cannot inferre, that Sabbath-breakers are now to be punished with death; yet we may well argue, Sabbath-breakers may be punished, and Sabbath-breakers are not unpunishable, and above all Law; So may we argue here: Vzzah, though a King, was punished; Ergo, Kings are punishable by Subjects.

Quest. 16. Whether or no, as the deniall of active obedience in things unlawfull, is not dishonourable to the King as King, he being obliged to command in the Lord only, so the deniall of passive subjection to the King using unjust violence, be also no dishonouring of the King?] Ans. As the King is under Gods Law both in commanding, or in exacting active obedience, so is he under the same regulating Law of God, in punishing or demanding of us, passive subjection,* 1.792 and as he may not command what he will, but what the King of Kings war∣ranteth him to command, so may he not punish as he will, but by warrant also of the supreame Iudge of all the earth; and therefore it is not dishonourable to the Majesty of the Ruler, that we deny passive subjection to him, when he punisheth beside his warrant, more then its against his Majesty and honour, that we deny active obedience, when he commandeth illegally; else I see not how it is lawfull to fly from a tyrannous King, as Elias, Christ, and other of the witnesses of our Lord have done; and therefore what Royalists say here is a great untruth, namely, Tha•• in things lawfull we must be subject actively, in things unlawfull, passively. For as we are in things lawfull to be subject actively,* 1.793 so there is no duty in point of conscience, laying on us to be subject passively, because I may lawfully fly, and so lawfully deny passive subjection to the Kings will, punishing unjustly.

Quest. 17. Whether may the Prince make away any part of his Dominions, as an Iland, or a Kingdome, for the safety of the whole kingdomes he hath: as if goods be like to sinke an over-burthened Ship, the Sea-men cast away a part of the Goods in the Sea, to save the lives of the whole Passengers: and if three thousand Passengers being in one Ship, and the Ship in a storme like to be loosed, it would seeme that a thousand may be cast over-board, to save the lives of the whole Passen∣gers?] Ans. The Kingdome being not the Kings proper Heritage, it would seeme he canno•• make away any part of his Kingdome to save the whole, without the expresse consent of that part,* 1.794 though they be made away to save the whole, In things of this kind, men are not as the commodities of Merchants, nor is the case alike: as when one thousand of three thousand are to be cast into the Sea to save all the rest, and that either by common consent, or by Lots, or some other way; for it is one thing, when destruction is evidently inevitable, as in the casting so many men into the Sea to save the whole and many Passengers, and when a King for peace, or for

help from another King,* 1.795 maketh away part of his Dominion. The Lord is here to be waited on in his good Providence, and events are to be committed to him; but far lesse can it be imaginably lawfull for a King, to make away a part of his Dominions, without their consent, that he may have help from a forraign Prince to destroy the rest: This were to make merchandize of the lives of men.

Quest. 18. Whether or no, the convening of the subjects without the Kings will, be unlawfull?] Answ. The convention of men of it self, is an indifferent thing, and taketh its specification from its causes, and manner of convening, though some convention of the Subjects without the King, be forbidden; yet Ratio Legis est anima Legis, The reason and intent of the Law, is the soul of the Law. Con∣vention of the Subjects in a tumultuary way, for a seditious end, to make war without warrant of Law, is forbidden; but not when Religion, Laws, Liberties, Invasion of forraign Enemies, necessita∣teth the Subjects to conveen, though the King and ordinary Iudi∣catures, going a corrupt way to pervert Iudgement, shall refuse to consent to their conventions: Upon which ground, no convention of Tables at Edinburgh, or any other place, An. 1637. 1638. 1639. can be judged there unlawfull; for if these be unlawfull, because they are convention of the Leagues, without expresse Act of Par∣liament, then the convention of the Leagues to quench a house on fire, and the convention of a Countrey, to pursue a Wolf entered in the Land, to destroy women and children, which are warranted by the Law of nature, should be lawlesse, or against Acts of Parlia∣ment.

Quest. 19. Whether the Subjects be obliged to pay the debts of the King?] Answ. These debts which the King contracteth as King, in Throno Regali, the people are to pay; For the Law of nature, and the divine Law doth prove, That to every servant and Minister, wages is due, Rom. 13.5, 6. compared with Vers. 4. and 1 Cor. 9.9, 10, 11, 12. 1 Tim. 5.18. If the Prince be taken in a war, for the defence of the people, it is just that he be redeemed by them: So the Law saith, Tit. F. & C. de negotiis gestis, & F. & C. Manda. But when Fer. Vasquius illust. quest. l. 1. c. 7. n. 6. Vicesimo tertio appa∣ret, &c.—saith, If the Prince was not doing the businesse of the publike, and did make war without advice, and consent of the people, then are they not to redeem him. Now certain it is, when the King raiseth war, not onely against his Oath, and saith, God do

so to me and mine, if I intend any thing but peace, yet maketh war, and also raiseth war without consent of the Parliament, and a Par∣liament at that time convocated by his own Royall Writ, and not raised, and dissolved at all, but still sitting formally a Parliament; if he borrow money from his own Subjects, and from forraign Princes, to raise war against his Subjects and Parliament, then the people are not obliged to pay his debts,* 1.796 1. Because they are obliged to the King only as a King, and not as an enemy: But in so raising war, he cannot be considered as a King. 2. Though, if the people agree with him, and still acknowledge him King; it is unpossible, Physicè, he can be their King, and they not pay his debts, yet they sin not, but may, ex decentia, non ex debito legali, pay his debts, yet are they not obliged by any Law of God, or man to pay his debts; but though it be true, by all Law the King be obliged to pay his debt, (except we say, that all the peoples goods, are the Kings, a com∣pendious way, I confesse, to pay all that any voluptuous H••lioga∣bolus shall contract) yet it may easily be proved, That what his subjects and forraign Princes lent him to the raising of an unjust war, are not properly debts, but expences unjustly given out under the reduplication of formall enemies to the Countrey, and so not payable by the Subjects; and this is evident by Law, because one may give most unjustly moneys to his neighbour, under the notion of loan, which yet hath nothing of the essence of loan and debt, but is meer delapidation, and cannot properly be debt by Gods Law; for the Law regulateth a man in borrowing and lending, as in other politike actions: if I, out of desire of revenge, should lend moneys to a robber, to buy powder and fewel to burn an innocent Citie, or to buy armour to kill innocent men, I deny that that is legally debt. I dispute not, whether A. B. borrowing money formally, that thereby he may buy a Whore, shall be obliged to repay it to C. D. under the reduplication of debt; or if the borrower be obliged to pay what the lender hath unjustly lent. I dare not pray to God, That all our Kings debts may be payed; I have scarce faith so to do.

Quest. 20. Whether Subsidies be due to the King as King?* 1.797] Answ. There is a twofold Subsidie; one Debitum, of debt, another Cha∣ritativum, By way of charitie: a Subsidie of debt, is rather the Kingdoms due for their necessitie, then the Kings due, as a part of his rent; we read of Custome due to the King as King, and for

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conscience sake, Rom. 13.5, 6. never of a Subsidie or taxation to the Kings of Israel and Judah, at any convention of the States. Augu∣stus Caesar his taxing of all the World, Luk. 2. for the maintenance of Wars, cannot be the proper rent of Augustus, as Emperour, but the rent of the Romane Empire: and it is but the fact of a man. Cha∣ritative subsidies to the King, of indulgence; because, through bad husbanding of the Kings rents, he hath contracted debts: I judge no better than Royall and Princely begging. Yet lawfull they are, as I owe charitie to my brother, so to my father, so to my Politique father the King. See Ferd. Vasq. illust. quest. l. 1. c. 8. who desireth that Superiors, under the name of Charitie, hid not rapine: and ci∣teth Cleer, gravely saying, offic: l. 1. Nulla generi humano & justitiae major pestis est, quam eorum, qui dum maximè fallunt, id agunt, ut boni viri esse videantur, &c.

Quest. 21. Whether the Seas, Floods, Road-wayes, Castles, Ports, publike Magazine, Militia, Armour, Forts and Strengths be the Kings?* 1.798] Ans. All these may be understood to be the Kings, in di∣vers notions. 1. They are the Kings, quoad custodiam, &. publicam possessionem, as a pawn is the mans in whose hand the pawn is laid down. 2. They are the Kings, quoad jurisdictionem cumulativam, non privativam; The King is to direct, and Royally to command, that the Castles, Forts, Ports, Strengths, Armour, Magazine, Mili∣tia, be imployed for the safetie of the Kingdome. All the Wayes, Bridges, the publike Road-wayes, are the Kings, in so far as he, as a publike and Royall watchman, is to secure the Subjects from Rob∣bers, and to cognosce of unknown Murthers, by himselfe and the inferior Iudges: yet may not the King imploy any of these against the Kingdome. 3. They are the Kings, as he is King, quoad offici∣alem, & Regalem, & publicam proprietatem: for he hath a Royall and Princely propriety to all these, as his own, in so far as he useth them according to Law: And thus they are, 4. The Kings also, quoad usum, in regard of officiall use. But they are the Kingdomes, quoad fructum, in regard of the effect and fruit. 2. They are the King∣domes, finaliter, being destinated for the safetie and securitie of the Kingdome. 3. They are the Kingdomes, quoad proprietatem propriam, & legalem stricté sumptam; according to the proper and legall proprietie; And are not the Kings proper heritage, as he is a Man: 1. Because he may not sell these Forts, Strengths, Ports, Magazine, Bridges, &c. to a stranger, or a Forraigne Prince.

2. When the King is dead, and his Heires and Royall line interrupted, these all remaine proper to the Kingdome; yet so, as the State cannot, as they are Men, make them away, or sell them, more then the King: for no Publike persons, yea the Multitude cannot make away the securitie, safetie, and that which necessarily conduceth to the securitie of the Po∣steritie. The Lord build his owne Zion, and appoint Salvation for walls and bulwarks.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  How Govern∣ment is from God.
• * 1.2

  Civill power in the root im∣mediately from God.
• (a) 1.3

  Aristot. po∣lit. l. 1. c. 2.
• (b) 1.4

  Sacro sanc. reg. majestas, c. 1. p. 1.
• (c) 1.5

  Molina to. ••. de justit. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 22.
• (d) 1.6

  Bodin. de rep. l. 1 c. 6.
• (e) 1.7

  Suarez to. 1. de legib. l. 3. c. 3.
• * 1.8

  Civill societie how naturall.
• (f) 1.9

  Vasquez il∣lust. quae t. l. 1. c. 41. num. 28, 29.
• * 1.10

  Power of Go∣vernment, and of Govern∣ment by Magi∣strates diste∣rent.
• (g) 1.11

  L. 2. in princ. F. de iust. & jur. & in princ. Iust. Cod. tit. c. jus nat. 1. disp.
• (h) 1.12

  Dominium est jus quoddam. l. fin. ad med. C. de long. temp. prest. l. qui u∣sum fert. Civil subjecti∣on formally not natures Law.
• * 1.13

  Our consent to Laws not ante∣cedently natu∣rall.
• * 1.14

  Government by Rulers a se∣condary Law of na••ure.
• (a) 1.15

  Ad Tanne∣rus, m. 12. tom. 2. disp. 5. de peccatis, q. 5. dub. 1. num. 22.
• (b) 1.16

  Sotus 4. de justit. q. 4. ar. 1.
• (c) 1.17

  Lod. Moli∣na, to. 1. de just. disp. 22.
• (d) 1.18

  Victoria in relect. de potest. civil. q. 4. art. 1.
• * 1.19

  Family Go∣vernment and civil different.
• * 1.20

  Civill govern∣ment, by con∣sequent, natu∣rall.
• * 1.21

  Rom. 13.
• (e) 1.22

  Govarruvi∣as, tr. 2. pract. quest. 1. n 2, 3, 4
• (f) 1.23

  Soto loc. cit.
• (g) 1.24

  Suarez de Reg. lib. 3. c. 4. n. 1, 2.
• (h) 1.25

  Barclaius con. Monarcho∣ma, l. 3. c. 2.
• * 1.26

  The King from God, un∣derstood in a fourefold sen••e.
• (i) 1.27

  Sacro, an. reg. maj. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sa∣cred and royall prerogati•••• of Christian Kings c. 1. q. 1. p. 6, 7.
• (k) 1.28

  Bellarm. de locis, l. 5. c. 6. not. 5. Politica universe consi∣derata est de ju∣re divino, in particulari con∣siderata est de jure gentium.
• * 1.29

  Royall power is of divine in∣stitution.
• (a) 1.30

  Hieromy in ••. 4. Com∣ment. in Ierem.
• (b) 1.31

  Basilius Epist. 125.
• (c) 1.32

  Athanasius Epist. ad solita.
• (d) 1.33

  Optat. Me∣levitanus. Lib. 3
• (e) 1.34

  Epiphanius l. 1. tom. 3. He∣res. 40.
• * 1.35

  How and in what sence any forme of Go∣vernment is indifferent.
• * 1.36

  How Govern∣ment is an Or∣dinance of man, 1 Pet. 2 3.
• (f) 1.37

  Rivetus in dee••t. Mand. 5. pa. 194.
• (g) 1.38

  Pisc. in loc
• (h) 1.39

  Diodat. annot.
• (i) 1.40

  Occumenius Quod hominum dispositione con∣sistit. & huma∣nis suffragiis creatur.
• (k) 1.41

  Dydimus.
• (l) 1.42

  Cajetan, officium regime∣nis, quia huma∣nis suffragiis creatur.
• (m) 1.43

  Estius in loc.
• (n) 1.44

  Betrandus tom 4. Bib.
• (o) 1.45

  Gloss. ordi∣nar.
• (p) 1.46

  Lyranus.
• (q) 1.47

  Syriak.
• (r) 1.48

  Lorin. in lo.
• (s) 1.49

  Durandus lib. de orig▪ juris
• * 1.50

  How the King is from God, and how from the people.
• * 1.51

  Royall power three wayes in the people.
• * 1.52

  How Royall power is radi∣dically in the people.
• * 1.53

  The people make the King.
• * 1.54

  The people create a King according to the Scripture.
• (a) 1.55

  Lavater com. in Part 12 38. Hodie quo que in liberis urbibus, & gentibus, magi¦stratus secundum dei verbum, Exod. 18. & Deut. 1. cli∣gendi sunt, non ex assectibus.
• (b) 1.56

  Barclaius, l. 3. cont. Monar∣chomach. 8. c. 3.
• * 1.57

  Making a king and choosing a king, not to be distinguished.
• * 1.58

  David not a King, because anointed by Samuel.
• * 1.59

  By the peoples▪ election one is made of no King a King.
• * 1.60

  Kings elected & made by the people, though the Office in the ••bst••act be imme••i••tely of God.
• (a) 1.61

  Bellarmine l. 5. c. 6. not 5. De Laicis.
• * 1.62

  Sacro. Sa. reg. Ma. 5.2. pag. 20.21, 22, 23.
• * 1.63

  The people have a reall action more then approba∣tion in ma∣king a King.
• * 1.64

  The same word that is a∣scribed to the people in ma∣king a King, 2 Sam. 16.18. is given to God, 1 King. 12.28.
• * 1.65

  Kinging of a person ascribed to the people.
• * 1.66

  Kings in a spe∣ciall manner from God, but it followeth not, ergo, not from the peo∣ple.
• * 1.67

  Ib. c 24.
• * 1.68

  Kings are from God, yet from the peo∣ple also.
• * 1.69

  The place, Prov. 8.15. proveth not but Kings are made by the people.
• * 1.70

  Thom. 12. q. 93. art. 3.
• * 1.71

  Pag. 30.
• * 1.72

  Dr. Fern, 3. ••. 13.
• * 1.73

  The formes of Government not from God by a naked act of Providence, but by his ap∣proving will.
• * 1.74

  cap. 4. pag 41
• * 1.75

  Soveraigntie not from the people by sole approbation.
• * 1.76

  That Kings in an eminent 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of divine pro∣vidence, have their crownes from God, hin∣dreth not but they have their crownes from the people also▪
• * 1.77

  Phrases ascri∣bing the ma∣king of Kings in a peculiar manner to God prove not that the free will of the people hath no hand in the making Kings.
• * 1.78

  Prophesies of Christ ex∣pounded by the P. Prelate of prophane Hea∣then Kings. The P. Prelate expoundeth Prophesies of David, Solo∣mon and Iesus Christ as true of prophane heathen Kings.
• * 1.79

  Sacro sancta Maj. 43.44.
• * 1.80

  The P. P. ma¦keth all the Heathen Kings to be anoynted with grace from Heaven.
• (a) 1.81

  Aug. in locum, u••xi ma∣num fortem, ser∣vum obedient••m ideo in ••o posui adjutorium.
• (b) 1.82

  Lyra. Gra∣tia est habitua∣lis, quia stat pu∣gil contra dia∣bolum.
• (c) 1.83

  Gloss. or∣din. &
• (d) 1.84

  Hu∣go Cardinalis, Oleo laetitia quo prae consortibus unctus fuit Christus, Ps. 45.
• (e) 1.85

  Bellarm. ib.
• (f) 1.86

  Lorinus.
• (g) 1.87

  Theodatus.
• (h) 1.88

  Ainsworth, annot.
• (i) 1.89

  1 Sam. 16 1.13, 14. Luk. 4.18.21. Io. 3.••4.
• (k) 1.90

  Iunius an∣not. in loc.
• (l) 1.91

  Mollerus com. ibid.
• * 1.92

  〈…〉〈…〉 of the Church and Christ, by the P P. exp••un∣ded of profane Kings▪
• (a) 1.93

  Chald. par.
• (b) 1.94

  Diodat. an.
• (c) 1.95

  Ainsworth. Athanasius, Eu∣sebius, Origen. Augustine, Dydimus.
• (d) 1.96

  Ainsw. an. i•• v. 5.
• * 1.97

  The excellen∣cy of Kings maketh them not of Gods only constitu∣tion and desig∣nation.
• * 1.98

  Antonin. de dominis Archi¦epis. de dom. l. 6. c. 2. n. 5, 6. seq.
• * 1.99

  How Sove∣raigntie is in the people, and how not.
• * 1.100

  A Communi∣ty doth not surrender their right and li∣bertie to their Rulers, so much as their power active to do, and pas∣sive to suffer unjust vio∣lence.
• * 1.101

  Gods losing of the bond of Kings, by the mediation of the peoples dispising him, proveth against P. P. that the Lord taketh and giveth Royall Majesty mediately.
• * 1.102

  The subordi∣nation of crea∣tures naturall, not voluntary as is the sub∣ordination of people to Kings and Ru∣lers.
• * 1.103

  7. Arg. pag. 51.52. The place Gen. 9.5. He that sheddeth mans blood, &c.
• (a) 1.104

  Quint. Curtius, l. 5.
• (b) 1.105

  Aug. de civ. Dei, l. 16. c. 17.
• (c) 1.106

  Euseb. in exo. Cronic.
• (d) 1.107

  Hieron. in c. 2. Hos.
• (e) 1.108

  Euseb. l. 9. de prepar. Evan. c. 3.
• (f) 1.109

  Clemens recog. l. 4.
• (g) 1.110

  Pirerius in Gen. c. 10. v. 8, 9. disp. 3. n. 67. Illud quoque mihi fit percre∣dibile, Nimrod fuisse eundem, at{que} enim quem alia appellant Belum patre•• Ni••i.
• (i) 1.111

  Euseb. pro∣log l. 1. Chron.
• (k) 1.112

  Paul Oro∣sius. l. 1. de Or∣mesta mundi.
• (l) 1.113

  Hieron. in traditio Hebrei in Gen.
• (m) 1.114

  Tostat. A∣bulensan Gen. c. 10.9.6.
• (n) 1.115

  Calvin com.
• (o) 1.116

  Iosephus in c. 10. Ge.
• (p) 1.117

  Luth. cò. ib.
• (q) 1.118

  Musculus.
• (q) 1.119

  Calv. com. Quanquam hoc loco non simpliter fertur lex politica, ut plectantur homicidae.
• (r) 1.120

  Ainsw. com.
• (r) 1.121

  Calv. in lect.
• (s) 1.122

  Mortar.
• (t) 1.123

  Pirerius in Gen. ••.9. v. 3, 4. n. 37. Vatablus hath divers interpretations; In homine, id est, in conspectu omnium & publicè, aut in homine, i.e. hominibus testificantibus, alii, in homine, i. e. propter hominem, quia occidit hominem, jussu magistratus. Cajetan expoundeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 contra hominem, in despight of man.
• (h) 1.124

  Calvin com. in c. 9. Gen.
• (s) 1.125

  Mortar
• (t) 1.126

  Pirerius in Gen. ••.9. v. 3, 4. n. 37. Vatablus hath divers interpretations; In homine, id est, in conspectu omnium & publicè, aut in homine, i. e. hominibus testificantibus, alii, in homine, i. e. propter hominem, quia occidit hominem, jussu magistratus. Cajetan expoundeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 contra hominem, in despight of man.
• (a) 1.127

  M. Anto. de domini. Arch. Spalatens. l. 6. c. 2. n. 5.6. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 petius h••∣bet a natura, non tam vim a••••ice rectivam aut gubernativ••m, quam inclinatio∣nem passive re gibilem (ut ita loquar) & gu∣bernabilem, qua volens & libens sese submittit rectoribus &c.
• (b) 1.128

  Almain. de potest. & La. 1 q. 1. c. 1.6. & q. 2.3, 5.
• (c) 1.129

  Navarrus
• (d) 1.130

  Nem. don iud. not. 3. n. 85.
• * 1.131

  In any commu∣nity there are active and pas∣sive power to government.
• * 1.132

  Pag. 95, 96.
• * 1.133

  Spal••tensis, I∣bid. pag. 648.
• * 1.134

  Popular Go∣vernment is not that in which the whole people are Governors. People by na∣ture, are equal∣ly indifferent to all the three forms of Go∣vernment.
• * 1.135

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 16. August. de lib. arb. l. 1. c. 6. ••i deprauatus populus rem pri∣vatam Reipub. preserat. atque habeat venale suffragium cor¦ruptusque ab ii•• qui honoros a••nant, regnum in sefactiosis con∣s••••leratisque committat; non ne item rectê, si quis tunc extile∣rit vir bonus qui plurimum possit, adimat huic populo po∣testatem dandi honores, & in pavcorum bo∣norum, vel etiam unjus red regat arbitri∣um?

  Pag. 97. sacr. sanc. regum majest.
• * 1.136

  The P. Prelate holdeth the Pope no•• to be the Antichrist, but that as Pa∣pists say, the Antichrist shal be one single man.
• * 1.137

  The bad suc∣cesse of Kings chosen by the people proveth nothing, be∣cause Kings chosen by God had bad suc∣cesse, through their own wic∣kednesse.
• * 1.138

  The P. Prelate condemneth King Charles his ratifying in Parliament, 2. An. 1641. the proceed∣ings of Scot∣land in this present Refor∣mation.
• * 1.139

  That any are supreme Iudg∣es, is an emi∣nent act of speciall provi∣dence, which hindereth not but that the King is made by the people▪
• * 1.140

  The people not patients▪ in making a King, as is water in pro∣ducing grace in baptisme.
• * 1.141

  Barclaius contr. Monarch. l. 4. c. 10. p. 268. ut hostes publicos non solù ab uni∣verso populo, sed à singulis etiam ••mpeti o••edi{que} jure optimo posse tota Antiquitas ••ensuit.
• * 1.142

  ••ow the peo∣ple is the sub∣ject of Sove∣raigntie.
• * 1.143

  Sac. Reg. Maj. The sacred an•• royall prero∣gative of King c. 9. p. 101.102
• * 1.144

  Stollen from Barclaius.
• * 1.145

  The power of Parliaments.
• * 1.146

  The Parlia∣ment hath more power then the King.
• * 1.147

  C. 10. pag. 105.
• * 1.148

  C. 16.105, 106, 107.
• * 1.149

  Iudges and Kings differ.
• * 1.150

  Cap. 15. p. 147 148.
• * 1.151

  Barclaius contra Monarchum. l. 5. c. 12. Idem. l. 3 c. ult pag. 2, 3.
• * 1.152

  People may resume their power in some cases, not be∣cause they are infallible, but because they cannot so easi∣ly erre as one man.
• * 1.153

  That the San∣edrim puni∣shed not David, Bathsheba, Ioab, proveth no∣thing in law, as a fact or non fact is not law.
• (a) 1.154

  Covarruvi∣as, tom. 2. pract. ••uest.. c. 1. n. 2 3 4▪
• * 1.155

  Spalato de rep. eccles. l. 6. c. 2. n. 32.
• * 1.156

  Sa. sa. maj. The sacred and royall prero∣gative of Kings c. 7. p. 82, 83, 84.
• (a) 1.157

  Covarr. to 4 pract. quest. c. 1. •• 2.
• * 1.158

  Government how both na∣turall, and also voluntary.
• * 1.159

  There is a sub∣ordination of creatures natu∣rall, and go∣vernment must be naturall, and yet this or that forme i•• voluntary.
• * 1.160

  Edward Sym∣mons, in his loyall subjects beleefe, sect. 3. p. 16.

  Royaltie not transmittable from father to sonne.

  Vpon what tearme a peo∣ple chooseth a Familie to reigne over them by suc∣cession.
• * 1.161

  The Throne by speciall pro∣mises of God, made to David and his seed, Ps. 89. no ground to make birth in foro dei a iust title to the Crowne.
• * 1.162

  3 Arg.
• * 1.163

  M. Symmons, Loyall Sub∣jects beliefe, Sect. 3. p. 16.
• * 1.164

  Title to a Crown by con∣quest must be unlawfull if truth be Gods just Title to a Crowne.
• * 1.165

  Royalists who hold conquests a iust title to the Crowne, teach mani∣fest treason a∣gainst our So∣veraigne King Charles and his Heires.
• * 1.166

  4. Arg.
• * 1.167

  Onely bona for∣tunae, not ho∣nour is trans∣mittable from father to son.
• * 1.168

  Violent con∣quest cannot regulate the consciences of people to sub∣mit to a con∣querour as their lawfull King.
• * 1.169

  Naked birth is inferiour to the divine unction, which yet made no man a King, without the peoples e∣lection.
• * 1.170

  Symmons loyall Subiects beleef. Sect. 3. p. 16.
• * 1.171

  Birth a typical designment to the crown.
• * 1.172

  If a Kingdom were by birth, the King might sell it.
• * 1.173

  Symons, sect. 3. pag. 7.
• * 1.174

  Joan. Episc••. Roffens. de po∣test. Papae. l. 2. c. 5.
• * 1.175

  Arnisaeu•• de authorit. prin∣cip. c. 1. n. 13.
• * 1.176

  The heir of a Crown hath the Crown as the patrimony of the King∣dom, not of the King his father.
• * 1.177

  The choice of a family to the Crown, resol∣veth upon the free election of the people, as on the fountain-cause.
• * 1.178

  6. Argum.
• * 1.179

  Sect. 4. p. 39.
• * 1.180

  Election of a family to the Crown law∣full.
• * 1.181

  Speed, Hist. pag. 757.
• * 1.182

  A King by e∣l••ction com∣m••th neerer to the first King th•••• a K••ng by suc∣••••ssi••n.
• * 1.183

  D. Fern, part 3. sect. 3 p. 14.
• * 1.184

  If the people may limit the King, they may give him power
• * 1.185

  A community have not power formally to punish them∣selves.
• * 1.186

  Barclay cont. Monarcham. c. 2. p. 56.
• * 1.187

  The elective King and the hereditary King better and worse, every one then another, in divers rela∣tions.
• * 1.188

  Sac. sanc. Reg. Maiest. c. 17. p. 158.
• * 1.189

  Letter p. 7.
• * 1.190

  Twofold right of conquest.
• * 1.191

  Sect. 7. p. 30.
• * 1.192

  Vniust con∣quest is no sig∣nification of Gods appro∣ving Will.
• * 1.193

  1 Arg.
• * 1.194

  2 Arg.
• * 1.195

  Meere violent domineering is contrary to the rules of gover∣ning.
• * 1.196

  3 Arg.
• * 1.197

  Violence hath nothing in it of a King.
• * 1.198

  4 Arg.
• * 1.199

  5 Arg.
• * 1.200

  A King given to a people by a bloody Con∣quest, must be a judgement, not a blessing, and so not per se a King.
• * 1.201

  6 Arg.
• * 1.202

  Strength, as prevailing strength, is not law or reason.
• * 1.203

  Fathers cannot dispose of the liberty of the posteritie not borne.
• * 1.204

  A father as a father hath not power of life and death.

  Hugo Gootius de ••ute belli & pacis l. 2. c. 4. n. 10.
• * 1.205

  7 Arg.
• * 1.206

  Part 3. Sect. 3. pag. 20. Arnisaeus de au∣thoritat. Prin∣cip. c. 1. n. 12.
• * 1.207

  The peoples and Davids conquest of Canaanites, A∣monites, and Edomites, do not prove con∣quest to be a good title to a Crown.
• * 1.208

  Davids con∣quest of the Ammonites more rigorous then that it can legitimate Crowns by conquest.
• * 1.209

  2 Sam. 12.30.31.
• * 1.210

  7. sorts of su∣perioritie and inferioritie.
• * 1.211

  Power of life and death from a positive law not from the superioritie o•• father & chil∣dren.
• * 1.212

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.213

  A dominion antecedent and consequent.
• * 1.214

  Kings and sub∣jects no natu∣rall order.
• * 1.215

  Buchan. de ju•• Regni apud Sco••tos.

  A man is bor•• consequenter, i•• a poltique re••lation.
• * 1.216

  Slavery not naturall.
• * 1.217

  Every man by nature free borne in re∣gard of civill subjection.
• * 1.218

  1 Arg.
• * 1.219

  2 Arg.
• * 1.220

  3 Arg.
• * 1.221

  4 Arg.
• * 1.222

  5 Arg.
• * 1.223

  6 Arg.
• * 1.224

  Politque soci∣etie naturall in radice, free in modo rei.
• * 1.225

  7 Arg.
• * 1.226

  Sac. sanct. R••g. ma. c. 12. p. 12••.
• * 1.227

  P. Prelate.
• * 1.228

  Politick Go∣vernment how naturall.
• * 1.229

  P. Prelate. Sac. sanct. Mai. p. ••26.
• * 1.230

  Inslaving of children by the parents not naturall.
• * 1.231

  The King un∣der a naturall, but no civil ob∣ligation to the people, say Royalists.
• * 1.232

  If the conditi∣on without the which one of the parties would never have entered in covenant, be not performed, that person is loosed from the covenant. Arnis. de an∣thorit. prin. c. 1 n. 6, 7.
• * 1.233

  The people & Princes in their place are obli∣ged to maintain Religion and Iustice, no lesse then the King.
• * 1.234

  In so far as the King presseth a false Religion on the people, catenus, in so far they are under∣stood not to have a Kingly power.
• * 1.235

  The covenant between King and People gi∣veth a coactive power to each other.
• * 1.236

  The covenant bindeth the King, as King, not as he is a man only.
• * 1.237

  The covenant tyeth the King to the People politically as well as to God naturally or religiously.
• * 1.238

  2 Arg.
• * 1.239

  How the cove∣nant is condi∣tionall, and what breach dissolveth the covenant.
• * 1.240

  One or two tyrannous acts deprive not a King of his Royall right.
• * 1.241

  The covenant between King and people conditionall.
• * 1.242

  Though there be no positive written cove∣cant (which yet we grant not) yet there is a naturall, tacite, and im∣plicite cove∣nant betwixt the King and the people.
• * 1.243

  If the King be made King absolutely, he is made such an one contra∣ry to the word of God and nature of his office.
• * 1.244

  The people are not given to the Kings kee∣ping so as they be his owne, as sheep or mony are given.
• * 1.245

  The King could not buy or sell, borrow or contract debt if his co∣venant with men did not bind him.
• * 1.246

  The covenant sworn by Asa and all Iudah, 2 Chron. 15. obligeth the King.
• * 1.247

  Barclay.
• * 1.248

  Alber. Gentilis in disput. Regal. l. 2. c. 12. l. ••3. c. 14•• 15.116. Hug. Grotius de jure belli, & poc. l. 2. c. 11, 12, 13. Arnisaeus do authorit. prin∣cip. c. 1. n. 7.8.10. Haenon. disp. 2.
• * 1.249

  Ioan. Roffens. de potest. pape. l. 2. c. 5.

  Adam suppose he had lived till now should not have bin King of the whole earth because a father.
• * 1.250

  King a father Metaphorical∣ly only.
• * 1.251

  A fatherly power and a politike pow∣er are not one and the fame.
• * 1.252

  D. Ferne, par. 1. sect. 3. pag. 8.
• * 1.253

  Sacr. sanct. Reg. Maiest. c. 7. pag. 87. Arni∣saeus de potest. princip. c. 3. n. 1.2.
• * 1.254

  See Aristotle saith the Pro∣late, Eth. 8.10. pol. 1. c. Ho∣mer. Odys. 1. he might have said, see Arnisaeus loc. tit.
• * 1.255

  The King as King, hath no masterly domi∣on over the people, but on∣ly fiduciarie.
• * 1.256

  To be a King, is by office, and actu primo, to defend, save, feed, and not to hurt or inthral.
• * 1.257

  A King not o∣ver men as rea∣sonable men.
• * 1.258

  Prelate. Sacr. sanct. maj. c. 16· p. 15. Hugo Grotius hath the same de jur. bel. & pacis, l. 1. c. 3.
• * 1.259

  A compelled surrender of liberty tyeth not.
• * 1.260

  A surrender of ignorance and mistake, is some way un∣voluntary and obligeth not.
• * 1.261

  The Goods of the Subjects not the Kings.
• * 1.262

  Quod jure gentium dici∣tur. F. de justi¦tia & jure. l. ex h••e.

  Quod partim jure civili. Iu∣sti. de rerum divisio. sect. singulorum.
• * 1.263

  L. item si verberatum. F. de rei vindicat. Ias. plene m. l. Barbarius. F. de offici. prator. all the goods of the people are the Kings in a fourfold noti∣on, but not in propriety.
• * 1.264

  Subjects are propriators of their own Goods.
• * 1.265

  Argum. 1.
• * 1.266

  Argum. 2.
• * 1.267

  Argum. 3.
• * 1.268

  The answer of Hybreas to a extorting Prince Antoni∣us.
• * 1.269

  Argum. 4.
• * 1.270

  Species enim furti est de ali∣••no largiri, & beneficit debito rem sihi acqui∣rer••, L. si pig∣nore, sect. de furt.
• * 1.271

  Argum. 5.
• * 1.272

  Argum. 6.
• * 1.273

  Argum. 7.
• * 1.274

  Argum. 8.
• * 1.275

  The Kings po∣wer fiduciarie.
• * 1.276

  The King a Tutor.
• * 1.277

  Difference be∣tween a father and a Tutor.
• * 1.278

  A free Com∣munity no pu∣pill or minor.
• * 1.279

  The Kings po∣wer not pro∣perly Maritall or husbandly.
• * 1.280

  The King a Patron rather then a Lord.
• * 1.281

  The King an honourable servant.
• * 1.282

  Royall power only from God, and only from the peo∣ple in divers respects.
• * 1.283

  The King the servant of the people both objectively & subjectively.
• * 1.284

  By one and the same act the Lord of Heaven, and the People make the King according to the physicall realitie of the act.
• * 1.285

  The King head of the Com∣munitie only metaphorically
• * 1.286

  The King but metaphorically only Lord of the familie.
• * 1.287

  The King not heire nor pro∣prietor of the Kingdome.
• * 1.288

  The place, 1 Sam. 8, 9, 11. discussed.
• (a) 1.289

  Grotius de ju. bel▪ & pacis, l. 1. c. 4. n. 3.
• (b) 1.290

  Barclaius contra Monar chom. l. 2. p. 64. Potestatem in∣telligit non cam quae competit e•• praecepto, neque etiam quae ex permissu est, quatenus liberat à ••cecato, sed quatenus paenis legalibus eximit operantem.
• (c) 1.291

  Barclaius contra Monar∣cho. l. 2. p. 56, 57.
• * 1.292

  The power & office of the King, badly di••••erenced by Barclay.
• (d) 1.293

  Barclaius, l. 3. c. 2.
• (e) 1.294

  Arr. Mon. Haec erit ratio Regis.
• (f) 1.295

  70. Inter∣pret.

  Vatabul. judica 〈◊〉〈◊〉 judicium & consuetudinem, ••. mores & ib. his moribus & hac consuetudine utentur erga vos reges.
• g 1.296

  Chald▪ Para. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 70. Interp. 70. Interp.
• (h) 1.297

  P. Mar∣tyr. coment. 1 Sam. 8. ve∣rum jus regium describit in Deut. apud Sa∣muelem autem usurpatum.
• (i) 1.298

  Calvin. conc. 1 Sam. 8.
• (k) 1.299

  Andr. Ri∣vetus in decal. c. 20. Exod. in ••. mundat. p. 195.
• (l) 1.300

  Junius an∣not. in 1 Sam. 2.13.
• (m) 1.301

  Diodatus annot. 1 Sam. 8.3.
• (n) 1.302

  Gloss•• interlinearis.
• (o) 1.303

  Lyra in locum. hic accipitur jus large sumptum quo•• reputatur jus propter malum abusum. Nam illa quae dicuntur hic de jure Regis, magis contingunt p••r Tyranidem.
• (p) 1.304

  Tostatu•• Abulens. in 1 Reg. 8. q. 17. deq. 21.
• (q) 1.305

  Cornelius a Lapid. in locum.
• (r) 1.306

  Cajetan. in locum.
• (s) 1.307

  Hugo Car∣dinal. in loc.
• (t) 1.308

  Serrarius in locum.
• (u) 1.309

  Thom. A∣quin. l. 3. de Regni Prin∣cip. c. 11.
• (x) 1.310

  Mendoza, jus Tyranno∣rum.
• (y) 1.311

  Clemens Alexand. pag. 26.
• (z) 1.312

  Beda, l. 2 expo. in Samuel
• (a) 1.313

  Petrus Ro¦buffus tract. d•• incongrua. prert. p. 110. Osiander, he setteth not down the Office of the King, what he ought to be, but what man••ner of King they should have.

  Pelican. that ruled by will, not by law.

  Willet. Such as decline to Ty∣ranny.

  Borhaius, Ty∣rants, not Kings.
• (b) 1.314

  Rabb. Levi Ben. Gersom. in 1 Sam. 8. Pezelius in exp. leg. Mosai. l. 4. c. 8. Tossan. in not. Bibl. Bosseus de Rep. Christ. potest. supra regem, c. 2. n. 103. Bodin. de Rep. l. 1. •• 19. Brentius, homil. 27. in 1 Sam. 8. Mos regis non de jure, sed de vulgatâ consuctudin••.
• * 1.315

  Doct. Ferne, p. 2. sect. pag. 55.
• * 1.316

  Active and passive, Obed. pag. 24.
• * 1.317

  D. Ferne. 3. p. Sect. 2. pag. 10.
• * 1.318

  Learned Au∣thors teach that Gods Law, Deut. 17. and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a manner of the King, 1 Sam. 8, 9 are opposite one to another, so Gerson in trin∣princ. sac. adu. lat. par. 4. Alp. 66. lit. l. cons. 8. Buchan. de jure regni. apud Scot. Chasson. cat. glo. mundi cons. 24. n. 162. cons. 35. Tho∣loss. l. 9. c. 1. Rossen. De polus Rep. c. 2. n. 10. Magdeburg. in trac. de. off. ma.

  Crying to God not the only remedy against a tyrant.
• * 1.319

  Ferne par. 3. pag. 95.

  Resisting of tyrants, and patience not inconsistent.
• * 1.320

  The Law of the King not a permissive law as was the law of devorcement
• * 1.321

  Mal. 2.
• * 1.322

  The law of the King written in a booke, 1 Sam. 11. not the law of Ty∣ranny.
• * 1.323

  In what consi∣derations the King is wor∣thier then the people, and the people wor∣thier then the King.
• * 1.324

  A meane as a meane inferi∣our to the end.
• * 1.325

  A King inferi∣our to the people.
• * 1.326

  Argum. ••.
• * 1.327

  Argum. 2.
• * 1.328

  Argum. 3.
• * 1.329

  Argum. 4.
• * 1.330

  Argum. 5.
• * 1.331

  The Church because the Church of more worth then the King because King.
• * 1.332

  Argum. 6.
• * 1.333

  Argum. 7.
• * 1.334

  People in the spece immor∣tall, King not so.
• * 1.335

  If sinne had never been, there should have been no need of Kings.
• * 1.336

  Arg. 8.
• * 1.337

  The King is to expend his life for the people, and so inferior ••o them.
• * 1.338

  A meane is considered re∣duplicatively and formally as a meane, and materially, as the thing which is the mean: in this latter sense the mean may be of more worth then the end, but not so in the former sense.
• * 1.339

  A meane may be considered as a meane on∣ly, and as more then a meane.
• * 1.340

  The people may be with∣out the King, but not the King without the people.
• * 1.341

  10. Argum.
• * 1.342

  The people worthier as the constituent cause then the King, who is the effect.
• * 1.343

  Argum. 1.
• * 1.344

  Argum. 2.
• * 1.345

  Vnpossible that people can limit Royall power, but they must giv•• Roy∣all power.
• * 1.346

  Argum. 3.
• * 1.347

  Argum. 4.
• * 1.348

  Except. 2. Ioan. Rossens. De potest. pap. l. 2. c. 5.
• * 1.349

  Though God immediately create Kings without the people, yet can the people un∣make Kings.
• * 1.350

  Though God should imme∣diately give a talent and gift for Prophecy¦ing, as he gave to Balaam, Caia∣phas and others, yet they may lose that talent by digging it in the earth, and be deprived by the Church.
• * 1.351

  Except. 3. Sacr. sanc. M••∣jes. c. 9. p. 98.99 Arnisaus De au∣thorit. princip. cap. 1. n. 1.
• * 1.352

  The people putting a King above them∣selves, retaine the fountain-power, and so are superior to the King.
• * 1.353

  Ulpian l. 1. ad Sc. Tupil. Po∣pulus omne su∣um imperium & potestatem confert in Re∣gem. Bartolus ad l. hostes 24. f. de capt. & host.
• * 1.354

  Arnis. c. ••. n. 10.
• * 1.355

  The King; as King, a meane and inferior to the people.
• * 1.356

  The King both as a man, and as a King inferior to the people.
• * 1.357

  Except. 4. Sacr. sanct. maj. c. 9. p. 98.
• * 1.358

  Observe here, that the P. P. yieldeth there is a free cove∣nant, by which the people re∣signe their power to the King: but whether Roy∣all power, or some other, he dare not assert, lest he destroy his own prin∣ciples.

  To sweare non-selfe-pre∣servation, and to sweare self-murther, all one.
• * 1.359

  5 Reply. Sac. sanct. maj. c. 9. p. 129. stollen from Barclaius, l. 5. c. 12.
• * 1.360

  The people cannot make a∣way their po∣wer to the King irrevocably
• * 1.361

  The people may resume the power they gave to Com∣missioners of Parliament, when they a∣buse that power▪
• * 1.362

  Buchanan not understood by the P. P.
• * 1.363

  Tables lawfull when the se∣cret Counsell is corrupted, and Parlia∣ments are denyed.
• * 1.364

  6 Rep. Barc. l. 4. con••. Monar••bo. c. 11 pag. 27.
• * 1.365

  7. Rep. Sacr. sanc. Ma••▪ c. 13. p. 130. stolen out of Arnisaeus d•• jure Majest. cap. 3. n. 1. pag. 34.
• * 1.366

  Quod ••fficit tale, &c. hold∣eth when the agent maketh not away all its vertue by alie∣nation.
• * 1.367

  8. Rep. Sacr. sanc. Mai. pag. 131.
• * 1.368

  Propter quod unumquod{que} &c. not under∣stood by the P. P.
• * 1.369

  The King hath Soveraignty by loane and in trust.
• * 1.370

  Soveraigntie how in the Communitie, how not.
• * 1.371

  Power of life and death, how in the Com∣munitie.
• * 1.372

  A Communi∣tie of it selfe, wanting Ru∣lers, is a Poli∣tique body, and how.
• * 1.373

  Sacr. sanc. maj. c. 4. p. 43.
• * 1.374

  The propaga¦tion of Kings is by filiati∣on, saith the P.P. A speech that hath nei∣ther sense nor reason. Filiati∣on is later then propagation: one must be propagated ere he be a sonne.
• * 1.375

  Kings and in∣ferior Iudges Gods analogi∣cally.
• * 1.376

  Inferiour Iudges no lesse Gods imme∣diate Vicars then the King.
• * 1.377

  The consci∣ence of the in∣feriour Iudge is immediate∣ly subordinate to God, not to the King either mediately, or immedia••ely.
• * 1.378

  Grotius de jure Belli & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 l. 1. c. 4. Nam ••••nis faculeas gubernandi in Magistratibus, summae potestati ita subjicitur ut qui••quid con••ra voluntatem summi imperan∣tis faciant, id dosectum sit ca facultate, ac proinde de pro actu privato ••abendum.
• * 1.379

  Grotius ibi. spe∣cies intermedia, si genus respici∣as, est species, si speciem infra positam, est ge∣nus: ita magi∣stratus illi, infe∣riorum quidem ratione habita sunt publicae, personae, at sup∣per ores si con∣siderentur, sunt privati.
• * 1.380

  Grot. 16.
• * 1.381

  Inferiour Iudges truely Iudges in re∣lation to the King.
• * 1.382

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 judge, how the Deputy of the King.
• * 1.383

  Inferiour Iud∣ges powers ordained of God.

  Rebuked for perverting judgement.
• * 1.384

  They are the Ministers of God.
• * 1.385

  To resist them is to resist God.
• * 1.386

  They are Gods
• * 1.387

  By this the Parliament of both King∣domes ought to put to death cut-rhroat-; Cavaliers ••ai∣sing warre a∣gainst the sub∣ject, though the King com∣mands the contrary. Sac. Sanc. mai. c. 4. pag. 46.
• * 1.388

  How the King judgeth by in∣feriour Iudges.
• * 1.389

  Simmons loyall subjects beleif. Sect. 1. pag. 3.
• * 1.390

  The honour of an inferiour Iudge com∣meth neither from East, nor from West, more then from the King.
• * 1.391

  Argu. 9.
• * 1.392

  Power of Kings and of inferiour Iud∣ges dister gra∣dually, not spe∣cifically.
• * 1.393

  The specifick acts and for∣mall object of Kings and in∣feriour Iudges are the same.
• * 1.394

  The same ob∣ligation of con∣s••ienc•• that ly∣eth on the King in all things, lyeth on the inferi∣our Iudge.
• * 1.395

  Inferiores Iu∣dices sunt im∣propriè Vicarii Regis, quoad missionem exter∣nam ad officium, sed immediati Dei vicarii, quo∣ad officium in quod missi sunt. Barcl. l. 2. contr. Monarchom. p. 56, 57.

  Arnisaeus de au∣thorit. Princ. c. 3. n. 9. Marant. disp. 1. Zoan. tract. 3. de desens. Mynsing. obs. 18. cent. 5. Symmons, sect. 1 p. 2.

  The Iudges of Israel, and the Kings after them, differed, but not essen∣tially.
• * 1.396

  Sacr. sanct. maj. 6.7. p. 81, 82.
• * 1.397

  Nature is as neare to Ari∣stocracy as to Monarchy, for the wife cannot be under the husband, as a subject under a Monarch, slie by the fift Commande∣ment hath a joynt headship with the husband.
• * 1.398

  Iudges inferi∣our depend on the King, in fieri when the constitution of the Kingdome is such, but not in facto esse nor in their essence.
• * 1.399

  Arg. 10.
• * 1.400

  Inferiou•• Iudges, after the King is dead, as also the States of Par∣liament remain Iudges.
• * 1.401

  Arg. 11.
• * 1.402

  God, not the absolute Pr••nce, maketh the inferiour Iudges.
• * 1.403

  No heritable Iudges accor∣ding to Gods Word.
• * 1.404

  Inferiour Iudges more necessary in a large Kingdom then the K••ng, and so Aristo∣cracy in that more sutable to the naturall end of govern∣ment then Mo∣narchy.
• * 1.405

  Principes sunt capitis tempora, Rex ••ertex.
• * 1.406

  Elders of a land joyntly in Parliament, must have as much, if not more, (vi•• uni∣••a sortior) then when they are divided in se∣verall tribes, cities, shires: but, divided, they are as es∣sentially Iudg∣es, as the King. The whole must have more power in extension, then the part. Jer. 38.25. they had power a∣gainst the Kings will, to put Ieremiah to death. Iere∣miah saith, Doe whatsoever soe∣meth good to you, v. 10.

  The power of conveening Parliaments, in the Estates, without the King.

  Ps. 122.2, 3. Why are thrones set for judgement for all the tribes, if only the King judge.
• * 1.407

  Tables in Scot¦land lawfull.
• * 1.408

  The inferiour Iudges are not subject in their conscience to the King, in their acts of judgement, ei∣ther, quoad ••••••∣cifi••ationem, to give unjust sentences at his will; nor quo ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉, to execute, or not execute judgement for the oppressed.
• * 1.409

  Vnjust judge∣ing, and no judging at all, are sinnes in the States.
• * 1.410

  Junius Brut. q. 2. p. 51. vin. l. contr. Tyran.
• * 1.411

  The Parlia∣ment Iudges not advisers only.
• * 1.412

  Ieferiour Iudges not the Legats, or Ser∣vants, or Mes∣sengers of the King.
• * 1.413

  Publick Go∣vernment be∣longeth to the States, and El∣ders as to the King.
• * 1.414

  Arg. 8.
• * 1.415

  Arg. 9.
• * 1.416

  Arg, 10.
• * 1.417

  Arg. 11.
• * 1.418

  Ferne par. 3. Defence. Sect. 3. pag. pag. 12
• * 1.419

  The question is not, if the King be so ab∣solute as he is freed from all Morall re∣straint com∣ming from Gods Law.
• * 1.420

  Sacr. sanc. Maj. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 14 p. 163.
• * 1.421

  No resisting of the most Tur∣kish Tyran by the Royalists way.
• * 1.422

  An absolute King more ab∣solute then the Great Turke, by Royalists way.
• * 1.423

  No law at all, by Royalists way, to im∣pede a King from a super-inundation of overflowing Tyranny.
• * 1.424

  1 Arg. against Absolu••en••slo of Kings.
• * 1.425

  Why the King •• breathing Law? three reasons.
• * 1.426

  2. Argument against an ab∣solute King: The People have no abso∣lute power o∣ver themselves, and so cannot make over any such power to the King.
• * 1.427

  Arg. 3.
• * 1.428

  Against an ab∣solute Prince.
• * 1.429

  Power Tyran∣nicall is not from God.
• * 1.430

  Barclaius 〈…〉〈…〉 l. 2. pag. 62.
• * 1.431

  That ••••••sion 〈…〉〈…〉 mortall ••an may resist, ••s from God.
• * 1.432

  Argum. 4.
• * 1.433

  Against an ab∣solute Prince. A King as a King must be a plague, if God be the Creator of an absolute Prince.
• * 1.434

  The goodnesse of an absolute Prince in not putting forth his power in actuall de∣stroying of the people, hinder∣eth not the power to be actu primo, Tyrannicall.
• * 1.435

  Argum. 5.
• * 1.436

  Against abso∣lute Princes. An absolute Prince against justice, peace, reason, law, &c.
• * 1.437

  Argum. 6.
• * 1.438

  Against an ab∣solute Prince.
• * 1.439

  It is against nature.
• * 1.440

  Arg. 7.
• * 1.441

  Against an ab∣solute Prince, contrary to the fift Comman∣dement.
• * 1.442

  Arg. 8.
• * 1.443

  Against an ab∣solute Prince. The King re∣maineth a bro∣ther when he is King, and may be rebuked, may not take his neighbours vineyard from him.
• * 1.444

  A Damsell forced by the King may vio∣lently resist.
• * 1.445

  No sufficient meanes against all cruelties and unjust vio∣lences, i•• an ab∣solute Prince be from God, all go•• to con∣fusion.
• * 1.446

  Barclaius cont. Monarch. l. ••. pag. 76, 77.
• * 1.447

  9. Argument 〈◊〉〈◊〉 an ab∣••••lu••e P••••nce. The 〈…〉〈…〉 express••, upon which the P••••n••e recei∣ve••h the crown ••ight with all absolute pow¦er.
• * 1.448

  Prerogative taken two wayes.
• * 1.449

  No Preroga∣tive Royall in the Scripture.
• * 1.450

  Jus personae, jus coronae.
• * 1.451

  The question touching Pre∣rogative Roy∣all, vaine.
• * 1.452

  Prerogative Royall of Roy∣alists, Gods due.
• * 1.453

  Acts founded upon the sole▪ pleasure of the Agent, proper to God.
• * 1.454

  A threefold dispensation.
• * 1.455

  A dispensati∣on, 1. of sole pleasure, 2. of ••ustice, 3. of grace.
• * 1.456

  A twofold ex∣poning of the Law by grace.
• * 1.457

  In re dubia pos¦sunt dispensare Principes, quia nullus sensus presumitur, qui vincat princi∣polem, l. ••. Sect. initium ib.
• * 1.458

  Kings, as Kings, cannot doe things of meere grace, because they must doe all ex debito officii, by necessitie of their office.
• * 1.459

  Rom. 13.4.
• * 1.460

  Prov. 17.15.
• * 1.461

  Kings, equivo∣cally Kings.
• * 1.462

  The King may ••s well do acts of m••er cruelty, from his sup∣pos••d Preroga∣tive, as acts of meer grace to one man, out of the same fountain.
• * 1.463

  If Prerogative may ov••r-leap Law in one, why not in twenty▪
• * 1.464

  No Tyrant c••n do any the most cruell act, but under the notion of apprehended good.
• * 1.465

  Pretended Prerogative Royal of Roy∣alists Tyranny Polanus in Da∣niel, c. 5.19. Rollocus, com. 16. ib.
• * 1.466

  The Sa••ches de matr. tom. 1. l. 2. dis. 15. n. 3. est arbitrii pleni¦tudo, nulli ne∣••••••sitati sub∣jecta, ruliius{que} public•• juri•• regalis limita 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Baldus, l. 2. n. 40. C. de servit. & aqua. Sueto••i. in Ca∣ligu. cap. 29. memento tibi omnia, & in omne•• licere. Coelius Rodigi, l. 8. Lect. An∣tiq. c. 1.
• * 1.467

  Vasquez, illust. quest. l. 1. c. 26. n. 2.
• * 1.468

  A contradicti∣on in Ferne.
• * 1.469

  Treaties of Monarchicall Government. c. 2. pag. 6, 7.
• * 1.470

  The King of Persia not ab∣solute.
• * 1.471

  The O••th of Iudah to the King of Baby∣lon tyed them not to renounce naturall selfe preservation.
• * 1.472

  Servants are not by 1 Pet. 2.18, 19. inter∣dited of selfe-defence.
• * 1.473

  Declar. at New Market, Mar. 9. 1641.
• * 1.474

  Magna Charc•• against an ab∣solute Prince.
• * 1.475

  How the King is Lord of the Parliamen••.
• * 1.476

  Monarch. Go∣verna. part 2. c. 1. pag. 31.
• * 1.477

  Sac. sanc. Mai. c. 14. p. 144.
• * 1.478

  Princes are not to be in∣vested with power to all Tyranny, up∣on this pre∣tence, that they cannot do good, except they have also absolute pow∣er to do evil.
• * 1.479

  Sac. Maj. pag. 145.
• * 1.480

  Sacr. sanc. Maj. c. 16. p. 170, 171.
• * 1.481

  A power to shed innocent blood, is no part of a true Prerogative.
• * 1.482

  The King be∣cause of the publikenesse of his office in∣feriour to sub∣jects and other Iudges, in many privi∣ledges.
• * 1.483

  Loyall sub∣jects belief, Sect. 6. p. 19.
• * 1.484

  Barcl. l. 4. c. 23. p. 325.
• * 1.485

  Humane Laws as penall, take life from Law makers: as reasonable, they have life from the eter∣nall Law of God.
• * 1.486

  The King not greater then the Law.
• * 1.487

  No necessitie that an unjust will of a King be either done by us, or on us.
• * 1.488

  The King hath no Nomothe∣tick power, his alone.
• * 1.489

  Symmons, Loy∣all Subject, Sect. 5. pag. 8.
• * 1.490

  Prerogative Royall, war∣ranteth not the Prince to de∣stroy himselfe; nor is the peo∣ple to permit him to cooperat for destruction to themselves.
• * 1.491

  The King in∣feriour to the People.
• * 1.492

  Parliaments supplicate not the King, ex debito▪
• * 1.493

  Sac. sanct. maj. ••. 9 p. 103, 104
• * 1.494

  Subordination of the King to the Parlia∣ment, and co∣ordinatiō, both consistent.
• * 1.495

  Do. p. 3. Sect. 4. pag. 27.
• * 1.496

  Temperament of all the three in a limited Monarchy.
• * 1.497

  Barcl. Ad ver∣fus Monarcho∣machous l. 1. pag. 24.

  A King as King how ex∣cellent a head of the people, how contrary to a Tyrant.
• * 1.498

  The King as an erring man no reme∣dy against con∣fusions, and op∣pressions of Anarchy.
• * 1.499

  A Court of necessity, and a Court of Iustice.
• * 1.500

  Humane Laws not so obscure as Tyranny is legible.
• * 1.501

  Ferne, part. 3. sect. 5. pag. 39.
• * 1.502

  It is ridiculous to say, a King cannot be so void of reason, as to destroy his people.
• * 1.503

  Part. 3. sect. 5. pag. 39.
• * 1.504

  If there be a civill restraint from mans Law, laid up∣on the King, it must be forceable.
• * 1.505

  Its more re∣quisite, the people, religi∣on, and Church, be se∣cured, then one man.
• * 1.506

  D. Ferne, p. 3. sect. 5. pag. 40.
• * 1.507

  To swear to an absolute Prince, as ab∣solute, is an oath Eatenus, in so far, not obligatory.
• * 1.508

  Difference be∣twixt a Tyrant in act, and a Tyrant in ha∣bit.
• * 1.509

  Epist. 45.
• * 1.510

  The tragicall end of many Tyrannous Princes.
• * 1.511

  ••easons why ••he Peoples ••••fetie, is the ••overaignes ••aw.
• * 1.512

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 good Prince 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to postpone 〈◊〉〈◊〉 own safetie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the safetie 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the people.
• * 1.513

  Sac. sane. Ma••▪ c. 16.159. Dr. Ferne, Conscience 〈◊〉〈◊〉 satisfied, Sec. p. 28.
• * 1.514

  The King in his governme•••• is to seeke 〈◊〉〈◊〉 safetie of the people, not himselfe.
• * 1.515

  ••••c. sanc. maj. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 160.
• * 1.516

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 Armini. Declar. Remonstrant. in ••uod. dordra••.
• * 1.517

  The Royalists principles drive at this, to make none Kings but only rank Tyrants.
• * 1.518

  V••••dix regum. pag. 65.
• * 1.519

  Sac. sanc. Mai. 16. pag. 161, 162, 163.
• * 1.520

  Sacr. san. M••i. pag. 165.
• * 1.521

  The subjects may gratifie the King for doing what he is obliged to doe by his office.
• * 1.522

  Sac. sacr. Ma••. pag. 170.
• * 1.523

  Page 172.
• * 1.524

  Symmons hath the same very thing in his Loyall Subjec. ••nbelief. p. 39. Page 175.
• * 1.525

  The safetie of the people, far above the King
• * 1.526

  Page 176.
• * 1.527

  A King may though we should deny all Prerogative, breake through the letter of a Law, for the safety of the whole Land.
• * 1.528

  The Kings supposed Pre∣rogative, no∣thing, in com∣parison of the lives and blood of so many thousands as are killed in England and Ireland.
• * 1.529

  The power of the Dictator no plea for a Prerogative above Law.
• * 1.530

  Pag. 177.
• * 1.531

  Sac. sa••••. maj. cap. 16.
• * 1.532

  The Law a∣bove the King in four consi∣derations.
• * 1.533

  The meaning of this [The King is not subject to the Law]

  The Law a∣bove the King in supremacy of constitution
• * 1.534

  In what sense the King m••y do all things.
• * 1.535

  Plutarch in A∣poth••g. l. 4.
• * 1.536

  The King un∣der the funda∣mentall Laws.
• * 1.537

  Whether the King be pu∣nishable, or be to he punished. Two divers questions. Magistratus ipse est judex & ex∣ecùtor contra s••ipsum, in pr••∣pria causa, prop∣ter excellentiam sut officii, l. s•• pater familias▪ & l. & hoc Tiberius Caesar F. De Here••. ••oc. just.
• * 1.538

  The King a∣bove s••me Lawes.
• * 1.539

  The King ••∣bove Lawes that con••erne subj••cts as subjects.
• * 1.540

  Some Lawyers and Schoole-men free the King from the Law.
• * 1.541

  Reasons to prove that the King is under the Law.

  Th••t a King hath no superi∣our but God, a false ground to liberate the the King from the coaction of Law.
• * 1.542

  Argum. 2.
• * 1.543

  Argum. 3.
• * 1.544

  A Tyrant in ••xercise, may be puni••••••d by th•• 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.545

  But how this c••n 〈◊〉〈◊〉 w••th th•• d••∣ctrine o•• R••y∣al••••ts, I see not: to wit, Once a father, alway a father, once a King, ever a King. None can punish a King, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Go•• Almighty, say they.
• * 1.546

  Arg. 4.
• * 1.547

  The K••ng un∣der the strict••st obligation of L••w.
• * 1.548

  Arg. 5.
• * 1.549

  A King remai∣neth a man, and a sociall creature.
• * 1.550

  〈…〉〈…〉 Mai. 〈…〉〈…〉 1••6, 14••.
• * 1.551

  In what consi∣derations the people is the subject of all politike power.
• * 1.552

  Sac. Mai. p. 147, 148.
• * 1.553

  C. 15. p. 148.
• * 1.554

  Stollen from Arnisaeus De authorit. Prin. c. 4. num, 5. pag. 73▪
• * 1.555

  If David in his Murthering Vriah and his Adultery sin∣ned against none but God.
• * 1.556

  Arg. 6.
• * 1.557

  The place Psa. 51. Against hee only have I sinned, Discussed.
• * 1.558

  Against thee only, &c. can∣not exclu••e men, as if Da∣vid had sinned against no mortall men on earth, as Royalists would teach.
• * 1.559

  Sac. sanct. maj. pag. 153.
• * 1.560

  Gods delive∣ring his peo∣ple by Iudges, and by Cyrus nothing ag••inst the power of a free people.
• * 1.561

  That the peo∣ple may swear a Covenant for Reformation, of Religion, without the King, is pro∣ved.
• * 1.562

  A twofold ex∣position of Lawes.
• * 1.563

  A Rule to ex∣pone Lawes.
• * 1.564

  The King not the sole inter∣preter of the Law.
• * 1.565

  The Kings conscience no rule of judging to the inferiour Iudge.
• * 1.566

  The King not the authentick peremtory and Lordly inter∣preter of the Law.
• * 1.567

  Argum. 1.
• * 1.568

  Argum. 2.
• * 1.569

  The Will of the King is not the sense of the Law.
• * 1.570

  The King is King according to the Law, but not King of the Law.
• * 1.571

  Argum. 3.
• * 1.572

  Arg. 5.
• * 1.573

  There can be no written Law, if the King only be the authentick expositor of the Law.
• * 1.574

  Imperator 〈…〉〈…〉 condere dicit. i. omnium, C. de testam.
• * 1.575

  Arg▪ 6.
• * 1.576

  Arnisaus de authori. Princ. c. 1. n. 2. The state of the question concerning re∣sistance.
• * 1.577

  Arnisae. 16. n. 4.
• * 1.578

  If Kings be absolute by di∣vine Instituti∣on, then all Covenants re∣straining them, must be un∣lawfull spoil∣ing of Kings, of that which God hath gi∣ven them.
• * 1.579

  Resistance in some c••ses lawfull, ac∣cording to D. Fern.
• * 1.580

  De author. Princ. c. 2. n. 10.
• * 1.581

  Royalists hold it lawfull to resist an infe∣riour Iudge.
• * 1.582

  The Exactors of unjust tri∣bute, not easily to be resisted.
• * 1.583

  Arguments for the lawfulnesse of resisting un∣just violence.
• * 1.584

  Argum. 1.
• * 1.585

  Argum. 2.
• * 1.586

  Argum. 3.
• * 1.587

  Argum. 4.
• * 1.588

  Arg. 5.
• * 1.589

  Arg. 6.
• * 1.590

  The Kings person as a man, in concret•• and as a King and his office, in abstracto, are very different in this dispute.
• * 1.591

  S••cr. sanc. Reg. Mai. c. 1. pag. 2.
• * 1.592

  Arnisae. de au∣thoritat. Prin∣cip. c. 4. n. n. pag. 96.

  Every one that commandeth o∣bedience active or passive un∣justly, is ••••••e∣nus, no higher power.
• * 1.593

  Arnisaeus 16. Laertius, l. 3. in Plato.
• * 1.594

  The person or the man who is the Magi∣strate, may law∣fully be resis∣ted, and the man as using the power lawfully, or the office can not be resisted.
• * 1.595

  Arg. 5.
• * 1.596

  Pag. 141.
• * 1.597

  Sac. sarc. mac. 2 pag 28. pag. 30.31.
• * 1.598

  Arnis••n de po∣test. prin. c. 2.11.17.
• * 1.599

  pag. 3. sec. 5. pag. 30. Royalists rea∣sons th••t to re∣sist the man or person is to re∣sist the King, office or ordi∣nance of God.
• * 1.600

  Grot. de iur. belli & pacis. l. 1. c. 4. n. 7. Winzetus V••l••∣tat. ad••er. Bu∣chanan. Barclay, adv. Monarchom. l. 3. c. 8.
• * 1.601

  We may kill a person as a man, and love him as a sonne, a father, a wife, according to Gods Word.
• * 1.602

  How the per∣son and office ••f the Ruler are both the ob∣ject of our sub∣iection.
• * 1.603

  The question of subjection toucheth the persons as abu∣sing their power.
• * 1.604

  De Authorit. princ. c. 2. n. 18.
• * 1.605

  Loyall Sub∣iects beliefe. pag. 49.
• * 1.606

  〈…〉〈…〉 pag. 9.
• * 1.607

  Pilates power to crucifie Christ, was no Law-power given by God to Pilate as a Iudge.
• * 1.608

  Patient bear∣ing of ill, and resistance, are compatible in one and the same person.
• * 1.609

  Resistance not forbidden, 1 Pet. 2.18. but patient suffer∣ing onely re∣commended.
• * 1.610

  D. Fern••, part 3. § 2. p. 1••.
• * 1.611

  Suffering and non-resistance passive▪ f••ll un∣der 〈◊〉〈◊〉 law.
• * 1.612

  Christs non-resisting of Pi∣late, no plea a∣gainst resi∣stance of unjust violence.
• * 1.613

  Many things not imitable by us in Christs non-resistance.
• * 1.614

  D. Ferne, part 3. §. 2. p. 10.
• * 1.615

  Confes. Re∣monstrant.
• * 1.616

  Suffering not commanded of God formally.
• * 1.617

  We are com∣pa••atively ra∣ther to suffer, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to deny the truth, but we are not commanded formally to 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.618

  Patience in suffering is commanded, not suffering it self formally.
• * 1.619

  Re-offending in ended is con∣trary to patient ••ubj••ct••on.
• * 1.620

  The physicall act of taking away of the life maketh not homicide.
• * 1.621

  We have a greater domi∣nion over our goods and members (mu∣tilation excep∣ted) then over our life.
• * 1.622

  Populo quidem hoc casu resi∣slendi actuen∣di se ab inju••ia potestas compe∣ti••••••ed tuendis•• tantum, non au∣tem Principem in ••adendi, & resis••endi in••u∣••iae illatae, n••n recedendi a de∣bita reveren∣t••••—non ••im 〈…〉〈…〉 jus ha∣bet.
• * 1.623

  Defensive warres cannot be without offending
• * 1.624

  D. Ferne ac∣knowledgeth violent resist∣ing to be law∣full, but not defensive warres
• * 1.625

  Defensive wars are ••ff••nsive only by 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.626

  There 〈◊〉〈◊〉 holding of an a〈…〉〈…〉es hands, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 warding of stroakes, but by offensive wars conjoyn∣ed by accident with defensive wars.
• * 1.627

  Flying is re∣sistance.
• * 1.628

  Self-defence naturall
• * 1.629

  D. Ferne al∣loweth the re∣sistance of de∣nying of Tri∣bute to a ty∣ranous Prince.
• * 1.630

  Apologies, Supplication••, Flight, taking of A••mes law∣full in self-defence.
• * 1.631

  Violent re-of∣fending in self-def••nce the last 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.632

  〈1 paragraph〉〈1 paragraph〉
• * 1.633

  〈1 paragraph〉〈1 paragraph〉
• * 1.634

  〈…〉〈…〉 a Church or nation not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mean of sel••••defence alway possible, and so not required of God.
• * 1.635

  A self defence remote, and a self-defence neere-hand.
• * 1.636

  When David had Saul in his hand, he was in a c••se of actu∣all self-defence, Saul being in a habituall un∣just pursuit.
• * 1.637

  〈…〉〈…〉 was in, when he came arm••e upon King Saul sleeping.
• * 1.638

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 D. Fe••ne.
• * 1.639

  The law of u∣niversall and particular na∣ture warranteth s••lf-defence.
• * 1.640

  This or that King not the adequat head of the commu∣nity.
• * 1.641

  Exod 32. Rom 9.
• * 1.642

  The love of our selfe the rule and mea∣sure of our love to our neighbour.
• * 1.643

  We are to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 our brethrens salvation a∣obve our l••fe, not their life a••ove our owne.
• * 1.644

  How many wayes a man may preferre the safety of his owne life to the safety of his brother.
• * 1.645

  〈…〉〈…〉 common to man wi••h beast.
• * 1.646

  Takeing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 armes in the law is a sov••∣raigne ground o•• a difensive postu••e.
• * 1.647

  Off••nsive and defe••sive wars differ in the e∣vent and inten∣tions of men, but not phy∣sically.
• * 1.648

  A whore may not sell her own body for hire. Covar. 10.1. par. 2. §. 1. de ••urti & ra∣pi restituti §. 2. n. 1.
• * 1.649

  The lawfulness of violent re∣sistance of Kings cleare from Scripture proofes.
• * 1.650

  Symmons Loy∣all subject. 5.10. pag. 31.
• * 1.651

  David•• not ••n∣vading Saul and his men, a case far con∣trary to the condition of England and Scotland now.
• * 1.652

  It is not law∣full to kill the King as Jesu∣its teach.
• * 1.653

  D. Ferne his resolving of consc••ence. Sect. ••.

  Arnisaeus de authorit. princ. c. 2. n. 15.

  Davids exam∣ple not extra∣ord••nary.
• * 1.654

  Elisha's fact proveth the lawful••esse of defensive wars.
• * 1.655

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 by no ex••••aordinary spirit resisted Jo••am.
• * 1.656

  Loyall subjects beliefe.
• * 1.657

  Resist••nce made to King Vzziah pro∣veth the same.
• * 1.658

  Vat••b. Detur∣ba••unt eum ex illo l••••o, com∣pulsus{que} ut e∣grede••etur. in not. Festinanter egredi eum co∣egerunt, hoc est, extruserunt eum.
• * 1.659

  1 Sam. 14. The peoples resist∣ing of Saul in rescuing ••ona∣than unjustly condemned to die, saith, that th•• Esta••es of the two King∣domes may swear and co∣venant to res∣cue thousands of innocents from the unjust sword of ••••••∣throats of I••e∣land, & Papists in England.
• * 1.660

  Chald. Par. Manifestum est quod Jonathan peccavit perig∣norantiam. P. Ma••t. saith with a doubt, Si•• ista seditio∣se fecerunt—nullo modo ex∣cusari possunt. Yea he saith, they might sus∣s••agiis, with their suffrages free him. Jun. The people op∣posed a just oath to Sauls hypocriticall oath. Osiander and Borhaius justifie the peo∣ple.

  P. Mar. Com. in 2 Reg. c. 8. saith, Lib••ah revolt∣••d, Quia subdi∣tos nit••batur cogere ad Ido∣lolatriam, quod ipsi libnenses pati noluerunt & merito: prin∣cipibus ••nim parendum est, verum us{que} ad aras▪ The King would compell them to Idola∣try, and they justly revolted. Vatab. in no••. Impulit Judae∣os ad Idolola∣triam, alioqui ••am pronos ad cultum Idolo∣lorum.
• * 1.661

  The Citie of Abels revolt∣ing, a proof for the lawfulnesse of resistance.
• * 1.662

  The place Rom. 13. discuss••d.
• * 1.663

  The King one∣ly is not under∣stood in the Text.
• * 1.664

  Th•• King is principally understood in the Text, Rom. 13. in regard of dignity, but not only in regard of ••ss••nce.
• * 1.665

  Onely Nero cannot be un∣derstood, Rom. 13.1.
• * 1.666

  Vata•• Homi∣nes intelligit publica autho∣••itate p••••editus.
• * 1.667

  The P. Prelats poo••e reas••n▪ ••estraining the Text to Kings, answered. Prelat. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Sanct. ma••. c. 2. pag. 29. P. Marty••. 〈…〉〈…〉 potestatum g••∣n••ra—regna, Aristocrat•• ••a, Politi••a, Ty∣rannica, Oli∣gar••hi••a— Deus etiam il∣lorum author. Willet saith the same, and so Beza, so Tolet. Haymo.
• * 1.668

  Reasons a∣gainst the law∣fulnesse of re∣sistance made to unjust vio∣lence, answer∣ed.
• * 1.669

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.670

  He••••d. l. 7. de Xe••xe.
• * 1.671

  Vulgar version and Lyra turn 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an Apostate.
• * 1.672

  Luk. 15.32.
• * 1.673

  Prelat. Sac. sanc. maj. c. 5. n. 6.
• * 1.674

  The objection that G••ds Prophets ne∣ver 〈◊〉〈◊〉 non-resistance as a murtherous omission, and that God•• people in Scripture ne∣ver pract••s••d resista••c••, a••d God n••v••r c••mma••de•• it, ••••lly ••nsw••red.
• * 1.675

  Nota.
• * 1.676

  〈…〉〈…〉. 6. 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ 234. Shew∣eth the reasons, why Christ ••••ndemned 〈◊〉〈◊〉, n••t because he thought felt de••e••ce unlaw∣full, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 1. it had a kind of revenge in it. ••or so, ••ew could not repel such an army as ca••e to take Christ. 2. He waited n••t on Christs an∣swer. 3. He could have defended him∣self ••noth••r way. 4. It was contrary to Gods will re∣ve••led to Pet••••.
• * 1.677

  The Prophets cry against the sin of non-re∣sistance, when they cry against the peoples not executeing judgement for the oppressed, and not relie∣ving those that were crushed in the gate.
• * 1.678

  There is no warrant in the word, by pre∣cept, or pra∣ctice, that the King and Ca∣valliers should rise, and op∣pose Princes and States, in a hostile w••y, for their con∣science.
• * 1.679

  Sacr. sance. 6. pag. 74, 75, 76. The Do∣ctors of Aber∣deene in their Duplyes.
• * 1.680

  T••••tull••an in an errour.
• * 1.681

  The ancient Chr••sti••ns did rise in Armes against perse∣cuting Empe∣rours.
• * 1.682

  Inferiour Judges have the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the sword as∣well as the King.
• * 1.683

  The people ty∣ed to acts of Charity, and to defend them∣selves, the Church, and their posterity against a for∣reigne Army, though the King forbid.
• * 1.684

  We must de∣fend with the sw••rd ••he Church of God, whether the King will or no, ••xcept it be said the King may c••mma••d murther, and discharge us 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the dut••es 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the second Table.
• * 1.685

  Examples of lawfull warres without the Ki••g.
• * 1.686

  If the Parlia∣ment make the King and give to him the sword, the King cannot make the Parliament nor use the sword to their destruction.
• * 1.687

  Parliamentary power a foun∣taine power a∣bove the King.
• * 1.688

  〈…〉〈…〉. Beliefe.
• * 1.689

  Cause•• o•• war make law••ull war, not the s••le pleasure 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Ki••g.
• * 1.690

  〈…〉〈…〉 6. n. 18.
• * 1.691

  It is necessary and la••full for t••e States of Scotland to help their bre∣thren in Eng∣land.
• * 1.692

  Cases ••n which we are to help our brethren according to divers opi¦nions.
• * 1.693

  We are to help our brethren, though they desire us not.
• * 1.694

  Solons testi∣mony.
• * 1.695

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the ••g••ptians ••gainst those that helped not the oppressed.
• * 1.696

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈…〉〈…〉 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.697

  〈…〉〈…〉 ad 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.698

  Acts of charity 〈◊〉〈◊〉 help••ng our bre••hren a∣gainst u••just oppressions, of lig•• us whether the King c••mma••d th••m or forbid 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.699

  Loyall sub••ect•• ••eliefe. sect. 4. ••ag. 7.

  Sacr. Sanct. Reg. ma••. c. 2. ••ag. 26.27.
• * 1.700

  The question ••oncerning the ••xcellency of Monarchy a∣••ove other ••••rmes, vari••us ••ccording to ••ivers conside∣••••tions.
• * 1.701

  An absolute Monarchy the baddest of governments
• * 1.702

  Epiminondas his watchful¦nesse.
• * 1.703

  A power to sin worse then a power of non-sinning.
• * 1.704

  Monarchy in it selfe consi∣dered is the best govern∣ment.
• * 1.705

  Every forme in some constru∣ction, best.
• * 1.706

  A mixed Mo∣narchy, best.
• * 1.707

  Tolossan. de Rep. l. 13. c. 12.
• * 1.708

  Pa••••l cont. Mona••ch. l. 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.709

  Symm••ns L••y∣all Subj. un∣b••liefe. § 4. pag 7.
• * 1.710

  A threefold supreame power.
• * 1.711

  What be jura regalia or ju•••• majestatis.
• * 1.712

  An••isaeus d•• ju••i 6. mat. c. 1. n 3. pag. 15••▪ 158.
• * 1.713

  Kings con••••r honours, a•• re∣wards of vertue as they p••nish ••ldoers, not be∣cause they are absolute, but according to law.
• * 1.714

  The law of the King 1 Sam 8.9.11.
• * 1.715

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 A Father con∣sideration of the place 1 Sam. 8.9.11.
• * 1.716

  Difference of Kings and Judges.
• * 1.717

  The law or manner of the King 1 Sam. 8.9. no permis∣sive law of God as was the law of a bill of di∣vorcement.
• * 1.718

  God cannot make a permis∣sive law ten∣ding to the de∣struction of a whole national Church and Kingdome.
• * 1.719

  What domini∣on the King hath over the goods of the subject.
• * 1.720

  The peoples power over the King by reason of the Corona∣tion covenant.
• * 1.721

  Mutuall pu∣n••shments may be, w••ere there be no mutuall relations of su∣periority and inferiority.
• * 1.722

  A promise lay∣eth a politique obligation on the promiser, and giveth law to him to whom the promise is made, to presse performance, or punish vio∣lation, when the promises are betwixt man and man.
• * 1.723

  Three kindes of oathes or covenants ••••de by Kings as Arnisaeus thinketh.
• * 1.724

  The King not King while he first swear the oath.
• * 1.725

  It is an evasi∣on onely to distingu••sh be∣tween the Kings promis••s and his oath.
• * 1.726

  Grotius de jur. bel. & pac. l. 1. c. 4.
• * 1.727

  Barclai. l. 4. c. 6.
• * 1.728

  A King can∣not swear to be a just King, be∣cause he is al∣ready King.
• * 1.729

  Bartol in l. 1. n. 4. de his qu•• not. ••nfam. Arnisae. cap. 6. An princeps qui tura•• sub∣ditis, &c.
• * 1.730

  Io. Ross. de potest. pa. lib. 2. c. 20.
• * 1.731

  B. Rochester. 16
• * 1.732

  A difference betwixt a fa∣ther and a King.
• * 1.733

  A people may give Royall power to the King by limi∣tation and measure: but people can give no gift which is solely and immedi∣ately from God, by mea∣sure: they cannot mea∣sure God.
• * 1.734

  Sacr. san. reg. maj. c. 1. pag. 1, 2.
• * 1.735

  An. 1633. Coronation of King Charls in Scotland.
• * 1.736

  L. 3. desens. sid. Orth. c. 3. n. 2, 3.
• * 1.737

  The P. Prelate is a Papist.
• * 1.738

  Iesuites te∣nents concer∣ning Kings.
• * 1.739

  Tract. contra primatum Re∣gis Angliae.
• * 1.740

  Calvin Iust. l. 4. c. 4.
• * 1.741

  Sac. sanc. Mai. c. 1. p. 17, 18.
• * 1.742

  Soveraigne power in the King, but not power of Ty∣rannie.
• * 1.743

  The King not the Vicegerent of Christ, as mediator.
• * 1.744

  The King not the head of the Church.
• * 1.745

  The Prelates reason proveth all creatures to be the vice∣gerents of Christ, as Me∣diator.
• * 1.746

  2 Reas. p. 58.
• * 1.747

  The King no mix•••• person, or half Clergie man, in the externall go∣vernment of the Church, as the P. P. drea∣meth.
• * 1.748

  1 Parl. King Charles, an. 1633.
• * 1.749

  The P. Prelate prayeth for the Pope.
• * 1.750

  The power of Presbyteries Ministeriall.
• * 1.751

  P. Prelates de∣ny Kings to be subject to the Gospel and Discipline of Christ▪
• * 1.752

  Pag. 65.
• * 1.753

  The Ministe∣riall power of
• * 1.754

  Page 65.
• * 1.755

  The P. Prelate maketh the King a Church-man.
• * 1.756

  The P. Prelate giveth an Ar∣bitrary power of government, in Christs-Church to the King.
• * 1.757

  Prelates ex¦tend a lawlesse prerogative to the govern∣ment of the Church.
• * 1.758

  Two Supremes under Christ; one in the Church, an∣other in the State, are not absurd.
• * 1.759

  P. 66, 67, 68.
• * 1.760

  The King no•• the servant of the Church.
• * 1.761

  Ruling Elders not Lay-men.
• * 1.762

  The King of Scotland not a∣bove Laws and Parliaments, proved from our acts of Parliament.
• * 1.763

  The King of Scotland's oath at his Corona∣tion.
• * 1.764

  How the King is supreme Iudge in all Causes.
• * 1.765

  The Estates of Parliament do append their collaterall Seales with the Great Seal, in Treaties with forraigne Princes.
• * 1.766

  Angl. Conf. art. 37. Sed eam tantum Prerogativam aquam in sacris Scripturis à Deo ipso omni∣bus piis Princi∣••us semper fu∣••sse tributam, ••oc est, ut om∣••es status at{que} ••rdin••s fidei, ••ive comm••ssos, ••••xe illi ecclesi∣••st••ci sint, sive ••iviles, in officio ••ontineant, & ••ontumaces a•• ••clinquentes ••ladio civili ••••er••c••nt.
• * 1.767

  W. Laud and other Prelates enemies to Parliaments.
• * 1.768

  The Parlia∣ments of Scot∣land doe regu∣late, limit, and set bounds to the Kings power.
• * 1.769

  Fergus the first King of Scot∣land no Con∣querour, but a freely elected Prince.

  A fundamentall Law of ele∣ctive Kings in Scotland.
• * 1.770

  The Parlia∣ments of Scot∣land chosed Kings.
• * 1.771

  ••he Oath of ••aldus the 21. ••ing of Scot∣••••nd.
• * 1.772

  Kings of Scot∣••and censured ••nd punished ••y the Parlia∣••ent.
• * 1.773

  Kings of Scot∣land of old had no negative voyce.
• * 1.774

  Buchan Res. Scot. l. 7.
• * 1.775

  Coronation Oath.
• * 1.776

  Parliament•• of Scotland by Law are to de∣cide who should raigne.
• * 1.777

  How Royaltie is the first and naturall Go∣vernment.
• * 1.778

  Many Rulers over a great multitude, more naturall than one.
• * 1.779

  To resist the Will, is not to resist the Pow∣er.
• * 1.780

  Pag. 9.
• * 1.781

  It is no good consequence: Christ and the Apostles used not violent re∣sistance to spread the Go∣spel, ergo, such resistance is unlawfull.
• * 1.782

  The Corona∣tion of the King, in con∣creto, is more then a Cere∣monie.
• * 1.783

  Men may limit the Power that they gave not.
• * 1.784

  Arnisaeus de authorit. princi. c. 3. n. 6.
• * 1.785

  Subiects not more obnoxi∣ous to a King then Clients, Vassals, Chil∣dren.
• * 1.786

  Servi indignè ••abiti consugi∣••ndi ad statuas, & dominum ••••utandi copiam ••abent, l. 2. De ••is qui sunt sui. Item, C. De lat. Hered. toll.
• * 1.787

  Arnisaeus De authori. princi∣••um in popul. ••. 3. n. 7.
• * 1.788

  Subjects in a∣ctive obedience must subject to a Kings law∣full comman∣dement: but in things un∣lawfull, they are not natu∣rally subject, in passive sub∣jection.
• * 1.789

  Whether King Vzzah was de∣throned.
• * 1.790

  Arnisaeus de jure Pontif. Rom. in Regna & Princ. c. 5. n. 30.
• * 1.791

  Bellarm. de pae∣nit. l. 3. c. 2.
• * 1.792

  Deniall of passive obedi∣ence in things unjust not dis∣honourable to the King, more then deniall of active obedi∣ence in these same things.
• * 1.793

  Loyall Convert, page 10.
• * 1.794

  The King may not make away a part of his owne Domi∣nions.
• * 1.795

  Ferdinan. Vas∣quius illustr. quest. l. 1. c. 3. n. 8. juri alieno quisquam nec in minima parte obesse potest. l. id quod no∣stru. F. de reg. jur. l. jur. natu. cod. titul. l.
• * 1.796

  How subjects are obliged to pay the Kings debts.
• * 1.797

  Subsidies the Kingdoms due rather then the Kings.
• * 1.798

  In how many divers notions the Seas, Forts, Castles, Mili∣tia, Road-wayes, are the Kings: and how more pro∣perly they are the Kingdomes.