we cannot foresee with what circumstances our futures may be perplext. Therefore it is sufficient that we swore things not necessary, but possible; such as might happen or not happen, because depending on things which depend not totally on us, nor on our will, but rather mixtly on the wills of others, and on that which to us is change or fortune, For which reason he is not forsworne, who ef∣fects not alwaies what he by Oath promiseth, no more then he sinnes, who alwaies effects not his simple pro∣mise.
Secondly, This tacite condition in a promissory Oath, and in things naturally and morally possible, is proved by the very nature and definition of the Oath. For it is onely an attestation, and imprecation of God in such manner, that if the promiser faile, he would have him to whom he promist, under∣stand, that be puts himselfe under Gods severe wrath.
From hence it is to be noted, that the bare promise obliged as strictly before he swore, as after he swore; and of the reason is, because he was obliged by nothing, but by that which was in Pact. The investing it with an Oath, or with Gods punishment, relates onely to the Penalty: so that a promissory Oath signifies no more, then such a penalty upon such a promise: But a penalty (as we know) in law and equity relates onely to that which is un∣lawfull, such as is the violation of a Pact.
The addition of never so many penalties, to a thing in it selfe unlawfull, can never fasten any obligation on me to doe it; Nor can severall Penalties to an obligati∣on in it selfe lawfull, adde anything to the first Ius or right of it, but onely to my future feare, least I doe in∣justice.
The Capitall question therefore in these cases will be. What the nature of the things are to which we obliged our selves at first? For according as they stand or fall, our relations or obligations, to them stand or fall whi∣ther we will or no.
Thirdly, We finde such tacite conditions, conceal'd,