The bounds & bonds of publique obedience, or, A vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our Solemne League and Covenant : in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers, and to the author of The grand case of conscience, who professe themselves impassionate Presbyterians.

THE Bounds and Bonds OF publique obedience, OR A vindication of our lawfull sub∣mission to the present Government, or to a Government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things. (Book 1)

I know not by what fate or misfortune it comes to passe,* 1.1 that in the disquisition of a truth (though a simple uniforme thing) yet the contests about it, are usually infinite, and it is as difficult a thing to disincum∣ber it feom errours, as it is a good field from weeds and brambles; which when the country man hath burnt to ashes, and thinks he hath quite destroyed, the next yeare to his astonishment he sees them return more numerous then before. Surely our unhappinesse in the E••a∣dication

of civill errours is, that we speake more to the affections then to the Iudgement, and therefore offer passion in stead of reason, or make one but the counterfeit of the other, or else not affecting one anothers persons, we fling headily into opposite paths or principles, in which not treading together at first, we cannot possibly meet together at last, and in this aberration we loose both truth and our selves.

Thus we finde it in these three severall answers to the first Treatise, in which (and the unhappilier, to give foundation to practicable errors) they at the very entry of the controversie mis∣take principles, in jure publico, in the riginall of Magistracy and Government, in the nature of possession, prescription, right of extream necessity, of assertory & promissory Oaths, &c. things which were otherwaies stated and proved in that dis∣course to which they have bin referred; I should not so disertly tell these tripartite answerers, that they do suponere quodlibet, ut Probetur quidlibet, were it not but that I see them so Majeste∣rially peremptory to prescribe to others, and to necessitate us into action of the greatest prejudice that may be betwixt man & man; that I finde one of them give such a losse to his passion, that it carries him into direct Blasphemy,* 1.2 advising that a Committee might treat with God, yea sentence the blessed Trinity. Lastly because all the world knows they give that obedience which to attaine publique desolation they will not allow toothers; where∣fore as the subtilties of the vop••••rs are so fine and delicate, that they passe upwards on every hand about us imperciptibly till at last we heare them over our heads formd into Thunder, Light∣ning and Tempests, even so the fumes of these private mens Pas∣sions passe so subtilly through their soft words, that if we who con∣verse with them, be not maturely advisd of them, their insinua∣tion will draw us into fire and flame, into blood and desolation, into the Calamities of a war, which perhaps may end as distant∣ly from our and their now Covenant intentions as the two for∣mer have already done.

The Question which was first asserted stands still un∣shaken and almost untoucht, and in all th••se answers it is evidently granted, That we of the people may lawfully

give obedience to an unlawfull power;* 1.3 this onely is deni∣ed, That it may be not with an acknowledgement of their authority and right, which is very uncasuistly and uncon∣scientiously inserted here, because that is not the Peoples present case, but the Governours, these onely asserting that, contenting themselves with simple obedience from us.

The first Argument of the first Demurrer is formed a∣gainst the incapacity of the persons governing,* 1.4 and it runs thus:

Ob. That which is now termed a Parliament, is neither formal∣ly, materially, nor effectually a Parliament, such as is requisite for this Kingdom, either according to the mind of God, or the neces∣sities of the State. First, because the change which is made in it, is not made by those who first constituted it, unlesse it be by con∣quest. The modern modell containes not the whole, nor the major part of the peoplee Secondly, the alteration is made by the Com∣mons only, the Nobility as illustrior pars populi, appeared not in it.

Ans. Though this Argument (with the rest) relates more to the Commanders then to the obeyers,* 1.5 (of whom our controversie onely is) and that we of the People have a right to do lawfull things, though there were no Magi∣strate lawfull or unlawful to oversee us, yet I shall not stop at these advantages, but oppose to the main of this Argu∣ment, the main of our Creation and conservation. For we have nothing else to doe in the world, but to praise God and love our neighbour. The circumstance of the Magistrate is onely to be an encouragement of this, and to see that it be done with security: and if he doe this (whatever he be) we are beholding to him, and should praise God for him, and then why not obey him?

Though this were granted, That one Magistrate was unjustly ejected by another, and one government by another, yet that relates onely to those who co-operated in it whilst it was doing. How can such a supposed guilt in them, be in any part continued upon, and ascribed to

us of the low ranke of the people? or now especially that we come into it after it is done, and after we are under the full possession of a present Power? People by the effects of it, sustaine punishment enough if they lose a good Magistracy, must they likewise be punisht because it is lost, though they were no con-cause of it?

The Authour of the Grand Case of Conscience, p. 10. infers Yes, and therefore makes our new commotions ne∣cessary: because we can do nothing just in a State, where, (through the defect of a legal Magistracy) we can have no justice, yea though the things we do be in themselves just. For (quoth he) judgement is then onely just, when it is exercised by the higher Powers, the legall Magistracy of that Kingdome, where it is acted.

I answer, things are considerable, onely so far as they may reach the ends for which they are.* 1.6 The end of every Magistrate is to see justice executed in case it be violated: Iusto enim non ponitur lex. The end of justice is to be a mea∣sure of equity, that is, of equality. Justice or the proportion of equality is either comutative or distributive. But neither of these relate so essentially to the legall Magi∣strate, that nothing may be done truly and conscienci∣ously just, without he co-operate in it. As for commuta∣tive equality, if Titius lend Sempronius ten bushels of such a quantity, which bushels have the publique mark upon them, and Sempronius pay him ten other every way of the same equality,* 1.7 but that there wants the former mark, or that the said bushels have another mark, will you say Sempronius hath not intrinsically done Titius justice, or hath not justly satisfied him in his quantity? especially if in the mean time no more of that former marke can be had? As for distributive justice, we know that St. Paul ad∣vised the Corinthians to avoyd the Iegall Magistracy and the judgement of the higher powers of that Countrey,* 1.8 and rather to end things by arbitrement among them∣selves, which had been an advice unjust, and to the scan∣dall of Christianity, if things in themselves just might not

be done but by the justice of the legall Magistrate. This therefore is but according to an old Axiome of justice, Provisio hominis tollit provisionem legis.

Thus much I have thought fit to answer in generall to this objection;* 1.9 but now more particularly I answer to its terms. And first, why is not this effectually a Parliament, seeing it is the Supream present power of the whole Na∣tion, no part excluded?* 1.10 which in this controversie is the very term of the question. I hope he means no Criticisme by the word Parliament; if he doth, it signifies onely a publique speaking or consulting together for the Pub∣lique. Moreover, the Authour would be (I am sure) much perplext, if I should aske him, how he knoweth so indubitably that this is not a Parliament or supreame Power requisite for this Kingdome, according to the mind of God? He must par∣don us if we thinke formes no more then persons are to last here alwaies; or that the changes which have been, and still are to be of both, must never be done but accor∣ding to the customary formalities of a quiet people, but rather according to the extreame necessity of a State. For if he aske me, what it is that forms in-organizd peo∣ple into a Government,* 1.11 of what sort soever? I answer, Necessity. If, what makes or takes away a Law in a Go∣vernment established? I answer, Necessity. If, what takes away a Government it selfe? I answer, according to him∣selfe. page 2. that which first gave it being, viz. Necessity. Of which there are severall degrees; for in a peaceable State a word may take away that which in a disturbd State must be taken away by the Sword: after which it is but equall that he who gives the last blow, should in that quarrell give the last word, and leave us to a peremptory obedience, unlesse we would have no quarter in the world, or be like the old servati in bello, who were sold, confind to chains all their lives, or condemnd to dig perpetually in Mynes; All which it seems this Authour would have the conclusion of this argument, or else we are more be∣holding to the charity of enemies, then to his. If we will

not be perswaded by the States arguments, yet let us hear what Grotius, among others, determined long agoe, for all the world in this case. If a King have but part of a supream power (which consists in making and taking away Lawes, in laying universall Taxes) and the People or Senate have the other, the King may be forcibly opposed if he invade that part which is not his, because for so much he hath no right nor power. This is to hold, although such a King have the Militia alone; for that (in his hand) relates onely to forraigne warre, it being uncon∣ceivable how they who share in supreame. Rights, can be exempt from a right of defending them. When war shall happen be∣twixt such Fundamentall and Supreame parties, the King may loose all his share by the right of War. Lib. 1. c. 4. § 13. de Ju∣bel. & pa.] Which Right of Warre betwixt those who divide a whole Kingdome, if it end clearly to the Redu∣ction of one party, is not called so properly conquest as victory.* 1.12 This Authour uses the name of the first onely for the hatred every one bears to it, because it swallows the rights and persons of the whole; Whereas victory relates onely to a part of either, as beginning and ending in Civill Warres, where disputes of Right arise betwixt those of the same Jurisdiction and Country, and of the same Common Law.

But we have Arguments more Authentique then these, to shew that such changes may be according to the mind of God; and the Demurrer all his life will never prove the con∣trary, Dan. 4.31, 32.* 1.13 Gods power is an everlasting power, and his Kingdome is from heneracion to generation; All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing, and according to his will he worketh in the army of Heaven, and in the inhabitants of the earth, and none can stay his hand, nor say unto him what dost thou? That is, God as Universall Lord, and King of Kings, governes both Angels, men, and Divels, and all must submit to him, because of his supreame irresistibility. Psalm. 75.7. God is the Iudge, he maketh low, and he maketh high. It must be confest that by him Princes raigne; but our Authour had

rather perpetually imbroile our bodies and soules, then clearly say, by whom it is that Princes cease to reign. For then this Controversie would easily he reconc••l'd, and we as easily one to another.

Wee have shewn how the reason of Constituting,* 1.14 and of changing Governments, is still one and the same, viz. Su∣preame Necessity: But the Demurrer objects that our change hath not beene done by the same order of persons, who were in the old, viz. By major part of Lords, and ma∣jor part of the Commons.

Although he is againe besides the state of the Que∣stion, shewing onely how they who are the Supream Power of the Land,* 1.15 ought not to command us, rather then that we may not obey them in lawfull things; yet I shall here make another sort of reply, which will be very short to those who profess themselves Presbyterians, that is, originally Parliamentarians.

Kingdoms which are Supream in themselves,* 1.16 and com∣municate not in one anothers Lawes, are all of them Iu∣re Gentium, in a state of War, unless they be mutually bound by Leagues to the contrary; which Leagues if they come to be broken, usually have the conditions of Invasion annexed, and the time and places nominated for beginning it; and because there is nothing any lon∣ger due by Law, or League from the party injured, where now the Sword is onely to end the Controversie, there∣fore what ever shall be acquired in this state of things from the party injuring, rightly changes all Titles in Iure publico, and in the right of governing what is ac∣quired; but in one and the same Kingdome, where the Supremacie of Power and Right lies divided (as Grotius page 7. states it) there,* 1.17 if they differ fundamentally, de∣nying one anothers Rights and Powers, they are then immediately in the same state of War with those other separate Kingdoms; here onely is the difference, that these in their Concurrence and Constitution, making but one, have none of those ordinary Cautions, as Leagues

have for their Right of invading one another by the way of war: a circumstance no more necessary betwixt them, then that in the marriage of two persons, a Lawyer should come after the Minister hath conjoyn'd them, and tell them in what cases they may again proceed to Di∣vorce, and after their Divorce, what kinde of mar∣riages they should make next. Even so war is suppos'd in that case, as well as Divorce in this; But because War begins there where Law ends, and reciprocally, and hath nothing but necessity for its equity, and that all the degrees of necessity cannot at first be foreseen, nor where security may at the end of all be presum'd off, therefore there neither is, nor ever was any fixt rule in any Coun∣trey, what people should be bound to do at the end of a a VVar. I hope the Presbyterians neither of England, nor Scotland intend to deny what all the world knowes, that they concluded the King under the necessity of VVar, as well as others who conjoyned with them, and having stated his case there, they of the Kirke long agoe frank∣ly declared, that he not satisfying for the blood of three Kingdoms, was not to touch the Scepter any more, but as Mr. Hinderson applyed in his Newcastle Conference the 4th. of Hester 14.* 1.18 That if his Majesty reforme not according to their way, he and no lesse then his Fa∣thes House were to perish: by which what could hee and they understand lesse, then change of Govern∣ment? a thing, why now so horrid for the other party to think on, seeing they gave first intimation of it? They joyntly declared, that the King was not to judge any thing for himselfe, nor upon what tearms his readmit∣tance to simple liberty could stand with their securi∣ty; * for, his VVar when it ended (as they said who im∣prisoned him) continued the same necessity upon them, which made them take Armes at the beginning. There∣fore they themselves concluded, that nothing could be changed in the Kings concernment, according to the old forme and constitution of the Kingdom, which relates to a time of Peace, and not to a time of War.

But the Nobility whom he here stiles, illustrior pars populi, concurred not to this change; therefore it is formally and funda∣mentally unlawfull.

In the first place,* 1.19 I understand not, and I beleeve the Lords doe as little, what he meanes by putting them into such improper Latine. For they alwaies understand themselves to be rather of the two Comites Regis, then partem populi; and therefore as if they were an integrant part of the Kingdome, form'd to themselves a separated House, a Jurisdiction over the people, & lay as a Barre be∣twixt the King and them; whether that power of their's had any congruity with the other supreame and Legisla∣tive rights of the people or no, is not now the question, but rather this, Whether according to their mutuall engage∣ments, their rights of a separated house were rightly lost to the House of Commons, or no?

This is by them affirmed, and the state of Venice as pro∣found Platonists deny the other; for otherwise Noble men would be as difficulty reformed as Kings, and there∣fore they rarely conferre illustrious Titles of Nobility on any but those who are in illustrious Offices, things separable from persons, by which meanes all Offices with them are questionable: But to return, that which according to themselves thus excluded the King, by the same Logicke excluded the Lords; and if they either directly or indi∣rectly concurred to the ruine of the rest of the Kingdome, then the argument runs strong, that the House of Com¦mons were bound to preserve it, and that the rest rightly owe their whole protection under God to them▪ But because I will suppose nothing here, the argument of matter of fact must judge one as well as the other.

Wherefore if any will aske whether there was not a Warre undertaken last yeare very eminently dangerous to the whole Parliament and their Party; the Army, and Country Committees, and that by the contrivance of the Royall Par∣ty here, the Scots Nation in the North, Ormond in Ire∣land, it will be past denying; Likewise whether the House of

Lords in that extremity declared with the Commons that the Scots were Enemies to the Kingdome, or upon the first or second request gave their Concurrence for Counties to arme themselves for their defence; The ••oyce of all parties must needs say no: So that, that House undertook to act a part as dangerous to the rest of the Par∣liament, as they did, who were actually in Armes against their party every where. And how then should they expect to bestill necessary to them, and to their securities, who had put them into such apparent extremity and necessi∣ties? As for the exclusion of some Members of the house of Commons,* 1.20 I hope the sincere Presbyterians wonder not at that act, because the Kirk and State of Scotland was preserved by such an act last year, and by the con∣courrence of the same meanes which did this here. Yea though they who from thence invaded our Nation, de∣clared as much for the Covenant and Presbytery as the Kirke it selfe, save only that the Kirke had the good luck to speake the last word.

They who sit at top in the State are tanquam in nubibus, to the eyes of us of the People. Wee know not how they manage their Counsels, nor contrive their tran••actions, that is best determined by and amongst themselves. It is enough for us if they be of a number competent to act; and be persons who enter by vertue of free Election, and s••t in the legall place. For in a case where five are chosen to a businesses, and that any three of them are to be of the Qu••rum, though two of them be never so accidentally or violently detained, yet what the other three doe is to all intents and purposes valid, which is the present case. By this Gentlemans favour,* 1.21 we have an Axiome of Law, which saith that in Partner-ship or Society (as the Civill Law calls it) when matter of extreme prejudice is agitated betwixt those who are of equall contribution either of Art or Mony, then Potior est conditio negantis: nothing ought in this case to be concluded against the nega∣tives, though fewer in number, which was the Parliaments case when after the equall provocations

of a Prince by Warre and imprisonment some of the same House thought he might have been securely readmitted into the Government again, and others thought it evi∣dently dangerous. In this case the difference was as it were legall betwixt the Members, but not to be decided any way but by force, there being no other Tribunall to judge them, and their house might not judge of it, be∣cause there they were parties and judges, a thing allowed no where;* 1.22 and if otherwise, then the major part might legally vote the other out of the house at pleasure. But what was at last determined by any number above forty with the speaker in the legal place, seemes not out of form to us of the people; which was the case of the House of Lords when most of them & many of the Commons at the beginning of the first War, fled to the King under pretence of force from Westm. Yea when the five members were forc't from sitting, yet the rest of the House sat and acted without them, and voted a Committee, Ian. 5. To sit in London, and there to take into consideration the breach of Priviledges, the safety of the King and Kingdome, and preservation of Ireland, which was accordingly done by vertue of those Votes, made when Members were thus forct away. All our scruples therefore are concerning things to us practicably lawfull or unlawfull in themselves,* 1.23

As for the will of the Major part of the people, how will the Demurrer prove that they had not rather obey this present Power, then seeke to be rid of it by the hazards and calamities of another War.? They usually looke after nothing but their Rents, Markets, and rea∣sonable subsistances, they are the luxurious and ambiti∣ous part onely which pretends to new troubles. The peo∣ples question thereof is not how the change was made, but an sit whether it be so changed or noe? For if according to its formality that be not rightly done; it concerneth not their consciences no more then the Thunder or light∣ning over their heads doth, which are things totally out of their power, much lesse may they lawfully desolate Neighbours for them.

* 1.24But he hath found one firme Axiome, That when part of any thing is cut off, the whole qua tale is destroyed quià dum cessat forma, cessat formatum; ergo the late force on the Parlia∣ment hath made this no Parliament.

* 1.25I wish he had taken the paines to give either a distincti∣on or an instance in his Axiome, or have drawn up his inference into a Syllogisme; for I feare we shall finde wide impertinence in the first, and a grosse non sequitur, in the last as he hath ordered it. The question disputed here is not whither the denominated Parliament now sitting at Westminster be a Parliament according to the old forme and composure of Parliament or no, but whither tht Parliament now sitting at Westminster, be the supreame power of the Kingdome or no, and to be obeyed in lawfull things. His Ar∣gument runs thus;

The surpeme power of the Kingdome consists in a Parliament of King, Lords and Commons.

But at Westminster there is not a Parliament consisting of King, Lords and Commons.

Ergo at Westminster, there is no true Parliament at all nam dum cessat forma, cessat formatum.

I thought he had been so good a Logician, as to have understood that the conclusion of his Syllogisme ought to have been contradictory to the question, from which it is as distant as if he would have concluded that two and three make five, which is very true, but how is it any thing to the purpose?

* 1.26However I will doe him the favour to deny his Major—For we speake of powers which now are, and he himselfe hath all along condoled the e••ection of the King, and of house of Lords, as things which are not. Sed non entium nultae sunt affectiones; & so consequently they who are now nothing, make nothing now at Westminster, or any where else. But doth it follow however, that there can not be now any supream power at Westminster? at all If he had proved this,* 1.27 he had proved something. But pe••••aps the ve∣ry word Parliament poses him, or else he would thereby

impose on others. I must confesse words are dangerous, when they are not fully explained: and possibly the King mistook himselfe very much upon the very Alphabet and word of his Title, supposing he could not be named King, unlesse he were ab••olute, as he observed other Kings were; whereas by our constitution he was but one of three, who concurred to the making and abrogating a Law, and it belong'd to the Commons alone, to lay an uni∣versall taxe; so that he was in most things rather Prince by office, then King by power, in tanto, non in toto. Even so the word Parliament, as it hath been popularly under∣stood, signifies the assembly of severall houses, deliber∣ating and concluding what was judged for the good of the publique.

But it is a contradiction to say a Parliament cannot at all be truly so called, unles so understood; we know there are eight Parliaments in France, which are not of such a constitution, though of the same Denomination. And if severall persons plenipotentiarily deputed to conclude for the publique good of the people, sit now at Westmin∣ster, and that the other concurrent powers be civily dead; why may not we congruously enough still call them a Parliament? His axiome therefore serves onely against himselfe, and the true English of dum cessat form•• cessat for∣matum; is this, That seeing the old forme of this state, as it was in the supremacy of Kings Lords and Commons▪ hath in that relation ceased to be, and is civilly dead, not being able any longer to act any thing; and that a civill body as well a naturall, cannot live without a head one day; it followes then by this position, that the Regall Government is gone, and that we are in the state of a Re∣publique; no other power now informing or actuating us, besides that which pretends to such a state; and where I pray you is that to be found now, but at Westmin∣ster.

In the next place he offers a case, If the King, when hee came to accuse the five Members,* 1.28 had detained all

but forty and the Speaker; and had forc't them to Vote, that the whole Legislative power resided in himselfe; would we have deemed this a valid Vote? Especially seeing some Votes since this Session were adjudged Null, because the House was under a force. By which it seemes (quoth he) that with some new veritas non est perpetua; and Duo dum faciunt idem, non estidem.

* 1.29To the first I answer positively, That such a Vote at∣tained by the King, had beene no wayes duely valid.

* 1.30But what is this to the purpose? For the question should have beene after the King had detained such a Vote, and had got us all into his full possession, whether we of the people might have obey'd him ever after in lawfull things.

Secondly, if he would have the people understand this case to be parallel, to the late exclusion of the Members, he prevaricates grosly againe; For he supposes the very forty in the House, with the King, to have been under a force; whereas in the Parliaments late case, none but those who were out of the House, were under restraint; the former were supposed to be forc't to a particular Vote, the latter were kept from Voting at all: Besides they who de facto Vo∣ted in the House, have publiquely declared that they past their Votes, with all wonted freedome, and were rescued as it were from an overawing power, which concludes a∣gainst his Argument abundantly. As in this Argument he hath done truth little service; so he hath (by his mistake) done Kingly Government lesse. For if Princes who have us in their full possession, may be obey'd in no lawful things, after they acquire an addition of some other powers un∣lawfull; then he would dislove most of their Govern∣ments, and have absolv'd us from Allegiance to King Charles long before this Parliament began; by which sort of arguing the Royallists I see will have no great prise this Gentleman.

But the Parliament hath already declared the Votes made under a force are null; This Vote I suppose he meanes past,

after Boyes and apprentices of the Towne,* 1.31 had entred the House, and made the Speaker propound, and the Mem∣bers Vote what they pleas'd. Here indeed there were forced Votes; But surely this proves not, that they who Voted, when the Members were last excluded, Voted in that manner. Besides the Parliament which knowes bet∣ter then we of the people, what their owne disorders within their House are, are only fit to Vote, what Votes have beene forc't upon them, and they since that time have declared, they never transacted things with greater freedome and lesse overawing. From whence I easily see that his Axiomes will serve him nothing at all. For we ac∣knowledge Veritatem esse perpetuam,* 1.32 if we speake of naturall and Mathematicall truths, where there is no medium pro∣portionis, to varie the thing; as, all number are even or odd; because there is no middle number, so all lines are either crooked or straight: But morall & civil things are alwaies in change, because humane actions are invested with such an infinity of circumstances and accidents;* 1.33 for which reason Duo dum faciunt idem non est idem; For no two men in the world can act the same thing in all the same cir∣cumstances: Thus we heare that Omnis des••nitio in jure est periculosa; and summum jus aliquando sit summa miuria, which cannot be but in regard of those various accidents which perplex our actions, and make them like that famous flower the Marvell of Peru, which changes the colour of it's Leaves every day. His last axiome, That no man ought to take advantage of his owne wrongfull act or of ano∣thers: is impertinent and no way beloning to us of the people. If he intends it to the present Governours, he had best to take heed againe, that he determine not against severall lines of our Kings: For the clearing of whose titles after usurpations, the Judges were ancienty sore put to it,* 1.34 to make this one Axiome for all. That the imposition of the Crowne takes away all de∣fects, and stops in blood. And if this be true, then we and our forefathers for the most part, have live'd ••nder no

better Titles then Plenary possession, to which they submit∣ted, either because they knew no better Titles, or could have none of better to command them, or because they were resolved they might lawfully submit in law∣full things, which therefore as it now seemes, is not so much our present question as our present passion.

Two principall inconveniences hee findes in this pre∣sent Government, and by the goodnesse of the fruit hee hopes hee may judge of the Tree. where I must againe ad∣monish him, that the civill fruit of a Government is alike in all Governments, especially as to the Meum and Tuum of a people besides, if the tree and the fruits here were alike, then a good Axiome were spol'd; Malus homo potest esse bonus civis, & bonus magistratus, A man bad to him∣selfe, may be a good Magistrate and a good Common∣wealths man. His first inconvenience is,

* 1.35That wee have now made the basis of the State, a quick-sand; and it stands like Nebuchadnezzars Image, upon a mixt footing, part iron, part clay.

I answer, that it stands not now on so mixt a footing as before; For the concurrence of King, Lords, and Com∣mons, for the product of a supream act, was a mixture of things very heterogeneous, to enter into one and the same composition: By reason whereof, supremacy confin'd as it were on a Battable ground; and if we will believe Per∣sidents, King sometimes gain'd upon the other two, some∣times the Lords topt both, and now all is more united then ever in the sole sufferage of the people.

* 1.36Toleration is the next inconvenience, it being but e∣quitable, That if wee thinke it lawfull to force people to submit to the Orders of the State, the same people be compel'd to adhere to an established confession of faith in Religion. For it is presum'd that Obedience is fully as due to God as to man.

I answer, the Christian Religion is not tolerated a∣mongst us, it is enjoyn'd, as much as one man can passe it upon another;* 1.37 For, the finall penalty of neglecting it

here is not to be required of us mutually in this life.

Secondly, The confessions of faith, which he would have men forc't too, are (as I conceive he meanes) but logicall deductions out of Scripture, Ergo not indubita∣bly, true enough to be by force obtruded on mens faiths; It is not enough to say here, that they who compile them verily believe them true, and intend not to deceive, which is all that can be said. For then they doe no more but quote themselves, and we are taught that it is a Po∣pish opinion to beleeve any company of men are infalli∣ble, in what they purpose: wherefore the Magistrate can doe no more safely, then recommend not force, their notions and Logick on the people. But in a case of meum and tuum, or in a morall thing he may be more perempto∣ry then in a divine, because those things are certainlyer knowne to us as men, then what is of divine revelation and inference.

He feares that by an obedience to an unlawfull power,* 1.38 he may assert its unlawfulnesse; and should our servants rise against us, and command us by threats to performe a lawfull Act, which is but transient we might yeild to avoid their force: But if they should affirme that the Government of the family were theirs by right, and that they intended to perpetuate it over us; we should thinke it a great sinne to betray that place and power wherein God hath naturally and morally placed us.

This indeed is a very fine subtilty to end in nothing:* 1.39 and I am sure what ever the basis of the State be,* 1.40 the Basis of his Argument is put on a quick-sand. For if he intend truth thereby, he should have proved this maine thing; That the former Magistrate was our naturall parent, and that we all derive from him, as from a Genarcha, which being so evidently false, is as ill supposed. For in this con¦fusion of Families in the world, in which the originall Families are lost; we owe no naturall duty to any, but to those from whose blood we derive.

Secondly, Though it were true, that the chiefe Magi∣strate were our naturall Parent, yet it followes not, but

there may be a case wherein he might be refrained from Government; the law supposes many, which is sufficient to oppose this Gentlemans single judgement; And if he be indeed a Presbyterian, he hath already concluded as much in the last Kings case, by concurring to invest his person with the accidents of Warre, in detayning him prisoner at Holmby, and Newcastle &c.

Thirdly, I understand not what he meanes by Gods placing a Magistrate morally over us. For God he is our Di∣vine and supreame Magistrate; our Parent is our naturall and domestik Magistrate, and those who command the State wherein we are, are our civill publique subordinate Magistrates under God; and every particular man who is arrived to the maturity of reason, is, (if any such be) his owne morall or private Magistrate. For the principle of a humane or morall action, is a minde acting freely according to vertue, and those lawes which are written within us. But if by a morall Magistrate, he meanes such a one only, as is seated over us, and hath a care that we live conformably to vertue, and honesty in relation to others; then it followes, that whoever hath the capacity so to hold inspection over us, is a sufficient Magistrate; but that can onely be he under whose full possession we actually are. Moreover he is to know againe, that States cannot looke so strictly after vertue, as after publique quiet. For morall vertue is a private thing, and by rea∣son of the free concurrence of the will, cannot be disco∣vered certainely, but by those who are able to look with∣in a man:* 1.41 But that which is ad alterum, and concernes rather wrong, then right, belongs to the Politicall Ma∣gistrate, as a thing which cannot without confusion have redresse otherwayes. For the chiefe convenience of a State, is, that people might be kept from inconveni∣ence, or incommoding one another; and that they may be conserv'd in a liberty to doe other good things ac∣cording to Piety and honesty: So that he who doth things in themselves good, though under an unlawfull

civill Magistrate, doth not by those acts assert any Ma∣gistrates right; but his only who originally gave Law and Rules for those internall acts, and that is Gods right alone.

Lastly, whereas in this argument, he saith a Father of a family so abused should in his required submission,* 1.42 sin, if he betrayed his place and power which God had naturally given him. I answer that there is a difference betwixt betray∣ing a place so given, and loosing it by force (which in∣deed is his first supposition) The one cannot be done without sin, because it is done voluntarily and totally by himselfe, but it is not our sin if we be forc't out of a place; to which we are compelled by a principle with∣out us, and totally besides our power.

But there is a lawfuller power visible enough to religious eyes,* 1.43 though for the present in an Ecclipse, and suspended. It is not lawfull for a man to marry another woman whilst his owne wife is in a sound, or for a woman to marry another man, whilst her husband is in captivity or restraint, and willing to come to her if he might.

To this I answer;* 1.44 First, How knowes he certainely that the other power is onely in an ecclipse or suspen∣ded? or if it be onely in an Ecclipse, doth it follow that we of the People might not doe lawfull Actions by the suppliment of other lights, whilst we cannot have that of the Sun? Must we all that while cease to be men for the absence of that which we cannot help? The Presybterian party would not have that understood so; when the King was in prison at Holmby. There be no more suns in the world but one, but there are many Magi∣strates, and such who give better light one then the other, for which reason God first chose not Monarchy for the Jewes, certainly in an Ecclipse, the Sun is never out of his naturall Orbe, though his light and influence may be suspended and intercepted from us, but when a Prince is in a forraigne Country, and lives under the Lawes of another Magistracy, and that all Lawes and di stributi∣ons

of Justice and Magistracy in the Country he pretends to, are made without him and against him, will you according to the Lawes of Nature, Nations, or Policy, say he alone, and in that condition, is the supreame power or Authority of that Country, or rather that we of the People do nothing but sinne in his absence, though we do things in themselves lawfull? If you will aske how he came to be out of his Orbe or Country,?* 1.45 I am sure it was against the advice either of Presbyterian or Independent. It is easily granted, That a man may not mar∣ry another woman, so soone as his wife falls into a swound. But you must againe be reminded that the nature of Mar∣riage and of Government differ extreamly there, where you suppose them most to agree. For Marriage is not alwaies necessary to every particular man. But the pub∣lique body of a people cannot be without Government one day, no more then a man can be without a Head, because a smalltime serves to the ruine of a man. Secondly, to take this or that woman to wife, is a thing of free choice; but it is not so alwaies with the Peo∣ple in relation to Kings, who have many of them commit∣ted great Rapes upon them, as I beleeve this Gentleman will acknowledge.

* 1.46A Woman may not marry another Husband, whilst her first is in Captivity, and willing to come to her if he might.

* 1.47 These cases of Marriage still makes a very bad paralell with our present case. For first, we have been taught by all parties in this Warre, that a King of England is not as a Husband to the People of England. For a Husband is he who alone makes and abrogates the Laws of his owne Family, as a right of his propriety, which a King of Eng∣land could not doe alone in this state. Secondly, where was this Prince ever Crowned by which this Author meanes solemnly married to this state? where was the be∣nedictio sacra, the anointing or the Oath of Contract ta∣ken by him? I am sure the Covenant hath made no pro∣vision for him.

To this purpose is that Argument in the grand case of Conscience,* 1.48 [viz.] The Apostle commands Wives to submit to their Husbands, surely quà Husbands, not quà men But sheuld a stranger come to anothers Wife and ca••l himselfe Husband (having before either imprisoned or slaine the right full Husband) and require submission, surely though shee might hee forced, yet it were a sinne to submit to him thus as a husband.

I answer,* 1.49 to submit in Adultery is a plaine sinne; but for a Woman to submit in lawfull things to the power of a stranger is no sinne, though he please to call himselfe her Husband, or exercise the Government of the Family. There is the same mistake of Husband here, as in the former, so that the Argument built thereupon, of it selfe fals to the ground. But if by this he meanes that in matter of supreame Command, we of the People may not obey any but the Husband or the King,* 1.50 why then did the Presbyterian party for so many years oppose, and not totally submit to their now supposed Hus∣band? Why did they Commissionate so many thousand Men, who by accidents of Warre had the power, though not the chance to kill him? Nay in the Par∣liaments case it was alwaies conjoyntly argued by them, that it was he the Husband, that would have kil∣led them the supposed Wife, for which reason the Kirke of Scotland long ago sent him a bill of Divorce, un∣lesse he satisfied for the blood of three Kingdoms. Which of the two parties it was that at last killed him, belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people, though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differ'd no more (if he will further argue it) then dim n••tio and obtruncatio capitis doe, for they who after a long Warre, and by long imprisonment dispoyl'd him of that re∣gall power (here so much argued for) did accord∣ing to the terme of the civill Law, diminuere caput Regis, and they who in consequence of his civill Death, tooke away his naturall life, did obtrune are Caput Regis. If he had been kill'd in an action of Warre before, should the Soul∣dier,

or he who gave the Souldier commission have an∣swered for his life? As for the submission of a Wife to a stranger as to her Husband, which is indeed a sin, I ear∣nestly pray the Author seriously to consider, whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin, ever since this Kingdome long agoe fell under the power of an u∣surping king, if this his way of arguing be true?

As for the second Demurrer, I consider he hath gi∣ven account to another very worthy Pen, which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field; however I shall see what hath escaped his hand, that the world may witnesse at last, that truth hath lovers, as well as errour and passion have Cham ions.

This Author and the grand case of Conscience begin with St. Paul Ro. 13.* 1.51 That wee must submit to higher powers, not that wee may lawfully submit, and that not for wrath onely, but for Conscience sake, which is of things necessary, not of things lawfull: Wherefore (say they) it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawfull things, obedience as a matter of Conscience being a thing necessary.

* 1.52 I grant it either in lawfull or necessary things, when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole Sepremacy of power in themselves. If I hold this lawfull, and he hold it necessary, we are not contra∣ry; He onely makes what I allow more allowable. But the reason wherefore the Apostle requires obedience to such, Not onely for wrath (which is onely in regard of the power which they who are supreàme have to destroy us) but for Conscience sake is,* 1.53 least by our re∣sisting them we unnecessarily disturbe and draw cala∣mity on others, and likewise in regard of their Au∣thority from God, Tyrants even in title not arriving to the great Dominions of the Earth, without Gods secret order, God having clearly stated the Government of the world for ever in himselfe as his cheife Prerogative, he not being known or feared any way so much as by Do∣minio n,

which made St. Augus. in C. Dei. rightly say, Potestates omnes sunt a Deo, non omnes voluntates, so that the reason wherefore God permits sometimes such Princes to attaine to these powers, is the same wherefore he per∣mits Devils in his Government of the world, a Nimrod, or a Pharaoh, a Caesar, or a Herod, an Antichrist or a Turke, who as bad, and as usurping as they are, and seeme to us in exercising so severe, though so secret a part of Gods Justice, yet fulfill severall prophecies, which shewes they come not to what they are, meerely by humane contri∣vance by chance or accident.

The grand case of Conscience. P. 3. distinguisheth betwixt Authority or Power, and Rulers deputed to the exercise of that Authority. The first is by Gods positive Ordinance, the other bu•• by his permission.

Here he grants enough as to our case,* 1.54 which is of obe∣dience, for if he can assure me that it is consonant to Gods permissive will that such persons be my Magistrates, I am well satisfied then, that Gods will is, I must be their Sub∣ject, Gods free admission of one being the necessary ex∣clusion of all the rest, so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice, but of my necessity.

But the Demurrer, P.3. would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawfull powers,* 1.55 and unlawfull powers, if obedience be necessary to both.

I answer,* 1.56 If the powers here supposed by him agree e∣qually in their supremacy, and absolutenesse, and dif∣fer onely as one is got lawfully, the other unlawfully, then the difference of our obedience to either, is onely in the difference of things commanded, as they are ei∣ther lawfull or unlawfull; neither can the Author (now arguing so much for a lawfull power) conscien∣ciously tell us, that the lawfulnesse of the civill power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawfull thing commanded; but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlaw∣full, and worse to us of the People, then if we were un∣der

the absolute command of an unlawfull power which exacts nothing but lawfull things. The knot of this point lies here, Whither a civill circumstance (such as is the Magistrate either lawfull or unlawfull) can vitiate an Act of morall duty? I believe his distinction P.2. of a Government constituted or constituting,* 1.57 serves nothing for the discovery of a supreame lawfull power in it selfe. For I hold that whatever was once a sin may alwaies be called a sin, though with rooting or without rooting. Not but that God and we may make good use of other mens bad actions if they be such, for which reason poore beggers may in their extremities receive necessary Almes from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression; the receipt whereof they do not justify the Title of such Estates, much lesse doe wee justifie the unlawfull Title of a supreame Magistrate,* 1.58 from whose care we re∣ceive necessary protection. I say much lesse, because cases of Estates are juris privati and have Courts to judge of them, but the other is so much juris publici, that there is no mortall Court to judge of it, for which reason how will these Authors (what Governours soever they desire) evidently prove that they originally had lawfull Titles, or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves, but that the people vo∣luntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in Nimrods Case.* 1.59 From whence this may be inferd to the satisfaction of the grand case of Conscience, p. 3. That, if he had that desired Governour, yet according to him∣selfe he would not owne him long, because he were not sure to have in him a supreame power, such as the Apostle, Ro. 13. in his sence understands necessary for the Kingdome of England. But in our sence of plenary possession, which was the case of the Apostles time, we can easily see first, how our present power is the higher (the whole Kingdome now receiving all law protection and subordinate Magistracy, from them) and how they may be in lawfull things obeyed according to the

same Apostle; and to the duty of our Creation and be∣ing in this world.

The case of conscience p. 3. acknowledgeth that a Government may be altered;* 1.60 but it must be done still by the higher powers, whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered, as to a continued for me▪ But it is a sinne if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low, and exact obedience as to the legall au∣thority.

I thought that he who in his sence understood the Co∣venant in terminis Eternall,* 1.61 would not have allowed a change of Government here; no more then he might al∣low the Scots (though upon never so much reason to themselves) to change their Doctrine or discipline; be∣cause we swore during all our lives, to preserve that which was established among them, at the time of our swearing. But I now see we may well distinguish be∣twixt the Covenant it selfe, and some Covenanters, the Covenant being as open for one change, as for the other.

Secondly,* 1.62 If a Government though never so reason∣ably reformed or altered, be never in any lawfull things to be obeyed, (termes which he did ill to leave out of his Argument) unlesse by the concurrence of all the higher powers; then farewell all the old consequences of Solis populi suprema lex, and the Presbyterians form••. Armes are unjustifiable. How corrupt and Tyrannicall are most of the Governments of the world, and yet how ma∣ny of those supreame powers hath he observed to reforme themselves? or diminish any thing in themselves, to al∣ter for the better? although the taking away of some∣thing in a Government, may be as necessary, as continu∣ing any old or new thing in it. Certainly these Authors have read but few of Ionases, who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a Tempest.

Thirdly,* 1.63 Our Alteration was made by the present su∣preame power of the people: and the reason wherefore both Houses laid the exercise of Regall power aside for

some yeares, made the Commons as they have agrued it, lay it aside for altogether. viz. Salus populi suprema lex; The laying of it aside for some yeares is argument enough to us of the people; that it might be laid aside for more yeares, and that one King might be laid aside as well as another. For to us it seemes effectually all one, Non esse & non operari, for a thing not to be at all, and in this world to doe nothing at all. If they sinned who did this, is that any thing to any but themselves? It is an Axiome of good Law Noxa sequitur caput. Thus whilst his Argu∣ment should have been against our lawfull obedience, it is against their exacting it, as to the legall authority, which yet is grosly false; for they exact it not as to the old legall authority, but as to the present supreame power of the people, Non nomine Regis, sed nominepopuli: And yet in one good sence it may be still called the same legall Au∣thority, because we have still under it the same lawes for our properties as before, and continued in life by them, as our lives themselves are.

* 1.64 Case of Cons. p. 3. it is objected that this principle of obey∣ing those onely who are in plenary possession of all supreame power, is fit onely to destroy States: for then should none Governe any longer then their swords and strengths could beare them up.

* 1.65I conceive (according to what is already proved) that nothing can befound, either more consonant to Christian charity, or to the preservation of States, then this our principle of obedience; besides he knowes no Kingdome in the world,* 1.66 where people doe not obey upon this same plenary possession; Allegiance alwayes relating to pro∣tection. And if according to his consequence,* 1.67 we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that Per••on who derives a knowne and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact (because according to these Authors intermediate intrusions, are violations of rights, and may not be obeyed even in things lawfull) then I pray you of what can we resolve lesse, then certainly to extirpate one another? which

will come to passe ere we finde what we search for in such a blind scuffle; and for feare of doing a lawfull thing under the inspection of one, who is suppos'd to have done another thing unlawfully, must we resolve of do∣ing all unlawfull things by warre our selves, and desert unnecessarily, the cares of Wife and Children, of Church and Neighbour? For non-obedience in a State is but a Chimaera, neutrality, a State without relation; there is no subsistence for it in any State, and unlesse you will al∣low me to concurre with others, and under others in lawfull things, I must leave the world; my subsistence being onely in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction.

The two Demurrers p. 3. &p. 7.* 1.68 Except against this our pre∣sent obedience, beeause the present powers is yet new: neither is there a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery.

Philosophers hold that the Definition of a man belongs to an infant,* 1.69 as well as to one of many yeares. Because after the Organization of the parts,* 1.70 he is informed with the same principle of life and reason, as a growne man is; and having the same forme, is the same thing. Even so the present power hath possest all the parts of this King¦dome gives them life in the administration of publique justice and protection, which are the soule of a State, and the power which preceded this, what did it infuse more vitall then this? And now that that is taken away, if this other did not presently enter into its place; the Com∣mon-wealth were dead, and each man were left in his naturals, to subsist of himselfe, and to cast how hee could in such a state of warre, defend himselfe from all the rest of the world, every man in this State having an equall right to every thing.

Wherefore let every man, especially, they who would informe consciences, take heed of affecting popular re∣venge, vvhich must also reach themselves at last: for vvhen they have once frighted people from lawfull act∣ions, vvhat can they th••n commit but the un'avvfull?

Into what an unhappy transport are we fallen, that such a principle should be derived from our Church, the ve∣ry Papists being ever ready to obey in things lawfull, though the State seemed to them unlawfull. These will judge better of the State now then of the Church, the one inviting and incouraging us to lawfull things, the other deterring us from them. But to return to the Ar∣gument; I have already shewed, that new or old powers, never can signifie good or bad powers. The uncertaine hopes of recovering in the future, proves that the thing is certainly lost for the present, and it is our obedience at this time which this Q••estion relates to However the King of Portugals acquisition, or Usurpation was pre∣sently acknowledged by our King and others, although the King of Spaine then had and still hath great hopes of recovering it, he being alwaies Hannibal ad portas, and never removing out of his own Dominion into another Forreigne Magistracy.

* 1.71The first Demurrer p. 7. conc••ives our present condition like that of Israel, betwixt David and Absalom, at which time (quoth he) the people had grievously sinned, had they ren∣drd obedience to Absaloms commands and substitutes, so long as David was living.* 1.72

* 1.73This is very true, but farre from the purpose. For Absalom was not a fundamentall legislative party in the state of Israel, as the House of Commons lately was, and so could not pretend such a right of Warre. Secondly David had his Army hard by in the same Kingdome with Absalom. We have none here but the Parliaments, all the Kings forces and adherents being dissipated. Thirdly the Israelites scruples are supposed during the time of Warre in Israel, our after the War is ended. But if he mean by this fallacious paralell, that the Israelites ought not to have opposed David at all in the way of Warre, then how will he salue the scruples of his own breast, who promo∣ted the course of War as well as others against the King?

The Author of the grand case of Conscience is very in∣genuous

in his contest with his adversary to forme a Syllogisme with foure terms, and their be able to finde them out, and to answer the fallacy: so that whilst he wrastles thus stoutly with himself, he can have but a faire fall in his own shaddow, to prevent which I shall take the pains to part them both. His Syllogisme (as he imputes it to his Adversary) is p. 4.5.

If the people of the Roman Empire did submit to the power of Claudius and Nero, who by force were put upon them, then the people of England may lawfully submit to a change of Government though beleeved unlawfull.

But they did submit. Ergo those of England may.

Here he excepts against the equality of inference made betwixt those whose persons were without due Title forc't upon people, but still in the same Government; and those persons who without right of Title force themselves upon, us now in another Government,

But what if the Syllogisme be indeed and vertually onely this?

If the people of the Roman Empire were required by the Apo∣stle to continue obedience to Claudius and Nero, then the peo∣ple of England may lawfully continue obedience to their present Governours.

But those might, Ergo these may.

His distinction of persons intruding wrongfully into the same Government,* 1.74 and into a different Government according to his former position satisfies not conscience in either, because both are supposed unlawfull and differ only secundum m••jus & minus quae non var••ant speciem so that if obedience were not a sin in one, it is not a sin in the other. If he say, obedience to intruders into the same Government is not a sin, then he hath dispatcht all con∣troversie concerning the exclusion of the Kings Line, and that the Parliamens fault as to him was that they rather changed the Government then the Governours, which he acknowledgeth more plainly P. 5. where speaking con∣cerning the persons comming to power, he saith it is not

materiall who puts them in, nor what men are put into powers ordained by God.* 1.75 But to come nearer to the point, he cannot say that of the usurping Caesars, which may be said of the Parliament. For these are the repre∣senters of the people of England, and were lawfully a third part of the supreame power before the change of Government. Caesar had no part of supreame right, but what he rather usurped then acquired by any dicision of right, or fundamentall legislative controversie betwixt the Senate and him. To say as the Demurrer, p. 4. That Caesar had gotten the consent of the Senate, and added compact to his conquest, is absurd, unlesse he meanes he had gotten the Senate so into his power, that he had them in a condition of Quarter;* 1.76 in which case as the Law saith principum rogamina sunt mandata, without doubt if the peoples submission to Caesar were lawfull upon his changing a Republique into a monarchy, after the Senate had for bad the approach of his Army, and that he had expelled many members from the Senate, why may not a lawfuller obedience be given to those of a Senate it self, who have changed Monarchy into a Republique? These two changes are so farre alike, that they frustrate this Authors distinction of persons intruding unlawfully into the same, and into a different Government.

* 1.77He followes his objection still, p. 5. arguing that though peo∣ple did de facto, obey such false possessors, and Vsurpers, yet that proves not the lawfulnesse of our obedience, nam a facto ad jus non valet consequentia; their submission should have been proued legall.

* 1.78If he hath a quarrell to us for our peaceablenesse, yet why should he quarrell with St. Paul?

He bad the Romans submit in the same kinde; and unlesse we had Prophets on purpose to tell Governours, as well as us of the People, who must alwaies succeed ac∣cording to the minde of God, then the state of the world, the nature of politick justic•• of society and Religion is such that we may & ought to submit in obedience to those who plenarily possesse, protect and command us lawfull

things. Surely he did not consider his Axiome well, For a facto ad jus valet consequentia, from fact wee inferre many civill rights, as custome and prescripti∣on, &c.

Neither is it necessary to prove their submission legall, is it be prov'd absolutely necessary and equitable.

And yet we conceive another case (besides that be∣fore mentioned) wherein this submission to a new power may be call'd legall.* 1.79 For the end of all law and Government is to preserve our persons and estates; and they who are in supremacy of power, have power to preserve or destroy both if they please; and therefore have as great a power over our lawes, which are lesse, then our lives. So soone as one supreame power is expelled by another, law, life, and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power; and what it doth not actually take away, stands in effect as deriving from it; and if that supreame power make a sanction for our obedience to it (as alwaies is immediately done) then we may say our submission is legall, or else the su∣preame power cannot make a law.

To that argument where we assert, that the Authority which excluds all other Authorities must be obey'd, or else all authority falls to the ground; The grand case of Cons. answers obliquely still, That notwithstaning, such authority can never illegally get the legall p••wer; nor can it exclude others from their authority. In which answer he plainely contradicts himself, p. 7. For Caesars power was (ac∣cording to himselfe) legall, and yet got by a Circum∣stance very illegall; the Senate being empty, and inti∣midated, and not so much in their own, as in his power.

This argument is so farre from concerning us,* 1.80 that it is directed onely against those Princes who ab origin, drive from illegall acquisitions. Of which he will doe well to speake largelyer, when he can assure my consci∣ence by infallible evidence of right, that I may safely sweare or destroy men upon it, that there was ever such

a man in England as William the Conquerour, or any other ancient King, from whom Titles are said to be de∣rived, either legally or illegally: This is a proposition, which I beleeve he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off, no more then I now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the Kingdom; is for which reason they assert their Authority, and it is his part to shew how infallibly it appeares to be anothers by indu∣bitable right ab origine. But because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right Title, none are so blind as the people (who among other burthens have the impositi∣on of other mens judgements cast upon them) therefore an usurped Title to them is true enough to exact obe∣dience.

* 1.81Hence the grand case of Cons. answers, p. 10. That then by the rule of contraries it followes, That when titles are visibly unlawfull, people are disengaged from obedience to them.

To this I reply, that this answer is nothing but a meere repetition of the question,* 1.82 and hath no medium of proofe annexed to it; the very question being this con∣clusion, viz. Whether obedience be lawfull to Titles visibly unlawfull?

Secondly, It hath been shown, that non-obedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible; every man in a state stands in a Relation, and must either command or obey; and owes something to him, by whose care he•• sleepes quietly in his Bed.

Thirdly, If by disengagement from obeying a law∣full Title, he meanes that we may choose whither we will obey or no, then though disengag'd, wee ma•• obey.

These answers helpe us halfe way over the next di∣ficulty.

* 1.83We may not any way affirme the right of the Vsurper, or de∣ny interpretatively the just title of the Heire, without the guilt of treachery, lying and falsenesse, if not of vow-breaking, In suf∣fering a Theife to take my purse, I cannot helpe it; If I must

part with that or my life, I chuse to loose my Purse; not for feare least I breake the fifth or eight Commandement, but least I breake the sixt, in being guilty of selfe murther; yet rather then say he hath authority to take it, I must loose my life. In point of protection among theeves, I may desire some to preserve mee from others, yet may I not say their robbery is just, or joyne or ply with them in robbing others.

To say no more of the certaine evidence,* 1.84 and of the indubitablenesse of ancient originall Titles (which is here the maine of the Argument) I answer that simple obedience to an establisht Vsurper, doth not alwaies in∣terpretatively affirme his right, or deny anothers, but af∣firmes rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power. God is the supream magistrate of al the world, and by reason of his Omnipotent presence every where, we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of, or right to any of our Actions; but our earthly Magistrates may fall into such circumstances, that they may have neither per∣sonall or virtuall presence with us, and therefore may be said to be civilly dead, according to the former Axiome, Idem est non esse & non operari, to doe nothing and be no∣thing is to us the same thing, motion being the chiefe evidence of life.

In his case of the Thiefe, I desire any man to consider whether (as he hath put it) he hath not clearely bro∣ken one Commandement, besides those which he hath named, viz. the third, because it is an untruth to say the Parliament requires not obedience from any of us, unlesse we all acknowledge the lawfulnesse of their au∣thority, which is the second false supposition here.

When Officers gather Taxes for the State, they have no commission to demand our Declarations of the States authority first, but onely to receive the money Taxed, which this Author knowes is a truth knowne to every one.* 1.85 As for the peoples conjoyning and complying wi••h the State to Robbe another, by obeying to the prejudice of another; he must meane it in a Robbery either of

power, or of Riches. For power, the people aime not at it, their condition alwaies is l••rge who ever sits at top. And for getting by the warre, I hope the Presbyte∣rian party which had the authorizing of Taxes, as well as others, knowes as well as the people themselves, that this is a grosse prevarication. Last of all there is differ∣ence betwixt willing compliance, and necessary subjecti∣ion, which is the peoples case.

* 1.86He objects againe p. 6. If obedience be necessary then a title once wrong'd can never be lawfully righted, it will be sinne to helpe the weaker party, or to rescue our selves from perpetuall slavery.

* 1.87Here he is started suddainly into two other questions. First, how a Title may be recovered? and secondly, How we of the people may rescue our selves from the slavery of any Titles? These two relate to the future, which is of Gods secret disposing; our question is of the present only.

* 1.88But I pray you what doe people get when warres for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous? What are the people of France or the people of Spaine better for the long and hereditary anger of their two Kings? Or what was the world better for Alexanders Conquering it? The Houses which are burnt, and the millions of bodies left dead in the field, are the peo∣ples; and Princes scorning to derive from them, still trample them to dung. We talke of some Titles wrong∣ed, as if their rights were so certaine, and so necessary to live under, as God almighties is, who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chiefe Officers, and not we; Who is it then that can right wronged Ti∣tles, but he alone who makes all Titles right?

To that case where it is argued, that if the Masters mate had throwne him over-board, and by power would suffer no other to guide the Ship but himselfe,* 1.89 if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the Ship, the Ship must needs perish and themselves with it; It is answered by the Grand Case of Cons. p. 9 That the case should not have

been of a Mate as a partner (which is false) but of a party of the Seamen, who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment, especially for acknowledging the Vsurping Stearesmans right, which is still falsely suppos'd in our case.

Here I desire this Casuist to pull off his maske and speake plainly,* 1.90 whether he doth not plead for his owne punishment, as one who at the beginning of our warre principally incouraged us not to be guided by the then pretending Stearesman, whom they of his party said aside, and stear'd a while themselves; the Scots declaring that he was not fit to touch the helme againe, till hee had sa∣tisfied, &c.

Besides, this is true, that they then required obedience from compounding Royalists, although to them they seemed an unlawfull power and Magistracy, as to the dispencing of publique and private justice.

Secondly, the reason wherefore these marriners might not acknowledge him the right master, (as he hath vari∣ed the case) is rather because this is in an inferiour thing de jure privato, Master and Marriners being accountants to the Merchants who have a Court of Justice to judge the fact; but what Court is there in this world to call that power, which here is the supreamest to any ac∣count?

Thirdly, he supposes the usurper and the complyers to be brought to account by the others, but not till they come to shore; whereas in our case we can do nothing but in the ship, that is in the common-wealth, when we leave that, we go into another world, our true patria where in∣deed we doe not call one another, but are all called to∣gether to an account by our supreame Magistrate, whose sentence we would faine prejudge here by a confusion of the ship in via.

The grand case of Conscience, p. 9. Adviseth that seeing we are so unsetled,* 1.91 we should use meanes for a settlement, though by its procurement wee were more unsetled: If a man be at the rivers brinke he would advise him to keepe out of the water, but

if at once he leap into the middle of the river, he would per∣swade him to come to the bank, although he wade through much water to come thither.

* 1.92I see according to this horrid tenent, that if God (as the Scotch phrase hath it) comes not to the whole length of our desire,* 1.93 then there must be no peace betwixt man and man in this world. Mr. Ste. Marshall preacht late∣ly, that God was to be thankt for some thing, that Church doores were yet open to those who had a zeale, and a will to congregate, that they were not under their enemies swords, nor compounding with them; Hee saw how they might be worse if God should through their peevishnesse let them see forraigne armies at their doores, who have both faces tongues, religions & affections diffe∣rent from ours; and wil not care for firing our houses and Churches, or for giving us lawes againe in an unknown tongue, and perhaps Religion too. Can he think the No∣tion of our Church government would be a charme to such swords and consciences? Or rather can he assure us of his prophecy here, that if we begin new troubles, we shall certainly have victory? For his argument sup∣poses it must needs end so, and that by his perswasion we shall wade to the bank. If we were indeed in the midst of the water (that is in the midst of warre and confusion) then being engaged for life, we might endeavour to wade through, though the streame were running deepe with our own and Childrens innocent bloods, for after all Metaphors, that is the element which he means. Thus in no diseases but those which are supposeddeadly, may we use desperate remedies, such as may endanger the destruction of the whole body;* 1.94 But may a man in∣danger his whole body, when it is not for the cure of himselfe but of another, and by the killing also of others besides himselfe, wife and children? I will not name what sort of subtilty this Gentleman hath used in this Argument, nor def••ne with what conscience here he seekes to satisfie anothers; For, lest we of the People

should bogle at comming on the Stage to Act our late Tragedy over againe, hee would impose it on our be∣leifes, that we are still in the middle act of it and that we ought to finish it. It is high time for him to consider whither if we run along with him in this we should not shut up compassion from our Brethren,* 1.95 and shut out a great part of our gratitude towards God; although I confesse some scars and haltings may remaine yet, after the warre it selfe is ended. Methinks he should finde every thing both in Nature and Christianity more favourable for our present Peace, then for our third Warre, espe∣cially seeing all our former warres have ended very con∣trary to the expectation of those who were hottest to be∣gin them. But I consider that passion is the last hold out of which we are beaten, of which the fuller men are, the lesse do they (through a great judgement on their spi∣rits) perceive into what deformities they doe trans∣port them, it being the nature of all intoxications that their defects are better perceivd by any, then by those who are opprest by them.

Notes

• * 1.1

  whence the difficulty of perswading civill truth.
• * 1.2

  ••irst Demur.
• * 1.3

  Demur. p 6. case of Con. p. 3.7. ••
• * 1.4

  Pag. 2.
• * 1.5

  The end of Ma∣gistracy, sub∣sevient to the end of our be∣ing.
• * 1.6

  All justice or just things re∣late not essen∣tially to the le∣gall Magistrate.
• * 1.7

  Of commuta∣tive justice Vid. p. 26.35.
• * 1.8

  1 Cor. 6. of distributive justice.
• * 1.9

  This present Parliament is effectually a Parliament.
• * 1.10

  Vid p. 18.
• * 1.11

  Necessity above formes of, Go∣vernment.
• * 1.12

  The difference betwixt con∣quest & victory
• * 1.13

  Vid. p. 33.
• * 1.14

  Object.
• * 1.15

  Answer.
• * 1.16

  The State of Kingdoms as separated, and as mixt in themselves.
• * 1.17

  Of the Ri••ht of War be∣twixt Funda∣mentall Par∣ties.
• * 1.18

  page 9.
• * 1.19

  Of the House of Lords.
• * 1.20

  Of Secluded Members.
• * 1.21

  The negative when preva∣lent in equall partnarship.
• * 1.22

  Whither the transactions of the legall num∣ber of the house be invaled, when any mem¦bers are forct away?
• * 1.23

  Of the present consent of the Major part of the People.
• * 1.24

  Ob.
• * 1.25

  Answ.
• * 1.26

  Whither the present power be the suprem?
• * 1.27

  Whither it be a Parliament?
• * 1.28

  Object.
• * 1.29

  Ans.
• * 1.30

  The case of the Kings com∣ming to the house of Com∣mons not par∣allel.
• * 1.31

  The case of the apprentices en¦tring and for∣cing the house not parallel.
• * 1.32

  The Parl. votes against force, still observed & are the same still.
• * 1.33

  VVhy actions of Govern∣ment must change.
• * 1.34

  How wrong hath been fit∣ted for a title. 〈…〉〈…〉 Bac. H. 7.
• * 1.35

  Ob.
• * 1.36

  Object.
• * 1.37

  Of toleration.
• * 1.38

  Ob.
• * 1.39

  Ans.
• * 1.40

  The magistrate in a state, not as a Father of a Family.
• * 1.41

  VVhy states cannot looke so strictly after vertue, as after publique quiet
• * 1.42

  O••.
• * 1.43

  Ob.
• * 1.44

  Ans. Of the Ecclips suspention and extinction of supream pow∣ers.
• * 1.45

  The union of people to a GoVernment not like a mar∣riage.
• * 1.46

  Obj.
• * 1.47

  Ans. A King of Eng¦land, why not as a husband to the people of England.
• * 1.48

  Ob.
• * 1.49

  Answ.
• * 1.50

  Of taking away the Kings life.
• * 1.51

  Ob.
• * 1.52

  Ans. Of obedience for wrath, and for conscience sake.
• * 1.53

  Tyrants in ti∣tles from whom.
• * 1.54

  Of our lawfull submission to a Magistrate who rules by Gods permissive will
• * 1.55

  Ob.
• * 1.56

  Ans. Obedience ne∣cessary to law∣full and unlaw∣full powers how different.
• * 1.57

  How we may have a right to take what ano∣ther may not have aright to give.
• * 1.58

  The difference betwixt privat Title and pub∣lique.
• * 1.59

  Of possession.
• * 1.60

  Object.
• * 1.61

  Answer.
• * 1.62

  Of supream po¦wers altering themselves by joynt concur∣rence.
• * 1.63

  How seperatly
• * 1.64

  Ob.
• * 1.65

  Ans.
• * 1.66

  Demur p. 8.
• * 1.67

  Of non obedi∣ence.
• * 1.68

  Ob.
• * 1.69

  Ans.
• * 1.70

  What time makes a form'd Government.
• * 1.71

  Obj.
• * 1.72

  Ans.
• * 1.73

  Our condition different from Israels betwixt David and Ab∣salom.
• * 1.74

  Obedience to false Gover∣nours in the right or wrong Government varies not the sin of obedi∣ence.
• * 1.75

  Wherein Cae∣sars case & the Parl. disagree
• * 1.76

  Wherein Ce∣sars case & the Parl. agree, as to justifie our obedience.
• * 1.77

  Obj.
• * 1.78

  Ans.
• * 1.79

  In what sen•••• the present submission 〈◊〉〈◊〉 legall.
• * 1.80

  Of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 evidence of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ri••••ts, to as to satisfie con••••••∣e••ce for acti∣ons of w••r u••¦on them.
• * 1.81

  Ob.
• * 1.82

  Ans.
• * 1.83

  Object. Demn. p. 5.
• * 1.84

  Ans. Obedience some times as∣serts not a Ti∣tle but power.
• * 1.85

  They who obey a wrong autho¦rity r••bbe not the ri••h••••.
• * 1.86

  Obj.
• * 1.87

  Ans.
• * 1.88

  Of the recove∣ry of dubious Rights, and the benefit which people get by most warres.
• * 1.89

  Obj.
• * 1.90

  Answer. The case of the Master of th•• Ship thrown over board.
• * 1.91

  Ob.
• * 1.92

  Answ.
• * 1.93

  Whether we be actually in the unsettle∣ment & deepes which he sup∣poses?
• * 1.94

  When the whole body may be hazar∣ded for a dispe∣rate remedy & when not.
• * 1.95

  1 Joh. 3.17.