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A Common-wealth is a certain So∣vereign Govornment of many Families, with those things that are common among them.
A Monarchy is that State where the Sovereignty resteth in the Person of one only Prince.
An Aristocraty, is where some small part of the People have in them as a Body corporate, the Sovereignty and Supreme Power of the whole State.
A Democraty, is where all the People have Power and Authority Sovereign.
So doth it appear, that the Place and Person where the Sovereignty resteth, doth cause the State to be either a Monarchy, an Aristocraty, or Popular Go∣vernment.
SOvereignty is an absolute and perpe∣tual Power in every publick State, and he is properly and only a Sovereign, that acknowledgeth no Superior or Equal, nor holdeth of any other Prince, Person or Power, but God and his own Sword.
The first Mark of Sovereignty, is ab∣solute Power and Authority to command all Subjects in general, and every of them in particular, without consent of any other Person or Persons, either grea∣ter or inferior to himself.
The second Mark of Majesty is Au∣thority to make War, and conclude Peace at his pleasure.
The third is Power to beslow all Ho∣nors and chief Offices at his pleasure.
The Fourth Mark of Sovereignty is Appellation.
The Fifth Mark and last, is power to pardon all Subjects by rigor of Law or otherwise, condemned in Life, Lands, Goods or Honors.
These Powers are not to be imparted to any Officer, Deputy or other Magi∣strate, but in the Prince's absence, and for some urgent occasion.
The Diversity of Monarchies doth not proceed from the Nature of the State, but the diverse proceedings of those Princes that govern; for great difference there may be between the nature of the Com∣monwealth and the Government thereof. That Prince that giveth the Magi∣stracies Honors and Offices without re∣spect of Nobility, Riches or Vertue, may be said to govern popularly. And that Monarchy may be said to be governed Aristocratically, when the Monarch im∣parteth the principal Honors and Offices to the Noble and Rich Men only.
The same difference there is to be sound in States Aristocratical and Popu∣lar; for the one and the other may be both Signioril or Tyrannical.
A Monarch Signioril is he who by force of Arms and just War, is made Owner of Mens Bodies and Goods, and governeth them as a Master of a Family governeth base Servants and Slaves.
A Monarch Royal, is he whose Subjects are obedient unto his Laws, of God and Nature, suffering every Subject to enjoy Liberty natural, with Property in Lands and Goods, governing as a Father governeth his Children.
A Monarch Tyrannical, is he who without regard to the Law of God or Nature, commandeth Free-men as Slaves and useth their Lands and Goods as his own.
ALL People subject to Princes, are governed as Free-men by their Prince, and certain other particular Lords of Lands and Liberties; who not by the Princes Commission, but by Ancient 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Custom, have Inheritance and Tenements; or else they are by one Prince and his Ministers commanded, which Ministers have not by Law or Ordinance, any Authority or Interest of themselves, but being like to the People (base Men and Slaves) they command only by Commission in the Princes name; and the Authority of those Ministers doth cease at the Princes pleasure, so that the People do not ac∣knowledge any Superior but the Prince, nor owe any Service to other mean
Lords: So as all the People stand with∣out Property in Lands or Goods; for example, the Empire of Turky and the West-Indies.
The Provinces of this Monarchy are allotted to sundry Magistrates or Mi∣nisters, and they altered and removed at the Princes pleasure; but it is other∣wise in a Monarchy Royal, because the Monarch is there accompanied with many mean Lords. And albeit those mean Lords are Subjects unto the Prince, yet have they particular Tenants, who may not, without just cause, be dispossessed by the Prince; and those People having had depen∣dency of their Lords and their An∣cestors, do ever beare unto them a cer∣tain natural Love and dutiful Respect; whoso therefore compareth these Prin∣cipalities, shall perceive, that to Con∣quer a State Signioril there is great difficulty, but being conquered, it may easily be maintained; for the difficulty to conquer such a State, proceedeth from the lack of mean Lords to call in and assist the Prince that doth in∣vade: Who therefore desireth to subdue
a Nation thus governed, must of force assault all the People, and rather trust in his own Strength than the Aid of the Country. But if he can prevail, then one only Fear remaineth, which is the Prince's Posterity, which necessarily must be extinguished, because the Prince's Race only hath Interest both in the People and Soldiers. But to enter a Monarchy Royal, is an Enterprise of no great Difficulty, when he that doth enter, hath the Friendship and Aid of some mean Lords to take his part, and prepare the place where he is to arrive.
MOnarchies Royal are for the most part Ancient and Hereditary, and consequently easie to be governed. For it is sufficient for the Prince to main∣tain the old Laws, and on occasion
temporize with those Accidents that happen: Such a State cannot be taken from the Prince without excessive Force, and if it be, it shall be soon recovered. Example, England and France.
But if a Monarchy newly conquered, be annexed unto an old, and not pro∣perly Ancient, then it is with much more difficulty maintained.
First, For that Men naturally in∣clined to Variation, are easily induced to take Arms against him that newly governeth.
Secondly, Every new Prince is forced to exact as well upon those Subjects that joyned with him, as those that did re∣sist him, and therefore shall offend both. Example, Ireland annexed to the Crown of England, Sicilia and Naples to Spain.
The means to maintain such a Mo∣narchy, is,
First, To extinguish the Race of him that was anciently Prince.
Secondly, To continue all Laws and Customs in the former Force; for so shall the Subject find nothing altered but the Prince, and therefore will soon rest contented; and the rather if that new
Monarchy, and the ancient Dominion of the Prince, be of one Language: But if the People be of a contrary Language and Humor, then to hold it, there need∣eth great Industry and Fortune; in that case the best way is, that the Prince should inhabit there, as well to incoun∣ter all Inconveniences proceeding from the Subject, as to preserve the People from Oppression of his own Ministers. Another way is, to send thither certain Colonies, and plant them in fit places, or else to settle some Garisons both of Horse and Foot; but Colonies are less chargeable to the Prince. As for the People inhabitant (who must necessa∣rily remove, they being a small number and dispossessed) they cannot have power to offend; for in that case, this Rule or Maxim shall be found true, that Men must be either kindly intreated, or with all Extremity oppressed; because of light Injuries they may be revenged, but of utter Oppression they cannot.
A third way to hold a conquered Dominion, is, to cherish and defend the Neighbors of little Power, and oppress or keep under those that are most
Potent; and above all, to take order that no Forreign Prince or Power do enter; for it is ever to be looked for, that so many of the Nation as are dis∣contented, either for Ambition or Fear, will be ever ready to bring in Strangers: And to conclude this matter of Princi∣pality annexed, I say it behoveth every Prince possessed of such a State, never to increase the Power of any Potent Nighbor, never to oppress those that are of small Power, never to permit any Forreign Potentate to enter, but ever to plant Colonies and Garisons, or else to make that Dominion his chief Habitation.
TYrannical Princes are not advanced by Favor, neither do they trust unto Fortune, but by degrees of War, or else by some other indirect means do aspire unto Greatness; and therein do
maintain themselves by all ways either Honest or Dishonest, without respect of Justice, Conscience or Law either of Na∣tions or Nature: A Prince by such im∣pious means aspired, and desiring to hold that he hath gained, will take order that the Cruelties he committeth may be done roundly, suddenly, and as it were at an instant; for if they be executed at lei∣sure and by piece-meal, then will the Prince's Fears continue long, and the Terror in Subjects take deeper Impressi∣on, whose Nature is such, that either they must be bound by Benefits, or by Cruelty made sure from offending: Example, Dionysius and Agathocles.
SOme other Princes there are, that from private Estate have aspired to Sove∣reignty, not by unnatural or impious pro∣ceedings as the former, but by Vertue and Fortune, and being aspired, have
found no great Difficulty to be main∣tained; for such a Prince having no other Dominion, is forced to settle him∣self where he is become a Prince: But here is to be noted, that albeit such a Man be Vertuous, yet wanting Fortune, his Vertue proveth to small purpose, and Fortune without Vertue doth seldom work any great Effect. Howsoever it be, a Prince being aspired, both by the Aid of the one and of the other, shall notwith∣standing find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten; because he is forced to introduce new Laws and new Orders of Government differing from the old, as well for his own Security, as confirma∣tion of the Government; for avoiding of which Dangers, he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his Sub∣jects to obey, or must pray in aid of others: If he can do the first, he needeth not doubt, but being driven to the other, his Greatness cannot long con∣tinu; for albeit a matter of no diffi∣culty, it is to perswade a People; yet to make them constant, is a work well near impossible. Example, Theseus, Cyrus, Romulus.
The second sort of new Princes are such as be aspired by Favor or Corrupti∣on, or by the Vertue or Greatness of Fortune or Friends: A Prince by any or all these means advanced, and desirous to hold his Estate, must indeavor by his own Vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other; which may be done by this means: First, To assure all Enemies from offend∣ing. Secondly, To win the Love and Friendship of so many Neighbors as possibly he may. Thirdly, To compass all Designs tending to his Honor or Pro∣fit, and bring them to pass either by Fraud or Force. Fourthly, To make himself honored and followed of Cap∣tains and Soldiers. Fifthly, To oppress all those that would or can offend. Sixthly, To be obsequious and liberal to Friends, magnanimous and terrible to Foes. Seventhly, To cass all old and unfaithful Bands, and entertain new. Eighthly, To hold such Amity with Kings and Princes, as they ought reason∣ably to favor him, or else they would offend; easily they cannot. Example, Giovannio, Torrigiani, Caesar, Borgi.
The third and last means whereby private Persons do aspire to Principa∣lities, is not Force and Violence, but meer good Will and Favor of Men. The cause or occasion thereof, is only Vertue or Fortune, or at least a certain Fortu∣nate Craft and Wittiness, because he aspireth either by Favor of the People, or by Favor of the Nobility; for these contrary Humors are in all Common∣wealths to be found. And the reason thereof is, that the great Men do ever endeavor to oppress the People, and the People do labor not to be oppressed by them. Of these divers Appetites one of these three Effects do proceed, viz. Prin∣cipality, Liberty, or Licentious Life. Principality may come either by love of the Multitude, or of the great Men; for when any of these Factions do find it self oppressed, then do they soon consent to make one a Prince, hoping by his Vertue and Valor to be defended. Ex∣ample, Francesco Sforza, Alessandro de Medici.
A Prince in this sort aspired, to main∣tain his Estate, must first consider well by which of these Factions aforesaid he
is advanced; for if by Favor of great Men he be aspired, then must he meet with many Difficulties; for having about him divers Persons of great Qua∣lity, and such as were but lately his Equals, hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth: But if the Prince be advanced by the People, few or none shall hardly disobey him. So it appeareth that a Prince made by the Multitude, is much more secure than he whom the Nobility preferreth; for com∣mon People do not desire to enjoy more than their own, and to be defended from Oppression; but great Men do study not only to hold their own, but also to command and insult upon Inferiors.
A Senate or Council is a certain law∣ful Assembly of Counsellors, to give advice to him or them that have in the Commonweale Power Sovereign.
A Counsellor is called in the Latine Senator; which Word signifieth in ef∣fect an old Man: The Grecians and Ro∣mans also most commonly composed their Councils of ancient and expert Persons; for if they, or the greater part of them had been Young Men, then might the Council have more properly been called a Juvenate than a Senate.
The chief and most necessary Note required in a Counsellor is to have no dependence of any other Prince or Com∣monweale; either Oath, Homage, Na∣tural Obligation, Pention, or Reward: In this Point the Venetians have been ever most precise, and for that reason, do not admit any Cardinal or other
Clergy-man to be either of or at their Councils, therefore when the Venetian Senate is Assembled, the Usher being ready to shut the Door, cryeth aloud, Fuora Preti, Depart Priest. Note also that in every State, of what Quality so∣ever, a Secret or Cabinet-Council is mainly necessary.
THE King of Spain, for the Go∣vernment of his Dominions hath Seven Councils, (viz.) the Council of the Indies, the Council of Spain, the Council of Italy and the Low Countries, the Council of War, the Council of Or∣ders, the Council of Inquisition, and the Council Royal.
In France are Three Councils, (viz.) the Council srivy, the Council of Judg∣es, which they call Presidents et Conceli∣ers
de Parlament, and the great Coun∣cil, which they call Assemblies du troys Estates.
In Venice, beside the Senate and great Council, are Four Councils, (viz.) the Sages of the Sea, the Sages of the Land, the Council of Tenn, the Three Presi∣dents of Quarantia, and the Senate: All which Councils do amount to One hun∣dred and twenty Persons, with the Ma∣gistrates.
The Great Council of Ragusa consist∣eth of Sixty Persons, and hath another Privy Council of Twelve.
Genoua hath Three Councils: the Great Council of Two hundred, the Se∣nate which consisteth of Sixty, and the Privy Council which hath Twenty six Counsellors: So it doth appear that in all Commonwealths, be they Monar∣chies, Aristocracies, or Popular States. The Council-Privy is most necessary,
and often used; Also this difference is to be noted between the Councils in Monarchies, and the Councils in Ari∣stocracies and States Popular; that is to say, that all Deliberations fit to be pub∣lished, are in a Monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the Council Privy, and after ratified by Com∣mon Council; But in Optimacies or Popular Government the Custom is contrary.
Here also is to be noted, that albeit the Use and Authority of every Senate a Privy Council is most needful, yet hath it no Authority to command but in the name of those in whom the Sove∣reignty resteth: For if Counsellors had power to command absolutely, then should they be Sovereigns, and conse∣quently all Execution at their Pleasure; which may not be without detracting from Majesty, which is a thing so So∣vereign and Sacred, as no Citizen or Subject of what quality soever, may touch or approach thereunto.
AN Officer is a Person publick, that hath Charge ordinary and limited by Law.
A Commissioner is also a Person pub∣lick, but his Charge is extraordinary and limited by Commission.
Officers are of two sorts, and so be Commissioners; the one hath power to command, and are called Magistrates: the other hath Authority to execute: so the one and the other are Persons publick: yet are not all publick Per∣sons either Officers or Commissioners.
Commissioners are ordained to go∣vern in Provinces, in War, in Justice, in disposing the Treasure, or some o∣ther Function concerning the State; but all Commissions do spring and pro∣ceed from the Sovereign, Magistrates and Commissioners. And here is to be noted, that every Commission ceas∣eth
if he that granted the commission doth dye, or revoke it, or if the Com∣missioners during his Commission shall aspire to Office and Authority equal to his that made it.
A Magistrate is an Officer having power to command in the State; and albeit that every Magistrate be an Officer, yet every Officer is not a Ma∣gistrate, but they only that have power to command.
Also in making Officers of and Ma∣gistrates in every Commonweale, Three things are specially to be ob∣served (viz.) who doth make them, what Men they are that should be made, and the form and manner how they are made.
The 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 to him or them in whom the Sovereignty resteth; the second also belongeth to Majesty; yet therein the Laws are commonly follow∣ed, especially in Aristocracies and States Popular; In the one the Magistrates are chosen out of the most Wealthy or most Noble: In the other, elected out of the whole Multitude.
The form and manner of choosing Magistrates in Aristocracies and States Popular, is either by Election, by Lot, or by both, and their Office is to com∣pel those that do not Obey what Sove∣reignty commandeth: For all force of Commandment lieth in Compul∣sion.
Commandment likewise is of two sorts; the one may be called Sovereign and Absolute, above Laws, above Ma∣gistrates, and above People. In Mo∣narchies such Command is proper to the Prince only; in Aristocracies it rest∣eth in the Nobility: And in Democra∣cies the People have that power.
The second Commandments are Sub∣ject both to Sovereignty and Law.
Here is to be noted, that every Ma∣gistrate may recall his own Command∣ment, and forbid what he did Com∣mand, yet cannot revoke that which he hath Judged.
* 1.1 Also in the presence of the Sovereign, all Autho∣rity of Magistrates ceas∣eth; and in presence of great Magistrates the inferior have no power; and Magistrates equal can∣not do any thing but by Consent, if his Colleagues or Fellow-Magistrates be present.
THE First concern matter Intrin∣sick.
The Second touch matter Extrinsick.
The Administration of Justice.
The Managing of the Treasure.
The disposing of things appertaining to War.
The Skill how to deal with Neighbors.
The Diligence to vent their Designs.
The way how to win so much Con∣fidence with some of them, as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise.
The good and direct Administration of Justice, is in all Places a principal part of Government; for seldom or never shall we see any People discontented and desirous of Alteration, where Ju∣stice is equally administred without re∣spect of Persons; and in every State this Consideration is required, but most of all in Countries that do front upon other Princes, or were lately 〈◊〉〈◊〉
Hereunto the Princes Vigilancy and the Magistrates Uprightness are especi∣ally required; for oft-tentimes the Prince is deceived, and the Magistrates corrupted; it behoveth also the Prince to maintain the Judges and Ministers of Justice in their Reputation, and yet to have a vigilant Eye upon their Pro∣ceedings, and the rather if their Autho∣rity do include Equity, and from their Censure be no Appeal; and if their Office be during Life, and they are Men born and dwelling in the same Country; all these things are duly to be considered of the rince; for as to call the Judges into question, is as it were to dis∣grace the Judicial Seat; so to wink at their Corruptions were matter of just discontent to the Subject: in this case therefore the Prince cannot do more than by his Wisdom to make choice of Good Men; and being chosen, to hold them in good Reputation so as the or∣dinary course of Justice may proceed; for otherwise great Disorder, Contempt, and general Confusion will ensue there∣of. Secondly, he is to keep his Eye open upon their Proceedings; and last∣ly
to reserve unto himself a Supreme Power of Appellation.
The want of Money is in all States very perilous, and most of all in those which are of least Strength, and do confine upon Nations with whom they have commonly War, or unas∣sured Peace, but most perilous of all to those Governments which are remote from the Prince, or Place where they are to be relieved.
First, The Customs and Impositions upon all forts of Merchandize and Traf∣fick is to be looked unto and advanced.
Secondly, The excessive eating of Usury must be suppressed.
Thirdly, All supersluous Charges and Expences are to be taken away.
Lastly, The doings and accounts of Ministers are severally to be exammed.
Touching the matter of Custom and Impost thereof, assuredly a great Prosit is in every State to be raised;
chiefly where Peace hath long con∣tinued, and where the Country af∣fordeth much plenty of Commodities to be carried out, and where Ports are to receive Shipping.
The moderating of Interest is ever necessary, and chiefly in this Age, by reason that Money aboundeth in Eu∣rope; since the Traffick into the In∣dies; for such Men as have Money in their Hands great plenty, would in no wise imploy the same in Merchan∣dize, if lawful it were to receive the utmost Usury, being a Course of most Profit and greatest Security.
The taking away of superfluous Expences is no other thing than a certain wise and laudable Parsimony; which the Romans and other well go∣verned States did use. These Expen∣ces consist in Fees, Allowances, and Wages granted to Ministers of little or no Necessity; also in Pensions, Rewards, Entertainments and Dona∣ries, with small Difficulty to be mo∣derated, or easily to be suppressed.
* 1.2 By abridging or taking away of these needless Expences a marvelous Profit will be saved for the Prince; but if he continue them, and by impo∣sing upon the People do think to in∣crease his Treasure or Revenue, be∣sides the loss of their Love, he may also hazard their Obedience, with ma∣ny other Inconveniences.
Whatsoever Prince or Common∣weale is Neighbour to any People which can, will, or were wont to of∣fend, it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his Person and Country, but also to fore∣cast and use every caution and other diligence: For the Inconveniencies which happen to Government, are sudden and unlook'd for; yea, the Providence and Provision required in this Case ought to be such as the Ex∣pences
all other ways imployed must stay to supply the Necessity of War.
THIS first Point of matter Extrin∣sick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good, but otherwise becometh dangerous; for the Proceeding must be divers according to the diversity of the Ends which the Prince or Governor intendeth; for if he desire to continue Peace with his Neighbors, one way is to be taken; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break, and to become an Enemy to one or more of his Neighbors. Is he do desire to live peaceably withal, then he is to observe these Rules (viz)
First, To hold and continue firmly all Contracts and Capitulations.
Secondly, To shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of Wrong or Injury.
Thirdly, With all care and favor to further Commerce and reciproke Traf∣fick for the profit of the Subject, and increase of the Princes Revenue.
Fourthly, Covertly to win so great Confidence with Neighbors, as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made Umpire.
Fifthly, To become so well believed with them as he may remove such Diffi∣dences as grow to his own disadvan∣tage.
Sixthly, Not to deny Protection or Aid to them that are the weakest, and chiefly such as do and will endure his Fortune.
Lastly, In Favouring, Aiding and Pro∣tecting (unless necessity shall other∣wise so require) to do it moderately, so as they who are to be aided, become not Jealous, and consequently seek Ad∣herency elsewhere, which oft-times hath opened way to other Neighbors that desire a like occasion.
This Point in time of War is with great diligence to be looked unto; also in time of Peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle War is behoveful; for to foresee what may happen to the Prejudice of a Princes Profit or Repu∣tation, is a part of great Wisdom. The means to attain the Intelligence of these things are two.
The First is by friends, the next by Espials; the one for the most part faith∣ful, the other not so assured.
These matters are well to be consi∣dered; for albeit the Nature of Man desireth nothing more than curiously to know the doings of others, yet are those things to be handled with so great Secrecy and Dissimulation as the Princes Intent be not in any wise suspe∣cted, nor the Ministers made odious; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation, do devise causes of Diffe∣rence where no need is, divining of things Future which prove to the Prejudice of their own Prince.
This is chiefly attained unto by being Loved and Honored; for these things do work so many good Effects, as daily Experience sufficeth without any express Example to prove them of great Force.
The ways to win Love and Trust, is in all Actions to proceed Justly, and sometimes to wink at Wrongs, or set aside unnecessary Revenges; and if any thing be done not justifiable, or unfit to be allowed, as oftentimes it happen∣eth, there to lay the Blame upon the Minister, which must be performed with so great show of Revenge and Dissimulation, by reproving and punish∣ing the Minister, as the Princes offended may be satisfied, and believe that the cause of Unkindness proceeded from thence.
Now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching Provision, to the end the People may not be drawn into despair by Famine, or extream Dearth of Victual, chiefly for want
of Corn, which is one principal Con∣sideration to be regarded, according to the Italian Proverb, Pane in Piazza, Giustitia in Palazzo, siverezza per tutto: Whereunto I could wish every Prince or Supreme Governor to be thus qua∣lified (viz.) Facile de audienza: non facilede credenza, desioso de spedition, essemplare in costunii proprii, & inquei de sua casa tale che vorra governare, e non esser governato da altro; he della raggione.
EVery good and lawful Principality is either Elective or Successive Of them Election seemeth the more Ancient; but Succession in divers re∣spects the better: Minore discrimine sumitur Princeps quam quaeritur. Tac.
The chief and only Endeavour of every good Prince, ought to be the Commodity and Security of the Sub∣jects, as contrariwise the Tyrant seek∣eth his own private Profit with the Oppression of his People: Civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est. Sal.
To the Perfection of every good Prince, two things are necessarily re∣quired (viz.) Prudence and Vertue;
the one to direct his Doings, the other to govern his Life: Rex eris si recte fe∣ceris. Hor.
The second care which appertaineth to a good Prince, is to make his Subjects like unto himself; for thereby he is not only honored, but they also the better governed: Facile imperium in bonos. Plaut.
Subjects are made good by two means (viz.) by constraint of Law, and the Princes Example; for in all Estates, the People do imitate those Conditions whereunto they see the Prince enclined: Quicquid faciunt principes, praecipere vide∣antur. Quintil.
All Vertues be required in a Prince, but Justice and Clemency are most necessary; for Justice is a Habit of doing things Justly, as well to him∣self as others, and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth: This is that Vertue that preserveth Con∣cord among Men, and whereof they be called good: Jus & aequit as vincula civi∣tatum. Cic.
* 1.3 It is the Quality of this Vertue also, to pro∣ceed equally and tempe∣rately; it informeth the Prince not to surcharge the Subjects with infinite Laws; for thereof pro∣ceedeth the Impoverish∣ment of the Subjects and the Inrich∣ing of Lawyers, a kind of Men which in Ages more Ancient, did seem of no Necessity: Sine causidicis satis foe∣lices olim fuere futuraeque sunt urbes. Sal.
The next Vertue required in Princes is Clemency, being an Inclination of the Mind to Lenity and Compassion, yet tempered with Severity and Judg∣ment; this Quality is fit for all great Personages, but chiefly Princes, be∣cause their occasion to use it is most; by it also the Love of Men is gained: Qui vult regnare, languida regnet manu. Sen.
After Clemency, Fidelity is expected in all good Princes, which is a certain Performance and Observation of Word and Promise; this Vertue seemeth to
accompany Justice, or is as it were the same, and therefore most fit for Princes: Sanctissimum generis humani bo∣num. Liv.
As Fidelity followeth Justice, so doth Modesty accompany Clemency; Mo∣desty is a Temperature of Reason, whereby the Mind of Man is so go∣verned, as neither in Action or Opi∣nion he over-deemeth of himself, or any thing that is his; a Quality not common in Fortunate Folk, and most rare in Princes: Superbia commune nobili∣tatis malum. Sal.
This Vertue doth also moderate all External Demonstration of Insolence, Pride and Arrogance, and therefore ne∣cessary to be known of Princes, and all others whom Favor or Fortune have ad∣vanced: Impone faelicitati tua fraenos, fa∣cilius illam reges. Curt.
But as Princes are to observe the Bounds of Modesty, so may they not forget the Majesty appertaining to their Supreme Honor, being a certain Reve∣rend Greatness due to Princely Vertue and Royal State; a Grace and Gravity no less beseeming a Prince than Vertue
it self; for neither over-much Famili-arity, nor too great Austerity, ought to be used by Princes: Facilit as au∣toritatem, severit as amorem minuit. Tac.
To these Vertues we may apply Li∣berality, which doth not only Adorn, but highly Advance the Honor due to Princes; thereby also the good Will of Men is gained; for nothing is more fitting a Prince's Nature than Bounty, the same being accompanied with Judg∣ment, and performed according to the Laws of Liberality: Perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt. Tac.
It seemeth also that Prudence is not only fit, but also, among other Vertues, necessary in a Prince; for the daily use thereof is in all Humane Actions re∣quired, and chiesly in Matters of State and Government: Prudentia imperant is propria & unica virtus. Arist.
The Success of all Worldly Proceed∣ings, doth shew that Prudence hath com∣passed the Prosperous Event of Humane Actions, more than Force of Arms or other Power: Mens una 〈◊〉〈◊〉 plurium vincit manus. Eurip.
Prudence is either natural, or re∣ceived from others; for whoso can Counsel himself what is fit to be done, needeth not the Advice of others; but they that want such Perfection, and are nevertheless capable, and are will∣ing to know what others inform, ought to be accounted wise enough: Laudatissimus est qui cuncta videbit, sed laudandus est is qui paret recte monenti Hesiod.
ALbeit the excellent Spirit of some Princes be such as doth justly de∣serve the highest Commendation; yet for that every Course of Life needeth the Aid of Men, and the Mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite Care appertaining to publick Affairs; it be∣hoveth Princes to be assisted: Magna ne∣gotia, adjutoribus egent. Tac.
The Assistants may be properly di∣vided into Counsellors and Ministers; the one to Advise, the other to Exe∣cute: Without Counsel, no Kingdom, no State, no private House can stand; for Experience hath proved, that Com∣mon-weales have prospered so long as good Counsel did govern, but when Favor, Fear or Voluptuousness entered,
those Nations became disordered; and in the end subject to Slavery: Quid∣dam sacrum profecto est Consultatio. Plato.
Counsellors are Men specially selected to give Advice to Princes or Common∣wealths, as well in Peace as in War; the chief Qualities required in such Men, are Fidelity and Knowledge; which two concurring do make them both Good and Wise, and consequently fit for Counsel: Prudentis proprium munus recte consulere. Arist.
The Election of Counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among Men of long Experience and grave Years; for as Youth is fittest for Action in respect of Corporal Strength; so elder Folk ha∣ving felt the Force of every Fortune, and observed the Course of Worldly Proceedings do seem most meet for Con∣sultation: Consilia senum, facta juvenum. Plato.
Albeit we say that the Excellency of Wisdom should be in Counsellors; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a Conceit as is more apt for Innovation than orderly Government: Hebetiores
quam acutiores melius Remp. administrant. Thucyd.
To Fidelity and Experience we wish that our Counsellors should be endued with Piety, Liberty, Constancy, Modesty and Silence; for as the Aid and Assi∣stance of God is that which governeth all good Counsels, so liberty of Speech, and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit, is necessary in Coun∣sellors. Likewise to be constant and not to vary in opinion, either for Fear or Favor, is very commendable: Also as Modesty in giving Counsel escheweth all Offences, and gaineth good Will, so Secresie is the best and most secure means to govern all publick Affairs: Res magnae sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit. Curt.
The first Obstacle to good Counsel is Pertinacy or Opiniativeness; a Condi∣tion far unfit for Counsellors; yet some Men are so far in love with their own Opiniastre Conceits, as that they cannot patiently endure Opposition. Secondly, Discord must from Counsellors be re∣moved, because private Offence many times impeacheth publick Proceedings.
Thirdly, Affection is an Enemy to Coun∣sel, the same being commonly accom∣panied with Anger, wherewith nothing can be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or considerately done. Lastly, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 seemeth a Vice worthy to be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of all Counsellors, 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 away both Fidelity and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the principal Pillars of all good Counsel: Pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum, utilitas. Tac.
To good Counsel other Impediments there are, which square not with Wis∣dom; for all Crafty and Hazarding Counsels do seem in the beginning likely to succeed; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil Event. It therefore seemeth behoveful to be wary in resolving, and bold in ex∣ecuting: Animus vereri qui scit, scit tuto aggredi. Pub.
Another Lett to good Consultation is immoderate Desire, which every wise Man must endeavor to restrain: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pauca recte siunt, circumspectione plurima. Thucyd.
Thirdly, Haste is an Enemy to good Deliberation; for whoso greedily de∣sireth any thing, proceedeth rashly; and
rash proceeding endeth ever in Repen∣tance: Scelera impetu, bona consilia mora valescunt. Tac.
Having already spoken of Counsellors, somewhat is to be spoken of Ministers; I mean those that either publickly or privately serve the Prince in any Fun∣ction; in choice of which Men, care must be had; First, That they be Per∣sons honestly born; for no Man des∣cended of base Parentage may be ad∣mitted, unless in him be found some noble and excellent Vertue: Optimus quis∣que Nobilissimus. Plato.
Secondly, They ought to be of honest Condition, and of good Fame; for that Common-weale is better and more secure, where the Prince is not good, than is that where his Ministers are Evil. It seemeth therefore that Mini∣sters should be Men of good Quality and Blameless: Emitur sola virtute potestas. Claud.
Thirdly, Consideration is to be had of their Capacity and Fitness, for that Fun∣ction wherein they are to be used; for as some Men are apt for Learning, so others are naturally disposed to Arms. Also it is necessary that every one Square with the Office whereunto he is appoin∣ted, in which matter some Princes have used great Caution; for as they little liked of Men Excellent, so they utterly detested the Vitious; the one they doubt∣ed to trust in regard of themselves, the other were thought a publick Indignity to the State. Wise Men have therefore resolved, that those Wits which are nei∣ther over-haughty and singular, nor they which be base or dull, are fittest for Princes Secrets and Services; howsoever we may hereof say with Tacitus: Nescio quomodo Aulica haec comitia affectus diri∣git, & fato quodam ac sorte nascendi, ut caetera, ita principum inclinatio in hos, offensio in illos est. Tac.
And because the Course and Quality of Mens Lives serving in Court, is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous, great Heed and Circumspection ought therein to be used; for whoso serveth
negligently, forgetting the dutiful En∣deavors appertaining to the place, seem∣eth to take a way of no good speed: Quanto quis obsequio promptior, tanto hono∣ribus & opibus extollitur. Tac.
It shall also become such a Man to look well unto his own Profit, and be∣have himself rather Boldly than Bash∣fully: Malus minister Regii imperii pu∣dor. Sen.
To be Modest, and closely to handle all Actions, is also a course well beseem∣ing a Courtier; neither shall he do well to attribute any good Success to his own Vertue or Merit, but acknowledge all to proceed from the Prince's Bounty and Goodness, by which means Envy is eschewed, and the Prince not robbed of his Honor: Haec est conditio Regum, casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant, se∣cundos virtuti suae. Prov. Emped.
And to conclude these Precepts Sum∣marily, I say it behoveth all Ministers and Servants in Court to be Patient, Wary and of sew words: Fraudum sedes Aula. Sen.
TO Govern, is a certain Skill how to command and continue Subjects in due Obedience, so as offend they ought not, or if they will they cannot; wherein two special things are to be considered (viz.) the Nature of Men, and the Nature of the State; but first the Condition of the Vulgar must be well conceived: Noscenda natura vulgi, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur. Tac.
The Disposition of Men is divers; some are apt to Anger, some are Hardy, some Fearful; it therefore behoveth the Prince to accommodate his Government to the Humor of People whom he go∣verneth: Principis est virtus maxima nosse suos. Mart.
Likewise the Nature of Commonweals is mutable and subject to change, and Kings are not only accompanied with For∣tune, but also followed with Hate, which
breedeth a continual Diffidence, chiefly towards those that are nearest to Maje∣sty: Suspectus semper invisusque dominan∣tibus quisquis proximus destinatur. Tac.
Moreover the Vulgar sort is generally variable, Rash, Hardy, and void of Judgment; Ex opinione multa, ex veri∣tate pauca judicat. Cic.
To confirm a Government, Force and Arms are of greatest necessity; by force I mean the Guards and Arms which Princes use for their Defence or Orna∣ment; Miles in foro, Miles in curia prin∣cipem comitari debet. Tac.
To this may be added Fortisication and strong Buildings, in these days much used by new Princes, and others also to whom People yield, not willing Obe∣dience. In ancient times Princes plant∣ed Colonies as well to suppress Rebellion in Conquered Countries, as to front suspected Neighbours: Coloniae vera sedes servitutis. Tac.
The Government of Princes is also greatly increased by a Virtue, which I call a commendable Affection in Sub∣jects, proceeding of Love and Autho∣rity: These effects do grow from the
Princes own Merit, but their being liv∣eth in the mind of the People; this Love is gained by Lenity, Liberality, and Mercy; yet is every of them to be tem∣pered: Nec aut reverentiam terrore, aut amorem humilitate captibis. Plin.
Affection is also no way sooner won then by Liberality, the same being used with Judgment and Moderation. Bel∣lorum sociis, periculorum consortibus, sivi de te bene ac fortiter — — meritis. Sen.
By Indulgence likewise, and Pricely Affability, the love of Men is gain'd; for the Multitude desire no more than necessary Food and Liberty, to use or∣dinary Recreations: Vulgo, sicut pueris, omne ludicrum in pretio est. Sen.
AUthority is a certain reverent Im∣pression in the Minds of Subjects and others touching the Princes Virtue and Government; it resteth chiefly in Admiration and Fear: Ingenita quibus∣dam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio. Curt.
Authority consisteth in three things: (viz.) the Form of Government, the Strength of the Kingdom, and the Con∣dition of the Prince; for in them all Re∣putation and Security resteth: Majest as Imperii, salutis tutela. Curt.
Whoso desireth to govern well, it be∣hoveth him to use Severity, Constancy and Restraint; for over much Lenity introduceth Contempt, and certain hope of Impunity; the Condition of Men be∣ing such as cannot be restrained by Shame, yet it is to be commanded by
Fear: Salutaris 〈◊〉〈◊〉 as vinicit inanem speciem 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Cic.
Yet ought Severity to be used with great respect and sparingly, because over great Terror breedeth Desparati∣on: Paena ad paucos, metus ad omnes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Cic.
To govern constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and ancient Laws in force without Change or Innovation unless exceeding great Commodity or ur∣gent Necessity shall so require: for where extream Punishments are used, Reforma∣tion is always needful: Nocet interdum prisucs rigor & nimia severitas. Tac.
Also to restrain Authority is a matter of great Necessity and worthy a Wise Prince; else he maketh others partakers of the Honor and Power to himself only due, the same being also dangerous: Periculosum privati hominis nomen supra (immo & juxta) principes extolli. Tac.
It seemeth also perilous that great Au∣thority given to private Men should be∣long; for thereby oft-tentimes they are made Insolent and apt to Innovation: Libertatis sive principatus magna custodia
est, si magna imperio 〈◊〉〈◊〉 esse non sinas. Liv.
Authority is also reinforced and en∣larged by Power, without which no Prince can either take from others or defend his own: Parum tuta sine viribus Majestas. Liv.
POwer and Strength is attained by these five ways, Money, Arms, Counsel, Friends and Fortune: but of these the first and most sorcible is Mo∣ney: Nihil tam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 quod non expug∣nari pecunia possit. Cic.
Next to Money Arms are of most use as well to defend as to offend; to keep, and to conquer; for oft-tentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from o∣thers, as to hold what is our own: Sua retinere private est domus, de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 certare Regia laus est. Tac.
Also of great and necessary use is Counsel, to devise how Arms ought to be employed or enforced: Arma concilio temperanda. Tac.
Likewise Friends and Consederates do greatly increase the Virtue of Power, the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid: In caducum parietem ne inclina. Adri.
The last, yet not the least part of Power consisteth in Fortune; whereof daily Experience may be seen; for the Success of all humane Actions seem ra∣ther to proceed from Fortune than Vir∣tue: Omni ratione potentior fortuna. Curt.
To these Particularities concerning Power, we may add the Qualities of the Prince, which greatly Grace his Autho∣rity; these are partly internal, and partly extenal: by the one I mean the Virtues of the Mind, by the other a certain seemly Behavior and comely ge∣sture of the Body; of the first kind I do suppose Piety and Providence to be the chief, for Piety maketh a Prince Vene∣rable, and like unto God: Oportet prin∣cipem res divinas videri curare serio & ante omnia. Arist.
Providence is a Forecast and likely conjectures of things to come, supposed to be in those Princes that in their Acti∣ons proceed slowly and circumspectly, it seemeth also a course of Princely Dis∣cretion to be retired aud not ordinarily to converse with many: Autoritatem absentia tueare. Suet.
COnspiracy is commonly addressed to the Princes Person; Treasons are addressed against his Government, Au∣thority, Country, Subjects, or Places of Srength. These Mischiefs are easily feared, but hardly eschewed; for albeit open Enemies are openly encountred, yet Fraud and Subtilty are secret Foes, and consequently not to be avoided:
Occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vi∣tare in promptu est. Salust.
The danger of Conspiracy proceedeth of divers Causes, as Avarice, Infidelity of Subjects, Ambition in Servants, and Corruption in Soldiers, therefore with great difficulty to be avoided: Vitae tuae dominus est, quisquis suam contempsit. Sen.
Notwithstanding it seemeth that ei∣ther by Inquisition, Punishment, Inno∣cency, or Destiny, the evil Affection of Men may be oft-tentimes discovered:
1. For whoso will curiously inquire and consider the Actions and ordinary Spee∣chees of Men (I mean those that be Persons of Honor and Reputation) may oft-tentimes vent the Myne that lurketh in the Minds: Quoniam rarò nisi male lo∣qunti mali faciunt. Lips.
2. Punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the Consideration thereof with the hope of Reward doth often dis∣cover those dangerous Intentions: Cru∣ciatu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt. Tac.
But as it is Wisdom in Princes to give ear to Informers, so are they not al∣ways to be believed; for Hope, Envy,
Hate, or some other Passion oft-ten∣times draws them to speak untruly: Quis innocens esse potest si accusare suffi∣cit? Tac.
3. The third and likeliest Desence against Conspiracy is the Princes own Innocency; sor never having injured any Man, it cannot be thought there liveth any Subject so lewd as will endea∣uor to hurt him: Fidelissima custodia prin∣cipis ipsius innocentia. Plin.
4. The last and best Bulward to withstand the force of this Mischief we call Destiny; which proceeding from the Fountain of Divine Providence, may be truly called the Will of God; in whose only Power it resteth to protect and defend good Princes: Ille erit a la∣tere tuo, & custodiet pedem tuum ne capia∣ris. Salo.
Treasons are most commonly enter∣prized by covetous Persons, who pre∣ferring private Prosit before Fame or Fi∣delity, do not fear to enter into any im∣pious Action: To this humor ambitious Men dissentious, and all such as be de∣sirous of Innovation, are inclined: Pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes. Hom.
To these Offenders no Punishment is equal to their impious Merit, can be devised, being Persons odious as well to Friends as Foes: Proditores etiam in quos anteponunt, invisi sunt. Tac.
HAving briefly touched the Virtues and Means whereby Princes are maintained in Authority and Honor, let something be said of the Causes from whence their Ruine doth proceed; the chief whereof seemeth to be Hate and Contempt: Hate cometh of Fear, which the more Common it is, the more Dangerous: Nulla vis imperii tan∣ta est, quae premente metu possit esse diu∣turna. Cic.
The causes of Fear are Punishments, Impositions and Rigor; and therefore
it behoveth a Prince not only to shun them, but to eschew those Acti∣ons whereby he may reasonable in∣cur their Suspision: Sentias enim ho∣mines ut metuant aut oderint, non mi∣nus opinione & fama, quam certa aliqua ratione moveri. Cic.
Yet Punishment, Imposition and Cen∣sure are in all States necessary, although they shew and seem terrible, and con∣sequently breed a certain Desperation in Subjects, unless they be discreetly and modesty used; for extream and frequent Punishments taste of Cruelty; great and many Imposts favor of Co∣vetousness; Censure of Manners when it exceedeth the quality of Offences, doth seem Rigour in these matters; therefore it behoveth the Prince to be moderate and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 chiefly in Ca∣pital Punishment, which must be con∣fined within the Bounds of Justice: Sit apud 〈◊〉〈◊〉 parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis. Sen.
But if for Security sake the Prince be forced to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 let the same be done with shew of great Sorrow and Lothness: 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 & 〈◊〉〈◊〉
nocum tormento ad castigandum veniat. Sen.
Let all Punishments also be slowly executed; for they that are hastily pu∣nished do seem to have been willing∣ly condemned; neither ought any Ca∣pital Punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the Commonweale, and for Example sake: Non tam ut ipsi pareant, quam ut alios pereundo deterreant. Sen.
In punishing also a specil respect must be had, that no shew of content or plea∣sure be taken therein: Forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere. Sen.
Also in Punishing, equality must be observed, and the nature of the Punish∣ment according to the Custom: Nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur, alii ne ap∣pellentur quidem. Cic.
But in punishing publick Offences wherein a Multitude have part, the Execution ought to be otherwise, and as it were at an instant, which may haply seem terrible, but in effect is not: Frequens vindicta paucorum odium 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 at. Sen.
Another means to satisfie a People offended is to punish the Ministers of Cruelty, and with their Blood to wash away the common hatred. Pia∣culares publici odii victimae. Plin. By this King David did appease the Gi∣beonites.
The next cause of Discontent cometh of Impositions, under which word is comprehended all Levies of Money, a matter nothing pleasing to People, as that which they esteem equal to their own Lives: Pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus. Plaut.
First, to remove Hate conceived of this cause, there is nothing better then publick Expostulation of Necessity: for what Commonwealth or Kingdom can be without Tributes? Nulla quies gen∣tium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine Tributis haberi queunt. Tac.
The second Remedy against Hate for Impositions is to make moderate Levies and rare. For as Tiberius the Emperor was wont to say, a Sheep should be sleeced not slead: Qui nimis emungit, elicit 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Tac.
Thirdly, also to eschew the Offence of People, it behoveth the Prince to have a vigilant Eye on Informers, Promo∣ters, and such fiscal Ministers, whose Cruelty and covetous Proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great Hate; but this mischief may be, though hardly, en∣countred, either by choosing honest Offi∣cers, or (proving otherwise) not only to remain them but to use them as Spunges: Exprimendi post quam biberint. Suet.
In all Impositions or Taxations, no Cruelty or Force ought to be used, the second cause to kindle Hate: and to meet with that mischief, nothing is better than to proceed moderately, and without Extremity: Ne Boves ipsos, mox agros, postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant. Tac.
The fourth Remedy is the Princes own Parsimony, not giving so largely to private Persons as thereby to be forced to take from the Multitude: Magnae opes non tam multa capiendo, quam haud multa perdendo, quaeruntur. Maecae∣nas.
The last help against Hate is in Ta∣xation to proceed equally, indifferent∣ly, and without Favor or Respect; and that the Assessors of Taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of People: Populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet. Tac.
Touching Censure, which we num∣bred amongst the causes whereof Hate is conceived, much needeth not to be spo∣ken, because the same is discontinued, or rather utterly forgotten; yet doth it seem a thing necessary, being a certain Observation and Controlement of such evil Manners and Disorders, as were not by Law corrigible; these Officers were of the Romans called Magistri pudoris & modestiae. Livi.
To the Function of Censures these two things are anciently subject Man∣ners, and Excess; under Manners I com∣prehend Wantonness, Drunkenness, Di∣cing, Brawling, Perjury, and all such Lawdness as Modesty condemneth. These Disorders were anciently punish∣ed by the discretion of Censors in all Ages and Sexes, to the end that Idleness might be generally avoided. Universa
plebs habeat negotia sua, quibus a malo pub∣lico detineatur. Salust.
Excess includeth Riotousness, expence of Money, Prodigal House-keeping, Banquetting and Superfluity in Apparel, which things are the Mothers of many Mischiefs. It also seemeth in some sort perilous to the Prince that the Subject should exceed either in Covetize or Con∣suming: Nemo nimis excedat, sive ami∣corum copia, sine opum. Arist.
The Punishment inflicted upon these sorts of Offenders, were either 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Pecuniary Punishments: Censo∣ris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ru∣borem. Tac.
The first and chiefest means to re∣move these Inconveniences, is the Princes own Example, whose Life being well censured, easily reduceth others to order. Vit 〈◊〉〈◊〉 principis censura perpetua. Plin.
Secondly, Those Disorders may be taken away without danger, if the Censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely; for the Nature of Man may not suddenly be altered. Vitia quae∣dam tollit facilius princeps, si eorum sit pa∣tiens. Sen.
These are the chiefest Rules whereby to esehew Hate; but impossible it is for any Prince or Minister utterly to avoid it; for being himself good, he incurreth the Offence of all bad Folk, if he be Evil, Good Men will hate him; this Danger therefore Wise and Vertuous Princes have little regarded; because Hate may be gained as well by good as evil Doing: Odia qui nimium timet, regnare nescit. Sen.
One other means to remove this Error, is, to reward the good and well de∣serving Subjects; for no Man can think him Cruel, that for love to Vertue useth Austerity; which will appear, when he bestoweth Bountifully on the Good: Praemio & poena Respublica continetur. Solon.
The other Vice which indangereth the State of Princes, we call Contempt, being a certain base and vile Conceit, which entereth into the Subjects, Stran∣gers or Servants, of the Prince and his Proccedings; for the Authority of a King may be resembled to the Powers of Mans Mind, whereunto the Pland, the Feet, the Eyes, do by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 obey:
Vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt. Livi.
The Causes of Contempt do proceed chiefly from the Form of Government, Fortune, or the Prince's Manners; the Form of Government becometh Con∣temptible, when the Prince, desiring to be thought Merciful, ruleth rather Piti∣fully than Justly; which manner of Pro∣ceeding taketh away all Reverence in the People, and in lieu thereof, entereth Liberty, or at least a certain Boldness to offend: Facultas faciendi quod euilibet visum, non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem. Tac.
Also to be Mutable, Irresolute, Light and Inconsiderate in bestowing the Ho∣nors and Offices of State, maketh the Prince Contemptible: Qui praesentibus fruitur, nec in longius consultat. Arist.
But if Contempt be caused by For∣tune, or as may be said more reasonably, by Destiny, and that those Friends do fail, who ought in Duty to defend the Prince and his Authority, then is there small hope to esehew Contempt: Fato obnoxia virius. Plaut.
The Prince's Manners do breed Con∣tempt, when he yieldeth his Affections to Sensuality and Sloth, or if he incur the Suspition of Simplicity, Cowardise, or any such Vice, unworthy the Dignity he beareth: Common People do sometimes also disesteem the Prince for external and light causes, as Deformity of Person, Sick∣ness or such like: Mos vulgi est, fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere. Tac.
ALbeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy Praise, chiesly in private Persons; yet because all Men in their Actions do not so proceed, it be∣hoveth Wise Men and Princes, above others, at occasions to Semble and Dis∣semble; for as in all Actions a Prince ought to be Slow and Advised; so in Consent and Believing, Haste and Faci∣lity
is most dangerous; and though Cre∣dulity be rather an Error than a Fault, yet for Princes it is both Unfit and Pe∣rilous. Wherefore it importeth them to be desended with this Caution, Nihil cre∣dendo, atque omnia cavendo. Cic.
Notwithstanding he must not shew himself Diffident or Distrustful utterly; but as I wish he should not over-slightly believe all Men, so ought he not for small causes distrust every Man: Multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli. Sen.
Dissimulation is as it were begotten by Dissidence, a Quality in Princes of so great Necessity, as moved the Emperor Tiberius to say, Nescit regnare, qui nescit dissimulare
The Necessity of Dissimulation is chiefly to be used with Strangers and Enemies; it also sheweth a certain Dis∣cretion in Magistrates, sometimes to dis∣guise with Friends when no Offence doth thereof follow: Doli non sunt doli, nisi astu colas. Plaut.
This kind of Craft, albeit in every Mans Conceit not praisable, is never∣theless tolerable, and for Princes and Maglstrates (the same being used to
good ends) very necessary. But those Cunnings which are contrary to Vertue, ought not of Honest Men to be used; neither dare I commend Adulation and Corruption, though they be often used in Court, and are of some Learned Wri∣ters allowed: Decipere pro moribus tem∣porum, prudentia est. Plin.
By great Subtilty and Frauds, con∣trary to Vertue and Piety, I mean Per∣jury and Injustice, which though all Men in Words detest, yet in Deeds are used of many, perswading themselves, by Cavillations and Sophistications, to excuse the Impiety of their False Oaths; as it is written of Lysander, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 talis, viros jurament is circumvenire 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Plut.
THE Art Military is of all other Qua∣lities most necessary for Princes, for without it they cannot be defended; force of Men only sufficeth not, unless the same be governed by Council, and Martial Wisdom: Duo sunt quibus resp. servatur; in hostes sortitudo, & domi 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Tac.
Military knowledge concerneth War, and every War is either Forreign or Domestical. Touching Forreign, it must be considered when it must be begun, how to continue it, and when to be ended; to begin War, a Prince is to take heed that the Cause be Just, and the Enterprise advisedly entred into: Sunt enim & belli 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pacis jura, justeque ea non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉〈◊〉 gerere debes. Livi.
The Laws of Arms are in all Com∣mon-weales to be duly observed; for to enter fight rashly and without respect to Reason, were Beastly; also to Kill or Slay would work no better Effect, than that all Nations should without Mercy Murder one another: Barbaro ritu coe∣dem coede, & sanguinem sanguine expiare. Sal.
No War therefore is to be made, but such as is Just; and in every Just War these three things are to be looked into (viz.) That the Author be of Authority, That the Cause be Good, and the End Just; for in all States, the Prince, or they in whom the Sovereignty resteth, are the Just Authors of War; others have no such Authority: Si quis privatim sine pu∣blico scito, pacem bejumve fecerit, capitale esto. Plato.
Wars are of two sortt; Defensive and Offensive; the one to Resist, the other to Invade; against Desence nothing can be said, because it is Natural and Necessary. Est non modo justum sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 necessariam cum vi vis illat a desenditur. Cic.
Defensive War is of two sorts, either to defend thine own, or thy Friends; for it
is reason that every one should keep se∣curely that which to him appertaineth; and therewith also by Arms to defend the Liberty of Country, Parents and Friends: Nullum bellum a civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro side aut pro salute. Cic.
The like reason leadeth us to assist and protect Friends; for the common Obli∣gation of Humanc Society doth so re∣quire: Qui enim non obsistit si potest, in∣juriae, tam est in vitio, quam si parentes aut patriam, aut socios deserat. Cic.
Invasion is also just and allowable, but not ever; for whoso hath been robbed, or spoiled of his Lands or Goods, may lawfully seek Repossession by Force; yet so as before any Force be used, he first civilly seek Restitution, wherein is Justice be denied, then is the use of Arms necessary: Justum bellum quibus necessa∣rium; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes. Liv.
Likewise Invasion is lawsul against Barbarians, whose Religion and Im∣piety ought to be abhorred, chiesly if they be Potent and apt to offend; for the cause of such War is Compulsion and Suppression of Evil: Cui licentia
iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur. August.
Finally, To conclude this matter of In∣vasion, I say, That no Revenge, no desire of Honor or Empire, are any lawful Causes of War; but the intent thereof ought to be directed only to Defence and Security: For Wise Men do take Arms to win Peace, and in hope of Rest they endure Travel: It a bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesita videatur. Cic.
Having said somewhat against unjust War, let us speak of Temerity and unad∣vised War, an Enterprise worthy discom∣mendation: Omnes bellum sumunt facile, oegerrime desinunt; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & sinis est. Sal.
A wise 〈◊〉〈◊〉 rince theresore ought neither to undertake any unlawful Invasion, nor without sober and mature Deliberation enter into any War, as he that is un∣willing to oftend, yet of Courage enough to desend: Nec provoces bellum, nec time∣as. Plin.
To make War three things are re∣quired, Money, Men and Arms; and to maintain a War, Provision and Council, are needsul: Theresore a wise Prince,
before he begins a War, doth carefully consider what Forces and charge there∣unto belongeth: Diu apparandum est bel∣lum, ut vincas melius. Pub.
Above all other Provisions, care must be had, that Bread be not wanting; for without it neither Victory nor Life can be looked for: Qui frumentum necessari∣umque commeatum non praeparat, vincitur sine ferro. Vegetius.
Lastly, It behoveth a Prince always to have Arms in readiness, I mean, Harness, Horses, Weapons, Artillery, Engines, Powder, and every other thing necessary either for Service on Horse or Foot: We may add hereunto Ships, and Shipping of all sorts, with every Furniture of Offence or Defence; for these Preparations make a Prince sormidable, because no Man dare do or attempt Injury to that King or People, where Preparation is ever ready to revenge: Que desider at pacem, praeparat bellum. Cass.
By Men we mean a Multitude of Sub∣jects armed, trained to desend or offend: These are of two sorts, Captains and Sol∣diers; and Soldiers are either Footmen or Horse-men; the one of great use in the
Champion, the other in Mountainous places; also for defence or assault of Towns or Grounds fortisied most ne∣cessary, and consequently meet for Ser∣vice in all places, which moved Tacitus to say, Omne in pedite robur. Tac.
For sudden Service, Horses do seem most meet, and the Execution of any En∣terprise is by them most speedily per∣formed: Nevertheless the Actions of Foot-men do seem most certainly exe∣cuted, chiesly if they be well armed, and skilfully lead; for so Experience hath of late time proved; besides, that they are of less Expence and of greater num∣ber: In universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur. Tac.
Having thus proved, that both Horse and Foot be necessary, let us remember, that unless they be serviceable, great Numbers are to small purpose: Manibus opus est bello, non mult is nominibus. Livi.
To make Soldiers serviceable, consist∣eth in good Choice and good Discipline; the one at this day little regarded: Emunt militem, non legunt. Livi.
Soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able Number of Bodies,
and every Company composed of Men known one to the other; for thereby they are made the more Confident: But hereof is small heed taken, for commonly they are Purgamenta urbium suarum. Curt.
Touching Discipline, it seemeth that thereof the external Form, and not the certain Substance, is observed: For as in former Ages Soldiers endeavored to be Vertuous and Modest, so now they rather study to excel in Riot than in Martial Knowledge: Exercitus lingua quam manu promptior, praedator est sociis, & ipsa praeda hostiam. Sal.
For as much as Soldiers are made good by Election and Choice, it seemeth that the Foundation and Ground of Service consisteth in the Discretion and Judg∣ment of those that have Authority to make Election; yet will we add, that they must be chosen of Natural Subjects, for Strangers are Covetous, and conse∣quently Corruptible; they are also Mu∣tinous and Cowardly: Their Custom likewise is to Rob, Burn and Spoil both Friends and Foes, and to consume the Princes Treasure: Ossa vides regum va∣cuis exsuct a medullis. Juven.
But the Native Soldier is Faithful and Obedient, Resolute in Fight, Loving to his Country, and Loyal to his Prince: Gentes quae sub regibus sunt, pro Deo colunt. Curt.
Native Soldiers are of two sorts, (viz.) They that be in continual Pay, and they that are trained ready to serve, but do not withstanding attend their own pri∣vate Affairs, until they be called: The first are for all Princes necessary: In pace decus, in bello praesidium. Tac.
Of this sort no great number ought to be, as well to eschew Disordor, as also to save Expences. The second kind of Foot Soldiers are to be levied in Villages, as People more patient of Pains, and fit for the Wars; yet so judiciously disposed as the Citizens: Odio praesentium & non cu∣pidine mut ationis. Tac.
Touching the number of these extra∣ordinary Soldiers, that must be referred to Discretion: Bellum parare, simul & aerario parcere.
To conclude, I say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary Foot ought to be according to the number of the People, not inserting any Gentlemen; for Service on Horse-back is to them only
proper: Alas rusticis non tribuo; in nobi∣litatem & in divites haec a pauperibus oner a inclines. Livi.
The most certain Notes whereby to conceive the Disposition of Men fit to become Soldiers, are these Five, The Country where they are Born, their Age, Proportion of Body, their Quality of Mind, and their Faculty. Touching,
First, Their Country, it is a thing ap∣parently proved, that Mountainous Re∣gions, or Barren places, and Northern Habitations, do breed Wits well dis∣posed to the War: Locorum asperitas ho∣minum quoque ingenia durat. Curt.
Secondly, The Age most apt for the War, was anciently observed to be about eighteen Years, and so the Romans used: Facilius est ad virtutem inslraere novos milites, quaem revocare praeteritos. Veget.
Thirdly, The Stature of a Soldier ought to be observed: Marius liked best the longest Bodies; Pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned Men; but Vege∣tius in his Choice, rather esteems Strength than Stature: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 est fortes milites esse quam grandes. Veget.
Fourthly, The Mind or Spirit of a Soldier ought to be considered, for that Mind which is quick, nimble, bold and confident, seemeth apt for War: He is also of good Hope, that loveth Honor more than Ease or Profit: In brief, Is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam. Sal.
Lastly, It is to be marked in what Art or Faculty a Man hath been bred; for it may be presumed that Fishers, Fowlers, Cooks, and orthers trained up in Esseminate Arts, are unfit for Martial Endeavor: And as these Men were, in respect of their Trade, thought unmeet, so in old time, Slaves and Masterless∣Men were repulsed from Arms, as Per∣sons Infamous: Sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales Domini habere fastidiunt. Veget.
How Soldiers ought to be chosen, these few words we have spoken, may suffice. Let us therefore say somewhat of Dis∣cipline. Choice findeth out Soldiers, but Discipline doth make and continue them fit for Service: Paucos viros fortes natura procrear, bona institutione plures reddat industria. Veget.
Discipline is a certain severe Confirmation of Soldiers in * 1.4 their Valor and Vertue, and is performed by four means, Exercise, Order, Compulsion and Example. The two first appertain to Valor, the third to Vertue, the last to both: But of Ex∣ercise, first, I say, That a Soldier being chosen, ought to be informed in Arms, and used in Exercise and Action; the word 〈◊〉〈◊〉 importeth nothing else: Exercitus dicitur, quod melius fit exerci∣tando Varro.
Order consisteth in dividing, dispo∣sing, and placing of Men aptly on all Occasions to be commanded, as the Leaders shall direct: This matter re∣quireth a large Discourse, and therefore I refer it to skilful Captains and Wri∣ters, as Polybius, Vegetius, Dela Nonne, and others.
Compulsion and Correction, is that which bridleth and governeth the Man∣ners of Soldiers; for no Order can be observed amongst them, unless they be Continent, Modest and Abstinent; for Continency is chiesly to be shewed in their Diet, and moderate Desires: De∣generat
a robore ac virtute miles assuetu∣dine voluptatum. Tac.
The Modesty of a Soldier is per∣ceived by his Words, Apparel and Acti∣ons: For to be a Vaunter, or Vam∣glorious Boaster, is far unfit in him that professeth Honor or Arms, seeing true Vertue is silent: Viri militiae nati, factis magni, ad verborum linguaeque certamina, rudes. Tac.
The Apparel of a Soldier sheweth Modesty, if therein he do not exceed; for albeit it fitteth well the Profession of Arms, to be well armed and decently apparelled; yet all Superfluity savoreth of Ignorance or Vanity: Horridum mili∣tem esse decet, non coelatum auro argentoque sed ferro. Livi.
Abstincnce is also fit for all Soldiers; for thereby guided, they refrain from Violence and Insolency; by that Rule also they are informed to govern them∣selves civilly in the Country where they ferve, and likewise in their Lodgings: Never taking any thing from the Owner, nor committing any Outrage: Vivaut cum provincialibus jure civili, nec insoles∣cat animus qui se sensit armatum.
The last mark of Discipline we called 〈◊〉〈◊〉 under which word is com∣prehended Reward and Punishment: For Men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular Service, Honor or Riches: And for Evil, they have their due when they taste the Punishment thereunto belong∣ing: Necessarium est acrius ille dimicet, quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium consuevit evehere. Veget.
Likewise as Gold and Glory belongeth to good and well deserving Soldiers; so Pumshment is due to those that be Vitious and Cowardly; for nothing holdeth Soldiers in Obedience so much as the Severity of Discipline: Milites imperatorum potius quam hostem metuere debent. Veg.
OF Soldiers let this little suffice, we will now speak of what Quality Chieftains and Leaders ought to be, for upon them dependeth the Welfare of whole Armies: Militaris turba sine duce, corpus sine spiritu. Curt.
A Chief or General in War, is either of his own Authority Chief, or a General that commandeth in the Name of ano∣ther. Of the first sort are Emperors, Kings and Princes; of the other, be their Deputies, Lieutenants, Colonels, and in∣deed all general Commanders in the War: Now whether it be more Expe∣dient that the Prince should command in Person or by Deputy, divers wise Men have diversly thought, therefore it may be thus distinguished; if the War do then only concern some parti∣cular
Part or Province, then may the same be performed by a Lieutenant; but if the whole Fortune of a Prince do thereupon depend, then is he to command in his own Person and not otherwise: Dubiis bellorum exemplis sum∣mae rerum & imperii seipsum reservat. Tac.
It therefore importeth the Prince sometimes by his own Presence, some∣times by his Deputation to perform that Office; but however occasion shall require, it ever behoveth that one only Commander ought to be, (for Plurality of Chieftains doth rarely or never work any good Effect) yet with this Caution that he be of Experience, and Wise: In bellica praesectura major 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ha∣bendus peritiae quam virtutis aut morum. Arist.
The Qualities required in a Chieftain are these, Skill, Vertue, Providence, Au∣thority and Fortune: By Skill we mean he should be of great Knowledge, and long Experience, or to make a suffi∣eient Captain; the Information of others, or his own reading is not enough: Qui norit quis ordo agminis, quae cura exploandi,
quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus. Cic.
Military Vertue is a certain Vigor or Force both of Body and Mind to exercise Soldiers as well in fained War as to sight with the Enemy; and summarily a Cap∣tain ought to be Laboriosus in negotio, fortis in periculo, industrius in agendo, celeris in conficiendo. Cic.
Next to Vertue we placed Providence as necessary in great Captains; for being of such Wisdom, they will not hazard nor commit more to Fortune than ne∣cessity shall inforce; yet true it is, Fools and vulgar Folks, that commend or dis∣commend Actions according to Success, were wont to say, Cunctatio servilis, sta∣tim exequi, Regium est. But advised and provident Captains do think, Temerit as praeterquam quod stulta, est etiam infelix. Livi.
Albeit Providence be the best mean of good Speed, yet some Captains of that Quality and in Skill excelling, have been in their Actions unlucky, when others of less Sufficiency have marvellously pre∣vailed; we may therefore reasonably say with Cic. Quod olim Maximo, Marcello,
Scipioni, Mario & ceteris magnis Impe∣ratoribus non solum propter virtutem, sed etiam propter fortunam soepius imperia mandata, atque exercitus esse commissos. Cic.
Lastly, We wished Authority to be in Chieftains, for it greatly importeth what Opinion or Conceit the Enemy hath of such a Governor, and likewise how much his Friends and Confederates do esteem him; but the chief and only means to maintain Authority, is Auste∣rity and Terror: Dux Authoritatem max∣imam severitate sumat, omnes culpas mili∣tares legibus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nulli errantium cre∣datur ignoscere. Veget.
Also Experience hath proved, that such Chieftains as were affable and kind to their Soldiers, were much loved, yet did they incur a Contempt; but on the other side, those that commanded severely and terribly, although they gained no good Will, yet were they ever obeyed: Dux sacilis inutilis. App.
AFter Men found and framed sit for the War, to small or no purpose shall they serve, unles, they be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by Wisdom or good Council: Mon mi∣nus est Imperatoris consilio quam vi persi∣cere. Tac.
Council in War is of two sorts, direct Council and indirect; the first sheweth a plain and orderly course for proceeding, as to lay hold on occasion; for as in all other Humane Actions occasion 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of great Force: Occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus. Veget.
As Occasions presented are means of good Success, so Fame worketh 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Effects in the Wars, therefore it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a Captain to be Constant, and not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to believe the vain Rumors and Report, of Men: Male imperatur, cum regit vulgus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suos. Sen.
Confidence is also to be eschewed, for no Man is sooner surprised, than he who feareth least; also Contempt of the Ene∣my hath been occasion of great Discom∣fitures, therefore as a Captain ought not to fear, so should he not contemn his Enemy: Nimia fiducia semper obnoxia. AEmyl.
As Security, and overmuch Estimation of our own Vertue or Valor is hurtful, so doth it import every good Captain to be well informed, not only of his own Forces but also of what Strength the Enemy is; likewise it behoveth him to know the Situation of the Country, and the Quality of the People, with every other Circum∣stance. Moreover, the Generals Honor and Capacity ought to be known, with the Condition and Nature of the Enemy: Impetus acres cunctatione languescunt, aut in persidiam mutantur. Tac.
Temerity in War is also dangerous, sor wise Captains were wont not to En∣terprise any thing without Deliberation and good Opportunity, unless they were thereunto by Necessity inforced: In re∣bus asperis & tenui spe, fortissima quaque consilia tulissima sunt. Livi.
Some wise Men, not Superstitiously but Discreetly, do think prodigious Signs from Heaven, or on Earth, are not to be neglected, neither are Dreams in time of War to be contemned: Nam amat be∣nignit as numinis, seu quod merentur homi∣nes, seu quod tangitur eorum affectione, his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent. AEmi.
A wise Captain will also wait Oppor∣tunities, and spy out fit times when the Enemy is wearied, or pretending fear, draw him into danger; which Advan∣tages, with many other, are gained chiesly by observing of time: Quia si in occasionis momento, cujus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 opportunit as, cunct at us paulum fueris, nequicquam mox omissam querare. Livi.
Next the Observation of Time, the Place is to be well considered, whether it be for thine Advantage or thine Ene∣mies: Amplius prodest locus saepe quam virtus. Veget.
Thirdly, It importeth much, that Men be well ordered, trained, and prepared for the Fight; for the want of Art is cause of many Disadvantages, and many times a small Supply of choice Soldiers
on Horse-back or Foot, doth seem to the Enemy very Terrible; likewise a sudden Shout or Conceit hath amazed a whole Army: Milites vanis & inanibus, magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur. Curt.
Fourthly, It were to good purpose, that in ordering of Men for Fight, Sol∣diers of one Country or Nations, should be ranged together, and above all, to foresee that the least loss of Blood be among the Natural Subjects, and so han∣dle the Matter, that the chief Slaughter light upon Strangers and Mercenaries: Ingens victoriae decus, citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti. Tac.
The Generals own Courage and lively Disposition to Fight, will greatly animate the Multitude of Soldiers, as a contrary 〈◊〉〈◊〉 or Appearance of Fear, will exceedingly Amaze and Daunt: Necesse estad fugam parati sint, qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare. Veget.
It were also for thy great Advan∣tage, that the Forces should be ordered for the Fight, before the Enemy be pre∣pared.
First, For that thou maist the better perform, what thou thinkest fit to be done.
Secondly, That thereby thine own Forces will thereof receive great Courage, being readiest to assail the Enemy, and to begin the Fight: Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti. Livi.
After Victory it is not the best Policy to execute the Enemies with extream Cruelty, but proceed Moderately, for it shall suffice the Victory is thine: Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia, & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma fermido. Veget.
Lastly, I would advise that the General should be wary in his Actions, and in every Enterprise to frustrate the Soldiers from Spoils and Pillage: Saepe obstitit vin∣centibus pravum inter ipsos certamen, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hoste spolia consectanda. Tac.
Of direct Councils, let that we have said suffice. We will now speak of Coun∣cils Indirect, commonly called by the Greek Word, Stratagems or Subtile Pra∣ctices: Which manner of Proceeding, hath been, in times past, of divers Grave Writers condemned: Vir 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 & clanculum velit oscidere hoslem. Eurip.
Notwithstanding the Opinion of this, and divers other Writers worthy Credit, it seemeth reasonable, and in Piety allow∣able, that Stratagems and Subtilties may be used in the War, yet with such Cau∣tion, as the same may stand with Fidelity and Honor; for Fraud being used, con∣trary to Contracts and Agreements made with the Enemy, is mere Treachery: As to Poyson him or her, a Murtherer to kill him, were plain Impiety: Faedera∣tum injuste fallere, impium. Livi.
Also out of the War covertly to kill a particular Enemy by secret Assault or Practice, is not warrantable, either by Faith or Honor; yet to use all Crast, Cunning and Subtilty in open War, is both allowable and praisable; and so is thought by Christian Writers: Cum ju∣stum 〈◊〉〈◊〉 suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis, nihil ad justitiam in∣terest. Aug.
The same is also approved by divers Authors of good Credit: Consice sive dolo 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 cominus euse. The same is also 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by Xenophon, Reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis.
Thus having briefly touched what Counsels are required in War, let us con∣sider how Victory is to be used, for the end of every good War is Peace; to the enjoying whereof, three things are re∣quired, Wariness, Mercy and Modesty; because over-great Confidence may hap∣pily impeach the end of good Success: Res secundae negligentiam creant. Livi.
I also wish the Victory to be handled Mercifully, because all Conquests are in their own Nature cruel enough: And the Ire of Insolent Soldiers, forces the Con∣quered to become Desperate: Gravissime morsus irritate necessitatis. Curt.
To proceed Modestly, is also and honor∣able Quality in him that conquereth; for in prosperous Fortunes, Men do hardly refrain covetous and proud Doings; yea, some good and great Captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them: In rebus secundis etiam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Duces insolescunt. Tac.
After Victory followeth Peace: For if War did ever continue, no State or Go∣vernment could stand: Therefore how great, or how long soever the War be, the end must be Peace; the name whereof
is not only Sweet, but also Comfortable: Pax una triumphis innumeris potior.
Peace is not only good and profit∣able to him that is Victorious, but also to those that are victored: Pacem re∣duci velle victori, expedit, victo necesse est. Tac.
Nevertheless until good and honorable Peace be offered, Arms may not be laid aside: Wherein I wish Tully's Advice to be followed: Bellum gerendum est; si bellum omittemus, pace nunquam fruemur. Livi.
In Treaty of Peace, two things must be considered: First, That the Condi∣tions be Honorable. To condescend to any Base Conditions, is unto a Princely Mind not only great Indignity, but also Intolerable: Cum dignitate potius caden∣dum, quam cum ignominia serviendum. Plut.
It also importeth, the Peace should be simple, true and unseigned; for all seigned and dissembling Amity is to be doubted: Pace suspecta tutius est bellum. Mithrid.
The fittest Season to speak of Peace, is either when the War beginneth, or
during the time that the Enemies be of equal Force; for if the War continueth, it must behove the Weaker to yield to Necessity: Not unlike the Ship-master, who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his Loading into the Sea: Ne∣cessitati pare, quam ne dil quidem superant. Livi.
Finally, Having generously defended thy self, and performed all things required in a magnanimous Captain, and finding nevertheless thy Force insufficient, it can∣not be dishonorable to accept Peace. Wherefore laying aside Hatred and Hope, which are but weak Supporters, thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved Discretion of an honorable Enemy: Victores secundae res in misera∣tionem ex ira vertunt. Livi.
Now for as as much as every Peace pro∣miseth Rest and Quiet, as well to the Victorious as to the Victored; we may add thereunto, that the Prince Victo∣rious receiveth thereby Honor, Profit and Security. For although his Happiness may occasion Hope of great Success, yet in respect of Fortunes Mutability, it shall be Good and Glorious to listen to Peace:
Decorum principi est cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat, pacem non abnuere, ut sciant omnes te & suscipere juste bellum, & finire. Livi.
It seemeth also the more Honorable; for who so is Victorious, doth give Peace and not take it: He also sheweth him∣self Discreet by using a Moderation in Victory, and no Extremity in Spoiling, which our Wise and Godly Writers have commended: Pacem contemnentes, & glo∣riam appetentes, pacem perdunt & gloriam. Bern.
Peace is also Profitable for the Victo∣rious, because continual War breedeth Weariness, and of violent Proceeding De∣sparation and Peril cometh: Maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium Be∣stiarum. Sen.
Likewise Peace is more assured than any Victory. Hope of the one is in thine own Power; the other in the Hand of God: Add thereunto the force of Fortune, which hath great power in all Humane Actions: In rebus secundis nihil in quen∣quam superbe ac violenter consulere decet, nec praesenti credere Fortunae, cum quid vesper seral, incertus sis. Sen.
Also Conditions of Peace ought to be reasonably and freely bestowed: For no People can live contented under such a Law as forceth them to loath the State wherein they are. Misera pax bello bene mutatur. Sen.
THE greatest and most grievous Calamity that can come to any State is Civil War; for therein Subjects take Arms against their Prince or among themselves, whereof followeth a Misery more Lamentable than can be described. Non aet as, non dignit as quenquam protegit, quo minus stupra caedibus, & caedes stupris misceantur. Tac.
The first Cause of Civil War proceed∣eth of Destiny, for God in his own Di∣vine Providence foreseeth many Years before, that great and mighty Empires
shall be ruined. In se magna 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lae∣tis hinc numinarebus Crescendi posuere mo∣dum / s-/ Lucan.
The second Cause is, Excess, Riot, and Dissolute Life; for nothing breed∣eth Civil Fury so soon as over great Happiness; also pompous Apparel, Ban∣quetting and prodigal Spending con∣sumeth Riches, and Plenty is turned into Poverty; for by these means are Men brought into Desperation. Rapa∣cissimo cuique ac perditiffimo, non agri aut 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sed sola instrumenta vitiorum mane∣bunt. Tac.
Now to consider how Destiny might be eschewed, were in vain: For such a Remedy no Wit or Wisdom can devise, being the Decree of God, no doubt it is inevitable. Ita fato placuit, nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam. Sen.
There is nothing exempt from the peril of Mutation; the Earth, Heavens, and whole World is thereunto Subject. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 eunt cuncta temporibus; nasci de∣bent, crescere, extingui. Sen.
Touching the second Causes of Civil War some Remedies may be used, be∣cause it proceedeth of Faction, Sedition
or Tyranny. I call Faction a certain Association of divers Persons combined to the Offence of others. It proceedeth often of private or publick Displeasure, and more often of Ambition. Nemo eo∣rum qui in Rep. versantur, quos vincat, sed a quibus vincatur, aspicis. Sen.
1. Factions are of two sorts; for ei∣ther they consist of many or of few Per∣sons: both be dangerous, but the for∣mer more apt to take Arms; and that Party which proveth weakest, prayeth Arms of Foreign Forces.
2. The other Faction wherein are fewer partakers, be commonly great Personages or Men of more Importance than ordinary People; and that proveth most Perilous and Bloody. Nobilium factiones trahunt ad se, & In partes, uni∣versum etiam populum. Arist.
Albeit some wise Men have held Opinion that Factions are necessary, yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained, unless it be upon Consines, and in such places where Conspiracy is feared, which Cato in his private Family used. Semper contentiunculas 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 inter servos callide
serebat, suspectum habens nimiam concordi∣am orum, metuensque. Plut.
Factions against the Nobility, are sometimes suppressed by forbidding Co∣lors, or unknown Bagdes to be worn, also to inhibit Names or Watch-words of Mutinies is necessary, which was Mecaenas Counsel to Augustus; and Aristotle thinketh it fit that Laws should be made against the Factions of No∣blemen. Nobilium contentiones & par∣tes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari. Arist.
Another Cause of Civil War, we call Sedition, which is a sudden Com∣motion or Assembly of Common Peo∣ple against their Prince or his Magi∣strates: the Original of which Disor∣ders may proceed of divers Causes, but chiefly of Oppression. Imminentium pe∣riculocum remedium, ipsa pericula arbi∣trari. Arist.
Again, Fear may be the occasion of Sedition, as well in him that hath done Injury, as in him that looketh to be injured, and is desirous to pre∣vent it before it cometh. It may pro∣ceed also of over great Mildness in
Government. Non miseriis licentia sed licentia, tantum concitum turbarum, lascivire magis plebem quam saevire. Livi.
Sedition many times ariseth of Po∣verty, or of the Artificers, whose Arts are grown out of Use, and consequent∣ly no means whereof they can live. Semper in civitate, quibus opes nullae sunt, bonis invidem, vetera odere, nova expe∣tunt, odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student. Sab.
Lastly, Sedition cometh of Tyranny, Insolency, or Mutinous Disposition of certain Captains, Cavaliers, or Ring∣leaders of the People; for albeit the Multitude is apt to Innovation, yet doth it stand firm, until some first Mover taketh the matter in hand. Mul∣titudo omnis, sicut mare, per se immobi∣lis. Livi.
Of these Movers some are Ambi∣tious, who wanting other means to Aspire, hope by practice of Sedition, to compass their Designs; or else they are Unthrifts, who having consumed their own, seek by Violence to possess themselves of other Mens: Or else they
are vain and light Persons, that with∣out Cause or Reason, attempt Inno∣vation, themselves know not for what. Non tam praemiis periculorum, quam ipsis periculis loeti, pro certis & olim partis, nova, ambiguae ancipitia maelunt.
Thus having told the Causes of Se∣dition, I wish the Remedies were pre∣pared. Omne malum nascens facile oppri∣mitur, inveteratum fit plerumque robu∣stius. Cic.
The first way to suppress Sedition, is Eloquence and excellent Perswasion, which oft-tentimes worketh great Ef∣fects among the Multitude; chiesly when it proceedeth from some Reve∣rend and grave Person, for his Wis∣dom and Integrity of Life honored: For the Prince himself is not to take Office in hand, unless necessity so in∣force: Integra autorit as principis ma∣joribus remediis servetur. Tac.
If Perswasion cannot prevail, then Force must compel: But before such violent Proceedings, Use, Art and Cun∣ning, either to appease the People, or at least to disunite them; and rather if the Prince do offer fair and promise
plausibly. Verba apud populum plurimum valent. Tac.
It is lawful also in such Cases for Princes to use Subtilty; and the same not prevailing, to wash away the Stain thereof with Clemency: For when Arms laid down, and every one yielded, general Punishment were need∣less. Omnium culpa fuit, paucorum sit poena. Tac.
The last Cause of Sedition we named Tyranny, which is a certain violent Government, exceediug the Laws of God and Nature. The difference be∣tween Kings and Tyrants is this; the one imployeth Arms in defence of Peace, the other useth them to terrific those of whom his Cruelty hath de∣served Hate. Auferre, trucidare, ra∣pere, falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem fecerint, pacem appellant. Tac.
The quality of Tyrants is to esteem Promoters more then good Ministers, because those Men are the Scourge of infinite others. They are also Prote∣ctors of impious Persons, and stand in daily doubt of Noble and Virtuous
Men. Nobilitas, opes, amissi gestique honores, pro crimine: Et ob virtutes cer∣tissimum exitium. Tac.
Tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of Letters and Civil Life, to the end all Arts should be exi∣led, and Barbarism introduced. Pel∣lunt sapientiae professores, & omnes bonas artes in exilium agant. Tac.
These and such like, be the Condi∣tions of Tyrants, who for the most part are deposed and slain; for as Kings live long and deliver their Do∣ininions to their Children and Posto∣rity: So Tyrants being feared and ha∣ted of all Men, cannot continue in their Estate.
The Remedies of these Mischiefs which proceed from the Violence of sach a Prince, are Persecution or Pati∣ence. Many generous Spirits have used the first; perswading themselves rather
to dye, than endure the sight of a Ty∣rant. Also the Grecians did think it a Service acceptable to Murther the Per∣son of such an impious Prince. Graeci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui Tyrannos necaverunt. Cic.
Nevertheless, in Christian Conside∣ration, the other Course is to be taken: Let Patience therefore incounter this mischief; for seeing all Kings, as well the bad as the good be sent by God, they must be indured. Res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem. Homer.
Persecution is not only perilous, but for the most part infortunate: For therefore present Revenge is taken by that Prince that succeedeth. Facinotis ejus ultor est, quisquis successerit. Tac.
The Murther of Tyrants is also fol∣lowed with many inconveniences worse than Civil War it self. Principes bont, votis expetendi, qualescunque tolerandi. Tac.
For as Fire, Floods, and other ine∣vitable Plagues are necessarily to be suffered: So evil Princes in their Cove∣tousness and Cruelty ought to be pati∣ently indured, because their Office is
to command, and Subjects must Obey. Indigna, digna habenda sunt, Rex quae facit. Sen.
And as it is the use of vulgar People to find Faults in the long Reign of Princes; so the Ambition of great Sub∣jects is desirous of Novelty. Proesens imperium subditis semper grave. Thucyd.
To conclude, we say that the best Remedy against Tyranny, is Patience: For so long as Men are, so long will Vices be. Regum ingenia toleranda, neque usui crebrae mutationes. Tac.
TO the Perfections of Men, Three things are necessarily required; Nature, Nurture and Use: The first giveth Capacity, Aptness and Under∣standing; which are Graces from Above. Nurture, is Learning, Knowledge, Art, or Order. Use, is Practice, Experience, and orderly Observation; whereof may be conceived, that Nature alone sus∣ficeth not; nor can Nurture work any good effect, where natural Aptness wanteth; and they can frame no Perfection, unless Experience be also conjoined. Nemo nascitur sapiens, sed fit. Sen.
Ambassadors, Negotiants, and gene∣rally all other Ministers of mean Fortune, in Conversation with Princes and Supe∣riors, must use great respect, shewing themselves rather Ceremonious than Pre∣sumptuous, and acknowledge their Ob∣ligation great, for the Favor and Grace, they find in those which might com∣mand them.
It is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the Actions of Men by their Success; for oft-tentimes some Enterprises attempted by good Counsel, end unsortnately; and others unadvi∣sedly taken in hand, have happy Suc∣cess. Who so then commendeth incon∣siderate Counsels for their fortunate Event, thereby encourageth Men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know, and by Experience have proved.
In Actions publick, and every other matter of great moment, the begin∣ning is well to be considered: For af∣terwards it lieth not in our power, without dishonor to abandon what was begun.
The time doth not always serve, nor is apt occasion always offered to Enter∣prise what would; yer who so doth ex∣pect every Opportunity, shall either at∣tempt nothing at all, or if he do, the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage.
When any Resolution is taken, either with over great haste, or too much Af∣fection, seldom it receiveth good suc∣cess: For he that doth the one, hath no leisure to consider; the other transport∣eth the Mind so as it cannot conceive more than that which presently presseth.
To these we add others, I mean some of them that have leisure, and are void of Affection, yet for want of natural Capacity, or for continual Negligence in their doings, never bring any thing well to pass.
Who so desireth to be beloved in a Commonwealth, must rest content with that which Men do give, and the Laws allow him to take: So shall he neither incur Danger nor Envy: for indeed, that which is taken or extorted from others, and not that which is given, doth make Men hated.
Arms, Laws and Religion, may not in any well governed State be disjoined; every one of them in particular main∣taineth them all united.
In Actions of War, Courage and Con∣duct are of great Necessity; yet all good Government consisteth in using the Vir∣tues Moral; and in handling the mat∣ter of Martial Policy, it is fit to imitate the Proceedings of ancient and appro∣ved Captains.
Among Mortal Men, there is nothing more common than to believe the Estate of one Man to be better than another; for hereof it cometh, that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel, than to enjoy his own with rest.
The state of Princes is good, being well used; so is the Fortune of private Men, if therewith they be contented. The rich Man liveth happily, so long as he useth his Riches temperately; and the poor Man that patiently endureth his Wants, is Rich enough.
Whensoever a Man is so dangerously distressed, as either proceeding or stand∣ing, he liveth in like peril, then doth
it behove him in any wise, to resolve upon Action. The reason is, that so long as nothing is done, the same Acci∣dents that caused his Dangers, do still remain in their former force; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat, either he may meet with means to make him secure, or at the hardest, shew himself of so great Courage and Wit, as he dare and can attempt a way to do it.
It seemeth a thing of great difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince or Ma∣gistrate to eschew the evil speech and bad report of Men; for if they be good and virtuous, then they incur the backbiting of lewd Persons; if evil, then will all good Men exclaim against them.
All Commonwealths ought to desire Peace, yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the War; because Peace disarmed is weak, and without Repu∣tation: Therefore the Poets feign, that Pallas the Goddess of Wisdom did al∣ways appear armed.
Every Prince (well advised) ought to govern his Subjects and Servants in such sort, that by his Affability and Virtue they may be induced rather to
serve voluntarily, then for Pay or hope of Preferment. For otherwise doing, whensoever the Prince shall want means to pay, the Subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve. But he that faithfully loveth, doth neither in Pro∣sperity become Arrogant, nor in con∣trary Fortune retire, or complain of the small favor he findeth: For (till death) Love and Life remain at the Princes Commandment.
Where poor Men find Justice, evil Men are punish'd, Measures and Weights be just, Youth well nurtured, and old Folk free from Avarice, there is the Com∣monwealth good and perfect.
In War between Neighbors, Neutra∣lity is commendable; for by that means we eschew many Troubles and great Ex∣pences, so long as the Forces of either side be so equal in strength, as we need not to fear the Victory of any: For so long their Discord is our Security, and oft∣tentimes offereth us means to increase our own State and Reputation.
The chief Reasons to move War, are, the sustice of the Cause, the Facillity of Success and the Profit of the Victory.
In all Humane Actions it behoveth to accommodate the Council of Men unto present Necessity, and never to expose Security to manifest Peril, nor hope of that which without great Difficulty or Impossibility cannot be obtained.
It is the Nature of Men, having escaped one Extreme, which by force they were constrained long to endure, to run Head∣long into the other Extreme, forgetting that Vertue doth always consist in the mean.
The Multitude is inclined to Innova∣tion, and easily induced by false Perswa∣sion, and consequently easily transported by Seditious Leaders.
Men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten Danger and Terror; yet unless these Perils, by some new Accident, be daily revived, that Fear by little and little vanisheth, and Secu∣rity recovereth the place.
Whoso findeth himself contemned, or not respected, becometh Discontent; which Humor in generous Minds, breed∣eth oftentimes Adventerous Imagina∣tions, whereof Audacious Attempts have followed, chiefly in Persons of Authority
and Reputation; for he that hopeth no Good, feareth no Evil: Yet true it is, that dangerous Enterprises, the more they be thought upon, the less Hope they give of good Success, for which reason Conspiracies not suddenly exe∣cuted, are for the most part revealed or abandoned.
All People do naturally imitate the Manners of their Prince, and observing his Proceedings, resolve to Hate or Love him: But if they happen once to Hate the Prince, then his Doings, Good or Evil, are afterwards not Good; but if at the beginning he gained the Love of the Peo∣ple, then every bad Action is reputed a Vertue; as though he could not be in∣duced to do amiss without good Cause or Reason.
Greatly are Princes deceived, if in the Election of Ministers, they more respect their own particular Affection, than the Sufficiency of the Person elected.
A Prince having conquered any new Dominion, is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened, unless the same be after well governed; and seldom is it
seen, that a Principality, by ill means gotten, hath been long enjoyed.
As to the Perfection of the whole Body, soundness of Head only sufficeth not, un∣less the other Members also do their Office; even so it is not enough that a Prince be Faultless, but it behoveth also that the Magistrates and Ministers should perform their Duty.
Great Princes rarely resist their Appe∣tites, as for the most part private Men can; for they being always honored and obeyed, do seldom with Patience indure the want of any thing reasonable, as be∣ing perswaded that what they desire is Just, and that their Commandment hath power to remove all Difficulties.
All Men are naturally * 1.5 good, when no respect of Profit or Pleasure draws them to become Evil. But this Worlds Corruption, and our Frailty is such, as easily and often for our particular In∣terest we incline to the worst; which was the cause that wise Law-makers found out Reward and Punishment; the one to incite Men to Good, the other to fear them from being Evil.
A Tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his Estate by three means. First, He practiseth to hold all Subjects in extreme Awe, and to be basely minded, to the end they should want Courage to take Arms against him. Secondly, He kindleth Diffi∣dence and Discord among the Great Men; thereby to remove occasion of Conspiracy and Combination. Lastly, He holdeth them Disarmed and Idle, so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him.
To govern, is nothing else but to hold Subjects in Love and Obedience; for in respect of the end, they ought not, and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the Governor's Will and their Duty.
The Laws and Ordinances of a Com∣mon-weale made at the beginning there∣of when Men were good, do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil; and therefore new Laws are made ac∣cording to the Accidents which happen.
The Discontent and Disorder of Peo∣ple is ever occasioned by the Inequality of their Goods, because the Poorer sort would be made equal to the Rich; but
the Offence that grows among great Men is the desire of Honor; for they being equal, do endeavor to aspire to equal Authority.
A Prince that desireth, by means of his Ambassador, to deceive any other Price, must first abuse his own Am∣bassador, to the end he should do and speak with more Earnestenss, being indeed perswaded that the Intent and Meaning of his Master is Simple, which happily would not, were he privy that his Prince's Meaning were to Dissemble. This course is also commonly holden by those, that by Imployment of a third Person, would perswade any thing Feigned or False.
For the Performance of Conditions of Treaty of Peace, or League of Amity, the Promises, Vows and Oaths of Princes are of great Effect; and be∣cause Fidelity in a Man is not ever cer∣tain, and time doth daily offer Occa∣sions of Variation, there is no Assurance so Secure and Good, as to stand so pre∣pared, as the Enemy may want able means how to offend.
To resolve in Matters Doubtful, or answer Requests which we are not will∣ing to grant, the least offensive way is not to use direct Denial, but by delays prolong the time, and so in effect, afford good Expectation.
The old Proverb faith, Magistratus virum ostendit; which is no less true than Ancient; for Men in such For∣tune, are occasioned not only to make proof of their Sufficiency, but also to discover their Affections; and the more their Greatness is, the less respect they have to contain those Passions which are natural.
Albeit great Troubles and continual Adversity seem Insupportable, yet is there nothing more Dangerous, than overmuch Prosperity; and being pressed by new Appetites, they disturb their own Security.
In speaking of Occurrents doubtful, it is always Wisdom to feign Ignorance, or at least alledge that we believe them not; for most commonly they are ut∣terly untrue, or far other than vulgarly is believed.
The Actions of Men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good Success; attributing that to Council which sometimes is due to For∣tune.
The Multitude of Men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow Resolutions; and many times account those Enterprises Generous, which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted.
Great Difference there is between Subjects Desperate, and others which are only Discontented; for the one de∣sire nothing but present Alteration, which they endeavor with all Hazard; the other wish for Innovation, inciting any Motion or Practice, because their Intent is to attend time, and that occa∣sion may present it self.
A Benefit bestowed on him who think∣eth himself greatly injured, doth not suffice to raze the same out of his Memory, chiefly if the Benefit be given at such time as no mere Motion, but Necessity may seem the occasion thereof.
That Peace ought to be desired, which removed Suspition, which assureth us from Peril, which bringeth Quiet cer∣tain, and acquitteth us of Expences; but when it worketh contrary Effects, it may be called a dangerous War, co∣vered with the name of Deceitful Trust, not unlike a perilous Poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome Medicine.
The Effect of things, and not Exter∣nal show, or seeming, ought to be re∣garded; yet it is credible what great Grace is gained by courteous Speech and Affability; the reason whereof is, as I suppose, that every Man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is wor∣thy, and consequently holdeth himself injured, whensoever he findeth Men not to afford him like Estimation.
Men ought in any wise, to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend, for which respect it were great Folly, either in presence or absence, to utter displeasing Speech, unless necessity in∣forceth.
The Matters whereof Counsellors are chiesly to consider, are five, The Prince's Revenue, Peace and War,
Defence, Traffick, and what Laws are to be made.
In giving Council divers things are to be observed; but amongst them are two of most Importance: First, It behoveth, that he who is counselled should be Wise; for seeing Counsel is nothing else but a certain considerate Discourse of things to be done or not done, if he who is to take Counsel be not of Discretion, then will he refuse all good Advice offered, and rather incline to that which his own Fancy affecteth, because the want of Judgment draweth him to take I lea∣sure in vain things; and as one incapa∣ble of what is good and true, will follow that which is Evil and False: So on the other side, if he that giveth Counsel be not Faithful, then will he a Thousand ways disguise and dissemble the Truth, and consequently miscarry the Mind of him that is Counselled; yea in the end utterly abuse him.
The Affairs and Proceedings of the World, are so variable, and accompanied with so many Chances and Changes, as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best; therefore Experience informeth,
that the Conjectures of the most Wise, prove vain and uncertain. I therefore mislike the Judgment of those Men, that will let slip Opportunity of present Good (though it be small) for fear of a future Evil, notwithstanding it be greater unless the Evil be very near at hand, or certain. For if that do not follow which is feared, then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired.
Whensoever a general Opinion is conceived, of the singular Vertue and Knowledge of any Man, although he be indeed Ignorant, and far unworthy that Account, yet it is hard to remove such a settled Conceit: The Reason is, That Men having at the first given Credit to common Report, do make thereof so deep an Impression, as after∣wards, without great Difficulty, cannot be removed.
The Bodies of Men, Munition and Money, may justly be called the Sinews of War, yet of them the two first are more necessary, for Men and Arms have means to find Money and Meat; but Money and Meat cannot so easily find Soldiers and Swords.
One wise General having but a Thou∣sand Men, is more to be feared and esteemed, than twenty Commanders of equal Authority; for they being com∣monly of divers Humors, or judging diversly, do never, or very rarely, what is to be done, and consequently lose much time before any Resolution can be taken.
A Prince of mean Force, ought not in any wise to adventure his Estate upon one days Fight; for if he be Victorious he gaineth nothing but Glory; but if he lose, he is utterly ruined.
The most part of Men are delighted with Histories, for the Variety of Acci∣dents therein contained; yet are there few that will imitate what they read, and find done by others; being per∣swaded that Imitation is not only hard but impossible, as though the Heavens and Men were changed in their Motion, or Order and Power, which they anci∣ently had.
The Nature of Men is such, as will not endeavor any thing Good, unless they be forced thereunto; for where Liberty aboundeth, there Confusion and
Disorder follow. It is therefore sup∣posed, that Hunger and Poverty make Men Industrious; but good Laws in∣force them to be Honest; for if Men were of themselves good, then Laws were needless.
There are two kinds of Adulation: The first proceedeth from a Subtle Malice: The second cometh by an or∣dinary use of Conversation; the one tendeth to Profit and Deceiving; the other hath no farther Design, than a Respect or Fear to offend; whereunto the most Honest are in some sort bound. Whoso bindeth himself to Flattery, doth thereby bewray his Intent, either to gain, or not to lose that he hath. For the Person slattered, is always su∣perior to him that doth Flatter, or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead. It may therefore be inferred, that only Men of base and miserable Condition, and such as cannot help or hurt, be free from Flatterers. And con∣trariwise, Magnanimous and Fortunate Folk, proud Men, and such as content themselves with their present Estate, are seldom found to be Flatterers.
Every wise Prince doth presuppose, that Times of Trouble may come, and that all such Occasions he shall be forced to use the Service of Men diversly quali∣fied. His Study therefore is, in the mean time so to entertain them, as when those Storms arise, he may rest assured to com∣mand them; for whosoever perswades himself, by present Benefits, to gain the good Will of Men, when Perils are at hand, shall be deceived.
In ancient times Princes and Governors were wont, when Peace and Security were most like to continue, to find or feign Occasions to draw their Subjects to Fear, to the end that Doubt might move them to be more careful of their own well-doing; for well they knew it a general Defect in Men, to be reachless, and never willing to use Industry; unless by necessity they were con∣strained.
All Histories do shew, and wise Poli∣ticians do hold it necessary, that for the well governing of every Common-weal, it behoveth to presuppose that all Men are Evil, and will declare themselves so to be, when occasion is offered; for albeit
some Inconvenience doth lye hid for a time, it proceedeth from a covert occa∣sion, which for want of Experience, was not found, until Time the Mother of Truth discover it.
Neutrality is always a thing Danger∣ous and Disallowable, because it offend∣eth all Parties: He that is Strong looketh to be assisted in his Greatness; and he that is Weak, not being defended, holdeth himself offended; the one is not assured from Foes, and the other holdeth no Friends.
Albeit Neutrality procure present Quiet and Security, during the Troubles of others; yet after the same falleth out a Disadvantage, because it entertaineth a certain Falseness, and so in short space will be perceived; not unlike those Men that borrow upon Usury; for albeit they enjoy a certain time, without Trouble or Charge, yet the same being 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and the day of Payment come, they then feel the great Danger which their short Pleasure hath purchased.
Whoso examineth all Humane Actions shall find, that in eschewing one Incon∣venience, we presently incur another.
As for Example, if we endeavor to make our Dominions Mighty, it be∣hoveth to have the same fully reple∣nished with People, and well armed, and so being, they are not easily go∣verned. On the other side, if our Coun∣try be not well Peopled, or Disarmed, then it is easily holden in Obedience; yet therewith so Weak, that it can nei∣ther increase the Bounds thereof, nor defend it self. It is therefore necessary, in all our Deliberations, to consider what Inconvenience is least, and choose that as the best; for to find all Perfect, Void and Secure of Suspect or Imperfection, is impossible.
A Prince being instantly required to take part with other Princes, the one being in Arms against the other, is he deny both, incurreth Suspicion of both, and may be thought to have Secret Intelligences with one or both of them; so as either of them shall account him an Enemy, and conse∣quently he that proves Victorious will be revenged; and the other holding him suspected, will not acknowledge his Friendship.
It is the use of Men to presume much upon their own Merit, and seeing the Success of some others to be such, as with∣out Cause or Desert, are aspired to Dignity thereby encouraged, they promised to themselves the like: Nevertheless being entred into the course of their Design, and finding many Crosses and Impeachments they do not a little repent their Over∣weening and Presumption, but also many times utterly abandon their rash and un∣advised Enterprize; neither can I think, that the Vertue or Sufficiency of any Man without the Favor of the Heavens, can ad∣vance him; for as the Poet saith, Nec velle juvat, potiusve nocet, si fat a repugnant.
Whoso serveth a Prince far from his Presence, shall with great Difficulty content him. For if he commit any Error, it shall be aggravated: Besides that, the In∣structions sent unto him cannot be parti∣cularly conceived, because the State of wordly things doth daily alter. Also to serve aloof, is a thing full of Danger and far from Reward; which Inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his Prince's Person.
Let no Man that cometh to serve in Court, assure himself by his Wisdom to be advanced or eschew all Encounters. Neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to Fortune, but be per∣swaded that this worldly Life is like to a Voiage by Sea; wherein albeit Art with the favor of the Wind may do much, yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the Haven appointed; for daily Experience doth shew, that some strange Ships in the calmest Weather, are drowned or impeached by the way, when others much weaker and disarm∣ed pass securely.
Among Men worthy of Commenda∣tions, those have merited best that first planted true Religion: next they that framed Kingdoms and Commonwealths; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their Domini∣ons; lastly, Learned Men deserve Fame and Memory: and as every of these are worthy of Fame and Honor; so ought they to be accompted Infamous that in∣troduce Atheism, or the Subversion of Kingdoms, or are become Enemies to Learning and Virtue.
Whosoever taketh in hand to govern a Multitude either by way of Liberty, or Principality, and cannot assure him∣self of those Persons that are Enimies to that Enterprise, doth frame a State of short Perseverance: yet true it is that such Princes be infortunate, as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary, and have the Mul∣titude their Enemy; for he that hath few Foes may with small dishonor be assured; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured; and the more Cruelty he useth, the weaker his Principality proveth.
In commending another Man, great Moderation is to be used; for as con∣tumely offendeth him against whom, it is used; so great praise, besides that it is uttered with danger to his Judgment that speaketh it, the same doth oft-ten∣times offend him that heareth it. For Self-love which commonly possesseth Men, causes the Good or Evil we hear, to be measured with our own. And consequently every Man that is touched with like deserts and defects, doth grow offended that his Commendation is not
set forth, and feareth lest his Imperfecti∣on should be discovered.
It is often, or rather ever seen, that the force of Leagues not used in their first heat, becomes cold; because Suspi∣tion soon entereth, which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded, and may not without long time be re∣joined.
The power of Ambition which posses∣seth the Minds of Men, is such, as rare∣ly or never suffereth them to rest: The reason thereof is, That Nature hath framed in them a certain Disposition to desire all things, but not to obtain them; so as our Desires being greater than our Power, therefore following Discontenr and evil Satisfaction. Hereof also pro∣ceedeth the Variation of Fortune; for some Men desiring to get, and others fearing to lose that they had gotten, do occasion one Man to injure another, and consequently Publick Wars do follow; by means whereof, one Country is ruin∣ed, and another inlarged.
Princes of great Power, and chiesly those that are Inhabitants of the North, having many Children, were wont to
be much inclined to the Wars, as well to win unto themselves Honor, as also to get Possessions for their Sons; which manner of Proceedings did oft-tentimes remove such Disturbance as the Plurali∣ty of Brethren bringeth. These and o∣ther reasons induced Princes to attempt War against those Kingdoms, which in cheir opinion seemed easily conquered, or whereunto they can pretend little; for by colour thereof they may the ra∣ther justifie their Proceedings.
When a Prince deferreth to answer an Ambassador, it proceedeth from some of these Respects; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth, or that he intend∣eth covertly to deny that which is de∣manded, or that he esteemeth not the Prince that doth demand, or that he dis∣daineth the Person by whom the de∣mand is made, or else that he intendeth to hear from his own Ministers to be better resolved: Wherefore a discreet Negotiator ought in such cases to con∣sider which of these Reasons move the Prince where he is employed, to en∣tertain him with delays, and make his dispatch accordingly.
The sufficiency of good Counsellors consistetd in fonr things.
First, They ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their Affairs, di∣recting all doings to publick Commo∣dity.
Secondly, To be just in their Proceed∣ings, giving to every one that which to him appertaineth.
Thirdly, To be stout, and void both of partial respects and fear.
And lastly, To be temperate and mo∣derate in their Desires.
Whoso desireth to govern well and securely, it behoveth him to have a vi∣gilant Eye to the Proceedings of great Princes, and to consider seriously of their Designs: For it is matter of small diffi∣culty to live in Peace with him who de∣sireth our Amity, and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us.
The Intelligences that Princes study to attain, are procured by divers means: Some are brought by report, some ven∣ted by Conversation and Sounding, some by means of Espials; but the most sure and credibe Occurrents, are those which come from Ambassadors, chiesly
those that either for the Greatness of their Prince, or their own Virtue, be of most Reputation. For those Men conversing daily with great Personages, and pondering diligently their Manners, Words, Wisdom, and the order of each Man's Troceedings, yea, of the Prince himself, may with Commodity attain unto matters of great Importance sooner than they that are Writers of Rumors, or that take upon them to Conjecture of things to come.
Whensoever a People is induced to commit so great an Error, as to give Reputation to one only Man, to the end he should oppress all those great Men whom they hate, they thereby give him opportunity to become their Prince; and so being assisted with their Favor and Aid, he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the Nobility; and they be∣ing extirpated, he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the People, by whose help he aspired.
So many as are not consenting to the Tyranny, rest Enemies to the Person of the Tyrant, who can by no means gain the Love of all. For impossible it is,
that the Riches of any Tyrant should be so great, and the Honors he can give so many as may satisfie all. Hereof it cometh, that those Tyrants that are fa∣vored of the People, and disfavored of the Nobles, are most secure; because their Tyranny is supported with a greater Strength (having the Multi∣tude their Friends) then is the Tyrant whom the Humor of the Nobles only hath advanced.
A dangerous thing it is in all Com∣monwealths by continual punishing, to hold the Minds of Subjects in Suspi∣tion; for Men ever fearing their Ruine, will (without respect) determine to save them selves, and as Men desperate, attempt Innovation. All Capital Exe∣cutions ought therefore to be executed suddenly, and as it were at one Instant, so to assure the Minds of Men from fur∣her Molestations.
The Intent of every Wise Prince that maketh War, either by Election or Ambition, is to gain and hold what is gotten: Also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself, and
not impoverish his own People or Country.
He that inlargeth his Dominions, doth not always increase his Power; but he that increaseth in force as well as in Dominion, shall thereby grow great; otherwise he gained no more than is shortly to be lost, and conse∣quently he ruineth himself: For who spends more in the War, than he gains by Victory, loseth both Labor and Cost.
Every Prince and Commonwealth must above all things take heed, that no Necessity how great soever, do per∣swade him to bring into his Dominion any Auxiliary Soldiers; because the hardest Conditions the Enemy can offer, are more easie than is such a Resolution.
A Prince sheweth his Ruine at hand, whensoever he beginneth to break the, Laws and Customs, which are 〈◊〉〈◊〉 have been long time obeyed by the to People of his Dominion.
That Prince which careth to keep himself secure from Conspiracy, ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great Favors, than them
whom he hath much injured: For these want Opportunities, the other do not; and both their Desires are as one; be∣cause the Appetite of Commanding, is always as much or more than the desire of Revenge.
Whensoever a Prince discovers a Conspiracy, he must well consider the quality thereof, measuring the Force of the Conspirators with his own; and finding them many and mighty, the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled, until the Princes Power be prepared to oppose them; otherwise he hazardeth his own security.
It hath been by long Experience found better to send one General to an Army, though he be of mean Sufficien∣cy, than to give the same Authority to two or more Excellent Personages with equal Commission.
He that coveteth to be over-much loved, oft-tentimes becomes contempti∣ble; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared, is ever hated: And to hold the mean between them, can∣not be exactly done, because Nature will not so permit.
Whoso aspireth to any Dignity, must resolve himself to endure the Envy of Men, and never to be moved for any Offence conceived against him, though they that be offended, be his dear Friends: Neither shall he for the first affront or encounter, relinquish his hope; for he that constantly maketh head a∣gainst the assault of Fortune, shall after with Facility arrive where he de∣signed.
In giving Council to a Prince or Com∣monwealth, and therefore desiring to eschew Danger and Offence, no other mean is to be taken than that the Coun∣sellor shall without Passion or Perswasi∣on pronounce his Opinion, and never to affirm any thing as a Resolution, but with modesty to defend that he speak∣eth; so as the Prince which follows his Advice, may seem to do it voluntarily, and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the Counsel.
A discreet Captain being in the Field against the Enemy, of whose Virtue he hath had no Proof, ought first by light Skirmishes to feel of what Virtue he is; and not to Enterprise any general
Adventnre, to the end that Terror or Fame should not daunt nor discourage his own Soldiers.
Albeit Fraud be in all Actions detest∣ed, yet is the same in Martial Enter prises commendible and glorious: For that Captain who compasseth his Designs by Wit or Stratagem, is no less commended than he that Van∣quisheth the Enemy by Violence and Force.
In times of Extremity, when Reso∣lution must be taken for the having or utter Loss of the State, then no regard is to be had of Justice or Injustice, Mercy or Cruelty, Honor or Ignomi∣ny, but rather setting aside all Re∣spects, that course is to be followed which defended the Lives and Liberties of Men.
Whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter, let him think of that is past; for the World hath ever been in a circular Revolution: What∣soever is now, was heretofore, and things past or present are no other than such as shall be again: Redit orbis in orbem.
A Prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another, must if it be possible urge a sudden Answer, and lay before him that is moved, a Necessity to resolve presently, giving him to understand that denial or de∣lays may breed a perilous and sudden Indignation.
There is nothing more difficult, doubt∣ful and dangerous than to attempt In∣novation: For he that taketh in hand an Enterprize of such quality, maketh all those his Enemies which lived well under the old Order, and findeth them cold Defenders that affect his Novel∣ties, which coldness proceedeth chief∣ly of Incredulity; for Men are not easily induced to believe a new thing till Experience hath proved it to be good.
There is no Art nor Knowledge so seemly and necessary for a Prince as the Art Military with theOrdinances and Discipline thereof: For that is the only Skill required in him that commandeth, and such a Virtue as doth not only main∣tain them that are born Princes, but of∣ten advanceth private Men to that Dig∣nity.
The deep Impressions which old In∣juries make in the Minds of great Men cannot with new Benefits be razed out; it is also to be remembred that Inju∣ries be done all together: For they of∣fend the less, and will be forgotten the sooner; but Benefits should by little and little be bestowed, so shall the Memory of them long continue.
A small pleasure or displeasure present∣ly done, doth move more than a great good turn bestowed in times past; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the Minds of Men, than doth the Memory of things past, or expectation of things to come.
It is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discontentment of other Men. For every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of Friends, and likewise how much or how little Foes can do, if we have Patience to hear, which Patience is the beginning of all good Speed; but he that delighteth to speak much, and hear little, shall ever in∣form others more than himself can learn.
Among other dangers which a Prince incurreth by being disarmed, the great∣est
is, that thereby he becometh con∣temptible; for no comparison there is between Men armed and them that are disarmed: and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield Obedience to him that is disarmed, neither is it like that a Prince disarmed can be secure from his own Subjects armed.
A Prince Ignorant of Martial know∣ledge, among other Misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own Sol∣diers; it behoveth him therefore as well in time of Peace as War to exercise Arms, which may be done by two means; the one by Action of Body, the other by Contemplation of Mind. The Body may be exercised in Hunting, Hawking, and such like Pastimes; thereby to be made apt to endure Travel: his Mind likewise may be informed by Reading of Histories, and the Consideration of Actions performed by excellent Cap∣tains, observing the occasion of their Victories or Losses, to the end he may imitate the one, and eschew the other.
He that doth not as other Men do, but endeavoureth that which ought to be done, shall thereby rather in∣cur
Peril than Preservation; for who∣so laboureth to be sincerely Perfect and Good, shall necessarily Perish, living among Men that are generally Evil.
A Prince that useth Liberality to his prejudice, ought not to regard the In∣famy of Miserable, because his Parsi∣mony will in time enable him to be Li∣beral, and so may declare himself to be, having by Parsimony increased his Power, and therefore without imposing upon the People, may defend himself from all such as will make War; so shall he use Liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing, who are infi∣nite; and use Miserliness to those only to whom he giveth, who are but few.
There is nothing that consumeth it self like to Librality; for if it be long used, it taketh away the means to con∣tinue it, and consequently doth make Men poor and basely minded: Or else to eschew Poverty, they shall be forced to Extortion and become Odi∣ous.
It is better to incur the name of Co∣vetous (which is a Scandal without
hate) then with desire to be account∣ed Liberal, deserve the Infamy of Op∣peression (an Ignominy accompanied with hatred.)
A Prince ought to be slow in believing, and advised in proceeding; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared, but in all his Actions shew great Wisdom tempered with Curtesie; so shall not over much Considence in∣duce him to be careless, nor over much diffidence render him intolerable.
Whoso observeth, shall see that Man offended, less respect him whom they Love, than him whom they fear. For Love is maintained by a certain reci∣proque Obligation, which because Men are Evil, useth to be by every occasion of Profit broken. But Fear is continued by a certain dread of Punishment which never faileth.
A Prince that holdeth in the Field an Army wherein are great numbers of Soldiers, ought not to care though he be accompted Cruel: For without such an Opinion conceived, he cannot keep his Forces united, nor apt to attempt any Enterprize.
Men for the most, do use rather to judge by their Eyes, than by their Hands, for every one may see, but few can cer∣tainly know. Every one seeth what thou seemest to be, but few can understand what thou art indeed; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the Opinion of many which have the Majesty of Estate to defend them. Also in the Actions of all Men, and chiefly Princes, from whom is no Appellation, the End is ever ob∣served. Machiavel.
A Prince being forced to use the Con∣dition of Beasts, must among them make Choice of the Fox and the Lyon; for the Lyon cannot take heed of Snares, and the Fox is easily overcome by the Wolves: It behoveth him therefore to be a Fox to discover the Snares, and a Lyon to terri∣fie the Wolves.
A Prince newly advanced cannot ob∣serve those Rules, which are the Cause that Men be accounted Good; be being many Times constrained for defence of his State to proceed contrary to Promise, contrary to Charity, and all Vertue; and consequently it behoveth him to have a Mind apt to Alteration, as the Wind and
Variation of Fortune shall direct; yet ought he not to abandon the Good, if so he can, but be ready to use what is Evil, if so he shall be inforced.
Every Prince ought to have two Ears, the one Intrinsick, in respect of Sub∣jects; the other Extrinsick, in respect of Forreign Potentates, from whom he may be defended with Good Arms, and Good Friends: Also Matters Intrinsick will ever stand well, so long as all things abroad rest firm.
A Prince that is favoured of the Multi∣tude, need not to doubt Conspiracy; but contrary wise, where the People is generally Discontented and Hareth the Prince, then may he reasonably doubt every Thing, and every Person; for no Man is so Poor, that wanteth a Weapon wherewith to offend.
When any Occasion is presented to have that thou desirest, fail not to lay hold thereof; for these Worldly Things do vary, and that so suddenly, as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing, un∣less the same be already in Hand: On the other Side, if any Trouble threaten thee, defer it so long as thou mayest;
for Time may occasion some Accident to remove all Dangers.
The Prince that doubteth the Fidelity of his Subjects, must of Force build For∣tresses; but he that feareth Foreign Force more than his own People, were better to leave them unbuilt. Howsoever it be, that Prince that desireth generally to be Respected and Esteemed, must perform some notable Enterprise, and give Testimony of great Vertue and Valour.
A Prince shall do well at all Times to be counselled so as no Man do presume to give Counsel but when the Prince doth ask it. It is also to be noted, That he who is not of himself Wise, cannot be well counselled of others, unless happily he yield to some Wise Men the Govern∣ment of his whole Affairs. For Good Counsels from whomsoever they proceed, shall be thought to come from the Prince, and not the Wisdom of the Prince to pro∣ceed from the Counsel of others.
He that taketh Delight to be Employed in Publick Affairs, must by all Means endeavour to continue in such Services: For oft one Business dependeth on ano∣ther,
whereunto the Florentine Proverb may be applied, Di cosa, nasae cosa, & it tempole governa.
Some Men have not only desired, but also compassed Honour and Profit; yet being in Possession of both, were not therewith so satisfied, as they hoped to be; which being believed, would happily extinguish the immeasurable Ambition wherewith many Men are possessed.
By Experience I have learned, That great Folly it is to account That Ours which we have not, or spend presently in Hope of suture Gain. Therefore Mer∣chants, during the Adventure of their Goods, do not increase Domestical Ex∣pences, but Fearing the Worst Assure what is in Hand.
For such Men as have gained unto themselves Reputation and are account∣ed vertuous, to maintain that Conceit, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Envy, there is nothing bet∣ter than a Life retired from daily Conver∣sation, and chiefly of the Multitude. Fu∣giat sapiens commercia 〈◊〉〈◊〉
The End that moveth a Prince to make War, is to Enrich Himself, and Impo∣verish the Euemy: Neither is Victory
desired for other Purpose than thereby to become the more Mighty, and make the Enemy Weak: Consequently whereso∣ever thy Victory doth Impoverish thee, or thy Gain therein doth Weaken thee, it followeth that either thou pass or un∣dergo that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 whereunto the Intention of War was directed. And that Prince is by Victory 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that can 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Enemies Power, and become Master of his Goods and Possessions. And that Prince is by Victory Impoverished when the Enemy, notwithstanding he be Vi∣ctored, can still Maintain himself, and the Spolis and Possessions are not taken to the Use of the Prince Victorious, but imparted unto his Soldiers. For then may he be thought in his own Losing Infortu∣nate, and in Victory Unhappy; for if he be Vanquished, then must he endure the Osfence by Foes: And being Victo∣rious shall be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to abide the Wrong offered by Friends; which as they be less Reasonable, so are they also less support∣able, because he is still by Impositions forced to burthen the Subjects, whereof may be inferred. That the Prince, hav∣ing in him any Generosity, cannot justly
rejoyce at that Victory which causeth the Subject to lament.
Who so desireth to obtain any thing, hopeth to compass his Desire, either by Intreaty, Presents, or Threatning; for so shall he, to whom the Request is made, be moved either with Compassion, Pro∣fit, or Fear: Nevertheless, with Covet∣ous and Cruel Men, and such as are in their Opinion Mighty, none of these can prevail. And consequently in vain do they labour, that go about by Suit to stir them to Pity, by Gifts to gain them, or by Threats to fear them.
Who so is persuaded that any Com∣mon-weal can continue disunited, doth greatly deceive himself: True it is, That some Divisions do maintain the Estate, but other do indamage the same. They which do Harm, are such as with Sects and Partakings be accompanied; they which help without Sects and Par∣takings, be maintained. A wise Govern∣our therefore, albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some Enemies will arise in the State, yet may he take Order that no Factions may thereby grow. It is therefore to be noted, that the Citizens
of every Estate, may aspire to Reputa∣tion, either by Private or Publick Means. Reputation by Publick Means, is gained chiefly in the War, either by obtaining Victory in some Battle, or surprising of some City; or else by performing some Ambassage deligently, prosperously: But Private Reputation is gotten by doing Favour to this or that Man, and protecting them from Magistrates, giv∣ing them Mony, advancing them unwor∣thily to Honour and Office; and by great Feasts, entertaining the Multitude; of which manner of Proceeding, Sects, Factions and Partakings do grow: And as Reputation thus gained is dangerous, so the other without Faction is profitable; because the same is founded on Common Welfare, and no private Profit: And albeit among Citizens of this sort, will oft arise great Hate, yet wanting Fol∣lowers for their particular Profit, the State shall not be indangered, but rather strengthned; for every Man endeavour∣ing to deserve well, will hold himself within the Bounds of Civil Life, and by Vertuous Merits labout to be advanced.
To persuade or dissuade particular Per∣sons, is a Matter of no Difficulty: For if Words suffice not, yet Authority will prevail: But hard and perilous it is to remove a False Opinion conceived by a whole Multitude, for therein fair Speech and no Compulsion must be used.
The best means which wise Captains can use to make their Soldiers resolute, is to take from them all Hope; which Resolution may also be increased with the Love of our Country and Confidence in the Captain: For Confidence grow∣eth by the Valour of Men, and Discipline in former Victories, and Trust reposed in the Leader. The Love of our Coun∣try is Natural, but the Affection we bear to the Captain, proceedeth rather from his Vertue, than the Benefits he hath bestowed. Necessity also may do much, and chiefly that where no Choice is left, but either overcome by Arms or dye in Desperation.
There is nothing of so great Force to hold an Army united, as the Reputation os the Captain, which proceedeth only from his Vertue; for neither Dignity nor Autho∣rity without Valour can work that Effect.
The first Care that a Captain must have, is to hold his Soldiers well punish∣ed and paid; for where Payment faileth, Punishment ought not to be inflicted: And consequently no Reason it is to pu∣nish him for Robbery, whom want of Pay enforceth to shift; but where the Soldier is paid, and not punished (of∣fending) then will he, without Respect, become Insolent towards his Captain; whereof ensue Mutinies, Discord, and utter Ruin.
It is a Custom, very honourable, not to promise more than thou wilt assured∣ly perform: Yet true it is, that whoso∣ever is denied (though justly) doth rest ill-contented; for Men indeed are. not governed by Reason: Otherwise it is for him that promiseth; and so good Promises shall stand in stead of Perfor∣mance: Besides that, he may find Ex∣cuse enough, because the most part of Men are so simple, that fair Words alone have Power to abuse them, chiefly when they proceed from a Person of Reputa∣tion and Authority. The best way, therefore, is not to promise precisely, but entertain the Suitors with An∣swers.
general, and full of good Hope: Yet not such as shall directly and abso∣lutely bind.
The greatest and most material Dis∣pleasures that use to arise between the Nobility and People, are caused by the diversity of Humours, the one labouring to command, the other endeavouring not to obey; so as all Troubles and Disorders in every Common-weal, do thereof re∣ceive Nutriment.
The City which is maintained rather by Factions than Laws, so soon as one Faction is become strong, and without Opposition, the same of necessity must be divided in it self: for those particular Causes which were at the first taken, are not of Force enough to maintain it.
It is the nature of Men not to endure any Discommodity, unless Necessity do thereunto enforce them: Which may ap∣parently be perceived by their Habita∣tions; for as the Fear of War draweth them to Places of Strength (for their Defence) so that Peril being past, they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit Countries of more Commodity and Profit.
It may seem strange, and no even Measure (yet approved by Experience) that where many offend, few are punish∣ed. Also petty Errors are severely cor∣rected, but great and grievous Crimes be rewarded. In like manner, where many receive Wrong, few seek Revenge. For Injurics universal, are with more Patience than particular Offences en∣dured.
All, or the greatest part of Men that have aspired to Riches or Power, have attained thereunto either by Force or Fraud: And without they have by Craft or Cruelty gained, to cover the foulness of their Fact, they call Purchase as a Name more honest. Howsoever he, that for want of Will or Wit useth not those Means, must rest in Servitude and Poverty. The Reason thereof is, That as Nature hath laid before Men the chief of all Fortunes, so she disposes them ra∣ther to Rapine than honest Industry, and more subject to bad than good Endea∣vours: Hereof it cometh, that one Man eateth another, and he that is weakest must always go to the worst.
Where Necessity forceth, Boldness is reputed Wisdom, and in great Enter∣prises Peril is not to be made accompt of. For those Attempts that begin with Danger, always end with Honour, or Reward; also from one Peril there is no way to escape, but by entring into another.
A wise Man ought not to desire to in∣habit that Country where Men have more Authority than Laws: For indeed that Country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own; not that, where with facility it may be taken away; and that Friends for fear to lose their own, are inforced to forsake them.
Some Magistrates either by over great Zeal or Ignorance take a Course of Ri∣gour, which being for the present favour∣ed, they are ever the more imployed, as Men meet to extirpate Inconveni∣ences.
But thereby the Subjects are often drawn into Desperation, and conse∣quently have recourse unto Arms, as their uttermost Refuge. In this case a Wise Prince for appeasing the People is sorc'd
to disallow his Ministers, and sometimes also to inflict publick Punishment.
A Prince naturally suspicious, and having about him Persons inclined to Envy, is easily induced to mistrust those Men that have served him with most suf∣ficiency: Which Danger they cannot eschew, because they who are worthiest Commendation are oftentimes envied by such Persons as have access unto the Prince.
Who so cannot endure both Envy and Hate, must refrain to enterprise great Matters: For great Honours being de∣sired of many, it behoveth him that aspireth unto them, to be for his Dignity envied, and for his Authority hated; which Authority, albeit the same be well used, yet they who hate or envy (persuading themselves it might be bet∣ter handled) endeavour to oppress that Power, as fearing it will be worse.
Among other things which worketh the Inconveniences of Common weals, Ambition and Desperation are chief; of both, Desperation is worst: For Am∣bition may attend Occasion, Desperation will not, as that cannot endure Delays.
Historians desiring to write the Actions of Men, onght to set down the simple Truth, and not say any thing for Love or Hatred: Also to chuse such an Oppor∣tunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will, and write what they think, which is a rare Happiness of the Time.
In commending or disallowing the A∣ctions of Men, it is a course very requi∣site to consider the Beginning, the Pro∣ceeding, and End: So shall we see the Reasons and Causes of things, and not their bare Events only; which for the most part are governed by Fortune.
It is a matter of much Necessity, that every Man, and chiefly a Prince should in his first Actions, give some Testi∣mony of Vertue; for falling at first into obloquie, do he well or ill, all isill-taken.
The Custom of the Common People is to judge rather by their Eyes than by their Ears: Which is the cause they al∣low more of external Shew than in∣ward Vertue: And true it is, where excellency of Mind, and Beauty of Body concur, the Commendation due to such a Person is far the greater.
Gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore vir∣tus.
A Prince or great Personage that con∣stantly endureth Adversity, deserveth great Praise: Yet greater Commenda∣tion is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his Happiness. For Miseries are ost born with Patience, but Felicity corrupteth.
To be descended of Princes, or great Personages, is a matter of meer Fortune, and so to be esteemed: But Adoption proceedeth from the Judgment of Men, therefore seemeth incorrupt, and seldom abused.
It hath been long observed, and is a Rule which rarely faileth, that he shall be ever suspected of the Prince in posses∣sion, whom Men account worthy to be a Prince in Reversion.
It hath been a Use very ancient to give Credit to Astrologers, and other such Persons, who by their Star-Learning or Blind Divination, take upon them to tell of things to come. The Reason thereof is, That the most part of Men believe that soonest which they least understand; and if they see the Event of a Prediction,
though it happeneth by meer Chance to fall out according to that was premised, thereupon they settle so firm an Impres∣sion, as albeit many other fail, yet the good Conceipt of their Cunning cannot be removed.
Liberality is a Vertue which gaineth Love, but much are they deceived whom Riot in lieu thereof abuseth. To cast away and consume is soon learned, but to give in good Order few have the Skill.
In Time of sudden Mutiny, Conspira∣cy, and Offence of People, the wisest Resolution is not to oppose Force to pre∣vent Fury, but rather give Space for the Bad to amend, and the Good to consent: For Treasons prevail on the sudden, but good Council gathers Forces by Lei∣sure.
Mature Deliberation ought ever to be used; but when Arms are to determine, speedy Execution is the best: Because no Delay in that Euterprise is sit which cannot be commended before it be ended.
Who so is pleased to observe the pro∣ceedings of Men in Authority, shall ob∣serve that some of them hold a plain course without respect; others project∣ing for time to come, do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger: For they mi∣strusting present Prosperity and fearing a change, prepare beforehand some pri∣vate Friends to oppose against publick hatred: Whereof may be inferred, that no care is taken of Innocency, but every one studieth how to pass without pu∣nishment.
In Captains and all Military Comman∣ders, three things are required, Vertue, Discipline, and Authority; but in pri∣vate Soldiers Obedience and Courage only sufficeth; for by due obeying, and no curious scanning the Leaders directi∣ons are maintained; and the Army in danger is alwaies most valiant, which be∣fore the danger is most quiet. Let the Soldier therefore be well armed and va∣liantly minded. To advise and direct must be the Captains care.
It is a matter of no great moment, yet always worthy the noting, that any
exterior Behaviour, or Garment pre∣senting Pride or Greatness, chiefly in Persons lately advanced, though no Man be thereby interessed or injured, doth move in others a certain offence: For the nature of Man is such, as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious Eye, and wisheth a moderation of Fortune no where so much as in those we have known in equal degree with our selves.
In all Enterprises of War (if present necessity doth not otherwise require) Leisure and Deliberation ought to be used; for often it sufficeth in lieu of Wisdom, to take the advantage of other Mens solly.
All Men that are to consider of great Actions, ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the Commonweal, honourable to themselves, and easie to be effected; or at least not greatly difficult. Also he that persuadeth, is to be examined whe∣ther besides bare Words and Counsel, he will 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his own Peril; and if For∣tune favour the attempt, to whom the principal Glory shall redound.
The Perils which accompany private Enterprises, are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to Principality. For in private attempts a Man may pause or proceed as he will: But to him that aspires to Empire there remains no middle course, but either by Victory to triumph as a Prince; or being vanquished to endure death as a Traytor.
Let no Man in his Prosperity, give much credit to common Applause or Service, assured by any of whom in meaner Fortune he hath had no experi∣ence; for the base People are learned in no Lesson, only without difference of Truth or Falshood to slatter Men in Authority, and with Shouts and Words of great rejoycing make shew of great Affection.
As overmuch haste is dangerous, so too great delay oftentimes proveth dis∣advantagious; for albeit consultation ought to forego action, yet to Dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side, or take a middle course (which in cases of doubt and danger is worst) was ever accompted great disereti∣on.
There is no course more comely, nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise Man, having made prcos of his own Vertue (and finding in Age no Fortune due to such effect) as to retire himself from the Court and Company; for so shall he shun the Inconveniences of Con∣tempt and the Discommodity of Travel (Jucunda senectuti otia) yet true it is, that whoso hath lived a Prince or go∣verned as a publick Person, cannot ex∣pect security in a private Estate.
Whensoever danger draweth near, and terror is at hand, all Men look a∣bout, but none willingly adventure: For in such Cases every Man will give Council, but few will take part of the peril.
In Common-wealths where Sects or Partialities be, the Leader of any side is able to kindle Civil War; yet is he una∣ble to moderate the Victory: For to stir up dissentions and troubles, the worst Man most commonly bears the stroke; but peace and quietness are not establish∣ed but by Men of rare Gifts and excellent Vertue.
It may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and Christian profession, that Men are far more mindful of Inju∣ries done unto them, than of benefits received by them. The reason thereof is, that Thankfulness is accompted a burden, but Revenge is sweet, and rec∣koned a great gain.
Of reconciled Foes, and such as know that our harms were caused by their means, we oft-times expect favour, as persuaded that new Friendship will re∣pair the loss of old displeasure: But the matter doth seldom so fall out; for the quality of Man's nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt, and love them whom he hath made beholding. Quos laeserunt oderunt. Tac.
To common Persons and such as are ignorant in Matters of State, every Taxation and Imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous; yet the wiser sort know, that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm People in Peace, and Peace cannot be maintained without Arms, nor Arms without Pay, nor Pay with∣out Impositions.
As fortunate Folk are envied, so are the poor contemned; which Rule reach∣eth also to Princes: The one lives in Plenty with War, the other in Poverty with Peace. For 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is it seen, that those People are assaulted where nothing is to be gained, and whose base Beings afford no other spoils than Blood and Beggery.
Wisemen have observed that in mat∣ter of State, and the managing thereof, three Things are especially to be looked unto: The. first is, Occasion; the se∣cond, the Intentions of other Men; the third, our own Affection. For there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as Occasion, nothing so difficult as to judge what an other Man intendeth; nor any thing more 〈◊〉〈◊〉 than our own immo∣derate 〈◊〉〈◊〉
It hath been ever a course observed by wise Princes, but much more by Arislocracies and Popular States, against Force and Fury of the Multitude, to desend themselves with Silver and Gold.
How much more it importeth all Prin∣ces to lead a vertuous Life, and give
daily example of Piety and Justice, ap∣pears apparently in the Proceedings of the Roman Bishops; who by the well∣doing of some few of them at the first, became greatly honoured; but after∣wards they became contemptible: For the Reverence which Men did bear to the sanctity of their Lives failing, it was impossible of so contrary Manners and Examples to look for like effects.
The success of the War chiefly depen∣deth on the Reputation of the Prince, which declining, the vertue also of the Soldiers faileth: Likewise the sidelity of the People decayeth, and their Mony to maintain the War, ceaseth; contrary∣wise, the Courage of the Enemy is in∣creased, they that stood doubtful be∣come resolved, and every difficulty augmenteth.
The Authority which Princes give, is chiefly in respect of Wisdom and Valour: Yet true it is, that for the most part they account them the wisest Men that can best accommodate themselves to their Humour.
The greatest Distress and Difficulty which can come to any Army, doth
proceed of these Causes: Want of Mo∣ny, scarcity of Victuals, hatred of People, discord of Captains, disobedi∣ence of Soldiers, and their flying to the Enemy, either of necessity or free∣will.
A Prince or great Magistrate having long maintained the reputation of Wis∣dom and Vertue, must take heed that no rash or dangerous Resolution do taint the Honourable Fame of his former Life: For to be transported with Anger against his own Profit, is lightness; and to esteem small dangers more than great, is want of Judgment.
A Prince or Person of great Estate, must be wary not to inure the conceit of double dealing: For little Sincerity and Trust is looked in his Actions, of whom there is an opinion of Crast and Falshood conceived.
Experience hath always proved, that whatsoever the most part of men desire, rarely cometh to pass: The reason here∣of is, that the effects of Human Acti∣ons commonly depend on the will of a few; and their Intentions ever differ∣ing from the greater number, the end
and success cannot be other than as pleaseth the few that are to direct them.
There is nothing more dangerous than to enterprise a War, or other Actions of Importance upon popular persuasion; for such expectations are vain, and such designs fallible: Also the Fury of the Multitude is great, when danger is lit∣tle or far off; but Perils growing great and near, their Courage quaileth, as they whose Passions have no Rule or Measure.
It is strange to see how apt Men are to doubt displeasure threatned by Ene∣mies, chiefly when they draw near; for the People do naturally over-much fear Dangers at hand, and esteem less than is fit of things present: Also to make small account of those that are far from them, because divers Remedies may be hoped as well by time, as other accidents.
The offensive Words or Answers of Indignation, proceeding from great Princes, ought never to admit displea∣sure into the Minds of them against whom they are spoken: For having by
Speech uttered a great part of Choler, the edge of their Deeds becomes the calmer, and more easily appeased: Such is the condition of noble and gene∣rous Spirits.
To judge right of other Mens merit, seems of great difficulty; for time and tryal is thereto required: Also it is not easie to answer the expectation of Men, but ost-times inconsiderate, and not mea∣sured in due proportion.
It is a part of great discretion to di∣vide the seasons of Affairs and Vacati∣ons: For as it sitteth well a Prince or Person of Dignity in times of Audience and Judgment, to be grave, heedsul, and austere: So those Offices perfor∣med, all shew of Authority and sad looks ought to be set apart; for by that means, neither courteous Behaviour shall detract from the Reverence due to his place, nor severity diminish the Love which to his Behaviour apper∣taineth.
Magistrates must look into all things, but not exact all things to rigor. Light Faults may be pardoned, but great Of∣fences severely 〈◊〉〈◊〉 yet not al∣ways
proceeding to punishing, but ost contented with Repentance. To be bit∣ter in rebuking is also fit for a Magistrate, shewing himself sowre to the bad, and sweet to the good; framing both Coun∣tenance and Condition according to the Merit of Men, and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend, than to hate.
Soldiers must be encouraged in all For∣tunes to stand resolved, and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage; ever attending a Time and Opportunity of Revenge; which commonly cometh to pass where Mens Minds are united: For common Danger must be repelled with Union and Concord.
Among other Reasons wherewith Sol∣diers are encouraged, Necessity and Di∣stress doth oft inforce them: For as Men of Vertue perform the Actions of Arms for Honour, so the Coward must do them for his Security.
All Enterprises attempted by Arms, are Honourable; but those that are done in Countries remote, are more praise∣able: For the less they be in Know∣ledge, the greater is the Glory to At∣chieve them.
To be truly and faithfully loved, is a thing greatly to be desired; for Ter∣ror and Fear are weak Works of Affe∣ction: For they being taken away, he that ceaseth to fear, will soon begin to hate; and as they that by Force are kept under, obey with ill Will; so they that govern without Line justly, rule against Right.
Some Men either deserving to be accounted of excellent Wisdom, or sin∣gular in that Skill whereof they make Profession, do ordinarily love the Pro∣ceedings of others; taking that Ad∣vantage of their ill Success: Yet sure it is, that Disaster and unhappy Event of some Actions, proceed not of Disorder, for Human Imperfection, but from a certain Fatal Fury, which neither Counsel nor Constancy of Men can with∣stand.
It is a matter of much difficulty, or rather impossible for any Prince to main∣tain the Law, Civil or Military, without Severity: For where Men hope to be easily pardoned, there are they apt to offend. Contrarily, where Mens Actions are precisely sitted, there do they live in
over-great Aw, and Hatred doth always accompany such Severity. The best course therefore is to punish Offences se∣verely, and reward vertuous Merits libe∣rally; so shall Fear be converted to re∣verend Respect, and none have cause to complain: For as it lies in each Man's Power to shun offending, so is it in their Power also to deserve well, and merit Reward.
Whosoever, aster mature deliberation, hath resolved what Course to hold in the Action he hath in hand, must not after repent, or fear any Difficulty: For such Thoughts would break the Vigour of the Mind, and impeach the Proceedings of that which was resolved. And albeit some Differences do happily arise, yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater Impediments.
Young Men for the warmness of their Blood, and for not having before-time been deceived by Fortune, more will∣ingly enterprise Actions rather honour∣able than severe. But Old Men as well for that their Heat is cooled, as also for having attempted many things in vain,
make choice of Enterprises severe, rather than those that are followed with Fame and Glory.
The greatness of one Prince is nothing else but the Ruin and Distress of ano∣ther: Likewise his Strength is the Weakness and Oppression of others.
Some Conquests are of such Quality, as albeit a victorious Captain merit tri∣umphal Honour; yet a modest resusal becomes his greater Glory.
The Dignity of Magistrates is not as∣sured without Arms; for when Obedi∣ence faileth, no other means is left to continue a People united.
As willing Obedience in Subjects is the Prince's Strength, so is the same their own Security: For as by the Princes Au∣thority the People are governed, so by their Consent he is maintained.
Three things Men covet with immo∣derate Desire, Lands, Riches, and Ho∣nours; but as seldom they compass their full Content, so are they for the most part to endure a Destiny far other than they wished.
Strange it is, yet by Experience prov∣ed true, That in Time of Danger, For∣tune
(or rather Destiny) so much amaz∣eth the Judgment of Wise Men, as sel∣dom they conceive what Resolution is best to be taken.
No great Free-City can long continue quiet, unless the same be used to foreign Assaults: For wanting Foes without, some inward Enmity will arise, not un∣like to strange Bodies of Men, which being secure from external Injury, are nevertheless by their own Poise op∣pressed.
As every Pilot of ordinary Skill know∣eth in calm and quiet Seas to direct the Course of his Ship; so every Governor of Capacity doth understand how the Affairs of State are in peaceable Times to be handled: But when Tempests are, and Subjects bent to Sedition; the one requires an excellent Sailer, the other the Aid of some excellent Wisdom.
It oft happens, that Publick Duty is opposite to private Friendship; so as we are either forced to omit the Offices due to our Country, or draw our dearest Friends into Danger: In which case we are to prefer publick Respect, before par∣ticular Obligation.
The nature of base People is such, as either they obey slavishly, or com∣mand insolently: For Liberty being the Mark whereat they aim, is by them of that Quality, neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued; and always there are some seditious Leaders to be found, who of Disorder are inclined to kindle the Ire and Offence of Ignorant People. Dux rebus motis, facile inveni∣tur. Salust.
Experience hath oft proved, That Men in best Fortune, and such as esteem them∣selves most secure, even then fall soonest into Disadventure, because those Dan∣gers unfeared be as it were contemned, and not regarded.
To enter needless Dangers, was ever accounted Madness; yet in Times of extream Peril and apparent Distress, Bold and Hazardous Attempts are great∣est Security.
The divers Adventures which happen to Men, may well inform, That much better it is, chiefly in Arms, to be go∣verned by Reason than by Fortune.
A certain Peace is ever accounted bet∣ter Security than Victory hoped or ex∣pected
Melior tutiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria. Liv.
If to our Prosperity God were pleased to add the Grace of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 we should thereby judge not only of what is past, but also of all that can succeed hereafter.
Rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings, unless first we have felt the deceits of Fortune. Dis∣cord or Dissention in any State or City, offers opportunity to such men as are am∣bitious to work their will: For the hu∣mor of Sects and Partialities is such, as the weaker Faction doth ever chuse 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to call for aid of Strangers, than yield to the Dominion of an adverse Party.
Ancient Customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away. Fortune which altereth all things, will by little and little wear them out of use.
To be oft in fight, and converse much with men, breedeth a kinde of Satiery: therefore it behoveth persons of great Estate and Authority to be retired, lest over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable Estate.
The natures of men not content to live according to their Fortune and Birth, are of all others most prone to Envy; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in esti∣mation above them.
Great heed is to be taken, that no Citizen or Subject, be suffered to aspire to such greatness, as cannot be forced to obey the Laws; and no order there is of more necessity, than that every man of what quality soever, may be without respect accused and judged.
For conservation of particular Great∣ness and Dignity, there is nothing more noble and glorious, than to have felt the force of every Fortune.
It is the quality of wise men only, to know how to use Prosperity, and never to trust too much to the favors of present Happiness. A man well ad∣vised in his Prosperity, beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent; nor must he believe in his own present felicity, for the Day knows not what the Night bringeth: He only is to be reputed a man, whose mind cannot be puft up by prosperity, nor
dejected by any adverse Fortune.
Men of Cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent Speeches, but wise men laugh them to scorn.
The way whereby a Prince eschues the hate of Subjects, is, not to take from them their Lands or Goods; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted, unless the same be accompanied with Con∣fiscation (which a Prince is rarely forced to use) it seldom causeth him to become odious.
A Rule most cerain it is that he who commands any thing unpleasing, must by severe means cause it to be observ∣ed; and who desireth to be obeyed, must know how to command: And he only knows how to command, that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey; wherein finding a proportion, then he may boldly proceed, otherwise forbear.
In Actions of difficulty great courage is to be used, and who so compasseth any thing by violence, cannot maintain it by mildness, nor command by affability: He therefore that is of nature soft, should do best to refrain all extraordinary com∣mands.
and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his mild spirit; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the Prince or his Magistrates, but to the Laws and Ordinances of State.
When Necessity presseth, desperation is deemed Wisdom, and generous Minds do not account of danger, be∣cause those Attempts which begin with Peril, do for the most part end with Glory.
He that endeavours to be good among many that are evil, or will uphold that which those labour to pull down of Force, worketh his own undoing. All Common-wealths alter from order to disorder, from disorder to order again; for Nature having made all worldly Things variable, so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height, they must descend; so from good they fall back to evil; and from evil they return to good. War begets Quiet, Quiet Idleness, Idleness Disorder, Disorder Ruin; likewise Ruin Order, Order Vertue, Vertue Glory and good Fortune.
Wise Men have observed that Arms were before Learning, and Captains before Philosophers; for good and well regula∣ted Armies having gained Victory, esta∣blished Rest and Security, whereof the Study of Letters and Liberal Sciences ensued.
That Country deserveth to be loved of all Men, which loves all Men indiffe∣rently, and not that Country which re∣specting the best part, advanceth a few: No Man therefore is to be blamed, if for such cause he desire rather to abandon than embrace his Country.
Common wealths are Bodies mixt, yet have they of Bodies simple some re∣semblance: And as in these, many In∣firmities grow, which without violent Medicines cannot be cured; so in the other many Mischiefs arise, which a good and godly Patient should offend to leave uncured, though therein he use both force and fire.
Those Wars be most just which are most necessary; and those Arms are most merciful where no hope of help re∣mains but in them only.
In Actions which promise either pub∣lick Glory, or private Honour, Men may be reasonably persuaded to adventure life and living, because great hope there is to die with Reputation, or live to re∣cover that Peace which War hath con∣sumed: But where Men are no less op∣pressed by insolency of Commanders, than by insolency of Foes, there is the Calamity doubled, and of two evils the danger of War seemeth least; for that hath end, the other is infinite.
Who so persuades himself to be no less esteemed in evil than good Fortune, is deceived: For promises made, during distress, are rarely persormed, unless the same necessity continue.
The intent of every Prince, or other State that makes War, is to enrich him∣self, and impoverish the Enemy: Nei∣ther is Victory for other occasions sought, nor the possessions of the Enemy to other end desir'd, than to make them∣selves mighty, and their Enemy weak. It sollows then, that so oft as the Victory impoverishes them, or the gains weaken them, either they pass or come short of that Mark whereat the War was aimed.
Ancient and well-governed Common∣wealths were wont by their Conquests to fill the Treasuries with Gold and Silver, to give reward to Soldiers, to spare the People from Tributes, to make Tri∣umphs and Publick Feasts: But in later times the Wars have used, first, to con∣sume the Treasure, and after impoverish the People without assuring them from their Enemies.
A Prince or State that leaves promises unperformed, by reason of unexpected Impediments, and for no ill intent, ought not to be blamed: Neither are such acci∣dents any just cause or colour why Friends should abandon their Confede∣rates.
Where Magistrates govern justly, Sub∣jects obey dutifully; where private Per∣sons grow rich, and Princes enlarge their Empire; there is the Common∣wealth blessed, and the People fortu∣nate.
ALL Cities and Towns of State are builded either by People dwelling in or about the Place where they are builded, or else they are made by Stran∣gers: Of the first are Athens and Ve∣nice, of the other Alexandria and Flo∣rence.
The Fortune of every City builded, and Vertue of the Builder, appeareth by Choice of the Place, and Quality of Laws: For as fertile Places occasi∣on Men to be slothful, unless by good Laws they be forced to labour, so Bar∣renness
compels them to Industry; which Reason induceth Wise Men to plant Ha∣bitations in either: Examples of the first are Ferrara and Rome, of the second Ra∣gusa and Genoa.
All Laws whereby Commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent Man, and at an instant; or else they were ordained at sundry Times, according to such Accidents as befel. Example, The Laws of Sparta made at the beginnig by Lycurgus, the Laws of Rome at sundry Times.
The Government of every City in Time becomes corrupt; Principality changeth into Tyranny: The Optimacy is made the Government of the People; and the Popular Estate turns to licentious Disor∣der; which Instability or Alteration moved some Law-makers to take Order that in the Government of their City there should be a Mixture of all three, and was the Cause that the Policy of Sparta con∣tinued 800 Years, when the Popular State of Athens endured not one hundred. Example, The Laws of Sparta made by Lycurgus, and the Laws of Athens by Solon.
Whoso taketh in hand to frame any State or Government, ought to presuppose that all Men are Evil, and at occasions will shew themselves so to be. Example, The Envy of the People of Rome to the Nobles, and their Insolency towards them appeared not so long as the Kings govern∣ed; but the Tarquins being Banished, Opportunity was thereby offered, that the Malice of the one and the other be∣came discovered.
The divers Honours of the Nobility and People, the one desiring to command, the other not to obey, are the Cause of continual Troubles, unless some third Mean there be of more Authority than either, to bridle the Force of both. Ex∣ample, The Kings in Rome expulsed, forthwith arose much Mutiny, and could not be suppress'd till the Tribum Plebis were created; whose Authority wrought the same effect which the Kings had done. Some States endeavour to enlarge their Dominions, and some others labor only to maintain that Estate they an∣tiently possessed. Example of the first was the City of Rome, of the second Sparta.
All States desiring to live at Liberty, think fit that every Man should be per∣mitted to accuse any Citizen that offend∣eth, which manner of proceeding works two excellent Effects: First, That the People should not dare for Fear of accu∣sing to attempt ought against the State; or if they do, they shall be presently and without Respect punished. Secondly, by Liberty of accusing, every Man hath Means to utter the Offence wherewith he can charge others, which he could not; unless it were lawful to take such an or∣dinary Course, and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary, particu∣lar Revenge, or calling in Foreign Forces. Example, Coriolanus and Appius, Claudius at Rome, Lucanncve at Chinsi, Francisco Valeri in Florence.
As Accusations are in every State ne∣cessary, so Slanders are dangerous, and worthy of Punishment; the Difference betwixt Accusations and Slanders, is, that the one is publickly performed be∣fore Magistrates, with good Proofs and Witnesles to maintain the Truth of the Accusation; but Slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret,
and Places of Repair, without Witness and Justification, so as every Man may be slandered, but few are orderly accus∣ed. Example, Appius Claudius accused by L. Virginius; Furius Camillus, slan∣dered by Manlius Capitolinus.
The only means to suppress Slander is, to give Authority to some Persons of Re∣pute, to compel every Slanderer to be∣come an Accuser; and if the Accusation prove true, then to reward the Accuser, or at least not to punish him. Exam∣ple, Manlius the Slanderer of Camillus for his untrue Information punished.
A Rule most certain and assured it is, That every Kingdom and State at the first well framed, or after well informed, doth take the Perfection thereof from the Wisdom of some excellent Man, who ought not to be blind though in a Matter of great Moment he happily useth some extraordinary Violence or Proceedings; for he that employeth Force to mend and not to mar, deserves Commendation. Example, Romulus, Lycurgus, Cleo∣menes.
There lives no Man so simple or wise, so wicked or well-disposed, but prefers
those Persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable: Not withstand∣ing for that well-near all Men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is Good, deem∣ing that Honourable which in Truth is otherwise; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a Course which merits rather Infamy than Commendation. Example, Every Man wisheth himself Timoleon, or Age∣silaus, rather than Dionysius or Phalaris; rather a Titus or Trajan, than Caligula or Vitellius.
Who reads Histories treating of great Actions shall perceive that good Princes indeed are more secure and better defend∣ed by the Love of the People, and Fide∣lity of Counsellors, than were they that entertained many Legions and Men of War. Example, Of all those Emperours which reigned after Caesar until Maximi∣inus, the greatest number were for their Vices taken and slain, only Galba and Per∣tinax excepted, who were good Emper∣ours.
A Prince of great Knowledge both in Arms and Wisdom, so firmly setleth the Foundation of Government, as albeit his
Successor be of the less Vertue, yet may he be maintained even by the Memory of his Predecessor: But if it happen that the third Prince prove not more like the first than the second, then all that is past goeth to Ruine. Example, The Martial Valour of Romulus was the cause that Numa might govern safely in Peace: Which Tullus could not have done, had he been unlike to Romulus; nor should Bajazet Emperour of Turky have en∣joyed the State of his Father Mahomet, and left the same to his Posterity, if Selim his Son had not been more like to his Grand - father than to Bajazet his Fa∣ther.
The Succession of two excellent Prin∣ces, chiefly if they be of long life, works wondrous Effects: The like is seen in Optimacies and Popular States, where the Governours successively elected be Men of great Vertue and Understanding. Example, The first appeared in Philip of Macedon, and Alexander his Son, the second in the Consuls of Rome.
In every State, where Soldiers are not, the Fault thereof proceeds from the Go∣vernours. Wise Princes were therefore
wont even in Times of Peace to cause Warlike Exercises to be used; for with∣out them the most Warlike Nations be∣come not only Ignorant in Martial Know∣ledge, but also effeminate. Example, Pelopidas & Epaminondas in Thebes, and King Tullus in Rome as well in Peace∣able as Troublesome Times used the exer∣cise of Arms.
No Prince or State well advised, haz∣ards his whole Estate upon the Valour of some few Persons, nor ought to Strength of strait Places, where the Enemy is to pass. Example, Tully King of Rome, and Me∣tius King of Alba, condescended that three of their Nobility for either side, chosen should enter Combate, and that Nation which was Victorious should command the other. Francis the French King go∣ing to recover Lombardy, was by the Switzers attended into two or three Places in the Mountains, hoping there to repulse him, but the King taking another way, passed securely and prevailed.
Every State well governed doth re∣ward Men of good Merit, and punish all Offenders; and if any Person of good Desert shall wilfully be a Delinquent,
the same Man ought not withstanding his former service, be punisht. Example, The same Horatto that in Combat gained the Victory against the Albani, having insolently slain his own Sister, was not∣withstanding his egregious Act and the fresh memory thereof, called into trial of his life, and with great difficulty ob∣tained Pardon: And Manlius who had with great Glory saved the Capitol, for moving Sedition in Rome, was after from the same cast down headlong.
Every wise Man having performed any great service to his Prince or Country, ought to be content with such recom∣pence as it shall please the Prince or Country to bestow: Measuring the same according to the Power of the giver, and not the merit of him that receiveth. Example, Horatius Cocles for having lost his Hand in defence of the Bridge of Rome, and Mutius Scaevola suffering his Hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill King Porsenna, were rewarded with a small Portion of Land; and Manlius that defended the Capitol from the Gal∣leys, had no greater reward than a little measure of Meal.
Ingratitude is a Vice so natural and common, as not only private Persons, but Princes and States also either through Covetousness or Suspition are there with infected. Example, Vespasian proclaimed Emperor, was chiefly aided by Antoni∣us Primus, and by his help prevailed against Vitellius, in Reward of which Service Vespasian removed him from the Command of his Army, and gave that honour to Mutianus. Consalvo Ferranoe having taken the Kingdom of Naples from the French, was first removed from his Command of the Castles and Soldi∣ers, and in the end brought into Spain, where in disgrace he ended his Life. Collatinus Tarquinius who with the aid of Brutus suppressed the Tarquins of Rome, and with him Pub. Valerius were banish'd for no other cause but for be∣ing of the name of Tarquin, the other because he 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a House upon Mount Caelio.
All Errors that great Captains com∣mit, are either wilful or ignorant, to∣wards the one and the other of which Offenders to use greater lenity than the quality of their Offences deserves, Seem∣eth
necessary: For Men of Honour suffer nought by the Infamy which evil Ser∣vice doth bring. It is also to be consi∣dered that a great Captain being cum∣bred with many cares, cannot proceed in his Actions couragiously, if he stand in daily doubt to be punish'd for every er∣ror that hapneth. Example, Sergius and Virginius were before Veio, the one part of the Army on the one side of the City, the other not far from the place. Sergi∣us being assaulted by the Falisci was not aided by Virginius, neither would he require his help, such was the envy the one bare to the other; and consequently their Offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment. Likewise when Varro by his Ignorance, received an over∣throw by Hannibal at Cannae, he was nevertheless pardoned and honoura∣bly welcomed home by the whole Se∣nate.
Whensoever an Inconvenience ariseth within or without the State, it seems a Resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof, than to seek by sud∣den violence to suppress it. Example, Cosmo de Medioes having gained extraor∣dinary
Reputation in Florence, the Citi∣zens imagined, that to suffer the same to increase was dangerous, and therefore they Banished him: Which extream Proceeding, so offended the Friends of Cosme, being the stronger, as they sor∣ced the Citizens to revoke him, and make him Prince of that City. The like hapned in Rome, where Caesar for his Vertue, much admired and followed, became afterwards to be feared; and they that feared, not considering their force to be inferior to the power of Caesar, endeavouring to oppress him, were the occasion of his greater Glory.
In every Republick, an excessive Au∣thority given to one or two Persons for long time, proveth dangerous, chiefly when the same is not restrained. Ex∣ample, The Dictatorship given to Caesar for life, was an occasion to oppress the Liberties of the Romans. The same effect was before that time like to follow the Decemvirate, by suffering Appius Claudius to prolong the time of his Dignity.
The Ambition of Men is such, as rare∣ly they will obey when formerly they
have commanded; neither do they will∣ingly accept of mean Office, having before sate in higher place: Yet the Citizens of well-governed States, did not refuse as well to obey as command. Example, The Victory the Romans ob∣tained against the Veienti, Q. Fabius was slain, having the year before been Con∣sul: Nevertheless he then served in meaner place under C. Manilius, and M. Fabius his own Brother then Con∣sul.
There is nothing more strange, yet by experience proved true, That Men in ad∣verse Fortune be much grieved, and in Prosperity also discontented; which is the reason, that not being forced to fight for necessity, they will nevertheless con∣tend for Ambition; and that Humour doth as well possess those that live aloft, as others whom Fortune holdeth down. Example, The People of Rome having by the Authority of the Tribunes obtain∣ed to make themselves secure from op∣pression of the Nobility, forthwith re∣quired, That the Honour and Office of State might be also imparted unto them. The like Ambition moved them to have
their part of Lands by force of Lex Aga∣ria, which was at last the overthrow of the Roman Liberty.
It seemeth that People displeased with some Innovations hapned in the State, do sometime without just Reasons com∣plain of those that govern: Not unlike to a sick Man, who deemeth that the Phy∣sician, not the Fever, is the cause of his Grief. Example, The People of Rome were persuaded that the Ambition of Consuls was the cause of continual War, therefore required that no more Consuls should be; yet they were content that certain Tribunes should command with like Authority; so was nothing altered in the Government, but the Governors Title, which alone did courent them.
Nothing can corrupt and alter the na∣ture of Man so much, or so soon as the immoderate desire of Honour; in so much as Men of honest Minds and ver∣tuous Inclinations are sometimes by Am∣bition, drawn to abuse that Goodness whereunto they are inclined. Example, Appius Claudius having lived long an Enemy to the Multitude, hoping by their aid to continue his Authority of
the Decemviri in Rome, became their Friend, and disfavoured the Factions of great Men. Likewise Q. Fabius a Man of singular vertue, being also called to that dignity by Appius's self, adultera∣ted his nature and became like unto him.
Seldom or never is any People discon∣tented without just cause; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence pro∣ceedeth, many times for want of some fit Man to pronounce their grief, they stand silent. Example, The Romans at the death of Virginia, were gathered to∣gether armed upon Mount Sacro, and being asked by the Senate, for what cause they so did? No Answer was made; until Virginio Father of the Vir∣gin had procured, that twenty of the Tribunes might be made to be as Head of the People, and confer with the Senate.
A great Folly or rather meer Madness it seemeth to desire any thing, and tell before-hand that the end purpose of the desire is evil; for thereby he shew∣eth Reason why it ought not to be grant∣ed. Example, The Romans required of
the Senate that Appius and the rest of the Decemviri should be delivered into their Hands, being determined to burn them all alive.
The first part of their Request seem∣ed reasonable, but the end thereof un∣reasonable.
A course very dangerons it is in all States, by continual accusing and pu∣nishing, to hold the Subject in doubt and daily fear: For he that stands always looking for some trouble, becometh care∣less and apt to attempt Innovation. Ex∣ample, The Decemviri being opprest, the Tribunes authorized in their place, en∣deavoured daily to call in question the most part of the Decemviri, and many other Citizens also, whereof great In∣conveniences arose, and much danger would have ensued, had not a Decree propounded by M. Duillius been made, that for one year no Roman Citizen should be accused.
Strange it is to see how Men in seek∣ing their own security, lay the Injuries which they fear, upon other Men; as though it were necessary, either to offend or to be offended. Example, The Ro∣mans
among themselves, united and strong, always endeavoured to offend the Nobles; and the Nobles likewise being persuaded they were strong, la∣boured to oppress the People: Which Humours were the cause of continual Troubles.
To make estimation and choice of Men fit to govern, the best course is to consi∣der in particular; otherwise it might be imagined, that among the Multitude or meaner People, they being the greatest numbers, might be found some Persons of more perfection. Example, The People of Rome desiring that the Consul∣ship might be given among them as Men of most Merit, did by all means en∣deavour to obtain that Honour; but be∣ing come to Election, and every Mans Vertue particularly considered, there could not be among the Multitude only one found fit for so great a place; and therefore the People themselves consen∣ted, that the Dignity should still remain as it was.
To persuade a Multitude to any Enter∣prise, is easie, if that which is persua∣ded, doth promise either Profit or Ho∣nour;
yet oft under that external apparence lies hid loss or disadvantage. Example, The Romans persuading themselves that the slow Proceeding of Fabius Maximus in the War, was both chargeable and cowardly, required, That the General of the Horse might direct the War; which course had ruined Rome, if the Wisdom of Fabius had not been. Like∣wise, when Hannibal had divers years reigned in Italy, one M. Centenius Penu∣ta, a Man of base Birth, yet a Soldier of some Repute, undertook that if he with such Voluntiers as would follow him, might have Authority to Fight, he would within few days deliver Hannibal either alive or dead: Which Offer was by the Senate accounted rash, yet for fear to offend the People, granted; and Penula with his Soldiers was cut in pieces.
To appease a Mutiny or Tumult in any Camp or City, there is no means more speedy or successful, than if some Per∣son of great Quality and Respect, pre∣sent himself to the People, and by his Wisdom lay before them the damage of their Discords, persuading them to Peace
and Patience. Example, The Faction of the Frateschi and Arratiati in Florence; the one ready to assault the other. Fran∣ciso Soderini, Bishop of Voterra, in his Episcopal Habit, went between the Par∣ties and appeased them: Also Count Egre∣mont, by the Authority of his Wisdom and Presence, supprest a great Mutiny in Autwerp, between the Martinists and Papists.
A People corrupted, do rarely or ne∣ver observe any Order or Ordinance, un∣less by Force of some Prince's Power they be thereto inforced; but where the Mul∣titude is Incorrupt and Religious, all things are done justly, and without Com∣pulsion. Example, Camillus at the Victo∣ry against the Vrienti, vowed that the tenth part of the Pillage should be offered to Apollo; but the Senate supposing that the People would not consent to so great a Contribution, studied to dispense with that Vow, and to please Apollo and the People also by some other Means: Where∣at the People shewed themselves openly offended, and willingly gave no less than the Sum formerly decreed. When the Free-Cities of Germany are occasioned to
make Mony for any Publick Service, the Magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every City, which done, every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own Conscience he is able; and he with his own Hand, no other Witness being present, casteth the Mony into a Coffer prepared for the purpose; which he would not, if his own Conscience did not inforce him.
When any extraordinary occasion hap∣pens to a City or Province, some prodi∣gious Voice is heard, or some marvelous Sights are seen. Before T. Gracchus Ge∣neral of the Roman Army was betraid by Flavius Lucanus, the Aruspices discovered two Serpents eating the Entrails of the Beasts sacrificed; which done, they va∣nish'd: Which Vision, as they divined, prognosticated the General's Death: Likewise F. Savanarola foretold the com∣ing of King Charles VIII. into Italy: And M. Sedigitus, when the Gauls first came towards Rome, informed the Senate he heard a Voice much louder than any Man's, crying aloud, Galli veniunt.
The multitude of base People is natu∣rally audacious and apt to Innovation;
yet unless they be directed by some Per∣sons of Reputation and Wisdom, rarely do they joyn in any Action of great im∣port. Example, The Romans, when their City was taken and sack'd by the Gauls, went to Veio with determination to dwell there: The Senate informed thereof, commanded, That upon great Pain every Citizen should return to Rome, whereat the People at first mocked; but when every Man particularly within himself considered his own Peril, all in gene∣ral determined to obey the Magi∣strates.
In the Employment of Men for Ser∣vice, neither Age nor Fortune ought so much to be regarded as Vertue; for young Men having made trial of their Valour, soon become aged, and thereby either unapt or unable to serve: Therefore well governed Commonwealths, pre∣ferred Military Vertue before any other respect. Example, Valerius Corvinus, with others, made Consul the three and twentieth Year of his Age, and Pompey triumphed in his Youth.
No wise or well-advised Prince or other State will undertake without ex∣cessive
Forces to invade the Dominions of any other Prince, unless he assure himself of some Friends there to be a Mean, and as it were a Gate to prepare his Passage. Example, The Romans by Aid of the Saguntines. entred Spain, the AEtoli called them into Greece, the Hediai into France: Likewise the Palaeologi in∣cited the Turk to come into Thrace; and Ludovicus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 occasioned Charles the French King to come into Italy.
A Republick desirous to extend the Bounds thereof, must endeavour to be fully furnish'd with Inhabitants, which may be done both by Love and Force: Love is gained by suffering Strangers to inhabit the City securely; and Force compels People to come thither, when other Cities and Towns near at hand be demolished or desaced: And impossible it is without this Order of proceeding. to enlarge any City or make the same of greater Power. Example, The Romans to enlarge their City demolished Alba, and many other Towns, and therewith also entertained all Strangers courtcously: So as Rome grew to such greatness, that the City only could arm six hundred and
forty thousand Men; but Sparta or Athens could never exceed twenty thousand, for that Lycurgus had inhibited the access of Strangers.
A Commonwealth that consumes more Treasure in the War, than it profits in Victory, seems to have rather hindred than honoured or inriched the State. A wise Captain therefore in his Actions, ought as well to profit the Republick, as to gain to himself Glory. Example, The Consuls of Rome did seldom desire Tri∣umph, unless they returned from the War loaden with Gold, Silver and other rich Spoils fit to be delivered into the Com∣mon Treasury.
All Foreign War's with Princes or other States taken in hand, be either for Am∣bition or Desire of Glory, or else for Ne∣cessity. Example, The Romans for their Ambition conquered many Nations, with intent only to have the Obedience of the People; yet did they suffer them to hold Possession of their Houses, and sometimes they were permitted to live only with their old Laws. Likewise Alexander the Great endeavoured to sup∣press many Princes for his Glory, but
did not dispossess the People, nor kill them.
Otherwise it is where a whole Nation inforced by Famine or Fury of War, abandon their own Dwellings, and are forced to inhabit elswhere. Example, The Goths and other People of the North invaded the Roman Empire, and many other Provinces, whereof their Altera∣tion of Names did ensue; as Illyria, now called Slavonia, England formerly named Britain.
A common Conceit and Saying it is, That Mony makes the War strong, and is the Force and Sinews thereof; as though he who hath most Treasure, be also most mighty; but Experience hath apparently shewed the contrary. Example, After the Death of Alexander King of Macedon, a multitude of Gauls went into Greece, and being there arrived, sent certain Ambas∣sadors to the King, who supposing to make them afraid of his Power, shewed them his Treasure, which wrought a contrary effect; for the Gauls, before de∣sirous of Peace, resolved then to continue the War, in hope to win that mighty mass of Mony. Likewise Darius should
have vanquished Alexander, and the Greeks might have conquered the Romans, if the richer Prince might ever by his Mony have prevailed.
Every League made with a Prince or Republick remote, is weak and rather aideth us with Fame than Effect, and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose Confidence. Example, The Florentines being assaulted by the King of Naples and the Pope, prayed Aid of the French King; who being far di∣stant, could not in Time Succour them: And the Cedicini desiring Aid of the Ca∣puani against the Samnites, a People of no Force, were deceived.
A Prince whose People is well arm'd and train'd, shall do better to attend his Enemy at Home, than by Invasion to assault his Country: But such Princes whose Subjects are disarmed, had need to hold the Enemy aloof. Example, The Romans, and in this Age the Swisses, be∣ing well armed, may attend the War at Home; but the Carthaginians and Itali∣ans being not so well furnished, did ever use to seek the Enemy.
The Plurality of Commanders in equal Authority, is for the most part occasion of slow Proceeding in the War. Example, There was at one Time in Rome created four Tribuni Militares with Authority of Consuls, viz. T. Quintus after his Con∣sulship, Cajus Furius, M. Posthumus, and A. Cornelius Cassius, amongst whom arose so much Diversity and Contrariety of Opinion, as nothing could be done till their Authority ceased, and M. AEmylius made Dictator.
A Victory obtained by any great Cap∣tain with the Authority of his Prince's Commission, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Directions, ought ever to be imputed rather to the Wisdom of the Prince, than the Valour of the Captain: Which made the Em∣perors of Rome to permit no Captains (how great soever his Victories were) to Triumph, as before that time the Con∣suls had done; and even in those Days a modest Refusal of Triumph was com∣mended. Example, M. Fulvius hav∣ing gained a great Victory against the Tuscans, was both by the Con∣sent of the Senate and People of Rome, admitted to Triumph; but the 〈◊〉〈◊〉
of that Honour proved his great Glory.
All they that from private Estate have aspired to Principality, either by Force or Fraud be come thereunto, unless the same be given, or by Inheritance de∣scended: Yet it is rarely seen, that Force alone prevaileth, but Fraud without Force oft-times sufficeth. Example, Aga∣thocles by such means became Prince of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 John Galeazzo by abusing his Uncle Barnabas, gained the Dominion of Lombardy; and Cyrus circumvented Cy∣axares his Mothers Brother, and by that Craft aspired to Greatness.
Sudden Resolutions are always danger∣ous; and no less Peril ensueth of slow and doubtful Delays. Example, When Hie∣ron Prince of Syracuse died, the War even then being in great Heat between the Romans and Carthaginians, they of Syracusa consulted, whether it were bet∣ter to follow the Fortune of Rome or Car∣thage. In which Doubt they continued until Apollonides, a chief Captain of Syra∣cusa, laid before them, That so long De∣lay would make them hated both of Ro∣mans and Carthaginians. Likewise the
Florentines being by Lewis the Twelfth required to give his Army Passage to∣wards Naples, mused so long upon an Answer, that he became their Enemy, and they forced to recover his Favour full dearly.
To govern a State is nothing else but to take such Order as the Subjects may not, or ought not to offend; which may be done, either by removing from them all means to disobey, or by affording them so great Favours, as reasonably they ought not to change their Fortune; for the mean Course proveth Dangerous. Example, The Latins being by the Va∣lour of Camillus overcome, yielded them∣selves to endure what Punishment it pleased the Romans to inflict.
An Ingenious and Magnanimous Answer being made unto Wise Magistrates, doth oft obtain both Pardon and Grace. Ex∣ample, When the Privernates had rebel∣led, and were by Force constrained to return to the Obedience of the Romans, they sent certain of the City unto Rome, to desire pardon; who being brought be∣fore the Senate, one of the Senators asked the Privernates, what punishment them∣selves
did think they had deserved: The same, quoth they, which Men living in Freedom, think they are worthy of. Whereto the Consul thus replied, Quid si poenam remittimus? Qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus? The Pri∣vernates answered, Si bonam dederitis, & fidelem & perpetuam: Si malam, haud diuturnam. Which Answer was thought to proceed from generous Men, and therefore they were not only pardoned, but also honoured and received into the number of the Roman Citizens.
All Castles, Forcresses, and Places of Strength, be made for Defence, either against the Enemy or Subject: In the first Case they are not necessary, in the second dangerous. For thereby the Prince may at his Pleasure take occasion to insult upon the Subject, when much more seemly he might settle his Estate upon the Love and good Affection of Men. Example, The Castle of Millan made by Duke Francisco Sforza, incited his Heirs to become insolent; and consequently they became odious; which was also the cause that so soon as that City was assault∣ed, the Enemy with facility did possess it.
That Prince or Potentate which builds his Severity rather upon the Trust he hath in Fortresses, than the Love of Men, shall be deceived: For no Place is so strong, as can long defend it self, unless by the Love and Aid of Men it be in time of Necessity succoured. Example, Pope Julio having drawn the Bentivoli out of Bologm, built there a strong Castle; the Governor thereof robbed the People, and they there with grieved, in a short Time took the Castle from him. So after the Revolt of Genoa, Lewis the Twelsth came to the Recovery thereof, and builded there the strongest Fortification of Italy, as well for Sight as the Circumstances inexpugnable. Nevertheless the Citi∣zens rebelled, and within sixteen Months the French were sorced to yield the Castle and Government to Octavio Fra∣gosa.
To build Forts upon Places of Strength, either for defence of our own, or to hold that which is taken from others, hath ever proved to small purpose. Example, The Romans having supprest the Rebel∣lion of the Latins and Privernates, albeit they were People Warlike, and lovers
of Liberty; yet to keep them Subject, built there no Castle, nor other Places fortified: And the Lacedemonians did not only forbear to fortifie the Towns they conquered, but also left their chief City of Sparta unwalled.
The Necessity or Use of Fortification is only upon Frontiers, or such principal pla∣ces where Princes make their Habitation; to the end the Fury of sudden Assaults may be staid, and Time for Succor en∣tertained: Otherwise, Example, the Castle of Millan being made to hold the State in Obedience, could not so do either for the House of Sforza or France. Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Velin, driven from his Dominion by Caesar Borgia, so soon as he recovered his Country, caused all the Forts to be demolished: For by Expe∣rience be found the Love of Men was the surest Defence, and that Fortifications prevailed no less against him than for him.
The Causes of Division and Faction in every Commonweal proceed most com∣monly of Idleness and Peace, and that which unieth, is Fear War. Example, The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and Elinsci having Intelli∣gence
of great Contention between the Nobility and People of Rome, thought that a sit Opportunity to oppress the one and the other: But the Romans informed of such an Intention, appeased all Do mestick Anger, and by the Valour of their Arms, conducted by Gn. Manlius and M. Fabius defeated the Enemies Forces.
The means to usurp an Estate 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is, first before Arms be taken, to be∣come, as it were, an Arbitrator or a Friend indifferent; and after Arms be taken, then to send moderate Aid to the weak Side, as well to entertain the War between the Factions, as also to consume the Strength both of the one, and the other; yet in no wise to employ any great Forces, for thereby either party may discover the Intents to suppress them. Example, The City of Pistoia fallen into Division, the Florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one, and some∣times the other, that in the end both sides weary of the War, voluntarily yielded to their Devotion. Philippo Viscount, hoping sundry times by occasion of Fa∣ction to oppress the Florentines, did often
assault them with great Forces, which was the Cause that they became reunited; and consequently the Duke deceived of his Expectation.
A great Wisdom it is to resrain Op∣probrious and Injurious Speech: For as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the Enemies Force, so doth it move him to greater Hate, and more desire to offend. Example, Gabides, a General of the Persians having long be∣sieged Amida, became weary, and pre∣paring to abandon the enterprise, raised his Camp, which they of the City be∣holding, began to revile the Persians, and from the Walls reproved them of Cowar∣dise; which undiscreet Words so highly 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Gabides, as thereupon he re∣solved to continue the Siege, and within 〈◊〉〈◊〉 days won the City. Tiberius Gracchus appointed Captain of certain Bands of Men, whom for want of other Soldiers the Romans entertained, proclaimed in his Camp, That no Man, upon Pain of Death, should contumeliously call any Sol∣dier Slave, either in Earnest or Jest. Nam facetiae asperae quando nimium ex vero trax∣ere, acrem suimem riam 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Like∣wise
Alexander the Great having con∣quered well near all the East, brought his Forces before Tyre, they fearing Alex∣ander's Fury, offered upon honourable Considerations to yeild him Obedience, only requiring, that neither he nor any of his Forces should enter the City, which motion after four Months Alex∣ander accepted, and so signified by his Ambassador, who arriving at Tyre was by the proud Citizens slain, whereat Alex∣ander grew into Choler, and being ready to forsake the Siege, staid his Forces, and in the end sacked the City and put the People to the Sword.
A Prince or any other State being assaulted by an Enemy of far more puis∣sance than himself, ought not to refuse any honourable Compositions, chiefly when they are offered; for no Conditions can be so base, but shall in some 〈◊〉〈◊〉 turn to Advantage and Honour of him that accepts them. Example, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 1512. certain Florentines procured great Forces of Spaniards to come thither, as well to reposess the Medici then banish'd, as also to sack the City; promising that so soon as the Army of Spain did come
into the Florentine Dominion, the Faction of Medici would be ready armed to re∣ceive them. But the Spaniards being come, found no Forces at all to joyn with them; and therefore wanting Vi∣ctual, offered Composition. The Floren∣tines finding the Enemy distressed grew insolent and refused Peace, whereof followed the loss of Prato, and many other Inconveniences. The like happen∣ed to them of Tyre, as before.
The denial or delay of Justice desired in revenge of Injuries either publick or privately offered, is a thing very danger∣ous to every Prince or other State; for that the Party injured doth oft by indi∣rect means, though with hazard of his Country and himself, seek satisfaction: Example, The Complaint which the Galli made against the Fabii who sent Ambas∣sadors in favour of the Tossani, not being heard, nor any punishment inflicted up∣on them for Fighting against the Law of Nations, was the cause that the Galli were offended with the States, whereof followed the sack of Rome; and the de∣lay of Justice in Philip of Macedon, for not revenging the incestuous oppression
of Attalus to Pausanias, was the Motive to murther that King.
Whoso endeavours the alteration of any State must of necessity proceed with all severity, and leave some memorable Example to those that shall impugn the Ordinance of Government newly set∣led. Example, When Junius Brutus had by his great Valour banish'd the Traquins, and sworn the People that no King should ever reign in Rome; with∣in short time after, many young Nobles, among whom was Brutus's Son, impa∣tient of the equality of the new Govern∣ment, conspired to recall the Tarquins; but Brutus thereof informed, caused his own Son not only to be condemned to death, but was himself present at the Execution.
As Health and soundness of the Hands. Legs, and other outward Members can∣not continue Life, unless the Heart and vital Spirits within be strong and sirm; so Fortifications and Frontier-desences do not prevail, unless the whole Corps of the Kingdom and People be well arm∣ed: Example, When the Emperor came into Italy, and had with some difficulty
past the confines of the Venetians well near without resistance; his Army march'd to Venice, and might doubtless have possest the City, had it not been de∣fended with Water. Likewise the Eng∣lish in their assault of France, excepting a few Encounters on the Frontiers, found no puissant resistance within the Realm. And Anno 1513. they forced all that State, and the King himself to tremble, as ost before they had done; but contra∣riwise the Romans knowing that Life lay in the Heart, ever held the Body of their State strongest: For the nearer the Enemy approach'd Rome, the bet∣ter they found the Country armed and defended.
The desire to command sovereignly is of so great Force, as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of Prin∣cipality, but also in them that have no Title at all. Example, this Appetite moved the Wife of Tarquinius Priscus contrary to all natural Duty to incite her Husband to murder her own Father Ser∣vius, and possess his Kingdom, as being persuaded it were much more honoura∣ble to be a Queen than to be the Daugh∣ter of a King.
The violation of ancient Laws, Or∣ders and Customs, under which People have long time lived, is the chief and only cause whereby Princes hazard their Estate and Royal Dignity. Exam∣ple, Albeit the deflowring of Lucrece was the occasion, yet was it not the cause that moved the Romans to take Arms against Tarquin; for he having before that fact of Sextus his Son, go∣verned Tyrannically, and taken from the Senate all Authority, was become odious both to the Senate, Nobility and People, who finding themselves well∣governed, never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration.
A Prince that desires to live secure from Conspiracy, hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great Riches and Honors, than those whom he hath greatly injured; because they want Means to offend; the other have many opportunities to do it: Example, Perrenius the prime Favorite of Commodus the Emperor, conspired his Death. Plautianus did the like to Seve∣rus, and Sejanus to Tiberius; for being advanced to so great Honors, Riches and
Offices, as nothing remained desirable but the Imperial Title, they conspired against the Persons of their Sovereigns in hope of the Dignity; but in the end they endured that Punishment which to such Disloyalty and Ingratitude apper∣taineth.
An Army which wants Experience, albeit the Captain be expert, is not greatly to be feared; neither ought an Army of well-train'd Soldiers to be much esteemed, whose Captain is ignorant. Example, Caesar going into Africa against Afranius and Petraeus whose Army was full of old Soldiers, said he feared them little, Quia 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad exercitum sine duce. Contrariwise, when he went to Pharsa∣lia to encounter Pompey, he said, Ibo ad ducem sine exercitu.
A Captain General commanding an Army ought rather to govern with Cur∣tesie and Mildness, than with over-much Austerity and Severity. Example, Q. and Appius Claudius being Consuls, were appointed to govern the War. To Q. was allotted one Army which served very dutifully; but Appius commanding the other with great Cruelty, was by his
Soldiers unwillingly obeyed. Neverthe∣less Tacitus seems of contrary Opini∣on, saying, Plus Poena quam obsequium valet.
Therefore to reconcile these different Conceits, I say, that a General having power to command Men, either they are Confederates or Subjects: If Confede∣rates or Voluntaries, he may not pro∣ceed to extream punishment; if Sub∣jects, and his power absolute, they may be governed otherwise; yet with such respect, as the insolence of the General inforce not the Soldiers to hate him.
Honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of Victory. Every Man knoweth Glory is due to the Victor, and we deny not the same Priviledge to the vanquished, being able to make proof that the Loss proceeded not from his Default. Neither is it dishonoura∣ble to violate those Promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of War inforceth. And forced Promises which concern a whole State, are not binding, and rarely or ever kept, nor is the Break∣er thereby to receive Disgrace. Exam∣ple,
Posthumus the Consul having made a dishonourable Peace with the Samnites, was by them with his whole Army sent home disarmed. Being arrived at Rome, the Consul informed the People they were not bound to perform the base Con∣ditions he was compelled to yield unto; albeit, he and those few that promised, were bound to perform them. The Se∣nate thereupon concluded to send him Prisoner to Samno, where he constantly protested the Fault to be only his own; wherefore the People by that Peace in∣curred no Dishonour at all: And For∣tune so much favoured Posthumus, as the Samnites were content presently to re∣turn him to Rome; where he became more glorious for losing the Victory, than was Pontius at Samno for having won the Victory.
Wise Men have long observed, That who so will know what shall be, must consider what is past; for all worldly Things hold the same course they had at first. The Reason is, that as long as Men are possest with the same Passions with former Ages, consequently of these doings the same effects ensue. Ex∣ample,
The Almains and French have ever been noted for their Avarice, Pride, Fury and Infidelity, and so in divers Ages, experience hath proved even to this present: For perfidious Dealing the French have given sufficient proof, not only in ancient times, but also in the time of Charles VIII. who promised to render to the Florentines the Forts of Pisa, but having divers times received Mony, held them not with standing in possession. The Florentines found the like in the Almains; for in the Wars of the Visconti, Dukes of Milan, they prayed aid of the Emperor, who promi∣sed them great Forces; in consideration whereof, he was to receive of the Flo∣rentines one hundred thousand Crowns in Hand, and as much more when his Army was arrived in Italy, both which Payments were performed; but as soon as the Emperor came to Verona he devi∣sed Cavillations of Unkindness where∣upon he returned home.
A Prince desirous to obtain any thing of another, must if occasion so permit, urge his Demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present Answer, as he
who is prest may not have leisure to con∣sider how to excuse himself in denial. Example, Pope Julio endeavoured to drive out of Bologna all the Bentivoli, in which Action he thought the aid of the French recessary, and that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 neutial; and by divers 〈◊〉〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉〈◊〉 them to that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 any resolute An 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he though 〈◊〉〈◊〉 with those sew 〈◊〉〈◊〉 he had to take his Journey to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 on the Venetians 〈◊〉〈◊〉 him they would remain 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 the French King forthwith sent 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 as searing the Popes 〈◊〉〈◊〉 likewise the Tuscans having for 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 aid of the Samnites against the Romens, took Arms suddenly and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their request which the Samnites 〈◊〉〈◊〉 before denied.
When a Multitude 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all may not be 〈◊〉〈◊〉 because they are too many: To punish part and leave the rest 〈◊〉〈◊〉 were Injury to the Sufler∣ers; and to those that escape, an En∣couragement to offend again; therefore to eshew all extremity, mean Courses have been anciently used. Example,
When all the Wives of the Romans conspired to Poyson their Husbands, a convenient number of them wero punisht, and the rest suffered to pass Likewise at the conspiracy of the Bac∣chanals in the time of the Macedonian War, wherein many thousands Men and Women had part, every tenth person only was put to death by lot, although the ossence were general; by which manner of punishing, he that suffered, complain'd on his fortune; and he that escaped, was put in fear, that offending again, the same punish∣ment might light upon himself, and therefore would no more offend.
A Battel or great action in Arms ought not to be enterprised without special Commission or Command from the Prince; otherwise the General in∣curs great danger. Example, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Dictator punisht the General of the Horse in the Roman Army, for ha∣ving sought without his 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ad∣though he had in battle slain 20000 Ene∣mies without loss of 200 of his own: and Caesar commended his Captain 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for having refrain'd to fight,
though with great advantage he might. Also count Egmont hazarded the favor of the King his Master for giving bat∣tel to Marshall de Thermes, albeit he were victorious: for upon the success of that action the loss or safety of all the Low Countries depended.
To govern without Council is not only dangerous in Aristocracies and Po∣pular States, but unto independent Princes an occasion of utter ruin. Ex∣ample, Hieron the first King of Sicily in all his proceedings used the advice of Counsels, and lived fifty years pros∣perously in Peace; but his grand-child succeeding, refusing all Counsel lost his Kingdom, and was with all his Kinsfolk and Friends cruelly slain.
In all Monarchies the Senate or pri∣vy-Council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity, or Men of approved wisdom and understanding. Example, In Polonia no Man is Coun∣sellor unless he be a Palatine, a Bishop, a Castellan, a Captain, or such a one as hath been Ambassador: and in Turky the title of Counsellor is not given but only to the four Bassaes. The two Ca∣delesquires,
the twelve Beglerbegs, and Kings Son, who in his Fathers absence, is as it were a President of the Diva∣no or Senate.
Many Princes Ancient and Modern have used to select out of their Coun∣cil, two or three, or four at most, to whom only they did impart their affairs. Example, The Emperor Au∣gustus had Maecenas and Agrippa; Julius Caesar, Q. Paedius and Cor. Balbus, whom he only trusted with his Cipher and secrets, being Counsellors of the Cabi∣net (as we now call them.)
The alteration of old Laws, or in∣troduction of new, are in all States ve∣ry dangerous, notwithstanding any ap∣pearance of profit or publick utility, which moved wise Governours to de∣cree, that ancient Laws once establish∣ed might never be called in question. Example, The Athenians decreed that no Law should be propounded to the People without the consent of the Se∣nate: the like use is observed in Venice, where no Petition is preferred to the Senate but by advice of the Sages; and among the Loerians the Custom
was, that whosoever presented any new Law to be confirmed, should come with a Halter about his Neck, and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected; also Lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his Laws, did swear the People of Sparta to observe them until∣his return, and thereupon retired him∣self into voluntary exile, with intent never to return.
When necessity or good reason moves Innovation or Abolition of Laws, a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees than suddenly. Example, The Romans finding the Laws of the twelve Tables unprofitable, suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion, but would not publickly sup∣press them for fear of calling other Laws into contempt: so did they con∣tinue 700 years, and were then cassed by Ebutius the Tribune. But Agis King of Lacedemon desirous to revive the Laws of Lycurgus, long discontinued, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all Men to bring in their evi∣dence and writings to be cancelled, to the end a new partition of Lands and Goods might be made; which suddain
and violent proceeding proved so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that it moved a dangerous sedition, wherein he was disposed and with his Mother and Friends put to death; which Example haply moved the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not to attempt any thing against the Au∣thority of Augustino Barberino their Duke. but after his death, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Election of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 〈◊〉〈◊〉 new Ordinances 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 the Ducal Authority.
Whoso hath won to himself so great Love and Affection, as thereby to be∣come master of the forces, and at his pleasure commands the Subjects apt for Arms, may also without right or title assure himself of the whole Estate. Exam∣ple, Hugh Capat a Subject to the Crown of France, being greatly honoured by the Soldiers, sound means thereby to pre∣vent Charles Duke of Lorrain of the Crown, being right Heir by descent from Charlemain. And albeit the Fami∣lies of the Paleologi, Ebrami and Turcan. be of the blood Royal and Right 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Empire, when the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Line shall fail; yet it is like that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 chief Bassa having the love of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉
will usurp the State, because the Pa∣leologi and other Competitors be far from the Turks person, poor and without means to purchase the Soldiers favor.
A Commander General in Arms, ought upon pain of great punishment be enjoyned, not to imploy or retain any forces longer than the time of his Commission. Example, The Dictators of Rome were in this point so precise, as never any of them dared to trans∣gress the time prefixed, till Caesar ob∣tained that dignity should continue in him for life; which was the cause of his usurpation of the State. Also the Thebans commanded, that if the Gene∣ral of their Army did hold his forces one day longer than the time prefixt, he should thereby incur danger of death: which Justice was executed upon Epa∣minondas and Pelopidas.
Banishment of great Lords, or Citi∣zens of great Reputation, hath been in divers places diversly used: for in the one, they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction; in the other, Banishment was accompanied with Consiscation, a course of
great danger. Example, In Argos, Athens, Ephesus, and other Cities of Greece, the Citizens puissant in Friends, Vertue or Riches, were many times banish'd for Envy or Fear, but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer than ten Years; and that without loss of Goods, which was the cause that never any of them Warred against the Coun∣try: But Dion being banish'd Syracusa by Dionysius Junior, and Coriolanus from Rome, did make mighty Wars against their own Country. The like was done by the Medici in Florence.
Honourable and Magnanimous Men were wont not only to enterprise great Acts, but also to suffer patiently all In∣juries which Foes or Fortune could ex∣pose them to: As resolved, that no Calamity was so great as to make their Minds abject, or to forget the Dignity appertaining to Persons vertuous: Ex∣ample, After the defeat of the Roman Army upon the River Allia, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 persued the Victory even to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Walls: Whither being come, and find∣ing the Gates open, without any sign of Resistance they entred the Streets, where
all Honourable Palaces were also unshut, which caused the Galli greatly to doubt. Nevertheless looking into the Houses, they found in every of them a Senator set in a Chair of State, and in his Hand a Rod of Ivory; his Person was also vested with Robes of Dignity, which Majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the Galli, not having before that time seen any such Reverend Sight; and therefore did not only refrain to osfer Violence, but highly admired the Roman Courage, chiesly in that Fortune. Ne∣vertheless at length a rude Gall hapned with his Hand to touch the white Beard of M. Papyrius, whereat he taking 〈◊〉〈◊〉 disdain struck him with his Rod, in requital whereof the Barbarian slew Papyrius, and by that example all the other Senators and persons of dignity were also slain.
Albeit the knowledge and study of Letters be both commendable and necess∣sary in all well regulated States; yet if under so honest pretence, Idleness enter, such Abuses most seasonably be soreseen and rernoved. Example, When Deognis and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 two excellent Philosophers,
were sent Ambassadors from Athens to the Rommans, many of the Nobility that besore disposed themselves to Arms, al∣lured with their Eloquence and marvel∣ous Wisdom, began with great Admi∣ration to follow them: And in lieu of Arms, turned their endeavours to the study of Letters, which the wise Cato discerning, procured the Senate to decree that (to eschew all Inconveniences which so honest Idleness might breed) no Phi∣losophers should from thenceforth be re∣ceived into Rome.
The Honour due to Magistrates was anciently much regarded, and contrari∣wise all irreverent and undutisul Behavi∣our with great Severity punish'd. Ex∣ample, The Censors of Rome degraded a Citizen only for having yawned loud in their Presence: And another called Vectius was slain in the Field, for not doing due reverence to a Tribune when he past by him. It is also observed, that the Son of Fab. Maximus when he was Censor, meeting his Father on Horse∣back, and seeing the Sarjeans assraid to speak to him to dismount, did himself Command him so to do, which Com∣mand
the Father cheerfully and willing∣ly obeyed, saying, Domestick Power must give place to Publick Autho∣rity.
Tyrannous Princes having incurred the universal Hate of People, sound no means so meet to preserve them from Po∣pular Fury, as to execute or deliver into their Hands their own chief Minions and intimate Counsellors. Example, Tiberius delivered to the People his Fa∣vourite Seianus: Nero, Tigellinus. Henry King of Swede committed to their Fu∣ry his best beloved Servant George 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Caracalla caused all his Flatterers to be slain that had persuaded him to kill his Brother. The like was done by Caligula, whereby he escaped him∣self.
A Prince that rewards or pardons a Person that kills another Prince, albeit by that means he is aspired to Soveraign∣ty, shall thereby both incur great Dan∣ger and Hate, and encourage Men therein to attempt the like against 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Therefore wise Princes have not only lest such Services quite 〈◊〉〈◊〉 but also most severely punished
them. Example, The Emperor Severus put all those to death that consented to the Murder of Pertinax; and Alexander the Great executed him that slew Darius, as abhorring that Subject that would lay violent Hands on his Prince, not with∣standing he were an Enemy. Likewise Vitellius put to death all the Murderers and Conspirators against Galba; and Domitian Executed his Secretary Epa∣phroditus for the Murder of Nero, al∣though he instantly desired his aid.
The vertuous and vitious Examples of Princes incite Subjects to imitate the same Qualities; which Rule never or very rarely fails. Example, Francis the First King of France, and other Princes in divers Ages and Places, had great esteem of Learned Men; and forthwith all the Princes, Nobles, Nobility and Clergy, disposed themselves so earnestly to study, as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of Learned Men, as well in Tongues as Sciences. Contrariwise, Alexander the Great, otherwise a Prince of great Ver∣tue, by his immoderate use of Drinking, did draw the greatest number of his
Court and People also to delight in Drunkenness The like effect followed the excessive Intemperance of Mithrida∣tes, King of Amasia.
The last and not the least considerable, is, to observe how great effects Devoti∣on and Contempt of Human Glory work∣eth in the Minds not only of private Per∣sons, but of Kings and Princes also, who have oft abandoned worldly Profit, Ho∣nour and Pleasure, to embrace the con templative retired Life. Example, Ra∣mirus King of Aragon, Verecundus King of Spain, Charlemain Son of Carolus Mar∣tellus, Matilda Queen of France, Amu∣rath King of Turbay, with many others. Imperio Maximus, exemplo Major.
Commissions de∣termine in presence of him that grant∣ed them.
So Henry the Fourth of France by putting his Courtiers to Board∣wages was said to make Money with his Teeth.
The Author of the Epistle Dedicatory to the Dutchess of Suffolk, prefix'd to Mr. Latimer's Ser∣mons, saith, that Lawyers covetous∣ness hath almost devoured England.
Discipline.
Tam bene quam male facta prae∣munt. Mart.