Maxims of state written by Sir Walter Raleigh ; whereunto is added his Instructions to his sonne, and The son's advice to his aged father.

[illustration]

S^r. Walter Ralegh K^t.

MAXIMS OF STATE.

Written by Sir WALTER RALEIGH.

Whereunto is added His Instructions to his SONNE; AND The Son's ADVICE to his Aged Father.

LONDON, Printed by W. Bentley, and are to be sold by W. Shears, at the sign of the Bible, over against the North door of Pauls. 1650.

THE CONTENTS.

Page.

OF Government.

1

Of Policie.

2

Of Monarchie.

3

Of Aristocracie, or Senatory State.

5

Of Free State, or Popular State.

6

Of ••yranny.

7

Of Olygarchie, or the Govern∣ment of a few.

ibid.

Of a Common-wealth.

8

Of causes of States, and Com∣mon-wealths

in general.

10

Of founding a State.

ibid.

Of Causes preserving a State or Common-wealth.

15

Of Mysteries or Sophisms.

ibid.

Of Axioms or Rules of preser∣ving a State.

19

Rules for preser∣ving of a king∣dom. Hereditary.

25

Rules for preser∣ving of a king∣dom. Conquered.

25

Kingdoms hereditary are pre∣served at home by the or∣dering of a Prince.

ibid.

Kingdoms new gotten, or pur∣chased by force, are preser∣ved by 10. Rules.

35

Rules politick of Tyrants.

41

Sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny.

42

Sophisms of the sophistical, or

subtile Tyrant, to hold up his State.

46

Of preservation of an Aristo∣cracie.

52

Of preservati∣on of an Oly∣garchie, by Sophisms.

ibid

Of preservati∣on of an Oly∣garchie, by Rules.

ibid

Of Conversion of States in ge∣neral.

59

Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular.

ibid.

Particular causes of Conver∣sion of State, are of two sorts.

60

Of sedition.

61

Causes of sedition are of two sorts.

ibid.

Of alteration without vio∣lence.

64

A Method, how to make use of

the Book before•• in the reading of the storie.

67

Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government.

ibid.

Example of the like practice in Charls the Fifth.

68

Of observation for the Affir∣mative and the Negative.

ibid.

Of defence for David in mar∣rying Abishag.

70

Political Nobility.

Of Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom.

71

Observations.

Of ways of such as aspire to the Kingdom, and marks to discern them.

73

Political Prince.

75

THE TABLE Of the Chapters contain∣ed in Sir Walter Raleigh's IN∣STRUCTIONS to his SON.

CHAP.

Page.

VIrtuous persons to be made choice of for friends.

1

I. Great care to be had in the choosing of a Wife.

4

II. Wisest men have been abused by flatterers.

10

••V. Private Quarrels to be avoided.

11

••. Three Rules to be observed for the preservation of a

mans estate.

17

VI. What sort of servant•• are most fit to be entertain∣ed.

20

VII. Brave rags wear soon¦est out of fashion.

2••

VIII. Riches not to be sough•• by evil means.

ibid••

IX. What Inconvenience happen to such as deligh•• in Wine.

2••

X. Let God be thy Protectour and Directour in all th•• Actions.

2••

MAXIMS OF STATE.

OF GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is of two sorts. 1. Pri∣vate, of himself. So∣brietie. Of his Fami∣ly; called O••••onomie. 2. Publick, of the Common-wealth; called Poli••ie. A man must first Govern himself, e're he be fit to govern a Family: And his Fa∣mily, e're he be fit to bear the Government in the Common-wealth.

Of Policie.

POlicie is an Art of Government of a Common-wealth, and some part of it according to that State, or form of Government wherein it is setled for the publick good.

State, is the frame or set order of a Common-wealth, or of the Gover∣nours that rule the same, specially of the chief and Sovereign Governour that commandeth the rest.

The State or Sovereignty consisteth in 5. points.

• 1. Making or anulling of Laws.
• 2. Creating and disposing of Magi∣strates.
• 3. Power over life and death.
• 4. Making of War, or Peace.
• 5. Highest o•• last appeal.

Where these five are, either in one or in more, there is the State.

These five points of State, rest ei∣ther in,

• 1. One Monarchie or Kingdom.
• 2. Some few chief men for virtue and wisdom, called an Aristocracie.
• 3. Many, called a Fr••e-State, or Po∣pular State.

These three sorts of Government

have respect to the common good, and therefore are just, and lawful States.

These 3. degenerate into 3. o∣ther Governments. viz.

• 1. Monar∣chie,
• 2. Aristo∣••racie,
• 3. Popular Est••t,

into

• 1. Tyrannie.
• 2. Oligarchie.
• 3. Common-wealth o•• Government of all the common and baser sort, and therefore called a Common-wealth by an usurped Nick∣name.

These all respect their own, and not the publick good, and therefore are ••ailed Bastard Governments.

I. Monarchie.

A Monarchie, or Kingdom, is the Government of a State by one Head, or chief, tending to the com∣mon benefit of all.

Monarchie, or Kingdoms, are of three sorts touching the right, or possession of them; viz.

• 1. Hereditarie, by de••cent, as the English, French, &c.
• 2. Elective, by suffrage of the other Orders, or some of them, as the Poloni∣an.
• 3. Mixt, or of both kinds; viz. by Descent, yet not tyed to the next of bloud, as the ancient Iewish State.

Monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or authority; viz.

• 1. Intire. Where the whole power of ordering all State matters, both in peace and war, doth by law and cu∣stom appertain to the Prince, as in the English Kingdom, where the Prince hath power to make Laws, League, and W••r; To create Magistrates; to pardon life: Of appeal, &c. Though to give a contentment to the other degrees, they have a suffrage in making Laws, yet ever subject to the Princes plea∣sure, nor Negative will.
• 2. Limit••d or restrained, that hath no full power in all the points o•• mat∣ters of State, as the Military King that hath not the Sovereignty in time of peace, as the making of Laws, &c. But in War onely, as the Polonian Kings.

II. Aristocracie, or Senato∣rie State.

AN Aristocracie is the Government of a Common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort, preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the publick good.

Aristocracies are of three sorts, viz. Where the Senatours are chosen, for

• 1. Virtue, Riches, and the Common good, as the Venetian.
• 2. Virtue and the publick good without respect of wealth, as some∣times the Roman, when some of the Se∣natours were fetched from the plough, and some from the Schools.
• 3. Virtue and wealth, more respect∣ing their private, than their publick good, which inclineth towards an Oli∣garchie, or the Government of the Ri∣cher or nobler sort, as in Rome towards the end.

III. Free-State, or Popu∣lar Sta••e.

THe Popular State is the Govern∣ment of a State by the choiser sort of people, tending to the publick good of all sorts; viz. with due respect of the better, nobler, and richer sort.

In every Iust State, some part of the Government is, or ought to be im∣parted to the People; As in a King∣dom, a voice or suffrage in making Lawes; and sometimes also, in levy∣ing of Arms (if the charge be great, and the Prince forced to borrow help of his Subjects) the matter rightly may be propounded to a Parliament, that the tax may seem to have pro∣ceeded from themselves. So consulta∣tions, and some proceedings in Judici∣al matters, may in part be referred to them. The reason, least seeing them∣selves to be in no number, nor of rec∣koning, they mislike the state, or kind of Government: And where the mul∣titude is discontented, there must needs be many enemies to the pre∣sent State. For which cause, Tyrants,

(which allow the people, no manner of dealing in State matters) are for∣ced to bereave them of their wits and weapons, and all other means whereby they may resist, or amend themselves, as in A••shland, ••urk••y, &c.

IV. Tyranny.

A Tyranny is the swerving, or distort∣••g of a Monarc••ie, or the Govern∣m•••••• of one, tending not to the pub∣lick good, but the private benefit of himself, and his followers. As in the Russe and Turkish Government, where the State and Wealth of other o••••ers, are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the King or Empe∣rour. This is the worst of all the Bast∣a••d States, because it is the perverting of the best Regiment, to wit, of a Mo∣narchie, which resembleth the Sove∣reign Government of God himself.

V. Oligarchie, or the Govern∣ment of a few.

AN Oligarchie is the swerving, or the corruption of an Aristocracie;

or the Gov••••nment of some few, that are of the Wealthier or Nobler sort, without a••y respect of the publick good. The chief end of these Gover∣••••••••s, is, their own greatness and en∣riching. And therefore their manner is, to prepare fi•• mean•• to uphold their Esta••es. This St••te is not wholly so bad, as is the Tyrannie, and yet worse than the Commo••-wealth, be∣cause it respecteth the good of a few.

VI. Common-wealth.

A Common-wealth is the swerving or depravation of a F••ee, or popular State, or the Government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort, without respect of the other Orders.

These two States, to wit; The Oli∣g••••chie, and Common-wealth, are very adve••se the one to the other, and have many b••ckerings between them. For that the richer or nobler sort, suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect, because they are superiour, but in some re••pects one∣ly, to wit, in Riches, Birth, Parentage, &c. On the other side, the Common-people suppose, there ought to be an

equality in all other things, and some State matters; because they are equal•• with the Rich or Noble, touching their Lib••••tie, whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour, as touching Government and fitness thereunto, because they are such, to wit, because they are Rich, Noble, Free, &c. But because they are Wise, Virtuous, Valiant, &c. and so have fit parts to Govern a State.

These several States are sometimes mixed, and inter wrought one with the other, yet ever so, as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other, as in the humours and complexions of the body. So in the Rom••n State, the people had their Ple∣his••••ta, and gave the suffrage in the e∣lection of Magistrates: Yet the Senate (as the State stood) for the most part swayed the State, and bare the chief rule. So in the Ven••tian State, th•• Duke seemeth to represe•••• a Mon••rch, and the S••nate to be his Counc••l: Yet ••he Duke hath no power in State matt••rs, but is like a head set on by art, that heareth no brain. And so that State is S••natorical or Aristocratical.

Causes of States & Common-wealths in general.

Causes of States or of Commō-wealths are of 3. sorts, viz.

• 1. Founding, or setling a State where to be consi∣dered.
  • 1. Measure.
  • 2. Parts, & their Qua∣lities.
• 2. Preserving a State.
• 3. Changing, and altering a State.

Founding a State.

In founding a State are to be consi∣dered 2. things.

• 1. Propor∣tion.
• 2. Parts.

PRoportion, is a Just Measure or Me∣diocritie of the State, whereby it is framed and kept in that Order, as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind, to wit, so that a Monarch b•• not too Monarchical, nor strict, or abso∣lute, as the ••usse Kings; nor Aristocra∣tical, that is over-mated or eclipsed by the Nobility, as the Scottish King∣dom, but ever respective to the other degrees. That Aristocratie be not to ma∣gnificent nor intire to it self, but com∣municate

with the people some com∣modities of State or Government, as the V••netian, and sometimes the Roman allowed the people to elect certain Magistrates out of themselves, to have a Tribune, to make Plebiscita, &c. So a Free-State or Common-wealth that it be not over popular, viz. That it de∣press not to much the richer, wiser, nor learneder sort; but admit them to offi∣ces with a Caution out of the rules and mysteries of that State. That they seek no alteration of the present State. The reason, because the moderate States in their several kinds (as all other things that observe the mean) are best framed for their continuance, because they give less cause of grudge, envy, and affecting the Wealth, Honour, and Libertie which they see in others that govern the State; And so are less subject to stirs and commotions, and easiest kept in their present State wherein they are set.

Parts.

THe Parts of the State, or those Magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick Government.

Parts or Partakers of Publick Go∣vernment, are

• 1. Councel or Senate, which consul••∣eth of all matters pertaining to War and Peace, Magistrates, &c. in admit∣ting of whom there ought to be a more special care, that they may be men expert in matter of Policie, because it is their Trade and Vocation, as men use to chuse Pilots, and Masters of Ships, such as know the Art of Naviga∣tion, and not Husband-men, &c. And so ••he contrary.
• 2. Magistrates and Officers, which are to be executioners of that which is consulted, and found to be expedient for the Common-vvealth, wherein are to be observed, the kinds of Magistrates, that they be such as fit that kind of Government; The time of their conti∣nuance, and the manner of their ele∣ction or appointing, by whom, out of whom, and in what manner they be chosen.
• 3. Iudges; To determine in Civil, and Criminal matters, where are to be observed, out of whom they are to be chosen; what kinds are necessary, and the manner o•• Iudgement, and Iudici∣al proceeding.

In Ma∣gistrates are to be ob∣served.

1. Kinds of Ma∣gistrats as,

• ...

  1. Civil

  1. Superiour, which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the State, as Consuls for a year, and not perpetual Dict∣atours in a Se∣natorie State. Praetors, & Cen∣sors, that over∣see manners & orders of the people.

  For a King∣dom Lieute∣nant of Shires, Marshals, Ma∣sters of Horse, Admirals, &c.

  Inferiour, as conservatous of Peace, Consta∣bles, &c.

  Overseers of youth, that take care for their education for civil & warlike exercise.

• ...

  Clarks of the Market that provide for the quantity, and price of victual.

  Ediles for Buildings, Streets, Bounds.

  Questours, or Trea∣surers, to keep and di∣spence the publick Treasury.

  A••••uaries, or Reco••∣ders, which keep the publick Records.

  Ga••l••rs, to keep pri∣sons and Prisoners.

  Surveyours of woods and fields, &c.

• ...

  2. Ec∣clesia∣stical.

  1. As Bishops or Pa∣stours, Elders, Wardens.

  2. Time of Magi∣strates, whereof some are perpetual, some for a time, viz. for more years, a year, half a year, according to the necessity of the Com∣mon-wealth, and not perpetual; or at least not Hereditary in a Kingdom. Yearly in an Aristocracie, or half

• ...

  yearly in a Free-state.

  3. Manner of choise, by whom and how to be chosen, where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage, and not by Lot.

Causes preserving a State, or Common-wealth.

In preser∣ving of States, 2. things re∣quired.

• 1. Mysteries, or Sophisms.
  • 1. General to all States.
  • 2. Particular, for eve∣ry several State.
• 2. Rules, or Actions.
  • 1. General, for all States.
  • 2. Particular, for every State.

Mysteries, or Sophisms.

MYsteries, or Sophisms of State, are certain secret practises, either for the avoyding of danger, or avert∣ing such effects as tend to the preser∣vation

of the present State, as it is set or founded.

State Mysteries are of two sorts.

• 1. General: That pertain to all States; as first, to provide by all means, that the same degree, or part of the Common-wealth, do not exceed both in Quantity and Q••ality. In Quantity, as that the number of the Nobility, or of great persons, be not more, than the State or Common-wealth can beare. In Quality, as that none grow in wealth, liberty, honours, &c. more than it is meet for that degree; For as in weights, the heavier weights bear down the Scale: So in Common-wealths, that part or degree that ex∣celleth the rest in Quality, and Quan∣tity, overswayeth the rest after it, where∣of follow alterations, and conversions of State. Secondly, to provide by all means, that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams, (viz.) of Nobility and Ge••t••y, and the base rascal, and begarly sort. For this maketh the State constant and firm, when both the Extreams are tied together by a middle sort, as it were with a band, as for any conspiracy of the rich and beg∣garly sort together, it is not to be fear∣ed. To these two points, the Particu∣lar

• rules or Sophisms of every Common-wealth, are to be applied.
• 2. Particular: That serve ••or pre∣servation of every Common-wealth, in that form of State wherein it is setled as in a Kingdom. That the Nobility may be accustomed to bear the govern∣ment of the Prince, especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the Princes eye, it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the Princes Court, under pretence of doing them honour, or being desirous to see, and enjoy their prese••ce; and to have their children, especially their eldest, to be attendant upon the Prince, as of special favour towards them and theirs, that so they may be trained up in du∣ty and obedience towards the Prince, and be as Hostages for the good beha∣viour, and faithfull dealing of their Parents, especially, if they be of any suspected note. To that end serves the Pe••si•••• practise, in having a Band, or Train of the S••trapa's children, and other Nobles to attend the Court; which was well imitated by our Train of H••n••••men, if they were of the No∣bler sort. Again, sometimes to borrow small sums of his Subjects, and to pay them again, that he may after borrow

• greater sums and never pay: So in an Oligarchy, least it decline to a Popular State, they deceive the people with this and the like Sophisms, (viz.) They compel their own sort, to wit, the rich men, by great penalties, to frequent their Assemblies for choosing of Ma∣gistrates, for provision of Armour, war∣like Exercises, making an Execution of Laws, &c. By that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer, but to suffer the poorer, and meaner sor•• to be absent, and to neglect those As∣semblies und••r pretence, that they will not draw them from their business, and private earnings,: Yet withall to cite thither some few of them, (viz.) so many as are easily over matched by the ••icher sort, to make a shew, that they would have the people or poorer sort, partakers likewise of those mat∣ters, yet terrifying those that come to their Assemblies, with the tediousness of consultations, greatness of Fines, if they should mis-do, to the end, to make them unwilling to come a∣gain, or to have to do with those Con∣sultations; by which means, the rich∣er sort do still govern the State, with the peoples liking, and good content∣ment.

Axioms.

Axioms or Rules of pre∣serving the state are,

• 1. G••neral, that serve for all Common-wealths.
• 2. Particular, that serve for every several State.

General Rules.

1. THe first and principal Rule of Po∣licie to be observed in all States, is to profess, and practise, and main∣tain the true worship and Religion of Almighty God prescribed unto us in his word, which is the chief end of all government. The Axio••, That God be obeyed simply without excep∣tion, though he command that which seemeth unreasonable, and absurd to Humane policy; as in the Iews Common-wealth, That all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship God four times, leaving none to defend their coast, though being beset with many Enemies. Not to sow the seventh year, but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of fa∣mine, &c.

2. To avoid the causes of Conversi∣ons, whereby States are over-thrown, that are set down in the Title of con∣versions; For that Common-vvealths (as natural bodies) are preserved by avoid∣ing that which hurteth the health and State thereof, a••d are so cured by con∣trary medicines.

3. To take heed, that no Magistrate be created or continued contrary to the Laws and policy of that Stat••. As that in a S••nate, there be no•• created a perpetual Dict••tor, as Caesar in Rome. In a Kingdom, that there be no Senate, or Convention of equal power with the Prince in State matters, as in Po∣land.

4. To create such Magistrates as love the State as it is setled, and take heed of the contrary practise, as to advance Popular persons in a Kingdom, or A••i∣stocracie. And secondly, to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve, and what hurteth or altereth the present Stat••.

5. To that end to have certain Of••i∣cers to p••y abroad, and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in sit sort, agreeable to the present State, but de••••e rather to be under some o∣ther form, or kind of government.

6. To take heed that Magistracies be not sold for money, nor bribe in their Offices, which is specially to be observed in that Common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort; For if the Magistrate gain nothing but his Common Fees, the common sort, and such as want honour, take in good part that they be not preferred, and are glad rather that themselves are suffe∣red to intend private business. But if the Magistrate buy and sell matters, the common people are doubly grieved, both because they are debar'd of those preferments, and of that gain they see to grow by them, which is the cause that the Germ••in Oligarchi••s continue so firm; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth, and the rich∣er sort are by that means freed, and se∣cured from being under the poor.

7. To take heed that the State, as it is setled and maintained, be not over∣stuct, nor exceed in his kind; (viz.) That a Kingdom be not too Monarchi∣cal, nor a Popular State too Popular: For which cause it is good, that the Ma∣gistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour, and behave them∣selves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts, though

inferiour for place and Office; And sometimes popula••ly with the com∣mon people, which is the cause that some Common-wealths, though they be very simply, and unskilfully set, yet conti••••e ••••rm, because the Magistrates behave thems••lves wi••ely, and with due re••pect towards the r••st that are with∣out honour; and therefore ••ome kind of Modera•••• Popularity is to be used in every ••ommon-wealth.

8. To take heed of small beginnings, and to meet with them even at the first, as well touching the breaki••g and altering of Lawes, as of other rules which concern the continuance of eve∣ry several State. For the disease and alteration of a Common-wealth, doth not happen all at once, but grows by degrees, which every common wit cannot discern, but men expert in POLICIE.

9. To provide, that that part be e∣ver the grea••er in number and power, which favours the S••ate as now ••t sta••ds. This is to be observed as a ve••y Oracle in all Common-weal••hs.

10 To observe a mean in all the de∣grees, and to suffer no pa••t to exceed, or decay over much. As first for p••e∣fe••ments,

to provide that they be ra∣ther small and short, than great and long; and if a••y be grown to overmuch greatness, to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour. Where the Sophisms are to be practised (viz.) to do it by parts and degrees; to do it by occasion, or colour of law, and not all at once. And if that way serve not, to advance some other, of whose virtu•• and faithfulness, we are fully assur••d, to as high a degree, or to a greater ho∣nour; and to be the friends and fol∣lowe••s of him that excelleth, above that which is meet. As touching wealth, to provide, that those of the middle sort (as before was said) be more in number; and if any grow high, and overcharged with wealth, to use the So••••isms of a Po••ula•• State, viz. to send him on Embassages, and Forreign Negotiations, or imploy him in some Office that hath g••••at charges, and little honour, &c. To wh••ch end, the Edil••ship served in some Common-wealths.

11. To suppress the Factions, and quarrels of the Nobles, and to keep other that are y•••• free from joyni••g with them in their partakings and Fa∣ctions.

12 To increase or remit the common Taxes and Contributions, according to the wealth, or want of the People and Common-wealt••. If the people be in∣creased in Wealth, the Taxes and Sub∣sidies may be increased. If they be poor, and their Wealth diminish, spe∣cially by dearth, want of Traffick, &c. to forbear Taxes and Impositions, or to take little. Otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow. The Sophisms that serve for Imposi••i∣tions, are these, and other of like sort, to pretend business of great charge, as War, building of Ships, making of Ha∣vens, Castles, Fortifications, &c. for the Common defence; sometimes by Lotteries and like devises, wherein some part may be bestowed, the rest reserved for other expences; but Princely dealings needs no preten∣ces.

13 To Provide that the Discipline & Training of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that Common-wealth: As that in a Kingdom, the sons of Noble men to be attendant at the Court, that they may be accustom∣ed to obedience towards the Prince: In the Senatory State, that the sons of the Senatours be not idly, nor over

daintily brought up, but well instruct∣ed and trained up in Le••rning, Tongues, and Martial Exercise; that they may be able to bear that place in the Com∣mon-wealth, which their Father held, and contrariewise, in a Popular State,

14. To take heed, least their So∣phisms, or secret practises for the conti∣nuance and maintenance of that State, be not discovered; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves, but wisely used, and with great se∣crecie.

Particular Rules.

Rules and Axioms, for preserving of a King∣dom.

• ...Hereditary.
• ...Conquered.

Kingdoms Hereditary, are preserved at home by the ordering,

• 1. HImself, viz. By the tempering and moderation of the Princes Povver and Prerogative. For the less and more temperate their Povver and State is, the more firm, and stable is

• their Kingdom and Governm••nt; be∣cause they seem to be further off from a Master-like, and Tyrannical Empire; and less unequal in condition to the next degree, to wit, the Nobility, and so less subject to grudge and en∣vy.
• 2. Nobility; viz. By keeping that degree and due proportion, that nei∣ther they exceed in number more than the Realm, or State can bear, as the Scottish Kingdom, and sometime the English, when the Realm was over∣charged with the number of Dukes, Earls, and other Nobles; whereby the Authori••y of the Prince was eclipsed, and the Realm troubled with their Fa∣ctions and Ambitions. Nor that any one excel in Hono••r, Power, or wealth, as that he resemble another King with∣in the Kingdom, as the house of Lancaster within this Realm, To that end, not to load any with too much Hono••r or preferment, because it is hard even for the best, and worthiest men, to bear their greatness, and high Fortune tempera••ely, as appeareth by infinite examples in all States. The Sophism for preventing, or reforming this inconvenience, are to be used with great caution and wisdom. If any

• great person be to be abated, not to deal with him by calumniation, or for∣g••d matter, & so to cut him off without desert, especially if he be gratious a∣mong the people, after the Machiavili∣an Policie, which besides the injustice, is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the Prince. Nor to withdraw their Honour all at once, which maketh a desperate Discontent∣ment in the party, and a commiserati∣on in the peole, and so greater love, if he be gracious for his virtue, and pu∣blick service. Nor to banish him into forreign Countries, where he may have opportunity of practising with Forr••ign States, whereof great danger may en∣sue, as in the example of Coriolanus, Henry the fourth, and such like. But to use these, and the like Sophisms, viz. To abate their greatness by degrees, as David Ioabs, Iustinian Bellisarius, &c. To advance some other Men to as great, or greater Honour, to shadow, or over-mate the greatness of the o∣ther. To draw from him by degrees his friends, and followers by prefe••∣ments, rewa••ds, and other good a••d lawfull means; especially, to be pr••∣vided that these great men be not im∣ployed in great or powerfull affairs of

• the Common-wealth, whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the State.
• 3. People, viz. So to order and behave himself, that he be loved, and reverenced of the People. For that the Prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies, o•• forreign Invasion, if he be firmly loved of his own people. The reason, for that the Rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enter∣prise, nor any refuge, being discovered and put to flight, if the multitude affect their Prince: But the Common people being once offended, hath cause to fear every moving, both at home and abroad. This may be effected by the Prince, if he use means and art of get∣ting the favour of the people, and a∣void those things that breed hatred & contempt; viz. if he seem as a Tutor, or a Father to love the people, and to protect them, if he maintain the peace of his Kingdom; For that nothing is more popular, nor more pleasing to the people, than is peace.
• 4. If he shew himself oftentimes graciously, yet with State and Ma∣jesty to his people, and receive com∣plaints of his suppliants, and such like.
• ...

• 5. If he sit himself sometimes in o∣pen Courts, and place of Iustic••, that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people. If he bestow ma∣ny benefits and graces upon that City, which he maketh the seat of his Empire, and so make it sure and faithfull unto him, which is fit to be in the middle of his Kingdom, as the hear•• in the middle of the body, or the Sun in the middle of Heaven, both to divide him∣self more easily into all the parts of his Dominions; and least the furthest parts•• at one end move, whilest the Prince is in the other. I•• he go in progress many times to see his Provinces, especially, those that are re∣mote.
• 6. If he gratifie his Courtiers and Att••n••ants in that ••ort, and by such means, as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people, as with Monopolies, and such like.
• 7. If he commit the handling of such things as procure envy, or seem grievous to his Ministers, but reserve those things which are gratefull, and well pleasing to himself, as the French Kings, who for th••t purpose, as may seem, have erected their Court at Pa∣ris,

• which acquitteh the Prince from grudge and ••nvy, both with the Nobles and the P••ople.
• 8. If he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people, though he have no need, and pay the same justly with∣out defalca••ion of any part by his Ex∣chequer, or other Officer.
• 9. If he avoid all such things as may breed ••atred, or contempt of his per∣son, which may be done, if he shew himself not too light, inconstant, hard, cruel, ••sfeminate, fearfull, and dastardly, &c. But contrarywise, Religious, Grave, Iust Valiant, &c. Whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the Machiavilian Policie, with far the bet∣means to keep the people in obedi∣ence, than love, and reverence of the people towards the Prince.
• 10 If the Prince be well fur∣nished with Warlike provision, which is to be rumoured, and made known abroad: if it be known, that he is reverenced, and obeyed by his peo∣ples at home.
• 11. If he provide so much as lyeth in him, that his neighbour Kingdoms grow not over much in power and Do∣minion; which if it happen, he is to joyn speedily with other Princes, which

• are in like danger to abate that great∣ness, and to strengthen himself and the rest against it. An oversight of the Christian Princes towards the King of Spain.
• 12. If he get him Intelligencers by Reward, or other means, to detect or hinder the designs of that Prince, with whom he hath differences, if any thing be intended against his State. Or at least have some of his own Lydging a∣broad, about that Princes Court, under colour of Embassage, or some other p••etence; which must be men of skill and Dexterity to serve for that turn.
• 13. To observe the Laws of his Countrey, and not to encounter them with his Pr••rogative, nor to use it at all where there is a Law, for that it ma∣keth a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts, especially if it tender to take from them ••••••ir commodities, and to bestow them upon other of his COURTIERS and Mini∣sters.
• 14. To provide especially, That that part, which favoureth th•• State as it standeth, be more potent, than the other which favoureth it not, or desireth a change.
• ...

• 15. To make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of Magistrates, especially, of such as as∣sist the Prince in his Counsels, and Poli∣cies, and not to lean over much to his own advise, contrarie to the rule of Machiavil, who teacheth, That a Prince can have no good counsel, except it be in himself; his reason, because if he use the counsel of some one, he is in danger to be over-wrought, and supplanted by him; & if he counsel with more, Then he shall be distracted with the differences in opi∣nions. As if a Prince of great, or mean wisdom, could not take the Iudgement of all his Counsellorurs in any point of Policie, or of so many as the himself thinketh good, and to take it either by word, or in writing; and him∣self then in private peruse them all, and so after good and mature deliberation, make choice of the best, without any distraction or binding himself to the di∣rection of one. For the Proverb is true, that two eyes see more than one; and there∣fore the advises, and Consultations of a Senatory State, is compared by some to a Feast, or dinner, where many contribute to∣wards the shot, by which means they have more variety of dishes, and so better fare; and yet every man may make choice of

• ... that dish, that s••rve••h him best ••or his health and appeti••e.
• 16. The Prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique ju∣stice, and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity, whereby great re∣verence and estimation is gotten, as in the example of Solomon, which may seem the reason, why our Kings of En∣gland had their Kings Bench in place of publick Justice, after the manner of the ancient Kings that ••ate in the Gate; where for better performing of this Princely duty, some special causes may be selected, which may throughly be deba••ed and considered upon by the Prince in private, with the help and ad∣vise of his learned Councel, and so be decided publickly, as before is said, by the Prince himself; At least, the Prince is to ••ake accomp•• of every Mi∣nister of publick Justice, that it may be known, that he hath a care of Ju∣stice, and doing right to his people, which makes the Justic••rs also to ••e more ••••reful in performing of their duties.
• 17. To be moderate in his Taxes, and impositions; and when need doth require to use the Subjects purse, ••o do it by Parliaments, and with their

• consents, making the cause apparent unto them, and shewing his unwilling∣ness in charging them. Finally, so to use it, that it may seem rather an offer from his Subjects, than an exaction by him.
• 18. To stop small beginnings; unto ••his end to compound the dissentions ••hat arise amongst the Nobles, with caution, that such as are free be not drawn into parts, whereby many times the Prince is endangered, and the whole Common-wealth set in a combusti∣on; as in the example of the Barons Wars, and the late Wars of France, which grew from a quarrel betwixt the Guision Faction, and the other No∣bility.
• 19. To stir up the people, if they grow secure, and negl••gent of A••mour, and other provision for the Common-wealth, by some rumour or fear of dan∣ger at home, to make more ready when occasion requireth. But this seldom to be used, least it be supposed a false Alarm, when there is need in∣deed.
• 20. To have special care, that his children, especially, the heir apparent, have such bringing up as is meet for a King, viz. in learning, specially of

• matters pertaining to State, and in Martial exercise, contrary to the pra∣ctise of many Princes, who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure, and to spend their time in hunting, &c. which by reason of their defects, afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of State.

II. Kingdoms new gotten, or pur∣chased by force, are pre∣served by these means.

1. FIrst, if they have been Subjects before to his Ancestours, or have the same tongue, manners, or fashions, as have his own Countrey, it is an eas•••• matter to retain such Countries within their obedience, in case the Princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct. For men of the same qua∣lity, tongue, and condi••ion, do easily shole, and combine thems••lves together, so much the rather, if the people of that countrey have served before, and were not accustomed to their own Li∣b••r••y, wherein specially is to be ob∣served,

that the laws and customs o•• that purchased Countrey be not alte∣red nor innovated, or at least it be done by little and little. So the ••ur∣gundians and Acquitains were annexed to France. The reason, because part∣ly they have been accustomed to serve, and partly, for that th••y will not ••asily agree about any other to be their Prince, if the Bloud Royall be once extinguished. As for the invasion of a forreign Coutrey, whereunto the Prince hath no right, or whereof the right heir is living,; It is not the part of a just Civil Prince, much less a Prince Christian to enforce such a countrey; and therefore, the Machiavilian practises in this case, to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the Bloud Royal, is lewd and imper••inent: The like is to be said of murthering the Natives, or the greatest part of them, to the end he may hold the rest in sure posession. A thing not onely against Christian Reli∣gion, but it is inhumane injustice, cruel, and barbarous.

2. The safest way is, (supposing a right) that some good part of the Natives be transplanted into some o∣ther place, and our Colonies, consist∣ing of so many as shall be thought

meet, be planted there in some part of the Province, Castles, Forts, and Havens, seized upon and more provided in fit places, as the manner was of the Baby∣lonian Monarch, which Transplanted 10. Iews: And of the Romans in France, Tribes of the Germany, Br••tany, and o∣ther places. The reason:

• 1. For that otherwise Forces of Horse and Foot, are to be main∣tained within the Province, which cannot be done without great charge.
• 2. For that the whole Province is ••roubled and grieved with re∣moving and supplying the Army with victuals, carriages, &c.
• ...

  3. For that Colonies are more sure and faith••ul, than the rest.

  As for the Natives that are removed from their former ••ears, they have no means to hurt, and the rest of the Natives being free from the inconvenience, and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly, are content to be quiet.

  The Turks practise in Asia, where the chief grounds and dwellings are posessed by the Souldiers,

• ...

  whom they call, Timariotae.

  That the Prince have his seat and his residence, in his new pur∣chase, especially, for a time, till things be well setled; especially, if the Province be great and large, as the Turks in Greece: The reason;

  • 1. Because the presence of the Prince availeth much to keep things in order, and get the good will of his new Subjects.
  • 2. They conceive that they have re∣fuge by the Princes presence, if they be oppressed by the Lieu∣tenants, and inferiour Govern∣ours: Where it will be conveni∣ent for the winning the peoples hearts, that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or op∣pression.
  • 3. Because being present, he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted; and so may quickly give remedy to it, which being absent, he cannot do, or not do in time.
  • 4. If the Prince himself cannot be present to reside, then, to take heed that the charge of Governing, or new

• ...
  • purchases be committed to such as be sure men, and of other meet quality, that depend wholly upon the Princes favour, and not to Natives, or other of their own Subjects, that are gracious ••or their Nobil••••y, or Virtue; especially, if the Province be great, and some∣what far distant, which may soon se∣duce the unsetled affections of those new subjects. As for such Governours, as depend wholly upon the Princes fa∣vour, being not born, but created No∣ble, they will not so easily suffer them∣selves to be won from their duty, and in case they would revolt, yet they are not able to make any great strength, for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers, to keep them in Subjection, and not for any ill will.

• 4. To have the children of the ch••e•• Noble men, and of greatest Au∣thority, Hostages with them in safe keeping, the more the better: For that no bound is stronger, than that of nature, to contain the Parents and Alies in obedience, and they the rest.
• 5. To alter the laws but by degrees one after another, and to make other that are more behovefull for the esta∣blishing

• of the present Govern••∣ment.
• 6. To keep the people quiet and peaceable, and well affected so much as may be, that they may seem by be∣ing conquered, to have gotten a pro∣tectour, rather than a Tyrant; For the Common-People, if they enjoy peace, and ••e not distracted nor drawn from their business, nor exacted upon beyond measure, are easily con••ained under obedience; Yet notwithstand∣ing, they are to be dis••used from the practise of Arms, and other Exerci∣ses which increase courage, and ••e weakened of Armour, that they have neither spi••it, ••or will to rebel.
• 7. If the••e be any ••action in the Countrey, to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part, and to combine with it, ••as Caesar in Fra••••e.
• 8. To look well to the Borders, and confining Provinces, and if any rule there of great, or equal power to him∣••elf, to joyn league with some other Borderers, though of less strength, to hinder the attempts (if any should be) by such neighbour Prince. For it hap∣peneth often, tha•• a Countrey in••e••ted by one neighbour P••ince, ••calleth in

• another, of as great, o•• greater power, to assist, and rescue it from the other that invadeth it; So the Romans were called into Greece, by the AEtolians; the Saxons, by the Britains, the Danes, by the Saxons.
• 9. To leave their Ti••les and digni∣ties to the Natives, but the command and Authority, wholly to his own.
• 10. Not to put much trust, nor to practise to often the Sophisms of Poli∣cy, especially those that appertain to a Tyrannical State, which are soon de∣••ected by men of Judgement, and so bring discredit to the Prince, and his Policy among the wiser, and better sort of his subjects, whereof must needs fol∣low very ill effects.

The Sophisms of Tyrants, are rather to be known, than practised, (which are for the supporting of their Tyrannical States,) by wise and good Princes, and are these, and such like as follow.

Rules Politick of Tyrants.

RVles practised by Tyrants are of 2. sorts. viz.

• 1. Barbarous, and Pro••essed, which is

• proper to those that have got head, and have power sufficient of them∣selves, without others help, as in the Tu••kish, and Russe Govern∣ment.
• 2. So••histical, and Dissembl••d; As in some States that are repu••ed for good and lawfull Monarchies, but inclining to Tyrannies, proper to those which are not yet ••••tled, nor have power suffici∣ent of themselves; but must use the power and help of others, and so are forced to be Politick Soph••st∣••••s.

I. Sophisms of a Barbarous and professed Tyranny.

TO expel and banish ou•• of his countrey all ho••est means, where∣by his people may a••tain to learning, wisdom, valour, and other virtues, that they might be fit for that estate, and ••ervile condition. For that these two, learning, and martial exercise, ef∣fect two things most dangerous to a Tyranny: viz. Wisdom, and Valour. For that men of spirit and understand∣ing, can hardly endure a Servile State.

To this end, to forbid learning of li∣••eral Arts, and Martial exercise; As in the Rus••e Government, so Iulian the Apo••tata dealt with the Christians. Contrarywise, to use his people to base occup••tions, and Mechanical Arts, to keep them from idleness, and to put a∣way from them all high thoughts, and manly conceits, and to give them a li∣berty of drinking drunk, and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted, and so made unfit for great enterprises. So the Egyptian Kings dealt with the Heb••ews; So the Russe Emperour with his Russe peo∣ple: And Charles the fifth with the Ne∣th••rlanders, when he purposed to en∣close their Priviledges, and to bring them under his absolute Govern∣ment.

2. To make sure to him, and his State, his Military men by reward, liberty, and other means, especially, his Guard, or Praetorian ••and; That being partakers of the spoil and be∣nefit, they make like that State, and continue firm to it; as the Turk, his Ianizaries; the Russe, his Boyarens, &c.

3. To unarm his people of weapons, money, and all means, whereby they

may resist his power; And to that end, to have his set and ordinary exactions, viz. Once in two, three, or four years, and sometimes yearly, as the Turk and Russe; who is wont to say, That his peo∣ple must be used as his flock of sheep, viz. Their fle••c•• taken from them, least it o∣verlade them, and grow too heavy; That t••ey are like to his beard, that the more it was shaven, the thicker it would grow. And if there be any of extraordinary wealth, to borrow of them in the mean while, till the Tax come about, or up∣on some devised matter, to confiscate their goods, as the common practise is of the Russe and Tu••k.

4. To be still in Wars, to the end, his people may need a Captain; and that his Forces may be kept in practise, as the Russe doth yearly a∣gainst the Tartar, Pol••nian, and Swe∣den, &c.

5. To cut off such as excel the rest in wealth, favour, or nobil••ty; or be of a pregnant, or a spiring wit, & so are fearfull to a Tyrant, and to suffer none to hold Office, or any honour, but one∣ly of him; as the Turk, his Bas••••••s; and the Russe, his ••u••zzes.

6. To forbid Guild••, Brotherhoods, Feastings, and other Assemblies among

the people, that they have no means or oportunity to conspire, or confer to∣gether of publick matters, or to main∣tain love amongst themselves, which is very dangerous to a Tyrant, the Russes practise.

7. To have their Beagles, or listen∣ers in every corner, and parts of the Realm; especially, in places that are more suspect, to learn what every man saith, or thinketh, that they may pre∣vent all attempts, & take away such as mislike their State.

8. To make Schism, and Division a∣mong his Subjects, viz. To set one Noble man, against another, and one Rich man against another, that through Faction & disagreement among them∣selves, they may be weakened, and at∣tempt nothing against him, and by this means entertaining whisperings, and complaints, he may know the secrets of both parts, and have matter against them both, when need requireth. So the Russe made the Faction of the Ze••∣••ky, and the Oppress••nie.

9. To have strangers for his Guard, and to entertain Parasites, and other base and servile fellows, not too wise, and yet subtile, that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he

commandeth, though never so wicked and unjust. For that good men can∣not flatter, and wise men cannot serve a Tyrant.

All these practises, and such like, may be contracted into one or two, viz. To bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt, or to alter the present State. The use is Caution, not Imitati∣on.

II. Sophisms of the Sophistical, or subtile Tyrant, to hold up his State.

1. TO make shew of a good King, by observing a temper and medio∣critie in his Government, and whole course of life; To which end, it is ne∣cessary, That this subtile Tyrant, be a cunning Polititian, or a Machiavilian at the least, and that he be taken so to be, for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded, and is thought thereby, not unworthy for to Govern others.

2. To make shew not of severity, but of gravity, by seeming reverent,

and not terrible in his speech, and gesture, and habite, and other demean∣our.

3. To pretend care of the Com∣mon-wealth; And to that end, to seem loath to exact Tributes, and other Charges; and yet to make ne∣cessity of it, where none is: To that end, to procure such War as can bring no danger toward his State, and that might easily be compounded, or some other chargeable business; and to continue it on, that he may continue his exacti∣on and contribution so long as he list. And thereof to imploy some in his publick Service, the rest to hoord up in his Treasury, which is sometimes practised even by lawfull Princes, as Edward the fourth in his Wars against France, when having levied a great sum of Money throughout his ••ealm, espe∣cially of the Londoners, he went over Seas, and returned without any thing doing.

4. Sometimes to give an account by open speech, and publick writing, of the expence of such Taxes and Impo∣sitions, as he hath rec••ived of his ••ub∣jects, that he may so seem to be a good Husband, and frugal, and not a robber of the Common-wealth.

5. To that end, to bestow•• some cost upon publick buildings, or some o∣ther work for the Common good, es∣pecially upon the Ports, Forts, and chief Cities of his Realm, that so he may seem a benenefactour, and have a delight in the adorning of his Coun∣trey, or doing some good for it.

6. To forbid feastings, and other meetings, which increase love, and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters, under pretence of sparing cost for better uses, To that end, the Curfieu Bell was first ordain∣ed by William the•• Conquerour, to give men warning to repair home at a cer∣tain hour.

7. To take heed that no one grow to be over-great, but rather, many e∣qually great, that they may envy, and contend one with another; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort, to do it warily, and by degrees; If quite to wreck him, and to have his life, yet to give him a lawfull tryal, after the manner of his Countrey; And if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation, as to do him contumely, or disgrace, not to suffer him to escape, because contumely and disgrace, are things contrary unto Ho∣nour,

which great spirits do most de∣sire, and so are moved rather to a re∣venge for their disgrace, than to any thankfulness, or acknowledging the Princes favour for their pardon or dis∣mistion; True in Atheists, but not in true Christian Nobilitie.

8. To unarm his people, and store up their weapons, under pretence of keeping them safe, and having them ready when service requireth, and then to arm with them, such and so many as he shall think meet, and to commit them to such as are sure men.

9. To make schism or division un∣der hand among his Nobility, and be∣twixt the Nobility and the people, and to set one Rich man against another, that they combine no•• together, and that himself by hearing the griess and complaints, may know the secrets of both parts, and so have matter a••ainst them both, when it listeth him to call them to an account.

10. To offer no man any contume∣ly or wrong, specially, about womens mat••ers, by attempting the chastity of their Wives or Daughters, which hath been he ruin of many Tyrants, and conversion of their States. As of ••ar∣quinius,

by Brutus, Appius, by Virgi∣nius, Pisistratus, by Harmodius, Alex∣ander Medices, Duke of Florence, Aloi∣sus of Placentia, Rodericus, King of Spain, &c.

11. To that end, to be moderate in his pleasures, or to use them close∣ly, that he be not seen; For that men sober, or watchfull, or such as seem so, are not lightly subject to contempt, or conspiracies of their own.

12. To reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enter∣prize; or do any special action ••or the Common-wealth, in that man∣ner as it may seem, they could not be better regarded, in case they lived in a Free-state.

13. All rewards and things grate∣full, to come from himself, but all pu∣nishments, exactions, and things un∣gratefull, to come from his Officers, & publick Ministers; And when he hath effected what he would by them, if he see his people discontented withall, to make them a Sacrifice to pacifie his Subjects.

14. To pretend great care of Reli∣gion, and of serving God, (which hath been the manner of the wickedest

Tyrants) for that people do less fear any hurt from those, whom they think Virtuous and Religious, nor at∣tempt likely to do them hurt, for that they think that God protects them.

15. To have a strong & sure Guard of forreign Souldiers, and to bind them by good turns, that they having at least profit, may depend upon him, and the present State; As C••ligula, the German Guard, where the Nobility are many and mighty. The like is practised by Lawfull Kings, as by the French King.

16. To procure that other great persons bee in the same fault, or case with them, that for that cause they be forced to defend the TYRANT, for their own safe∣tie

17. To take part, and to joyn him∣self with the stronger part; if the Common people, and mean degree be the stronger, to joyn with them; if the Rich and Noble, to joyn with them. For so that part with his own strength, will be ever able to overmatch the o∣ther.

18. So to frame his manners & whole behaviour, as that he may seem, if

not perfectly good, yet tolerably evil, or somewhat good, somewhat bad.

These Rules of Hypocritical Ty∣rants, are to bee known, that they may be avoyded, and met withall, and not drawn into imi∣mitation.

Preservation of an Ari∣stocracie.

RUles to preserve a Senatory State, are partly taken from the common Axioms, and partly from those that preserve a Kingdom.

Preservation of an Oligarchie, by

• Sophisms.
• Rules.

1. IN Consultations and Assemblies, about publick affairs, to order the matter, that all may have liberty to frequent their Common Assem∣blies, and Councels,; But to impose a Fine upon the richer sort, if they o∣mit that duty. On the other side, to pardon the people, if they absent themselves, and to bear with them un∣der

pretence, that they may the bet∣ter intend their Occupations,, and not be hindered in their Trades, and earnings.

2. In Election of Magistrates, and Officers: To suffer the poorer sort to vow, and abjure the bearing of Office, under colour of sparing them, or to enjoyn some great charge, as incident to the Office, which the poor cannot bear. But to impose some great Fine upon those, that be Rich, if they re∣fuse to bear Office, being Elect unto it.

3. In judicial matters: In like man∣ner to order, that the people may be absent from publick Trials, under pre∣tence of following their business. But the Richer to be present, and to com∣pel them by Fines, to frequent the Court.

4. In Warlike exercise and Arms: That the poor be not forced to have Armour, Horse, &c. under pretence of sparing their cost, nor to be drawn from their Trades by Martial Exer∣cises; but to compel the Richer sort to keep their proportion of Armor, Horse, &c. by excessive Fines, and to exer∣cise themselves in War-like matters, &c.

5. To have special care of instruct∣ing their Children in liberal Arts, Po∣licie, and Warlike exercise, and to observe good order and discipline. For as Popular States are preserved by the frequencie, and Liberty of the People, so this Government of the Richer, is preserved by discipline, and good o••der of Governours.

6. To provide good store of War-like furniture, especially of Horse, and Horse-men, and of Armed m••n, viz. Pike, &c. which are proper to the gentry, as shot, and light furniture, are for a Po∣pular Companie.

7. To put in practise some points of a Popular state; viz. To lade no one man with too much preferment; To make yearly, or half years Magi∣strates, &c. For that the People are pleased with such things, and they are better secured by this means from the Rule of one. And if any grow to too much greatness, to abate him by the Sophisms fit for this State.

8. To commit the Offices and Ma∣gistracies, to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters, which both tendeth to the conservation of this State, and pleaseth the people, for that they reap some

relief, and benefit by it.

9. To the same end, To contract mar∣riages among themselves, the rich with the rich, &c.

10. In some things which concern not the Points, and matters of State, as Electing Magistrates, making Laws, &c. to giv•• an equality, or sometimes a preferment to the Common People, and not to do, as in some Oligarchies they were wont; viz. To swear against the People, to suppress and bridle them; but rather contrary; To mini∣ster an Oath at their admission, That they shall do no wrong to any of the Peo∣ple; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the Commons, to shew some example of severe punish∣ment.

For other Axioms that preserve this State, they are to be bor∣rowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a Popular, and Tyrannical State; for the strict kind of Oligarchie, is kin to a Tyranny.

Preservation of a popular State;

• ...Sophisms.
• Rules or Axioms.

1. IN publick Assemblies and Con∣sultations about matters of State, creating of Magistrates, publick Ju∣stice, and Exercise of arms, to practise the contrary to the former kind of Go∣vernment, to wit, an Oligarc••ie. For in Popular States, the Commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those Assemblies, Magistrates, Offices, War-like Exercises, &c. by mulcts and re∣wards, and the richer sort are to be spared, and not to be forced by fine, or otherwise, to frequent these Exer∣cises.

2. To make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men, and not to swear against them, as the manner hath been in some Popular States; but ra∣ther to preferre them in all other mat∣ters, that concern not the State and publick Government.

3. To elect Magistrates from among the Common•• by Lot, or Ballating, and not to choose any for their wealths sake.

4. To take heed, that no mā bear office twice, except it be Military, where the pay, and salary, &c. is to be reserved in

their own hands, to be disposed of by a Common-Councel, &c. And to see that no man be too highly preferred.

5. That no Magistracy be perpetu∣al, but as short as may be, to wit, for a a year, half year, &c.

6. To compel Magistrates when their time expireth, to give an accompt of their behaviour and government, and that publickly before the Com∣mons.

7. To have publick Salaries and al∣lowance for their Magistrates, Judges, &c. And yearly dividents for the common people, and such as have most need among them.

8. To make Judges of all matters out of all sorts, so they have some apt∣ness to perform that duty.

9. To provide that publick Judge∣ments and Trials be not frequent; and to that end to inflict great Fines and other punishments upon Pettifoggers and Dilators, as the law of requital, &c. Because for the most part the richer and nobler, and not the Commons are indited and accused in this Common-wealth, which causeth the rich to con∣spire against the State; whereby many times the popular State is turned into an Oligarchie, or some other Govern∣ment.

Hereto tendeth that Art of Ci∣vil Law, made against Accusers and Calumniatours: Ad S••natus-consultum Turpilianum, l. 1. de Calumniatoribus.

10. In such free States as are popu∣lar, and have no revenue, to provide that publick Assemblies be not after: because they want salary for Pleaders and Oratours; And if they be rich; yet to be wary, that all the revenue be not divided amongst the Commons. For, that this distribution of the Com∣mon revenue among the multitude, is like a purse or barrel without a bot∣tom. But to provide, that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs.

11. If the number of the poor en∣crease too much in this kind of State, to send some abroad out of the Cities into the next Countrey places, and to provide above all, that none do live idly, but be set to their trades. To this end, to provide that the richer men place in their Farms and Coppi∣holds, such decayed Citizens.

12. To be well advised what is good for this State, and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular State, that seem∣eth most popular; but that which is ••est for the continuance thereof: And

to that end, not to lay into the Ex∣chequer, or Common-Treasurie, such goods as are confiscate, but to store them up as holy and consecrate things, which except it be practised, confisca∣tions, and fines of the Common people would be frequent, and so this State would decay by weakening the people.

Conversion of States in ge∣neral.

COnversion of a State, is the decli∣ning of the Common-wealth, ei∣ther to some other form of Govern∣ment, or to his full and last period ap∣pointed by God.

Causes of conversions of States are of two sorts: General and Particular.

GEneral, (viz.) 1. Want of Reli∣gion: viz. of the true knowledge and worship of God, prescribed in his word; and notable sins that proceed from thence in Prince and people, as in the examples of Saul, Uzziah, the Jewish State; the four Monarchies•• ••nd all other.

2. Want of wisdom and good Coun∣cel to keep the State, the Prince, No∣bles, and people in good temper, and due proportion, according to thei•• se∣veral orders and decrees.

3. Want of Justice, either in admi∣nistration (as ill Lawes, or ill Magi∣strates) or in the execution, as rewards not given where they should be, or there ••estowed where they should not be, or punishments not inflicted where they should be.

4. Want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self; viz. Of provision, as Armour, Money, Captains, Souldiers, &c. Execution, when the means or provision is not used, or ill used.

2. Particular: To be noted and col∣lected out of the contraries of those rules, that are prescribed for the preser∣vation of the Common-wealths.

Particular causes of Conver∣sion of States, are of two sorts.

• 1. FOrreign: By the over-greatness of invasion of some forreign Kingdom, or other State of meaner

• power, having a part within our own, which are to ••e prevented by the pro∣vidence of the chief, and rules of po∣licy for the preserving of every State. This ••alleth out very seldom for the great diff••cul••y to overthrow a forreign State.
• 2. Domestick:
  • Sedition or open violence by the stronger part.
  • Alteration without vio∣lence.

Sedition.

SEdition is a power of inferiours op∣posing it self with force of Arms a∣gainst the superiour power, Quasi ditio secedens.

Causes of Sedition are of two sorts.

1. General.

• ...Liberty
• ...

  Richer

  WHen they, that are of equal quality in a Commō-wealth, or do take themselves so to be, are not regarded e∣qually in all, or in a∣ny of these three.

  Or, when they are

• ...

  so unequal in quali∣ty, or take themselves so to be, are regard∣ed but equally, or with less respect than those that be of less de••ect in these three things, or in any of them.

• ...Honour

1. IN the Chief: Covetousness or op∣pression, by the Magistrate or higher Power, (viz.) when the Magi∣strates, especially the Chief, encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond mea∣sure, either with the publick or (private calamity, whereby the Governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in Olygarchies) or the other degrees conspire together, and make quarrel a∣gainst the Chief, as in Kingdoms: The examples of Wat Tyler, Iack Straw, &c.

2. In the Chief: Injury, when great Spirits, and of great power, are greatly wronged and dishonoured, or take themselves so to be, as Coriolanus, Cy∣rus minor, Earl of Warwick. In which cases the best way is to decide the wrong.

3. Preferment, or want of prefer∣ment; wherein some have over-much,

and so wax proud and aspire higher: or have more or less, than they deserve as they suppose; & so in envy and disda••, seek Innovation by open saction, so Caesar, &c.

4. Some great nec••ssity or calamity; So Xerxes after the ••oil of his great Ar∣my. And Sena••harib after the loss of 185. in one night.

2. Particu∣lar.

• 1. ENvie, when the chief exceed the medio∣cri••y before mentioned, and so provoketh the Nobility, and other degrees, to con∣spire against him; as Brutus Cassius, &c. against Caesar.
• 2. Fear, viz. Of danger, when one or more dispatch the Prince, by secret practice or force, to prevent his own danger, as Artab••nus did Xerxes.
• 3. Lust or Lecherie, as Tar∣quinius Superbus, by Brutus; Pisistratindae, by Armodius; Appius by Virginius.
• 4. Contempt; For vile qua∣lity & base behaviour, as Sar∣danapalus by Arbaces; Diony∣sius the younger by Dion.
• ...

• 5. Contumely; When some great disgrace is done to some of great Spirit, who standeth upon his honour and reputation, as Caligula by Chaereas.
• 6. Hope of Advancement, or some great profit, as Mi∣turidates, Anobarsanes.

Chief.

Other d••∣gr••es.

Other de∣grees.

Alteration without violence.

CAuses of alteration without vio∣lence are; 1. Excess of the State; when by degrees the State groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was, or should have been setled, and exceedeth in power, riches, and absoluteness in his kind, by the ambition and covetousness of the Chiefs immoderate taxes, and impo∣sitions, &c. applying all to his own be∣nefi••, without respect of other degrees, and so in the end changeth it self into another State or form of Government, as a Kingdom into a Tyranny, an Oli∣garch•••• into an Aristocraci••.

2. Excess, of some one or more in the Common-wealth; viz. When some one or more in a Common-wealth

grow to an excellency or excess above the rest, either in honour, wealth, or virtu••; and so by permission and popu∣lar favour, are advanced to the Sove∣reignty: By which means, popular States grow into Oliga••chies; and Oli∣garchi••s and Aristocracies into Monar∣chi••s. For which cause the Athenians and some other free States, made their Laws of Ostrocismos, to banish any for a time that should excel, though it were in virtue, to prevent the alteration of their State; which because it is an un∣just Law, 'tis better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means, that none should grow to that heigth and excellency, than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy.

FINIS.

A METHOD, how to make use of the Book before, in the reading of the Story.

DAVID being seventie years of age, was of wisdom, Memorie, &c. sufficient to gouern his Kingdom; 1. Reg. Cap. 1.

Old age is not ever unfit for publick Government.

DAvid being of great years, and so having a cold, drie, and impotent bodi••, married with Abishag, a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole Realm, to revive his bodie and prolong his life, 1. Reg. Chap. 1. verse. 3.

Example of the like practise in Charles the fifth.

DAvid being old and impotent of bo∣••t••, by the advise of h••s Nobles and P••isitians, marri••d a young maid call••d Abishag, to warm and pres••rve his old bodi••.

Observation.

VVH••ther David did well in m••••∣rying a maid? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impo∣tent man, to marrie a young woman; or on the other side, for an old, worn, and decrepite woman, to marrie a young and lustie man?

For the affirmative.

ARG. The end of marriage is So∣cietie and mutual comfort; b•••• th••r•• may be Soci••tie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old, and young partie; Ergo, 'tis Lawful.

Answ. Societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage; but none of the princi∣pal

ends of marriage: which are:

• 1. Pr••creation of children, and so the continuance o•• mankind.
• 2. The av••iding of Fornication.

As for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man, woman and woman, where no marriage is, and therefore no proper ends of marri∣••ge.

The Negative.

ARG. 1. That conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends, for which marriage was ••rdained by God, is no lawfull marriage. But the conjunction betwixt an old im••o∣tent, and young partie hath no respect t•• th•• ••••ght end, for which marriage was or∣dain••d by God. There••ore it is no lawful marriage.

2. No contract, wherein the part••e cont••acting, bindeth himself to an impos∣sible condition, or to do that which he cannot do, is good or lawfull. But the contract o•• marriage by an impoten•• per∣son, wit•• a young partie, bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot d••, viz. to perfo••m the duties of Marriage; Therefore it is unlawfull.

For the same cause, the civil Law determineth a nullity in these m••r••iages, except the woman know before the infi••∣mitie of the man, in which case she ca•• have no wrong, being a thing done with her own knowledge and cons••nt, because Volenti non fit injuria: — In legem Julian. de adulteriis leg. Si uxor, &c.

It provideth further, ••or the more cer∣taintie of the infirmiti••, That three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage, because that men that have been infirm at the first, by reason of sickness, or some other accident, afterwards pro∣ved to be sufficient: De repudiis leg. in causis.

Defence for David, in mar∣rying Abishag.

IT was rather a Medicine, than a mar∣riage, without any evil, or disordered aff••ction.

2. It was by the perswasion of his No∣bles, and Phisiti••ns.

3. It was for the publick good, to pro∣long the life of a worthie Prince.

4. It was with the knowledge and con∣sent of the young maid, who was made

acquainted with the Kings infirmitie, and to what end she was married unto him; who if she did it for the common good, and for duties sake, having withall the gift of continencie, she is to be commended; if for ambition, or some vain respect, it is ••er own, and not Davids fault.

Political Nobilitie. Adoniah aspiring to the Kingdom.

• FIrst, took the advantage of Davids affection and kindness towards him, and made him secure of any ill deal∣ing.
• Secondly, of his age and infirmities, disabling his Father as unfit for Govern∣ment.
• Thirdly, blazed his title, and Right to the Crown.
• Fourthly, got him Chariots, Horsemen, and Footmen, and a guard to make shew of State.
• Fifthly, being a comly, and goodly Per∣son, made a popular shew of himself, and his qualities.
• ...

• Sixtly, joyned to himself in Faction, Joab, the General of the Armie, who was in displeasure for murthering of Abner, and Amaza, and feared that David would supplie Benajah in his place, and so was discontented. And Abiather the high Priest, that was likewise discon∣tented with David, for the preferment of Zadoch.
• Seventhly, had meetings with them, and other his confederates, under pretence of a vovv, and offering at the Fountain of Raguel, in the co••••ines of Judea.
• Eightly, made a shevv of Religion by Sacrificing, &c.
• Ninthly, made himself familiar vvith the Nobles and people, and entertai••••d them vvith feasting.
• Tenthly, drevv into his part the chief Officers of the Court, and Servants to the King, by revvards, Familiaritie, &c.
• Eleventhly, disgraced and abased the Competitour, and such as he knevv vvould take part vvith him, and con∣cealeth his ambition, and purpose from them.
• Tvvelftly, had Jonathan a Favorite of the Court, and near about the King to give him intelligence, if any thing vvere discovered, and moved at the Court,

• whilest himself was in hand about his practise.

OBSERVATIONS. Waies of such as aspire to the Kingdom, & marks to discern them.

• FIrst, they wind into the Princes fa∣vour by service, officiousness, flatte∣rie, &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyaltie and faithfulness, thereby to make him secure of their practises.
• 2. They take advantage of the Prin∣ces infirmities, age, impotencie, negligence, sex, &c. And work upon that by disa∣bling the Prince, and secret detracting of his State, and Government.
• 3. They blaze their Title, and claim to the Crown, (if they have any) with their friends and favourites.
• 4. They provide them in secret of ex∣traordinarie forces, and furniture for the Wars, make much of good Souldiers, and have a pretence (if it be espied) of some other end, as for the Kings honour, or ser∣vice, and to be in readiness against forreign enemies, &c.
• ...

• 5. They make open shew of their best qualities, and comliness of their persons (which though it be vain as a dumb shew, it is very effectual to win the li∣king of the popular sort, which according to the rul•• of the election of Kings, in the Bees Common-wealth; think that Por∣ma est digna imperare) Activitie, Nobi∣litie, Ancestrie, &c.
• 6. To have their blazers abroad, to set out their virtues, and to prepare their friends in every Province.
• 7. To draw into their part, and make sure unto the••, of the chief P••ers, and men of best qualitie, such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers, and the Militarie men, and most subtile and politick, especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the State.
• 8. To have meetings for con••e••rence under some pretence of some ordinari•• matter in some convenient place, not too near, nor too far off, but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition.
• 9. To take up a shew, and pretence of Religion, more than before, and beyond the practise of their former life.
• 10. They use popular courtesie (which in a great person is verie effectual) feast∣ing, liberaliti••, gaming, &c.
• ...

• 11. To be over liberal, and win to them by gifts, familiaritie, &c. the chief Officers of the Court, and Governours of Shires.
• 12 To have some near about the Prince, to keep them in credite, and remove suspi∣tion, if any rise.
• 13. To disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the Prince, and present State, or to the competitour, and to bring them into contempt by slander, detraction, and all means they can, and to ••onc••al the designs from them, least they be discovered before they be too ripe.
• 14. To have some spie ••••ar about the Prince, to advertise them if any i••ckling of suspition arise, whilest themselves are practising.

Note the practises of Absolom: •• Sam. chap. 16. And of Cy••us minor in Xenophon; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. cap. 1.

Political Prince.

David being a most worthy and excellent Prince for wisdom, valour, religion,

and justice, and so highly deserving of the common-wealth, yet grown into age, grew withal into con∣tempt, & had many, both of his Nobles, & common people, that fell from him; first with Absolom, then with Adoniah, who affect∣ed the Kingdom, and re∣belled against him: For re∣medy whereof, he stirred up himself to publick act∣ions, which might shew his vigour and sufficiencie to mannage the affairs of his Kingdom.

1. AFter the victorie against Abso∣lom, he forced himself to ••orbear mourning, and shewed himself to his discontented Army, when all were like to fall from him, for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son.

2. After the victorie, he caused a g••n••ral convention to be ass••mbled o•• the whole nation, to bring him home with honour to Jerusalem, which was a re∣newing, and re-establishing of him. 2 Sam. 19. 12.

3. He gave an experiment of his power and authoritie, by deposing a person of great authoritie and estimation, to wit, Joab, General Captain of the Armie, and advancing Amasa to his place.

4. He sent kind Messengers to Jerusa∣lem, and to other chief and head towns, and speciall men of Judea, his contributes, putting them of their alliance with him, with these words, That they were of his own flesh and bloud, with protestation of his special love and affection towards them, to provide them with the like kind∣ness and affection towards him.

5. He assembled a Parliament of his whole realm, and took occasion upon the designing of his successour, to commend unto th••m the succession of his house, and the continuance and maintenance o•• Gods tru•• worship and religion then establish∣ed, and gave a grave and publick ch••rge to his Successour, now designed, touc••ing the manner of his gov••rnment, and main∣taining of religion. 1. Chron. 12. 13.

6. He shewed his bountie and magnifi∣cence

in cong••sting matter for the building of the Temple, as gold, silver, brass, &c. And caus••d it to be published and made known to the Parliament and whole Na∣tion, 1. Chron. 22. 13.

7 He revived the Church Govern∣ment, and set it in a right order, assigning to ••v••ry Church, Officers, his place and function.

8. He suppressed the faction of Ado••niah, and ordained Solomon his Succes∣sour, 1 Reg. 1. 22. By these means, h•• retained his Majestie and Authoritie i•• his old age, as appeareth by the eff••ct; ••o•• that being bed-rid, he suppressed the fa••ction of Adoniah, (which was grow•••• mightie, and vvas set on foot) vvith h•••• bare commandment, and si••nification 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his pleasure, and so he dyed in peace.

FINIS.