The compleat statesman, or, The political will and testament of that great minister of state, Cardinal Duke de Richilieu from whence Lewis the XIV ... has taken his measures and maxims of government : in two parts
Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis, duc de, 1585-1642., Du Chastelet, Paul Hay, marquis, b. ca. 1630.
Page  24

CHAP. VI. A Continual Negotiation contributes much towards the good Success of Affairs.

STates receive such advantages by continual Ne∣gotiations, when they are manag'd with Pru∣dence, that it is almost incredible to any but those who have had the Experience of it.

I own that I had been imploy'd five or six years in the management of Affairs before I discover'd this Truth: But I am so certain of it at present, that I dare affirm boldly, that to Nagotiate continually, openly, or secretly, in all Places, altho no present benefit be received by it, and but little Prospect for the Future, is a thing absolutely Necessary for the good of States.

I may say with Truth, that in my Time, I have seen the Affairs of France and of Christendom quite alter'd, by having put that Principle into Practice, by the Kings Authority, which till then had been absolutely neglected in this Kingdom.

Among the Seeds of them some produce Fruit sooner than others; some are no sooner in the Ground but they sprout while others are a long while without producing the same Effect.

He who Negotiates finally finds out a proper mo∣ment to compass his Ends; and tho he should not find it, at least, it is certain, that he can lose nothing, and that by the means of his Negotiation, he is inform'd with what passes in the World, which is a thing of no small Consequence for the good of States.

Page  25Negotiations are Innocent remedys, which never do any harm; it is necessary to Act every where, far and near, and particularly at Rome.

Among the good Councils, which Anthony Perez gave the late King, he advis'd him to make him∣self powerful in that Court, and not without rea∣son, since the Ambassadors of all the Princes in Christendom, who repair there, judg that those who have most Credit and Authority in that Court, are in reality those who have most Power in themselves, and most Fortune; and indeed their Judgment is not ill grounded, since it is certain, that tho Popes ought to respect Reason above all other Men, yet there is no Place in the World in which Power is more consider'd than in their Court, which is so evidently true, that the Respect which is paid to Am∣bassadors there, increases or diminishes daily accor∣ding to the good or ill State of their Masters affairs, from whence it often comes to pass that those Mini∣sters receive two different Faces in one day, if a Courier who comes at night brings different News from those that came in the Morning.

It is with States as it is with Human Bodies, the fresh Colour which appears in our Faces, makes the Physitian conclude that all is well within, and as that good Complection proceeds from the good Dis∣position of the Noble and Internal Parts, so it is certain that the best way a Prince can put in Pra∣ctice, to be in favour at Rome, is to settle his Affairs well at home, and that it is almost impossible to have a great reputation in that City, which has been long the Head, and is the Centre of the World, without having the same throughout the Universe, to the great advantage of publick Interest.

Page  26Natural Reason teaches us, that we ought to have a great regard for our Neighbours, by reason that as their Neighbourhood gives them an opportunity to annoy, it also puts them in a condition to serve as the Out-works of a Place, which hinder the Im∣mediate Approach of the Walls.

Persons of mean capacity limit their thoughts within the extent of the States in which they are born, but those to whom God has been pleas'd to give more knowledg, learning from Physitians, that in the greatest Distempers Revolutions are made with most Violence in the most distant Parts, they use their best Endeavours to fortify themselves at a distance.

It is necessary to act in all Places (which is to be observ'd) according to the humour and by suitable means to the capacity of those with whom we ne∣gotiate.

Different Nations have different Wayes, some speedily conclude what they design to do, and o∣thers are very slow.

Republics are of the last kind, they proceed slow∣ly, and commonly they do not at first grant what is desir'd of them, but one must be satisfy'd with little in order to obtain more.

As great Bodies do not move so easily as small ones, those kind of States being compos'd of seve∣ral heads, they are much slower in their Resolutions and in their Executions than others.

And for that reason, Prudence obliges those who negotiate with them to give them time, and to press them no more than their natural Constitution per∣mits.

Page  27It is observable, that as strong and solid Reasons are excellent for Men of vast Genius, weak ones are better for Men of meaner Capacitys, because they are more suitable to their reach.

Men conceive Affairs according to their capacity, the greatest seem easie and small to Men of good Understanding and great Courage, and those who want these qualifications commonly find every thing difficult.

Such Men are incapable of apprehending the Weight of what is propos'd to them, and sometimes slight what is most considerable, and also often set a great stress on things which deserve no considera∣tion.

It is necessary to act with every Man according to his Capacity: On some Occasions to Act and to speak couragiously, when we have fight on our side, is so far from making a Breach, that on the contrary, it is rather the way to prevent and to stifle it in it's Birth.

In others, instead of resenting unseasonably, cer∣tain imprudent Expressions spoken by those we treat with, we must suffer them with Prudence and Ad∣dress together, and have only Ears for those things which may conduce to our Ends.

There are Men who are so presumptuous, as to think they ought to shew their Bravery on all oc∣casions, hoping thereby to obtain what they cannot get by reason, and what they cannot constrain Peo∣ple to do by force.

They think they have done harm by threatning it; but besides, that this proceeding is contrary to reason, it never succeeds with Persons of Honor.

Page  28As Fools are not fit to negotiate, there are Minds so very nice and refin'd, that they are as unfit for it as they, by reason that subtilizing upon every thing they are like those who break the Points of Nee∣dles in whetting them.

The most proper Men are those who keep a Me∣dium between those two extreams, and the most subtle making use of their Wit, to avoid being de∣ceiv'd, must take care at the same time not to use it to deceive those they treat with.

Men are always diffident of those that act craf∣tily, and give an ill Impression of the frankness and fidelity they ought to behave themselves with; That never advances their Affairs.

The same Words have often two Senses, the one depends on the Sincerity and Ingenuity of Men, the other on Art and Subtlety by which it is very easie to turn the true Signification of a Word to volunta∣ry Explications.

Great Negotiations must not have one Moments Intermission, it is necessary to pursue what we un∣dertake with a perpetual chain of designs, never ceasing to act, unless with Reason, and not by a Relaxation of Mind, Indifference, wavering thoughts and contrary resolution.

Neither must Men be disgusted by an ill Event, since it often comes to pass, that what is underta∣ken with most Reason, succeeds with least happiness.

It is difficult to combat often, and always to be Conqueror, and it is a Sign of an extraordinary Blessing when Success is favourable in great Under∣takings, and only contrary in those that are of little Moment.

Page  29It is enough that Negotiations are so harmless, that one may receive considerable advantage by them, and never any harm.

If any body urges, that some of them prove prejudicial sometimes, I give him leave to reject my Judgment, if he does not find, in case he will open his Eyes, that instead of having any reason to impute the ill success he has observ'd in the Remedy I propose, they are only to be imputed to those who did not know how to make a good use of it.

Tho it should produce no other advantage than to gain Time on certain occasions, which happens commonly, the practice of it would be very com∣mendable and useful in States, since a moment of∣ten serves to avoid a Storm.

Notwithstanding the Alliances, which are often contracted by Marriages between Crowns, do not always produce the Effect that might be desir'd, yet they must not be neglected; and they often prove the most Important matters of Negotiations.

They always produce this advantage, that they retain States for some Time in some considerations of Respect one towards another; and to have a Va∣lue for them, it is sufficient that they prove some∣times advantageous.

As the way to get good Fruit is to Graft; the Princes of France, who derive their Birth from Pa∣rents of Equal and high Quality, must in Reason be more elevated, and without doubt, their Blood remains the more Illustrious, in being less mix'd with other.

Moreover Alliances serve sometimes to extin∣guish Leagues and Ingagements among Princes, and tho they do not always produce that good Effect, Page  30 the advantages the house of Austria derives by them, shows that they are not to be neglected.

In matters of State, all things must be improv'd, and what may be useful, must never be dispis'd.

Leagues are of that kind, the Benefit of them is often very uncertain, and yet they must be respected: However I would not advise a great Prince, to ingage himself voluntarily, upon the account of a League in a design of difficult Execution, unless he finds himself powerful enought to make it succeed altho his Colleagues should fail him.

Two Reasons oblige me to advance this Proposi∣tion.

The first draws its Original and Force from the Weakness of Unions, which are never very certain among divers Soveraign Heads.

The second consists, in that Petty Princes are often as careful and diligent, to Ingage great Kings into great Enterprises, as they are slow in seconding them, notwithstanding they are strictly oblig'd so to do, and that there are some, who save their own stake, at the cost of those they have ingag'd against their Will.

Altho it is a common Saying, that whoever has Force, has commonly Reason, it is true nevertheless, that two unequal Powers being joyn'd by a Treaty, the greatest is in danger of being forsaken by the o∣ther; the reason of it is Evident. Reputation is a thing of so much Importance to a great Prince, that no advantage can be propos'd to him, to recom∣pense the loss he would suffer by it, in case he should forfeit the Engagements of his Word and Faith: And such Terms may be offer'd to him, whose Po∣wer is Inconsiderable, tho his Quality is Sovereign, Page  31 that according to all Probability he will prefer his advantage to his Honor, which will make him fail in his Obligation towards him who, foreseeing his Infidelity, cannot resolve to prevent it; by reason that to be abandon'd by his Allys, is not of so∣much Consequence to him, as the prejudice he would receive in violating his Faith.

Kings must take a great deal of Care what Trea∣tys they make; but when they are made they must keep them Religiously.

I am sensible that many Polititians teach the Con∣trary; but without considering in this Place what the Christian Faith affords us against those Maxims; I maintain, that since the loss of Honor is greater then the loss of Life, a great Prince should sooner venture his Life, and even the Interest of his State, than to break his Word, which he can never vio∣late without loseing his Reputation, and consequently the greatest Force of Sovereigns.

The importance of this Place makes me observe, that it is absolutely necessary to be exact in the Choice of Ambassadors, and other Negotiators; and that a Prince can never be too severe in punishing those who exceed their Commissions; since by those Faults, they expose the Reputation of Princes, and the Well-fare of the Commonwealth at once.

The easiness, or corruption of some Persons, is sometimes so great, and the desire of others, who are neither so weak nor so wicked, to do something is often so extraordinary, that if they are not kept with∣in the bounds which are prescrib'd them, out of fear of absolute Ruin, there will always be a grea∣ter Number of those who will be drawn in to make ill Treatys, than to make none at all.

Page  32I have had so much Experience of this Truth, that it forces me to end this Chapter, saying, That whoever shall not be Rigorous in those Occasions, will be wanting in what is necessary to the subsistance of States.