An appendix to the late answer printed by His Majesties command, or, Some seasonable animadversions upon the late observator and his seaven anti-monarchicall assertions with a vindication of the King and some observations upon the two houses.

ANIMADVERSIONS upon those Notes which the late OBSER∣VATOR hath published upon the seven Doctrines, and Positions, which the KING by way of Recapi∣tulation (he saith) layes open so offensive.

POSITION I.

THat the Parliament hath an absolute, indisputable power of declaring Law: so that all the right of the King and People depends upon their pleasure.

To this the Observator saith;

It hath beene answered, That this Power must rest in them, or in the King, or in some inferiour Court; or else all suits will be endlesse, and it cannot rest more safely then in Parliament.

ANIMADVERSION I.

THe Observator hath contracted His Majesties words, but hath kept the sense in more generall termes, and seemes (though but faintly) to justifie the Position, by approving (I know not whose answer) that this Power can rest no where m••re safely then in Parlia∣ment. He meanes the Parliament without the King; if he had allow∣ed the King his place in Parliament, I know no understanding man but will easily subscribe, That the King in Parliament, or the Parlia∣ment with him, have an absolute, undisputable power, both to make, and declare Law; and to end all suits of what kind soever, determina∣ble by humane Law within the Kingdome. And here is the most safe resting of this power (and here it hath ever rested) & not in the King alone (who claimes not that Power, but is willing to governe His Sub∣jects according to the known Lawes) and much lesse in any inferiour Court. But that such an absolute undisputable Power of declaring Law, as hath lately beene assumed, by the Major part of the present

sitting Parliament, should be resting in them, is neither necessary for the ending of suites, nor can be safe either for King or Subject. If they may declare that for a Law, a fundamentall Law, which never yet was exacted, or had any being; and deny the plaine undoubted Lawes that have beene Enacted, or frustrate them by some unheard of interpretation, (as if such interpretation had been some mentall (or rather Parliamentall) reservation, laid up within the Parliament wals, to be produced upon emergent occasions, by their Successours) they will have so full an Arbitrary power, that the right and safety of King and People must wholly depend upon their Votes. Which power can never be safe, either for King, or People, nor can they produce one president that may warrant such a Power. But they are not bound, or limited by such presidents, That's the second Position.

POSITION II.

THat Parliaments are bound to no Presidents.

OBSERVATOUR.

Statutes are not binding to them, why then should Parliaments? Yet there is no obligation stronger then the honour & justice of a Parliament.

ANIMADVERSION II.

IF Statutes be not binding to them, there is no reason that presi∣dents should be. And he saith true, Statutes are not binding to them, that is, de facto, they are not (for they in some things goe di∣rectly against them) but de jure, they are; that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 they ought to be binding to them, till they be repealed by the same power they were made, that is, by Bill orderly passed both Houses, and ratified by His Majesties Royall assent. And unlesse they can shew better reason then their bare Assertion, Presidents (as they are the best warrant, so) they are, and ought to be the limits and bounds of their proceedings. He might have said as truly, That Oathes are not binding to them: and therefore neither Statutes, nor presidents, But the Observator tells us (Pag. 44.) That the Oathes of Supremacie and Allegiance are not endangered, by making the Kingdome, & not the King, the proper subject of power. And he yeelds reason for it. For (saith he) hee that ascribes more to the whole Vniversality, then to the King, yet ascribes to the King a true Supremacie of Power and Honour above all particu∣lars. I wonder what he meanes by a true Supremacie of Power and Honour above all particulars: Surely he meanes nothing but priority

of place, and height of Title; for hee is allowed little power over some particulars, namely, over the Members of either House, and whom else they please to exempt (as they did Serjeant Major Skip∣pon for his Power and Commands.) But this distinction helpes them The Members of either House are sharers in that Supremacie which is in the Universality and above his; and by the power of that Su∣premacie they can exempt whom they please from the power of this, Inferiour (pardon the phrase, and the absurdities cannot be ex∣prest without a Solecisme) Supremacie. Very good: but in good so∣ber sadnesse, doth the Observator thinke this distinction was thought on by the Framers and enjoyners of that Oath, or that the Members of the House, at their entring the House, did take their Oath to the King, as to the Supreme over all, with exception of themselves, or reservation of an higher Supremacy to themselves, when they should be entred? It is hardly credible: Nor do all (that desire to tender all due honour to the Parliament) beleeve that they are so the Univer∣sality, or the Kingdome, as the Observator presumes. They are trust∣ed by the Universality and Kingdome, and we pray, that they may discharge that trust, not knowing, but that a multitude of men sub∣ject (every one of them) to errour, may faile in their judgement, and being not exempted from the common condition of the sinfull Sons of Adam, may possibly, not rightly discharge the trust committed to them, as well as the King, who is blasted with foule failings and er∣rours, in judgement. Me thinks, men that so much detest Popery, should not borrow the grounds of their reasoning from them: and I shall as soone beleeve the Councell of Trent, telling us that they are the Universall Church, and therefore cannot possibly erre, as that the Parliament is the Universall, unerring, and unpervertibly just body of the Kingdome. And surely, the Spirit of declaring must needs re∣side in a strangely large measure in them, who have power thus to declare, not onely Law, but Oathes too: a greater, then which the Popes flatterers never gave him: and hardly ever any Pope assumed so great: Quo te constringam mutantem Protea nodo? How shall these men be bound to do right, who so easily untie the knots of these sa∣cred bookes of Law and Oathes? why, yes: There is a bond that will do it; The obligation of the Justice, and honour of a Parliament. But can any man be sure, that they whom neither Law, Custome, & Pre∣sidents of their Ancestors, nor Oathes can bind, will be alwayes held

in by the obligation of Justice and Honour? Is it not possible that they may (in time) finde a power in themselves of declaring that obligation void, as well as they have done the other? The same obli∣gation of Justice and Honour, is as strong upon Kings, (and hath ever beene held more powerfull and obstrictive in them, then in any State mannaged by a Community;) and yet they dare not trust His Majesty, though so obliged. The Observatour then must pardon me, if I de∣sire, they may rather be held in, (and hold themselves so to be) by the old obligations of Law, Presidents, and Oathes, rather then that the Kings liege people should be put wholly to confide to that single obligation of the Justice and Honour of a Parliament.

POSITION III.

THat they are Parliaments, and may judge of publike necessi∣ty without the King, and dispose of any thing.

OBSERVATOUR.

They may not desert the King, but being deserted by the King, when the Kingdome is in distresse, they may judge of that distresse, and relieve it; and are to be accompted by vertue of representation, as the whole body of the State.

ANIMADVERSION III.

HIs Majestie sets downe this Position in more words, but these are much to the same purpose; and upon these the inference which His Majestie makes, followes undeniably, That then the life and liberty of the subject, and all good Lawes made for the security of them, may be disposed of, and repealed by the major part of both Houses at any time present, and by any wayes and meanes procured so to be; and His Majestie shall have no power to protect them. They see nothing that see not the misery which may follow upon such a vast transcendency of arbitrary power, if it were invested in the Parliament, which (I dare boldly say) was never claimed by any Parliament, though in conjunction with (the head of it) the King. Every (the meanest) Subject hath such a right and propriety in his goods, that without Law they cannot bee taken from him, though to be employed for the publike good. And though the safe∣ty of the people be the highest Law, and that doe (many times)

give a power above other Laws, and against them, to the supreame Magistracy in a State, to dispose of private mens estates, yet the un∣changeable rule of Justice must have place, even in that highest Law, and that requires a compensation to be made to those, whose estates or goods are so disposed of; and never gives power to uphold the publike good with private injury. Nor can it be imagined, that a State upheld by such helpes, should not be able to make a just com∣pensation to those, by whom it was upheld. But let us heare our Observatour: They may not (saith hee) desert the King. Gra∣mercy for that; I am glad to heare they have yet any obligation upon them to tye them to the King. Yet I know not well what he meanes by deserting the King: if hee meane it in that sense, which he doth the Kings deserting of them, which (out of question) is his not assenting to whatsoever they shall thinke fit; Then in reason they should not, by their disallowing all his Proposals, have driven him to dissent from theirs, and so to have deserted them. Well: But being deserted by the King, when the Kingdome is in distresse, they may judge of that distresse, and relieve it. All their power then is upon supposition of the Kings deserting them: So that if it appeare▪ that His Majestie hath not deserted them (as many good men be∣leeve He hath not, in the redresse of any reall grievance,) then they have no such power. And however, they claime this power onely when the Kingdome is in distresse; But how if the Kingdome be not in distresse, or (at least) that distresse be only or principally cau∣sed by their claiming of that power, which cannot consist with the Honour and Royall Estate of His Majestie, which all men (by their late Protestation) are bound to defend? If it be so, wee may easily discerne how farre they may stretch this power, which they claime onely in order to distresse; and that they may make as much use of it, as the Pope doth of his power in temporals; In ordine ad spi∣ritualia. He claimes no more, (though some have said he hath right to more;) and the Parliament will need no more, to doe as much as he takes upon him to do with Christian Princes and States. But they must have a right to their power in this case of distresse; Whence have they that? why, they have it as the whole body of the State, and that they are, and must be so accompted, by vertue of represen∣tation. Very good. But let us consider his words a little more. There is no understanding man, but must and will acknowledge (unlesse he

wilfully derogate from them,) that the Parliament represents the body of the State, for those ends for which they convene, as an Am∣bassadour doth the Prince that sends him, in the mannage of that bu∣sinesse for which he is sent: But this is not an absolute representati∣on to all intents and purposes. Besides, whom doe they represent? The body (saith he) of the State. Be it so: but it is onely the Body without the Head. And if they were not by representation onely, but really, the whole body of the People (if it were possible they should convene together) they are all but an assembly of Subjects, of men to be governed, not to rule; to be commanded, not to com∣mand their Head and Soveraigne: and then there can be no virtue of representation that can advance them to the power, which the Observatour ascribes to them, when such power was never in the whole Body, which is represented. No? never such power in the whole body? I know the Observatours stomack will rise here. Did not the Peoples consent at first make Kings, and conveigh pow∣er into their hands? Truely Sir, not solely: but grant it, what then? Marry,* 1.1 he saith, then it is a principle in nature. Quicquid efficit ta∣le, est magis tale; In English, If the People make a King, they are more King themselves; or if they give power, they have more power: and may resume and exercise that power when they please. Excellent learning, and well applyed; I beleeve hee learn'd this piece from Suarez the Jesuite. But the Observatour may know, that that rule admits many limitations; and surely, it holds onely in cau∣sis totalibus, which the People are not in the constitution of Kings. But suppose their consent did at first give power to Kings; when their consent is given for them and their Successours, to a King and His Heires, can the succeeding people cut off the entaile, and retract the consent their Ancestours have given? By what right? with what justice? I know not: but the people may con∣tract for them and their Successours in the conveighance of Sove∣raigne power, (if ever they had it in their hands to give) as any man may in the conveighance of his lands or goods: and that such con∣veighance may be as binding to Successours in the one, as in the o∣ther; and then I am sure they cannot have power at all times, and in all succeeding ages, to resume what they have so given. Our Kings right (so far as it is derived from the people) is of this kinde. And if he had no other grounds for his claime of Soveraignty, (as it is most certaine that he hath) such a consent once granted, were sufficient

to binde the people, that it cannot ever be lawfull for them, by a major part of them, (comming in with a Nolumus hunc regnare su∣per nos) to deprive him of that right. But surely, they would never make so absolute a grant of their power to Princes, as to devest themselves of it. Good Sir, shew me that proviso in their grant. But it seemes to you unnaturall they should:* 1.2 I doe not wonder it should seeme so to you, who make it agreeable to the clearest beames of humane reason, and the strongest inclinations of nature;* 1.3 (and by consequence, as you would perswade the World, justifi∣able:) For every private man to defend himselfe by force, if assaulted, though by the force of a Magistrate, or his owne Father; and though he be not without all confidence by flight, &c. I wish whilest you have such recourse to nature, you would not forget Christianity, which teaches subjection and obedience, and gives no liberty (ei∣ther to private men, or the major part of the Communalty) of re∣sistance; but saith, They that resist,* 1.4 shall receive to themselves dam∣nation. And if the Observatur be a Gentleman, he should tender how he hath recourse to nature in point of right, lest he give occa∣sion to some Wat. Tyler's Chaplaine, to preach againe upon that Text:

When Adam dolve, and Eve span, Who was then a Gentleman.

He may finde a goodly Sermon upon that Text, set downe by John Stow, in Richard the second, and such Doctrine delivered upon it; the use of which would shake his title to his inheritance, and the name of Gentleman.

POSITION IV.

THat no Member of the Parliament ought to be troubled for Treason, &c. without leave.

OBSERVATOUR.

This is intended of suspitions onely, and when leave may seasonably be had; and when competent accusers appeare not in the impeachment.

ANIMADVERSION IV.

HIs Majestie hath said so much of this, and so little of it hath beene answered, (or indeed is answerable,) that I shall not need

to say much: Onely I observe the modesty of this Observatour, that hee doth not absolutely say they are not to be troubled for those crimes, but not upon suspition onely; &c. I know not what hee may call suspitions, but I beleeve the best evidences may easily be held for bare suspitions, if they may not have liberty to speake out; and that they cannot have, unlesse the accused be first in safe custody, and brought to tryall, where they may legally be produced. And, I beleeve, few wise men will thinke it reasonable, that the grounds of suspition of Treason should necessarily be opened before tryall.

POSITION V

THat the Soveraigne power resides in both Houses of Parlia∣ment, The King having no negative voyce.

OBSERVATOUR.

This power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, but to save the Kingdome from ruine; and in case, where the King is so seduced, as that he prefers dangerous men, and persecutes his loyall Subjects.

ANIMADVERSION V.

HIs Majestie infers upon this Position, That himselfe must be sub∣ject to their Commands. This sounds but harshly in the eares of loyall Subjects. That any posture wherein they can be put, can raise Subjects to a capacity of Soveraignty, and reduce their Soveraigne to become their Subject. But hee comforts us here, and tels us, this power is not claimed as ordinary, nor to any purpose, &c. This is but poore comfort: it is not, but it may be in good time, if they please. Hee doth not say, they shall not hereafter, and can∣not claime it as ordinary, and to other purposes then that he names. So that there may be other causes that may make them claime this power, as well as this. But indeed they need no other, if it be in their power to declare that to be the case of the King and King∣dome when they please: But they will never doe it, but where there is a just cause for it, and the truth leads them to it. Truly, I be∣lieve honourably of the Justice and Wisedome of Parliaments; but I doe beleeve that they are not either infallible, or that they cannot possibly do amisse. And the Observator must bring better arguments; (and I fear he cannot bring so good) to make me beleeve otherwise,

then ever yet were brought for the infallibility of a generall Coun∣cell. But I have said enough for the present of the residence of sove∣raigne power in the Parliament, and the ground of their claime to it, by the vertue of representation in my third Animadversion. I shall here onely give the Reader a briefe glosse upon the language here used by the Observatour to save the Kingdome from ruine, (that is from Monarchy or being governed by the King.) The King is seduced, that is, he is perswaded (by his owne understanding, and other evill Counsellours,) not to part with his Soveraignty, nor to become a Subject to his Subjects. He preferres dangerous men, (that is, such as would have him still to be their King.) persecutes his loyall Subjects, that is, such as would rule him, and the people at their pleasure.

POSITION VI.

THat the Levying of Forces against the personall commands of the King, (though accompanied with his presence) is not le∣vying of warre against the King: but warre against his authority, not Person, is warre against the King.

OBSERVATOUR.

If this were not so, the Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining himselfe, and the Kingdome, could not save both, but stand and looke on.

ANIMADVERSION VI.

I Thought this Position so strangely Paradoxall, and so apparently contrary to reason, and common sense, that no man would have appeared in the defence of it. Yet this Observator never blushes, nor blinkes at it, but affirmes it stoutly. But for all that, I shall beleeve very slowly, That the Kings Person can at any time be without the King, or without his Authority: Or that they may destroy the Kings Person to preserve the King. My faith is not strong enough to be∣leeve these sublime points, and mysteries of State: I shall subscribe thus farre, That warre against the Kings Authority (though in the absence of his Person) is warre against the King: But that the King and his Person should be 'intwo places, will never (I feare) downe with mee. But however Ile see his reason: What's that? Why else the Parliament seeing a seduced King, ruining himselfe and his King∣dome,

could not save both, but must stand and looke on. Surely this rea∣son is full of weight, and ready to burst, it is so big with probability. I suppose the Reader understands his language here by my former glosse: But if we should take the words as they sound, the reason would seeme as strange, as that which it is brought to confirme. The King ruining himselfe, and his Kingdome, a mad King, or an Ideot (hee meanes) and then 'twere fit the Parliament appointed him a guardian. Ruining himselfe and his Kingdome. Is it possible, that the King should ruine himselfe and his Kingdome. What? The King alone? Is he alone able to doe it without the people? It is hardly credible: If he have the people on his side, and a prevailing major party, I thinke the Observatour (standing to his own Principles) will not deny that he hath Soveraigne power with him, and that it is unnaturall to thinke the Community should destroy it selfe. But the Community (he will say) is to be lookt at in Parliament. Well, But good Sir, may not the people withdraw the power of representati∣on, which they granted to the Parliament; was their grant so abso∣lute, and so irrevocable, that they dispossesse themselves wholly of taking or exercising that power, in their owne proper persons? Re∣member your principles about the conveying of Soveraigne power into the hands of Kings; and if you can shew no better Cards for their power of representation, than the peoples revocable con∣sent, (and I would faine know why it should be more revocable from Kings than men) you will find their tenure in it very tickle.

POSITION VII.

THat according to some Parliaments they may depose Kings.

OBSERVATOUR.

'Tis denied that any King was deposed by a free Parliament, fairely elected.

ANIMADVERSION VII.

I Like this note better then all the rest, and am wholly of his mind: That never any free Parliament, fairely elected, deposed any King: and I hope (whatsoever his principles seeme to insinuate) they doe not beleeve they have power to do it, pray that they may never at∣tempt, (at least, not be able) to depose the King, or destroy Monar∣chy.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Pag. 2.
• * 1.2

  Pag. 3.
• * 1.3

  Pag. 16
• * 1.4

  Rom. 13