An appendix to the late answer printed by His Majesties command, or, Some seasonable animadversions upon the late observator and his seaven anti-monarchicall assertions with a vindication of the King and some observations upon the two houses.

Seasonable ANIMADVERSIONS upon the late Observator, and his seaven Anti-monar∣chicall ASSERTIONS.

IT is usuall (I know) for Books to have Prefaces, and Playes Prologues; but whosoever peruseth this, must expect nothing but concise reasons; forasmuch as Vnusq••isque suo sensu abundat, so let him reflect and censure of this at his pleasure.

The Observator, pag. 1. saith, That power is ori∣ginally inherent in the people, &c.

To this the answer is, that power is in God primariò & per se, according to that of the Apostle; Rom. 13. and in the King or peo∣ple, but onely secundariò & derivativè: Power or Dominion is not a gift of Nature, that is to say, naturally inherent in us; for if it were, then might all men have equall power, for that by nature we are all equall; but power is a gift of God to Nature, and is gratia gratis da∣ta; and yet power is congruous in nature, as was the power of King, and office of Priesthood in Melchisedec: for surely he had them both given, or appointed to him by God, being by interpretation King of Righteousnesse, and King of Peace, Heb. 2.7. And therefore it is not likely that he usurped to himselfe the Regall title of King, no more then he did of being Priest; and yet it was very probable that it was also agreeable in Reason and Nature, and although not tyrannicall, yet peaceable Kingly reigne, and sacred Priesthood did fitly belong to him:* 1.1 for he is by most Divines thought to have been Sem, the eldest sonne of Noah; and by the law of Nature, of Moses, and of most Nations, the eldest is to inherit; so that what was the right of Adam, Seth, and Noah, might belong unto him by birth∣right, although it may be God confirmed it unto him extraordinari∣ly. But to returne, power and dominion is derived from God, and congruous in Nature: but the power is in the people onely, when they are absolutely free to chuse to themselves what forme of go∣vernment they please, as were the Jewes before they subjected them∣selves to Kings, being formerly freed from the bondage of Egypt by the finger of God. The Romanes when they erected their Senate

and Consuls, having rebelliously (for it was no better) shaken off the yoke of Kings. The Venetians, when they first instituted their Common-wealth. But in Monarchies, where the people have been brought into subjection, either by the sword, as in Turky, Persia, and the like; or by innate, and prescribing, and prevalent authori∣ty, as in Florence; or by both, as in France and Castile; in these Dominions power is not inherent in the people, but in the Prince. And although some hereditary Monarches are more limited then o∣thers, as is the King of France more then the great Turke, and the King of England more then the King of France: yet is their power derived immediately from God, and inherent in themselves, not in the people: for those limitations are (in conquered Nations) but mere donatives of grace, proceeding from the Prince or his Succes∣sors to the people, touching certaine immunities and priviledges; so that the Prince his power is the efficient cause of them, and such im∣munities or priviledges are but as materiall effects. Now as it is most improper to say, that the effect should cause his owne cause, so is it to say, that a priviledged people should cause the Princes power, or that Power should remaine originally in such a priviledged people.

Some Nations elect their Kings, or Princes, and restraine them far more by conditionall inaugurations, then hereditary Monarches are, or ought to be restrained or limited: Yet have not such Nations power in themselves totally, but onely partially; that is, they have power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes, how farre forth they will be subject, and by what Rules they will be governed; but they have not power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes, that they will only be subject at their owne pleasures, and as them∣selves shall thinke good; that is to say, if they please at any time to assume more liberty unto themselves, and to alter and disanull former Constitutions of Government, that they may do it without the con∣sent of their Kings or Princes. This they cannot doe without trea∣son to their Crownes or Diadems: For although the persons of such Princes be elective, yet is their power permanent, jure consti∣tuto Coronae; which though they claime not as from progenitors, yet are they invested therewith as from Predecessors. And therefore being enthroned, they enjoy their dignities by prescription; that is to say, what belonged to their Predecessors; belongeth in the same manner to them, being once invested; nor can such Nations revolt from their elected Princes, without being reputed Rebels.

Now of this nature are the Kings of Poland, Hungary, and some o∣ther (to speake nothing of the Duke of Venice, for he is meerly titula∣ry, and a cypher) and such Kings first and principally claime their au∣thority from God the author of all power, who enspheareth them in the Orbe of dignity above others.

And secondly, they acknowledge it from the generall consent of the Nation, which made choyce of them, and over which they rule. And surely such was the right and title of Saul, the first King of Israel: for he was appointed by God, 1 Sam. 9.17. then anointed by Samuel, Chap. 10. v. 1. afterwards approved by the people, ibid. vers. 24. And finally, confirmed in his Kingdome, Chap. 11. vers. 14. And in the same manner was David likewise established in his Kingdome; so that their first and chiefe claime was immediately from God, and their second from the consent of the people. Nor is it of any consequence to al∣leadge, as the Observator seemeth to inferre, pag. 1. that those Kings had an extraordinary Institution from God; and therefore they might more lawfully claime their right, as appointed and appropriated to them by God. For to such Allegation it will be answered, That there is no power but of God, Rom. 13. So that whether God institute Kings by extraordinary, or ordinary meanes, it maketh no matter. For al∣though Saul and David were instituted extraordinarily by Gods spe∣ciall appointment; yet most of the Kings of Judah and Israel reigned afterthem but by ordinary succession; had they not therefore the same power that Saul and David had? Surely the Scriptures tell us they had. The Priests and Prophets in the old Law had an extraordinary vocation, especially the Prophets: the Priests or Ministers of the Go∣spell have but an ordinary vocation, are they therefore defective in power to those of the old Law? or have they not their vocation from God, because they have not extraordinary calling? Surely no. For how could Sacraments be administred, and the word preached? So is it with Monarchs: For though they have but ordinary succession; yet is their power immediately from God. Our Soveraigne is a free (though in some things a limited) Monarch, and derived therefore his power immediately (not mediately, as do other inferiour Ministers of justice) from God. And as touching limitations and priviledges, they are no∣thing else (as is aforesaid) but acts of grace conferred on this Nation by His Majesties predecessours in severall ages, and at severall times, and some of them lately by His Majesty himselfe, as the continuation of this present Parliament, the abolishing of the Starre-Chamber, and

High Commission censures, and the like. But these priviledges, and others granted to the subjects, dis-invest the King of no primary, or Birth-right-royalty, but onely oblige him in honour to observe them as covenants. A Lord purchaseth a Mannor for himselfe and his Heires for ever; his sonne and successors grant certaine Franchises to the te∣nants, and oblige their heires for ever to performe them: so the te∣nants live-in a more free state and condition, then they did in the first purchasers dayes; and paying their rents, and performing their services, they are not altogether subject to be turned out at the pleasure (or ra∣ther displeasure) of the Lord; but doth this Franchisement or freedome of theirs, cause the Lord to derive his right or title from his tenants? Law and experience tels us no. And this is our Soveraignes case; The Conquerour by his sword, or by deed of gift, or rather indeed by both, came in as a purchaser of the Kingdome of England, for himselfe, and his heires for ever, and by the Law of conquest had power to have made greater alteration in the State then he did, and to have induced what forme of government he had thought good, even as the King of Spaine hath done in Navarre, and the West Indies; yet hee did not, but onely imposed some hard things, as the having of Lawes in the French tongue, which the people generally understood not, Cover-fue-bell, and the like: his successours afterwards did immune, and ease the people from such grievances, so that they lived, and live at more liberty, and enjoy more securely their liberties and properties. But do therefore such immunities granted to the people, cause the King to derive his power and right from the people? The Lawes and cu∣stomes of all Nations and Kingdomes that live under Monarchs, tell us no. The ancient and present Monarchies of the world being sufficient witnesses thereof, besides the Dictamen of Scripture, and reason alrea∣dy inserted.

The Observator, pag. 2. saith, that it is an errour in some Princes, to strive more to be great over their people, then in their people. It may be some Princes have committed such an errour; but withall let the Ob∣servator take notice, that it is convenient for a free Prince to be both; that is to say, to have them wealthy, and yet obedient Subjects: for if he be onely great in his people, and not over them, hee may resemble the now Roman, or German Emperor, or the ancient Kings of France, the one whereof is daily in danger to be dis invested by commotion, & combinations of his Princes; the other were heretofore almost con∣tinually molested by factions of their Peeres and people: And sure the

French themselves have greatly occasioned the heavie burthen of di∣vers tributes and impositions which they undergoe: for they ever and anon rising in Armes against their King, gave him occasion to enslave them the more by his reconquering of them, or reducing them into his obedience, so that had they subsisted in due allegiance, 'tis likely their King had been as equally great over as in them; which equality, or parity in government, is (no doubt) the most happy and blessed co∣union that any Prince and people can enjoy.

The Observator telleth us in the same page, that the King, though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor. But why so? The Head Natu∣rall is not only singulis, but also universis membris majus dignitate, (though it may, 'tis not so in universis, as shall be by and by declared) For the Head hath in it selfe all Senses, other Members receive from it, but Feeling only, and Motion; the head governeth and directeth the whole Body, and is therfore in dignity more Noble then all the Mem∣bers of the Body considered together: and yet though it be more noble and excellent then them all; (for as much as Motion and Feeling dimane from the Braine, which is in the head, to them all) notwith∣standing in universis, in all things, or faculties, the head is not more ex∣cellent then all the members; for the Heart is the seat of Life (accor∣ding to most Philosophers) being primum vivens, & ultimum mori∣ens, and from it proceedeth naturall heat; the stomacke likewise admi∣nistreth sustenance, and aliment; the Feet goe, and the Hands worke, and without them the head cannot subsist, yet are they all subordinate to the Head: and even so is it, or ought it to be in the body politicke, unlesse we must beleeve the Observator, who in his 19. Page saith, That the Head Politicall receives more subsistence from the Body then it gives, &c. But by his leave, if priviledges and Immunities are (as they are) matters of Grace, proceeding from free Monarchs (for of such the Treatise is) to the people, do not such Heads give as much subsistence to the body Politicke, as they receive from it? The Observator telleth us, Pag, 6. That Edward the first was the first (whether he were, or not, it is not materiall) that repaired the Breaches which the Conquest had made upon this Nation; if so, did not hee, by such his reparation, give as much subsistence to the Common-wealth, as he received from the Common-wealth, or Body Politicke? And do not his Successors give likewise as much as they receive, when they conferre the like acts of Grace? Surely, hee that considereth rightly Magna Charta, and all

other Priviledges and Immunities, which now extend to the free∣borne people of this Kingdome, will finde them first to have pro∣ceeded from the Grace and Grant of our Kings: and therefore it is improper to say, That the Head Politick doth not give as much sub∣sistence to the Body Politick, as it receives from it.

The Observator saith likewise in his second Page, That id quod efficit tale, est magis tale; meaning thereby, that the people con∣ferring, as the efficient cause, Power on the King, have joyntly more Power in themselves.

It hath been shewed already, that free Monarchs, such as our King is, derive not their power from the people, but immediately from God: But suppose our King did secundarily acknowledge his pow∣er from this Nation's generall consent; as it may be, the King of Po∣land doth acknowledge his power in part from the Aristocracie of that Kingdome; and as Saul and David did in part from the Jewes approbation and consent: notwithstanding, it followes not from hence, that the people are the sole efficient cause of the Kings pow∣er, but onely the secundary and partiall. Now, when it is said, that id quod efficit tale, est magis tale, it is to be understood of entire and totall causes; but in this case, the people being at the most but the partiall cause of the Kings power, the Axiome or Rule faileth: as for example, the Moone being of her selfe a body darke, receives her light (at least-wise her chiefest) from the Sunne, as from an entire cause; the Sunne is therefore truely said to be more light, being the totall subordinate cause of light; in this case therefore it is truely said, id quod efficit tale, est magis tale: but the Sunne, mediante ho∣mine, producit hominem; & mediante Leone, Leonem; & mediante Plantâ Plantam; for that the Sunne affordeth to all sensible and vegetable creatures an influx of vigour and naturall heat: yet for as much as the Sunne is, in the production of these creatures, but a par∣tiall, and not an integrall cause, it were absurd to say, that the Sunne were more a man, then is a man; or more a Lyon, then is a Lyon; or more a Plant, then is a Plant: and so is it to say, that because a King may acknowledge his power in part received from the peoples generall consent, that therefore the people have more power then himselfe.

The Observator telleth us, Page 3. That the Kings dignity was erected to preserve the Communalty, the Communalty was not created for his service.

This is somewhat too harsh, especially if we consider our King to be, in all Causes, as well Ecclesiasticall as Civill, next and immediate∣ly under Christ, supreame Head and Governour: such words would have beene better accommodated to a Duke of Venice, then to a King of England. The Jewes, I beleeve, when they asked a King at Gods hands, were somewhat inclining to the Observators opinion; for they desired a King for their owne ends, chiefly to judge them, and to fight their Battailes; not well considering, that if they had a King, hee must and ought to have a Kingly Dominion over them: Wherefore God caused the Prophet Samuel to instruct them con∣cerning the Praeeminence of a King; and, that if they would have a King, a King would be such, and such a man, as is evidently chara∣cterized in the first of Samuel, chap. 8. where amongst other things, vers. 17. the Prophet saith, He will take the Tenth of your Sheepe, and yee shall be his servants: Where, by the word will, he shew∣eth the Authority which Kings would have; and by the word shall, hee sheweth the obedience that Subjects should have: nor did the Prophet speake of some, or to some few onely; but of all, and to all the people, (at least-wise to all the chiefest of them) saying, Yee shall be his servants.

I desire therefore that the Observator, and all his other adherents, would take more speciall notice of this Text of the Prophet, and that of Saint Pauls confirmation of this Text, Let every soule be subject to the higher Powers: For, though Christian Monarches ought not, by the Rules of Christianity, to Tyrannize, or make our Sonnes their Slaves, or our Daughters their Concubines, and the like; as did many of the Kings of the Gentiles, and some of the Jewes; yet ought they not to be thought so contemptible, as that the Commu∣nalty was no way created for their service.

The Observator saith in the same Page, That the right of Con∣quest cannot be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people, as the authors and ends of all Power; for meere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, and frustrate Law; and if it could, there were more reason why the people might justifie Force to re-gaine due liberty, then the Prince might to subvert the same.

By the Observators leave, for his first Clause it is answered alrea∣dy, That in Monarchies the people are not the authors or ends of Power. For the second Clause, That meere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, or frustrate the tenour of Law; that is to say, That

meere Force cannot captivate and debase a people by nature free, and living under a law of common consent. I suppose the words, cannot alter, should have beene, cannot, de jure, alter; or ought not to alter, &c. For that force can alter, and de facto hath altered the freedome and lawes of People and Nations, is knowne to most men; Histories and Chronicles testifying to the world the severall altera∣tions and formes of Government which Conquerours have induced; but whether they ought so to have done, is a question. Yet should the Observator and his adherents take advice, that though in Nature there is a parity of mankinde, and therefore Dominion may not seeme to be intended by Nature, yet God the author of Nature, fore-seeing the fall of Man, and the depravation in Nature, which did ensue thereof intended power and dominion, and that some should bee masters, and others servants; some command, and others obey; some should become slaves to Tyrants, others subjects to free Monarches; others members of popular Estates: and these things God hath or∣dained by his divine wisedome according to his will, and disposes and alters them at his pleasure: But as for the pot, it ought not to say to the Potter, Why hast thou made me thus? It is enough for it to know, that there is no power but of God, and so to be applyable to the use it was made for; if for honour, to honour; if for servility, to servility; being subject for conscience sake: Rom. 13.5.

Of a strange nature therefore are those words, viz. There were more reason why the people might justifie force, to re-gaine due liber∣ty, then the Prince might to subvert the same. If this Doctrine had beene good, our Saviour would surely have counselled the Jewes (when they asked him whether it were lawfull to give tribute to Caesar) to have kept their money in their purses, or to have made up a stock of it, and by force to have sought to re-gaine their due li∣berty from Caesar, and not have bid them Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's. If it be alleadged, that in case Christ had counselled the Jews so, they would have played the Jews indeed, and have accused him of high Treason: What then? Would Christ have concealed, or did he at any time conceale the truth for feare of the Jewes accu∣sations? When he was conjured to expresse whether or no he were the Sonne of God, (a thing more hatefull to the Jewes eares, then the denying of tribute could have beene to the eares of the Romans) Christ answered, Thou hast said it; which is as much as Yes. But

suppose the Jewes would have accused him of high Treason, in case he had denied tribute to Caesar, and that God would not have such a vile imputation as Treason laid on the Redeemer of the World: Yet had re-gaining of due liberty by force beene lawfull, Christ might have said, Yee may give tribute to Caesar, in the Potentiall Mood, (in which words no exceptions could have beene taken) and not have said, Give tribute to Caesar, or Give unto Caesar what is Caesar's, in the Imperative Mood. Or otherwise, when they asked him, Whether it were lawfull to pay tribute to Caesar, he might onely have answered them, Yes; but fore-seeing in his divine wisedome, that some indirect constructions might bee made of such a single word as Yes, 'tis lawfull to pay it, yee may pay it if yee please, 'tis not against the law of God, if yee doe pay it, &c. therefore Christ bid them shew him a piece of money, and bid them Give it unto Caesar, informing the covetous mindes of that perverse people, that they ought and were obliged to part with their money and sub∣stance to Caesar, if demanded as a tribute. But to let Arguments of Divinity passe, and to induce a few State reasons: If the people may justifie force to re-gaine due liberty, what Monarchy, what Aristo∣cracy, what Popular estate can remaine secure? The French sub∣jects being in generall oppressed with taxes, may revolt from their King, if this Tenet be good; and so may the Spanish: The Polish Peasants may rebell against the King and their Lords, for that they hold them in villinage: and the Townsmen and Boores in Holland, and the Pisani in Venice against the States, for their imposing on them terrible excizes. This Tenet, or Position, may quadrate, it may be, with the Irish Rebels, (for they pretend by force to re-gaine due liberty) but never with loyall subjects. And surely this Tenet, or Position afore-said, is dangerous to all the Monarchies and States of the world, yea, even to Parliaments themselves, if rightly conside∣red; and opposite also to the law of God and Nations.

The Observator telleth us, Page 13. That where the people by pub∣like authority will seeke an inconvenience to themselves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it is more inconvenience to de∣ny it, then grant it. This is a strange assertion, and against all rule of Monarchicall Government. Suppose (for a supposition is no falla∣cie) that a Christian people should generally (which God forbid) desire to revolt from Christianity to Mahometanisme; should their

King grant it? they seeme to be more interessed then the King, be∣cause it concernes their salvation or damnation; is it injustice there∣fore to deny it? Surely no; but most just and acceptable to God to hinder them from it. Suppose this Nation should in generall (which God of his goodnesse prohibit) desire to turne Anabaptists and Brownists, whereof there are too many already; is the King bound, or ought he to condescend to their desires? Surely no: but as Gods Vice-gerent, to oppose such exorbitant inclinations of the people. But if the Assertion of the Observator be good, Pilate seemes to be excuseable, whom the Observator condemneth in the page before: for the Jewes sought by authority of the Priests and Elders to cru∣cifie Christ, (an inconvenience enough to themselves) and instanced a law, and that by that law he ought to die, Joh. 19.7. and the Jewes were more interested in Christ, (he being their Countrey-man, and subject to their lawes, as they conceived)▪ then was Pilate; so that according to this Assertion of the Observator, It was more inconve∣nience and injustice for Pilate to have denyed to the Jewes Christ to have beene crucified, then to have granted it. Judica Deus.

The Observator saith, Page 17. The name of a King is great, I confesse, and worthy of great honour; but is not the name of a People greater?

The Observator must give me leave to tell him, that in Monar∣chies, where there were or are Kings, the name of a people neither was, nor is greater then the name of a King: Senatus populúsque Romanus, ceased to be, and gave place to the name of Caesar. The Ottoman name at this day, dignifies that great Empire subject to that family; and so doth the name of Sophy the Persian. The name of the House of Austria decorates their dominions; and so doth that of Bourbon, France: And I see no reason but why the name of Stewart should doe as much in England. If it be asked, But what availeth the names of these great Monarches, without their King∣domes or Dominions? The answer is, That Dominions are to Mo∣narches, as it were, materiall subjects; themselves (from whom their names result) as Formes. Now as the Forme is more worthy then its Matter, so is a free Monarch more worthy then his Empire, in respect of dignity politicall.

And indeed the word Monarch inferres as much; for Monarchy is derived from Monarch, not Monarch from Monarchy. But

it may be some will instance from hence, that if it be so, the good of a Monarch seemes to be preferred before the good of all his Sub∣jects in generall, so that a whole Kingdome or Empire should bee utterly pillaged, wasted, and consumed, rather then his Treasures be destroyed. Not so: for though Empires and Kingdomes are but as materiall subjects, and Monarches as formes politicall; yet even as in nature, formes cannot subsist without matter, (from whose pow∣er all formes, except the rationall soule, are educed;) so in policy, Monarchs cannot subsist without their people, from whose subje∣ction and obedience their power is educed immediately from God, as are formes from matter by nature: the good of both therefore must be consistent together, so that not salus populi alone, as the Ob∣servator would have it, but salus Regis & populi, is the true end of Monarchicall government.

Thus have I briefly answered the Observators chiefe arguments, from whence all his other assertions and conclusions are drawne, desire∣ing him and all others, rather to study how to produce reasons for obe∣dience (where it is due) to Monarchs, then to derogate from Monar∣chicall government: to endeavour how to incline, and not to disaffect (by nice positions) the distracted mindes of the people towards the King: to propound prudent Arguments which might move the King to accommodate with his Parliament; and not by lessening his autho∣rity, to divert him from it. Finally, to seeke how to unite the King and Common-wealth, and not to dis-unite them by impertinent and inva∣lid conclusions. God of his goodnesse grant co-union (as much as in this world may be) betweene our Soveraigne and His people, that He may know truely how to rule, and they to obey.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Seth and his genera∣tion began first to call upon the name of the Lord, that is to say, to give to God some set forme of worship, as Priests did, &c.