An impartial inquiry into the nature of sin in which are evidently proved its positive entity or being, the true original of its existence, the essentiall parts of its composition by reason, by authority divine, humane, antient, modern, Romane, Reformed, by the adversaries confessions and contradictions, by the judgement of experience and common sense partly extorted by Mr. Hickman's challenge, partly by the influence which his errour hath had on the lives of many, (especially on the practice of our last and worst times,) but chiefly intended as an amulet to prevent the like mischiefs to come : to which is added An appendix in vindication of Doctor Hammond, with the concurrence of Doctor Sanderson, Oxford visitors impleaded, the supreme authority asserted : together with diverse other subjects, whose heads are gathered in the contents : after all A postscript concerning some dealings of Mr. Baxter / by Thomas Pierce ...

CHAP. V. (Book 5)

§. 1. THE positive entity of sin is so clear from Scrip∣ture,* 1.1 and from the writings of all the Fathers both Greek and Latine; that as Mr. Hickman hath not attempted to give us Scripture for his opinion, so the FATHERS are very few, whose very figurative spee∣ches do look that way. And their meaning is so conspicu∣ous, by what the same Fathers say (before and after,) that if he drank out of the Fo••ntaines,* 1.2 as I see he hath done out of several Cisterns, I admire the greatness of his delu∣sion: His performance being no better, then mine or any mans would be, who should prove that an Idol hath not a positive being, (although the work of mens hands, and made of Massy Gold or silver) because it is said by the A∣postle, an Idol is nothing in the world. Or that the Planters of Christianity had not onely no positive, but not so much as a Real Being, because it is said by the same Apostle, that God hath chosen the things that are not, to bring to naught things that are. Yet this ad hominem, is a strong way of arguing; very much stronger then Mr. Hickmans, by how much that of the Scripture is the greatest Authority in the world. Now though it is said by the Holy Ghost, that Circumcision is nothing, that the foreskin is nothing, that wicked men are of nothing, that every man is but vanity, yea and altogether lighter then vanity it self, (which will be granted by all the world to have positive beings) yet doth he not say in any one text, That sin is nothing in the world, or that Blasphemies and Rapes have no positive be∣ing;* 1.3 but on the contrary, sins are said to be the works of men and devils. And now to prevent any exception to the propriety of the word,

§. 2. Those are properly called sins,* 1.4 which God him∣self in his written word doth commonly call by that name. And how many things are there that have positive entities or beings, (by the very confession of Mr. H. and all that are of his way,) of which wickednesse and sin are found to be predicated in scripture? As for example, For the man to lie with the Masters wife, Ioseph called a great wicked∣ness, and a sin aginst God. To take another mans wife,* 1.5 was called a great sin by King Abimelech. And Ieroboam, in driving Israel from following the Lord, is said to have made them sin a great sin. Davids sin is called a deed, that is, an act or fact 2 Sam. 12▪ 14. If St. Paul had not thought that some sins are actions, and that other sins are qualities,* 1.6 he would not certainly have told us of the mo∣tions of sins, and the lusts of sins. The motions of sins which were by the Law, did work in our members to bring fruit unto death. (Rom. 7.5.) So in the 7. verse of that Chapter, he expresseth sin by lust, as lusting by coveting. And yet so far is the Apostle from ascribing those positive things to God, that speaking there of wilful sin (in the person of a Carnal unregenerate man) the doing that which he would not do,* 1.7 he doth not add (like Mr. Hickman) It is not I that DO it, but GOD that DOTH it in me. No, his words (on the contrary) are justly these, It is no more I that do it, but SIN that dwelleth in me. That I may not be over∣long in so clear a case, I fain would know of Mr. Hickman; whether those works of the flesh which are manifest (saith the Apostle), and set in opposition to the fruits of the spirit,* 1.8 (and by an opposition of contrariety too, Gal. 5.17.) I say I would know of Mr. Hickman, whether those lusts of the flesh are not properly called sins▪ And whether Adultery, Fornication, Vncleanness, Lasciviousness, Idolatry, Witch∣craft, Hatred, Variance, Strife, Seditions, Heresies, Envy∣ings, Murders, Drunkenness, Revellings, and such like, have not real and positive beings. He will not sure deny this, because he knows that these things are either qualities or actions. Nor can he deny they are sins, because they are

set in a contrariety to the Fruits of the spirit, and because it is added presently after, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God. And (as I take it) they must be sins▪ for which the Doers are to suffer the loss of heaven, which is waited on with the paines of Hell too. When Iudas said, I have sinned, in that I have betrayed inno∣cent blood & Cain complained that his sin was greater then he could bear, meaning the killing his brother Abel; who sees not that sin is predicated in Recto of two such actions, as are granted by all the world to have positive beings? It is but dipping into the Scripture, to finde abundance of such examples.

* 1.9§. 3. 'Twere easy to write •• just volume, in shewing the concurrence of Antient F••THERS; and even the least that I can shew (with a desire of Brevity) will be more then Mr. Hickman was able to wrest to his seeming in∣terest. I cannot better begin, then with the great ATHA∣NASIUS, whom several mens misapprehensions have helpt to speak for their judgement, against his own. * 1.10 First he delivers his true meaning, when he useth the expression of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 applied to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And therefore with the Apostle, he first applies it unto Idols, which had as positive beings as those that made them: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Next he sets down the reason, † 1.11 why he useth that expression, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and his reason is, because they are not from him who is indeed the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but from those free and depraved Agents, who revolting from their maker made them Idols or Gods of their own invention: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 4▪ where the lusts of the flesh (which he calls the body) are given as Instances of the sins, to which the creature was now de∣scended, and by much repetition had made * 1.12 habitual. Af∣ter this he asserteth the opposition of contrariety twixt vice and virtue, thereby proving the positivity as well of the

one as of the other. And giving examples of those actions, as well as qualities, which man is able to produce by being a voluntary Agent, (abusing the Liberty of his will to ** 1.13 de∣sires and lusts of his own ** 1.14 forging) he names the committing of Adultery, Murder, Rebellion, Blasphemies, Comumelies, Perjuries, plundering, Beating, Gluttony, Drun∣kenness, which though granted by all the world to be positive things, are affirmed by that Father, to be the wick∣ednesse and sin of the soul of man; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; p. 6. And to make it yet more undeniable, that he opposeth his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to the excellent Creatures of God himself, (whom he often calls the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪) and not to all that hath a positive being, † 1.15 He sets Concupiscencies or Lusts in opposition to the Creature; that is, the crea∣tures of wicked men in opposition to those of God.

Then shewing the power of the soul to incite the mem∣bers of the body, and * 1.16 of her self to excite her self, he saith (in the * 1.17 concrete) she formeth evil unto her self. And so he proceeds to shew the errour of certain Graecians, who held sin to have a substance, (and not to be a meer accident) A substance created by a God too, whom they would have to be coeternal with the Father of Lights, and the maker of sin as a second Nature, which from all eter∣nity was collaterall with the First. (First in Dignity, though not in Time.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 6. which shews Mr. Hickman the strange Impertinence of what he citeth from Athana∣sius, p. 76. not onely quite beside, but (as I shall shew when I come thither) against his purpose. For the Fa∣ther, having proved against those hereticks, * 1.18 That there is one onely God, and that evil is a thing temporal, not derived from God, but from the voluntary creature indu∣ed with liberty of will, goes on (for several whole pages) to speak as much for my purpose, as I can wish him. He

shews the folly of their distinction, who so endeavour to put a difference betwixt the act of h••ting God, and the sin of ha∣ting God, (which they call the obliquity of the act) as to affirm the first to be from God, and therefore good; the other evil, and from the Creature, † 1.19 whereas 'tis impossible (saith the Father) that good and evil should be so inseparably together. For what he * 1.20 saith of a good and an evil God, is as true of a good and an evil act, and in a sense as co∣gent as that he speaks in; for it implyes a contradiction, that one and the same should be a good and an evil act too, to wit, that the a••t of hating God should be no less a good A••t, as being from God, then it is an evil one, as having an obliquity which is from m••n. I say such a m••x••ure of good and evil, in one and the same numerical act, must needs be absolutely impossible and con••radictory, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And is not that an unchristian Fabrick, which hath no better a Buttress whereon to lean? But I must hasten to other Fathers, be∣fore, and after Athanasius.

DIONYSIUS the AREOPAGITE, how much soe∣ver he lived before the great Ath••n••sius,* 1.21 I thought the fitter in this place to follow after, the more conducible I thought it for the finding out his right meaning; of which at first I began to doubt, because I found him so much mistaken by so learned a person as Mr. BARLOW, to whom Mr. Hickman is beholding pag. 56. Its true he useth such expressions, as I lately shew'd and explained in A••hanasius, (and Master Barlow saith in what pages, though Mr. Hickman doth not.) But he useth the very ** 1.22 same of God himself in some places, whom yet I hope Mr. Hickman will not thence conclude a meer privation, or a Non-entity. ** 1.23 God (saith Dionysius) is deprived of essence. Nay † 1.24 He is neither a substance, nor a spirit, nor any thing of the things that are, or exist: shall an Atheist

now say, that Dionysius was of his mind, and urge the letter of these words to bear him out? No, Mr. Hick∣man will tell him, the words are spoken in a sublime and figurative way, and must be explained by the context, to yield the Authors true meaning. The very same shall I say in the other case, That when the Father saith of sin, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he must be so understood, as Aquinas understood Austin, deny∣ing the * 1.25 act of sin to be anything; opposing that act (be∣ing an accident) to res simpliciter, which is substantia. And accordingly Corderius does render 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by substan∣tia, not by essentia, much less by entitas. What gave oc∣casion to Dionysius to speak of evil in that stile, holy Ma∣ximus tells us in his Scholion upon the place. For Dionysi∣us having said, that that which is * 1.26 not doth desire that which is good, [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] and again a few leaves before, that there is a will in that which is not: † 1.27 Maximus tells us that the words being spoken against the Manichaeans, he must largely explicate what is meant by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and why the thing that is evil is called that which is not: of which, as I have spoken in the praecedent paragraph, so I shall speak once for all in the 5. § of this Chapter, Number 9. But if the Que∣stion is to be carried by words and phrases, even so the very truth will be found to rest on my side. For the † 1.28 An∣tien••s (saith holy Maximus) did express the same thing by the word matter, and extreme turpitude, which is ex∣pressed also by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or that which is not: and thence forwards when he speaks of things that are not, (meaning evils) he * 1.29 explains himself presently by things material. In a word, Dionysius does give the reason, why that which is evil is said not to be, even because it is more remote from God, then that which is not in being. For that I con∣ceive must be the sense of the Greek, (what ever was

thought by the Translator, who seems not to hit the Fa∣thers meaning.) † 1.30 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Which how many several wayes it makes against Mr. Hickman, the in∣different Reader is left to judge. So clear to me is the meaning of that figurative Writer, that he saith of the sinner (not onely of the sin) that he is † 1.31 not in being, so far forth as he is a sinner, and desires nothing that is. Had Mr. Hickman prepar'd himself for the Reading of the book (if at least he ever read so much as a page or line of it) by reading the general observations prefixed to it by Corderius, in particular, * 1.32 that of his making God to be the position and * 1.33 privation of all things, [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] I think he could not have swallow'd so great an errour. That something is positive, as well as privative in sin,* 1.34 Dion••sius (or whoever is the Author of that book, which is thought unduly to wear his name) hath sufficiently inferr'd by his answer given to this Que∣stion, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; to which he answers, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (pag. 580.) and again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. (p. 584.)

But I have dwelt so long upon these two Fathers, that I must study to be brief in those that follow: and that by satisfying my self with one or two instances out of each. The force of which I shall not shew, (as I have hitherto done) but modestly leave to my Readers judg∣ment. I shall onely propose to consideration, whether those qualities or actions are not worthily called sins, of which the word sin is wont to be praedicated in recto. And whether that which is granted, to be a true proposition, (by all the world,) can possibly lose of its Truth, by the at∣tempts of so gross a Fallacie, as à dicto simplicitèr ad Dictum secundum Quid.

CLEMENS ALEX. strom. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. edit. Com∣mel. pag. 219. & edit. Paris. p. 511.—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Here to sin is by such an action to pollute the Title of man, and is said to be placed (or to consist) in the action or ope∣ration, not substance, or essence; and this is the ground, why it is not the work of God. So afterwards sin not brought to repentance is defined 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 5. p. 281. And though elsewhere he calls sin a variation from right reason, yet there is added a * 1.35 positive entity of each, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. (But I am ready to break my promise, almost as soon as I have made it.)

CYRILLVS HIEROS. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. edit morell. p. 30. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

HIERONYM. in Malach. c. 3. p. 284. A. Nequa∣quam levia putemus esse peccata, perjurium, calumniari viduam, & opprimere alienigenam, quae male sicio & ve∣neficiis & adulterio comparantur.

BASIL. in Hex. Homil. 2. p. 19. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

CHRYSOST. in 1. ep. ad Cor. c. 6. Hom. 16. p. 167. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉;

ATHENAGORAS in Legat. pro Christianis. p. 35. c. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

ANSELMVS super 2. ad Hebr. Peccatum est vel facere vetita, vel non facere jussa.

IUSTIN. MART. Q. & Resp. ad Orth. p. 419. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Sanct. THEOPHILVS ad Autolychum lib. 3. p. 125. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

TERTULLIAN. de Poenit. p. 375. Porrò peccatum, nisi MALVM FACTVM, dici non meretur. Nec quisquam benefaciendo delinquit▪ — * 1.36 Cùm Deum grande quid Boni constet esse, utique Bono nisi Malum non displiceret, quòd inter CONTRARIA sibi nulla A∣micitia est.

MACARIVS in Hom. 15. p. 100. c. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ (having spoken before of Adam's disobedience.)

Hom. 24. p. 137. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Hom. 38. p. 204. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — And long before (Hom. 3. p. 15. A.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉;

LACTANTIVS in Instit. l. 2. c. 7. p. 102. Duplici¦ratione peccatur ab insipientibus; primum quod Dei o∣pera Deo praeferunt; deinde quod elementorum ipsorum figuras humana specie comprehensas colunt.

—* 1.37 Haec facere, peccatum est.— † 1.38 Nesciunt quan∣tum sit nefas, adorare aliud, praeter Deum.

Si libido appetit thorum alienum, licet sit mediocris, vi∣tium tamen maximum est. — * 1.39 Cupiditas inter vitia nu∣meratur, si haec quae terrena sunt concupiscat, &c.

—† 1.40 Recens natos oblidere, maxima Impietas, expone∣re & necare, duplex scelus. See much more l. 5. c. 9. p. 299. especially c. 20. p. 319. So whilst the Blasphemy of Marcus the Magician, and his Followers, or their posi∣tive speaking against the honour of Gods essence, is cal∣led an Impiety by * 1.41 IRENAEVS, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 above all Impiety, he unavoidably imply's the positive being of Impiety, which (I hope) M. Hickman will not affirm to be good; or say impiety is one thing, and sin an∣other.

AMBROS. de Cain & Abel. lib. 2. cap. 9. fol. 260. Quanto gravius pec••ato ipso, ad Deum referre Quod f••∣ceris? There the positive fact is said to be a sin, though the ascribing it to God (which is done by Mr. Hickman) is said to be worse then the sin it self; that is to say, •• greater sin.

CYPRIAN. de Eleemosynâ, 1. Serm. p. 179. Coarcta∣ti eramus, &c. nisi iterum pieta•• Divina subveniens, —viam quandam tuendae salutis aperuisset, ut Sordes post∣modum quascunque contrahimus Eleemosynis abluamus. compare this with Daniel 4.27.

— * 1.42 Quia voluntas non erat in culpâ, providit Deus generali Damnationi remedium, & suae sententiam Justitiae temperavit, haereditarium ONVS à sobole removens, & misericorditer ablutione & unctione medicinali corruptio∣nis primitivae Fermentum expurgans.

ORIGEN. ad Ioan. 2. in Cat. pat. Gr. p. 77. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 — * 1.43 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

AUGUSTINVS Confess. c. 11. Talis motus (nimi∣rum voluntatis) Delictum atque peccatum est.— * 1.44 Me∣tus ille Aversionis, quod fatemur esse peccatum, vide quò pertineat, &c.

SALVIAN. l. 4. p. 128. Furtum in omni quidem est homine malum Facinus; sed damnabilius ab que dubio, si Senator furatur aliquando. Cunctis Fornicatio interdici∣tur, sed Gravius multò est, si de Clero aliquis, quàm si de populo fornicetur. Ita & nos qui Christiani Catholici esse dicimur, si simile aliquid Barbarorum Impuritatibus faci∣mus, Gravius erramus. Atrocius enim sub sancti nominis professione peccamus — quanto minori peccato illi per Daemonia pejerant,* 1.45 quàm nos per Christum? Quanto mino∣ris Res Criminis est, Jovis nomen, quàm Christi &c. The force of this last testimony may be learnt by Mr. H. from Dr. Field. [It must not be said, that God is the original cause, that man hath any such action of will as is evil ex ob∣jecto, for if he should Originally and out of himself will any such act, he must be the author of sin, seeing such an a••t is intrinsecally evil, so that it cannot be separated from deformity. p. 125, 126.] after this let Salvian speak — Nil ad Deum pertinens Leve ducendum est;* 1.46 quia etiam quod videtur exiguum esse Culpa, Grande hoc faciebat Di∣vinitatis In••uria.

EPIPHANIVS adv. Haer. l. 1. Tom. 3. p. 265. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.47 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.— 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.48 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. — 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, —

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.49 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. More instances may be seen p. 281.548, 549. And [to sin] is expressed at every turn, by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. All importing the positivity of sin.

BERNARDUS de modo bene vivend. Serm 37 p. 1281. Superbia est R••••ix omnium malorum. Superbia & Cupidi∣tas in tantum est unum malum, ut nec superbia sine cupidi∣ta••e, nec cupiditas sine superbiâ esse possit. — Quid est omne peccatum, nisi Dei Contemptus, quo ejus praecepta contemnimus?— * 1.50 Luxuria flagitium est, Avaritia spi∣ritualis nequiti••, unde illud vitium corporis, istud Animae, viz. quia nullum est peccatum, quod ita inquinet corpus, sicut Luxuria, — similiter super omne peccatum, avari∣tia inquinat Animam; unde & Idolorum servitus di∣citur.

Nor do I see how * 1.51 those Fathers, who say that an habit of sin is gotten, by the custom of such acts as are avoid∣able of themselves, can be imaginable not to hold the positi∣vity of sin; or to hold that such acts can be impu••able to God, which they affirm the Creature might have avoi∣ded. Evitabilium Actuum consuetudine censent generari in homine habitum vitiosum, so Ger. VOSSIVS in Hist. Pelag p. 215.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

* 1.52 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 so he calls Idolatry 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Orat. 38. p. 620.

† 1.53 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

* 1.54 Initium omnis peccati superbia — non solùm peccatum est ipsa, sed nullum peccatum fieri potuit, potest, aut poterit fine ipsâ, siquidem nihil aliud omne peccatum, nisi Dei contemptus est, quo ejus praecepta calcantur; which com∣pare with Ecclus. 10.13.

FULGENTIUS ad Monim. l. 1. p. 275. so also p. 302 Si initium peccati requiritur, nihil aliud nisi superbia inve∣nitur, — quae tùm initium sumpsit, cum Angelus adversus Deum elatus, per concupiscentiam (quae est radix omnium malorum) volens usurpare &c. — mala opera, hoc est, Peccata, praescisse tantum; non etiam praedestinasse: quia ibi non opus Dei esse dicitur;* 1.55 sed judicium. Ideo in pec∣cato opus Dei non est — sine operante Deo malus ope∣ratur.

LOMBARDUS l. 2. d. 2. Dist. 40. c. Opera ipsa peccata sunt, ut furta, stupra, Blasphemiae,— sunt nonnulli actus, qui peccata sunt —& mala per se—quaerimus quis Actus pecca∣tum sit,—dignosces quis Actus sit Peccatum,

* 1.56In lieu of producing more Antiquity in words at length (which would increase my Readers trouble) I shall insert the confession of Learned VOSSIUS,* 1.57 That the greatest part of the Amients do so speak, as if they thought Original sin to be som••thing positive, (to wit,) either a Habit, or some other Quality. I call it the confession of GERARD VOSSIUS, because I find it is none of his own opinions, that Origi∣nal sin is something positive, whatever he speaks of actual sins. And I think his confession to be of the greater consi∣deration, because of his being so very conversant in Anti∣ent writers, and because or his abilitie to understand their true meaning, and lastly of his unwillingness to understand them against himself. Nay when he speaks of those An∣tients,

who were otherwise minded, he takes their mea∣ning to have been, (not so much that this sin was a meer defect of Original Righteousnesse,* 1.58 as) that it was rather an habitual aversion from God, proceeding from the defect of Original righteousness.

They that held it to be a quality, could not otherwise hold it (in his opinion) then by holding also that the soul was begotten with the body, and sin begotten with the soul; or that the spirit being created was at least in∣fected by the flesh, some thought that the soul was as it were kindled by the soul in generation; and that the Le∣prosie of sin in childrens souls, was by infection from the leprosy with which their parents▪ had been infect∣ed. Of which Opinion was TERTVLLIAN,* 1.59 APOL∣LINARIVS, and the greatest part of the Eastern Fa∣thers. [Quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic animam nasci ex animâ, TERTVL. Apoll. & maxima pars Orientalium au∣tumavit, uti scribit Hieronymus ad Marcellinum & Ana∣psychiam, Epist. 45.] RUFFINUS also and AUGUSTIN are cited for it. But because of the latter tis said by VOS∣SIUS, that he durst not publickly avow, what was privately his opinion; His words are the worthier to be obser∣ved.

For thus he writeth to OPTATVS, se neque legendo, neque orando, ne{que} ratiocinando, invenire potuisse,* 1.60 quo∣modo cum animarum Creatione peccatum Originis defendatur. And for more to this purpose the Reader is referred to o∣ther places, as Epist. 28. ad Hieronymum, Lib. 10. in Ge∣nes. ad lit. cap: 23. & lib. 1 Retract. c. 1. Nay even then when he is doubtful of the souls extraction, (whether cre∣ated or begotten,) he still adheres to his opinion, that it is infected by the flesh with some positive Quality, as wine grows sowre by being put in a sowre vessel. And VOS∣SIVS himself doth so explain him. Haec enim mens est ver∣borum Augustini, [profecto aut utrum{que} vitiatum & ex∣homine

trahitur, aut alterum in altero, tanquam in vase vi∣tiato corrumpitur, ubi occulta justiti•• divinae legis includi∣tur. Quid autem horum sit verum, libentius disco, quàm dico, ne audeam dicere quod nescio.] It seemes he doubted whether the soul were ex traduce, or not; although, un∣lesse it were ex traduce, he knew not how to defend Ori∣ginal sin. But that he concluded it had a positive entity, appears as by all that hath been spoken,* 1.61 so by the motus bestialis, & bestialis Libido by which he expresseth the sin of Adam.

§. 4. As the most of the Antients, so the most eminent of the MODERNS, have held the soul to be ex traduce, and Original sin a positive entity, two of which number are commended by learned Vossius (but just now cited) for men of Excellency and Renown. And Vossius himself, in divers places, doth sufficiently ass••rt the positivity of sin: not so much when he saith of Original sin, that it inclines the minde to vitious acts, so that it may, and is wont to be cal∣led a Habit; as when he saith of its effects, (which ar•• Actual sins) that they are grown over the soul as a spiri∣tual Rust▪ that carnal Concupiscence is wholy vitious, as be∣ing a deflextion of the appetite from the Law of its Creation, from whence ariseth a disposit••on and propensity to R••∣bellion; that Morally vitious Acts are freely drawn out from that propensity; that by the custom of such a••ts there is ingendered in the sinner a vitious Habit. Cùm af∣fectus sic effraenis lascivit, ut rationis imperium antevertat, plurimùm adversus rationem insurgat, ac (nisi diligenter à ratione valletur) facile aurigam rationem curru excutiat: In graviori tentatione semper sit superior nisi ratio specia∣li juvetur Dei Judicio.

2. And as they who affirme the propagation of the soul so also they, who deny that God doth concur to the act of sin, do eo ipso hold sin to have a positive being: such as LOMBARD, BONAVENTVRE, ALEXANDER ALENSIS, ASOTO, DVRAND, AVREOLVS, the learned ARMACHANVS, and others cited by Dr.

STEARN in his Animi Medela, p. 256, 257. And though the Master of the sentences doth seem to some not to de∣fine which is truest, (the negative or the affirmative of G••ds concurrence to acts of sin, but leaves the Reader to judge of both tenets, (to Dist. 37.) yet he is cited by CAMERACENSIS (l. 1. q. 14.) for the defence of the Negative. Because according to his opinion, God doth on∣ly permit those evils which are sin, (as saith our learned Dr. FIELD, p. 128.

3. HEMMINGIVS (the Scholar of Melanehthon and known to be of his minde) defineth sin, in general,* 1.62 by disobedience against God, and affirmes Disobedience to im∣port four things in holy writ, Defect, corruption, inclinati∣on, and action. Original sin he defines to be a propagated corruption of humane nature, in which there is a material and formal part. The Material (saith he) containeth,* 1.63 both a defect in the intellect, and a concupiscence in the heart. In the fal of Adam there was a concurrence of these 8. sins 1. A doubting the truth of Gods word. 2. A loss of faith, or incredulity. 3. Curiosity. 4. Pride. 5. Contempt of God, 6. Apostacy. 7. Ingratitude. 8. A murdering of himself, and his posterity. And is expressed in Scripture by di∣vers names: Concupiscence, Flesh, the old man, the Law of sin, sin dwelling in us, Rebellion, the law of the members, and sometimes sin without any epith••t. * 1.64 Actuall sin he de∣fines to be something done, omitted, said, or thought, fighting with the law of God. (Or as he puts it in other tearmes) Actual sin is every action committed against the Law, both in the Intellect and the will and in the heart, and the out∣ward members. Thus that Regius Professor, famous for learning and moderation.

4. GREGORIE MARTIN of Silesia,* 1.65 stating the sin

of our first parents,* 1.66 begins to expound the word Lapsus, which he saith importeth a vitious act, with which a man does any thing ill, and is the same with peccatum. Then coming to speak of the term originall sin, he professeth to take the word for the positive act of eating the fruit which was forbidden. And so the expression of Original sin (he faith) doth also include an actual. From the im∣portance of the word, he comes to speak of the thing signified. Which first he consider's as to its Genus, which he saith is Action. Its genus rem••tum is actio hominis. Its immediate genus, is actio vitiosa, & privativa. Mark good Reader; he doth not say 'tis a mere privation, but a privative action. Positive in one respect, as 'tis an acti∣on; though privative in another, as destroying the Agent from whence it is. Take that excellent Logician in his own expressions of himself.—Vidimus nomen, Genus se∣cundo loco considerandum est, quod vel remotum, actio hominis; Propinquum actio hominis vitiosa; proximum Actio vitiosa, destr••ens ipsum agens, seu privativa. upon this I lay the greater weight, because the judgement and approbation of another great Methodist and Logician, e∣ven KECKERMAN of Dantzick, adds credit to that of this wise Silesian.

* 1.675. A late professor of Philosophy in the University of Leyden, and a great Aristotelian, saith, that evil includes ens, and adds a reall relation to it, after the manner that Good doth. And this he affirmeth of every evil. [Malum ergo omne, simili modo quo bonum, includit Ens & Enti addit Relationem realem, quâ, quod malum dicitur, ita se habet ad aliud, ut illi inconveniens atque adversum sit.] To which he adds, that those relations are contrary, and have contrary affections; from whence it follow's, (as he goes on.) that good and evil are opposed, rather contrariè, than privativè, and that according to their proper forms too. Convenientia & inconvenientia, being no less contrary, than equality and inequality. His reason is, because a thing is not said to be evil to any one, for being only not conveni∣ent,

but in as much as it is adverse, or affirmatè inconve∣niens (p. 123.) To the objection which he foresees, he an∣swers thus. This is the nature of immediate contrariety, that one extream is inferred from the negation of the other. And he means, by Inconvenient, whatsoever is positively adverse to that which is convenient.—licet inconveni∣ens, & adversum sit positivè quicquid non est conveniens, &c.—All which doth strengthen my Reply to Master BARLOW'S Answer to Aquinas. (for which look back on chap. 3. §. 13.) He concludes with a caterum, actiones sunt malae per se; Habitus, quatenus ex hujusmodi actio∣nibus orti sunt, quae rationem culpae habent. p. 126. If BETVLEIVS had not been of the same opinion, he would not have used that proposition, wherein sin is praedicated of that which will be granted by all to be a positive entity. Racha fratri imprecari, peccatum est. (Be∣tuleius in Lactant. l. 6. c. 16.)

6. I forgot (till just now) to note the Doctrine of Mr. CALVIN,* 1.68 who saith that sin original doth bring forth in us those works of the flesh, Gal, 5.19.) which he also cals sins, though positive entities. Nay he saith our whole na∣tu••e is quoddam peccati semen; that sin hath a force and an operation; that the whole man of himself is nothing else but concupiscence.

7. It is observ'd by ALSTED, that as the Hebrews call original Jezer hara, plasma malum; so peccare,* 1.69 to sin, doth signifie nothing but an action; not omission, or absence, or meer privation. And as Cicero define's it, by leaping over the hedge which the law doth set us; so accor∣dingly by Iunius, it is derived from * pecucare; because a sinner, like a stray sheep, doth leap over mounds. And Bellarmine saith, that evil surpasseth good in this respect,

that it aboundeth more in expressions; for to signifie an Action, we have peccatum, crimen, delictum, scelus, faci∣nus, flagitium, culpa, erratum. And after all we have vitium, which peculiarly signifies an habit; whereas to si∣gnifie an action, or an habit of vertue, we onely use the word vertue.

8. CHEMNITIVS speaking of the sin against the ho∣ly Ghost,* 1.70 reckons up six Ingredients in it, whereof the most if not all, have a positive being. And GERHARD does the like by the sin of Peter, who abjur'd his Savi∣our no less by his works, then by his words; adding perjury to cursing; and both, to lying. Whence he notes the fruitfullness of sin, for which 'tis called the Divels net, Prov. 5.22.

If I shall now add GROTIUS, who is instar multorum (although but one,* 1.71) no knowing Reader will look for more. He, in setting forth the verity of Christian Re∣ligion, to all the nations of the world which have a prae∣judice to the Gospel, takes special care to let them know, that when God is said to be the universal cause, or the cause of all things, it is onely meant of those things that are good, or of all those things which are indued with a subsistence, and are commonly known by the name of sub∣stance; * 1.72 which substances are the causes of certain acci∣dents, such as are actions; And therefore God is thus freed from being the originall cause of sin. So that tis clearly his opinion, that sins of commission at least are Ac∣cidents, even because they are actions, which will be gran∣ted by all to have a positive being.

§. 9. And this doth prompt me to shew the way of re∣conciling the words unto the meaning,* 1.73 and of proving un∣deniably

what must be the true meaning of certain Wri∣ters, whom some men's prejudices and praepossessions have unhappily tempted them to mistake.

1. When they say that all entities are good, they onely speak of all those, which are the works of Gods creation, or unavoidably produced by natural Agents, so as the ori∣gin of their being is duly imputable unto God; which all our voluntary actions cannot possibly be. For

2. When it is said in the common Axiom, That the cause of the cause, is the cause of the ••ffect, it is meant of causes which are physically and essentially subordinate. (as saith the Learned BISHOP OF DERRY in his Reply to Mr. Hobbs.) It is meant of such effects;* 1.74 as do follow their cause by an antecedent necessitation. But the case is quite otherwise when the effects do not follow by a ne∣cessity of nature, but by the intervention of humane liber∣ty. (for which I have the suffrage of Dr. Stearn.) Again 3. it is meant of such effects,* 1.75 as proceed from such second causes, as transgress not the order they ought to have up∣on the first. (and for this I have Aquinas 1.2. q. 79. art. 3. When God is said to work all things, (Eph. 1.11.) it is meant in the same restrained sense, in which it is said by S. Iames, that every good and perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, (Iam. 1.17.) Implying the contrary to be from below, as coming up from the Father of Lyes. And therefore

4. When it is said,* 1.76 That God is the Maker of all things visible, and invisible, (in the Nicene Creed) it is explained in the COLLECT for Evening Service, [O God from whom all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed &c.] It is not set thus, (as Mr. Hick∣man, and the Libertines, it seems, would have it) O God from whom are all desires, holy and unholy; or from whom are all counsels, good and evil; or from whom are all works, just and unjust. I say Mr. Hickman would have it thus, because he saith, the very work of hating God is from God, pag. 95, 96. nay he saith that every positive

entity is either God, or from God (p. 75.) and from him as his Creature, (p. 79.) Nay that every reall Being is produced by the first cause, that is by God, (p. 95.) Now it is granted by all the world, That all thoughts, words, and actions, all desires, counsels, and works, have either a positive, or a reall, (and indeed a positive) being. Which being is not diminished by any addition of good, or evil. For to hate God, is as reall, and as positive a thing, as to hate the Divel.

5. When it is said of God, that he can do every thing, (Iob. 42.2.) and that to him all things are possible, (Mat. 19.26.) it must needs be meant with a Restriction of all things that are good: because there are Texts which say the contrary, to wit, that he cannot do every thing; as that he cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2.13. and that all things are not possible to him; as that it is impossible for God to lye. Tit. 1.2. In a word, It is no truer, that God can do all things, (meaning things that are good,) then that he can do nothing, which argues uncleanness or imperfecti∣on. I may say to Mr. Hickman, as the antient Fathers were wont to do unto the Hereticks,* 1.77 (Austin to Faustus, and Origen to Celsus, and Isidore to the Sceptick, God can do all things, that is, all things that become him; yet cannot do any thing that is evil, because he cannot not be God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Or as the Reverend Bishop Bram∣hall to Mr. Hobs, (p. 93.) God is said to harden the heart, not causally, but occasionally; that is, by Gods doing good the sinner takes an occasion of doing evil. And as this is a good consequence, [such a thing is from God, therefore it is righteous;] so this consequence is as good, [such a thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God.] We must not therefore thus argue, A Lye is no reall thing, because it is Impossible for God to cause it; but rather thus, because it is impossible for God to cause it, therefore all things reall are not from God. And therefore

6. When it is said of sin, that it is nothing,* 1.78 or not in being, that it hath no essence, or is not amongst the things that are, (as Dionysius the Areopagite, and others speak,) me thinks the very extremity of the literal falshood, should have convinced Mr. Hickman that they are figurative ex∣pressions. And no more to the support of his sinking cause, then it would be to that Atheist's, who should dispute a∣gainst the veri••y, because against the wisdome and power of God, by citing the words of our Apostle, [The foolish∣ness of God is wiser then men, and the weakness of God is stronger then men. 1 Corinth. 1.25.] how many blasphemies might be broached from the many 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or seeming contradictions of holy Scripture, if by rational distinctions we might not be suffe••'d to reconcile them? As it is said by Saint Paul,* 1.79 that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, (and being so are very visible;) and as it is said by the Comedian, hoc aliquid Nihil est; so I may say with great reason, hoc nihil est Aliquid. This nothing∣ness of sin is something positive. And I will prove that Mr. H. himself is nothing, at least as well as he prove's that sin is nihil positivum, nothing positive. For M. Hickman is a man, who thinks himself something. And St. Paul hath said it, [If a man think himself something, when he is * 1.80 nothing, he deceiveth himself, Gal. 6.3.] Mr. Hickman cannot be ignorant, that generation and corruption are two species of motion; whereof the first is defined to be motus à Non esse, ad esse; the second to be motus ab esse, ad Non esse. But would he not be thought a prodigious Disputant, who should write a Book of ten sheets, to prove that Generation is a creation out of nothing, and so that the Generant is a God? or that to dye, is to be annihi∣lated, and so that there is not a Resurrection? Yet those two definitions will bear him out to M. Hickman, however ridiculous he would be to all men else. But as the meaning is, that corruptio est motus ab esse tali, ad non esse Tale; so something positive, simpliciter, may be said to be nothing secundum Quid. And in this very sense those words are

spoken by the Psalmist, Mine age is nothing in respect of thee, Psal. 39.5. But to make it yet more apparent,

7. By whom can the writings of the FATHERS be better explained then by themselves? If then the very same Father who saith at one time, that * 1.81 sin is nothing, doth also say at another, that † 1.82 Sin is no other thing then a contempt of God, (an example of which is in my Margin) 'tis plain that the former proposition must be explained by the latter▪ the like example I shewd out of Scripture, and out of the writings of ATHANASIUS, in the first and third Sec••ion of this present Chapter, and the like may be shew'd of all the rest, by the severall citations of the third and fourth Sections. So what is said by AQUI∣NAS and his Followers amongst the SCHOOLMEN, must of necessity be explained by such conspicuous asserti∣ons as these that follow▪— a 1.83 omne quod fit, habet Cau∣sam, sed peccatum fit: est enim dictum, vel factum, vel concupitum, contra legem Dei — b 1.84 Dicendum, quod pec∣catum est Actus quidam inordinatus: & ex parte actus po∣test habere per se causam.— c 1.85 Peccatum non solum signi∣ficat ipsam privationem Boni, quae est Inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali privatione &c.— d 1.86 nihil habet rationem mali, antequam applicetur ad Actum. — e 1.87 Ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, jam est quodd••m peccatum. — f 1.88 Pe••catum consistit principali∣ter in actu voluntatis. — Peccatum nominat ens & actionem cum quodam defectu. Thus frequently and plain∣ly doth Aquinas assert the positive e••tity of sin, and there∣fore by this we must explain him, and reconcile him unto himself, whensoever he seem's to say the contrary; or at least accuse him of contradictions. So he saith of original sin that it is * 1.89 not a meer privation, but a corrupt Habit, comparing it to a bodily disease, which hath something * 1.90 positive, as well as privative.

8. It must be carefully observed in ANTIENT WRI∣TERS,* 1.91 that because an accident cannot exist without the subject of Inhaesion which is substantia; and because substantia is ens per se subsistens; they do often take res to signifie a substance, and express an accident by nihil, or non existens; meaning, non per se subsistens. Which as I have hinted by some examples already given, so now I will make it undeniable by one taken out of Saint AV∣STIN. Who * 1.92 saith of the very act of sin, (which is acknowledged by all to have a positive being) that it is not any thing. Actus peccati non est Res aliqua. To which Aquinas makes Answer, † 1.93 that by res he means substantia, which is res simpliciter; not intending to deny, that it is an Accident, which (with Aquinas) is res secundum quid. And therefore GROTIVS (in imitation of the Antients) opposeth such accidents as actions are, to things which have a true subsistence. Cum diximus, Deum omnium es∣se causam, addidimus, eorum, quae ve••è subsistunt. Nihil enim prohibet, &c (ut superius paulo cit.) so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is opposed to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by Maxim. on Dionys. p. 317.

9. Again it must alwayes be carried in mind, that all those expressions of the Non-entity of sin were taken up in opposition to SCYTHIANVS, and MARCION,* 1.94 and the following crue of the MANICHAEANS, who a∣scrib'd to evil a being of it self, and by it self, and that eternal, no less then God. * 1.95 Nay duos Deos adfert (saith Tertul. of Marcion) tanqnam duas symplegadas naufragii s••i. Scythianus (before Manes) composed four books, in which he asserted two distinct, and coequal principles of † 1.96

things, to wit, of white and black, of moist, and dry, of body and soul, of heaven and earth, of just and un••ust, of good and evil. Now however this Heresie is very worthi∣ly exploded by all true Christians, yet right may be done upon a very wrong ground. And so it is, if all the ground be the Non-entity of sin, which yet the Fathers did onely use (by a * 1.97 catechresis) in opposition to that substance, or self-subsistence, which that many-headed-sect ascrib'd to evil. And this I say in Iustification of the Fathers and Schoolmen, from those mistakes of their meaning, by which the mistakers would make them fall from a great er∣rour into a greater. It being worse (of the two) to think that sin hath no being, or that God is the Author, (if it hath any) than to think that good and evil did proceed from two fountains, and both eternall.

10. I am exceedingly confirmed in what I say touch∣ing the Fathers, and their acception of the word nature, res, and aliquid, by what I find to be the judgement of learned VASQVEZ, whose words I think wo••thy to be inserted somewhat at large. [

Observandum est (inquit) Patres fere omnes,* 1.98 Doctrinam Manichaei, obiter, aut ex professo, refutare voluisse, qui ass••rebat substantiam ali∣quam in se & ex se malam esse; omnem autem substan••i∣am naturam appellabat, & aliquid, & rem. (sicut Ari∣stoteles in Categor. c. de substantiâ, omnem substantiam di∣xit esse hoc aliquid.* 1.99) Quare nomine Naturae quoties S. Patres disputant cum Manichaeo de hac re, non com••le∣••tuntur operationem & accidentia, (quae-aliquam habea••t naturam,) sed solam substantiam, secuti sententiam A∣ris••otelis,* 1.100 (2, phys. c. 1. &▪ 5. Metaph. c. 4.) qui solùm materiam & formam naturam, appellat▪ Immo ex his proprie solùm formam, materiam autem mataphori••è tan∣tùm. Contendunt igitur Patres, nullam esse naturam substantiae malam, quatenùs substan••ia & natura est; De actu verò non loquuntur. Concedunt enim malum esse opus arbitrii nostri, & actum. Sicut Augustinus l. de per∣fect. iustit. qui ratiocinatione 4. quaerit, quid sit peccatum,

Actusne, an Res. Quia ••i res est (inquit) habeat Aucto∣rem; & si Auctorem habet, jam alter erit auctor, quam Deus, alicujus rei. Quod si hoc impium est, necesse est di∣cere, peccatum esse actum, non rem.* 1.101 —Patres non tam curarunt propriam rationem vitii & peccati in gene∣re moris exprimere, quàm per aliquid conjunctum no∣bis magis notum eam desc••ibere. Quare cùm per boni pri∣vationem peccatum definierunt, non sunt ita intelligendi, quasi sit ipsa essentia & ratio formalis peccati, sed quia est necessario peccato conjuncta, & Christianis maximè nota. Multò enim faciliùs per negationem intelligimus.

11. To this let me add (what does just now occurr to my present purpose) That substantia with many FA∣THERS, as wel as with GROTIUS and other MODERNS,* 1.102 hath often carried away the name of ens; because ens is Analogum, (as every smatterer in logick know's, though Masters in it sometimes forget,) and the common Rule is here verified, Analogum per se positum pro famosiori stare praesumitur. Whosoever therefore is found to say, Pec∣catum est non ens, must be known to mean that it is not sub∣stantia, unless he be one who dares add, that it is not an ac∣cident. And so if any is found to say, that every finite en••ity is produced by God, he must be charitably conclu∣ded to understand every substance, unless he shall dare to add also, That God produceth as well the worst, as the best of actions. It being granted by all the world, that the former are accidents, no whit less then the latter.

12. Some perhaps, in good earnest,* 1.103 do think the best way to confute the Manichees, is by saying that sin is no∣thing reall, Because, denying it such a being as Manes gave it, and yet allowing it a being, (although not that) it must needs have a being either from God, or some Crea∣ture. If they shall dare to say from God, they sadly fall into the Blasphemy, which Manes (or rather Scythianus) devised his principle to avoid. If they say from some crea∣ture, they make that creature a kind of Creator, in making it able to give a being, where God himself doth give none.

* 1.104But (omitting that this last were the safest errour, if it were any) these men do not consider, that God was a∣ble to make a creature with such a light of understanding, and such a liberty of will; as to be fitly left * 1.105 in the hand of his own counsel; and to be a self-determiner, to this or that object which lyes before him; And so to be an Arti∣ficer of such unclean works, (by abusing the liberty of his will,) as could not by any possibility have been produced by his Creator. God made man upright, but he hath * 1.106 found out many inventions. And if it be in the power of man, to give being unto any thing, most easily may he be thought to give Being unto s••n; sin it self being no more, then what is displeasing to God Almighty; and no where else to be imagined, much less to be, but in the voluntary a∣ctings of created Agents, in contrariety to the law which they receive to act by. That so it is, is very evident, by the negative precepts of the Almighty, whereby he for∣bids us to give a being to this, or that, which he tells us he hateth the being of. Thou shalt not covet thy neighbours wife, is as much as to say, thou shalt not put such a con∣cupiscence in being. And yet to covet another man's wife, is as positively something, as to covet his own; and more po∣sitively something, than not to covet another man's; though that is the vice, and this the virtue.

13. They indeed who deny this natural freedome of the will,* 1.107 must either yield to the Manichees, or else do worse, as hath been shew'd. But this being granted, there needs no new principle (as the Manichees dreamed) for the pro∣duction of what is evil. For he that may do good (by ma••king use of that Talent which God hath given him) hath eo ipso the power to do the contrary, unless he is irresistibly and unavoidably good, which no man is, on this side hea∣ven. Now since both the habits and acts of sin, are as positive as the habits and acts of virtue, (and equally re∣ducible to the species of Quality, and that there needs no other power for the production of the former, then what is given us, whilst it is given us to be truly free agents; It

will be fit to make it appear, that I have not onely my pri∣vate, but publick reason also for what I teach.

§. 6. DIONYSIVS the AREOPAGITE,* 1.108 who re∣fell's the two principles in the Manichaean sense, doth set them up, and assert them in the sense of the Scripture. Affirming God to be the principle of every thing that is good, and the Divel on the contrary of every thing that is evil: to wit, the evil of sin, which is evil properly so called. He asserts the first in these word•• of Saint Paul, (Rom. 11.36.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. which he ex∣plains by the Restriction thought fit to be added by Saint Iames, (c. 1. v. 17.) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. he affirms the second in these termes— * 1.109 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Yet (3.) the * 1.110 power to sin (though not the act of sin it self) he rightly affirm's to be from God; which power is innocent, as in Adam and the Angels before their Fall▪ who could never have sinned, if before they actu∣ally sinned, they had not had the power to sin. But for the exertion of that power into act, that being evil * 1.111 can∣not possibly proceed from so good a fountain.

IGNATIVS in ep. ad Magnes. p. 53. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

IUSTIN. MARTYR. in Apolog. 1. pro Christ. p. 35. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. see him especially in Quaest. & Resp. ad Orthod. p. 396. & 436.

TERTVL. contra Marcion. Lib. 2. cap. 5, 6. Suae po. testatis invenio hominem a Deo constitutum lapsumque hominis non Deo, sed Libero ejus Arbitrio deputan∣dum.

ATHANASIVS (de anima humana loquens) in orat contra Gent. p. 5. —〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.112—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 * 1.113 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 And very much more to this purpose p. 9.37. & * 1.114 de Incar. verbi dei p. 57, 58.

— 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 p. 58.

AVGVSTIN. Retract. l. c. 9. per totum. Malum non exortum nisi ex libero voluntatis Arbitrio,— Quid opus est queri unde iste motus existat, quo voluntas avertitur

ab incommutabili bono ad commutabile bonum,* 1.115 cùm e∣um non nisi animi & voluntarium, & ob hoc culpabile es∣se fateamur, &c.

Quae tandem esse poterit ante voluntatem Causa volun∣tatis? Aut igitur voluntas est prima causa peccandi, aut nullum peccatum est prima Causa peccandi.

Non ergo est cui rectè imputetur peccatum, nisi volun∣tati, voluntas est quâ & peccatur & rectè vivitur.

NAZIANZ. orat. 40. p. 671. apud. D. Barl. p. 52. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 vide D. D. Hammondi, Annot. in 1 Cor. 8.4.

FVLGENTIVS apud Aqu. 1.2. q. 79. art 3. Deus non est ultor istius rei, cujus est Actor.

PROSPER▪ in senten. ex Aug. p. 444. Iniquitas per ip∣sum facta non est, quia Iniquitas nulla substantia ••st. Mark h••s Reason, and the two things which it implyes. 1 That iniquity is an Accident, and 2. Such, as is not from God; and therefore elsewhere he saith,* 1.116 that the sole cause of evil deeds is the liberty of the will — ad quam solam male gesta recurrunt.

CLEM. ALEX. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 167. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.117 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And so in the place above cited (§. 3) he saith all substances have their pro∣duction from God, but not all Actions or operations, un∣less when they are good. The Original of the evil he * 1.118 im••putes to free-will. And thus he disputes against them, who feigned another cr••ator even of substances, beside the onely

true God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

CYRILLUS HIERO. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 30. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, citing that Text Eccles. 7.30. And that of the A∣postle Ephes. 2.10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And after in the same page, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and a little after, p. 34. speaking of the Devil, and applying to him that of Ezek. 28.12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.119 he adds, it was very well said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

AMBROSIVS de Cain & Abel. l. 2. c. 9. fol. 260. H. Qui peccatum suum ad quandam (uti Gentiles asserunt) Decreti aut operis sui Necessitatem referunt, Divina ar∣guere videntur, quasi ipsorum vis Causa Peccati sit.— sed quanto gravius Peccato ipso, ad Deum referre quod Feceris, & Reatus tui invidiam transsundere in Authorem, non Criminis, sed Innocentiae?

EPIPHANIUS l. 1. To. 3. Haeres. 36. p. 266, 267, 268. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Nothing can be without God except sin—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.120 and more to this purpose p. 265.588. yet (saith he) God doth not hinder men from sinning (by violence or force upon their wills) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 671.

AUGUSTIN. de civit. Dei, l. 5. c. 9. Malae voluntates à Deo non sunt, quia contra naturam sunt, quae ab illo est. —Sicut omnium Creaturarum Creator est, ita omni∣um potestatum dator, non * 1.121 voluntatum: where by the will, he means the action of the will.

§. 7. That God gives onely the power to act what he forbiddeth, and that no more is meant by those Fathers,* 1.122 who say that all things in some sort do come from God, (still implying the act it self to be solely from the creature when it is wholly against God, as the act of hating God is confess'd to be,) I have already made apparent by diverse instances recited. And Doctor Stearn hath don it by di∣verse others, (An. med. l. 2. p. 256, 257.) of which I shall mark but three or four.

ANSELMVS de concord. Praed. & Praesc. Nul∣la Res habet potentiam ullam volendi aut faciendi nisi illo Dante.

AVREOLVS in 2. D. 37. Neque ego video quod dicunt, omnis actus est à Deo (dato quod sit posi∣tivus) nisi fortè conservando potentiam quae elicit, & natu∣ram actus elicitivam.

ALEXANDER ALENSIS part. 2. q. 100. Adjuvat ipsum ad actionem in quâ est malum; quia dat Potentiae, sive Libero Arbitrio, quòd possit operari.

RICHARD. ARMACHANVS l. 17. Quaest. Ar∣men. c. 3. Nec Deus attingit hoc modo actiones immedi∣atè ad actum, seu effectum productum, sed ad agens im∣mediatum ipsius effectus; puta intellectum, aut volunta∣tem.

—Si quis poterit ex sacris Scripturis probare hanc cooperationem divinam, cum omni agente creato; erit mihi mirandus, & libenter probationem illam acciperem; quoniam hoc facere me nescire fateor.

LESSIVS de Perf. Div. l. 11. c. 3. Hac ratione, Creaturae possunt dici instrumenta respectu Dei, & Deus omnia per illas operari; omnia (inquam) bona, non mala, quae Deus non intendit, neque ex perfectione virtutis à D••o insertae, sed ex defectu Creaturae sequuntur.

DVRANDVS 2. D. 37. Action••s non procedunt à Deo, nisi secundùm indifferentiam ad bonum & malum. Deus enim non est causa actionum liberi arbitr••i, nisi quia liberum arbitrium ab ipso & est, & conservatur; sed libe∣rum arbitrium in esse cons••rvatum, adhuc est indifferens ad eligendum Actum bonum v l malum, nec determinatio ejus ad malum, est à Deo. Actus enim malus naturam bonam sed imperfectè bonam (cujus Author Deus est) non neces∣sariò sed liberè sequitur. Naturae itaque imperfecte bo∣nae, non De•• (qui Deus est non volens iniquitatem) impu∣tandus est. (vide Anim. Med. l. 2. p. 270.)

FVLGENTIVS de Praedest. ad mon. l. 1. p. 251. Sicut ergo peccatum in eo non est: ita peccatum ex eo non est. Quod autem ex eo non est, opus ejus utique non est. Quod autem nunquam est in opere ejus; nunquam fuit in Praedestinatione ejus.—Peccatum, homo, non ex prae∣destinatione Divina; sed ex voluntate sua, malè concu∣piscendo, coepit, & malè operando, perfecit. But I re∣turn f••om this Antient,* 1.123 to other Writers more modern.

MELANCHTHON, de cau. pec. p. 48. Diabolus pa∣ter: id est, primus fons, & causa mendacii. Discernit autem Christus mendacium à substantia: quasi dicat, substantiam quidem habet Diabolus aliunde acceptam.— Habet autem proprium quiddam Diabolus, non à Deo ac∣ceptum, videlicet mendacium: id est, peccatum, quod libe∣ra voluntas Diaboli peperit. Neque haec inter se pugnant, —substantiam à Deo conditam esse & sustentati, & tamen voluntatem Diaboli & voluntatem hominis causas esse

peccati. Quia voluntas abuti libertate sua potuit, seque à Deo avertere.—Primus Author peccati est Diabolus.* 1.124 —Haec mala non sunt res conditae à Deo, sed horri∣bilis destructio humanae naturae.* 1.125—Voluntas libera Evae propriè & verè erat causa suae actionis, ac sponte se aver∣tit à Deo.—Quia peccatum ortum est à voluntate Di∣aboli & hominis, nec factum est Deo volente, sic erant conditae voluntates, ut possent non peccare. Est autem causa contingentiae nostrarum actionum Libertas volunta∣tis. (p. 51.) — Imò Ecclesia Dei,* 1.126 cum sciat De∣um verè, seriò & horribiliter odisse libidines Neronis, nequaquam dicet eas aut necessariò accidisse, aut volen∣te Deo accidisse. — Deus est essentia — volens justa, casta, non volens pugnantia cum suâ mente, injustam cru∣delitatem, incestas libidines, &c.* 1.127— Deus adest Crea∣turis, non ut Stoicus Deus, alligatus causis secundis, ut moveat simpliciter, sicut movent secundae: sed ut agens liberrimum, susten••ans naturam, & suo consilio aliter a∣gens in aliis.—Sic agit Deus cum voluntate, susten∣tans & juvans ordine agentem: Sed non juvans ruentem contra ordinem, etsi eam sustentat. Sic enim condidit vo∣luntatem Evae, ut esset liberum agens, quod posset tueri ordinem, aut deficere. Sit igitur haec crassa solutio: secun∣da causa non agit sine prima, scilicet sustentante. Hoc universaliter verum est: sed non semper adjuvante. Non enim adjuvat prima effectum, quem non vult. Est igitur voluntas Evae immediata causa sui actus, cum avertit se à Deo. And again, Sed Christianis necesse est discernere bona & mala. Secunda non agit sine prima, scilicet su∣stentante: sed multa facit prima causa praeter secundas, quia est agens liberum. Et secunda, libera: ut voluntas Evae vitiose agit sine primâ adjuvante, quia talis facultas est libertas. And again, Adest Deus suo operi, non ut Sto∣icus Deus, sed verè ut liberum agens, sustentans creaturam, & multa moderans. This shews the meaning of ME∣LANCHTHON, when he saith in one place (in com∣pliance with the vulgar) that original sin i•• nihil priva∣tivum,

which according to the Rule of aequipollence in Logick, must needs be tantamount to aliquid positivum. And this he shews to be his meaning, by saying it is that which requires a subject; that it is an ** 1.128 Inquination and con∣fusion of the man; which confusion he explains by wandring ** 1.129 motions, which he also saith are things positive. And he illustrates it farther by a ship that is tossed with winde and tempest, as well as desti••ute of sails and oars. By the former confusion he means original; and actual sin by the latter: giving his instance in Nero's † 1.130 lusts, which he denyeth to have been by the will of God, they having been sins, though positive entities. By which Mr. H. may understand his misapprehensions of Melanchthon p. 68. besides his forgetfulness of the proper task he hath set himself, which is not to prove that some sins are privative, but that no sin is more then a meer privation.

* 1.131The REMONSTRANTS call it a blasphemy, to say that no creature can either do more good, or f••wer evil acts, then now he doth. And yet that this is the sequel of Ma∣ster Hickmans Doctrine, the Apologist for Tilenus hath well evinced.

* 1.132Mr. BAXTER himself (it just now comes into my memory) doth frequently ascribe a self-determining power to the Free will of man, however Byassed by habits. And though himself hath printed as blasphemously as the most, in charging God with the causing of evil, (which, two lines after, he calls a truth,) yet he trounceth some of his brethren, for holding God the determiner of the will in eve∣ry sin, as the first efficient immediate physicall cause. And also saith of Freewill, that 'tis a high self-determining prin∣ciple, the great spring of our actions. (of Iudgement. pag. 152.) But Mr. B. (as many others) is produced by me in no f•••• place; I not observing any order either of dignity or

of time, but giving to every one a place, as he meets my memory, or my eye.

The words of GROTIUS deserve great heed,* 1.133 whilst he saith that the liberty of a man's will is not vitious, but able by its own force to produce a thing that is vitious; that is an action; meaning that a vitious action (as the action of hating God) is meerly from the sinner (man or Divel) and not without impiety to be ascribed unto God, either as a mediate, or immediate cause. And though I cited some part of his words before, yet (not to fail of his inten••) I shall intreat my Reader to weigh the whole. Neque ab eo, quod diximus, dimovere nos debet, quod mala multa evenire cernimus, quorum videtur origo Deo adscribi non posse, ut qui perfectissimè, sicut ante dictum est, bonus sit. Nam cum diximus, Deum omnium esse Causam, ad∣didimus, eorum quae verè subsistunt. Nihil enim prohi∣bet, quominus ipsa, quae subsistunt, deinde causae sint Acci∣dentium quorundam, quales sunt actiones. Deus hominem & mentes sublimiores homine, creavit cum agendi liber∣tate, quae agendi libertas vitiosa non est, sed potest suâ vi∣aliquid vitiosum producere. Et hujus quidem generis ma∣lis, quae moraliter mala dicuntur, omnino Deum adscribe∣re auctorem nefas est. p. 27, 28.

LYCERUS vindicating God from the very same calum∣nie,* 1.134 with which Mr. Hickman hath not feared to ••sperse him, saith that the Divel did pecc••re ex semetipso, (accor∣ding to our Saviour Ioh. 8.44.) that he alone is pater & fons malorum, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first inventor of evil things: to which he accommodates that of Austin, Quomodo Deus pater genuit filium veritatem, sic Diabolus lapsus genuit quasi filium mendacium.

God is said to be omnipotent, not because he can do all things (saith LOMBARD out of Augustin) but because he can do whatsoever he will;* 1.135 who cannot will to do any thing, but what is good. But there are some things (saith

he) which God cannot do,* 1.136 to wit, those things wich are un∣just, sunt alia quaedam quae Deus nullatenus facere potest, ut p••ccata. (p. 247.) Non potest Deus facere injusta p. 248. These following Doctrines, [quod voluntas hominis ex ne∣cessitate vult & eligit, & quod liberum Arbitrium est po∣tentia passiva — & quod necessitate movetur ab Appeti∣bili, — item quod dignitas esset in causis superioribus posse facere peccata, Item quod al••quis faciat aliquid omni∣no, ut Deus vult ipsum facere volu••tate Beneplaciti quod talis peccet, &c.] were condemned with an Anathema, by the Bp. of Paris and all the Professors of Divinity in that university A. D. 1270. & 1341. together with the Blasphemies of Ioannes de Mercurio of the Cistercian order, that God is in some sort the cause of the sinful act;* 1.137 And that whatever is caused by the will of the Creature, is so caused by vertue of the first cause. And that God is the cause of every mode of the act, and of every Circumstance that is produced. All which are the Blasphemies asserted as Neces∣sary truths by Mr. † 1.138 Hickman, & accordingly do call for a condemnation.

Bp. BRAMHALL shewes it to be his judgement, whilst he censures Mr. Hobbs for saying,* 1.139 that God wills and effects, by the second causes, all their actions, good and bad; and saith it implyes a contradiction, that God should willingly do what he professeth he doth suffer. Act. 13.18. & Act. 14.16. Then he thus states the matter. God causeth all good,* 1.140 permitteth all evil, disposeth all things both good and evil. — The general power to act is from God, (in him we live move and have our being,) this is Good. But the specification and Determination of this ge∣neral power to the doing of any evil, is from our selves, and proceeds from the free will of man — it is a good con∣sequence;* 1.141 This thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot pro∣ceed from God.

* 1.142Thus Aquinas and others are also expounded by Diotalle∣vius, not to mean that God is any cause of the evil act, but that he doth not withdraw his necessary support from the

will, which abuseth its liberty in determining it self to the evil act, and so that God is only the condition without which we cannot do evil, not the cause by which we do it. And so saith * 1.143 Aquinas, Licet Deus sit universale principium omnis intentionis motus humani quod tamen determinetur voluntas humana ad malum consilium, hoc non esse à Deo, sed ab ipsâ, again he saith, non à motione divinâ sed à disp••∣sitione humanae voluntatis oriri, ut malae potius action••s quàm bo••ae sequantur. He also * 1.144 cites for his opinion what I have cast into the Margin; and of which the result is this, D••∣termi••ation••m ad produc••ndam hu••••s actus en••itatem esse à voluntate humanâ, non autem à Deo, & Deum ita nolle an∣teceden••er, ut haec entitas sit; ut eam e••iam esse patiatur, suum concursum non subtrahendo: si conditio id exigat ex Creaturae libertate opposita. p. 92.93.94. mark how it is expressed by Dr. GO AD.

God made Adam able to be willing to sin, but he made him not to will sin, — that he chose death,* 1.145 it was by the strength of his will given him by God, but God did not binde him to chose death, for that were (a contradiction) a necessitated choice — if the Nature of a voluntary Agent be well observed, this point will be most evident.] And now the judicious Dr. Hammond will be the fittest to shut up all.

He that first gives the Law, and then pre••etermines the Act of transgressing (the disobedience,* 1.146 the doing con∣trary to) that law, that first forbids eating of the tree of knowledge, and then predetermines Adams will to choose and eat what was forbidden, is by his decree guilty of the Commission of the act, and by his Law the cause of its being an obliquity: And indeed if the obliquity, which renders the act a sinfull act, be it self any thing, it must necessarily follow, that either God doth not predetermine all things, or that he predetermines the obliquity; and Regularity bearing the same p••oportion of Relation to any act of Duty, as obliquity doth to sin, it cannot be imagined that the Author of the sinful Act,

should not be the Author of the obliquity, as well as the Author of the pious Act is by the disputers acknow∣ledged to be the Author of the regularity of it.

To conclude this Chapter in the words of Dr Reynolds, * 1.147 Let not any man resolve sins into any other original, then his own Lusts.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The positive entity of sin made undenia∣ble from scrip∣ture.
• * 1.2

  Psal. 115.4. & Psal. 135.15▪ Idolum hoc loco (Inquit Beza, ad 1 Cor. 8.4.) sumitur pro simulachro ad Numen re∣praesentan∣dum afficto. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 1 Cor. 8.4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 1 Cor. 1, 28 1 Cor 7.19. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Isa. 41.24.
• * 1.3

  1 Iohn. 3.8▪
• * 1.4

  God is fittest to be the Iudge of what is pro∣perly called sin.
• * 1.5

  Gen. 39.9. & carefully com∣pare it with vers. 7. Gen. 20.9. •• 2 King. 17.21
• * 1.6

  Rom. 7.5. Rom. 6.12.
• * 1.7

  Rom. 7.20.
• * 1.8

  Gal. 5·19, 26, 21.
• * 1.9

  Confirmed by the Concur∣rence of Anti∣ent Fathers.
• * 1.10

  Athanasius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 3
• † 1.11

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 5.
• * 1.12

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 4▪ ibid▪ p. 5.
• ** 1.13

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. pag. 5.
• ** 1.14

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. pag. 5.
• † 1.15

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 pag. 5.
• * 1.16

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p 6.
• * 1.17

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p 6.
• * 1.18

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; p. 7.
• † 1.19

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 7.
• * 1.20

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 7. Note, this ☞ is a Con∣firmation of the whole 4. chapter.
• * 1.21

  Ad quinti se∣culi ultima vel sexti ini∣tia pertinent quae Dionysii Areopagitae nomine lau∣dantur. Dallae, us de confir∣matione. p. 203
• ** 1.22

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Di∣onys. Areop. de Div. Nom. c. 4. p. 574.
• ** 1.23

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Di∣onys. Areop. de Div. Nom. c. 4. p. 574.
• † 1.24

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Idem de mystic•• Theolog. c. 5. p. 45, 46.
• * 1.25

  Look for∣wards on S. ••. num. 8.
• * 1.26

  De Divin. Nom. cap. 4. Sect. 18. pag. 570.
• † 1.27

  S. Maximus in locum jam ci••. p. 617. —〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.
• † 1.28

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. ib. pag. 618.
• * 1.29

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. ib. pag. 620.
• † 1.30

  Dionys. Are▪ op. de Div. nom. c. 4. p. 571, 572.
• † 1.31

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. ib. p. 575.
• * 1.32

  Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.

  Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.
• * 1.33

  Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.

  Baltha. Cord. observ. Gen. 8. p. 21.
• * 1.34

  Note his Im∣plying the a∣ctivity of sin, whilst he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, p. 317.
• * 1.35

  Idem 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 39. l. 39.
• * 1.36

  Ibid. p. 376.
• * 1.37

  l. 5. c. 18. p. 315▪
• † 1.38

  ib. c. 19. p. 316. ib. l. 6. c. 10. p. 349.
• * 1.39

  ib. c. 17. p. 364.
• † 1.40

  ib. c. 20. p. 371.
• * 1.41

  IRENAEVS adv hares▪ l. 1. c. 13. p. 94. ••▪
• * 1.42

  ib. p. 452.
• * 1.43

  ib. p. 95.
• * 1.44

  Id de lib. Arb. l. 2. c. 10. apud Author. Anim. med. p. 258.
• * 1.45

  Ib. p. 237.
• * 1.46

  Idem l. 6 p. 207.
• * 1.47

  ib. p. 671. ib. p. 585.
• * 1.48

  ib. p. 587. p.
• * 1.49

  ib. p. 588.
• * 1.50

  Idem in Serm de ver∣vis s••p••entiae, p. 1702.
• * 1.51

  BASIL▪ Homil. 1. in Psal. HIE∣RONYM. l. 2. adv. Pelag. ATHAN. O∣rat. con. Gent. & de eti▪ Chri∣s••i incar p. 58. AVGVST. confess l. 8 c. 5 CHEM. ALEX. Pae∣dag. c. 3. p. 162 D. ib. l. 2. c. 1. p. 143. THEOPHY∣LACT. in Rom. 1.13.
• * 1.52

  GREGORY. NAZIAN▪ Orat. 40. pag. 13.
• † 1.53

  TATIA∣NVS Assyri∣us in Orat. cont. Graecos. p. 164.
• * 1.54

  PROSPER de vi••â Con∣temp l. 3. c. 2 p. 254.
• * 1.55

  ib. p. 311.
• * 1.56

  The Confession of VOSSIVS for the greatest part of them.
• * 1.57

  Plerique Ve∣terum ita lo∣quun••ur. quast peccatum o∣riginale cen∣seant esse ali∣quid positi∣vum, sive ha∣bitum, sive a∣lium Qualita∣tem. Histor. Pelag. l. 2. par. 3 209.
• * 1.58

  Potius habi••u∣alem à Deo a∣versionem &c. ibid. p. 210. Aliqui, uti corpus à cor∣pore formatur ita animam st••tuunt ab animâ accen∣di &c. p. 211.
• * 1.59

  APOLLINA∣RIVS by name, a••d the greatest part of the Orientals, as IEROM witnesseth.

  RVFFINVS & AVGVST. apud eundem Voss ibid.
• * 1.60

  AVGVST. Epist. 157. held the ••ra∣duction of the soul; and ori∣ginal sin to be a positive qua∣lity.

  Affectio quae∣dam mala qualitatis, & morbidus af∣fectus Carnis, AVG. dicitus l. de. Nupt. c. 31.

  Adversus Iulian. lib. 5. cap. 3. see him also c••ted by Aquinas for making Original sin an H••∣bi••. 1.2 q. 82. art▪ 1 He also calls sin malam qualitatem, l. 6. contra I••l. c. 7.
• * 1.61

  De peccat. mer. & Remiss. l. ••. c. 16. in Iulian. l. 4. c. vlt.

  Georgius SOHNIVS tom. 11. loc. de p••cc. Orig. & Philip. MARNIXI∣VS Sanct. ALDEGON∣DIVS.

  Ger. Voss. ubi. supra. p. 214.215.216.
• * 1.62

  Nicol. HEM∣MINGIVS i•• opusc. Theol. Cl••ss. 1. c. 8. de peccato. p. 355▪ 356.
• * 1.63

  Duo sunt ob∣servanda in peccato ori∣ginali, materi∣••le & formale, materiale est in mente de∣fectus, — In corde con∣cupiscentia, p. 356.
• * 1.64

  De actuali peccato dicen∣dum est, quod rectè definitur esse cogitalum, dict••m, factum, omissum, pug. nans cum le∣ge Dei. Se••, peccatum actuale est omnis actio pugnans cum lege Dei, cum in mente, tum in volunta∣te, & corde, tum in membris externis. p. 358.
• * 1.65

  GREGOR. MARTINI apud K••ckermannum in si••••. log. part. 2. p. 653, 654▪
• * 1.66

  Lapsus accipi∣tur pro actu hominis, qui vi••iosus si••, & quo aliquid malè agit, aut in alterum commit••i••.—aquipollent lapsus primo∣rum paren∣tum, & pecca∣tum, aut Rea∣tu•• &c. — Nos priori modo sumi∣mus peccatum, prout est a∣ctio, ut pate∣bit p. 654.
• * 1.67

  FRANCO BURGERS∣DI••IVS in Institut Meta. l. 1. c. 20. p. 122 123, 124. Hine sequitur, malum bono potius esse contrarium, saltem quoad proprias for∣ma••, qu••m privativè op∣••oni.
• * 1.68

  CALVIN, In∣stit. l. 2. c. 1. S. 8. fol. 75. opera in nobis pro∣fert, quae Scri∣ptura vocat opera carnis, quali•• sunt A∣dulteria, fur∣ta, &c. quicquid in homine est, aut ut breviûs absolvatur, totum hominem non aliud ex seipso esse, quàm concupiscen••iam.
• * 1.69

  Iohan. Henr. ALSTED. in Lex. Theol. c. 8 Cicero. in 3. paradox. pec∣care, est tan. quam limites transilire, Iunius in l. de pec. Adami primo, q. 1. c. 2. p. 92. Bellarminus apud Alsted. ubi supra.
• * 1.70

  CHEMNITI∣VS in Harm. Evang. c. 59. p. 792. Gerhard, in Har. Ev. p. 70.
• * 1.71

  GROTIVS de Ver. Chr. Re∣lig. edit. Lugd. 1633 p. 27, 28▪
• * 1.72

  Nihil enim prohibet, quo minus ipsa, quae subfistunt, deinde causae sint acciden∣tium, quales sunt actiones. This is the judgement also of Prosper and Austin. lib. sent. ex August. pag. 444.
• * 1.73

  The severall wayes of RE∣CONCILE∣ING such Writers unto themselves, who plainly holding the positivity of sin, do sometimes seem to speak against it.
• * 1.74

  Bish. BRAM. HAL'S Reply mihi p. 105.
• * 1.75

  Anim. Medel. p. 270.
• * 1.76

  In what sense God is said to be Almighty, see LOM∣BARD l. 1. dist. 42. F, G.
• * 1.77

  See correct co∣py. p. 22, 23. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.78

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Dio∣nys. Areop. Peccatum est nihil▪ Aug. de lib. Arb. l. 1.
• * 1.79

  Rom. 1.20▪
• * 1.80

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ Being nothing, he deceiveth himself. Gal. 6.3.
• * 1.81

  Peccatum nihil est, in∣quit Bernard. in annum. B. Mar. S••rm. 1. p. 123.
• † 1.82

  Quid est o∣mne peccatum, nisi Dei con∣••emptus, quo eju•• praecepta con••emni∣mus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 l. de mo: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 viv. Sir. 37. p. 1281
• a 1.83

  AQVIN. in 1.2. qu••st. 75. art. 1.
• b 1.84

  ibid.
• c 1.85

  ibid. ad 1.
• d 1.86

  ibid. ad 3.
• e 1.87

  ib. art. 2.
• f 1.88

  ib. ad 2.
• * 1.89

  Sicut aegri∣••udo corpo∣ralis—ali. quid habet positivum▪ Ita etiam peccatum originale—non est privatio pura, sed est quidam corru∣ptus Habi••us. Idem. 1.2. q. 82. ar••. 1. ad. 1••
• * 1.90

  Sicut aegri∣••udo corpo∣ralis—ali. quid habet positivum. Ita etiam peccatum originale—non est privatio pura, sed est quidam corru∣ptus Habi••us. Idem. 1.2. q. 82. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1. ad. 1••
• * 1.91

  An accident oppos'd to Res simpliciter. Se•• Prosper's sent. ex Aug p. 444.
• * 1.92

  Augustin de persect. Justi∣tiae non longè à pri. lib. in resp. Ratiocin. 4. to 7.
• † 1.93

  AVGVST. nominat ibi Rem id quod est Res sim∣pliciter, sc. substantiam sic enim actus peccati non est Res. AQV. in 1.2. q. 79. Art. 2. ad. 1. GREG. NYSS. Hom. 5. in Ecclesiasten, p. 417. opposeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as that is explained by substan••ia, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.94

  The MANI∣CHAEAN he∣resie occasion∣ed some figura∣tive expressi∣ons.
• * 1.95

  TERTVL. advers. Mar. l. 1. c. 1. & 23. & 26. HIERON in N••hum. c. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• † 1.96

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. EPIPHANIUS l. 2 tom. 2. Haer••s. 45. seu 55. pag. 619. B. D.
• * 1.97

  Ex omni∣bus Physico∣••um, sive Me∣taphysicorum terminls ob∣seuris, nulli explicatu di∣gniores, quàm 〈◊〉〈◊〉 duo, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Me∣ric. Casaub. de verb. usu. p. 134.

  Manichaus ha∣ving expressed Substantia by Natura, Ali∣quid & Res.
• * 1.98

  VASQUEZ. Disp. 95. c. xi.
• * 1.99

  As Aristotle himself by Hoc aliquid.
• * 1.100

  Whom the An∣tients followed in their expres∣sions. Not in∣cluding Acci∣dents in the word nature. But granting ••in to be an act, and the work of our will.
• * 1.101

  An example taken out of S. AUSTIN.
• * 1.102

  Why ens ma∣ny times is u∣sed onely for substantia.
• * 1.103

  How unhappily some men con∣fute the MA••NICHEES.
• * 1.104

  How the sin∣ner is able to give the whole being unto his sin.
• * 1.105

  Ecclus. 15.14
• * 1.106

  Eccles. 7.29.
• * 1.107

  How they that deny it, must submit to the MANI∣CHEES, or worse.
• * 1.108

  The concur∣rence of the Learned, both ANTIENT and MO∣DERN, for the Affi••ma∣tive, That the sinfull Agent is the sole cause of the sinfull Act.

  DIONYS. AREOP. de Coelest▪ Hiera••. c. 1. p. 1.2.
• * 1.109

  De Div. Nom c. 4. sect. 18. p. 570. cum quâ con∣fer. p. 571.
• * 1.110

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. ibid. p. 574.
• * 1.111

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 &c. pag. 577▪ & pag. 578.
• * 1.112

  ib. p. 7.
• * 1.113

  Ne{que} ullam ej••s substan∣tiam esse, Pe∣trus Nannius interpretatur p. 8.
• * 1.114

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.115

  Deu•• non est causa ejus, quod homo sit deterior. Idem apud Aqu. 1.2. q. 79. Art. 3.
• * 1.116

  Idem in lib. de ingratis. p. 573.
• * 1.117

  ib. p. 169.
• * 1.118

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Idem 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 219.
• * 1.119

  ib. p. 34.
• * 1.120

  Idem l. 2. tom. 1. Haer. 64. p. 587.
• * 1.121

  Mala volun∣tas Peccatum dicitur meto∣nymicè, se•• Lombard. l. 4▪ dist. 50. A.
• * 1.122

  The power to act is from God, but the vitious action is not.
• * 1.123

  p. 302.
• * 1.124

  ib. p. 49,
• * 1.125

  ib. p. 50.
• * 1.126

  ib. p. 53.
• * 1.127

  ib. p. 55, 56. MELANCH∣THONS Di∣stinction of the first cause su∣staining, but not assisting the second, in evil actions.
• ** 1.128

  Vitium o∣riginis est i∣psarum parti∣um hominis inquinatio & confusio (ib. p. 49.) acce∣dunt motus— qui sunt res positiv••, etsi sunt motus er∣rantes, & quae∣dam ordinis Confusio &c. p. 50.
• ** 1.129

  Vitium o∣riginis est i∣psarum parti∣um hominis inquinatio & confusio (ib. p. 49.) acce∣dunt motus— qui sunt res positiv••, etsi sunt motus er∣rantes, & quae∣dam ordinis Confusio &c. p. 50.
• † 1.130

  53. He also saith (in collat. Wormat.) Peccatum vel est defectus, vel inclinatio, vel actio pugnans cum lege Dei.
• * 1.131

  Defens. sent. Rem▪ circa 1. de praed. art. p. 250.
• * 1.132

  M. BAXTER of Iudgement. p. 151, 152.
• * 1.133

  GROT. de ver. Chr. Rel. p. 27, 28.
• * 1.134

  POLYCAR. LYCERVS in Harm. E∣vang c. 103. p. 1460.
• * 1.135

  PET. LOM∣BARDVS l. 1. dist. 42. p. 248▪ D. E. F. Omnipotens est, ••o•• quod possit omnia facere, sed q••ia potest efficere quicquid vult. &c. vide August. Enc••i••▪ cap. 96. in fine tom. 3.
• * 1.136

  v. Ar••ic. con∣dem. & ex∣comm. à Stephan•• Pa∣ris. Epis••. & per Magistros Parisienses. ad calcem Lomb. p. 953, 967, 969.
• * 1.137

  ibid. p. 971. col. 1, & 2.
• † 1.138

  p. 79, 95.96. &c.
• * 1.139

  Bp. BRAM∣HAL in a re∣ply to T. H. Animadv. p. 94.95
• * 1.140

  id. ib. p. 97.
• * 1.141

  ib. p. 101.
• * 1.142

  Diotallevius in Opusc. Theol p. 103. p. 2. q. 80 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ 1. ad 3.
• * 1.143

  Greg in 2. d. 34. & 37. q. 1 art. 3. ad 8. & 12. C••preol▪ ib. q. 1. art. 3. Scotus in 2. d 37. q. 2 Suarez in o∣pusc. l 2. de con∣cursu Del ad actus malos. c. 3.
• * 1.144

  Greg in 2. d. 34. & 37. q. 1 art. 3. ad 8. & 12. C••preol▪ ib. q. 1. art. 3. Scotus in 2. d 37. q. 2 Suarez in o∣pusc. l 2. de con∣cursu Del ad actus malos. c. 3.
• * 1.145

  Dr. GO AD at the end of his Dispt. Ms.
• * 1.146

  Dr. HAM∣MOND of Fundamen∣tals ch. 16. p. 183, 184.
• * 1.147

  Dr. ED. REYNOLDS of the sinful∣nesse of sin. p. 212. in 4to.