of them are distinguished: and by how much every thing shall be more general, by so much it shall more precede.
Q. Why shall the first be in the most general place and order?
A. Because in light and knowledge it is first.
Q. Why shall the subalternates follow?
A. Because in their clearness they are next.
Q. It seemeth by this that those things which by nature are more known shall precede, those which are less known are substitute, and at length the most special follow?
A. So it is.
Q. What then shall precede pand be first?
A. The most general definition must be first.
Q. What shall follow?
A. The distribution.
Q. But how if there be many?
A. Then the partition in perfect parts shall precede.
Q. What shall follow?
A. The division into kinds.
Q. What then?
A. The parts themselves and the kinds are in the same order to be handled and defined again in which they were distributed.
Q. What further is required?
A. If there shall be a long explication of them, they are to be chained together by the chains of transcition.
Q. What benefit redoundeth from hence?
A. It refresheth and recreateth the auditor.
Q. But may not example be under this head?
A. Yes, as a more familiar thing is taken, so a more fami∣liar example must be used.
Q. Give example of what you have here shewed out of the art of Grammer?
A. All definitions, distributions, are found in the rules of Grammer, and every one of them severally judged; and all these documents inscribed in diverse tables, are confounded and mingled together as it were in a certain pot.
Q. What part of Logick teacheth us to compose these con∣fused Rules and digest them into order: first there is no need of the places of invention, when as they are all found: neither in the first judgement of axioma's, when as every axioma is proved and valued: neither of the second judgement of the syl∣logism,