touching; whose perception, I mean, is made by that sort of motion which is call'd patterning; for in my Book of Philosophical Letters, I do onely prove, that all perceptions cannot be made by one sort of mo∣tion; as also that perception is not immediately made by the exterior object, but by the perceiving or senti∣ent parts: Nor do I treat in it of all kinds or sorts of perceptions belonging to all kinds or sorts of Creatures in Infinite Nature; for they are too numerous to be known by one particular; How can an Animal tell what perception a Vegetable or Mineral has? We may perceive that the Air, which is an Element, doth pattern out sound; for it is not done by reverberation, as pressure and reaction, by reason there will be in some places, not onely two several Ecchoes of one sound, but in some three, or four; but surely one sound can∣not be in several distant places at one time: Also a Looking-glass, we see, does pattern out the figure of an object; but yet we cannot be certainly affirmed, that either the Glass, or the Air, have the same per∣ceptions which Animals have; for although their pat∣terns are alike, yet their perceptions may be different: As for example, the picture of a Man may be like its original, but yet who knows what perception it has? for though it represents the exterior figure of an Ani∣mal, yet it is not of the nature of an Animal; and there∣fore although a man may perceive his picture, yet he knows not what perception the picture has of him; for 0