Observations upon experimental philosophy to which is added The description of a new blazing world / written by the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princesse, the Duchess of Newcastle.

2. Some few Observations on Plato's Doctrine.

1. PLato says, That Life is two fold, Contemplative, and Active; and that Contemplation is an office of the Intellect, but Action an operation of the Rati∣onal soul?

To which I answer, first, That I know no other difference between Intellect and Reason, but that In∣tellect is an effect, or rather an Essential Propriety of Reason, if Reason be the Principle of Nature; for the Rational part is the most Intelligent part of animate Matter. Next, I say, That Contemplation is as much an action, as any other action of Nature, al∣though it be not so gross as the action of the body; for it is onely an action of the mind, which is more pure and subtile then either the sensitive or inanimate parts of matter are, and acts within it self, that is, in its own substance or degree of Matter.

2. He says, That Sense is a passion of the Soul.

I answer: There is as much difference between Sense, and the Soul, as there is between Sense, and Rea∣son, or a sensitive life, and a rational soul; for the Rational parts of Matter, are not the Sensitive, nor the Sensitive the Rational; a Fool may have his sense regular, and his reason irregular; and therefore sense and reason are not one and the same, although they have

an inseparable Communion in the body or substance of Nature.

3. He argues thus: That which moves in it self, as being the principle of Motion in those things which are moved, is always moved, and consequently Im∣mortal, Ungenerable and Incorruptible; but the Soul is so. Ergo, &c.

I answer: Natural Matter being thus self-moving, is the same.

4. From, says he, is joined to Matter.

I answer: Form and Matter are but one thing; for it is impossible to separate Matter from Form, or Form from Matter; but what is not dividable, is not com∣posable; and what cannot be separated, cannot be joined

5. Qualities, says he, are incorporeal, because they are accidents.

I answer: If Qualities be Incorporeal, they do not belong to Nature; for since the Principle of Nature is Matter, all that is natural, must also be material or cor∣poreal; and therefore all natural qualities or accidents must of necessity be corporeal, by reason quality can no more be divided from Matter, then figure, magni∣tude, colour, place, and the like; all which are but one and the same with body, without any separation or abstraction.

6. What Plato affirms, of that which never is, and never had a Beginning, and of that which has a Be∣ginning,

and not a Being, is more then he or any body can rationally prove; for what never was, nor is, no man can know or imagine; because all what is known or imagined, has its real being, if not without, yet within the Mind; and all thoughts have not onely a being, but a material being in Nature; nay, even the Thought of the existence of a Deity, although Deity it self is Immaterial.

7. I wonder so witty a Philosopher as Plato can be∣lieve, that Matter in it self, as it is the Principle of Nature, is void of all form; for he affirms himself, That whatsoever hath parts, hath also figure; but Mat∣ter has parts, (by reason there can be no single part in Nature, but wheresoever is body or matter, there are parts also) and therefore matter cannot be void of fi∣gure. But if by Form, he mean the innate and inhe∣rent self-motion of Matter, he contradicts himself; for how can all things be made of matter, as their principle, if matter be destitute of self-motion? Wherefore In∣finite Matter has not onely self-motion, but also figure, though not a circumscribed or limited figure: Nei∣ther can it be proved, that Nature, being infinite, is not qualitative, no more then she can be proved to have no parts, or to be finite. In short, it is impos∣sible for my reason to believe, that Matter should be capable of, and subject to all forms, and yet be void of all quality, form, and species; for whatsoever has neither form, figure, nor quality, is no body, and

therefore Plato's Matter is immaterial, or incorporeal. If it were possible, that there could be some converse or meeting between his and my soul, I would ask his soul how he would prove, that one and the same thing could exist, and not exist at one and the same time; that is, how matter could be no matter, or something and no∣thing at the same time; and whence it came to be thus? For though our reason does believe, that the Omni∣potent Creator can make something of nothing, and reduce something into nothing; yet no reason is able to comprehend how God could make a being which is neither something, nor nothing; neither corporeal, nor incorporeal. But Plato concludes that Matter is de∣stitute of all form, because it is subject to change of forms and figures in its particulars, which is a very great mistake; for the changes of forms or figures, do not alter the nature of Matter; but prove rather, that wheresoever there is form or figure, there is matter also; so that none can be without the other at no time; A piece of Wax may be transformed into millions of figures, but it can never be deprived of all figure; no more can Matter.

8. Concerning Ideas, Plato's Opinion is, That they are Principles of Nature, and the Eternal Notions of God, perfect in themselves; or an External exem∣plar of things which are according to Nature. But I would ask him, what Notions are, and whence they come; and, if they be pictures or patterns of all things in

Nature, What makes or causes them? He will say, They are the Thoughts of God. But what Crea∣ture in the Universe is able to describe the Thoughts or Notions of God? For though I do humbly ac∣knowledg God to be the Author of Nature; and with the greatest reverence and fear, adore that Infinite Deity; yet I dare not attribute any Notions or Ideas to God, nor in any manner or way express him like our humane condition; for I fear I should speak irre∣verently of that Incomprehensible Essence, which is above all finite Capacity, Reason, or Idea.

Next, he says, That those Ideas are not of things made by Art, nor of singulars, nor of preternatural accidents, as diseases, nor of vile and abject things, nor of Relatives. Which if so, I would enquire whence those effects do proceed? for if the Eternal Ideas, ac∣cording to his opinion, are Principles of all natural things, they must also be principles of the aforemen∣tioned effects, they being also natural: If they do not proceed from any principle, they must proceed from themselves; which cannot be, by reason they are ef∣fects of Nature: but if they have another principle besides the Eternal Notions, or Ideas; then there must be another power besides these, which power would oppose the divine power, or the power God has en∣dued Nature withal. In short, If the Ideas of God be the Principle of Nature, they must be a principle of all natural things; for that which is not Universal, can

never be a principle: which if so, then the Ideas or Notions of God, would not onely be the Cause and Principle of all Goodness, but of all evil effects; and if there be more wicked or evil souls in the World then good ones, there would proceed more evil from God then good; which is not onely impossible, but impi∣ous to affirm. But Perchance he will say, That the Ideas of the aforementioned effects are generated and annihilated. I answer: As for Nature, she be∣ing Eternal and Infinite, is not subject to new generati∣ons and annihilations in her particulars; neither can Principles be generated and annihilated; and as for su∣pernatural or immaterial Ideas, they being incorporeal, cannot be subject to a new generation, or annihilation; for what is supernatural, is not capable of natural affe∣ctions, nor subject to a natural capacity any ways. In truth, Plato, with his Ideas in God, in the Angelick Mind, in the Soul, &c. makes a greater stir then needs, and breeds more confusion in Nature then she really knows of; for Nature is as easie to be understood in her general principles, that regular sense and reason may conceive them without framing any such Ideas or Minds. He distinguishes also the Idea or exemplar of an house which the architect has in his mind; and as his pattern exactly strives to imitate, from the build∣ing or structure of the house it self by this, that he calls that intelligible, but this material and sensible; when as yet the form or pattern in the Architects mind, is as

much material, as the builded house it self; the onely difference is, that the Exemplar, or figure in the Mind, is formed of the rational matter onely, which is the pu∣rest, finest and subtilest degree, and the other is made of grosser materials.

9. The Soul of the World he makes immaterial, but the body material; and hence he concludes the World to be Eternal; because the soul is such which is not capable to be without body; and although it be incorporeal, yet its office is to rule and govern corpo∣real Nature. But concerning the Soul of Nature, I have sufficiently declared my opinion thereof in other places; to wit, that it is impossible she should be im∣material; for if the body of Nature be dividable and composable, the soul must be so too; but that which is not material, cannot admit of division, nor compo∣sition; wherefore the soul cannot be immaterial, or else some parts of the world would be destitute of a soul, which might deserve it as well as the rest, which would argue a partiality in the Creator. I wonder wise men will attribute bodily affections to immaterial beings, when as yet they are not able to conceive or comprehend them; by which they confound and di∣sturb Nature, which knows of no Immaterials, but her Essence is Matter.

10. As for his Ethicks, where he speaks of Beauty, Strength, Proportion, &c. I'le onely say this, That of all these, there are different sorts; for there's the

strength of the Mind, and the strength of the Body; and these are so various in their kinds and particulars, that they cannot be exactly defined; also Beauty, consi∣dering onely that which is of the body, there are so many several sorts, consisting in features, shapes and proportions of bodies, as it is impossible to describe pro∣perly what Beauty is, and wherein it really consists; for what appears beautiful to some, may seem ill-fa∣voured to others; and what seems extraordinary fair or handsom to one, may have but an indifferent cha∣racter of another; so that in my opinion, there's no such thing as a Universal Beauty, which may gain a general applause of all, and be judged alike by every one that views it; nay, not by all immortal souls, nei∣ther in body, nor mind; for what one likes, another may dislike; what one loves, another may hate; what one counts good, another may proclaim bad; what one names just, another may call unjust: And as for Temperance which he joins to Justice; what may be temperance to one, may be intemperance to another; for no particular knows the just measures of Nature; nay, even one and the same thing which one man loves to day, he may chance to hate, or at least dislike, to mor∣row; for Nature is too various to be constant in her particulars, by reason of the perpetual alterations and changes they are subject to; which do all proceed from self-moving Matter, and not from incorporeal Ideas. Thus Rational souls are changeable, which may be

proved by the changes of their Fancies, Imaginations, Thoughts, Judgments, Understandings, Concep∣tions, Passions, Affections, and the like; all which are effects or actions of the rational soul; nay, not onely natural rational souls, but even divine souls, if they were all good, none would be bad, nor vary as we find they do; and therefore I cannot believe that all souls can have the same likeness, being so different amongst themselves.