9. Of the Doctrine of the Scepticks concerning the Knowledg of Nature.
WHen Scepticks endeavour to prove that not any thing in Nature can be truely and thorowly known, they are, in my opinion, in the right way, as far as their meaning is, that not any particular Crea∣ture can know the Infinite parts of Nature; for Nature having both a divideable and composeable sense and reason, causes ignorance as well as knowledg amongst Particulars: But if their opinion be, that there is no true knowledg at all found amongst the parts of Na∣ture, then surely their doctrine is not onely unprofi∣table, but dangerous, as endeavouring to overthrow all useful and profitable knowledg. The truth is, that Na∣ture, being not onely divideable, but also composeable in her parts, it cannot be absolutely affirmed that there is either a total ignorance, or a universal knowledg in Na∣ture, so as one finite part should know perfectly all o∣ther parts of Nature; but as there is an ignorance a∣mongst Particulars, caused by the division of Natures parts, so there is also a knowledg amongst them, caused by the composition and union of her parts: Neither can any ignorance be attributed to Infinite Nature, by reason she being a body comprehending so many parts of her own in a firm bond and indissoluble union, so as no part can separate it self from her, must of necessity Page 34 have also an Infinite wisdom and knowledg to govern her Infinite parts. And therefore it is best, in my judgment, for Scepticks and Dogmatists to agree in their different opinions, and whereas now they express their wit by division, to shew their wisdom by composition; for thus they will make an harmonious consort and u∣nion in the truth of Nature, where otherwise their dis∣agreement will cause perpetual quarrels and disputes both in Divinity and Philosophy, to the prejudice and ruine of Church and Schools; which disagreement proceeds meerly from self-love: For every Man being a part of Nature, which is self-loving as well as self∣moving, would fain be, at least appear, wiser then his fellow-creatures. But the Omnipotent Creator has ordered Nature so wisely, as to divide not onely her power, but also her wisdom into parts, which is the rea∣son that she is not Omnipotent, being divideable and composeable; When as God can neither be divided nor composed, but is one, simple and individual in∣comprehensible being, without any composition of parts, for God is not material.