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9. Of the Doctrine of the Scepticks concerning the Knowledg of Nature.
WHen Scepticks endeavour to prove that not any thing in Nature can be truely and thorowly known, they are, in my opinion, in the right way, as far as their meaning is, that not any particular Crea∣ture can know the Infinite parts of Nature; for Nature having both a divideable and composeable sense and reason, causes ignorance as well as knowledg amongst Particulars: But if their opinion be, that there is no true knowledg at all found amongst the parts of Na∣ture, then surely their doctrine is not onely unprofi∣table, but dangerous, as endeavouring to overthrow all useful and profitable knowledg. The truth is, that Na∣ture, being not onely divideable, but also composeable in her parts, it cannot be absolutely affirmed that there is either a total ignorance, or a universal knowledg in Na∣ture, so as one finite part should know perfectly all o∣ther parts of Nature; but as there is an ignorance a∣mongst Particulars, caused by the division of Natures parts, so there is also a knowledg amongst them, caused by the composition and union of her parts: Neither can any ignorance be attributed to Infinite Nature, by reason she being a body comprehending so many parts of her own in a firm bond and indissoluble union, so as no part can separate it self from her, must of necessity