Observations upon experimental philosophy to which is added The description of a new blazing world / written by the thrice noble, illustrious, and excellent princesse, the Duchess of Newcastle.

15. Of the Rational Soul of Man.

OF all the opinions concerning the Natural Soul of Man, I like that best which affirms the Soul to be a self-moving substance; but yet I will add a Material self-moving substance; for the Soul of Man is part of the Soul of Nature, and the Soul of Na∣ture is Material; I mean onely the Natural, not the Divine Soul of Man, which I leave to the Church. And this natural Soul, otherwise called Reason, is nothing else but corporeal natural self-motion, or a particle of the purest, most subtil and active part of Matter, which I call animate; which animate Mat∣ter is the Life and Soul of Nature, and consequently of Man, and all other Creatures: For we cannot in Reason conceive that Man should be the onely Crea∣ture that partakes of this soul of Nature, and that all the rest of Natures parts, or most of them, should be soul-less, or (which is all one) irrational, although they are commonly called, nay believed to be such. Truly, if all other Creatures cannot be denied to be Material, they can neither be accounted Irrational, Insensible, or Inanimate, by reason there is no part, nay, not the smallest particle in Nature, our reason

is able to conceive, which is not composed of Animate Matter, as well as of Inanimate; of Life and Soul, as well as of Body; and therefore no particular Creature can claim a prerogative in this case before an other; for there is a thorow mixture of Animate and Inanimate Matter in Nature, and all her Parts. But some may object, That if there be sense and reason in every part of Nature, it must be in all parts alike, and then a stone, or any other the like Creature, may have reason, or a rational soul, as well as Man. To which, I answer: I do not deny that a Stone has Reason, or doth partake of the Rational Soul of Nature as well as Man doth, because it is part of the same Matter Man consists of; but yet it has not animal or humane sense and reason, because it is not of animal kind; but being a Mineral, it has Mineral sense and reason: for it is to be observed, that as Animate self-moving Matter moves not one and the same way in all Creatures, so there can neither be the same way of knowledg and understanding, which is sense and reason, in all Creatures alike; but Nature being various, not onely in her parts, but in her acti∣ons, it causes a variety also amongst her Creatures; and hence come so many kinds, sorts and particulars of Natural Creatures, quite different from each other; though not in the General and Universal principle of Nature, which is self-moving Matter, (for in this they agree all) yet in their particular interior natures, figures and proprieties. Thus although there be Sense

and Reason, which is not onely Motion, but a regu∣lar and well-ordered self-motion, apparent in the wonderful and various Productions, Generations, Transformations, Dissolutions, Compositions, and o∣ther actions of Nature, in all Natures parts and parti∣cles; yet by reason of the variety of this self-motion, whose ways and modes do differ according to the na∣ture of each particular figure, no figure or creature can have the same sense and reason, that is, the same natural motions which another has; and therefore no Stone can be said to feel pain as an Animal doth, or be called blind because it has no Eyes; for this kind of sense, as Seeing, Hearing, Tasting, Touching and Smelling, is proper onely to an Animal figure, and not to a Stone, which is a Mineral; so that those which frame an argument from the want of animal sense and sensitive organs, to the defect of all sense and motion; as for example, that a Stone would withdraw it self from the Carts going over it, or a piece of Iron from the hammering of a Smith, conclude, in my opinion, ve∣ry much against the artificial rules of Logick; and although I understand none of them, yet I question not but I shall make a better argument by the Rules of Natural Logick: But that this difference of sense and reason is not altogether impossible, or at least im∣probable to our understanding, I will explain by ano∣ther instance. We see so many several Creatures in their several kinds, to wit, Elements, Vegetables, Mi∣nerals,

and Animals, which are the chief distinctions of those kinds of Creatures as are subject to our sensitive perceptions; and in all those, what variety and diffe∣rence do we find both in their exterior figures, and in their interior natures? truly such, as most of both an∣cient and modern Philosophers have imagined some of them, viz. the Elements, to be simple bodies, and the principles of all other Creatures; nay, those several Creatures do not onely differ so much from each other in their general kinds, but there is no less difference per∣ceived in their particular kinds: for example, con∣cerning Elements, what difference is there not between heavy and contracting Earth, and between light and dilating Air? between flowing Water, and ascending Fire? so as it would be an endless labour to consider all the different natures of those Creatures onely that are subject to our exterior senses. And yet who dares deny that they all consist of Matter, or are material? Thus we see that Infinite Matter is not like a piece of Clay, out of which no figure can be made, but it must be clayie, for natural Matter has no such narrow bounds, and is not forced to make all Creatures alike; for though Gold and Stone are both material, nay, of the same kind, to wit, Minerals, yet one is not the other, nor like the other. And if this be true of Matter, why may not the same be said of self-motion, which is Sense and Reason? Wherefore, in all probability of truth, there is sense and reason in a Mineral, as well as in an

Animal, and in a Vegetable as well as in an Element, al∣though there is as great a difference between the man∣ner and way of their sensitive and rational perceptions, as there is between both their exterior and interior fi∣gures and Natures. Nay, there is a difference of sense and reason even in the parts of one and the same Creature, and consequently of sensitive and rational perception or knowledg; for, as I have declared here∣tofore more at large, every sensitive organ in man hath its peculiar way of knowledg and perception; for the Eye doth not know what the Ear knows, nor the Ear what the Nose knows, &c. All which is the cause of a general ignorance between Natures parts: And the chief cause of all this difference is the variety of self∣motion; for if natural motion were in all Creatures a∣like, all sense and reason would be alike too; and if there were no degrees of matter, all the figures of Crea∣tures would be alike, either all hard, or all soft; all dense, or all rare and fluid, &c. and yet neither this variety of motion causes an absence of motion, or of sense and reason, nor the variety of figures an absence of Matter, but onely a difference between the parts of Nature, all being nevertheless self-moving, sensible and rational, as well as Material; for wheresoever is natural Mat∣ter, there is also self-motion, and consequently sense and reason. By this we may see, how easie it is to con∣ceive the actions of Nature, and to resolve all the Phae∣nomena or appearances upon this ground; and I can∣not

admire enough, how so many eminent and learned Philosophers have been, and are still puzled about the Natural rational soul of man. Some will have her to be a Light; some an Entilechy, or they know not what; some the Quintessence of the four Elements; some com∣posed of Earth and Water, some of Fire, some of Blood, some an hot Complexion, some an heated and dispersed Air, some an Immaterial Spirit, and some Nothing. All which opinions seem the more strange, the wiser their Authors are accounted; for if they did proceed from some ignorant persons, it would not be so much taken notice of; but coming from great Philosophers, who pretend to have searched the depth of Nature, and disclosed her secrets, it causes great admiration in any body, and may well serve for an argument to confirm the variety and difference of sensitive and rational knowledg, and the ignorance amongst natural parts; for if Creatures of the same particular kind, as men, have so many different Perceptions, what may there be in all Nature? But Infinite Nature is wise, and will not have that one part of hers should know more then its particular nature requires, and she taking de∣light in variety, orders her works accordingly.