Plato redivivus, or, A dialogue concerning government wherein, by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern, an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own, with the causes and remedies ...

him for near two Moneths, had certain necessary occasions, which called him for some time into the Country. Where he had not been above three Weeks, before he heard, by meer accident, that the Gen∣tleman of Venice was fallen dangerous sick of a malignant Feaver. Which made him post away immediately to London, to assist and serve him in what he might. But he found him almost per∣fectly restored to his health by an emi∣nent Physician of our Nation, as renown∣ed for his Skill and Cures at home; as for his Writings both here and a∣broad: And who besides his profound knowledge in all Learning, as well in o∣ther Professions as his own, had particu∣larly arriv'd to so exact and perfect a discovery of the formerly hidden parts of human Bodies, that every one who can but understand Latine, may by his means know more of Anatomy than ei∣ther Hypocrates, or any of the Anci∣ents or Moderns did, or do perceive. And if he had lived in the days of Solo∣mon, that great Philosopher would never have said, Cor hominis inscru∣tabile. This excellent Doctor being in

the sick mans Chamber, when the other English Gentleman, newly alighted, came to visit him. After some Compliments and Conversation of course, they begun to talk of Political Matters, as you will better understand by the Introduction, and by the Discourse it self.

The FIRST DAY.

The Introduction.

English Gen∣tleman.

THE sudden news I had of your sad distemper, and the danger you were in, has been the cause of a great deal of affliction to me, as well as of my pre∣sent and speedy repair to London, some Weeks sooner than I intended: I must confess I received some comfort to hear at my arrival of your amendment, and do take much more now to find you up, and

as I hope recover'd; which I knew would be a necessary consequence of your send∣ing for this excellent Physician, the Esculapius of our Age, it being the first request I had to make to you, if by see∣ing him here in your Chamber I had not found it needless. For the Destiny of us English-men depends upon him, and we either live or dye Infallibly, according to the Judgment or good Fortune we have, when we are sick, either to call or not call him to our assistance.

Noble Venetian.

I am Infinitely ob∣liged to you, for your care of me, but am sorry it has been so inconvenient to you, as to make you leave your Affairs in the Countrey sooner than you propo∣sed to your self to do: I wish I might be so fortunate in the course of my Life, as to find an opportunity of making some part of an acknowledgment, for this and all the rest of your favours, but shall pray God it may not be in the same kind; but that your health may ever be so en∣tire, that you never need so transcendent a Charity, as I now receive from your Goodness: And as to this incomparable Doctor; although, I must confess, that

all the good which has happen'd to me in this Country, as well as the knowledge I have received of Persons and Things, does derive from you; yet I must make an exception, as to this one point; for if I can either read, or hear, this Gentle∣man's excellent Writings, and the Fame he worthily injoys in my Country, would have made it inexcusable in me, to implore the help of any other; and I do assure you, that, before I left England, it was in my Ambition to beg your Me∣diation towards the bringing me into the acquaintance and favour of this Learned Person, even before I had any thoughts of becoming the Object of his Care and Skill, as now I am the Tro∣phy of both.

Doctor.

Well, Gentlemen, you are both too great to be Flatterers, and I too little to be flattered, and therefore I will impute this fine discourse you both make about me, to the overflowing of your Wit, and the having no Object near you to vent it upon but me. And for you, Sir, if my Art fail me not, the voiding this Mirth, is a very good sign that you are in a fair way to a perfect recovery.

And for my Countryman here: I hope whilst he has this vent, that his Hypo∣condriack distemper will be at quiet, and that neither his own thoughts, nor the ill posture of our Publick Affairs will make him hang himself, for at least this twelve Months: Only, Gentlemen, pray take notice, that this does not pass upon me, nor do I drink it like Milk (as the French phrase it) being mindful of what a grave Gentleman at Florence replyed to a young Esquire, who answered his Com∣pliments with, Oh, Sir, you flatter me, i prencipi s'adulano i pari vostri si coglio∣nono; That last word I cannot render well into Latin.

English Gentleman.

Well, Doctor, we will not offend your Modesty: The next time we do you Justice, it shall be behind your back, since you are so se∣vere upon us. But you may assure your self that my intention of recommending you to this Gentleman, was for his own sake, and not for yours: For you have too many Patients already, and it were much better, both for you and us, that you had but half so many: For then we should have more of your Writings, and

sometimes enjoy your good Conversati∣on; which is worth our being sick on purpose for. And I am resolved to put my self sometimes into my Bed, and send for you, since you have done coming to our Coffee-House.

But to leave this Subject now, I hear you say, that this Gentleman is in a perfect way of recovery; pray is he well enough to hear, without any prejudice to his convalescence, a reprehension I have to make him?

Doct.

Yes, yes; you mav say what you will to him, for your Repremands will rather divert than trouble him, and prove more a Cordial than a Corrosive.

Eng. Gent.

Then, Sir, pray consider what satisfaction you can ever make me, for the hard measure you have used to∣wards me, in letting me learn from com∣mon Fame and Fortune, the news of your Sickness, and that not till your recove∣ry; and for depriving me of the oppor∣tunity of paying the debt I owe to your own merit, and to the recommendati∣on of those worthy Persons in Italy, who did me the honour to address you to me. And this injury is much aggravated by

the splendour of your Condition, and greatness of your Fortune, which makes it impossible for me ever to hope for a∣ny other occasion to express my faith∣ful service to you, or satisfie any part of the duty I have to be at your devoti∣on. To be sick in a strange Country, and to distrust the sincerity and obedi∣ence of—

Noble Ven.

Pray, Sir, give me leave to interrupt you, and to assure you, that it was not any distrust of your goodness to me, of which I have had sufficient ex∣perience; nor any insensibleness how much your care might advantage me; much less any scruple I had of being more in your debt; which if it had been possible for me to entertain, it must have been thought of long since, before I had received those great Obligations, which I never made any difficulty to accept of. It was not, I say, any of these Conside∣rations, which hindred me from adver∣tising you of my Distemper; but the Condition and Nature of it, which in a moment depriv'd me of the exercise of those Faculties which might give me a Capacity of helping my self in any thing.

But otherwise I assure you that no day of my life shall pass, wherein I will not express a sence of your Favours, and—

Doct.

Pray now, Sir, permit me to inter∣rupt you; for this Gentleman, I dare say, looks for no Compliments; but that which I have to say, is; That the desire you signified to me, to give you some ac∣count of our Affairs here, and the turbu∣lency of our present State, will be much better placed, if you please to ad∣dress it to this Gentleman whose Parts and Studies have fitted him for such an Employment; besides his having had a great share in the managing Affairs of State here, in other times: And really no man understands the Government of England better than he.

Eng. Gent.

Now, Doctor, I should tell you, i pari miei si coglionono, for so you your self have baptized this kind of Civility; But however, this is a Pro∣vince that I cannot be reasonably prest to take upon me, whilst you are pre∣sent, who are very well known to be as skillful in the Nature and Distem∣per of the Body Politick, as the whole

Nation confesses you to be in the con∣cerns of the Natural. And you would have good store of Practice in your for∣mer Capacity, if the wise Custom a∣mongst the Ancient Greeks were not to∣tally out of use. For they, when they found any Craziness or indisposition in their several Governments, before it broke out into a Disease, did repair to the Physicians of State (who, from their Profession, were called the Seven Wise Men of Greece) and obtain'd from them some good Recipes to prevent those seeds of distemper from taking root, and de∣stroying the publique Peace. But in our days, these Signes or Forerunners of Diseases in State are not foreseen, till the whole Mass is corrupted, and that the Patient is incurable, but by violent Remedies. And if we could have per∣ceived the first Symptoms of our Distem∣per, and used good Alteratives, the curiosity of this worthy Gentleman had been spared, as also his command to you, to give him some light into our matters; and we unfortunate English-men had re∣posed in that quiet, ease, and security, which we enjoy'd three hundred years

since. But let us leave the contest who shall inform this Gentleman, lest we spend the time we should do it in unprofitably, and let each of us take his part; for if we speakall, it will look like a studied dis∣course fitted for the Press, and not a fa∣miliar Dialogue. For it ought to be in private Conversation, as it was origi∣nally in the planting the Gospel, when there were two sorts of preaching; the one Concionary, which was used by the Apostles and other Missionaries, when they spoke to those who had never heard of the Mysteries of Christian Reli∣gion, possibly not so much as of the Jew∣ish Law, or the History of Christ: The duty of those was to hear, and not re∣ply, or any way interrupt the harrangue: But when the Believers (called the Church) assembled together, it was the Custom of such of the Auditors, to whom any thing occurred, or (as S. Paul calls it) was revealed, to interpose and desire to be heard, which was called an Interlocutory Preaching, or Religious Conversation; and served very much to the instructing and edifying those who had long believed in Christ, and possibly

knew as much of him as their Pastor himself; and this is used still amongst many of our Independent Congregations.

Doct.

I have (besides the reason I al∣ledged before, and which I still insist up∣on) some other cause to beg that you will please to give your self the trouble of answering this Gentleman's Queries; which is, that I am very defective in my Expressions in the Italian Language; which though I understand perfectly, and so comprehend all that either of you deliver, yet I find not words at hand to signifie my own meaning, and am there∣fore necessitated to deliver my self in Latin, as you see. And I fear that our pronunciation being so different from that which is used in Italy, this worthy person may not so easily comprehend what I intend, and so be disappointed in the desire he hath to be perfectly in∣structed in our Affairs.

Noble Ven.

Really, Sir, that is not all; for besides that, I confess your pronunci∣ation of the Latin Tongue to be very new to me, and for that reason I have been forced to be troublesom to you, in making you repeat things twice, or

thrice. I say besides that your Latinity, as your Writings shew, and all the world knows, is very pure and elegant, which it is notorious to all, that we in Italy scarce understand: Gentlemen there never Learning more Latin, than what is necessary to call for Meat and Drink, in Germany or Holland, where most of the Hosts speak a certain Franck, compounded of Dutch, Latin, and Italian. And though some of us have Latin enough to understand a good Author, (as you have of our Language) yet we seldom arrive to speak any bet∣ter than this Franck, or can without stu∣dy comprehend good Latin, when we meet with it in discourse. And there∣fore it is your perfection in that Tongue, and my ignorance in it, that makes me concur with you, in desiring this Gen∣tleman, to take the pains of instructing my Curiosity in Italian.

Eng. Gent.

I shall obey you in this, and all things else, upon this condition, that both you and the Doctor will vouch∣safe to interrogate me, and by that means give me the Method of serving you in this: And then that you will both

please to interrupt and contradict me, when you think I say any think amiss, or that either of you are of a different Opini∣on, and to give me a good occasion of ex∣plaining my self, and possibly of being convinced by you, which I shall easily confess; for I hate nothing more than to hear disputes amongst Gentlemen, and men of sence, wherein the Speakers seem (like Sophisters in a Colledge) to dispute rather for Victory, than to discover and find out the Truth.

Doct.

Well, all this I believe will be granted you; so that we have nothing to do now, but to adjourn, and name a time when to meet again. Which I, being this Gentlemans Physician, will take upon me to appoint, and it shall be to morrow morning about nine of the Clock, after he has slept well, as I hope he will, by means of a Cordial I intend to send him immediately. In the mean time, not to weary him too much, we will take our leaves of him for this Night.

Noble Ven.

I shall expect your return with great impatience, and if your Cor∣dial be not very potent, I believe the de∣sire

of seeing you will make me wake much sooner than the hour you appoint. And I am very confident, that my mind aswell as my body, will be sufficiently improved by such Visits. It begins to be darkish, Boy light your Torch, and wait on these Gentlemen down.

Both.

Sir, we wish you all good rest and health.

Noble Ven.

And I, with a thousand thanks, the like to you.

The SECOND DAY.

Doct.

WEll, Sir, how is it? Have you rested well to Night? I fear we come too early

Noble Ven.

Dear Doctor, I find my self very well, thanks to your Care and Skill, and have been up above these two hours, in expectation of the favour you and this Gentleman promist me.

Doct.

Well, then pray let us leave off Compliments and Repartees, of which we had a great deal too much yesterday, and fall to our business, and be pleas'd to inter∣rogate this Gentleman what you think fit.

Noble Ven.

Then, Sir, my first request to you, is, That you will vouchsafe to ac∣quaint me for what Reasons this Nation, which hath ever been esteemed (and ve∣ry justly) one of the most considerable People of the World, and made the best Figure both in Peace, Treaties, War, and Trade, is now of so small regard, and signifies so little abroad? Pardon the free∣dom I take, for I assure you it is not out of disrespect, much less of contempt that I speak it: For since I arrived in England, I find it one of the most flourishing King∣doms in Europe, full of splendid Nobili∣ty and Gentry; the comliest persons alive, Valiant, Courteous, Knowing and Bountiful; and as well stored with Commoners, Honest, Industrious, fitted for Business, Merchandise, Arts, or Arms; as their several Educations lead them. Those who apply themselves to study, prodigious for Learning, and suc∣ceeding to admiration in the perfection of all Sciences: All this makes the Riddle impossible to be solved; but by some skillful Sphynx, such as you are; whose pains I will yet so far spare, as to acknow∣ledge, that I do in that little time I have

spent here, perceive that the immedi∣ate cause of all this, is the Dis-union of the People and the Governours; the Discontentment of the Gentry, and Turbulency of the Commonalty; al∣though without all Violence or Tumult, which is Miraculous. So that what I now request of you, is, That you will please to deduce particularly to me, the Causes of this Division, that when they are laid open, I may proceed (if you think fit to permit it) from the Disease, when known, to enquire out the Re∣medies.

Eng. Gent.

Before I come to make you any Answer, I must thank you for the Worthy and Honourable Character you give of our Nation, and shall add to it, That I do verily believe, that there are not a more Loyal and Faithful People to their Prince in the whole world, than ours are; nor that fear more to fall into that State of Confusion, in which we were twenty years since; and that, not only this Parliament, which consists of the most Eminent Men of the Kingdom, both for Estates and Parts; but all the Inhabitants of this Isle in general; even

those (so many of them as have their un∣derstandings yet entire) which were of the Anti-royal Party, in our late Trou∣bles, have all of them the greatest hor∣rour imaginable, to think of doing any thing, that may bring this poor Country into those Dangers and Uncertainties, which then did threaten our Ruin; and the rather for this Consideration; that neither the Wisdom of some, who were engaged in those Affairs, which I must aver to have been very great, nor the success of their Contest, which ended in an absolute Victory, could prevail, so as to give this Kingdom any advantage; nay, not so much as any settlement, in Satisfaction and Requital of all the Blood it had lost, Mony it had spent, and Haz∣zard it had run. A clear Argument why we must totally exclude a Civil War from be∣ing any of the Remedies, when we come to that point. I must add further, That as we have as loyal subjects as are any where to be found, so we have as gracious and good a Prince: I never having yet heard that he did, or attempted to do, any the least Act of Arbitrary Power, in any publick Concern; nor did ever

take, or endeavour to take from any particular person the benefit of the Law. And for his only Brother (although acci∣dentally he cannot be denyed to be a great motive of the Peoples unquietness) all men must acknowledge him to be a most Glorious and Honourable Prince; one who has exposed his life several times for the Safety and Glory of this Nation; one who pays justly and pun∣ctually his Debts, and manages his own Fortune discreetly; and yet keeps the best Court and Equipage of any Subject in Christendom; is Courteous and Affa∣ble to all; and in fine, has nothing in his whole Conduct to be excepted a∣gainst, much less dreaded; excepting, that he is believed to be of a Religion contrary to the Honour of God, and the Safety and interest of this People, which gives them just Apprehensions of their Future Condition: But of this mat∣ter, we shall have occasion to Specu∣late hereafter; in the mean time, since we have such a Prince, and such Sub∣jects, we must needs want the ordinary cause of Distrust and Division, and there∣fore must seek higher to find out the O∣riginal

of this turbulent posture we are in.

Doct.

Truly you had need seek higher or lower to satisfie us, for hitherto you have but enforced the Gentleman's Que∣stion, and made us more admire what the Solution will be.

Eng. Gent.

Gentlemen, then I shall de∣lay you no longer: The Evil Counsellors, the Pensioner-Parliament, the Thorow∣pac'd Iudges, the Flattering Divines, the Buisie and Designing Papists, the French Counsels, are not the Causes of our Misfortunes, they are but the Effects (as our present Distractions are) of one Primary Cause; which is the Breach and Ruin of our Government; which ha∣ving been decaying for near two hun∣dred years, is in our Age brought so near to Expiration, that it lyes agoni∣zing, and can no longer perform the Functions of a Political Life, nor carry on the work of Ordering and Preserving Mankind: So that the Shifts that our Courtiers have within some years used, are but so many Tricks, or Conclusions which they are trying to hold Life and Soul together a while longer; and have

played Handy-Dandy with Parliaments, and especially with the House of Commons, (the only part which is now left entire of the old Constitution) by Adjourning, and Proroguing, and Dissolving them (con∣trary to the true meaning of the Law) as well in the Reign of our late King, as during his Majestics that now is. Where∣as indeed our Counsellors (perceiving the decay of the Foundation, as they must, if they can see but one Inch into the Politicks) ought to have Addrest themselves to the King to call a Parlia∣ment, the true Physician, and to lay o∣pen the Distemper there, and so have endeavour'd a Cure, before it had been too late, as I fear it now is: I mean the piecing and patching up the Old Govern∣ment. It is true, as the Divine Machia∣vil says, That Diseases in Government are like a Marasmus in the Body Natural, which is very hard to be discovered whilst it is Curable; and after it comes to be easie to discern, difficult if not im∣possible to be Remedy'd; yet it is to be supposed that the Counsellors are, or ought to be skilful Physicians, and to foresee the Seeds of State-Distempers,

time enough to prevent the Death of the Patient; else they ought in Conscience to excuse themselves from that sublime Employment, and betake themselves to Callings more suitable to their Capaci∣ties. So that although for this Reason the Ministers of State here are inexcusa∣ble, and deserve all the Fury which must one time or other be let loose a∣gainst them, (except they shall sudden∣ly fly from the wrath to come, by find∣ing out in time, and advising the true means of setting themselves to rights) yet neither Prince nor People are in the mean time to be blamed for not being able to Conduct things better. No more than the Waggoner is to answer for his ill guiding, or the Oxon for their ill draw∣ing the Waggon, when it is with Age and ill usage broken, and the Wheels unserviceable: Or the Pilot and Mar∣riners, for not weathring out a Storm when the Ship hath sprung a planck. And as in the body of Man, sometime•• the Head and all the Members are in good Order, nay, the Vital Parts are sound and entire; yet if there be a Con∣siderable Putrifaction in the humors

much more, if the Blood (which the Scripture calls the life) be Impure and Corrupted; the Patient ceases not to be in great Danger, and oftentimes dies without some skillful Physician: And in the mean time the Head and all the parts suffer, and are unquiet, full as much, as if they were all immediately affected. So it is in every respect with the Body Politick, or Commonwealth, when their Foundations are moulder'd: And although in both these Cases, the Pati∣ents cannot (though the Distemper be in their own Bodies) know what they ail, but are forced to send for some Artist to tell them; yet they cease not to be extreamly uneasie and impatient, and lay hold of∣tentimes upon unsuitable Remedies, and impute their Malady to wrong and ridi∣culous Causes. As some people do here, who think that the growth of Popery is our only Evil, and that if we were se∣cure against that, our Peace and Settle∣ment were obtain'd, and that our Disease needed no other Cure. But of this more when we come to the Cure.

Noble Ven.

Against this Discourse, certainly we have nothing to reply: but

must grant, that when any Govern∣ment is decay'd, it must be mended, or all will Ruine. But now we must Re∣quest you to declare to us, how the Go∣vernment of England is decay'd, and how it comes to be so. For I am one of those Un∣skilful Persons, that cannot discern a State Marasmus, when the danger is so far off.

Eng. Gent.

Then no man living can: for your Government is this day the on∣ly School in the World, that breeds such Physicians, and you are esteemed one of the ablest amongst them: And it would be manifest to all the World for Truth; although there were no argument for it, but the admirable Stability and Dura∣bleness of your Government, which hath lasted above twelve hundred years entire and perfect; whilst all the rest of the Countreys in Europe, have not only changed Masters very frequently in a quarter of that time, but have vari∣ed and altered their Polities very often. Which manifests that you must needs have ever enjoy'd a Succession of wise Ci∣tizens, that have had skill and Ability to forwarn you betimes of those Rocks a∣gainst which your excellently-built Ves∣sel might in time split.

Noble Ven.

Sir, you over-value, not only me, but the Wisdom of my Fellow Citizens; for we have none of these high Speculations, nor hath scarce any of our Body read Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, or any of those great Artists, Ancient or Modern, who teach that great Science of the Governing and In∣creasing great States and Cities; without studying which Science no man can be fit to discourse pertinently of these matters; much less to found or mend a Govern∣ment, or so much as find the defects of it. We only study our own Government, and that too Chiefly to be fit for advantagi∣ous Employments, rather than to fore∣see our dangers. Which yet I must needs confess some amongst us are pret∣ty good at, and will in a Harangue made upon passing a Law, venture to tell us what will be the Consequence of it two hundred years hence. But of these things I shall be very prodigal in my discourse, when you have Leisure and Patience to command me to say any thing of our Polity; in the mean time pray be pleas∣ed to go on with your Edifying Instructi∣on.

Eng. Gent.

Before I can tell you how the Government of England came to be decayed, I must tell you what that Go∣vernment was, and what it now is: And I should say something too of Go∣vernment in General, but that I am afraid of talking of that Subject, before you who are so exact a Judge of it.

Noble Ven.

I thought you had been pleased to have done with this Discourse, I assure you, Sir, if I had more skill in that matter than ever I can pretend to, it would but serve to make me the fitter Auditor of what you shall say on that Subject.

Eng. Gent.

Sir, in the Course of my Reasoning upon this Point, I shall have occasion to insist and expatiate upon ma∣ny things, which both my self and o∣thers have Publish'd in former times. For which I will only make this excuse, that the Repetition of such matters is the more pardonable, because they will be at least new to you, who are a stranger to our Affairs and Writings. And the rather because those discourses shall be apply'd to our present condition, and suited to our present occasions. But I will say no more, but obey you, and proceed. I will not take

upon me to say, or so much as Conje∣cture, how and when Government be∣gan in the World, or what Government is most Ancient: History must needs be silent in that point, for that Govern∣ment is more Ancient than History. And there was never any Writer, but was bred under some Government, which is necessarily supposed to be the Parent of all Arts and Sciences, and to have produced them. And therefore it would be as hard for a man to Write an account of the beginning of the Laws and Polity of any Countrey, except there were memory of it, (which cannot be before the first Historiographer) as it would be to any person without Records to tell the particular History of his own Birth.

Doct.

Sir, I cannot comprehend you, may not Historians Write a History of Matters done before they were born? If it were so; no man could Write but of his own times.

Eng. Gent.

My meaning is, Where there are not Stories, or Records, ex∣tant; for as for Oral Tradition, it lasts but for one Age, and then degenerates

into Fable: I call any thing in Writing, whereby the account of the Passages or Occurrences of former times is derived to our knowledge, a History, although it be not pend Methodically, so as to make the Author pass for a Wit: And had rather read the Authentick Records of any Country, that is a Collection of their Laws and Letters concerning Transacti∣ons of State, and the like, than the most Eloquent and Judicious Narrative that can be made.

Noble Ven.

Methinks, Sir, your dis∣course seems to imply, that we have no account extant of the beginning of Go∣vernments; pray what do you think of the Books of Moses, which seem to be pend on purpose to inform us how he, by Gods Command, led that People out of Egypt into another Land, and in the way made them a Government? Besides, does not Plutarch tell us, how Theseus gathered together the dispersed Inhabi∣tants of Attica, brought them into one City, and under one Government of his own making? The like did Romulus in Italy, and many others in divers Coun∣tries.

Eng. Gent.

I never said that we had not sufficient knowledge of the Original of particular Governments; but it is e∣vident, that these great Legislators had seen, and lived under other Administra∣tions, and had the help of Learned Law-givers and Philosophers, excepting the first who had the Aid of God himself. So that it remains undiscovered yet, how the first Regulation of man-kind began: And therefore I will take for granted that which all the Politicians conclude: Which is, That Necessity made the first Government. For every man by the first Law of Nature (which is common to us and brutes) had, like Beasts in a Pasture, right to every thing, and there being no Property, each Individual, if he were the stronger, might seize what∣ever any other had possessed himself of before, which made a State of perpetual War. To Remedy which, and the fear that nothing should be long enjoyed by any particular person (neither was any mans Life in safety) every man consent∣ed to be debar'd of that Universal Right to all things, and confine himself to a qui∣et and secure enjoyment of such a part as

should be allotted him: Thence came in Ownership, or Property; to maintain which it was necessary to consent to Laws, and a Government to put them in Execution. Which of the Governments now extant, or that have been formerly, was first, is not possible now to be known; but I think this must be taken for granted, that whatsoever the Frame or Constituti∣on was first, it was made by the Perswasi∣on and Meditation of some Wise and ver∣tuous Person, and consented to by the whole Number. And then, that it was instituted for the good and Preservation of the Governed, and not for the Exalta∣tion and greatness of the Person or Per∣sons appointed to Govern: The Reason why I beg this Concession is, That it seems very improbable, not to say impossible, that a vast number of people should ever be brought to consent to put themselves under the Power of others, but for the ends abovesaid, and so lose their Liber∣ty without advantaging themselves in a∣ny thing. And it is full as impossible that any person (or persons so inconsi∣derable in number as Magistrates and Rulers are) should by force get an Empire

to themselves. Though I am not ignorant that a whole people have in imminent Dangers, either from the Invasion of a powerful Enemy, or from Civil Distra∣ctions, put themselves wholly into the hands of one Illustrious Person for a time, and that with good Success, under the best Forms of Government: But this is nothing to the Original of States.

Noble Ven.

Sir, I wonder how you come to pass over the Consideration of Pa∣ternal Government, which is held to have been the beginning of Monarchies?

Eng. Gent.

Really I did not think it worth the taking notice of, for though it be not easie to prove a Negative, yet I believe if we could trace all Founda∣tions of Polities that now are, or ever came to our knowledge since the World began; we shall find none of them to have descended from Paternal Power; we know nothing of Adam's leaving the Empire to Cain, or Seth: It was impossible for Noah to retain any Jurisdiction over his own three Sons; who were dispersed into three parts of the World, if our Antiquaries Calcu∣late right; and as for Abraham, whilst

he lived, as also his Son Isaac, they were out ordinary Fathers of Families, and no question governed their own Houshold as all others do; but when Iacob upon his Death-bed did relate to his Chil∣dren, the Promise Almighty God had made his Grandfather, to make him a great Nation, and give his Posterity a fruitful Territory, he speaks not one word of the Empire of Reuben his first-born, but supposes them all equal: And so they were taken to be by Moses, when he divi∣ded the Land to them by Lot; and by Gods command made them a Commonwealth. So that I believe this fancy to have been first started, not by the solid Judgement of any man, but to flatter some Prince, and to assert, for want of better Argu∣ments, the jus Divinum of Monarchy.

Noble Ven.

I have been impertinent in interrupting you, but yet now I cannot repent of it, since your Answer hath given me so much satisfaction; but if it be so as you say, that Government was at first In∣stituted for the Interest and Preservation of Mankind, how comes it to pass, That there are and have been so many abso∣lute Monarchies in the World, in which

it seems that nothing is provided for, but the Greatness and Power of the Prince.

Eng. Gent.

I have presumed to give you already my Reason, why I take for granted, that such a Power could never be given by the Consent of any People, for a perpetuity; for though the People of Israel did against the will of Samuel, and indeed of God himself demand, and afterwards chuse themselves a King; yet he was never such a King as we speak of; for that all the Orders of their Commonwealth the Sanhedrim, the Congregation of the People, the Princes of the Tribes, &c. did still remain in being, as hath been excellently proved by a learned Gentleman of our Nation, to whom I refer you; it may then be enquired into, how these Monarchies at first did arise. History being in this point silent, as to the Ancient Principalities, we will Con∣jecture, that some of them might very well proceed from the Corruption of bet∣ter Governments, which must necessari∣ly cause a Depravation in manners (as nothing is more certain than that Poli∣tick defects breed Moral ones, as our Nation is a pregnant Example) this De∣bauchery

of manners might blind the understandings of a great many, destroy the Fortunes of others, and make them indigent, insuse into very many a neg∣lect and carelesness of the publick good (which in all setled States is very much regarded) so that it might easily come into the Ambition of some bold aspiring Person to affect Empire, and as easily into his Power, by fair pretences with some, and promises of advantages with others, to procure Followers, and gain a numerous Party, either to Usurp Ty∣ranny over his own Countrey, or to lead men forth to Conquer and Subdue ano∣ther. Thus it is supposed that Nimrod got his Kingdom; who in Scripture is called a Great Hunter before God, which Expositers interpret, A great Tyrant. The Modern Despotical Powers have been acquired by one of these two ways, either by pretending by the first Founder thereof, that he had a Divine Mission and so gaining not only Followers, but even easie Access in some places without Force to Empire, and afterwards dilate∣ing their Power by great Conquests. Thus Mahomet and Cingis Can began, and

established the Sarazen and Tartarian Kingdoms; or by a long Series of Wis∣dom in a Prince, or chief Magistrate of a mixt Monarchy, and his Council, who by reason of the Sleepiness and In∣advertency of the People, have been a∣ble to extinguish the great Nobility, or render them Inconsiderable; and so by degrees taking away from the People their Protectors, render them Slaves. So the Monarchies of France, and some other Countries, have grown to what they are at this day; there being left but a Shadow of the three States in a∣ny of these Mocarchies, and so no bounds remaining to the Regal Power; but since Property remains still to the Subjects, these Governments may be said to be changed, but not founded or established; for there is no Maxim more Infallible and Holding in any Science, than this is in the Politicks, That Empire is founded in Property. Force or Fraud may alter a Government; but it is Property that must Found and Eternise it: Upon this undeniable Aphorisme we are to build most of our subsequent Reasoning, in the mean time we may suppose, that

hereafter the great power of the King of France may diminish much, when his en∣raged and oppressed Subjects come to be commanded by a Prince of less Courage, Wisdom, and Military Vertue, when it will be very hard for any such King to Govern Tyrannically a Country which is not entirely his own.

Doct.

Pray, Sir, give me leave to ask you by the way, what is the Reason that here in our Country, where the Peerage is lessened sufficiently, the King has not gotten as great an Addition of Power as accrews to the Crown in France?

Eng. Gent.

You will understand that, Doctor, before I have finisht this dis∣course; but to stay your Stomach till then, you may please to know that in France the greatness of the Nobility which has been lately taken from them, did not consist in vast Riches and Reve∣nues, but in great Priviledges, and Jurisdi∣ctions, which obliged the People to o∣bey them; whereas our great Peers in former times had not only the same great Dependences, but very Considerable Revenues besides, in Demesnes, and o∣therwise:

This Vassallage over the Peo∣ple, which the Peers of France had, be∣ing abolisht, the Power over those Tenants, which before was in their Lords, fell naturally and of course into the Crown, although the Lands and possessions divested of those Depen∣dences did and do still remain to the Owners; whereas here in England, though the Services are for the most part worn out, and insignificant; yet for want of Providence and Policy in former Kings, who could not foresee the danger a▪far off, Entails have been suffered to be cut off; and so two parts in ten of all those vast Estates, as well Mannours as Demesnes, by the Luxury and Folly of the Owners, have been within these two hundred years pur∣chased by the lesser Gentry and the Com∣mons; which has been so far from advan∣taging the Crown, that it has made the Country scarce governable by Mo∣narchy: But if you please, I will go on with my discourse about Government, and come to this again hereafter?

Noble Ven.

I beseech you, Sir, do.

Eng. Gent.

I cannot find by the small

reading I have, that there were any o∣ther Governments in the World Ancient∣ly than these three, Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. For the first, I have no light out of Antiquity to convince me, that there were in old times any other Monarchies, but such as were absolutely Despotical; all Kingdoms then, as well in Greece (as Macedon, Epirus, and the like; and where it is said, the Princes exerci∣sed their Power moderately) as in Asia, being altogether unlimited by any Laws, or any Assemblies of Nobility or Peo∣ple. Yet I must confess, Aristotle, when he reckons up the Corruptions of these three Governments, calls Tyranny the Corruption of Monarchy; which if he means a Change of Government, (as it is in the Corruptions of the other two) then it must follow, that the Philosopher knew of some other Monarchy at the first, which afterwards degenerated into Tyranny, that is, into Arbitrary Power; for so the Word Tyranny is most com∣monly taken, though in modern Lan∣guages it signifies the ill Exercise of Pow∣er; for certainly Arbitrary Government cannot be called Tyranny, where the

whole Property is in the Prince (as we reasonably suppose it to have been in those Monarchies) no more than it is Tyranny for you to govern your own House and Estate as you please: But it is possible A∣ristotle might not in this speak so accord∣ing to Terms of Art, but might mean, that the ill Government of a Kingdom or Family is Tyranny. However we have one Example, that puzzles Politici∣ans, and that is Egypt, where Pharaoh is called King; and yet we see, that till Ioseph's time he had not the whole Pro∣perty; for the Wisdom of that Patriarch taught his Master a way to make a new use of that Famine, by telling him, that if they would buy their Lives, and sell their Estates (as they did afterwards, and preserve themselves by the Kings Bread) they shall serve Pharaoh; which shews that Ioseph knew well, that Empire was founded in Property: But most of the Mo∣dern Writers in Polity, are of Opinion, that Egypt was not a Monarchy till then, though the Prince might have the Title of King, as the Heraclides had in Sparta, and Romulus and the other Kings had in Rome; both which States were Institu∣ted

Common-Wealths. They give good Conjectures for this their Opinion, too many to be here mentioned; only one is, That Originally (as they go about to prove) all Arts and Sciences had their Rise in Egypt, which they think very improbable to have been under a Monar∣chy. But this Position, That all Kings in former times were absolute, is not so Es∣sential to the intent I have in this Dis∣course, which is to prove, That in all States, of what kind soever, this Apho∣risme takes place: Imperium fundatur in Dominio. So that if there were mixed Monarchies, then the King had not all the Property; but those who shared with him in the Administration of the Soveraignty, had their part, whether it were the Senate, the People, or both; or if he had no Companions in the Sove∣raign Power, he had no Sharers like∣wise in the Dominion or Possession of the Land. For that is all we mean by Pro∣perty, in all this Discourse; for as for Personal Estate, the Subjects may enjoy it in the largest Proportion, without be∣ing able to invade the Empire: The Prince may when he pleases take away

their Goods, by his Tenants and Vas∣sals (without an Army) which are his Ordinary Force, and answers to our Posse Comitatus. But the Subjects with their Money cannot invade his Crown. So that all the Description we need make of this Kind or Form of Govern∣ment, is, That the whole possession of the Country, and the whole power lies in the Hands and Breast of one man; he can make Laws, break and repeal them when he pleases, or dispense with them in the mean time when he thinks fit; in∣terpose in all Judicatories, in behalf of his Favourites, take away any particular mans personal Estate, and his Life too, without the formality of a Criminal Process, or Trial; send a Dagger, or a Halter to his chief Ministers, and command them to make themselves away; and in fine, do all that his Will or his Interest suggests to him.

Doct.

You have dwelt long here upon an Argumentation, That the Ancients had no Monarchies, but what were Arbitrary.

Eng. Gent.

Pray give me leave to save your Objections to that point, and to assure you first, That I will not take

upon me to be so positive in that; for that I cannot pretend to have read all the Historians and Antiquaries that ever writ; nor have I so perfect a memory as to remember, or make use of, in a Verbal and Transient Reasoning, all that I have ever read; And then to assure you again, that I build nothing upon that Assertion, and so your Objection will be needless, and only take up time.

Doct.

You mistake me, I had no in∣tent to use any Argument or Example against your Opinion in that; but am very willing to believe that it may be so. What I was going to say was this, that you have insisted much upon the point of Monarchy, and made a strange descripti∣on of it, whereas many of the Anci∣ents, and almost all the Modern Writers, magnifie it to be the best of Govern∣ments.

Eng. Gent.

I have said nothing to the contrary. I have told you de facto what it is, which I believe none will de∣ny. The Philosopher said it was the best Government; but with this restriction, ubi Philosophi regnant, and they had an

Example of it, in some few Roman Em∣perours; but in the most turbulent times of the Commonwealth, and Facti∣ons between the Nobility and the People, Rome was much more full of Vertuous and Heroick Citizens, than ever it was under Aurelius or Antonius: For the Moderns that are of that Judgement, they are most of them Divines, not Po∣liticians, and something may be said in their behalf, when by their good Preach∣ing, they can insuse into their imaginary Prince (who seems already to have an Image of the Power of God) the Ju∣stice, Wisdom, and Goodness too of the Deity.

Noble Ven.

We are well satisfied with the Progress you have hitherto made in this matter; pray go on to the two o∣ther Forms used amongst the Ancients, and their Corruptions, that so we may come to the Modern Governments, and see how England stands, and how it came to decay, and what must Re∣build it.

Eng. Gent.

You have very good Rea∣son to hasten me to that; for indeed, all that has been said yet, is but as it were

a Preliminary discourse to the know∣ledge of the Government of England, and its decay: when it comes to the Cure, I hope you will both help me, for both your self and the Doctor are a thousand times better than I at Remedies. But I shall dispatch the other two Govern∣ments. Aristocracy, or Optimacy, is a Commonwealth, where the better sort, that is, the Eminent and Rich men, have the chief Administration of the Govern∣ment: I say, the chief, because there are very few ancient Optimacies, but the People had some share, as in Sparta, where they had power to Vote, but not Debate; for so the Oracle of Apollo, brought by Lycur∣gus from Delphos, settles it; But the truth is, these people were the natural Spartans. For Lycurgus divided the Coun∣try or Territory of Laconia into 39000 Shares; whereof Nine thousand only of these Owners were Inhabitants of Sparta; the rest lived in the Country: so that although Thucidides call it an A∣ristocracy, and so I follow him, yet it was none of those Aristocracies usually descri∣bed by the Politicians, where the Lands of the Territory were in a great deal fewer

Hands. But call it what you will, where ever there was an Aristocracy, there the Property, or very much the Over-bal∣lance of it, was in the hands of the Ari∣stoi, or Governours, be they more or fewer; for if the People have the greatest interest in the Property, they will, and must have it in the Empire: A notable example of it is Rome, the best and most glorious Government that ever the Sun saw; where the Lands being e∣qually divided amongst the Tribes, that is the People; it was impossible for the Patricii to keek them quiet, till they yielded to their desires, not only to have their Tribunes, to see that nothing passed into a Law without their consent, but also to have it declared, that both the Consuls should not only be chosen by the people (as they ever were, and the Kings too before them) but that they might be elected too, when the people pleased, out of Plebeian Families. So that now I am come to Democracy. Which you see is a Government where the chief part of the Soveraign Power, and the exercise of it, resides in the People; and where the Style is, Iessu populi au∣thoritate

patrum. And it doth consist of three fundamental Orders. The Senate proposing, the People resolving and the Magistrates executing. This Go∣vernment is much more Powerful than an Aristocracy, because the latter cannot arm the People, for fear they should seize upon the Government, and there∣fore are fain to make use of none but Strangers and Mercinaries for Souldi∣ers; which, as the Divine Machiavil says, has hindred your Commonwealth of Venice from mounting up to Heaven, whither those incomparable Orders, and that venerable Wisdom used by your Citizens in keeping to them, would have carried you, if in all your Wars you had not been ill served.

Doct.

Well, Sir, pray let me ask you one thing concerning Venice: How do you make out your Imperium fundatur in dominio there? Have the Gentlemen there, who are the Party governing, the possession of the whole Territory? Does not property remain entire to the Gentle∣men, and other Inhabitants in the seve∣ral Countries of Padua, Brescia, Vicenza, Verona, Bergamo, Creman, Trevisi, and

Friuli, as also in the Vltramarine Pro∣vinces, and Islands? And yet I believe you will not deny, but that the Govern∣ment of Venice is as well founded, and hath been of as long continuance as any that now is, or ever was in the World.

Eng. Gent.

Doctor, I shall not an∣swer you in this, because I am sure it will be better done by this Gentleman, who is a worthy Son of that honoura∣ble Mother.

Noble Ven.

I thought you had said, Sir, that we should have done Compli∣menting; but since you do Command me to clear the Objection made by our learned Doctor, I shall presume to tell you, first how our City began. The Goths, Huns, and Lombards coming with all the Violence and Cruelty im∣maginable, to invade that part of Italy which we now call Terra firma, and where our Ancestors did then inhabit, forced them in great numbers to seek a shelter amongst a great many little Rocks, or Islands, which stood very thick in a vast Lake, or rather Marsh, which is made by the Adriatique Sea, we call it Laguna; here they began to build, and getting

Boats, made themselves Provisions of all kind from the Land; from whence in∣numerable people began to come to them, finding that they could subsist, and that the barbarous people had no Boats to attack them, nor that they could be invaded either by Horse or Foot without them. Our first Government, and which lasted for many years, was no more than what is practised in many Coun∣try Parishes in Italy, and possibly here too, where the Clerk, or any other person, calls together the chief of the In∣habitants to consider of Parish-business, as chusing of Officers, making of Rates, and the like. So in Venice, when there was any publick provision to be made by way of law, or otherwise, some Offi∣cers went about to persons of the great∣est Wealth and Credit, to intreat them to meet and consult; from whence our Senate is called to this day Consiglio de pregadi, which in our Barbarous Idiom is as much as Pregati in Tuscan Language: Our security increased daily, and so by consequence our Number and our Rich∣es; for by this time there began to be another inundation of Sarazens upon A∣sia

Minor, which forced a great many of the poor people of Greece to fly to us for protection, giving us the possession of some Islands, and other places upon the Continent: This opened us a Trade, and gave a beginning to our greatness; but chiefly made us consider what Go∣vernment was fittest to conserve our selves, and keep our Wealth (for we did not then much dream of Conquests, else without doubt we must have made a popular Government) we pitcht upon an Aristocracy, by ordering that those who had been called to Council for that present year, and for four years before, should have the Government in their hands, and all their Posterity after them for ever, which made first the distincti∣on between Gentlemen and Citizens; the People, who consisted of divers Nations, most of them newly come to inhabit there, aud generally seeking nothing but safety and ease, willingly consented to this change, and so this State hath continued to this day; though the several Orders and Counsels have been brought in since, by degrees, as our Nobility encreased, and for other

causes. Under this Government we have made some Conquests in Italy, and Greece, for our City stood like a Wall between the two great Torrents of Goths and Sarazens; and as either of their Empires declin'd, it was easie for us, without being very Warlike, to pick up some pieces of each side; as for the Go∣vernment of these Conquests, we did not think fit to divide the Land amongst our Nobility, for fear of envy, and the effects of it: much less did we think it adviseable to plant Colonies of our Peo∣ple, which would have given the Pow∣er into their hands, but we thought it the best way for our Government to leave the People their Property, tax them what we thought fit, & keep them under by Governours and Citadels, and so in short make them a Province. So that now the Doctors Riddle is solved; for I suppose this Gentleman did not mean that his Maxime should reach to Pro∣vincial Governments.

Eng. Gent.

No, Sir, so far from that, that it is just contrary; for as in Natio∣nal or Domestick Government, where a Nation is Governed either by its own

People or its own Prince, there can be no settled Government, except they have the Rule who possess the Country. So in Provincial Governments, if they be wisely ordered, no man must have a∣ny the least share in the managing Af∣fairs of State, but strangers, or such as have no share or part in the possessions there, for else they will have a very good opportunity of shaking off their Yoak.

Doct.

That is true; and we are so wise here (I mean our Ancestors were) as to have made a Law, That no Native in Ireland can be Deputy there: But, Sir, being fully satisfied in my demand, by this Centleman; I beseech you to go on to what you have to say, before you come to England.

Eng. Gent.

I shall then offer two things to your observation; the first is, That in all times and places, where any great Heroes or Legislators, have founded a Government, by gathering people toge∣ther to build a City, or to invade any Countrey to possess it, before they came to dividing the conquered Lands, they did always very maturely deliberate un∣der

what Form or Model of Govern∣ment they meant to live, and according∣ly made the Partition of the Possessions; Moses, Theseus, and Romulus, Founders of Demacracies, divided the Land equally: Li∣curgus who meant an Optimacy, made a cer∣tain number of Shares, which he intended to be in the hands of the People of Laco∣nia. Cyrus, and other conquering Monarchs before him, took all for themselves and Successors, which is observed in those Eastern Countries to this day, and which has made those Countries continue ever since under the same Government, though Conquered and possessed very often by several Nations: This brings me to the second thing to be observed, which is, That wherever this apportion∣ment of Lands came to be changed in any kind, the Government either changed with it, or was wholly in a state of confusion: And for this reason Licurgus, the great∣est Politician that ever Founded any Go∣vernment, took a sure way to fix Pro∣perty by Confounding it, and bringing all into Common: And so the whole number of the Natural Spartans, who inhabited the City of Lacedemon, eat

and drank in their several convives toge∣ther: And as long as they continued so to do, they did not only preserve their Government entire, and that for a long∣er time than we can read of any Common∣Wealth that ever lasted amongst the An∣cients, but held as it were the principali∣ty of Greece. The Athenians, for want of some Constitutions to fix Property, as Theseus placed it, were in danger of utter ruine, which they had certainly encoun∣ter'd, if the good Genius (as they then call'd it) of that People, had not raised them up a second Founder, more than six hundred years after the first, which was Solon: And because the History of this matter will very much conduce to the illustrating of this Aphorisme we have laid down, I will presume so much upon your patience as to make a short recital of it, leaving you to see it more at large in Plutarch and other Authors. The Lands in the Territory of Attica which were in the possession of the Com∣mon People, (for what reason History is silent) were for Debt all Mortgaged to the great Men of the City of Athens, and the Owners having no possibility of Re∣deeming

their Estates, were treating to Compound with their Creditors, and deliver up their Lands to them: Solon (who was one of those State Physicians we spake of,) was much troubled at this, and harangued daily to the Nobility and People against it, telling them first, that it was impossible for the Grecians to re∣sist the Medes (who were then growing up to a powerful Monarchy) except A∣thens the second City of Greece did conti∣nue a Democracy; That it was as Impos∣sible the People could keep their Empire, except they kept their Lands, nothing being more contrary to Nature, than that those who possess nothing in a Country can pretend to Govern it. They were all sensible of his Reasons, and of their own Danger, but the only Reme∣dy (which was, that the great Men should forgive the Common People their Debts) would not at all be digest∣ed; so that the whole City now fully understanding their condition, were con∣tinually in an uproar, and the People flock'd about Solon, whenever he came a∣broad, desiring him to take upon him the Government, and be their Prince,

and they would make choice of him the next time they assembled. He told them no, he would never be a Tyrant, especi∣ally in his own Country; meaning, that he who had no more share than other of the Nobles, could not Govern the rest, without being an Usurper or Tyrant: But this he did to oblige his Citizens, he frankly forgave all the Debts that any of the People owed to him, and released their Lands immediately; and this a∣mounted to fifteen Attick Talents of Gold, a vast sum in those days; and be∣took himself to a voluntary Exile, in which he visited Thales, and went to the Oracle of Delphos, and offer up his Prayers to Apollo for the preservati∣on of his City: In return of which (as the People then believed) the hearts of the great ones were so changed and in∣larged, that they readily agreed to remit all their Debts to the People, upon Con∣dition that Solon would take the pains to make them a New Model of Govern∣ment, and Laws suitable to a Democra∣cy, which he as readily accepted and performed; by vertue of which that City grew and continued long the great∣est,

the Justest, the most Vertuous, Learned and Renowed of all that Age; drove the Persians afterwards out of Greece, defeated them doth by Sea and Land, with a quarter of their number of Ships and Men; and produced the great∣est Wits and Philosophers that ever li∣ved upon Earth. The City of Athens In∣stituted a Solemn Feast in Commemora∣tion of that great Generosity and Self∣denial of the Nobility; who Sacrificed their own Interest to the preservation of their Country: which Feast was called the Solemnity of the Seisactheia, which signifies recision or abolition of Debts, and was observed with Processions, Sacri∣fices and Games, till the time of the Ro∣man's Dominion over them (who encou∣raged it,) and ever till the change of Re∣ligion in Greece, and Invasion of the Sa∣razens. The Roman's having omitted in their Institution to provide for the fixing of Property, and so the Nobility called Patricii, beginning to take to themselves a greater share in the con∣quer'd Lands than had been usual (for in the first times of the Commonwealth un∣der Romulus, and ever after, it was always

practised to divide the Lands equally a∣mongst the Tribes) this Innovation stir∣red up Licinius Stolo, then Tribune of the People, to propose a Law; which, although it met with much difficulty, yet at last was consented to; by which it was provided, that no Roman Citizen, of what degree soever, should possess a∣bove five hundred Acres of Land; and for the remaining part of the Lands which should be Conquer'd, it was Ordered to be equally divided, as formerly, amongst the Tribes: This found admittance, after much oposition, because it did provide but for the future, no Man at that time being owner of more Lands than what was lawful for him to possess; and if this law had been strictly observed to the last, that glorious Commonwealth might have subsisted to this day, for ought we know.

Doctor.

Some other Cause would have been the Ruine of it, what think you of a Foreign Conquest?

Eng. Gent.

Oh Doctor, if they had kept their Poverty they had kept their Go∣vernment and their Vertue too, and then it had not been an easie matter to subdue

them, Quos vult perdere Iupiter dementat; Breach of Rules and Order causes Divisi∣on, and Division when it comes to be Incurable, exposes a Nation almost as much as a Tyrannical Government does. The Goths and Vandals, had they Invaded in those days, had met with the same suc∣cess which befell the Cymbri, and the Teutones. I must confess, a Foreign In∣vasion is a Formidable thing, when a Commonwealth is weak in Territory and Inhabitants, and that the Invader is numerous and Warlike: And so we see the Romans were in danger of utter ruine when they were first attacqued by the Gauls under Brennus: The like hazzard may be fear'd, when a Commonwealth is assaulted by another of equal Vertue, and a Commander of equal Address and Valour to any of themselves. Thus the Romans run the risk of their Liberty and Empire, in the War of Hannibal; but their Power and their Vertue grew to that heighth in that contest, that when it was ended, I believe, that if they had preserved the Foundation of their Go∣vernment entire, they had been Invin∣cible: And if I were alone of this Opini∣on,

I might be ashamed; but I am backt by the Judgement of your Incomparable Country-man Machiavil; and no Man will condemn either of us of rashness, if he first consider, what small States, that have stood upon right bottoms, have done to defend their Liberty against great Mo∣narchs; as is to be seen in the example of the little Commonwealth of Athens, which destroyed the Fleet of Xerxes, con∣sisting of a thousand Vessels, in the Streights of Salamis, and before the land army of Darius of three hundred thou∣sand in the Plains of Marathon, and drove them out of Greece; for though the whole Confederates were present at the Battel of Platoea, yet the Athenian Army singly under their General Miltiades, gain'd that renowned Battel of Marathon.

Noble Ven.

I beseech you, Sir, how was it possible, or practicable, that the Romans Conquering so many and so re∣mote Provinces, should yet have been a∣ble to preserve their Agrarian Law, and divide all those Lands equally to their Citizens; Or if it had been possible, yet it would have ruin'd their City, by send∣ing all their Inhabitants away; and by

taking in Strangers in their room, they must necessarily have had people less Vertuous and less Warlike, and so both their Government and their Military Discipline must have been Corrupted; for it is not to be imagined, but that the People would have gone with their Families to the place where their Lands lay: So that it appears that the Ro∣mans did not provide, in the making and framing their first Polity, for so great Conquests as they afterwards made.

Eng. Gent.

Yes, surely they did; from their first beginning they were Found∣ed in War, and had neither Land nor Wives but what they fought for; but yet what you object were very weighty, if there had not been a consideration of that early: For assoon as that great and wise People had subdued the Samnites on the East, and brought their Arms as far as the Greek Plantations, in that part of Ita∣ly which is now called the Kingdom of Naples; and Westward, had reduced all the Tuscans under their Obedience, as far as the River Arnus, they made that and the River Volturnus (which runs by the Walls of Capua) the two Boundaries of

their Empire, which was called Domici∣lium Imperii. These were the ne plus ul∣tra, for what they Conquered between these two Rivers, was all confiscated and divided amongst the Tribes; the Rustick Tribes being twenty seven, and the Vr∣bane Tribes nine, which made thirty six in all. The City Tribes were like our Companies in London, consisting of Tradesmen. The Country Tribes were divided like Shires, and there was scarce any Landed Man, who Inhabited in the City, but he was written in that Tribe where his Estate lay; so that the Rustick Tribes (though they had all equal Voices) were of far more Credit and Reputation than the Vrbane. Upon the days of the Comtia, which were very well known, as many as thought fit amongst the Country Tribes, came to give their Voices, though every Tribe was very numerous of Inhabitants that lived in the City. Now the Agrarian did not extend to any Lands conquered beyond this Pre∣cinct, but they were lest to the Inhabi∣tants, they paying a Revenue to the Commonwealth; all but those which were thought fit to be set out to main∣tain

a Roman Colony, which was a good number of Roman Citizens, sent thither, and provided of Lands and Habitations, which being Armed, did serve in the na∣ture of a Citadel and Garison to keep the Province in Obedience, and a Roman Pre∣tor, Proconsul, or other Governour, was sent yearly to Head them, and brought Forces with him besides. Now it was ever lawful for any Roman Citizen to pur∣chase what Lands he pleased in any of these Provinces; it not being dangerous to a City to have their People rich, but to have such a Power in the Governing part of the Empire, as should make those who managed the Affairs of the Com∣monwealth depend upon them; which came afterwards to be that which ruined their Liberty, and which the Gracchi en∣deavoured to prevent when it was too late; For those Illustrious persons seeing the disorder that was then in the Com∣monwealth▪ and rightly comprehending the Reason, which was the intermission of the Agrarian, and by consequence the great Purchases which were made by the Men of Rome (who had inriched them∣selves in Asia and the other Provinces)

in that part of Italy which was between the two Rivers, before mentioned, be∣gan to harrangue the People, in hopes to perswade them to admit of the right Re∣medy, which was to confirm the Agrari∣an Law with a Retrospect; which al∣though they carried, yet the difficulties in the Execution proved so great, that it never took effect, by reason that the Com∣mon People, whose Interest it was to have their Lands restored; yet having long lived as Clients, and Dependents of the great ones, chose rather to depend still upon their Patrons, than to hazard all for an Imaginary deliverance, by which supineness in them, they were pre∣vail'd with rather to joyne (for the most part) with the Oppressors of themselves and their Countrey, and to cut the throats of their redeemers, than to employ their just resentment against the covetous Vio∣lators of their Government and Proper∣ty. So perished the two renowned Grac∣chi, one soon after the other, not for any crime, but for having endeavoured to preserve and restore their Common∣wealth; for which (if they had lived in times suitable to such an Heroick under∣taking,

and that the vertue of their An∣cestors had been yet in any kind remain∣ing) they would have merited and en∣joyed a Reputation equal to that of Ly∣curgus, or Solon, whereas as it happen'd they were sometime after branded with the name of Sedition, by certain Wits, who prostituted the noble flame of Poe∣try (which before had wont to be em∣ployed in magnifying Heroick Actions) to flatter the Lust and Ambition of the Roman Tyrants.

Noble Ven.

Sir, I approve what you say in all things, and in Confirmation of it, shall further alledge the two famous Princes of Sparta, Agis, and Cleomines, which I couple together, since Plutarch does so; These finding the Corruption of their Commonwealth, and the Decay of their ancient Vertue, to proceed from the neglect and inobservance of their Founders Rules, and a breach of that E∣quality which was first instituted; en∣deavour to restore the Laws of Lycur∣gus, and divide the Territory anew; their Victory in the Peloponnesian War, and the Riches and Luxury brought into their City by Lisander having long before

broken all the Orders of their Common∣wealth, and destroyed the Proportions of Land allotted to each of the Natural Spartans: But the first of these two ex∣cellent Patriots perished by Treachery in the beginning of his Enterprize, the o∣ther began and went on with incompa∣rable Prudence and Resolution, but mis∣carried afterwards by the Iniquity of the times, and baseness and wickedness of the People; so infalliably true it is, That where the Policy is corrupted, there must necessarily be also a corruption and depravation of Manners, and an utter abolition of all Faith, Justice, Honour, and Morality; but I forget my self, and intrench upon your Province: there is nothing now remains to keep you from the Modern Policies, but that you please to shut up this Discourse of the Ancient Governments, with saying something of the Corruptions of Aristocracy and De∣mocracy; for I believe both of us are sa∣tisfied that you have abundantly pro∣ved you Assertion, and that when we have leisure to examine all the States or Policies that ever were, we shall find all their Changes to have turn'd upon

this Hinge of Property, and that the fix∣ing of that with good lawes in the begin∣ning or first Institution of a state, and the holding to those Lawes afterwards, is the only way to make a Commonwealth Immortal.

Eng. Gent.

I think you are very right; but I shall obey you, and do presume to differ from Aristotle, in thinking that he has not fitly called those extreams (for so I will stile them) of Aristocracy and De∣mocracy, Corruptions; for that they do not proceed from the alteration of Property, which is the Vnica corruptio po∣litica: For Example, I do not find that Oligarchy, or Government of a few, which is the Extream of an Optimacy, ever did arise from a few Mens getting into their hands the Estates of all the rest of the Nobility: For had it began so, it might have lasted, which I never read of any that did. I will therefore conclude, that they were all Tyrannies; for so the Greeks called all Usurpations, whether of one or more persons, and all those that I ever read of, as they came in either by Craft or violence, as the Thirty Tyrants of Athens, the Fifteen of Thebes, and the

Decem-viri of Rome (though these are first came in lawfully) so they were soon dri∣ven out; and ever, were either assassi∣nated, or dyed by the Sword of Justice; and therefore I shall say no more of them, not thinking them worth the name of a Government. As for the Extream of Democracy, which is Anarchy, it is not so: for many Commonwealths have last∣ed for a good time under that Admini∣stration (if I may so call a State so full of Confusion.) An Anarchy then is, when the People not contented with their Share in the Administration of the Go∣vernment, (which is the right of Appro∣ving, or Disapproving of Lawes, of Leagues, and of making of War and Peace, of Judging in all Causes upon an Appeal to them, and chusing all manner of Officers) will take upon themselves the Office of the Senate too, in manage∣ing Subordinate Matters of State, Pro∣posing Lawes Originally, and assuming Debate in the Market place, making their Orators their Leaders; nay, not con∣tent with this, will take upon them to alter all the Orders of the Government when they please; as was frequently

practised in Athens, and in the Modern State of Florence. In both these Cities, when ever any great person who could lead the People, had a mind to alter the Government, he call'd them together, and made them Vote a Change. In Flo∣rence they call'd it, Chiamar il popolo a Parlamento e ripigliar lo Stato, which is summoning the People into the Market∣place to resume the Government, and did then presently Institute a new one, with new Orders, new Magistracies, and the like. Now that which originally causes this Disorder, is the admitting (in the beginning of a Government, or afterwards) the meaner sort of People, who have no Share in the Territory, in∣to an equal part of Ordering the Com∣monwealth; these being less sober, less considering, and less careful of the Pub∣lick Concerns; and being commonly the Major part, are made the Instruments oft-times of the Ambition of the great ones, and very apt to kindle into Facti∣on: but notwithstaning all the Confu∣sion which we see under an Anarchy, (where the wisdom of the better sort is made useless by the fury of the People)

yet many Cities have subsisted hundreds of years in this condition; and have been more considerable, and performed great∣er Actions, than ever any Government of equal Extent did, except it were a well∣regulated Democracy; But it is true, they ruine in the end, and that never by Cow∣ardize or baseness, but by too much boldness and temerarious undertakings, as both Athens and Florence did; The first undertaking the Invasion of Sicily, when their Affairs went ill elsewhere; and the other by provoking the Spani∣ard and the Pope. But I have done now, and shal pass to say something of the Modern Policies.

Noble Ven.

Before you come to that, Sir, pray satisfie me in a Point which I should have moved before, but that I was unwilling to interrupt your ratio∣nal Discourse; How came you to take it for granted, that Moses, Theseus, and Ro∣mulus were Founders of Popular Govern∣ments? As for Moses, we have his Story written by an Insalliable Pen; Theseus was ever called King of Athens, though he liv'd so long since, that what is writ∣ten of him is justly esteem'd fabulous;

but Romulus certainly was a King, and that Government continued a Monar∣chy, though Elective, under seven Princes.

Eng. Gent.

I will be very short in my Answer, and say nothing of Theseus, for the reason you are pleased to alledge: But for Moses, you may read in Holy Writ, that when, by God's Command, he had brought the Israelites out of E∣gypt, he did at first manage them by accquainting the People with the Estate of their Government, which People were called together with the sound of a Trumpet, and are termed in Scripture, the Congregation of the Lord; this Go∣vernment he thought might serve their turn in their passage, and that it would be time enough to make them a better when they were in possession of the Land of Canaan; Especially having made them Judges and Magistrates at the instance of his Father-in-law, which are called in Authors, Praefecti Iethroniani; but find∣ing that this Provision was not sufficient, complained to God of the difficulty he had, to make that State of Affairs hold together; God was pleased to order

him to let seventy Elders be appointed for a Senate, but yet the Congregation of the Lord continued still and acted: And by the severall soundings of the Trumpets, either the Senate or popular Assembly were called together, or both; so that this Government was the same with all other Democracies, consisting of a Principal Magistrate, a Senate, and a People Assembled together, not by Re∣presention, but in a body. Now for Romulus, it is very plain, that he was no more then the first Officer of the Com∣monwealth, whatever he was called, and that he was chosen (as your Doge is) for Life; and when the last of those seven Kings usurpt the place, that is, did reign injussu Populi, and excercise the Go∣vernment Tyrannically, the People drove him out (as all People in the World that have Property will do in the like Case, except some extraordinary qualifications in the Prince preserve him for one Age) and afterwards appoint∣ed in his room two Magistrates, and made them Annual, which two had the same Command, as well in their Ar∣mies as in their Cities, and did not make

the least alteration besides, excepting that they chose an Officer that was to perform the Kings Function in certain Sacrifices (which Numa appointed to be performed by the King) left the People should think their Religion were chan∣ged: This Officer was called Rex Sacrifi∣culus. If you are satisfied, I will go on to the consideration of our Modern States.

Noble Ven.

I am fully answered, and besides am clearly of Opinion, that no Government, whether mixt Monarchy or Commonwealth, can subsist without a Senate, as well from the turbulent State of the Israelites under Moses till the Sanhedrin was instituted, as from a certain Kingdom of the Vandals in Afri∣ca; where after their Conquest of the Natives, they appointed a Government consisting of a Prince and a Popular As∣sembly, which latter, within half a year, beat the Kings brains out, he having no bulwark of Nobility or Senate to defend him from them. But I will divert you no longer.

Eng. Gent.

Sir, you are very right, and we should have spoken something of that before, if it had been the business of this Meeting to Discourse of the par∣ticular Models of Government; but in∣tending only to say so much of the An∣cient Policy as to shew what Govern∣ment in General is, and upon what Ba∣sis it stands, I think I have done it sufficiently to make way for the un∣derstanding of our own, at least when I have said something of the Policies which are now extant; and that with your favour I will do. I shall need say little now of those Commonwealths, which however they came by their Li∣berty, either by Arms or Purchase, are now much-what under the same kind of Policy as the Ancients were. In Germa∣ny, the Free Towns, and many Princes make up the Body of a Commonwealth called the Empire, of which the Empe∣rour is Head; this General Union hath its Diets or Parliaments, where they are all represented, and where all things concerning the Safety and Interest of Germany in General, or that belong to Peace and War, are Transacted; these

Diets never intermeddle with the parti∣cular Concerns or Policies of those Prin∣ces or States that make it up, leaving to them their particular Soveraignties: The several Imperial Cities, or Com∣monwealths, are divided into two kinds, Lubeck's Law, and Collen's Law, which being the same exactly with the ancient Democracies and Optimacies, I will say no more of them. The Govern∣ment of Swizerland, and the Seven Pro∣vinces of the Low-Countries were made up in haste, to Unite them against Per∣secution and Oppression, and to help to defend themselves the better, which they both have done very gallantly and successfully: They seem to have taken their Pattern from the Grecians, who when their Greatness began to decline, and the several Tyrants who succeeded Alexander began to press hard upon them, were forced to League themselves (yet in severall Confederacies, as that of the Etolians, that of the Achaians, &c.) for their mutual defence. The Swisses consist of Thirteen Soveraignties; some Cities which are most Aristocraticall, and some Provinces which have but a Village

for their head Township. These are all Democracies, and are Govern'd all by the Owners of Land, who Assemble as our Free-Holders do at the County-Court. These have their General Diets, as in Ger∣many. The Government of the United Provinces has for its Foundation the U∣nion of Vtrecht, made in the beginning of their standing upon their Guard a∣gainst the Cruelty and Oppression of the Spaniard, and patcht up in haste; and seeming to be compos'd only for necessi∣ty, as a state of War, has made Modern Statesmen Conjecture that it will not be very practicable in time of Peace, and Security. At their General Diet, which is called the States General, do inter∣vene the Deputies of the Seven Provin∣ces, in what number their Principals please; but all of them have but one Vote, which are by consequence Seven, and every one of the Seven hath a Ne∣gative; so that nothing can pass without the Concurrence of the whole Seven. Every one of these Provinces have a Counsel or Assembly of their own, cal∣led the States Provincial, who send and Instruct their Deputies to the States-General,

and perform other Offices be∣longing to the Peace and Quiet of the Province. These Deputies to the States Provincial, are sent by several Cities of which every Province consists, and by the Nobility of the Province, which hath one Voice only: The Basis of the Go∣vernment lies in these Cities, which are every of them a distinct Soveraignty; neither can the States of the Province, much less the States General, intrench in the least upon their Rights, nor so much as intermeddle with the Government of their Cities, or Administration of Ju∣stice, but only treat of what concerns their mutual Defence, and their Pay∣ments towards it. Every one of these Cities is a Soveraignty, governed by an Optimacy, consisting of the chief Citizens, which upon death are supplyed by new ones Elected by themselves; these are called the Vrnuscaperie or Herne, which Council has continued to Govern those Towns, time out of mind; even in the times of their Princes, who were then the Soveraigns; for without the consent of him, or his Deputy, called State Holder, nothing could be conclu∣ded

in those days. Since they have Insti∣tuted an artificial Minister of their own, whom they still call State-Holder, and make choice of him in their Provincial Assemblies, and for Form sake defer something to him, as the Approbation of their Skepen and other Magistrates, and some other Matters: This has been con∣tinued in the Province of Holland, which is the chief Province in the Succession of the Princes of Orange, and in the most of the others too: The rest have likewise chosen some other of the House of Nassaw. This Government (so oddly set together, and so compos'd of a State, intended for a Monarchy, and which, as Almanacks Calculated for one Meridian, are made in some sort to serve for another, is by them continued in these several Aristo∣cracies) may last for a time, till Peace and Security, together with the abuse which is like to happen in the choice of the Herne, when they shall Elect persons of small note into their Body, upon Va∣cancies, for Kindred or Relation, rather than such as are of Estate and eminen∣cy, or that otherwise abuse their power in the execution of it, and then it is be∣lieved,

and reasonably enough, that those People (great in wealth, and very acute in the knowledge of their own Interest) will find out a better Form of Government, or make themselves a prey to some great Neighbour-Prince in the attempting it; and this in case they in the mean time escape Conquest from this great and powerfull King of France, who at this time gives Law to Christendom. I have nothing now left to keep me from the Modern Monarchies, but the most fa∣mous Commonwealth of Venice, of which it would be presumption for me to say any thing whilst you are present.

Noble Ven.

You may very safely go one if you please; for I believe Strangers understand the Speculative part of our Government, better than we do; and the Doctrine of the Ballat which is our chiefe excellency: For I have read many Descriptions of our Frame, which have taught me something in it which I knew not before; paricularly, Donato Gianotti the Florentine, to whom I refer those who are curious to know more of our Orders, for we that manage the Mecha∣nical part of the Government are like

Horses who know their Track well e∣nough, without considering East or West, or what business they go about. Besides, it would be very tedious, and very needless, to make any Relation of our Model, with the several Counsels that make it up, and would be that which you have not done in Treating of any other Government: what we have said is enough to shew what beginning we had, and that serves your turn, for we who are called Nobility, and who man∣age the State, are the Descendents of the first Inhabitants, and had therefore been a Democracy, if a numerous Flock of Strangers (who are contented to come and live amongst us as Subjects) had not swelled our City, and made the Govern∣ing party seem but a handfull; so that we have the same foundations that all other Aristocracies have, who govern but one City, and have no Territory but what they Govern Provincially; and our People not knowing where to have bet∣ter Justice, are very well contented to live amongst us, without any share in the Managing of Affairs; yet we have power to Adopt whom we please into

our Nobility, and I believe that in the time of the Roman greatness, there were five for one of the Inhabitants who were written in no Tribe, but look'd upon as Strangers, and yet that did not vitiate their Democracy, no more than our Citizens and Common People can hurt our Optimacy; all the difficulty in our Administration, hath been to regulate our own Nobility, and to bri∣dle their faction and ambition, which can alone breed a Disease in the Vital part of our Government, and this we do by most severe Laws, and a very rigo∣rous execution of them.

Doct.

Sir, I was thinking to Interpose concerning the Propriety of Lands in the Territory of Padua, which I hear is wholly in the possession of the Nobility of Venice.

Noble. Ven.

Our Members have very good Estates there, yet nothing but what they have paid very well for, no part of that Country, or of any other Province, having been shar'd amongst us as in other Conquests: 'Tis true, that the Paduans having ever been the most revengeful People of Italy, could not be deterr'd

from those execrable and treacherous Murders which were every day commit∣ed, but by a severe Execution of the Laws as well against their Lives as E∣states: And as many of their Estates as were Confiscated, were (during our ne∣cessities in the last War with the Turks) exposed to sale, and sold to them that offered most, without any consideration of the persons purchasing; But it is very true that most of them came into the hands of our Nobility, they offering more than any other, by reason that their sober and frugal living, and their being forbidden all manner of Traffick, makes them have no way of employing the Money which proceeds from their Parsimony, and so they can afford to give more than others who may employ their Advance to better profit elsewhere. But I perceive, Doctor, by this Question, that you have studied at Padua.

Doct.

No really, Sir, the small learn∣ing I have was acquired in our own U∣niversity of Oxford, nor was I ever out of this Island.

Noble Ven.

I would you had, Sir, for it would have been a great honour to

our Country to have contributed any thing towards so vast a knowledge as you are Possessor of: But I wish that it were your Countrey, or at least the place of your Habitation, that so we might partake not only of your excel∣lent Discourse sometimes, but be the better for your skill, which would make us Immortal.

Doct.

I am glad to see you so well that you can make yourself so merry, but I assure you I am very well here; England is a good wholsome Climate for a Physician: But, pray let our Friend go on to his Modern Monarchies.

Eng. Gent.

That is all I have now to do: Those Monarchies are two, Abso∣lute, and Mixt; for the first kind, all that we have knowledge of, except the Empire of the Turks, differ so little from the ancient Monarchies of the Assyrians and Persians, that having given a short Description of them before, it will be needless to say any more of the Persian, the Mogull, the King of Pegu, China, Prestor-Iohn, or any other the great Men under those Princes, as the Satrapes of old; being made so only by their being

employed and put into great places and Governments by the Soveraign; But the Monarchy of the Grand Seignior is som∣thing different; they both agree in this, that the Prince is in both absolute Pro∣prietor of all the Lands, (excepting in the Kingdom of Egypt, of which I shall say somthing anon) but the diversity lies in the Administration of the Proper∣ty; the other Emperours as well Ancient as Modern using to manage the Reve∣nue of the several Towns, and Parishes, as our Kings, or the Kings of France do; that is, keep it in their hands, and Ad∣minister it by Officers: And so you may read that Xerxes King of Persia allowed the Revenue of so many Villages to The∣mistocles, which Assignations are practi∣sed at this day, both to publick and to private uses, by the present Monarchs. But the Turks, when they invaded the broken Empire of the Arabians, did not at first make any great alteration in their Policy, till the House of Ottoman the pre∣sent Royal Family did make great Con∣quests in Asia, and afterwards in Greece; whence they might possibly take their present way of dividing their conquered

Territories; for they took the same course which the Goths and other Modern People had used with their Conquered Lands in Europe, upon which they plant∣ed Military Colonies, by dividing them amongst the Souldiers for their pay or maintenance. These Shares were called by them Timarr's, which signifies Bene∣fices, but differ'd in this only from the European Knights-Fees, that these last O∣riginally were Hereditary, and so Pro∣perty was maintained, whereas amongst the Ottomans, they were meerly at will; and they enjoyed their shares whilst they remained the Sultan's Souldiers, and no longer; being turn'd out both of his Service, and of their Timarr's, when he pleases. This doubtless had been the best and firmest Monarchy in the World, if they could have stayed here, and not had a Mercinary Army besides, which have often (like the Praetorians in the time of the Roman Tyrants) made the Palace and the Serraglio the Shambles of their Prin∣ces; whereas if the Timariots, as well Spahis or Horse, as Foot, had been brought together to Guard the Prince by Courses (as they used to do King Da∣vid)

as well as they are to fight for the Empire; this horrid flaw and inconve∣nience in their Government had been wholly avoided. For though these are not planted upon entire Property as Da∣vid's were, (those being in the nature of Trained-Bands) yet the remoteness of their Habitations from the Court, and the Factions of the great City, and their desire to repair home, and to find all things quiet at their return, would have easily kept them from being in∣fected with that cursed Disease of Rebel∣lion against their Soveraign, upon whose favour they depend for the continuance of their livelihood: Whereas the Ianiza∣ries are for life, and are sure to be in the same Employment under the next Suc∣cessor; so sure, that no Grand Seignior can, or dares go about to Disband them, the suspicion of intending such a thing having caused the death of more than one of their Emperours. But I shall go to the limited Monarchies.

Doct.

But pray, before you do so, In∣form us something of the Roman Em∣perours: Had they the whole Domi∣nion or Property of the Lands of Italy?

Eng. Gent.

The Roman Emperours I reckon amongst the Tyrants, for so a∣mongst the Greeks were called those Ci∣tizens who usurpt the Governments of their Crmmonwealths, and maintain'd it by force, without endeavouring to Found or Establish it, by altering the Property of Lands, as not imagining that their Children could ever hold it after them, in which they were not deceived: So that it is plain that the Roman Empire was not a natural but a violent Govern∣ment. The reasons why it lasted longer than ordinarily Tyrannies do, are many; First, because Augustus the first Emperour kept up the Senate, and so for his time cajold them with this bait of Imaginary Power, which might not have sufficed neither to have kept him from the late of his Uncle, but that there had been so many Revolutions and bloody wars be∣tween, that all Mankind was glad to re∣pose and take breath for a while under any Government that could protect them. And he gain'd the service of these Senators the rather, because he suffered none to be so but those who had followed his Fortune in the several

Civil Wars, and so were engaged to sup∣port him for their own preservation; Besides, he confiscated all those who had at any time been proscribed, or si∣ded in any Encounter against him; which, considering in how few hands the Lands of Italy then were, might be an over-ballance of the Property in his hands. But this is certain, that what ever he had not in his own possession, he disposed of at his pleasure, taking it a∣way, as also the lives of his people, with∣out any judicial proceedings, when he pleased: That the Confiscations were great, we may see by his planting above sixty thousand Souldiers upon Lands in Lombardy; That is, erecting so many Beneficia, or Timarr's, and, if any Man's Lands lay in the way, he took them in for Neighbourhood, without any delin∣quency. Mantua vae miserae nimium vicina Cremonae. And it is very evident that if these Beneficia had not afterwards been made Hereditary, that Empire might have had a stabler Foundation, and so a more quiet and orderly progress than it after had; for the Court Guards, call'd the Praetorians, did make such havock of

their Princes, and change them so often, that this (though it may seem a Paradox) is another reason why this Tyranny was not ruin'd sooner; for the People, who had really an Interest to endeavour a change of Government, were so prevent∣ed by seeing the Prince, whom they de∣signed to supplant, removed to their hand, that they were puzled what to do, taking in the mean time great recreati∣on to see those wild Beasts hunted down themselves, who had so often prey'd up∣on their Lives and Estates; besides that, most commonly the frequent removes of their Masters, made them scarce have time to do any mischief to their poor op∣pressed Subjects in particular, though they were all Slaves in general. This Government of the later Romans is a clear Example of the truth and efficacy of these Politick Principles we have been discoursing of. First, that any Govern∣ment (be it the most unlimitted and ar∣bitrary Monarchy) that is placed upon a right Basis of Property, is better both for Prince and People, than to leave them a seeming Property, still at his devotion, and then for want of fixing the Founda∣tion,

expose their Lives to those dangers and hazzards with which so many Tu∣mults and Insurrections, which must necessarily happen, will threaten them daily: And in the next place, that any violent constraining of mankind to a sub∣jection, is not to be called a Govern∣ment, nor does salve either the Politick or Moral ends, which those eminent Le∣gislators amongst the Ancients proposed to themselves, when they set Rules to preserve the quiet and peace, as well as the plenty, prosperity, and greatness of the People; but that the Politicks or Art of Governing is a Science to be learned and studied by Counsellors and Statsemen be they never so great; or else Mankind will have a very sad condition under them, and they themselves a very per∣plexed and turbulent life, and proba∣bly a very destructive and precipitous end of it.

Doct.

I am very glad I gave occasion to make this Discourse: now I beseech you, before you go to the mixt Monar∣chies, not to forget Egypt.

Eng. Gent.

'Twas that I was coming to, before you were pleased to interro∣gate me concerning the Roman Empire. The Egyptians are this day, for ought I know, the only People that enjoy Pro∣perty, and are Governed as a Province by any of the Eastern absolute Princes. For whereas Damasco, Aleppo, and most of the other Cities and Provinces of that Empire, whose Territory is divided into Timarr's, are Governed by a Bashaw, who for his Guards has some small num∣ber of Janizaries or Souldiers; the Ba∣shaw of Egypt, or of Grand Cairo, has ever an Army with him; and divers Forts are erected, which is the way Eu∣ropean Princes use in Governing their Provinces, and must be so where Pro∣perty is left entire, except they plant Colonies as the Romans did. The reason why Selim, who broke the Empire of the Mamalukes, and conquered Egypt, did not plant Timarr's upon it, was the Laziness and Cowardliness of the People, and the great Fruitfulness of the Soil, and Deliciousness of the Country, which has mollifi'd and rendred effeminate all the Nations that ever did Inhabit it. So that

a resolution was taken to impose upon them, first the maintaining an Army by a Tax, and then to pay a full half of all the Fruits and product of their Lands (to the Grand Seignior) which they are to Cultivate and improve: This is well managed by the Bashaws and their Of∣ficers, and comes to an incredible sum; the goods being sold, the Money is con∣veyed in specie to the Port, and is the greatest part of that Prince's Revenue. And it is believed, that if all the Lands had been entirely confiscated, and that the Grand Seignior had managed them by his Officers, he would not have made a third part so much of the whole, as he receives now annually for one half: not only because those People are extream∣ly industrious where their own profit is concerned: but for that, it is clear, if they had been totally divested of their Estates, they would have left their Country, and made that which is now the most populous Kingdom of the World, a Desart, as is all the rest of the Turkish Dominions, except some Cities. And if the People had removed as they did elsewhere, there would not only

have wanted hands to have Cultivated and Improved the Lands, but mouths to consume the product of it; so that the Princes Revenue by the cheapness of Vi∣ctual, and the want of Labourers, would have almost fallen to nothing.

Noble Ven.

Pray God this be not the reason that this King of France leaves Property to his Subjects; for certainly he hath taken example by this Province of Egypt, his Subjects having a Tax (which for the continuance of it, I must call a Rent or Tribute) Impos'd upon them to the value of one full half of their Estates, which must ever increase as the Lands improve.

Eng. Gent.

I believe, Sir, there is ano∣ther reason; For the Property there, be∣ing in the Nobility and Gentry, which are the hands by which he manages his Force both at home and abroad, it would not have been easie or safe for him to take away their Estates. But I come to the limited Monarchies. They were first Introduced (as was said before) by the Goths, and other Northern People. Whence those great swarms came, as it was unknown to Procopius himself, who

liv'd in the time of their Invasion, and who was a diligent searcher into all the circumstances of their concernments, so it is very needless for us to make any enquiry into it, thus much being clear, That they came Man, Woman, and Child, and conquer'd and possest all these parts of the World, which were then subject to the Roman Empire, and since Christianity came in have been so to the Latin Church, till honest Iohn Calvin taught some of us the way how to deliver ourselves from the Tyrannical Yoak, which neither we nor our Forefathers were able to bear. Whence those Peo∣ple had the Government they Establisht in these parts after their Conquest, that is, whether they brought it from their own Country, or made it them∣selves, must needs be uncertain, since their Original is wholly so; but it seems very probable that they had some ex∣cellent persons among them, though the ignorance and want of learning in that Age hath not suffered any thing to remain that may give us any great light; for it is plain, that the Government they setled, was both according to the exact

Rules of the Politicks, and very natu∣ral and suitable to that Division they made of their several Territories. When∣ever then these Invaders had quieted a∣ny Province, and that the People were driven out or subdued, they divided the Lands, and to the Prince they gave usually a tenth part, or thereabouts▪ to the great Men, or Comites Regis (as it was translated into Latine) everyone (as near as they could) an equal share. These were to enjoy an Hereditary right in their Estates, as the King did in his part and in the Crown; but nei∣ther he, nor his Peers or Companions, were to have the absolute disposal of the Lands so allotted them, but were to keep a certain proportion to themselves for their use: and the rest was ordered to be divided amongst the Free-men, who came with them to Conquer. What they kept to themselves was called De∣mesnes in English and French, and in I∣talian, Beni Allodiali. The other part which they granted to the Free-men, was called a Feud: and all these Estates were held of these Lords Hereditarily, only the Tenants were to pay a small

Rent annually, and at every Death or Change an acknowledgment in Money, and in some Tenures the best Beast be∣sides: But the chief condition of the Feud or Grant, was, that the Tenant should perform certain Services to the Lord, of which one (in all Tenures of Free-men) was to follow him Armed to the Wars for the Service of the Prince and Defence of the Land. And upon their admittance to their Feuds, they take an Oath to be true Vassals and Tenants to their Lords, and to pay their Rents, and perform their Services, and upon failure to forfeit their Estates; and these Tenants were divided according to their Habitations into several Mannors, in every one of which there was a Court kept twice every year, where they all were to appear, and to be admitted to their several Estates, and to take the Oath above mentioned. All these Peers did likewise hold all their Demesnes, as also all their Mannors, of the Prince; to whom they swore Allegiance and Fealty: There were besides these Free∣men or Francklins, other Tenants to every Lord, who were called Villains,

who were to perform all servile Offices and their Estates were all at the L•••••••• disposal when he pleased; these consist∣ed mostly of such of the former Inha∣bitants of these Countries, as were not either destroyed or driven out, and pos∣sibly of others who were Servants a∣mongst them, before they came from their own Countries. Perhaps thus much might have been unnecessary to be said, considering that these Lords, Tenants, and Courts, are yet extant in all the Kingdoms in Europe; but that to a Gentleman of Venice, where there are none of these things, and where the Goths never were, something may be said in excuse for me.

Noble Ven.

'Tis true, Sir, we fled from the Goths betimes, but yet in those Countries which we recovered since in Terra firma, we found the Footsteps of these Lords, and Tenures, and their Ti∣tles of Counts; though being now Pro∣vinces to us, they have no influence upon the Government, as I suppose you are about to prove they have in th••se parts.

Eng. Gent.

You are right, Sir; for the Governments of France, Spain, England, and all other Countries where these Peo∣ple setled, were fram'd accordingly. It is not my business to describe particular∣ly the distinct Forms of the several Go∣vernments in Europe, which do derive from these People (for they may differ in some of their Orders and Laws, though the Foundation be in them all the same) this would be unnecessary, they being all extant, and so well known; and be∣sides, little to my purpose, excepting to shew where they have declined from their first Institution, and admitted of some change. France, and Poland, have not, nor as I can learn, ever had any Free-men below the Nobility; that is, had no Yeomen; but all are either No∣ble, or Villains, therefore the Lands must have been Originally given, as they now remain, into the hands of these Nobles. But I will come to the Administration of the Government in these Countries, and first say wherein they all agree, or did at least in their Institution, which is, That the Sove∣raign power is in the States assembled

together by the Prince, in which he pre∣sides; these make Laws, Levy Money, Redress Grievances, punish great Offi∣cers, and the like. These States consist in some places of the Prince and Nobi∣lity onely, as in Poland, and anciently in France (before certain Towns, for the encouraging of Trade, procured Privi∣ledges to send Deputies; which Depu∣ties are now called the third Estate) and in others, consist of the Nobility and Commonalty, which latter had and still have the same right to Intervene and Vote, as the great ones have both in Eng∣land, Spain, and other Kingdomes.

Doct.

But you say nothing of the Clergy; I see you are no great friend to them, to leave them out of your Poli∣ticks.

Eng. Gent.

The truth is, Doctor, I could wish there had never been any: the purity of Christian Religion, as also the good and orderly Government of the World, had been much better provided for without them, as it was in the Aposto∣lical time, when we heard nothing of Clergy. But my omitting their Rever∣end Lordships was no neglect, for I meant

to come to them in order; for you know that the Northern People did not bring Christianity into these parts, but found it here, and were in time converted to it, so that there could be no Clergy at the first: but if I had said nothing at all of this Race, yet I had committed no Solecism in the Politicks; for the Bishops and great Abbots intervened in the States here, upon the same Foundā∣tion that the other Peers do, viz. for their great possessions, and the depen∣dence their Tenants and Vassals have up∣on them; although they being a People of that great sanctity and knowledg, scorn to intermix so much as Titles with us profane Lay-Ideots, and therefore will be called Lords Spiritual. But you will have a very venerable opinion of them, if you do but consider how they came by these great possessions, which made them claim a third part of the Govern∣ment. And truely not unjustly by my rule, for I believe they had no less (at one time) than a third part of the Lands in most of these Countries.

Noble Ven. Pray, how did they acquire these Lands? was it not here by the Cha∣ritable

donation of pious Christians, as it was elsewhere?

Eng. Gent.

Yes, certainly, very pious men; some of them might be well mean∣ing people, but still such as were cheat∣ed by these holy men, who told them perpetually, both in publick and private, that they represented God upon Earth, being Ordained by Authority from him who was his Viceroy here, and that what was given to them was given to God, and he would repay it largely both in this World and the next. This wheedle made our barbarous Ancestors, newly Instructed in the Christian Faith (if this Religion may be called so, and sucking in this foolish Doctrine more than the Doctrine of Christ) so zealous to these Vipers, that they would have pluckt out their eyes to serve them, much more bestow, as they did, the fruitfullest and best situate of their possessions upon them: Nay, some they perswaded to take upon them their Callings, vow Chastity, and give all they had to them, and become one of them, amongst whom, I believe, they found no more sanctity than they left in the World. But this

is nothing to another trick they had, which was to insinuate into the most notorious and execrable Villains, with which that Age abounded; Men, who being Princes, and other great Men (for such were the Tools they work'd with) had treacherously poisoned, or other∣wise murdered their nearest Relations, Fathers, Brothers, Wives, to reign, or enjoy their Estates; These they did per∣swade into a belief, that if they had a desire to be sav'd, notwithstanding their execrable Villanies, they need but part with some of those great possessions (which they had acquired by those acts) to their Bishopricks or Monasteries, and they would pray for their Souls, and they were so holy and acceptable to God, that he would deny them nothing; which they immediately performed, so great was the ignorance and blindness of that Age; and you shall hardly find in the story of those times, any great Monastery, Abbey, or other Religious House in any of these Countries (I speak confidently, as to what concerns our own Saxons) that had not its Founda∣tion from some such Original.

Doct.

A worthy beginning of a wor∣thy Race!

Noble Ven.

Sir, you maintain a strange Position here, That it had been better there had been no Clergy: Would you have had no Gospel preached, no Sacra∣ments, no continuance of Christian Reli∣gion in the World? or do you think that these things could have been without a Succession of the true Priesthood, or (as you call it, of true Ministry) by means of Or∣dination? do's not your own Church hold the same?

Eng. Gent.

You will know more of my Church, when I have told you what I find the word Church to signifie in Scripture, which is to me the only rule of Faith, Worship, and Manners; neither do I seek these aditional helps, of Fathers, Councels, or Ecclesiastical history, much less Tradition: for since it is said in the word of God itself, That Antichrist did begin to work even in those days; I can easily believe that he had brought his Work to some perfection, before the word Church was by him applied to the Clergy: I shall therefore tell you what I conceive that Church, Clergy, and Ordi∣nation,

signified in the Apostolical times. I find then the word Church in the New Testament taken but in two sences; the first, for the Vniversal Invisible Church, called sometimes of the First-born; that is, the whole number of the true Fol∣lowers of Christ in the World, where∣ever resident, or into what part soever dispersed. The other signification of Church is an Assembly, which though it be sometimes used to express any Meet∣ings (even unlawful & tumultuous ones) as well in Scripture as prophane Au∣thors; yet it is more frequently under∣stood, for a gathering together to the Duties of Prayer, Preaching, and Break∣ing of Bread; and the whole Number so Congregated is, both in the Acts of the Apostles, and in their holy Epistles, called the Church; nor is there the least colour for appropriating that word to the Pastors and Deacons, who since the Corruptions of Christian Religion are call∣ed Clergy; which word in the Old Test∣ament is used, sometimes for Gods whole People, and sometimes for the Tribe of Levi, out of which the Priests were chosen: for the word signifies a Lot; so ••••

Dispencer of the Christian Faith. And I cannot sufficiently admire why our Clergy, who very justly refuse to believe the Miracle which is pretended to be wrought in Transubstantiation, because they see both the Wafer and the Wine to have the same Substance, and the same Accidents (after the Priest has mumbled words over those Elements) as they had before, and yet will believe that the same kind of Spell or Charm in Ordinati∣on can have the Efficacy to Metamor∣phose a poor Lay-Ideot into a Heavenly Creature; notwithstanding that we find in them the same humane Nature, and the same Necessities of it, to which they were subject before such Transformation; nay, the same Debauch, Profanness, Igno∣rance, and Disability to preach the Gospel.

Noble Ven.

Sir, this discourse is very new to me. I must confess I am much inclined to joyn with you in believing, that the power Priests Exercise over Mankind, with the Iurisdiction they pre∣tend to over Princes and States, may be a usurpation; but that they should not have a Divine Call to serve at the Altar, or that any person can pretend to per∣form

those Sacred Functions without be∣ing duly Ordained, seems very strange.

Eng. Gent.

I am not now to discourse of Religion; it is never very civil to do so in Conversation of persons of a diffe∣rent belief; neither can it be of any be∣nefit towards a Roman Catholick, for if his Conscience should be never so cleer∣ly convinc'd, he is not yet Master of his own Faith, having given it up to his Church, of whom he must ask leave to be a Convert, which he will be sure never to obtain; But if you have the Curiosity when you come amongst the learned in your own Country (for amongst our Or∣dination-Mongers, there is a great scarcity of Letters and other good Parts) you may please to take the Bible, which you acknowledg to be the Word of God as well as we, and intreat some of them to shew you any passage, the plain and ge∣nuine sense of which can any way evince this Succession, this Ordination, or this Priesthood, we are now speaking of; and when you have done, if you will let your own excellent Reason and Discourse judg, and not your Priest, (who is too much concerned in point of Interest) I make

no doubt but you will be convinced that the pretence to the dispensing of Divine things by virtue of a humane Constitution, and so ridiculous a one too, as the Ordi∣nation practised by your Bishops and ours (who descend and succeed from one and the same Mother) is as little Justifiable by Scripture and Reason, and full as great a Cheat and Vsurpation, as the Empire which the Ecclesiasticks pretend to over the Consciences and persons of men, and the Exemption from all Secular power.

Noble Ven.

Well, Sir, though neither my Faith nor my Reason can come up to what you hold, yet the Novelty and the grace of this Argument has delighted me extreamly: and if that be a Sin, as I fear it is, I must confess it to my Priest; but I ask your pardon first, for putting you upon this long Deviation.

Eng. Gent.

Well, this Digression is not without its use, for it will shorten our business (which is grown longer than I thought it would have been) for I shall mention the Clergy no more, but when-ever I speak of Peerage, pray take notice that I mean both Lords Spi∣ritual and Temporal, since they stand

both upon the same foot of Property. But if you please, I will fall immediate∣ly to discourse of the Government of England, and say no more of those of our Neighbours, than what will fall in by the way, or be hinted to me by your De∣mands; for the time runs away, and I know the Doctor must be at home by noon, where he gives daily charitable audience to an Infinity of poor people, who have need of his help, and who send or come for it, not having the con∣fidence to send for him, since they have nothing to give him; though he be very liberal too of his Visits to such, where he has any knowledg of them: But I spare his Modesty, which I see is con∣cerned at the Just Testimony I bear to his Charity. The Soveraign Power of England then, is in King, Lords, and Commons. The Parliaments, as they are now constituted, that is, the assign∣ing a choice to such a Number of Bur∣roughs, as also the manner and form of Elections and Returns, did come in, as I suppose, in the time of Henry the third, where now our Statute-Book begins; and I must confess, I was inclined to

believe, that before that time, our Yeo∣manry or commonalty had not formally assembled in Parliament, but been vir∣tually included, and represented by the Peers, upon whom they depended: but I am fully convinced, that it was otherwise, by the learned Discourses late∣ly publisht by Mr. Petit of the Temple, and Mr. Attwood of grays-Inne, being Gentlemen whom I do mention hono∣ris causa; and really they deserve to be honor'd, that they will spare some time from the Mechanical part of their Cal∣lings (which is to assist Clients with Counsel, and to plead their Causes, and which I acknowledg likewise to be honourable) to study the true Interest of their Country, and to show how an∣cient the Rights of the People in England are, and that in a time when neither Profit nor Countenance can be hop'd for from so ingenious an undertaking. But I beg pardon for the deviation. Of the three branches of Soveraign Power which Politicians mention, which are Enacting Laws, Levying of Taxes, and making War and Peace, the two first of them are indisputably in the Parliament;

and when I say Parliament, I ever in∣tend with the King. The last has been usually exercis'd by the Prince, if he can do it with his own Money: yet' because even in that Case it may be ruinous to the Kingdom, by exposing it to an In∣vasion, many have affirmed that such a Power cannot be by the true and anci∣ent free Government of England, sup∣posed to be Intrusted in the hands of one man: And therefore we see in di∣vers Kings Reigns, the Parliament has been Consulted, and their advice ta∣ken in those matters that have either concerned War or Leagues; And that if it has been omitted, Addresses have been made to the king by Parliaments, either to make war or peace, according to what they thought profitable to the publick. So that I will not determine whether that power which draws such conse∣quences after it, be by the genuine sence of our Laws in the Prince or no; although I know of no Statute or writ∣ten Record which makes it otherwise. That which is undoubtedly the Kings Right, or prerogative, is to Call and Dis∣solve Parliaments, to preside in them, to

approve of all Acts made by them, and to put in Execution, as Supream or So∣veraign Magistrate, in the Intervals of Parliaments, and during their Sitting, all Laws made by them, as also the Com∣mon Law; for which Cause he has the nomination of all Inferiour Officers and Ministers under him, excepting such as by Law or Charter are eligible other∣wise; and the Power of the Sword, to force Obedience to the Judgements given both in Criminal and Civil Causes.

Doct.

Sir, You have made us a very absolute Prince; what have we left us? if the King have all this Power, what do our Liberties or Rights signifie when∣ever he pleases?

Eng. Gent.

This Objection, Doctor, makes good what I said before, that your skill did not terminate in the bo∣dy natural, but extend to the Politick; for a more pertinent Interrogatory could never have been made by Plato or A∣ristotle: In answer to which, you may please to understand, That when these Constitutions were first made, our An∣cestors were a plain-hearted, well-mean∣ing People, without Court-reserves or

tricks, who having made choice of this sort of Government, and having Power enough in their hands to make it take place, did not foresee, or imagine, that any thoughts of Invading their Rights could enter into the Princes Head; nor do I read that it ever did, till the Norman Line came to Reign; which coming in by Treaty, it was obvious there was no Conquest made upon any but Ha∣rold, in whose stead William the First came, and would claim no more after his Victory, than what Harold enjoy'd, ex∣cepting that he might confiscate (as he did) those great men who took part with the wrong Title, and French-men were put into their Estates; which though it made in this Kingdom a mixture be∣tween Normans and Saxons, yet produ∣ced no Change or Innovation in the Go∣vernment; the Norman Peers ••••ing as tenacious of their Liberties, and as active in the recovery of them to the full, as the Saxon Families were. Soon after the death of William, and possibly in his time, there began some Invasions upon the Rights of the Kingdom, 〈…〉〈…〉gat Grievances, and afterwards〈…〉〈…〉

plants and Discontents, which grew to that height, that the Peers were fain to use their Power, that is, Arm their Vassals to defend the Government; whilest the Princes of that Age, first King Iohn, and then Henry the Third, got Force together. The Barons call'd in Lewis the Dauphin, whilst the King would have given away the Kingdom to the Sarazens, as he did to the Pope, and armed their own Creatures; so that a bloody War ensued, for almost forty years, off and on; as may be read in our History: The success was, that the Barons or Peers obtained in the close two Charters or Laws for the ascertain∣ing their Rights, by which neither their Lives, Liberties, or Estates, could ever be in danger any more from any Arbi∣trary Power in the Prince; and so the good Government of England, which was before this time like the Law of Nature, onely written in the hearts of Men, came to be exprest in Parchment, and remain a Record in Writing; though these Charters gave us no more than what was our own before. After these Charters were made, there could not

chuse but happen some encroachment upon them: but so long as the Peers kept their greatness, there was no brea∣ches but what were immediately made up in Parliament; which when-ever they assembled, did in the first place con∣firm the Charters, and made very often Interpretations upon them, for the be∣nefit of the People; witness the Statute de Tallagio non concedendo, and many others. But to come nearer the giving the Doctor an answer, you may please to understand, that not long after the framing of these forementioned Char∣ters, there did arise a Grievance not foreseen or provided for by them; and it was such an one that had beaten down the Government at once, if it had not been Redressed in an Orderly way. This was the Intermission of Par∣liaments, which could not be called but by the Prince; and he not doing of it, they ceast to be Assembled for some years: if this had not been speedily re∣medied, the Barons must have put on their Armour again; for who can Ima∣gine that such brisk Assertors of their Rights could have acquiesced in an O∣mission

that ruin'd the Foundation of the Government, which consisting of King, Lords, and Commons, and having at that time Marched near Five hundred years upon three Leggs, must then have gone on hopping upon one; which could it have gone forward (as was impossible whilest Property conti∣nued where it was) yet would have rid but a little way. Nor can it be won∣der'd at, that our great Men made no provision against this Grievance in their Charters, because it was impossible for them to imagine that their Prince, who had so good a share in this Government, should go about to destroy it, and to take that burden upon himself, which by our Constitution was undeniably to be divided between him and his Subjects: And therefore divers of the great Men of those times speaking with that ex∣cellent Prince King Edward the First a∣bout it, he, to take away from his Peo∣ple all fear and apprehension that he in∣tended to change the Ancient Govern∣ment, called speedily a Parliament, and in it consented to a Declaration of the Kingdoms Right in that point; with∣out

the clearing of which, all our other Laws had been useless, and the Govern∣ment itself too; of which the Parlia∣ment is (at the least) as Essential a part as the Prince; so that there passed a Law in that Parliament that one should be held every year, and oftner if need be; which like another Magna Charta, was confirmed by a new Act made in the time of Edward the Third, that glorious Prince: nor were there any Sycophants in those days, who durst pretend Loy∣alty by using Arguments to prove that it was against the Royal Prerogative, for the Parliament to entrench upon the Kings Right of calling and Dissolving of Parliaments; as if there were a Pre∣rogative in the Crown, to chuse whe∣ther ever a Parliament should assemble, or no; I would desire no more, if I were a Prince, to make me Grand Seigni∣or. Soon after this last Act, the King, by reason of his Wars with France and Scotland, and other great Affairs, was forced sometimes to end his Parliaments abruptly, and leave business undone, (and this not out of Court-tricks, which were then unknown) which produced

another Act not long after, by which it was provided, That no Parliament should be dismist, till all the Petitions were answered; That is, in the Lan∣guage of those times, till all the Bills (which were then styled Petitions) were finished.

Doct.

Pray, Sir, give me a little ac∣count of this last Act you speak of; for I have heard in Discourse from many Lawyers, that they believe there is no such.

Eng. Gen.

Truly, Sir, I shall con∣fess to you, that I do not find this Law in any of our Printed Statute-Books; but that which first gave me the know∣ledg of it was, what was said about three years ago in the House of Com∣mons, by a worthy and Learned Gen∣tleman, who undertook to produce the Record in the Reign of Richard the Se∣cond; and since I have questioned many Learned Counsellors about it, who tell me there is such a one; and one of them, who is counted a Prerogative-Lawyer, said it was so, but that Act was made in Factious times. Besides, I think it will be granted, that for some time after,

and particularly in the Reigns of Henry the 4th, Henry the 5th, and Henry the 6th, it was usual for a Proclamation to be made in Westminster-Hall, before the end of every Session, that all those that had any matter to present to the Parliament, should bring it in before such a day, for otherwise the Parlia∣ment at that day should determine. But if there were nothing at all of this, nor any Record extant concerning it; yet I must believe that it is so by the Fundamental Law of this Government, which must be lame and imperfect with∣out it; for it is all one to have no Par∣liaments at all but when the Prince pleases, and to allow a power in him to dismiss them when he will, that is, when they refuse to do what he will; so that if there be no Statute, it is cer∣tainly because our wise Ancestors thought there needed none, but that by the very Essence and Constitution of the Govern∣ment it is provided for: and this we may call (if you had rather have it so) the Common-Law, which is of as much va∣lue (if not more) than any Statute, and of which all our good Acts of Parliament

and Magna Charta itself is but Declara∣tory; so that your Objection is suffici∣ently aswered in this, That though the King is intrusted with the formal part of summoning and pronouncing the Dissolution of Parliaments, which is done by his Writ, yet the Laws (which oblige him as well as us) have deter∣min'd how and when he shall do it; which is enough to shew, that the Kings share in the Soveraignty, that is, in the Parliament, is cut out to him by the Law, and not left at his disposal. Now I come to the Kings part in the Intervals of Parliament.

Noble Ven.

Sir, before you do so, pray tell us what other Prerogatives the King enjoys in the Government; for o∣therwise, I who am a Venetian, may be apt to think that our Doge, who is call'd our Prince, may have as much Power as yours.

Eng. Gent.

I am in a fine condition amongst you with my Politicks: the Do∣ctor tells me I have made the King Ab∣solute, and now you tell me I have made him a Doge of Venice; But when your Prince has Power to dispose of the Pub∣lick

Revenue, to name all Officers Eccle∣siastical and Civil that are of trust and profit in the Kingdom, and to dispose absolutely of the whole Militia by Sea and Land, then we will allow him to be like ours, who has all these Powers.

Doct.

Well, you puzzle me extreamly: for when you had asserted the King's Power to the heighth, in Calling and Dissolving Parliaments, you gave me such satisfaction, and shewed me where∣in the Law had provided, that this vast Prerogative could not hurt the People, that I was fully satisfied, and had not a word to say; Now you come about again, and place in the Crown such a Power, which in my Judgment is incon∣sistent with our Liberty.

Eng. Gent.

Sir, I suppose you mean chiefly the Power of the Militia, which was, I must confess, doubtful, before a late Statute declar'd it to be in the King: For our Government hath made no o∣ther disposal of the Militia than what was natural, viz. That the Peers in their several Counties, or Jurisdictions, had the Power of calling together their Vassals, either armed for the Wars, or

onely so as to cause the Law to be e••••∣cuted by serving Writs; and in case of resistance, giving possession: which Lords amongst their own Tenants did then perform the two several Offices of Lord-Lieutenant, and Sheriff; which latter was but the Earls Deputy, as by his Ti∣tle of Vice-Comes do's appear. But this latter being of daily necessity, and Justice itself, that is, the Lives, Liberties and Estates of all the People in that County depending upon it, when the greatness of the Peers decay'd (of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter) the Electing of Sheriff was referred to the County-Court, where it continued till it was placed where it now is by a Sta∣tute. For the other part of the Militia, which is, the Arming the People for War, it was de facto exercised by Com∣mission from the King, to a Lord-Lieute∣nant (as an image of the Natural Lord) and other Deputies; and it was tacitely consented to, though it were never set∣led by Statute (as I said before) till His Majesties happy Restauration. But to answer you, I shall say, That whatever Powers are in the Crown, whether by

Statute or by old Prescription, they are, and must be understood to be intrusted in the Prince, for the preservation of the Government, and for the safety and interest of the People; and when either the Militia, which is given him for the execution and support of the Law, shall be imploy'd by him to subvert it (as in the case of Ship-Money it was) or the Treasure shall be mis-apply'd, and made the Revenue of Courtiers and Syco∣phants (as in the time of Edward the Se∣cond) or worthless or wicked People shall be put into the greatest places, as in the reign of Richard the Second; In this case, though the Prince here cannot be que∣stionable for it (as the Kings were in Sparta, and your Doges I believe would be) yet it is a great violation of the trust reposed in him by the Government, and a making that Power, which is given him by Law, unlawful in the Executi∣on. And the frequent examples of Ju∣stice inflicted in Parliament upon the King's Ministers for abusing the Royal Power, shews plainly that such autho∣rity is not left in his hands to use as he pleases. Nay, there have be fallen fact

troubles and dangers to some of th••se Princes themselves, who have abused their Power to the prejudice of the Sub∣jects; which although they are no way justifiable, yet may serve for an In∣struction to Princes, and an example not to hearken to ruinous Councils: for men when they are enraged do not always consider Justice of Religion, pas∣sion being as natural to man as reason and vertue, which was the Opinion of divine Machiavil. To answer you then, I say, That though we do allow such Powers in the King, yet since they are given him for edification and not de∣struction, and cannot be abused without great danger to his Ministers, and even to himself; we may hope that they can never be abused but in a broken Govern∣ment: And if ours be so (as we shall see anon) the fault of the ill execution of our Laws is not to be imputed either to the Prince or his Ministers; except∣ing that the latter may be, as we said before, justly punishable for not ad∣vising the Prince to consent to them end∣ing the frame; of which we shall talk more hereafter: but in the mean time I

will come to the Kings other Preroga∣tives, as having all Royal Mines, the being serv'd first before other Creditors where mony is due to him, and to have a speedier and easier way than his Subjects to recover his debts and his Rents, &c. But to say all in one word, when there arises any doubt whether any thing be the king's Prerogative or no, this is the way of deciding it, viz. To consider whether it be for the good and protection of the people that the King have such a Power; For the defi∣nition of Prerogative is a considerable part of the Common Law, by which Power is put into the Prince for the pre∣servation of his People. And if it be not for the good of his Subjects, it is not Pre∣rogative, not Law, for our Prince has no Authority of his own, but what was first intrusted in him by the Govern∣ment, of which he is Head; nor is it to be imagined that they would give him more Power than what was necessary to Govern them. For example, the power of pardoning Criminals condemned, is of such use to the Lives and Estates of the People, that without it many would be

exposed to die unjustly; As lately a poor Gentleman, who by means of the Harangue of a Strepitous Lawyer was found guilty of Murder, for a Man he never kil'd; or if he had, the fact had been but Man-slaughter; and he had been inevitably murdered himself, if his Majesty had not been graciously pleased to extend his Royal Mercy to him; As he did likewise vouchsafe to do to a Gen∣tleman convicted for speaking words he never utter'd; or if he had spoken them, they were but foolishly, not ma∣litiously spoken. On the other side, if a Controversie should arise, as it did in the beginning of the last Parliament, be∣tween the House of Commons, and the Prerogative-Lawyers, about the choice of their Speaker, these latter having in∣terested his Majesty in the Contest, and made him, by consequence, disoblige, in limine, a very Loyal, and a very Worthy Parliament; and for what? for a Que∣stion, which if you will decide it the right way, will be none: for setting aside the Presidents, and the History when the Crown first pretended to any share in the Choice of a Speaker, which Ar∣gument

was very well handled by some of the Learned Patriots then, I would have leave to ask, what man can shew, and what reason can be alledged, why the protection and welfare of the People should require that a Prerogative should be in the Prince to chuse the Mouth of the House of Commons, when there is no particular person in his whole Domi∣nion that would not think it against his interest, if the Government had given the King Power to nominate his Bayliff, his Attorney, or his Referree in any Ar∣bitration? Certainly there can be no ad∣vantage either to the Soveraign or his Subjects, that the person whose Office it is to put their deliberations into fitting words, and express all their requests to his Majesty, should not be entirely in their own Election and appointment; which there is the more reason for too, because the Speakers for ma∣ny years past have received Instru∣ctions from the Court, and have bro∣ken the Priviledges of the House, by revealing their Debates, Adjourning them without a Vote, and committed many other Misdemeanours, by which

they have begotten an ill understand∣ing between the King and his House of Commons, to the infinite prejudice both of his Majesties Affairs, and his People. Since I have given this rule to Judge Prerogative by, I shall say no more of it; for as to what concerns the King's Office in the Intervals of Parliament, it is wholly Ministerial, and is barely to put in Execution the Common Law and the Statutes made by the Soveraign Power, that is, by Himself and the Par∣liament, without varying one tittle, or suspending, abrogating, or neglecting the Execution of any Act whatsoever; and to this he is Solemnly Sworn at his Coronation: And all his Power in this behalf is in him by Common Law, which is Reason itself, written as well in the hearts of rational Men, as in the Law∣yers Books.

Noble Ven.

Sir, I have heard much talk of the Kings Negative Voice in Parliaments, which in my Opinion is as much as a Power to frustrate, when he pleases, all the endeavours and labours of his People, and to prevent any good that might accrue to the Kingdom by

having the right to meet in Parliament: for certainly, if we in Venice had placed any such Prerogative in our Duke, or in any of our Magistracies, we could not call ourselves a free People.

Eng. Gent.

Sir, I can answer you as I did before, that if our Kings have such a Power, it ought to be used accord∣ing to the true and genuine intent of the Government, that is, for the Preserva∣tion and Interest of the people, and not for the disappointing the Counsels of a Parliament, towards reforming Grievances, and making provision for the future execution of the Lawes; and whenever it is applyed to frustrate those ends, it is a violation of Right, and in∣fringement of the King's Coronation-Oath; in which there is this Clause, That he shall Confirmare consuetudines, (which in the Latine of those times is leges) quas vulgus elegerit. I know some Criticks, who are rather Grammarians than Law∣yers, have made a distinction between elegerim and elegero, and will have it, That the King Swears to such Laws as the people shall have chosen, and not to those they shall chuse. But in my O∣pinion,

if that Clause had been intend∣ed onely to oblige the King to execute the Laws made already, it might have been better exprest by servare consuetu∣dines, than by confirmare consuetudines; besides that he is by another clause in the same Oath sworn to execute all the Laws. But I shall leave this Controversie unde∣cided; those who have a desire to see more of it, may look into those quar∣relling Declarations, pro and con, about this matter, which preceded our unhap∣py Civil Wars. This is certain, that there are not to be found any Statutes that have passed, without being present∣ed to his Majesty, or to some commission∣ed by him; but whether such Addresses were intended for Respect and Honour to His Majesty, as the Speaker of the House of Commons and the Lord May∣or of London are brought to him, I leave to the Learned to Discourse; onely thus much we may affirm, That there never were yet any Parliamentary Requests, which did highly concern the Publick, presented to any King, and by him re∣fused, but such denials did produce very dismal effects, as may be seen in our Hi∣stories

ancient and late; it being certain, that both the Barons Wars, and our last dismal Combustions, proceeded from no other cause than the denial of the Prin∣ces then reigning to consent to the de∣sires of the States of the Kingdom: and such hath been the wisdom and goodness of our present gracious Prince, that in twenty years and somewhat more, for which time we have enjoy'd him since his happy Restauration, he hath not ex∣ercis'd his Negative Voice towards more than one publick Bill; and that too, was to have continued in force (if it had pas∣sed into an Act) but for six Weeks, be∣ing for raising the Militia for so long time; and as for the private Bills, which are matters of meer grace, it is unrea∣sonable his Majesty should be refused that Right that every Englishman enjoys, which is not to be obliged to dispence his favours but where he pleases. But for this point of the Negative Vote, it is possible that when we come to Dis∣course of the Cure of our Political Di∣stemper, some of you will propose the clearing and explanation of this matter, and of all others which may concern the

King's Power and the Peoples Rights.

Noble Ven.

But pray, Sir, have not the House of Peers a Negative Voice in all Bills? how come they not to be obli∣ged to use it for the Publick Good?

Eng. Gent

So they are, no doubt, and the Commons too; but there is a vast difference between a deliberative Vote which the Peers have with their Negative, and that in the Crown to blast all without deliberating. The Peers are Co-ordinate with the Commons in pre∣senting and hammering of Laws, and may send Bills down to them, as well as receive any from them, excepting in matters wherein the People are to be Taxed: and in this our Government imitates the best and most perfect Com∣monwealths that ever were; where the Senate assisted in the making of Laws, and by their wisdom and dexterity, po∣lisht, fil'd, and made ready things for the more populous Assemblies; and some∣times by their gravity and moderation, reduced the People to a Calmer State, and by their authority and credit stem'd the Tide, and made the Waters quiet, giving the People time to come to them∣selves.

And therefore if we had no such Peerage now upon the old Constitution, yet we should be necessitated to make an artificial Peerage or Senate in stead of it: which may assure our present Lords, that though their Dependences and Power are gone, yet that we can∣not be without them; and that they have no need to fear an annihilation by our Reformation, as they suffered in the late mad times. But I shall speak a word of the peoples Rights, and then shew how this brave and excellent Go∣vernment of England came to decay.

The People by the Fundamental Laws, that is, by the Constitution of the Go∣vernment of England, have entire free∣dome in their Lives, Properties, and their Persons; nether of which can in the least suffer, but according to the Laws already made, or to be made here∣after in Parliament, and duly publisht: and to prevent any oppression that might happen in the execution of these good Laws, which are our Birth-right, all Tryals must be by twelve Men of our equals, and of our Neighbourhood; These in all Civil Causes judge absolute∣ly

and decide the matter of Fact, upon which the matter of Law depends; but if where matter of Law is in question, these twelve Men shall refuse to find a special Verdict at the direction of the Court, the Judge cannot Controul it, but their Verdict must be Recorded. But of these matters, as also of Demur∣rers, Writs of Errour, and Arrests of Judg∣ment, &c. I have discours'd to this Gen∣tleman (who is a Stranger) before now; neither do's the understanding of the Execution of our Municipal Laws at all belong to this discourse: Onely it is to be noted, that these Juries, or twelve Men, in all Trials or Causes which are Criminal, have absolute Power, both as to matter of Law and Fact (except the Par∣ty by Demurrer confess the matter of Fact, and take it out of their hands.) And the first question the Officer asks the Foreman, when they all come in to deliver their Verdict, is this, Is he Guilty in manner or form as he is Indicted, or not Guilty? which shews plainly, that they are to Examine and Judge, as well whether, and how far the Fact commit∣ted is Criminal, as whether the person

charged hath committed that Fact. But though by the Corruption of these times (the infallible consequences of a broken frame of Government) this Office of the Juries and Right of Englishmen have been of late question'd, yet it hath been strong∣ly and effectually vindicated by a learned Author of late, to whom I refer you for more of this matter. I shall say no more of the Rights of the People, but this one thing, That neither the King, nor any by Authority from him, hath any the least Power or Jurisdiction over any Englishman, but what the Law gives them; and that although all Commissi∣ons and Writs go out in the King's name, yet his Majesty hath no right to Issue out any Writ (with advice of his Coun∣cil, or otherwise) excepting what come out of his Courts; nor to alter any Clause in a Writ, or add anything to it. And if any person shall be so wicked as to do any Injustice to the Life, Liber∣ty, or Estate of any Englishman, by any private command of the Prince, the person agrieved, or his next of kin (if he be assassinated) shall have the same remedy against the Offender, as he

ought to have had by the good Laws of this Land, if there had been no such Command given; which would be ab∣solutely void and null, and understood not to proceed from that Royal and lawful Power which is vested in his Ma∣jesty for the Execution of Justice, and the protection of his People.

Doct.

Now I see you have done with all the Government of England; pray before you proceed to the decay of it, let me ask you what you think of the Chancery, whether you do not be∣lieve it a Solecism in the Politicks to have such a Court amongst a free People; what good will Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, or St. Edwards Laws do us to defend our Property, if it must be entirely subjected to the ar∣bitrary disposal of one man, whenever any impertinent or petulant person shall put in a Bill against you? How in∣consistent is this Tribunal with all that hath been said in defence of our rights, or can be said? Suppose the Prince should in time to come so little respect his own honour and the Interest of his People, as to place a covetous or revengeful person

in that great Judicatory, what remedy have we against the Corruption of Regi∣sters, who make what Orders they please; Or against the whole Hierarchy of Knavish Clerks, whilst not only the punishing and reforming misdemeanours depend upon him, who may without controul be the most guilty himself, but that all the Laws of England stand there arraigned before him, and may be con∣demned when he pleases? Is there, or ever was there any such Tribunal in the World before, in any Countrey?

Eng. Gent.

Doctor, I find you have had a Suit in Chancery, but I do not intend to contradict or blame your Or∣thodox Zeal in this point: This Court is one of those Buildings that cannot be repaired, but must be demolished. I could inform you how excellently mat∣ters of Equity are Administred in other Countries; And this worthy Gentleman could tell you of the Venerable Quaran∣zia's in his City, where the Law as well as the Fact, is at the Bar, and subject to the Judges, and yet no complaint made or grievance suffered: but this is not a place for, it this is but the superstructure;

we must settle the foundation first; every thing else is as much out of Order as this. Trade is gone, Suits are endless, and nothing amongst us harmonious: but all will come right when our Government is mended, and never before, though our Judges were all Angels: this is the pri∣mum quaerite; when you have this, all o∣ther things shall be added unto you; when that is done, neither the Chance∣ry (which is grown up to this since our Ancestors time) nor the Spiritual Courts, nor the Cheats in trade, nor any other abuses, no not the Gyant Popery itself, shall ever be able to stand before a Par∣liament, no more than one of us can live like a Salamander in the fire.

Noble Ven.

Therefore, Sir, pray let us come now to the decay of your Go∣vernment, that we may come the sooner to the happy restauration.

Eng. Gent.

This harmonious Govern∣ment of England being founded as has been said upon Property, it was impos∣sible it should be shaken, so long as Pro∣perty remain'd where it was placed: for if, when the ancient Owners the Bri∣tains fled into the Mountains, and left

their Lands to the Invaders (who divi∣ded them, as is above related) they had made an Agrarian Law to fix it; then our Government, and by consequence our Happiness had been for ought we know Immortal: for our Constitution, as it was really a mixture of the three, which are Monarchy, Aristocracy, and De∣mocracy (as has been said) so the weight and predominancy remain'd in the Opti∣macy, who possessed nine parts in ten of the Lands; And the Prince but about a tenth part. In this I count all the Peo∣ples share to the Peers, and therefore do not trouble myself to enquire what pro∣portion was allotted to them, for that al∣though they had an Hereditary right in their Lands, yet it was so clog'd with Tenures and Services, that they depend∣ed, as to publick matters, wholly on their Lords, who by them could serve the king in his Wars; and in time of Peace, by leading the people to what they pleased: Could keep the Royal Power within its due bounds, and also hinder and prevent the people from In∣vading the Rights of the Crown; so that they were the Bulwarks of the Govern∣ment;

which in effect was much more an Aristocracy, than either a Monarchy or Democracy: and in all Governments, where Property is mixt, the Administra∣tion is so too: And that part which hath the greater share in the Lands, will have it too in the Jurisdiction: And so in Com∣monwealths, the Senate or the People have more or less Power, as they have more or fewer possessions; as was most visible in Rome, where in the beginning, the Patricii could hardly bring the Peo∣ple to any thing; but afterwards, when the Asiatick Conquests had inricht the Nobility to that degree, that they were able to purchase a great part of the Lands in Italy, the People were all their Clients, and easily brought even to cut the throats of their Redeemers the Gracchi, who had carried a Law for restoring them their Lands. But enough of this be∣fore. I will not trouble myself nor you, to search into the particular causes of this change, which has been made in the pos∣sessions here in England; but it is visible that the fortieth part of the Lands which were at the beginning in the hands of the Peers and Church, is not there now; be∣sides

that not only all Villanage is long since abolished, but the other Tenures are so altered and qualified, that they sig∣nifie nothing towards making the Yeo∣manry depend upon the Lords. The consequence is, That the natural part of our Government, which is Power, is by means of Property in the hands of the People, whilest the artificial part, or the Parchment, in which the Form of Go∣vernment is written, remains the same. Now Art is a very good servant and help to Nature, but very weak and inconside∣rable, when she opposes her, and fights with her: it would be a very Impar con∣gressus, between Parchment and Power: This alone is the cause of all the disorder you heard of, and now see in England, and of which every man gives a reason according to his own fancy, whilest few hit the right cause: some impute all to the decay of Trade, others to the growth of Popery; which are both great Calamities, but they are Effects, and not Causes; And if in private Families there were the same causes, there would be the same effects. Suppose now you had five or six Thousand pounds a year, as it is

probable you have, and keep forty Ser∣vants, and at length, by your neglect, and the industry and thrift of your Do∣mesticks, you sell one Thousand to your Steward, another to your Clerk of the Kitchen, another to your Bayliff, till all were gone; can you believe that these Servants, when they had so good Estates of their own, and you nothing left to give them, would continue to live with you, and to do their service as before? It is just so with a whole Kingdom. In our Ancestors times, most of the Mem∣bers of our House of Commons thought it an honour to retain to some great Lord, and to wear his blew Coat: And when they had made up their Lord's Train, and waited upon him from his own House to the Lords House, and made a Lane for him to enter, and de∣parted to sit themselves in the Lower House of Parliament, as it was then (and very justly) called; can you think that any thing could pass in such a Parlia∣ment that was not ordered by the Lords? Besides, these Lords were the King's great Council in the Intervals of Parliaments, and were called to advise of Peace and

War; and the latter was seldom made without the consent of the major part; if it were not, they would not send their Tenants, which was all the Militia of England (besides the King's tenth part.) Can it be believed, that in those days the Commons should dislike any thing the Lords did in the Intervals, or that they would have disputed their Right to re∣ceive Appeals from Courts of Equity, if they had pretended to it in those days, or to mend Money-bills? And what is the reason, but because the Lords themselves at that time represented all their Tenants (that is, all the People) in some sort? and although the House of Commons did As∣semble to present their Grievances, yet all great Affairs of high Importance con∣cerning the Government, was Transact∣ed by the Lords; and the War which was made to preserve it, was called the Ba∣rons Wars, not the War of both Houses: for although in antienter times the word Baron were taken in a larger sense, and comprehended the Francklins or Free∣men; yet who reads any History of that War, shall not find that any mention is made of the concurrence of any assembly

of such men, but that Simon Monford Earl of Leicester, and others of the great ones, did by their Power and Interest manage that contest. Now if this Property, which is gone out of the Peerage into the Commons, had passed into the King's hands, as it did in Egypt in the time of Io∣seph, as was before said, the Prince had had a very easie and peaceable reign over his own Vassals, and might either have refu∣sed, justly, to have Assembled the Parlia∣ment any more; or if he had pleased to do it, might have for ever managed it as he thought fit: But our Princes have want∣ed a Ioseph, that is, a wise Councellor; and instead of saving their Revenue, which was very great, and their expences small, and buying in those Purchases which the vast expences and luxury of the Lords made ready for them, they have alienated their own Inheritance; so that now the Crown-Lands, that is, the publick Patri∣mony, is come to make up the interest of the Commons, whilest the King must have a precarious Revenue out of the Peoples Purses, and be beholding to the Parliament for his Bread in time of Peace; whereas the Kings their Predecessors ne∣ver

asked Aid of his Subjects, but in time of War and Invasion: and this a∣lone (though there were no other decay in the Government) is enough to make the King depend upon his People; which is no very good condition for a Monarchy.

Noble Ven.

But how comes it to pass that other Neighbouring Countries are in so settled a State in respect of England? does their Property remain the same it was, or is it come into the hands of the Prince? You know you were pleased to admit, that we should ask you, en passant, something of other Countries.

Eng. Gent.

Sir, I thank you for it, and shall endeavour to satisfie you. I shall say nothing of the small Princes of Ger∣many, who keep in a great measure their ancient bounds, both of Government and Property; and if their Princes now and then exceed their part, yet it is in time of Troubles and War, and things return into their right Chanel of Assem∣bling the several States, which are yet in being every where: But Germany ly∣ing so exposed to the Invasion of the Turks on the one side, and of the French on the other; and having ever had e∣nough

to do to defend their several Liber∣ties against the encroachments of the House of Austria (in which the Imperial dignity is become in some sort Heredita∣ry) if there had been something of ex∣traordinary power exercised of late years, I can say Inter arma silent leges: but be∣sides their own particular States, they have the Diet of the Empire, which ne∣ver fails to mediate and compose things, if there be any great oppresson used by Princes to their subjects, or from one Prince or State to another. I shall there∣fore confine myself to the three great Kingdoms, France, Spain, and Poland; for as to Denmark and Sweden, the first hath lately chang'd its Government, and not only made the Monarchy Heredita∣ry, which was before Elective, but has pull'd down the Nobility, and given their Power to the Prince; which how it will succeed, time will shew. Sweden remains in point of Constitution and Property exactly as it did anciently, and is a well-Governed Kingdom. The first of the o∣ther three is France, of which I have spoken before, and shall onely add, That though it be very true, that there is Pro∣perty

in France, and yet the Govern∣ment is Despotical at this present, yet it is one of those violent States, which the Grecians called Tyrannies: For if a Law∣full Prince, that is, one who being so by Law, and sworn to rule according to it, breaks his Oaths and his Bonds, and reigns Arbitrarily, he becomes a Tyrant and an Usurper, as to so much as he as∣sumes more than the Constitution hath given him; and such a Government, be∣ing as I said violent, and not natural, but contrary to the Interest of the people, first cannot be lasting, when the adven∣titious props which support it fail; and whilst it does endure, must be very un∣easie both to Prince and People; the first being necessitated to use continual op∣pression, and the latter to suffer it.

Doct.

You are pleased to talk of the op∣pression of the People under the King of France, and for that reason, call it a vio∣lent Government, when, if I remember, you did once to day extol the Monar∣chy of the Turks for well-founded and natural; Are not the people in that Em∣pire as much oppressed as in France?

Eng. Gent.

By no means; unless you

will call it oppression for the grand Seig∣nior to feed all his People out of the Pro∣duct of his own Lands; and though they serve him for it, yet that does not alter the Case: for if you set poor men to work and pay them for it, are you a Tyrant, or rather, are not you a good Common∣wealths-man, by helping those to live, who have no other way of doing it but by their labour? But the King of France knowing that his People have, and ought to have Property, and that he has no right to their Possessions, yet takes what he pleases from them, without their consent, and contrary to Law; So that when he sets them on work he pays them what he pleases, and that he levies out of their own Estates. I do not affirm that there is no Government in the World, but where Rule is founded in Property; but I say there is no natural fixed Government, but where it is so; and when it is otherwise, the People are perpetually complaining, and the King in perpetual anxiety, always in fear of his Subjects, and seeking new ways to se∣cure himself; God having been so merci∣ful to mankind, that he has made nothing

safe for Princes, but what is Just and Ho∣nest.

Noble Ven.

But you were saying just now, that this present Constitution in France will fall when the props fail; we in Italy, who live in perpetual fear of the greatness of that Kingdom, would be glad to hear something of the decaying of those props; What are they, I beseech you?

Eng. Gent.

The first is the greatness of the present King, whose heriock Actions and Wisdom has extinguished envy in all his Neighbour-Princes, and kindled fear, and brought him to be above all pos∣sibility of control at home; not only be∣cause his Subjects fear his Courage, but because they have his Virtue in admira∣tion, and amidst all their miseries cannot chuse but have something of rejoycing, to see how high he hath mounted the Empire and Honour of their Nation. The next prop is the change of their ancient Constitution, in the time of Charles the Seventh, by Consent: for about that time the Country being so wasted by the In∣vasion and Excursions of the English, The States then assembled Petitioned the King that he would give them leave to go

home, and dispose of Affairs himself, and Order the Government for the future as he thought fit. Upon this, his Successor Lewis the Eleventh, being a crafty Prince, took an occasion to call the States no more, but to supply them with an Assemble des notables, which were cer∣tain men of his own nomination, like Barbones Parliament here, but that they were of better quality: These in succeed∣ing reigns (being the best men of the Kingdom) grew Troublesome and Intra∣ctable; so that for some years the Edicts have been verified (that is in our Lan∣guage) Bills have been passed in the Grand Chamber of the Parliament at Pa∣ris, commonly called the Chambre d' au∣dience, who lately, and since the Impri∣sonment of President Brouselles and o∣thers during this King's Minority, have never refused or scrupled any Edicts whatsoever. Now whenever this great King dies, and the States of the Kingdom are restored, these two great props of Ar∣bitrary Power are taken away. Besides these two, the Constitution of the Go∣vernment of France itself, is somwhat bet∣ter fitted than ours to permit extraordi∣nary

Power in the Prince, for the whole People there possessing Lands, are Gen∣tlemen; that is, infinitely the greater part; which was the reason why in their A∣sembly of Estates, the Deputies of the Provinces (which we call here Knights of the Shire) were chosen by, and out of the Gentry, and sate with the Peers in the same Chamber, as representing the Gentry onely, called petite noblesse. Whereas our Knights here (whatever their blood is) are chosen by Common∣ers, and are Commoners; our Laws and Government taking no notice of any No∣bility but the persons of the Peers, whose Sons are likewise Commoners, even their eldest, whilest their Father lives: Now Gentry are ever more tractable by a Prince, than a wealthy and numerous Commonalty; out of which our Gentry (at least those we call so) are raised from time to time: For whenever either a Merchant, Lawyer, Tradesman, Grasier, Farmer, or any other, gets such an Estate, as that he or his Son can live upon his Lands, without exercising of any other Calling, he becomes a Gentleman. I do not say, but that we have men very No∣bly

descended amongst these, but they have no preheminence, or distinction, by the Laws or Government. Besides this, the Gentry in France are very needy, and very numerous; the reason of which is, That the Elder Brother, in most parts of that Kingdom, hath no more share in the division of the Pater∣nal Estate, than the Cadets or Younger Brothers, excepting the Principal House, with the Orchards and Gardens about it, which they call Vol de Chappon, as who should say, As far as a Capon can fly at once. This House gives him the Title his Father had, who was called Seignior, or Baron, or Count of that place; which if he sells, he parts with his Baronship, and for ought I know becomes in time roturier, or ignoble. This practice divides the Lands into so many small parcels, that the Possessors of them being Noble, and having little to maintain their Nobility, are fain to seek their Fortune, which they can find no where so well as at the Court, and so become the King's Servants and Souldiers, for they are ge∣nerally Couragious, Bold, and of a good Meen. None of these can ever advance

themselves, but by their desert, which makes them hazard themselves very des∣perately, by which means great numbers of them are kill'd, and the rest come in time to be great Officers, and live splen∣didly upon the King's Purse, who is like∣wise very liberal to them, and according to their respective merits, gives them of∣ten, in the beginning of a Campagne, a considerable sum to furnish out their E∣quipage. These are a great Prop to the Regal Power, it being their Interest to support it, lest their gain should cease, and they be reduced to be poor Provinciaux, that is, Country-Gentlemen again: where∣as, if they had such Estates as our Coun∣try-Gentry have, they would desire to be at home at their ease, whilest these (having ten times as much from the King as their own Estate can yield them, which supply must fail, if the King's Revenue were reduced) are perpetually engaged to make good all exorbitances.

Doct.

This is a kind of Governing by Property too, and it puts me in mind of a Gentleman of good Estate in our Coun∣try, who took a Tenants Son of his to be his Servant, whose Father not long after

dying, left him a Living of about ten pound a year: the young Man's Friends came to him, and asked him why he would serve now he had an Estate of his own able to maintain him: his Answer was, That his own Lands would yield him but a third part of what his Service was worth to him in all; besides, that he lived a pleasant Life, wore good Clothes, kept good Company, and had the con∣versation of very pretty Maids that were his Fellow-servants, which made him ve∣ry well digest the name of being a Ser∣vant.

Eng. Gent.

This is the very Case; but yet Service (in both these Cases) is no Inheritance; and when there comes a Peaceable King in France, who will let his Neighbours be quiet, or one that is covetous, these fine Gentlemen will lose their Employments, and their King this Prop; and the rather, because these Gen∣tlemen do not depend (as was said before) in any kind upon the great Lords (whose standing Interest is at Court) and so can∣not in a change, be by them carried over to advance the Court-designs against their own good and that of their Coun∣try.

And thus much is sufficient to be said concerning France. As for Spain, I be∣lieve there is no Country (excepting Sweden) in Christendom, where the Pro∣perty has remained so intirely the same it was at the beginning; and the reason is, the great and strict care that is taken to hinder the Lands from passing out of the old owners hands; for except it be by Mar∣riages, no man can acquire another man's Estate, nor can any Grandee, or Titula∣do, or any other Hidalgo there, alienate or ingage his Paternal or Maternal E∣state, otherwise than for his Life; nor can alter Tenures, or extinguish Services, or dismember Mannors: for to this the Prin∣ces consent must be had, which he never gives, till the matter be debated in the Consejo de Camera, which is no Iunta or secret Consejo de Guerras, but one where∣in the great men of the Kingdom inter∣vene, and wherein the great matters concerning the preservation of the Go∣vernment are transacted, not relating to Foreign Provinces or Governments, but to the kingdom of Castile and Leon, of which I only speak now. It is true, there have been one or two exceptions against

this severe Rule, since the great calami∣ties of Spain, and two great Lordships have been sold, the Marquisate del Mo∣nastero, to an Assent ista Genoese, and ano∣ther to Sebastian Cortiza a Portuguese, of the same Profession: but both these have bought the intire Lordships, without curtailing or altering the condition in which these two great Estates were be∣fore; and notwithstanding, this hath caused so much repining amongst the na∣tural Godos (as the Castilians call them∣selves still for glory) that I believe this will never be drawn into an Example hereafter. Now the Property remaining the same, the Government doth so too, and the King's Domestick Government, over his natural Spaniards, is very gen∣tle, whatever it be in his Conquer'd Pro∣vinces; and the Kings there have very great advantages of keeping their great men (by whom they Govern) in good temper, by reason of the great Govern∣ments they have to bestow upon them, both in Europe and the Indies; which changing every three years, go in an Age through all the Grandees, which are not very numerous. Besides, Castile

having been in the time of King Roderi∣go over-run and Conquered by the Moors, who Governed there Despotical∣ly, some hundreds of years, before it could be recovered again by the old In∣habitants, who fled to the Mountains; When they were at length driven out, the Count of Castile found a Tax set up∣on all Commodities whatsoever, by the Moors, in their Reign, called Alcaval, which was an easie matter to get conti∣nued (when their old Government was restored) by the Cortes, or States; and so it has continued ever since, as the Excise has done here, which being im∣posed by them who drove and kept out the King, does now since his happy Re∣stauration remain a Revenue of the Crown. This Alcaval, or Excise, is a very great Revenue, and so prevented, for some time, the necessities of the Crown, and made the Prince have the less need of asking Relief of his People, (the ordinary cause of disgust,) so that the Cortes, or Assembly of the States, has had little to do of late, though they are duly assembled every year, but seldom contradict what is desired by the Prince;

for there are no greater Idolaters of their Monarch in the World than the Castili∣ans are, nor who drink deeper of the Cup of Loyalty: so that in short, the Go∣vernment in Spain is as ours was in Queen Elizabeths time, or in the first year after his now Majesties Return, when the Parliament for a time Com∣plimented the Prince, who had by that means both his own Power and the Peoples: which days I hope to see again, upon a better and more lasting Founda∣tion. But before I leave Spain, I must say a word of the Kingdom of Arragon, which has not at all times had so quiet a state of their Monarchy as Castile hath enjoyed; for after many Combustions which happened there, concerning their Fueros and Privilegios, which are their Fundamental Laws, the King one day coming to his Seat in Parliament, and making his demands, as was usual, they told him that they had a Request to make to him first; and he withdrawing thereup∣on, (for he had no right of sitting there to hear their Debates) they fell into dis∣course how to make their Government subsist against the encroachments of the

Prince upon them, and went very high in their Debates, whch could not chuse but come to the king's ear, who walked in a gallery in the same Palace to expect the issue; and being in great Passion, was seen to draw out his Dagger, very often, and thrust it again into the sheath; and heard to say, Sangre ha de costar; which coming to the knowledg of the Estates, they left off the Debate, and sent some of their number to him, to know what blood it should cost, and whether he meant to murder any body. He drew out his Dagger again, and pointing it to his breast, he said, Sangre de Reys; leaving them in doubt, whether he meant that his Subjects would kill him, or that he would do it himself. However, that Parliament ended very peaceably, and a famous settlement was there and then made, by which a great person was to be chosen every Parliament, who should be as it were an Umpire between the King and his people, for the execu∣tion of the Laws, and the preservation of their Government, their Fueros and Privilegios, which are their Courts of Justice, and their Charters. This Offi∣cer

was called. El Iusticia d' Arragon, and his duty was to call together the whole Power of the Kingdom, whenever any of the aforesaid Rights were by open force violated or invaded, and to admo∣nish the King, whenever he heard of any clandestine Councils among them to that effect. It was likewise made Treason, for any person of what quality soever, to refuse to repair upon due sum∣mons to any place where this Iusticia should erect his Standard, or to with∣draw himself without leave, much more to betray him, or to revolt from him: Besides, in this Cortes, or Parliament, the old Oath which at the first Foundation of their State was ordered to be taken by the King at his admittance, was again revived, and which is, in these words: Nos que valemos tanto camo nos, y podemos mos, os eligimos nuestro Rey, conque nos guardeys nuestros Fueros y Privilegios; y si no, no. That is, We who are as good as you, and more Powerful, do chuse you our King, upon condition that you preserve our Rights and Priviledges; and if not, not. Notwithstanding all this, Philip the Se∣cond, being both King of Castile and

Arragon, picked a quarrel with the latter, by demanding his Secretary Antonio Perez, who fled from the King's displea∣sure thither, being his own Country; and they refusing to deliver him (it be∣ing expresly contrary to a Law of Arra∣gon, that a Subject of that Kingdom should be against his will carried to be tryed elsewhere) the King took that oc∣casion to Invade them with the Forces of his Kingdom of Castile (who had e∣ver been Rivals and Enemies to the Ara∣goneses) and they to defend themselves under their Iusticia, who did his part faithfully and couragiously; but the Ca∣stilians being old Soldiers, and those of Arragon but County-Troops, the former prevailed, and so this Kingdom in get∣ting that of Castile by a Marriage (but an Age before) lost its own Liberty and Government: for it is since made a Pro∣vince, and Governed by a Vice-Roy from Madrid, although they keep up the for∣mality of their Cortes still.

Doct.

No man living that knew the hatred and hostility that ever was be∣tween the English and Scots, could have imagined in the years 1639, and 1640,

when our King was with great Armies of English upon the Frontiers of Scotland, ready to Invade that Kingdom, that this Nation would not have assisted to have brought them under; but it proved o∣therwise.

Eng. Gent.

It may be they feared, That when Scotland was reduced to sla∣very, and the Province pacified, and Forces kept up there, That such Forces and greater might have been imployed here, to reduce us into the same conditi∣on; an apprehension which at this time sticks with many of the common People, and helps to fill up the measure of our Fears and Distractions. But the visible reason why the English were not at that time very forward to oppress their Neighbours, was the consideration, That they were to be Invaded for refusing to receive from hence certain Innovations in matters of Religion, and the worship of God, which had not long before been in∣troduced here; and therefore the People of this Kingdom were unwilling to per∣petuate a Mungrel Church here, by im∣posing it upon them. But I do exceed∣ingly admire, when I read our History,

to see how zealous and eager our Nobili∣ty and People here were anciently to as∣sert the right of our Crown to the King∣dom of France; whereas it is visible, that if we had kept France (for we Conquer∣ed it intirely and fully) to this day, we must have run the fate of Arragon, and been in time ruined and opprest by our own Valour and good Fortune; a thing that was foreseen by the Macedonians, when their King Alexander had subdu∣ed all Persia and the East; who weigh∣ing how probable it was, that their Prince having the possession of such great and flourishing Kingdoms, should change his Domicilium Imperii, and inhabit in the Centre of his Dominions, and from thence Govern Macedon, by which means the Grecians, who by their Vertue and Valour had Conquered and subdued the Barbarians, should in time (even as an effect of their Victories) be opprest and tyrannized over by them: and this pre∣cautious foresight in the Greeks (as was fully believed in that Age) hastened the fatal Catastrophe of that great Prince.

Doct.

Well, I hope this consideration will fore-arm our Parliaments, That they

will not easily suffer their eyes to be dazled any more with the false glory of Con∣quering France.

Noble Ven.

You need no great cauti∣ons against Conquering France at this present, and I believe your Parliaments need as little admonition against giving of Money towards new Wars or Allian∣ces, that fine wheedle having lately lost them enough already; therefore, pray, let us suffer our Friend to go on.

Eng. Gent.

I have no more to say of Foreign Monarchies, but only to tell you, That Poland is both Governed and Pos∣sessed by some very great Persons or Po∣tentates, called Palatines, and under them by a very numerous Gentry; for the King is not onely Elective, but so li∣mited, that he has little or no Power, but to Command their Armies in time of War; which makes them often chuse Foreigners of great Fame for Military Exploits: and as for the Commonalty or Country-men, they are absolutely Slaves or Villains. This Government is extreamly confused, by reason of the nu∣merousness of the Gentry, who do not al∣ways meet by way of representation as

in other Kingdoms, but sometimes for the choice of their King, and upon other great occasions, collectively, in the Field, as the Tribes did at Rome; which would make things much more turbulent if all this body of Gentry did not wholly de∣pend for their Estates upon the favour of the Palatines their Lords, which makes them much more tractable. I have done with our Neighbours beyond Sea, and should not without your command have made so long a digression in this place, which should indeed have been treated of before we come to speak of England, but that you were pleased to divert me from it before: However, be∣ing placed near the Portraicture of our own Country, it serves better (as con∣traria juxta se posita) to illustrate it: but I will not make this Deviation longer, by Apologizing for it; and shall therefore desire you to take notice, That as in England by degrees Property came to shift from the few to the many, so the Government is grown heavier and more uneasie both to Prince and People, the complaints more in Parliament, the Laws more numerous, and much more

tedious and prolix, to meet with the tricks and malice of men, which works in a loose Government; for there was no need to make Acts verbose, when the great Persons could presently force the Execution of them: for the Law of Ed∣ward the First, for frequent Parliaments, had no more words than A Parliament shall be holden every year, whereas our Act for a Triennial Parliament, in the time of King Charles the First, contained several sheets of paper, to provide against a failer in the Execution of that Law; which if the Power had remained in the Lords, would have been needless: for some of them, in case of intermission of Assem∣bling the Parliament, would have made their Complaint and Address to the King, and have immediately removed the ob∣struction, which in those days had been the natural and easie way: but now that many of the Lords (like the Bishops which the Popes make at Rome, in parti∣bus infidelium) are meerly grown Titu∣lar, and purchased for nothing but to get their Wives place, it cannot be won∣dred at if the King slight their Addresses, and the Court-Parasites deride their Ho∣nourable

undertakings for the safety of their Country. Now the Commons suc∣ceeding, as was said, in the Property of the Peers and Church (whose Lands five parts of six have been alienated, and mostly is come into the same hands with those of the King and Peers) have inhe∣rited likewise, according to the course of nature, their Power; But being kept from it by the established Government, which (not being changed by any law∣full Acts of State) remains still in being formally, whereas virtually it is abolish∣ed; so that for want of outward Orders and Provisions, the people are kept from the Exercise of that Power which is faln to them by the Law of Nature; and those who cannot by that Law pretend to the share they had, do yet enjoy it by ver∣tue of that Right which is now ceased, as having been but the natural Effect of a Cause that is no longer in being: and you know sublata causa, t••llitur. I can∣not say that the greater part of the peo∣ple do know this their condition, but they find very plainly that they want something which they ought to have; and this makes them lay often the blame

of their unsetledness upon wrong causes: but however, are altogether unquiet and restless in the Intervals of Parliament; and when the King pleases to assemble one, spend all their time in Complaints of the Inexecution of the Law, of the multiplication of an Infinity of Grievan∣ces, of Mis-spending the Publick Monies, of the danger our Religion is in by pra∣ctices to undermine it and the State, by endeavours to bring in Arbitrary Power, and in questioning great Officers of State, as the Causers and Promoters of all these Abuses; in so much, that every Parlia∣ment seems a perfect State of War, wherein the Commons are tugging and contending for their Right, very just∣ly and very honourably, yet without coming to a Point: So that the Court sends them packing, and governs still worse and worse in the Vacancies, being necessitated thereunto by their despair of doing any good in Parliament; and there∣fore are forced to use horrid shifts to sub∣sist without it, and to keep it off; with∣out ever considering, that if these Coun∣sellers understood their Trade, they might bring the Prince and People to such

an Agreement in Parliament, as might re∣pair the broken and shipwrack'd Govern∣ment of England; and in this secure the Peace, Quiet and Prosperity of the People, the Greatness and Happiness of the King, and be themselves not only out of pre∣sent danger (which no other course can exempt them from) but be Renown∣ed to all Posterity.

Noble Ven.

I beseech you, Sir, how comes it to pass, that neither the King, nor any of his Counsellors could ever come to find out the truth of what you discourse? for I am fully convinced it is as you say.

Eng. Gent.

I cannot resolve you that, but this is certain, they have never en∣deavoured a Cure, though possibly they might know the Disease, as fearing that though the Effects of a Remedy would be, as was said, very advantagious both to King and People, and to themselves; yet possibly, such a Reformation might not consist with the Merchandize they make of the Princes Favour, nor with such Bribes, Gratuities and Fees as they usually take for the dispatch of all Mat∣ters before them. And therefore our

Counsellors have been so far from sug∣gesting any such thing to their Master, that they have opposed and quashed all Attempts of that kind, as they did the worthy Proposals made by certain Members of that Parliament in the beginning of King Iames's Reign, which is yet called the Undertaking Parlia∣ment. These Gentlemen considering what we have been discoursing of, viz. That our old Government is at an end, had framed certain Heads, which, if they had been proposed by that Parliament to the King, and by him consented to, would, in their Opinion, have healed the Breach; and that if the King would per∣form his part, that House of Commons would undertake for the Obedience of the People. They did believe that if this should have been moved in Parliament before the King was acquainted with it, it would prove Abortive: and therefore sent three of their number to his Majesty: Sir Iames a Croft, Grandfather or Father to the present Bishop of Hereford; Tho∣mas Harley, who was Ancestor to the Honourable Family of that Name is He∣refordshire; and Sir Henry Nevill, who

had been Ambassador from Queen Eliza∣beth to the French King. These were to open the matter at large to the King, and to procure his leave that it might be pro∣posed in Parliament: which, after a very long Audience and Debate, that wise Prince consented to, with a promise of Secresie in the mean time, which they humbly begged of His Majesty. How∣ever, this took Vent, and the Earl of Northampton; of the House of Howard, who ruled the Rost in that time, having knowledg of it, engaged Sir R. Weston, afterwards Lord Treasurer and Earl of Portland, to impeach these Undertakers in Parliament before they could move their matters; which he did the very same day, accompanying his Charge (which was endeavouring to alter the established Government of England) with so eloquent an Invective, that if one of them had not risen, and made the House acquainted with the whole Series of the Affair, they must have been in danger of being impeached by the Commons: but however it broke their designe, which was all that Northampton and Weston desi∣red, and prevented Posterity from know∣ing

any of the Particulars of this Refor∣mation; for nothing being moved, no∣thing could remain upon the Journal. So that you see our Predecessors were not ignorant altogether of our condition, though the Troubles which have befallen this poor Kingdom since, have made it much more apparent: for since the De∣termination of that Parliament, there has not been one called, either in that King's Reign, or his Son's, or since, that hath not been dissolved abruptly, whilst the main businesses, and those of most concern to the publick, were depending and unde∣cided. And although there hath happen∣ed in this Interim a bloody War, which in the Close of it, changed the whole Or∣der and Foundation of the Polity of Eng∣land, and that it hath pleased God to re∣store it again by his Majesty's happy Re∣turn, so that the old Government is alive again; yet it is very visible that its deadly Wound is not healed, but that we are to this day tugging with the same dif∣ficulties, managing the same Debates in Parliament, and giving the same disgusts to the Court, and hopes to the Country, which our Ancestors did before the Year

1640. whilst the King hath been forced to apply the same Remedy of Dissolution to his two first Parliaments, that his Fa∣ther used to his four first, and King Iames to his three last, contrary to his own vi∣sible Interest, and that of his people; and this for want of having Counsellors about him of Abilities and Integrity e∣nough to discover to him the Disease of his Government, and the Remedy: which I hope, when we meet to Morrow Mor∣ning you will come prepared to enquire into; for the Doctor says, he will advise you to go take the Air this afternoon in your Coach.

Noble Ven.

I shall think it very long till the morning come: But before you go, pray give me leave to ask you some∣thing of your Civil War here; I do not mean the History of it (although the World abroad is very much in the dark as to all your Transactions of that time for want of a good one) but the grounds or pretences of it, and how you fell into a War against your King.

Eng. Gent.

As for our History, it will not be forgotten; one of those who was in Employment from the Year 40. to 60.

hath written the History of those 20 Years, a Person of good Learning and Elocution; and though he be now dead, yet his Executors are very unwilling to publish it so soon, and to rub a Sore that is not yet healed. But the Story is writ with great Truth and Impartiality, al∣though the Author were engaged both in Councils and Arms for the Parlia∣ments side. But for the rest of your De∣mand, you may please to understand, that our Parliament never did, as they pretended, make War against the King; for he by Law can do no Wrong, and therefore cannot be quarrelled with: The War they declared was undertaken to rescue the King's Person out of those Mens hands who led him from his Parlia∣ment, and made use of his Name to levy a War against them.

Noble Ven.

But does your Govern∣ment permit, that in case of a disagree∣ment between the King and his Parlia∣ment, either of them may raise Arms a∣gainst the other?

Eng. Gent.

It is impossible that any Government can go further than to pro∣vide for its own Safety and Preservation

whilst it is in being, and therefore it can never direct what shall be done when it self is at an end; there being this diffe∣rence between our Bodies Natural and Politick, that the first can make a Testa∣ment to dispose of things after his death, but not the other. This is certain, that where-ever any two Co-ordinate Powers do differ, and there be no Power on Earth to reconcile them otherwise, nor any Umpire, they will, de facto, fall to∣gether by the Ears. What can be done in this Case de jure, look into your own Country-man Machiavell, and into Grotius, who in his Book De jure Belli∣ac Pacis, treated of such matters long be∣fore our Wars. As for the ancient Poli∣ticians, they must needs be silent in the Point, as having no mixt Governments amongst them; and as for me, I will not rest my self in so slippery a Place. There are great disputes about it in the Parlia∣ments Declarations before the War, and something considerable in the King's An∣swers to them; which I shall specifie im∣mediately, when I have satisfied you how our War begun; which was in this man∣ner: The Long Parliament having pro∣cured

from the King his Royal Assent for their Sitting till they were dissolved by Act, and having paid and sent out the Scottish Army, and disbanded our own, went on in their Debates for the settling and mending our Government: the King being displeased with them for it, and with himself for putting it out of his Power to dissolve them, now the busi∣ness which they pretended for their Per∣petuation was quite finished, takes an un∣fortunate Resolution to accuse five prin∣cipal Men of the Commons House, and one of the Peers, of High-Treason: which he prosecuted in a new unheard-of way, by coming with armed Men into the Commons House of Parliament, to de∣mand their Members; but nothing being done by reason of the absence of the five, and Tumults of discontented Citizens flocking to White-Hall and Westminster, the King took that occasion to absent himself from his Parliament. Which indu∣ced the Commons House to send Com∣missioners to Hampton-Court to attend his Majesty with a Remonstrance of the State of the Kingdom, and an humble Request to return to his Parliament, for the Redres∣sing

those Grievances which were speci∣fied in that Remonstrance. But the King, otherwise Counselled, goes to Windsor, and thence Northwards, till he arrived at York; where he summons in the Militia, that is, the Trained-Bands of the Coun∣ty; and besides, all the Gentry, of which there was a numerous Appearance. The King addressed himself to the latter with Complaints against a prevailing Party in Parliament, which intended to take the Crown from his Head; that he was come to them, his loving Subjects, for Prote∣ction; and, in short, desired them to as∣sist him with Moneys to defend himself by Arms. Some of these Gentlemen pe∣titioned His Majesty to return to his Par∣liament, the rest went about the Debate of the King's Demands; who, in the mean time, went to Hull, to secure the Magazine there, but was denied Entrance by a Gentleman whom the House had sent down to prevent the seizing it; who was immediately declared a Traytor, and the King fell to raising of Forces: which coming to the Knowledge of the House, they made this Vote, That the King, se∣duced by Evil Counsel, intended to levy War

against his Parliament and People, to de∣stroy the Fundamental Laws and Liberties of England, and to introduce an Arbitrary Government, &c. This was the first time they named the King, and the last: For in all their other Papers, and in their De∣claration to Arm for their Defence (which did accompany this Vote) they name no∣thing but Malignant Counsellors. The Kings Answer to these Votes and this Declaration, is that which I mentioned; wherein His Majesty denies any inten∣tion of invading the Government, with high Imprecations upon himself and Po∣sterity if it were otherwise: and owns that they have Right to maintain their Laws and Government. This is to be seen in the Paper it self now extant; and this Gracious Prince never pretended (as some Divines have done for him) that his Power came from God, and that his Sub∣jects could not dispute it, nor ought he to give any Account of his Actions (though he should enslave us all) to any but him. So that our War did not begin upon a point of Right, but upon a matter of Fact; for without going to Lawyers or Casuists to be resolved, those of the People who be∣lieved

that the King did intend to destroy our Liberties, joyned with the Parlia∣ment; and those who were of opinion that the prevailing party in Parliament did intend to destroy the King or de∣throne him, assisted vigorously His Ma∣jesty with their Lives and Fortunes. And the Question you were pleased to ask never came; for both parties pretended and believed they were in the right, and that they did fight for and defend the Government: But I have wearied you out.

Noble Ven.

No sure▪ Sir, but I am infinitely obliged to you for the great care you have taken and still have used to in∣struct me, and beg the continuance of it for to morrow morning.

Eng. Gent.

I shall be sure to wait up∣on you at nine a Clock, but I shall be∣seech both of you to bethink your selves what to offer, for I shall come with a design to learn, not to teach: nor will I presume in such a matter to talk all, as you have made me do to day; for what I have yet to say in the point of Cure, is so little, that it will look like the Mouse to the Mountain of this days discourse.

Doct.

It is so in all Arts, the Corollary is short, and in ours particularly. Those who write of the several Diseases incident to humane bodies, must make long Dis∣courses of the Causes, Symptomes, Signs and Prognosticks of such Distempers; but when they come to treat of the Cure, it is dispatched in a few Recipes.

Eng. Gent.

Well, Sir, for this bout, I humbly take my leave of you; nay, Sir, you are not in a condition to use ceremo∣ny.

Doct.

Sir, I forbid you this door; pray retire: to stand here, is worse than to be in the open air.

Noble Ven.

I obey you both.

Doct.

I shall wait on you in the Even∣ing.

The THIRD DAY.

Noble Ven.

GEntlemen, you are ve∣ry welcome: what, you are come both together!

Doct.

I met this Gentleman at the door: But methinks we sit looking one upon another, as if all of us were afraid to speak.

Eng. Gent.

Do you think we have not reason, in such a subject as this is? how can any Man, without Hesitation, presume to be so confident as to deliver his private opinion in a point, upon which, for al∣most 200 year (for so long our Govern∣ment has been crazy) no Man has ven∣tured; and when Parliaments have done any thing towards it, there have been A∣nimosities and Breaches, and at length Civil Wars?

Noble Ven.

Our work to day is, to en∣deavour to shew how all these troubles may be prevented for the future, by ta∣king away the Cause of them, which is the want of a good Government; and therefore it will not be so much presum∣ption

in you, as charity, to declare your self fully in this matter.

Eng. Gent.

The Cure will follow na∣turally, if you are satisfied in the Disease, and in the Cause of the Disease: for if you agree that our Government is broken, and that it is broken because it was Found∣ed upon Property, and that Foundation is now shaken; it will be obvious, that you must either bring Property back to your old Government, and give the King and Lords their Lands again, or else you must bring the Government to the Pro∣perty as it now stands.

Doct.

I am very well satisfied in your Grounds; but because this Fundamental truth is little understood amongst our People, and that in all conversations men will be offering their opinions of what the Parliament ought to do at their Meet∣ing, it will not be amiss to examine some of those Expedients they propose, and to see whether some or all of them may not be effectual towards the bringing us to some degree of settlement, rather than to venture upon so great a change and alteration as would be necessary to mo∣del our Government anew.

Eng. Gent.

Sir, I believe there can be no Expedients proposed in Parliament that will not take up as much time and trouble, find as much difficulty in passing with the King and Lords, and seem as great a change of Government, as the true remedy would appear, at least I speak as to what I have to propose; but however, I approve your Method, and if you will please to propose any of those things, I shall either willingly embrace them, or endeavour to shew reason why they will be of little fruit in the settling our State.

Doct.

I will reduce them to two Heads (besides the making good Laws for keep∣ing out Arbitrary Power, which is al∣ways understood:) the hindering the growth of Popery, and consequently the providing against a Popish Successor; and then the declaring the Duke of Mon∣mouth's Right to the Crown, after it hath been examined and agreed to in Parlia∣ment.

Eng. Gent.

As for the making new Laws, I hold it absolutely needless, those we have already against Arbitrary Pow∣er being abundantly sufficient, if they

might be executed; but that being im∣possible (as I shall shew hereafter) till some change shall be made, I shall post∣pone this point: and for the first of your other two, I shall divide and separate the consideration of the growth of Popery from that of the Succession. I am sorry that in the prosecution of this Argument, I shall be forced to say something that may not be very pleasing to this worthy Gentleman, we being necessitated to discourse with prejudice of that Religi∣on which he professes; but it shall be with as little ill breeding as I can, and altoge∣ther without passion or invectives.

Noble Ven.

It would be very hard for me to suspect any thing from you that should be disobliging; but pray, Sir, go on to your Political discourse, for I am not so ignorant my self, but to know that the conservation of the National Religi∣on (be it what it will) is assential to the well ordering a State: and though in our City the doctrinals are very different from what are professed here, yet as to the Government of the State, I believe you know that the Pope or his Priests have as little influence upon it, as your

Clergy have here, or in any part of the World.

Eng. Gent.

I avow it fully, Sir, and with the favour you give will proceed. It cannot be denyed but that in former times Popery has been very innocent here to the Government, and that the Clergy and the Pope were so far from op∣posing our Liberties, that they both sided with the Barons to get a declaration of them by means of Magna Charta: It is true also, that if we were all Papists, and that our State were the same, both as to Property and Empire, as it was 400 years ago, there would be but one incon∣venience to have that Religion National again in England, which is, That the Clergy, quatenus such, had and will have a share in the Soveraignty, and inferi∣our Courts in their own Power, called Ecclesiastical; this is, and ever will be a Solecism in Government, besides a ma∣nifest contradiction to the words of Christ our Saviour, who tells us, his Kingdom is not of this World: and the truth is, if you look into the Scriptures, you will find, that the Apostles did not reckon that the Religion they planted should be

National in any Country, and there∣fore have given no precepts to the Magi∣strate to meddle in matters of Faith and the Worship of God; but Preach'd, That Christians should yield them obedience in all lawfull things. There are many passages in Holy Writ which plainly de∣clare, that the true Believers and Saints should be but a handful, and such as God had separated, and as it were taken out of the World; which would not have been said by them, if they had believed that whole Nations and People should have been true Followers of Christ, and of his Flock: for certainly none of them are to be damn'd, and yet Christ himself tells us, that few are saved, and bids us strive to get in at the strait gate; and therefore I conceive it not to be imagin∣able, that either Christ or his Apostles did ever account that the true Religion should be planted in the World by the framing of Laws, Catechisms, or Creeds, by the Soveraign Powers and Magistrates, whe∣ther you call them Spiritual or Tempo∣ral, but that it should have a Progress suitable to its beginning: for it is visible that it had its Original from the Power

and Spirit of God, and came in against the stream, not onely without a Numa Pompilius, or a Mahomet, to plant and establish it by humane Constitutions and Authority, but had all the Laws of the World to oppose it, and all the bloudy Tyrants of that age to persecute it, and to inflict exquisite torments on the Pro∣fessors of it, In Nero's time (which was very early) the Christians were offered a Temple in Rome, and in what other Cities they pleased, to be built to Jesus Christ, and that the Romans should receive him into the number of their gods; but our Religion being then in its purity, this was unanimously refused, for that such a God must have no Companions, nor needed no Temples, but must be Wor∣shipped in Spirit and Truth. The Succes∣sors to these good Christians were not so scrupulous; for within some Ages after, the Priests to get Riches and Power, and the Emperors to get and keep the Empire (for by this time the Christians were grown numerous and powerful) combined toge∣ther to spoil our Holy Religion, to make it fit for the Government of this World, & to introduce into it all the Ceremonious fol∣lies

and Superstitions of the Heathen; and which is worse, the Power of Priests, both over the Persons and Consciences of Men. I shall say no more of this, but refer you to innumerable Authors who have treat∣ed of this Subject, particularly to a French Minister, who hath written a Book, En∣tituled, La Religion Catholique Apostolique Romaine instituee par Nume Pompile; and to the incomparable Machiavel in his Posthume Letter, Printed lately in our Language, with the Translation of his Works. But I have made a long digressi∣on; and to come back again, shall onely desire you to take notice, when I say that anciently Popery was no inconvenience in this Kingdom, I mean onely Political∣ly, as the Government then stood, and do not speak at all of the prejudice which mens Souls did and will ever receive from the Belief of those impious Tenents, and the want of having the True Gospel of Jesus Christ preached unto them, but living in perpetual Superstition and Ido∣latry: The consideration of these Mat∣ters is not so proper to my present pur∣pose, being to Discourse onely of Govern∣ment. Notwithstanding therefore, as I

said before, that Popery might have suit∣ed well enough with our old Constitu∣tion, yet as to the present Estate, which inclines to Popularity, it would be whol∣ly as inconsistent with it, and with the Power of the Keys, and the Empire of Priests (especially where there is a For∣reign Jurisdiction in the case) as with the Tyranny and Arbitrary Power of any Prince in the World. I will add thus much in Confirmation of the Doctor's As∣sertion, That we ought to prevent the Growth of Popery, since it is now grown a Dangerous Faction here against the State.

Noble Ven.

How can that be, I be∣seech you, Sir?

Eng. Gent.

Sir, I will make you Judg of it your self; I will say nothing of those foolish Writings that have been put forth by Ma∣riana, Emanuel Sa, and some others, about the lawfulness of destroying Princes and States in case of Heresie, because I know all the conscientious and honest Papists (of which I know there are great num∣bers in the World) do not only not hold, but even abhor such cursed Tenents; and do believe, that when the Pope, by Ex∣communication

hath cut off any Prince from the communion of the Church, can go no further, nor ought to pretend a Power to deprive him of his Crown, or absolve his Subjects from their Oaths and Obedience: But I shall confine my self to the present condition of our Papists here. You know how dangerous it is for any Kingdom or State to have a consi∣derable, wealthy, flourishing party a∣mongst them, whose interest it is to de∣stroy the Polity and Government of the Country where they live; and therefore if our Papists prove this Party, you will not wonder why this People are so eager to depress them. This is our Case: for in the beginning of Queen Elizabeths reign, there was an alteration of Religion in our Country, which did sufficiently enrage the Holy Father at Rome, to see that this good Cow would be Milked no longer. He declares her an Heretick and a Ba∣stard, (his Sanctity not having declared null that incestuous Marriage which her Father had contracted before with his Brothers Wife, and which that King had dissolved to Marry her Mother) and af∣terwards Excommunicated our Queen,

depriving her, as much as in him lay, of the Kingdom; some of the Zealots of that Party (having a greater terrour for those Thunder-bolts than I believe many have now) began to Conspire against her; and Plots grew at length so fre∣quent, and so dangerous, that it was ne∣cessary (as the Parliaments then thought) to secure the Queen, by making severe Laws against a People, who did not be∣lieve themselves her Majesties Subjects; but on the contrary, many of them thought themselves in Conscience obli∣ged to oppose and destroy her: and al∣though that Excommunication, as also the pretended doubtfulness of the Title▪ both died with that renowned Queen, yet a new desperate Conspiracy against the King her Successor and the whole Parliament ensuing, not long after her decease, those rigorous Laws have been so far from being repealed, that very many more, and far severer, have been since made, and are yet in force. Now these Laws make so great a distinction between Protestants and Papists, that whereas the former are by our Govern∣ment and Laws, the freest People in the

World, the latter are little better than slaves, are confined to such a distance from their Houses, are not to come near the Court, which being kept in the Ca∣pital City, mostly deprives them from attending their necessary occasions; they are to pay two third parts of their Estates annually to the King, their Priests are to suffer as Traitors, and they as Felons for harbouring them; in fine, one of us, if he do not break the Municipal Laws for the good Government of the Country, need not fear the King's Power, whereas their being what they are, is a breach of the Law, and does put them into the Princes hands to ruine them when he pleases; nay, he is bound by Oath to do it, and when he does it not, is com∣plained against by his People, and Par∣liaments take it amiss. Now judge you, Sir, whether it is not the interest of these People to desire and endeavour a change, whilest they remain under these discou∣ragements, and whether they are not like to joyn with the Prince (whose con∣nivance at the inexecution of those Laws is the onely means and hope of their preservation) whenever he shall

undertake any thing for the increase of his own Power, and the depressing his Parliaments.

Noble Ven.

What you say is very un∣deniable, but then the Remedy is very easie and obvious, as well as very just and honourable, which is the taking away those cruel Laws, and if that were done they would be one People with you, and would have no necessity, and by conse∣quence no desire to engreaten the King against the Interest and Liberty of their own Country.

Eng. Gent.

You speak very well, and one of the Reasons amongst many which I have, to desire a composure of all our troubles by a setled Government, is, that I may see these People (who are very considerable, most of them, for Estates, Birth and Breeding) live quietly under our good Laws, and increase our Trade and Wealth with their expences here at home; whereas now the severity of our Laws against them, makes them spend their Revenues abroad, and inrich other Nations with the Stock of England; but as long as the State here is so unsetled as it is, our Parliaments will never con∣sent

to countenance a Party, who by the least Favour and Indulgence may make themselves able to bring in their own Re∣ligion to be National, and so ruine our Po∣lity and Liberties.

Noble Ven.

I wonder why you should think that possible?

Eng. Gent.

First, Sir, for the Reason we First gave, which is the craziness of our Polity, there being nothing more certain, than that both in the Natural and also the Politick Body any sinister accident that intervenes, during a very Diseased habit, may bring a dangerous al∣teration to the Patient. An Insurrection in a decayed Government, a thing otherwise very inconsiderable, has proved very fa∣tal, as I knew a slight flesh-wound bring a lusty Man to his Grave in our Wars, for that he being extreamly infected with the French Disease, could never procure the Orifice to close; so although the de∣signs both at home and abroad, for alter¦ing our Religion, would be very little formidable to a well-founded Govern∣ment, yet in such an one as we have now, it will require all our care to obvi∣ate such Machinations. Another Reason

is the little Zeal that is left amongst the ordinary Protestants, which Zeal uses to be a great Instrument of preserving the Religion establish'd, as it did here in Queen Elizabeths time; I will add the little Credit the Church of England hath a∣mongst the People, most men being al∣most as angry with that Popery which is left amongst us (in Surplices, Copes, Altars, Cringings, Bishops, Ecclesiastical Courts, and the whole Hierarchy, be∣sides an Infinite number of Useless, Idle, Superstitious Ceremonies, and the Igno∣rance and Vitiousness of the Clergy in general) as they are with those Dogma's that are abolished; So that there is no hopes that Popery can be kept out, but by a company of poor People called Fa∣naticks, who are driven into Corners as the First Christians were; and who only in truth Conserve the Purity of Christi∣an Religion, as it was planted by Christ and his Apostles, and is contained in Scri∣pture. And this makes almost all sober men believe, that the National Clergy, be∣sides all other good qualities have this too, that they cannot hope to make their Hie∣rarchy subsist long against the Scriptures,

the hatred of mankind, and the Interest of this People, but by Introducing the Ro∣man Religion, and getting a Foreign Head and Supporter, which shall from time to time brave and hector the King and Paliament in their favour and be∣half, which yet would be of little advan∣tage to them, if we had as firm and wise a Government as you have at Venice. Another Reason, and the greatest, why the Romish Religion ought to be very wa∣rily provided against at this time, is, That the Lawful and Undoubted Heir to the Crown, if his Majesty should die without Legitimate Issue, is more than suspected to Imbrace that Faith; which (if it should please God to call the King, before there be any Remedy applied to our Distracted State) would give a great opportunity (by the Power he would have in Intervals of Parliament) either to Introduce immedi∣ately that profession, with the help of our Clergy, and other English and Foreign Aids, or else to make so fair a way for it, that a little time would perfect the work; ••nd this is the more formidable, for that ••a very Zealous and Bigot∣〈…〉〈…〉and therefore may be sup∣posed

to act any thing to that end, although it should manifestly appear to be contrary to his own Interest and Quiet; so apt are those who give up their Faith and the Con∣duct of their Lives to Priests (who to get to themselves Empire, promise them the high∣est Seats in Heaven; if they will sacrifice their Lives, Fortunes, and Hopes, for the Exaltation of their Holy Mother, and pre∣venting the Damnation of an innumerable company of Souls which are not yet born) to be led away with such Erroneous and wild Fancies. Whereas Philip the Second of Spain, the House of Guise in France, and o∣ther great Statesmen, have always made their own greatness their first Aim, and used their Zeal as an Instrument of that; And instead of being cozen'd by Priests, have cheated them, and made them endeavour to Preach them up to the Empire of the World. So I have done with the Growth of Popery, and must conclude, that if that should be stopt in such manner, that there could not be one Papist left in England, and yet our Polity left in the same disorder that now afflicts it, we should not be one Scruple the better for it, nor the more at quiet; the Growth and Danger of Popery not being 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

the Cause of our present Distemper, but the Effect of it: But as a good and setled Go¦vernment would not be at all the nearer for the destruction of Popery, so Popery and all the Dangers and Inconveniences of it would not only be further off, but would wholly vanish at the sight of such a Reformation. And so we begin at the wrong end, when we begin with Religion before we heal our Breaches. I will borrow one Similitude more, with our Doctor's favour, from his Profession. I knew once a man given over by the Physitians, of an incurable Cachexia, which they said proceeded from the ill Quality of the whole Mass of Blood, from great Adustion, and from an ill habit of the whole Body. The Patient had very often painful Fits of the Chollick, which they said proceeded from the sharpness of the humour which caused the Disease; and, amongst the rest, had one Fit which tormented him to that degree, that it was not expected he could out-live it; yet the Doctors delivered him from it in a small time: Notwith¦standing, soon after the man died of his first Distemper. Whereas if their Art had arrived to have cured that (which was the Cause of the other) the Chollick had vanished of it

self, and the Patient recovered. I need make no Application, nor shall need to say much of the Succession of the Crown (which is my next Province) but this I have said already, That it is needless to make any Provision a∣gainst a Popish Successor if you rectifie your Government; and if you do not, all the Care and Circumspection you can use in that Particular, will be useless and of none effect, and will but at last (if it do not go off easily, and the next Heir succeed peace∣ably, as is most likely, especially if the King live till the People's Zeal and Mettle is over) end probably in a Civil War about Title; and then the Person deprived may come in with his Sword in his Hand, and bring in upon the Point of it both the Popish Reli∣gion, and Arbitrary Power: Which, though I believe he will not be able to maintain long (for the Reasons before alledged,) yet that may make this Generation miserable and unhappy. It will certainly be agreed by all lovers of their Country, that Popery must be kept from returning, and being National in this Kingdom, as well for what concerns the Honour and Service of God, as the Welfare and Liberty of the People; and I conceive there are two ways by which

the Parliament may endeavour to secure us against that danger; the first by ordering such a change in the Administration of our Government, that whoever is Prince, can never violate the Laws, and then we may be very safe against Popery; our present Laws being effectual enough to keep it out, and no new ones being like to be made in Parlia∣ment that may introduce it; and this re∣medy will be at the same time advantagious to us against the Tyranny and Incroach∣ments of a Protestant Successor, so that we may call it an infallible Remedy both a∣gainst Popery and Arbitrary power. The second way is by making a Law to disable any Papist by name or otherwise, from In∣heriting the Crown; and this is certainly fallible, that is, may possibly not take place (as I shall shew immediately;) and besides, it is not improbable that an Heir to this Kingdom in future times, may dissemble his Religion, till he be seated in the Throne; or possibly be perverted to the Roman Faith after he is possest of it, when it may be too late to limit his Prerogative in Parlia∣ment; and to oppose him without that, will I fear, be Judged Treason.

Doct.

But Sir, would you have the Par∣liament

do nothing, as things stand, to pro∣vide (at least, as much as in them lies) that whoever succeeds be a good Protestant?

Eng. Gent.

Yes, I think it best in the first place to offer to his Majesty the true Reme∣dy; & if they find him averse to that, then to pursue the other which concerns the Suc∣cession, because the People (who are their Principals, and give them their Power) do expect something extraordinary from them at this time; and the most of them believe this last the only present means to save them from Popery, which they judge (and very justly) will bring in with it a change of Government. But then, I suppose, they may be encouraged to propose in the first place the true Cure; not only because that is in∣fallible, as has been proved, but likewise be∣cause His Majesty in probability will sooner consent to any reasonable Demand towards the Reforming of the Government, and to the securing us that way, than to concur to the depriving his onely Brother of the Crown. And possibly this latter (as I said before) may be the only way the Parlia∣ment can hope will prove effectual: For if you please to look but an Age back into our Story, you will find that Henry the Eighth

did procure an Act of Parliament, which gave him power to dispose of the Crown by his last Will and Testament; and that he did accordingly make his said Will, and by it devise the Succession to his Son Edward the Sixth, in the first place, and to the Heirs of his Body; and for want of such, to his Daughter Mary, and to the Heirs of her Bo∣dy; and for want of which Heirs, to his Daughter Elizabeth, our once Soveraign of Immortal and Blessed Memory, and the Heirs of her Body; and for want of all such Issue, to the right Heirs of his Younger Sister, who was, before he made this Will, married to Charles Brandon Duke of Suffolk, and had Issue by him. By this Testament he disinherited his elder Sister, who was married in Scotland; and by that means did, as much as in him lay, exclude His Majesty (who now, by God's Mercy, Reigns over us) as also his Father and Grandfather. And to make the Case stronger, there passed an Act long after, in the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, That it should be Treason during that Queen's Life, and a Premunire afterwards, to assert that the Imperial Crown of Eng∣land could not be disposed of by Act of Par∣liament: yet after the Decease of that

Queen, there was no considerable Oppositi∣on made to the peaceable Reception and Recognition of King Iames of happy Memory. And those who did make a little stir about the other Title, as the Lord Cob∣ham, Sir Walter Rawleigh, and a few others, were apprehended & condemn'd according to Law. And, notwithstanding that, since, in the Reign of K. Charles the First, there was a bloody Civil War, in which Men's Minds were exasperated at a high rate; yet in all the Course of it, the Original Want of Title was never objected against His late Majesty. I do not urge this to aver that the Parlia∣ment, with the King's Consent, cannot do lawfully this, or any other great Matter; which would be an incurring the Penalty of that Law, and a Solecism in the Politicks: But to shew, that when the Passions of men are quieted, and the Reasons other than they were, it happens oftentimes that those Acts which concern the Succession fall to the Ground of themselves, and that even without the Sword, which in this Case was never adoperated. And that therefore this Remedy in our Case may be likely never to take place, if it please God the King live till this Nation be under other kind of Circum∣stances.

Doct.

Sir, you say very well: but it seems to me, that the last Parliament was in some kind of Fault, if this be true that you say; for I remember that my Lord Chancellor did once, during their Sitting, in His Majesty's Name offer them to secure their Religion and Liberties any way they could advise of, so they would let alone meddling with the Succession, and invited them to make any Proposals they thought necessary to that end.

Eng. Gent.

Hinc ille lachrimae. If this had been all, we might have been happy at this time; but this Gracious Offer was In limine, accompanied with such Conditions that made the Parliament conjecture that it was only to perplex and divide them; and did look upon it as an Invention of some new Romanza, (Counsellors and those too, possibly, influenced by the French) to make them embrace the Shaddow for the Sub∣stance, and satisfying themselves with this Appearance, to do their ordinary Work of giving Money, and be gone, and leave the Business of the Kingdom as they found it. For it was proposed, that whatsoever Secu∣rity we were to receive, should be both Con∣ditional and Reversionable: That is, First,

We should not be put into Possession of this new Charter (be it what it will) till after the death of His Majesty who now is; whereas such a Provision is desirable, and in∣deed necessary for us for this only reason, that when that unfortunate hour comes, we might not be, in that Confusion, unpro∣vided of a Calm, Setled and Orderly, as well as a Legal Way to keep out Popery. Whereas otherwise, if we be to take Posses∣sion in that Minute, it must either miscarry, or be gotten by a War, if it be true that Possession be Nine Points of the Law in o∣ther Cases, it is in this the whole Ten: and I should be very unwilling, in such a Di∣straction, to have no Sanctuary to fly to, but a piece of Parchment kept in the Pells; and to have this too, as well as other Advan∣tages, in the Power and Possession of him in whose prejudice it was made: this had been almost as good an Expedient to keep out Popery, as the Bill which was thrown out that Parliament; which provided, that in the Reign of a King that should be a Papist, the Bishops should chuse one another upon Vacancies. Those Counsellors who put my Lord Chancellor upon this Proposal, were either very slender Politicians themselves, or

else thought the Parliament so. If Magna Charta and The Petition of Right had not been to take place till after the Decease of those Princes who confirmed them, neither had the Barons shed their Blood to so good purpose, nor the Members of the Parliament in Tertio Caroli, deserved so Glorious an Imprisonment after it was ended. The o∣ther Condition in this renowned Proposal is, That all Provision and Security which is given us to preserve our Religion, shall cease immediately, whenever the Prince shall take a certain Oath to be penned for that purpose; and I leave it to all thinking men to determine what that will avail us, when we shall have a King of that Profession over us, who shall not have so much Zeal for his Religion, as he who is now the next successor hath; but shall possibly prefer his Ambition, and his desire to get out of Wardship, be∣fore the Scruples of his Confessor; and yet may afterwards, by getting Absolution for, and Dispensation from such Oaths and Compliance, employ the Power he gets himself, and the Security he deprives us of, to introduce violently what Worship and Faith he pleases. This Gracious Offer had the fatality to disguist one of the best Parlia∣ments

that ever Sate, and the most Loyal; so that laying it aside, they fell upon the Suc∣cession, the only thing they had then left, and were soon after Dissolved, leaving the Kingdom in a more distracted Condition than they found it; and this can no way be composed, but by mending the Polity, so that whoever is King cannot (be he never so inclined to it) introduce Popery, or destroy whatever Religion shall be established: as you see in the Example of the Dutchy of Hanover, whose Prince some fourteen Years since, was perverted to the Roman Church, went to Rome to abjure Heresie (as they call the truth) return'd home, where he lived and Governed as he did before, without the least Animosity of his Subjects for his Change, or any endeavour of his to Introduce any in his Government or People, and dying this last Spring, left the Peaceable and undisturbed Rule of his Subjects to the next Successor, his Brother the Bishop of Osnaburg, who is a Protestant, and this because the Polity of that Dukedom has been conserved entire for many years, and is upon a right Basis: and if our Case were so, we should not onely be out of danger to have our Religion altered (as I said before) whoever is King, but should

in other things be in a happy and flourish∣ing condition. But I have made a long and tedious digression to answer your demands: Now 'tis time you assist me to find the Na∣tural Cure of all our Mischiefs.

Doct.

Stay, Sir, I confess my self to be wonderfully Edified with your discourse hitherto, but you have said nothing yet of the Duke of Monmouth.

Eng. Gent.

I do not think you desire it, though you were pleased to mention such a thing, for I suppose you cannot think it pos∣sible, that this Parliament (which is now speedily to meet by his Majesties Gracious Proclamation) can ever suffer such a thing to be so much as Debated amongst them.

Doct.

Sir, you have no reason to take that for granted, when you see what Books are Printed, what great and Honourable Persons frequent him in private, and countenance him in publick; what shoals of the middle sort of people have in his Progress this Sum∣mer met him before he came into any great Town, and what Acclamations and Bon-fires have been made in places where he lodged.

Eng. Gent.

These things, I must con∣fess, shew how great a Distemper the Peo∣ple are in, and the great reason we have to pray God of his Mercy to put an end

to it by a happy Agreement in Parlia∣ment. But certainly this proceeds only from the hatred they have to the next Successour and his Religion, and from the compassion they have to the Duke of Mon∣mouth (who as they suppose, hath suffer∣ed banishment and dis-favour at Court, at his Instance) and not from any hopes of expectations that the Parliament will countenance any pretence that can be made in his behalf to the Succession.

Doct.

It may be when we have dis∣coursed of it, I shall be of your mind, (as indeed I am enclined already) But yet nothing in War is more dangerous than to contemn an Enemy; so in this Argumentation that we use to secure our Liberties, we must leave nothing unan∣swered that may stand in the way of that, especially the Duke of Monmouth's Claim, which is pretended to confirm and forti∣fie them, for (say some Men) if you set him up, he will presently pass all Bills that shall concern the Safety and Interest of the People; And so we shall be at rest for ever.

Eng. Gent.

Well, I see I must be more tedious than I intended; First then, the

reasoning of these men you speak of, does in my apprehension, suppose a thing I cannot mention without horrour, which is, That this Person should be admitted immediately to the Possession of the Crown to do all these fine Matters; for otherwise, if he must stay till the Death of our Soveraign who now Reigns (which I hope and pray will be many years) possibly these delicate Bills may never pass, nor he find hereafter the People in so good a humour to admit him to the Reversion, which if it could be obtain'd (as I think it impossible Politically) yet the Possession must be kept by a standing Army, and the next Successour cannot have a better Game to play, nor a better Adversary to deal with, than one who leaps in over the Heads of almost all the Protestant Princes Families abroad, besides some Papist who are greater; and when we have been harrassed with Wars, and the miseries that accompany it some few years, you shall have all these fine People, who now run after him, very weary of their new Prince: I would not say any thing to disparage a Person so highly born, and of so early merit; but this I may say,

That if a Lawful Title should be set on foot in his favour, and a thousand Dutch Hosts, and such like, should swear a Mar∣riage, yet no sober Man, that is not blind∣ed with prejudice, will believe, That our King (whom none can deny to have an excellent understanding) would ever Marry a Woman so much his Inferiour as this great Persons Mother was; and this at a time when his Affairs were very low, and he had no visible or rational hopes to be restored to the Possession of his King∣doms but by an assistance which might have been afforded him by means of some great Foreign Alliance. Well, but to leave all this, do these Men pretend that the Duke of Monmouth shall be declared Successour to the Crown in Parliament, with the King's Concurence or without it; if without it, you must make a War for it, and I am sure that no Cause can be stated upon such a point, that will not make the Assertors and Undertakers of it be condemned by all the Politicians and Moralists of the World, and by the Ca∣suis ts of all Religions, and so by conse∣quence, it is like to be a very unsuccesful War. If you would have this declar'd

with the King's Consent, either you sup∣pose the Royal assent to be given, when the King has his liberty either to grant it, or not grant it, to Dissolve the Parlia∣ment, or not Dissolve it, without ruine or prejudice to his Affairs: If in the first Case, it is plain he will not grant it, be∣cause he cannot do it without confessing his Marriage to that Duke's Mother, which he hath already declared against in a very solemn manner, and caused it to be Re∣gistred in Chancery; and which not on∣ly no good Subject can chuse but believe, but which cannot be doubted by any rati∣onal person; for it would be a very un∣natural, and indeed a thing unheard of, that a Father who had a Son in Lawful Matrimony, and who was grown to per∣fection, and had signalized himself in the Wars, and who was ever intirely beloved by him, should disinherit him by so so∣lemn an asseveration (which must be a false one too) to cause his Brother to succeed in his room. And whereas it is pretended by some, that His Majesties danger from his Brothers Counsels and Designs may draw from him something of this; beside that they do not much Complement the

King in this, it is clear, his Brother is not so Popular, but that he may secure him when he pleases, without hazard, if there were any ground for such an ap∣prehension. But we must in the next place suppose that the King's Affairs were in such a posture, that he could deny the Parliament nothing without very great mischief, and inconvenience to him∣self and the Kingdom; then I say, I doubt not, but the Wisdom of the Parliament will find out divers Demands and Re∣quests to make to His Majesty of great∣er benefit, and more necessary for the good of his People than this would be; which draws after it not only a present unsetledness, but the probable hazard of Misery and Devastation for many years to come, as has been proved. So that as on the one side the Parliament could not make a more unjustfiable War than upon this Account, so they could not be Dissol∣ved upon any occasion wherein the People would not shew less discontent and re∣sentment, and for which the Courtiers would not hope to have a better pretext to strive in the next Choice to make their Arts and endeavours more successful in

the Election of Members more suitable to their Designs for the continuance of this present mis-government; For if this Parliament do mis-spend the Peoples Mettle, which is now up, in driving that Nail which cannot go, they must look to have it cool, and so the Ship of this Commonwealth, which if they please may be now in a fair way of Entering in∣to a Safe Harbour, will be driven to Sea again in a Storm, and must hope for, and expect another favourable Wind to save them; and God knows when that may come.

Doct.

But Sir, there are others, who not minding whether the Parliament will consider the Duke of Monmouths con∣cern, so far as to debate it, do yet pre∣tend, that there is great reason to keep up the peoples affections to him; and pos∣sibly to foment the opinion they have of his Title to the Crown, to the end, that if the King should die re infectà, that is, before such time as the Government is re∣drest, or the Duke of York disabled by Law to Succeed, the people might have an Head, under whose Command and Conduct they might stand upon their

Guard, till they had some way secured their Government and Religion.

Eng. Gent.

What you have started is not a thing that can safely be discoursed of, nor is it much material to our design, which is intended to speculate upon our Government, and to shew how it is de∣cayed: I have industriously avoided the argument of Rebellion, as I find it coucht in modern Polititians, because most Prin∣ces hold, that all Civil Wars in mixt Mo∣narchies must be so, and a Polititian, as well as an Oratour, ought to be Vir bo∣nus, so ought to discourse nothing, how rational soever, in these points under a peaceable Monarchy, which gives him protection, but what he would speak of his Prince if all his Councel were pre∣sent. I will tell you only, that these Au∣thors hold, that nothing can be alledged to excuse the taking Arms by any people in opposition to their Prince from being Crimen Lesae Majestatis, but a claim to a lawful Jurisdiction, or Co-ordination in the Government, by which they may judg of, and defend their own Rights, and so pretend to fight for, and defend the Government; for though all do ac∣knowledg, 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

that Populi salus is, and ought to be the most Supreme, or Soveraign Law in the world; yet if we should make private persons, how numerous soever, judg of Populi salus, we should have all the Risings and Rebellions that should ever be made, justified by that title, as hap∣pened in France, when La Guerre du bien publique took that name, which was raised by the insatiable ambition of a few No∣ble men, and by correspondency and con∣federacy with Charles, Son of the Duke of Burgundy, and other enemies to that Crown.

Doct.

But would you have our peo∣ple do nothing then, if the King should be Assassinated, or die of a natural death?

Eng. Gent.

You ask me a very fine question, Doctor: If I say, I would have the people stir in that case, then the King, and his Laws take hold of me; and if I should answer, that I would have them be quiet, the peo∣ple would tear me in pieces for a Iesuit, or at least, believe that I had no sense of the Riligion, Laws, and Liberty of my Countrey. De facto, I do sup∣pose,

that if the people do continue long in this heat which now possesseth them, and remain in such a passion at the time of the Kings death without setling mat∣ters, they may probably fall into tumults and Civil War, which makes it infinitely to be desired, and prayed for by all good English men, that during the quiet and peace we injoy, by the blessing of his Majesties life and happy Reign, we might likewise be so wise and fortunate, as to provide for the safety and prosperity of the next generation.

Doct.

But if you would not have the people in such a case, take the Duke of Monmouth for their Head, what would you have them do?

Eng. Gent.

Doctor, you ask me very fine questions; do not you know that Machivel, the best and most honest of all the modern Polititians, has suffered suffi∣ciently by means of Priests, and other ig∣norant persons, who do not understand his Writings, and therefore impute to him the teaching Subjects how they should Rebel and conspire against their Princes, which if he were in any kind guilty of, he would deserve all the re∣proaches

that have been cast upon him, and ten times more; and so should I, if I ventured to obey you in this. I am very confident, that if any man should come to you, to implore your skill in helping him to a drug that might quickly, and with the least fear of being suspected, dis∣patch an enemy of his, or some other, by whose death he was to be a gainer; or some young Lass that had gotten a Sur∣ruptitious great Belly, should come to you to teach her how to destroy the fruit; I say, in this case you would scarce have had patience to hear these persons out; much less would you have been so wicked to have in the least assisted them in their designs, no more than Solon, Lycurgus, Periander, or any other of the Sages could have been brought to have given their advice to any persons who should have begged it, to enable them to ruine and undermine the government of their own Commonwealths.

Doct.

Sir, this Reprehension would be very justly given me, if I had intended by this question to induce you to coun∣sel me, or any other how to rebel; my meaning was to desire you (who have

heretofore been very fortunate in pro∣phesying concerning the events of our changes here) to exercise your faculty a little at this time, and tell us, what is like to be the end of these destractions we are under, in case we shall not be so happy as to put a period to them by mending our Government, and securing our Reli∣gion and Liberty in a regular way.

Eng. Gent.

Doctor, I will keep the re∣putation of Prophecy, which I have gained with you, and not hazard it with any new predictions, for fear they should miscarry; yet I care not, if I gratifie your curiosity a little in the point, about which you first began to Interrogate me, by presaging to you, that in case we should have troubles, and combustions here, after his Majesties decease (which God avert) we must expect a very un∣succesful end of them, if we should be so rash and unadvised, as to make the great Person we have been lately speak∣ing of, our head; and that nothing can be more dangerous and pernitious to us than such a choice. I have not in this discourse the least intention to except a∣gainst, much less to disparage the perso∣nal

worth of the Duke of Monmouth, which the world knows to be very great, but do believe that he hath Courage and Conduct proportionable to any imploy∣ment that can be conferred upon him, whether it be to manage Arms, or Coun∣sels; but my opinion is, that no person in his circumstance can be a proper head in this case; for the people having been already put on upon his scent of the title to the Crown, will be very hardly called off, and so will force the wiser men, who may design better things, to consent that he be Proclaimed King immediately, ex∣cept there be some other head, who by his Power, Wisdom, and Authority, may restrain the forwardness of the mul∣titude, and obviate the acts of some men, whose interest and hopes may prompt them to foment the humours of the people. Now the consequences of hurrying a man to the Throne so tumultuously, without the least deliberation, are very dismal; and do not only not cure the politick di∣stempers of our Countrey, which we have talked so much of, but do infinitely augment it, and add to the desease our State labours under already (which is a

Consumption) a very violent Feaver too; I mean War at home, and from a∣broad, which must necessarily follow in a few years: nor is it possible to go back, when once we have made that step; for our new King will call a Parliament, which being summoned by his will, neither will nor can question his Title or Govern∣ment, otherwise than by making Addres∣ses, and by presenting Bills to him, as they do to his now Majesty.

Nob. Ven.

It seems to me, that there needs nothing more than that; for if he consent to all Laws as shall be presented to him, you may reform your Govern∣ment sufficiently, or else it is your own fault.

Eng. Gent.

We have shewed already, and shall do more hereafter, that no Laws can be executed till our government be mended; and if you mean we should make such as should mend that (besides that it would be a better method to capitulate that, before you make choice of your Prince, as wise people have done in all ages, and the Cardinals do at Rome in the Conclave before they choose their Pope) I say besides this, it is not to be taken for

granted that any Bills that tend to make considerable alterations in the administra∣tion, (and such we have need of, as you will see anon) would either in that case be offered or consented to; both Prince and People being so ready to cry out up∣on Forty-one, and to be frighted with the name of a Common-wealth, even now when we think Popery is at the door; which some people then will think farther off, and so not care to make so great alterations to keep it out; besides the great Men and favourites of the new Prince will think it hard that their King should be so bounded and limited both in power and Revenue, that he shall have no means to exercise his liberality towards them, and so may use their interest and eloquence in both Houses to dissuade them from pressing so hard upon a Prince who is a true zealous Protestant, and has alwaies headed that par∣ty and who is justly admired, if not ador∣ed by the people; and considering too that all the power they leave him, will serve but to enable him to defend us the better from Popery and Arbitrary power; for which latter Monarchy was first Institut∣ed. Thus we may exercise during a Parlia∣ment

or two, love-tricks between the Prince and his people, and imitate the hony-moon that continued for about two years after his Majesties Restauration till the ill management of affairs and the new grevances that shall arise (which will be sure never to fail till our true cure be effected, notwithstanding the care of the new King and his Councellors) shall awak∣en the discontents of the people, and then they will curse the time in which they made this election of a Prince, and the great men for not hindring them. Then men will be reckoning up the discontents of the Peers, sometime after they had made a rash choice of H. the 7th in the field, who (had then no title) when they saw how he made use of the power they gave him to lessen their greatness, and to for∣tifie himself upon their ruins; when it comes to this, and that the Governing party comes to be but a little faction, the people (who never know the true cause of their distemper) will be looking out abroad who has the Lawful title (if the next Heir be not in the meantime with an Ar∣my of English and Strangers in the field here, as is most likely) and look upon the

Prince of Orange, or the next of kin, as their future Saviour (in case the Duke be dead in the mean time, and so the cause of all their distrust taken away) thus most men, not only discontented persons, but the people in general, lookt upon his Ma∣jesty that now is, as their future deliverer during our late distractions, when his con∣dition was so weak that he had scarce wherewithall to subsist, and his enemies powerful at home and victorious abroad, which will not be I fear, our case. I Pro∣phesy then (because you will have me use this word) that if Nobles or people make any such unfortunate choice as this during the distractions we may be in upon his Majesties death, we shall not only miss our cure, or have it deferred till another Government make it; but remain in the confusion we now suffer under; and be∣sides, that shall be sure to feel, first or last, the calamity of a Civil and Foreign War, and in the mean time to be in per∣petual fear of it, and suffer all the burden and charge which is necessary to provide for it, besides all the other ill consequen∣ces of a standing Army. To conclude, I assure you in the Faith of a Christian,

that I have made this discourse solely and singly out of zeal and affection to the In∣terest of my Countrey, and not at all with the least intention to favour or promote the Cause or Interest of the D. of York, or to disparage the Duke of Monmouth, from whom I never received the least un∣kindness, nor ever had the honour to be in his Company; and to whom I shall ever pay respect suitable to his high Birth and Merit.

Noble Ven.

Well, Sir, your Reason∣ing in this point has extreamly satisfied me; and the Doctor, I suppose, was so before, as he averred; therefore pray let us go on where we left.

Eng. Gent.

I cannot take so much up∣on me as to be Dictator in the Method of our Cure, since either of you is a thousand times better qualified for such an Office, and therefore shall henceforth desire to be an Auditor.

Doct.

Pray, Sir, let us not spend time in Compliments, but be pleased to pro∣ceed in this business, and we doubt not but as you have hitherto wonderfully delighted us, so you will gratifie us in concluding it.

Eng. Gent.

I see I must obey you, but pray help me, and tell me in the first place, whether you do not both believe, that as the causa causarum of all our Di∣stractions is (as has been proved) the breach of our Government; so that the immediate Causes are two: First, The great distrust on both sides between the King and his People and Parliament; the first fearing that his Power will be so les∣sened by degrees, that at length it will not be able to keep the Crown upon his head: And the latter seeing all things in disorder, and that the Laws are not exe∣cuted (which is the second of the two Causes) fear the King intends to change the Government, and be Arbitrary.

Noble Ven.

I am a Stranger, but (though I never reflected so much upon the Original Cause, as I have done since I heard you discourse of it) yet I ever thought that those two were the Causes of the Unquietness of this Kingdom: I mean the Jealousie between the King and his People, and the Inexecution of the great Laws of Calling Parliaments An∣nually, and letting them sit to dispatch their Affairs: I understand this in the

time of His Majesties Grand-Father, and Father, more than in His own Reign.

Eng. Gent.

Then whoever can absolute∣ly lay these two Causes asleep for ever, will arrive to a perfect Cure; which I conceive no way of doing, but that the King have a great deal more Power or a great deal less: And you know that what goes out of the King must go into the People, and so vice versa: Insomuch that the People must have a great deal more Power, or a great deal less: Now it is no question, but either of these two, would rather increase their Power than dimi∣nish it; so that if this cannot be made up by the Wisdom of this Age, we may see in the next, that both the King will en∣deavour to be altogether without a Parlia∣ment, and the Parliament to be without a King.

Doct.

I begin to smell, that you would be nibbling at the pretence which some had before his Majesties Restauration, of a Commonwealth or Democracy.

Eng. Gent.

No, I abhor the thoughts of wishing, much less endeavouring any such thing, during these Circumstances we are now in; That is, under Oaths of

Obedience to a Lawful King. And truly if any Themistocles should make to me such a Proposal, I should give the same Judgment concerning it, that Aristides did in such a Case. The Story is short; After the War between the Greeks and the Persians was ended, and Xerxes driven out of Greece, the whole Fleet of the Gre∣cian Confederates (except that of Athens which was gone home) lay in a great Ar∣senal (such as were then in use) upon the Coast of Attica; during their abode there, Themistocles harrangues one day the Peo∣ple of Athens (as was then the Custome) and tells them, that he had a design in his head, which would be of Infinite pro∣fit and advantage to the Commonwealth; But that it could not be executed with∣out the Order and Authority of them, and that it did likewise require secresie; and if it were declared there in the Mar∣ket place, where Strangers as well as Ci∣tizens might be present, it could not be concealed, and therefore proposed it to their consideration what should be done in it: it was at length concluded that The∣mistocles should propose it to Aristides, and if he did next morning acquaint the Peo∣ple

that he gave his approbation to it, it should be proceeded in: Themistocles in∣forms him that the whole Fleet of their Confederates in the War against the Medes had betaken themselves to the great Ar∣senal upon their Coast, where they might be easily fired, and then the Athenians would remain absolute Masters of the Sea, and so give Law to all Greece; when Aristides came the next day to deliver his Judgment to the People, he told them that the business proposed by Themisto∣cles, was indeed very advantageous, and profitable to the Athenians; But withal, the most Wicked and Villanous Attempt that ever was undertaken; upon which it was wholly laid aside. And the same Judgment do I give, Doctor, of your De∣mocracy at this time. But to return to the place where I was, I do belive that this difference may easily be terminated very fairly, and that our House need not be pulled down, and a new one built; but may be very easily repair'd, so that it may last many hundred years.

Noble Ven.

I begin to perceive that you aim at this, That the King must give the People more Power, as Henry the

Third, and King Iohn did, or the Parlia∣ment must give the King more, as you said they did in France in the time of Lewis the Eleventh; or else that it will come in time to a War again.

Eng. Gent.

You may please to know, that in all times hitherto, the Parliament never demanded any thing of the King, wherein the Interest and Government of the Kingdom was concerned (excepting Acts of Pardon) but they founded their demands upon their Right, not only be∣cause it might seem unreasonable for them to be earnest with him to give them that which was his own, but also because they cannot chuse but know, that all Powers which are Fundamentally and Lawfully in the Crown, were placed there upon the first Institution of our Government, to capacitate the Prince to Govern and Protect his People: So that for the Par∣liament to seek to take from him such Authority, were to be felo de se, as we call a self-Homicide; but as in some Di∣stempers of the Body the Head suffers as well as the Inferiour parts, so that it is not possible for it, to order, direct and provide for the whole Body as its Office

requires, since the Wisdom and Power which is placed there, is given by God to that end; In which Case, though the Distemper of the Body may begin from the Disease of some other part, or from the mass of Blood or putrefaction of other Humours; yet since that noble part is so affected by it, that Reason and Discourse fails, therefore to restore this again, Re∣medies must be apply'd to, and possibly Humours or Vapours drawn from the Head it self, that so it may be able to Govern and Reign over the Body as it did before, or else the whole Man, like a Slave, must be ruled and guided ab extrinseco, that is by some Keeper: So it is now with us, in our Politick Disease, where granting (if you please) that the Distemper does not proceed from the Head, but the Corruption of other parts, yet in the Cure, Applications must be made to the Head as well as to the Mem∣bers, if we mean poor England shall re∣cover its former perfect health; and there∣fore it will be found, perhaps, Essential to our being, to ask something (in the condition we now are) to which the King as yet may have a Right; and which ex∣cept

he please to part with, the Phenome∣na of Government cannot be salved; That is, our Laws cannot be executed; nor Magna Charta it self made practicable; and so both Prince and People, that is, the Polity of England, must die of this Disease, or by this Delirium must be Go∣verned, ab extrinseco, and fall to the Lot of some Foregin Power.

Noble Ven.

But, Sir, since the busi∣ness is come to this Dilemma, why may not the King ask more Power of the Par∣liament, as well as they of him?

Eng. Gent.

No question but our pre∣sent Councellours and Courtiers would be nibbling at that bait again, if they had another Parliament that would take Pen∣sions for their Votes; But in one that is come fresh from the People, and under∣stand their Sense and Grievances very well, I hardly believe they will attempt it; for both Council and Parliament must needs know by this time-a-day, that the Cause of all our Distractions coming (as has been said an hundred times) from the King's having a greater Power already than the condition of Property at this present can admit, without Confusion

and Disorder; It is not like to mend Mat∣ters for them to give him more, except they will deliver up to him at the same instant their Possessions, and Right to their Lands, and become Naturally and Politically his Slaves.

Noble Ven.

Since there must be a vo∣luntary parting with Power, I fear your Cure will prove long and ineffectul, and we Reconcilers shall, I fear, prove like our devout Cappuchin at Venice; this poor Mans name was Fra. Barnardino da Udine, and was esteemed a very holy Man, as well as an excellent Preacher, insomuch that he was appointed to Preach the Lent Sermons in one of our principal Chur∣ches, which he performed at the begin∣ing with so much Eloquence, and Ap∣plause, that the Church was daily croud∣ed three hours before the Sermon was to begin; the esteem and veneration this poor Fryar was in, elevated his Spirit a little too high to be contained within the bounds of reason; but before his De∣lirium was perceived, he told his Audito∣ry one day, that the true Devotion of that People, and the care they had to come to hear his word Preached, had

been so acceptable to God and to the Vir∣gine, that they had vouchsafed to Inspire him with the knowledg of an Expedient, which he did not doubt, but would make Men happy & just even in this Life, & that the Flesh should no longer Iust against the Spirit; but that he would not acquaint them with it at that present, because something was to be done on their parts to make them capable of this great Bles∣sing, which was to pray zealously for a happy Success upon his Endeavours, and to Fast, and to visit the Churches to that end; therefore he desired them to come the Wednesday following to be made ac∣quainted with this blessed Expedient. You may Imagine how desirous our Peo∣ple were, to hear something more of this Fifth-Monarchy; I will shorten my Sto∣ry, and tell you nothing of what croud∣ing there was all night, and what quar∣relling for places in the Church; nor with what difficulty the Saffi, who were sent by the Magistrate to keep the Paece, and to make way for the Preacher to get into the Pulpit, did both; But up he got, and after a long preamable of desiring more Prayers, and Addressing himself to our

Senate to Mediate with the Pope, that a week might be set apart for a Jubilee and Fasting three days all over the Christi∣an World, to storm Heaven with Masses, Prayers, Fasting and Almes to prosper his Designs; he began to open the Mat∣ter, That the Cause of all the Wickedness and Sin, and by Consequence of all the Miseries and Affliction which is in the World, arising from the enmity which is between God and the Devil, by which means God was often cross'd in his In∣tentions of good to Mankind here, and hereafter, the Devil by his temptations making us uncapable of the Mercy and Favour of our Creator; therefore he had a Design (with the helps before mention∣ed) to mediate with Almighty God, That he would pardon the Devil, and receive him into his Favour again after so long a time of Banishment and Imprisonment; and not to take all his power from him, but to leave him so much as might do good to Man, and not hurt; which he doubted not but he would imploy that way, after such reconciliation was made, which his Faith would not let him que∣stion. You may judge what the nume∣rous

Auditory thought of this; I can on∣ly tell you, that he had a different fort of Company at his return, from what he had when he came, for the Men left him to the Boys, who with great Hoops in∣stead of Acclamations, brought him to the Gondola, which conveyed him to the Redentor, where he lodged; And I never had the curiosity to enquire what became of him after.

Doct.

I thank you heartily for this In∣termess; I see you have learnt something in England: for, I assure you, we have been these twenty Years turning this, and all serious Discourses into Ridicule; but yet your Similitude is very pat; for in every Parliament that has been in Eng∣land these sixty Years, we have had no∣table Contests between the Seed of the Serpent, and the Seed of the Woman.

Eng. Gent.

Well Sir, we have had a Michael here in our Age, who has driven out Lucifer, and restored the true Deity to his Power: but where Omnipotency is wanting (which differs the Frier's Case and mine) the Devil of Civil War and Confusion may get up again, if he be not laid by prudence and Vertue, and better

Conjurers than any we have yet at Court.

Noble Ven.

Well Gentlemen, I hope you have pardoned me for my Farce. But, to be a little more serious, pray tell me how you will induce the King to give up so much of his Right as may serve your turn? Would you have the Parlia∣ment make War with him again?

Eng. Gent.

There cannot, nor ought to be, any Change, but by his Majesty's free Consent; for besides, that a War is to be abhorred by all Men that love their Country, any Contest of that kind in this case (viz. to take away the least part of the Kings Right) could be justified by no man living. I say, besides that, a Ci∣vil War has miscarried in our days, which was founded (at least pretendedly) up∣on Defence of the People's own Rights: In which, although they had as clear a Victory in the end, as ever any Contest upon Earth had, yet could they never reap the least advantage in the World by it: but went from one Tyranny to ano∣ther, from Barebones Parliament, to Cromwell's Reign; from that, to a Com∣mittee of Safety; leaving those Grave

Men, who managed Affairs at the begin¦ning, amazed to see new Men, and new Principles Governing England. And this induced them to Co-operate to bring things back just where they were before the War. Therefore this Remedy will be either none, or worse than the Disease: It not being now as it was in the Barons time, when the Lord who led out his Men, could bring them back again when he pleased, and Rule them in the mean time, being his Vassals. But now there is no Man of so much Credit, but that one who behaves himself bravely in the War, shall out-vye him; and, possibly, be able to do what he pleases with the Army and the Government: And in this corrupt Age, it is ten to one, he will ra∣ther do Hurt than Good with the Power he acquires. But because you ask me how we would perswade the King to this? I answer, by the Parliament's humbly Remonstrating to His Majesty, that it is his own Interest, Preservation, Quiet and true Greatness, to put an end to the Distractions of his Subjects, and that it cannot be done any other way, and to desire him to enter into debate with some

Men Authorized by them, to see if there can be any other means than what they shall offer to compose things; if they find there may, then to embrace it, other∣wise to insist upon their own Proposals: and if in the end they cannot obtain those Requests, which they think the only es∣sential means to preserve their Country, then to beg their Dismission, that they may not stay, and be partakers in the Ruin of it. Now, my Reasons why the King will please to grant this, after the thorough discussing of it, are two. First, Because all great Princes have ever made up Matters with their Subjects upon such Contests, without coming to Extremi∣ties. The two greatest, and most Valiant of our Princes, were Edward the First, and his Grandchild Edward the Third: these had very great Demands made them by Parliaments, and granted them all; as you may see upon the Statute∣Book. Edward the Second, and Richard the Second, on the contrary, refused all things till they were brought to Extre∣mity. There is a Memorable Example in the Greek Story of Theopompus King of Sparta; whose Subjects finding the Go∣vernment

in disorder for want of some Persons that might be a Check upon the great Power of the King, proposed to him the Creation of the Ephores (Officers who made that City so great and Famous afterwards). The King finding by their Reasons (which were unanswerable, as I think ours now are), that the whole Go∣vernment of Sparta was near its Ruin, without such a Cure; and considering that he had more to lose in that Disorder than others, freely granted their desires; for which being derided by his Wife, who asked him what a kind of Monarchy he would leave to his Son? answered, a ve∣ry good one, because it will be a very lasting one. Which brings on my Second Reason, for which I believe the King will grant these things; because he cannot any way mend himself, nor his Condi∣tion, if he do not.

Noble Ven.

You have very fully con∣vinced me of two things: First, That we have no reason to expect or believe that the Parliament will ever increase the Kings Power: And then, that the King cannot by any way found himself a New, and more absolute Monarchy, except he

can alter the Condition of Property, which I think we may take for granted to be impossible. But yet, I know not why we may not suppose that (although he cannot establish to all Posterity such an Empire) he may, notwithstanding, change the Government at the present; and calling Parliaments no more, admi∣nister it by force, as it is done in France, for some good time.

Eng. Gent.

In France it has been a long Work; and although that Tyranny was begun, as has been said, by Petition from the States themselves, not to be as∣sembled any more; yet the Kings since, in time of great Distraction, have thoughr fit to convocate them again; as they did in the Civil Wars thrice: Once at Orle∣ans, and twice at Blois. I would not re∣peat what I have so tediously discoursed of concerning France already, but only to intreat you to remember that our Na∣tion has no such poor and numerous Gen∣try, which draw better Revenues from the King's Purse, than they can from their own Estates; all our country people con∣sisting of Rich Nobility and Gentry, of Wealthy Yeomen, and of Poor Younger 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

Brothers who have little or nothing, and can never raise their Companies, if they should get Commissions, without their Elder Brothers Assistance amongst his Tenants, or else with the free consent and desire of the People, which, in this case, would hardly be afforded them. But we will suppose there be idle People enough to make an Army, and that the King has Money enough to Arm and Raise them: And I will grant too, to a∣void tediousness (although I do not think it possible) that the people will at the first, for fear, receive them into their Houses, and Quarter them against Law; nay, pay the Money which shall be by illegal Edicts, imposed upon the Subjects to pay them; Yet is it possible an Army can continue any time to enslave their own Country? Can they resist the Prayers, or the Curses of their Fathers, Brothers, Wives, Mothers, Sisters, and of all Per∣sons wherever they frequent? Upon this Account all the Greek Tyrants were of very short Continuance; who being in chief Magistracy and Credit in their Commonwealths, by means of Soldiers and Satellites, usurped the Soveraignty.

But did ever any of them, excepting Dio∣nysius, leave it to his Son? Who was dri∣ven out within less than a year after his Fathers death. Many Armies of the Na∣tives have destroyed Tyrannies: So the Decemvirate was ruined at Rome, the Tar∣quins expelled before that: Our own Country has been a Stage, even in our time, where this Tragedy has been suf∣ficiently acted; for the Army, after the War was done, fearing the Monarchy should be restored again, held Councils, got Agitators; and though there were often very severe Executions upon the Ring-leaders, did at length, by their per∣severance, necessitate their Officers to joyn with them (having many good Head∣pieces of the Party to advise them); and so broke all Treaties. And the Parlia∣ment too, adhering to a small Party of them who consented to lay aside Kingly Government, and afterwards drove them away too, fearing they would continue to Govern in Oligarchy. I am far from ap∣proving this way they used, in which they broke all Laws, Divine and Humane, Po∣litical and Moral: But I urge it only to shew how easily an Army of Natives is

to be deluded with the Name of Liberty, and brought to pull down any thing which their Ring-leaders tell them tends to enslaving their Country. 'Tis true, this Army was afterwards cheated by their General; who without their Know∣ledge, much less Consent, one Morning, suddenly made himself Tyrant of his Country. It as true, that their Reputa∣tion (not their Arms) supported him in that State for some time; but it is certain that they did very often, and to the last, refuse to be instrumental to levy Moneys, though for their own pay: and so he, a∣gainst his Will, was fain to call from time to time Parliamentary Conventions. And it is most certain that he did, in the Sick∣ness of which he died, often complain that his Army would not go a step farther with him: and, de facto, some Months after his death, they did dethrone his Son, and restore the Remainder of the old Parliament, upon promise made to them in secret (by the Demogogues of that Assembly) that a Commonwealth should be speedily framed and setled.

Noble Ven.

Sir, I am satisfied that an Army raised here on a sudden, and which never

saw an Enemy, could not be brought to act such high things for the Ruin of their own Government; nor possibly, would be any way able to resist the Fury and In∣surrection of the people. But what say you of a Forreign Army, raised by your King abroad, and brought over, whose Officers and Soldiers shall have no Acquaintance or Relations amongst the people here?

Eng. Gent.

All Forces of that kind must be either Auxiliaries or Mercenaries: Auxiliaries are such as are sent by some Neighbour Prince or State, with their own Colours, and paid by themselves: though possibly, the Prince who demands them may furnish the Money. These usually return home again, when the oc∣casion, for which they were demanded, is over: But whether they do or not, if they be not mixed and over-ballanced with Forces which depend upon the Prince who calls them, but that the whole Weight and power lies in them, they will certainly, first or last, seize that Country for their own Soveraign. And as for Mercenaries, they must be raised ('tis true) with the Money of the Prince who needs them, but by the Authority and

Credit of some Great Persons who are to Lead and Command them: And these, in all Occasions, have made their own Com∣mander Prince; as F. Sforza at Milan drove out by this trick the Visconti, ancient Dukes of that State; and the Mamalukes in Egypt made themselves a Military Commonwealth. So that the way of an Army here would either be no Remedy at all, or one very much worse than the Disease to the Prince himself.

Noble Ven.

Well Sir, I begin to be of Opinion, that any thing the King can grant the Parliament (especially such a Parliament as this is, which consists of Men of very great Estates, and so can have no interest to desire Troubles) will not be so inconvenient to him, as to en∣deavour to break the Government by force. But why may he not, for this time, by soothing them, and offering them great Alliances abroad for the Inte∣rest of England, and ballancing Matters in Europe more eaven than they have been; and, in fine, by offering them a War with the French, to which Nation they have so great a hatred; lay them asleep, and get good store of Money, and

stave off this severe Cure you speak of, at least, for some time longer?

Eng. Gent.

There has been something of this done too lately; and there is a Gentleman lies in the Tower, who is to answer for it. But you may please to understand, that there is scarce any a∣mongst the middle sort of People, much less within the Walls of the House of Commons, who do not perfectly know, that we can have no Alliance with any Nation in the World that will signifie any thing to them, or to our selves, till our Government be redressed and new model∣led. And therefore, though there were an Army Landed in this Island, yet that we must begin there, before we are sit to repulse them, or defend our selves. And the fear and sense of this People uni∣versally is, that if we should have any War, either for our own Concerns, or for those of our Allies, whilst Matters re∣main as they do at home, it would cer∣tainly come to this pass, that either be∣ing beaten, we should subject this King∣dom to an Invasion, at a time when we are in a very ill condition to repell it; or else, if we were Victorious, that our

Courtiers and Counsellors in fragrante (or as the French cry, d'emble), would employ that Mettle and good Fortune to try some such Conclusions at home as we have been discoursing of. And therefore, if any War should be undertaken without Parliament, you should see the People rejoyce as much at any disaster our Forces should receive, as they did when the Scots seized the four Northern Counties in 1639. Or before that, when we were beaten at the Isle of Rhee, or when we had any Loss in the last War with Holland. And this Joy is not so unnatural as it may seem to those who do not consider the Cause of it; which is the breach of our old Govern∣ment, and the necessity our Governors are under to make some new experi∣ments: And the fear we are in, that any Prosperity may make them able to try them, either with Effect, or at least with Impunity. Which Consideration made a Court-Droll say lately to His Majesty, (who seemed to wonder why his subjects hated the French so much); Sir, it is be∣cause you love them, and espouse their Interest: And if you would discover this Truth clearly, you may please to make

War with the King of France; and then you shall see, that this People will not only love them, take their parts, and wish them Success; but will exceedingly rejoyce when they are Victorious in sink∣ing your Ships, or defeating your Forces. And this is sufficient to answer your Pro∣posal for Alliances abroad, and for a War with France. Besides this (to wind all up in a Word) it is not to be imagined, that so good and wise a Prince as we have at this time should ever be induced (when he comes to understand perfectly his own Condition) to let his own Interest (grant∣ing his Power to be so, which is very false) contest with the Safety and Preser∣vation of his People, for which only it was given him; or that he will be any way tenacious of such Prerogatives, as now, by a natural Revolution of Political Circumstances, are so far from continu∣ing useful to his Governing the People, that they are the only Remora and Ob∣stacle of all Government, Settlement and Order. For His Majesty must needs know, that all Forms of regulating Man∣kind under Laws were ordained by God and Man, for the Happiness and Security of

the Governed, and not for the Interest and Greatness of those who rule; unless where there is Melior Natura in the Case. So God Governs Man for his own Glory only, and Men Reign over Beasts for their own Use and Service; and where an Absolute Prince rules over his own Servants whom he feeds and pays (as we have said), or the Master of a great and numerous Fa∣mily Governs his Houshold; they are both bound by the Law of God and Na∣ture, and by their own Interest, to do them Justice, and not Insaevire or Tyra∣nize over them, more than the necessity of preserving their Empire and Authori∣ty requires.

Doct.

But Sir, considering the difficul∣ty which will be found in the King, and possibly in the Parliament too, to come up to so great an alteration at the first, and the danger that may happen by our remaining long in this unsetled Condi∣tion, which does hourly expose us to in∣numerable hazards, both at home, and from abroad; why may we not begin, and lay the Foundation now, by remov∣ing all His Majesty's present Council by Parliament; which is no new thing, but

hath been often practised in many Kings Reigns?

Eng. Gent.

First, the Council, that is, the Privy Council which you mean, is no part of our Government, as we may have occasion to shew hereafter; nor is the King obliged by any Fundamental Law, or by any Act of Parliament to hearken to their Advice, or so much as to ask it; and if you should make one on purpose, besides that it would not be so effectual as what we may propose, it would be full as hard to go down either with King or Parliament. But besides all this, you would see some of these Coun∣sellours so nominated by Parliament, per∣haps prove honest, and then they would be forced to withdraw as some lately did, because they found, I suppose, that till the Administration be alter'd, it is im∣possible that their Councils can be im∣braced, or any thing be acted by them which may tend to the good of their Country; those who have not so great a sence of Honour and Integrity, will be presently corrupted by their own In∣terest, whilst the Prince is left in possessi∣on of all those baits and means to answer

such Mens ectpectations: It being most certain, that if you have a musty Vessel, and by consequence dislike the Beer which comes out of it, and draw it out, causing the Barrel to be immediately fill'd with good and sound Liquor, it is certain by ex∣perience, that both your new Drink, and all that ever you shall put into the Cask, till it be taken in pieces, and the Pipes sha∣ved, and new model'd, will be full as musty, and unsavoury as the first which you found fault with.

Noble Ven.

Now, Sir, I think we are at an end of our Questions, and I for my part am convinced, that as the King can∣not better himself any way by falling out with his people at this time, so that his goodness and wisdom is such, that he will rather chuse to imitate the most glorious and generous of his predecessors, as Ed∣ward the First, and Edward the Third, than those who were of less worth, and more unfortunate, as Edward the Second, and Richard the Second. And therefore we are now ready to hear what you would think fit to ask of so excellent a Prince.

Eng. Gent.

I never undertook to be so

Presumptuous; there is a Parliament to sit speedily, and certainly they are the fit∣test every way to search into such mat∣ters; and to anticipate their wisdom would be unreasonable, and might give them just offence. But because all this tit∣tle tattle may not go for nothing, I shall presume to give you my thoughts, how the Cure must be wrought, without de∣scending to particulars. The Cause Im∣mediate (as we have said) of our Disease, is the inexecution of our Laws; and it is most true, that when that is alter'd for the better, and that all our Laws are duly executed, we are in health; for as we can never have the entire benefit of them, till our Government is upon a right Basis; so whenever we enjoy this happiness, to have the full benefit of those Constituti∣ons, which were made by our Ancestors for our safe and orderly living, our Go∣vernment is upon a right Basis; therefore we must enquire into the Cause why our Laws are not executed, & when you have found and taken away that Cause, all is well. The Cause can be no other than this, That the King is told, and does believe, that most of these great Charters

or Rights of the people, of which we now chiefly treat, are against his Majesties In∣terest, though this be very false (as has been said) yet we will not dispute it at this time, but take it for granted, so that the King having the Supreme execution of the Laws in his hand, cannot be reason∣ably supposed to be willing to execute them whenever he can chuse whether he will do it or no; it being natural for eve∣ry man not to do any thing against his own Interest when he can help it; now when you have thought well what it should be that gives the King a Liberty to chuse whether any part of the Law shall be currant or no, you will find that it is the great Power the King enjoys in the Government; when the Parliament hath discovered this, they will no doubt demand of his Majesty an abatement of his Royal Prerogative in those matters only which concern our enjoyment of our All, that is our Lives, Liberties and Estates, and leave his Royal Power entire and untoucht in all the other branches of it; when this is done, we shall be as if some great Heroe had performed the ad∣venture of dissolving the Inchantment

we have been under so many years. And all our Statutes from the highest to the lowest, from Magna Charta to that for burying in Woollen, will be current, and we shall neither fear the bringing in Po∣pery, nor Arbitrary Power in the Inter∣vals of Parliament, neither will there be any Dissentions in them; all Causes of Fa∣ctions between the Country and Court∣party being entirely abolisht; so that the People shall have no reason to distrust their Prince, nor he them.

Doct.

You make us a fine Golden Age; but after all this, will you not be pleased to shew us a small prospect of this Canaan, or Country of rest; will you not vouch∣safe to particularize a little what Powers there are in the King, which you would have discontinued? would you have such Prerogatives abolished, or placed else∣where?

Eng. Gent.

There can be no Govern∣ment if they be abolished. But I will not be like a Man who refuses to sing amongst his Friends at their entreaty, because he has an ill Voice; I will rather suffer my self to be laught at by you in delivering my small Judgment in this Matter, but

still with this protestation, that I do be∣lieve that an Infinity of Men better qua∣lifi'd than my self for such sublime Mat∣ters, and much more the House of Com∣mons, who represent the Wisdom as well as the Power of this Kingdom, may find out a far better way, than my poor parts and Capacity can suggest. The powers then which now being in the Crown do hinder the execution of our Laws, and prevent by consequence our happiness and settlement, are four; The absolute power of making War and peace, Trea∣ties and Alliances with all Nations in the World, by which means, by Ignorant Councellours, or Wicked Ministers, many of our former Kings have made Confede∣rations and Wars, very contrary, and de∣structive to the Interest of England, and by the unfortunate management of them, have often put the Kingdom in great ha∣zard of Invasion: Besides that, as long as there is a distinction made between the Court-party and that of the Country, there will ever be a Jealousie in the peo∣ple, that those wicked Councellours (who may think they can be safe no other way) will make Alliances with powerful Prin∣ces,

in which there may be a secret Arti∣cle by which those Princes shall stipulate to assist them with Forces upon a short warning to curb the Parliament, and pos∣sibly to change the Government. And this apprehension in the People will be the less unreasonable, because Oliver Cromwel (the great Pattern of some of our Cour∣tiers) is notoriously known to have In∣serted an Article in his Treaty with Car∣dinal Mazzarin, during this King of France's Minority, That he should be as∣sisted with ten thousand Men from France upon occasion to preserve and defend him in his Usurped Government, against His Majesty that now is, or the People of Eng∣land, or in fine, his own Army, whose re∣volt he often feared. The Second great Prerogative the King enjoys, is the sole Disposal and Ordering of the Militia by Sea and Land, Raising Forces, Garison∣ing and Fortifying places, Setting out Ships of War, so far as he can do all this without putting Taxations upon the Peo∣ple; and this not only in the Intervals of Parliament, but even during their Session; so that they cannot raise the Train-bands

of the Country or City to Guard them∣selves, or secure the Peace of the King∣dom. The third point is, That it is in His Majesties Power to Nominate and Appoint as he pleases, and for what time he thinks fit, all the Officers of the King∣dom that are of Trust or profit, both Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical, (as they will be called) except where there is Ius Patronatus; These two last Powers may furnish a Prince who will hearken to ill designing Councellours, with the means either of Invading the Government by Force, or by his Judges and other Crea∣tures undermining it by Fraud; Especi∣ally by enjoying the Fourth Advantage, which is the Laying out and Imploying, as he pleases, all the Publick Revenues of the Crown or Kingdom, and that with∣out having any regard (except he thinks fit) to the necessity of the Navy, or any other thing that concerns the Safety of the Publick. So that all these Four great Powers, as things now stand, may be ad∣operated at any time, as well to destroy and ruine the good Order and Govern∣ment of the State, as to preserve and sup∣port

it, as they ought to do.

Nob. Ven.

But if you divest the King of these Powers, will you have the Par∣liament sit always to Govern these Mat∣ters?

Eng. Gent.

Sir, I would not divest the King of them, much less would I have the Parliament assume them, or perpetu∣ate their Sitting: They are a Body more fitted to make Laws, and punish the Breakers of them, than to execute them. I would have them therefore petition His Majesty by way of Bill, that he will please to exercise these four great Magna∣lia of Government, with the Consent of four several Councils to be appointed for that end, and not otherwise; that is, with the Consent of the Major part of them, if any of them dissent. In all which Councils His Majesty, or who he pleases to appoint, shall preside; the Councils to be named in Parliament; first all the number, and every Year af∣terwards a third part: So each Year a third part shall go out, and a Recruit of an equal number come in: And in three Years they shall be all new, and no Per∣son

to come into that Council, or any other of the four, till he have kept out of any of them full three Years, being as long as he was in. And this I learnt from your Quarantia's at Venice: and the Use is excellent; for being in such a Circula∣tion, and sure to have their intervals of Power, they will neither grow so inso∣lent as to brave their King, nor will the Prince have any occasion to corrupt them, although he had the means to do it, which in this new Model he cannot have. These Men in their several Councils should have no other instructions, but to dispose of all things, and act in their se∣veral Charges, for the Interest and Glory of England; and shall be Answerable to Parliament, from time to time, for any malicious or advised Misdemeanor: only that Council which manages the Publick Revenue, shall (besides a very copious and Honourable Revenue which shall be left to His Majesty's disposal for his own Entertainment, as belongs to the Splen∣dor and Majesty of the Government) have Instructions to serve His Majesty (if he pleases to command them, and not

otherwise) in the regulating and order∣ing his Oeconomy and Houshold; and if they shall see it necessary, for extraordi∣nary Occasions of treating Foreign Prin∣ces and Ambassadors, or Presenting them, and the like Ostentation of Greatness; to consent with His Majesty moderately to charge the Revenue to that end. I veri∣ly believe that this Expedient is much more effectual than either the Iustitia of Aragon was, or the Ephores of Sparta: Who being to check the King almost in every thing, without having any share in his Councils, or understanding them, could not chuse but make a sullen posture of Affairs; whereas these both seem, and really are the King's Ministers, only ob∣liged by Parliament to act faithfully and honestly; to which, even without that, all other Councellors are bound by Oath. As for the other Council, now called the Privy Council, the King may still please to continue to nominate them at his plea∣sure, so they act nothing in any of the Matters properly within the Jurisdiction of these four Councils, but meddle with the Affairs of Merchants, Plantations,

Charters, and other Matters, to which the Regal Power extendeth. And provided that His Majesty call none of the Persons employed in these other four Councils during their being so, nor that this Coun∣cil do any way intermeddle with any Af∣fairs, Criminal or Civil, which are to be decided by Law, and do belong to the Jurisdictions of other Courts or Magi∣strates, they being no established Judi∣catory, or Congregation, which either our Government or Laws do take notice of (as was said before) but Persons con∣gregated by the King, as his Friends and faithful Subjects, to give him their Opi∣nion in the Execution of his Regal Office. As for Example, the King does exercise, at this time, a Negative Voice as to Bills presented to him by the Parliament, which he claims by Right; no Man ever said that the Privy Council had a Nega∣tive Voice; yet former Kings did not only as their Advice as to the passing or not passing of such Bills, but often decided the Matter by their Votes; which, al∣though it be a high Presumption in them, when they venture to give him Council

contrary to what is given him by his grea∣test Council, yet never any of them have been questioned for it; being looked up∣on as private Men, who speak according to the best of their Cunning, and such as have no publick Capacity at all. But if this be not so, and that this Council have some Foundation in Law, and some pub∣lick Capacity, I wish in this new Settle∣ment it may be made otherwise, and that His Majesty please to take their Counsel in private; but summon no Persons to appear before them; much less give them Authority to send for in Custody, or Im∣prison any Subject, which may as well be done by the Judges and Magistrates; who, if Secrecy be required, may as well be Sworn to Secrecy as these Gentlemen; and I believe can keep Counsel as well, and give it too.

Nob. Ven.

But would you have none to manage State-Affairs, none Imprisoned for secret Conspiracies, and kept till they can be fully discovered? you have made an Act here lately about Imprisonments, that every Person shall have his Habeas Corpus, I think you call it: so that no

Man, for what occasion soever, can lie in Prison above a Night, but the Cause must be revealed, though there be great cause for the concealing it.

Eng. Gent.

This Act you mention, and a great many more which we have to the same purpose, that is, against Ille∣gal Imprisonments, shews that for a long time the Power over Men's Persons has been exercised (under His Majesty) by such as were very likely, rather to em∣ploy it ill than well; (that is) would ra∣ther Imprison ten Men for Honourable Actions; such as standing for the People's Rights in Parliament, refusing to pay Il∣legal Taxes, and the like; than one for projecting and inventing Illegal Mono∣polies, or any other kind of oppressing the People. This made first Magna Char∣ta, then the Petition of Right, and divers other Acts besides this last, take that Power quite away, and make the Law and the Judges the only Disposers of the Liberties of our Persons. And it may be, when the Parliament shall see the Fruit of this Alteration we are now discour∣sing of, and that State-Affairs are in bet∣ter

hands, they may think fit to provide that a Return, or Warrant of Imprison∣ment from one of these Four Councils (which I suppose will have a Power of Commitment given them, as to Persons appearing Delinquents before them) wherein it shall be expressed, That if the Publick is like to suffer or be defrauded, if the Matter be immediately divulged; I say in this Case, the Parliament may please to make it Lawful for the Judge to delay the Bailing of him for some small time, because it is not to be judg∣ed, that these Councellours so chosen, and so instructed, and to continue so small a time, will use this Power ill; especially being accountable for any abusing of it to the next Parliament. And I suppose the Parliament, amongst other Provisions in this behalf, will require that there shall be a Register kept of all the Votes of these several Councils, with the names as well of those who consented, as of such who dissented: And as to the former part of your Question, whether I would have none to manage State Affairs; I think there are very few State Affair

that do not concern either Peace and War, and Treaties abroad, the management of the Arms, Militia, and posse Comita∣tus at home; the management of all the Publick Moneys, and the Election of all Officers whatsoever; the other parts, of State Affairs, which are Making and Repealing of Laws, punishing high Crimes against the State, with Levying and Pro∣portioning all manner of Impositions up∣on the People, this is reserved to the Par∣liament it self; and the Execution of all Laws to the Judges, and Magistrates; And I can think of no other Affairs of State than these.

Doct.

Do you intend that the Council for chusing Officers shall Elect them of the King's Houshold, that is, his Menial Servants?

Eng. Gent.

No, that were unreason∣able, except any of them have any Juris∣diction in the Kingdom, or any place or preheminence in Parliament annexed to such Office; but in these things which con∣cern the powers and Jurisdictions of these several Councils (wherein, la guardia del∣la laberta, as Machiavil calls it, is now

to be placed) I shall not persume to say any thing, but assure your self, if ever it come to that, it will be very well di∣gested in Parliament, they being very good at contriving such Matters, and making them practicable, as well as at performing all other Matters that con∣cern the Interest and greatness of the Kingdom.

Doct.

I have thought that the Ephores of Sparta were an admirable Magistracy, not only for the Interest of the People, but likewise for the preservation of the authority of the Kings, and of their lives too; for Plutarch observes that the Ci∣ties of Mesene and Argos had the same Government with Lacedemon, and yet for want of erecting such an Authority as was in the Ephores, they were not only perpetually in broils amongst themselves, and for that reason ever beaten by their Enemies, whereas the Spartans were al∣ways victorious, but even their Kings were the most miserable of Men, being often call'd in question Judicially, and so lost their Lives, and many of them mur∣dered by Insurrections of the People:

And at last in both these Cities, the Kings were driven out, their Families extirpa∣ted, the Territory new divided, and the Government turn'd into a Democracy. And I ever thought that this expedient you propose (for I have heard you dis∣course of it often before now) would prove a more safe, and a more noble re∣formation than the Institution of the E∣phores was, and that a Prince who is a lover of his Country, who is Gracious, Wise and Just, (such a one as it has pleased God to send us at this time) shall be ten times more absolute when this Regulation is made, than ever he was or could be be∣fore; and that whatsoever he proposes in any of these Councils will be received as a Law, nay, as an Oracle: And on the o∣ther side, ill and weak Princes shall have no possibility of corrupting Men, or do∣ing either themselves or their People any kind of harm or mischief: But have you done now?

Eng. Gent.

No, Sir, when this Pro∣vision is made for the Execution of the Laws, (which I think very effectual, not to say Infallible) although it is not to be

doubted, but that there will be from time to time many excellent Laws Enacted; yet two I would have passed immediately, the one concerning the whole Regulation of the Elections to Parliament, which we need very much, and no doubt but it will be well done; that part of it which is ne∣cessary to go hand in hand with our Settle∣ment, and which indeed must be part of it, is, that a Parliament be Elected every year at a certain day, and that without any Writ or Summons, the People Meet∣ing of course at the time appointed in the usual place (as they do in Parishes at the Church-House to chuse Officers) and that the Sheriffs be there ready to preside and to certifie the Election. And that the Par∣liament so Chosen shall Meet at the time appointed, and Sit and Adjuorn as their business is more or less urgent: But still setting yet a time for their coming toge∣ther again; but if there shall be a necessity (by reason of Invasion or some other Cause) for their Assembling sooner, then the King to Call the Councellors of these Four Councels all together, and with the consent of the major part of them, inti∣mate

their Meeting sooner; but when the day day comes for the Annual Meeting of Another Parliament, they must be un∣derstood to be Dissolved in Law, with∣out any other Ceremony, and the new one to take their place.

Doct.

I would have this considered too, and provided for, That no Election should be made of any person who had not the majority of the Electors present to Vote for him; so the Writ orders it, and so Reason dictates; for else, how can he be said to represent the County, if not a fifth part have consented to his choice, as happens sometimes, and may do oftener? for where seven or eight stand for one vacant place, as I have know in our last Long Parliament, where the Votes be∣ing set in Columns, he who has had most Votes, has not exceeded four hundred of above two thousand who were present.

Noble Ven.

This is a strange way; I thought you had put every Man by him∣self, as we do in our Government, and as I understood they do in the House of Com∣mons, when there is any nomination, and then, if he has not the major part, he is rejected.

Eng. Gent.

This is very Material, and indeed Essential; but I make no doubt, but if this Project should come in play in Parliament, this and all other particu∣lars (which would be both needless and tedious to discourse of here) will be well and effectually provided for. The next Act I would have passed, should be con∣cerning the House of Peers, that as I take it for granted, that there will be a Clause in the Bill concerning Elections, that no new Boroughs shall be enabled to send Members to Parliament, except they shall be capacitated thereunto by an Act; so it being of the same necessity as to the Li∣berty of Parliament, that the Peers (who do and must enjoy both a Negative and Deliberative Voice in all Parliamentary Transactions, except what concern Le∣vying of Money Originally) be exemp∣ted from depending absolutely upon the Prince, and that therefore it be declared by Act, for the future, that no Peer shall be made but by Act of Parliament, and then that it be Hereditary in his Male Line.

Noble Ven.

I am not yet fully satisfied

how you can order your Matters con∣cerning this House of Peers, nor do I see how the Contests between the House of Commons and them, can be so laid asleep but that they will arise again: Besides the House of Commons must necessarily be extreamly concerned to find the House of Peers, which consists of private persons, though very great and honourable ones, in an Instant dash all that they have been so long hammering for the good of all the People of England whom they represent; were it not better now, you are upon so great alterations, to make an Annual E∣lective Senate, or at least one wherein the Members should be but for Life, and not Hereditary.

Eng. Gent.

By no means, Sir, the less change the better, and in this Case the Metaphysical Maxime is more true than in any, viz. Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate; for great alterations fright Men, and puzzle them, and there is no need of it at all in this Case. I have told you before, that there is a necessity of a Senate, and how short this Government would be without it, and how confused in

the mean time; the Roman Senate was He∣reditary amongst the Patricii, except the Censor left any of them out of the Roll during his Magistracy, for some very great and scandalous offence; and in that case too there was an Appeal to the People, as in all other Causes, witness the Case of Lucius Quintius and ma∣ny others. To shew that there can be no need of such a change here as you speak of, you may please to consider, that all differences between the several parts of any Government, come upon the account of Interest; now when this Settlement is made, the House of Peers, and the House of Commons, can have no Interest to dis∣sent; For as to all things of private Inte∣rest, that is, the Rights of Peers, both during the sitting of Parliaments, and in the Intervals, is left to their own House to judge of, as it is to the House of Com∣mons to judge of their own Priviledges; And as for the contest of the Peers Juris∣diction as to Appeals from Courts of Equi∣ty; Besides that I would have that set∣led in the Act which should pass concern∣ing

the Lords House; I believe it will never happen more, when the Govern∣ment is upon a right Foundation; it ha∣ving been hitherto fomented by two dif∣ferent Parties, the Court-party sometimes blowing up that difference to break the Session, lest some good Bills for the Peo∣ple should pass, or that the King by re∣jecting them, might discontent his Peo∣ple; to avoid which Dilemma, there needed no more, but to procure some person to prosecute his Appeal before the Lords; some honest Patriots afterwards possibly might use the same policy which they learnt from the Courtiers, to quash some Bill very destructive, in which they were out-voted in the Commons House; otherwise it is so far from the Interest of the Commons to hinder Ap∣peals from Courts of Equity, that there is none amongst them, but know we are almost destroyed for want of it: And when they have considered well, and that some such Reformation as this shall take place; they will find that it can ne∣ver be placed in a more honourable and

unbyas'd Judicatory than this; And I could wish that even in the Intermis∣sion of Parliamentary Sessions, the whole Peerage of England, as many of them as can conveniently be in Town, may sit in their Judicial Capacities, and hear Appeals in Equity, as well as Judge up∣on Writs of Errour. Now as to your other Objection (which is indeed of great weight) that the House of Com∣mons must needs take it ill, that the Lords should frustrate their endeavours for the Peoples good by their Negative; If you consider one thing, the force of this Objection will vanish; which is, That when this new Constitution shall be admitted, the Lords cannot have a∣ny Interest or temptation to differ with the Commons, in any thing wherein the Publick good is concerned, but are ob∣liged by all the ties in the World, to run the same course and fortune with the Commons, their Interest being ex∣actly the same; so that if there be any dissenting upon Bills between the two Houses, when each of them shall think

their own Expedient conduces most to the advantage of the Publick; this dif∣ference will ever be decided by right reason at Conferences; And the Lords may as well convince the Commons, as be convinced by them; and these con∣tests are and ever will be of admira∣ble use and benefit to the Commonwealth; the reason why it is otherwise now, and that the House of Peers is made use of to hinder many Bills from passing, that are supposed to be for the ease of the People, is, that the great Counsel∣lors and Officers which sit in that House, do suggest (whether true or false) that it is against his Majesties Will and Inte∣rest that such an Act should pass, where∣upon it has found Obstruction; but here∣after if our expedient take place it can∣not be so, first, because our King himself cannot have any designs going (as was proved before) which shall make it his advantage to hinder any good intended his people, whose prosperity then will be his own. And then because in a short time, the Peers being made by

Act of Parliament, will consist of the best Men of England both for Parts and Estates, and those who are already made, if any of them have small Estates, the King if he had the Interest, would not have the means to corrupt them, the Publick Moneys, and the great Offices being to be dispensed in another manner than formerly; so their Lordships will have no Motive in the World to steer their Votes and Councils, but their own Honour and Conscience, and the preser∣vation and prosperity of their Country. So that it would be both needless and unjust to pretend any change of this kind. Besides, this alteration in the ad∣ministration of our Government being proposed to be done by the unanimous consent of King, Lords, and Commons, and not otherwise, it would be very pre∣posterous to believe, that the Peers would depose themselves of their Here∣ditary Rights, and betake themselves to the hopes of being Elected; it is true, they have lost the Power they had over the Commons, but that has not been

taken from them by any Law, no more than it was given them by any; but is fallen by the course of Nature, as has been shewn at large; But though they cannot lead the Commons by their Te∣nures, as formerly, yet there is no reason or colour that they should lose their Co∣ordination, which I am sure they have by Law, and by the Fundamental Con∣stitution of the Government; and which is so far from being prejudicial to a lasting Settlement (as was said) that it in∣finitely contributes to it, and prevents the Confusion which would destroy it. If I should have proposed any thing in this Discourse which should have Intrench∣ed upon the King's Hereditary Right, or that should have hindred the Ma∣jesty and Greatness of these Kingdoms from being represented by his Royal Per∣son, I should have made your Story of the Capuchine Fryar very Applicable to me.

Noble Ven.

I see you have not forgi∣ven me that Novel yet; but pray give

me leave to ask you one Question: Why do you make the Election of Great Of∣ficers, to be by a small secret Council, that had been more proper for a Nume∣rous Assembly; as it is in most Com∣monwealths?

Eng. Gent.

It is so in Democracies, and was so in Sparta, and is done by your Great Council in Venice; but we are not making such a kind of Government, but rectifying an ancient Monarchy, and giving the Prince some help in the Admi∣nistration of that great Branch of his Regality; besides, it is sufficient, that our Parliament chuses these Councils, (that is always understood the Lords and Commons, with the Kings Consent) besides, it is possible, that if such a Re∣gulation as this come in Debate a∣mongst them, the Parliament will reserve to it self the Approbation of the Great Officers, as Chancellor, Judges, General Officers of an Army, and the like; and that such shall not have a settlement in those Charges, till they are according∣ly

allowed of; but may in the mean time exercise them. As to particulars, I shall always refer you to what the Par∣liament will judge fit to Order in the Case; but if you have any thing to Ob∣ject, or to shew in general, that some such Regulation as this cannot be effectu∣al towards the putting our Distracted Country into better Order; I shall think my self oblig'd to Answer you, if you can have Patience to hear me, and are not weary already; as you may very well be.

Noble Ven.

I shall certainly never be weary of such Discourse; however I shall give you no further trouble in this matter; for I am very fully satisfied, that such Reformation, if it could be com∣passed, would not only Unite all Parties, but make you very Flourishing at home, and very Great abroad: but have you a∣ny hopes that such a thing will ever come into Debate? what do the Parliament∣men say to it?

Eng. Gent.

I never had any Discourse to this purpose, either with any Lord, or Member of the Commons house, o∣therwise than as possibly some of these Notions might fall in at Ordinary Con∣versation: For I do not intend to In∣trench upon the Office of God, to teach our Senatours Wisdom. I have known some men so full of their own Notions, that they went up and down sputtering them in every Mans Face they met; some went to Great Men during our late troubles; nay, to the King himself, to offer their Expedients from Revelation. Two Men I was acquainted with, of which one had an Invention to reconcile differences in Religion; the other had a project for a Bank of Lands to lye as a Security for summs of Money lent; both these were Persons of Great Parts and Fancy; but yet so troublesome at all Times, and in all Companies, that I have often been forced to repeat an Ex∣cellent Proverb of your Country: God deliver me from a man that has but one business; and I assure you there is no

Mans Reputation that I envy less, than I do that of such Persons; and therefore you may please to believe that I have not imitated them in scattering these Notions, nor can I Prophesie whether a∣ny such Apprehensions as these will ever come into the Heads of those men who are our true Physitians. But yet to an∣swer your Question, and give you my Conjecture; I believe that we are not Ripe yet for any great Reform; not on∣ly because we are a very Debauch'd Peo∣ple; I do not only mean that we are gi∣ven to Whoring, Drinking, Gaming and Idleness; but chiefly that we have a Politique Debauch, which is a neglect of all things that concern the publick welfare, and a setting up our own pri∣vate Interest against it; I say, this is not all, for then the Polity of no Coun∣try could be Redrest: For every Com∣monwealth that is out of order, has e∣ver all these Debauches we speak of, as Consequences of their loose State. But there are two other Considerations which induce me to fear that our Cure is

not yet near. The first is, because most of the Wise and Grave Men of this Kingdom are very silent, and will not o∣pen their Budget upon any terms: and although they dislike the present Condi∣tion we are in as much as any Men, and see the Precipice it leads us to, yet will never open their Mouths to prescribe a Cure; but being asked what they would advise, give a shrug like your Country∣men. There was a very considerable Gentleman as most in England, both for Birth, Parts, and Estate, who being a Member of the Parliament that was cal∣led, 1640. continued all the War with them; and by his Wisdom and Eloquence (which were both very great) promoted very much their Affairs. When the Facti∣ons began between the Presbyters and In∣dependents, he joyned Cordially with the latter, so far as to give his Affirmative to the Vote of No Addresses; that is, to an Order made in the House of Commons, to send no more Messages to the King, nor to receive any from him. After∣wards, when an Assault was made upon

the House by the Army, and divers of the Members taken violently away, and Secluded; he disliking it (though he were none of them) voluntarily absent∣ed himself, and continued retired; being exceedingly averse to a Democratical Government, which was then declared for, till Cromwell's Usurpation; and be∣ing infinitely courted by him, absolutely refused to accept of any Employment under him, or to give him the least Counsel. When Cromwell was dead, and a Parliament called by his Son, or rather by the Army, the chief Officers of which did, from the beginning, whisper into the Ears of the Leading Members, that if they could make an honest Govern∣ment, they should be stood by (as the Word then was) by the Army. This Gentleman, at that time, neither would be Elected into that Parliament, nor give the least Advice to any other Person that was; but kept himself still upon the Re∣serve. Insomuch that it was generally believed, that although he had ever been opposite to the late King's coming to the

Government again, though upon Propo∣sitions; yet he might hanker after the Restoration of His Majesty that now is. But that Apprehension appeared ground∣less when it came to the pinch: for be∣ing consulted as an Oracle by the then General Monk, whether he should re∣store the Monarchy again or no, would make no Answer, nor give him the least Advice; and, de facto, hath ever since kept himself from Publick Business; al∣though, upon the Banishment of my Lord of Clarendon, he was visited by one of the Greatest Persons in England, and one in as much Esteem with His Majesty as any whatsoever, and desired to accept of some great Employment near the King; which he absolutely refusing, the same Person, not a Stranger to him, but well known by him, begged of him to give his Advice how His Majesty (who desired nothing more than to unite all his People together, and repair the Breaches which the Civil War had caused, now my Lord Clarendon was gone, who by his Counsels kept those Wounds open) might

perform that Honourable and Gracious Work: but still this Gentleman made his Excuses. And, in short, neither then, nor at any time before or after (except∣ing when he sate in the Long Parliament of the Year 40.) neither during the di∣stracted Times, nor since His Majesty's Return, when they seemed more repo∣sed, would ever be brought, either by any private intimate Friend, or by any Person in Publick Employment, to give the least Judgment of our Affairs, or the least Counsel to mend them, though he was not shye of declaring his dislike of Matters as they went. And yet this Gentleman was not only by repute, and esteem a wise Man, but was really so, as it appeared by his management of busi∣ness, and drawing Declarations, when he was contented to act; as also by his exceeding prudent managing of his own Fortune, which was very great, and his honourable Living and providing for his Family; his Daughters having been all Marryed to the best Men in England; and his Eldest Son to the most accomplisht

Lady in the World. I dare assure you, there are above an hundred such Men in England, though not altogether of that eminency.

Noble Ven.

Methinks these persons are altogether as bad an extreme as the lo∣quacious men you spoke of hefore. I remember when I went to School, our Master, amongst other Common-places in the commendation of silence, would tell us of a Latine saying, That a Fool whilst he held his peace did not differ from a Wise man; but truly I think we may as truly say, That a wise man whilst he is silent does not differ from a Fool; for how great soever his Wisdom is, it can neither get him credit, nor otherwise advantage himself, his Friend, nor his Country. But let me not divert you from your other point.

Eng. Gent.

The next Reason I have to make me fear that such an Expedient as we have been talking of, will not be pro∣posed suddenly, is the great distrust the

Parliament has of men, which will make most Members shy of venturing at such matters, which being very new, at the first motion are not perfectly under∣stood, at least to such as have not been versed in Authors who have written of the Politicks; and therefore the Mover may be suspected of having been set on by the Court-party to puzzle them, and so to divert, by offering new Expedients, some smart mettlesome Debates they may be upon concerning the Succession to the Crown, or other high matters: For it is the nature of all Popular Coun∣sels (even the wisest that ever were, wit∣ness the people of Rome and Athens, which Machiavil so much extols) in turbulent times, to like discourses that heighten their passions, and blow up their Indignation, better than them that endeavour to rectifie their Judgments, and tend to provide for their safety. And the truth is, our Parliament is very much to be excused, or rather justified in this distrust they have of persons, since there hath been of late so many and so success∣ful

attempts used by the late great Mi∣nisters, to debauch the most eminent Members of the Commons-House, by Pensions and Offices; and therefore it would wonderfully conduce to the good of the Common-wealth, and to the composing our disordered State, if there were men of so high and un∣questionable a Reputation, that they were above all suspicion and distrust, and so might venture upon bold, that is (in this case) moderate Counsels, for the saving of their Country. Such men there were in the Parliament of 1640. at least twenty or thirty, who having stood their ground in seven Parliaments before, which in the two last Kings Reigns had been dissolved abruptly and in wrath, and having re∣sisted the fear of Imprisonment and great Fines for their love to England, as well, as the temptation of Money and Offices to betray it, both inferred by the wicked Councellours of that Age, tending both to the ruine of our just Rights, and the detriment of their

Masters Affairs; I say, having constant∣ly, and with great magnanimity and ho∣nour made proof of their Integrity, they had acquired so great a Reputati∣on, that not only the Parliament, but even almost the whole People stuck to them, and were swayed by them in Actions of a much higher Nature than any are now discoursed of, without fear of being deserted, or as we say, left in the lurch, as the people of France often are by their Grandees, when they raise little Civil Wars to get great Places, which as soon as they are offer∣ed, they lay down Arms, and leave their Followers to be hang'd; but al∣though these two reasons of the silence of some wise men, and the want of re∣putation in others, does give us but a sad prospect of our Land of Promise, yet we have one Consideration, which does incourage us to hope better things ere long. And that is the In∣fallible Certainty that we cannot long Continue as we are, and that we can never Meliorate, but by some such

Principles, as we have been here all this while discoursing of, and that without such helps and succours as may be drawn from thence, we must go from one distraction to another, till we come into a Civil War, and in the close of it be certainly a prey to the King of France, who (on which side it mat∣ters not) will be a Gamester, and sweep Stakes at last; the World not being now equally ballanced between two Princes alike powerful, as it was during our last Civil War; and if as well this danger, as the only means to prevent it, be understood in time, (as no doubt it will) we shall be the happiest and the greatest Nati∣on in the World in a little time; and in the mean time, enjoy the best and most just easie Government of a∣ny People upon Earth. If you ask me whether I could have offer'd a∣ny thing that I thought better than this, I will answer you as Solon did a Philosopher, who askt him whether he could not have made a better

Government for Athens? Yes, but that his was the best, that the People would or could receive. And now I believe you will bear me witness, that I have not treated you as a Wise man would have done in silence; but it is time to put an end to this tittle∣tattle which has nauseated you for three days together.

Noble Ven.

I hope you think better of our Judgments than so; but I be∣lieve you may very well be weary.

Doct.

I am sure the Parish Priests are often thanked for their pains, when they have neither taken half so much as you have, nor profited their Auditory the hundredth part so much.

Eng. Gent.

The answer to Thank you for your pains, is always, Thank you, Sir, for your patience; and so I do very humbly both of you.

Noble Ven.

Pray, Sir, when do you leave the Town?

Eng. Gent.

Not till you leave the Kingdom. I intend to see you, if

please God, aboard the Yacht at Gravesend.

Noble Ven.

I should be ashamed to put you to that trouble.

Eng. Gent.

I should be much more troubled if I should not do it; in the mean time I take my leave of you for this time, and hope to wait on you again to morrow. What, Doctor, you stay to Consult about the Conva∣lescence? Adieu to you both.

Doct.

Farewell, Sir.

Nullum numen abest si sit prudentia.

FINIS.

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉