The theory and regulation of love a moral essay, in two parts : to which are added letters philosophical and moral between the author and Dr. Henry More / by John Norris ...

PART. II. (Book 2)

SECT. I. That Love requires some Measures of Re∣gulation, and why love as Dirigible is made the subject of Morality rather than understanding.

1 HAving finish'd the Theory of Love, I come now to consider the Measures of its Regulation. A great and important work this; for next to the Regulating of our Love, I know no∣thing either more difficult or more use∣ful and necessary, than to prescribe Measures how it ought to be Regulated. Indeed it is very Necessary to six the Bounds of Regulating our Love; and that both because of the Difficulty of Loving Regularly, and because of the Moment and Consequence of it.

2 For the Difficulty, as tis impossible not to love at all, so is it one of the Har∣dest things in the world to love well. Solus sapiens scit Amare, says the Stoic, The wise man only knows how to Love. And there are very few of these wise Men in the World, and to love regu∣larly is oftentimes more than the wisest of us all can do. For first the Appe∣tite which we have to good in Gene∣ral is so strong and Craving that it hur∣ries us on to all sorts and degrees of Particular good, and makes us fasten wherever we can trace the least Print or Foot-step of the universal good. Now this Promiscuous and Indefinite prosecution of Particular goods must needs oftentimes engage us in sin and irregularity. For though these parti∣cular objects of Love separately consi∣dered are good, as being Participati∣ons of the universal good, yet consi∣der'd as they stand in relation either to one another or to the universal, they may become evil, in as much as there

may be a Competition, and the the les∣ler may hinder the greater. As for instance, The pleasure of sense (as in∣deed all Pleasure) singly and sepa∣rately consider'd is good, but the en∣joyment of it may in some circum∣stances be against a greater good, the good of Society, and then 'tis evil as in Fornication or Adultery. But now we are so violently push'd on to Parti∣cular good, by that General Thirst after good in Common, that we don't mind how things are in Combination, but only how they are singly and sepa∣rately in themselves. For to observe how things are in Combination requires thought and Reflexion, which in this Hurry we are not at leisure to make, but to find how things are Singly in themselves there needs nothing but di∣rect Tast and natural sensation. Whence it comes to pass that we more readily do the one than the other, and so are very apt to transgress order, and to love irregularly.

3 This is one ground of the Diffi∣culty of Loving well, and as I con∣ceive a very considerable one, tho' no one that I know of did ever assign this as the cause of this difficulty. But there is also another. For as from the love of good in general we are ea∣gerly carried out to Particular goods, so from the Original Pravity and De∣generacy of our Nature, among all these Particular goods, that which we most eagerly propend to, is sensual good. The Lower life is now highly invigorated and awaken'd in us, the Corruptible Body (as the wise man com∣plains) presses down the Soul, and the Love, which we have to good in gene∣ral, does now by the Corruption of our Nature almost wholly display and ex∣ert it self in the prosecution of this one Particular good, the good of Sense.

4. Now though good of Sense be as truely good as good of the Intellect, as being a Rivulet of the same Sea, and a Ray of the same Sun, yet (as I said

before) it may in some Circumstances and Combinations cross and thwart some higher Interest, and so become Evil. And the strong inclination, which we now have to the good of Sense in general, will often betray us into the love and enjoyment of it in those par∣ticular circumstances wherein it is evil, and against Order. And that often∣times, even when we consider it as E∣vil, that is, when we do not only mind it as it is singly in it self, but as it is in a certain Combination. For this Sensual Concupiscence in us may be so strong, that though we do actually consider a sensual pleasure so circumstantiated as Evil, yet we may for that time think it a lesser Evil than to deny our selves the gratification of so importunate an Appetite, and so chuse it, and be guil∣ty of an exorbitant and irregular Love.

5 And if we further consider how we are perpetually sorrounded with sensible goods, which by Troops thrust themselves upon us, while those

that are Intellectual require our Search and Inquisition, how early they at∣tack us, and what deep impressions they make upon our then tender Facul∣ties, how much the Animal part is afore∣hand with the Rational, that we live the life of Plants and Beasts before we live the life of men, and that not only in the sense of Aristotle, while we are in the Womb, but long after we have beheld the Sun, that the Seducer Eve is Form'd while Adam sleeps, and that sensuality comes to be Adult and Mature, when our Discourses are but young and imperfect. So that by that time we arrive to some competent use of our Reason, there has been laid in such a stock of Animal impressions, that 'tis more than work enough for our riper Age, even to unravel the pre∣judices of our youth, and unlive our former life; I say if we consider this, the Difficulty of Regular love will ap∣pear so great, that instead of admir∣ing at the ill course of the World, one

should rather be tempted to wonder that men love so regularly as they do. So great Reason had the Stoic to say, The wise man only knows how to love.

6 But were it onely a piece of Diffi∣culty to steer the Ship right, and were there not also danger of splitting a∣gainst Rocks, and of other ill Contin∣gencys, the Pilot might yet be secure and unconcern'd, commit himself to his Pillow, and his Vessel to the Winds. But 'tis otherwise, there is Moment and Consequence in Loving regularly as well as Difficulty. No less a thing than Happiness depends upon it, private Happiness and publick Happiness, the Happiness of single Persons, and the the Happiness of the Community, the Happiness of this world, and the Hap∣piness of the next.

7 For as Motion is in the Natural, so is Love in the Moral world. And as the good state of the Natural World depends upon those Laws of Regular Motion, which God has establish'd in

it, in so much that there would need nothing else to bring all into confusi∣on and destruction, but the irregular Motion of those Bodies which it con∣sists of, so does the welfare and happy state of the Intellectual world depend upon the Regularity of Love. Accord∣ing as this Motion proceeds, so is the Moral world either an Harmonical Frame, or a disorderly Chaos, and there needs nothing but the Irregula∣rity of Love to undermine the Pillars of Happiness, and to put the Founda∣tions of the Intellectual World out of Course. And accordingly we see that God who loves Order, and takes care for the perfection of both worlds, has prescribed both Laws of Motion and Laws of Love. And for the same rea∣son 'tis a thing of great importance and necessity to state these Laws and Measures, the welfare of the Moral world being as much concern'd in Love, as that of the natural is in Mo∣tion.

8 And this is the Reason why Love as Dirigible is made the subject of Morality rather than understanding. For the Happiness of life is not so much concern'd in the Acts of our under∣standing, as in the Acts of our Love; in∣deed not at all in our understanding any further, than as our understanding affects our Love, and opinion influ∣ences practise. And then indeed it is, which is the ground of that Obliga∣tion to Orthodoxy, which we are un∣der as to those Articles of Faith which are call'd Fundamental. Otherwise in matters of pure Speculation the happi∣ness of Society is not at all concern'd in what we think, as for instance in that Celebrated Mathematical Pro∣blem, whether the pertual Approxima∣tion of some lines be consistent with the impossibility of their Concourse, what does it signify to the good estate of Society which way this be held? 'Tis indiffe∣rent therefore which side we take. But now we can't advance one step in the

Motion of Love, but something or other comes on't in relation to Poli∣tical Happiness, as there is not the least Motion in Nature but what tends ei∣ther to Generation or Corruption. For the difference is this, the Acts of our understanding are Immanent, and inef∣fective of any alteration upon things without us, but the Acts of Love are Transient, and leave external and per∣manent effects behind them in the course of things, and for this reason Love, as Dirigible, is made the Imme∣diate and proper subject of Moral con∣sideration, and understanding is here no otherwise concern'd than as it in∣fluences and determines our love. What the Measures of regulating our love are, I come now to define.

SECT. II. The Measures of Love of Concupiscence, all reduced to these two general Heads, what we must desire, and what we may desire; The Measures of these, both in general and in Particular. Whether sensual Pleasure be in its self evil, with an account of the true Notion of Origi∣nal Concupiscence and of Mortification.

1 BEing now to define the Measures of Love, I shall first begin with Love of Concupiscence. And here I consider that Duty and Liberty divide between them the Bounds of Morality, which ought wholely to be taken up in the consideration of these two things, what we must or ought to do, and what we may do without being Peccant. And accordingly I shall re∣duce all the Measures of Love of Con∣cupiscence to these two general Heads, what we must desire, and what we may desire.

2 Concerning the first, all that we must desire will I suppose be compre∣hended under these three, God, the good of the Community, and all those things which have a Natural Con∣nexion with it. God, as the greatest and last End Absolutely and Simply, the good of the Community, as the great∣est of Subordinate Ends, and all those things which have a Natural Connexi∣on with it, as Means without which 'tis not to be obtain'd. Wherein is also comprehended the obligation of not desiring, or avoiding whatever has naturally a contrary or opposite Ten∣dency.

3 The first thing which we must love or desire is God. But now God may be loved two waies, either confusely and implicitly, or distinctly and expli∣citly. The confuse and implicit Love of God is Natural and necessary, for tis the same with the love of good in common or Happiness, to which our Nature is Originally and invincibly

determin'd, and consequently cannot be Morally obliged. But that which we are here obliged to, is to love or desire him distinctly and explicitly, that is, to contract and concentre that Natural and Original Love, which we have to good in general or happiness, upon God, as being the true and only cause of all that happiness, to which we so blindly and necessarily aspire.

4 The love of God therefore, to which we are obliged, includes two things, a Desire and an Explicit desire of him. And this indeed is the only Love of him to which we can be Morally ob∣liged. For as to loving him confuse∣ly, that we can't be obliged to, be∣cause 'tis necessary and unavoidable; and as to loving him with love of Be∣nevolence or wishing well to, that we cannot be obliged to because 'tis un∣practicable; The former we cannot be obliged to, because of the condition of our own Nature, and the latter we cannot be obliged to, because of the Nature of God.

I know very well that I am singular in this Point, and that nothing is more common, among those that treat of the love of God, than to talk of it as of a love of Benevolence, and accordingly they alwaies express our Love to God, and our Love to our Neighbour un∣der the same common Appellation of Charity, as if they were both one and the same love, whereby we love God, and whereby we love our Neighbour. But there is I remember an old Rule, that we may talk with the Many, but must think with the Few, and I think tis very applicable in this case. For however we may use the word Charity in respect of God, to comply with popular modes of speaking, yet I can∣not see how in strictness and propriety of Notion God may be lov'd with Love of Benevolence. For certainly as Indi∣gence in the Lover is the ground of his loving with love of Concupiscence, so Indigence in the Person lov'd is the ground of our loving him with love

of Benevolence. But now what can we wish to God that he has not alrea∣dy? My goodness extendeth not to thee,* 1.1 but to the Saints which are in the Earth, sayes the Psalmist, and to speak truely we can no more love God with love of Benevolence, than he can love us with love of Desire. God is as much above this our Love as he is above our understanding, He can indeed wish well to us, but we can only Desire him.

6 And I observe that in Scripture our Love of God is set forth in such expressions as import not any Benevo∣lence to him, but a Desire of him. As when the Psalmist saies,* 1.2 like as the Hart desireth the Water-brooks, so longeth my Soul after thee O God; And again; My Soul is a thirst for God, when shall I come to appear before the Pre∣sence of God?* 1.3 And again, My Soul breaketh out for fervent Desire. Again, whom have I in Heaven but thee, and there is none upon Earth that I De∣sire in Comparison of thee.* 1.4 And so a∣gain

in the Canticles which express the very Soul and Spirit of Divine Love, saies the inamour'd Spouse, the Church, Let him kiss me with the kisses of his Mouth,* 1.5 for thy love is better than Wine. Again, Tell me O thou whom my Soul loveth,* 1.6 where thou feedest. But most emphatically of all, when She saies, I charge you O Daughters of Ieru∣salem, if ye find my Beloved,* 1.7 tell him, that I am sick of Love. Thus again the Angel expresses the Seraphic temper of Daniel, by calling him A man of Desires;* 1.8 For so the Hebrew Cri∣ticks chuse to read it. I shall mention but one place more, and that is in the 2 of Tim. where the Apostle describing a sort of wicked men, saies of them, that they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Lov∣ers of Pleasure more than Lovers of God. Which plainly intimates that our Love of God is of the same sort with that love wherewith we love Pleasure; But now we don't love Pleasure with Love of Benevolence, but only with Love of De∣sire,

and consequently that is the Love wherewith we love God.

7 If it be here objected that though there be no room for wishing well to God Formally and Directly, yet we may rejoyce and take a Complacency in those Perfections of his, which make him un∣capable of our more express Benevo∣lence, which will amount (as was urged before) to an implicit and vertual willing them to him, I answer, that what we rejoyce at we do implicitly will, if it be in a Being who either might not have had that Happiness, or holds it precariously and may hereafter be deprived of it, For here is still some Indigence in the Person to make him capable of our good wishes; But now the Happiness of God is as necessary as his Existence, and consequently how∣ever we may rejoyce in his being Hap∣py, we can no more will him to be Happy, than we can will him to exist. For to will him to be happy necessa∣rily supposes, that he has not the per∣fect

Possession of that Happiness which we will him, for if he has, why do we yet will it to him? Here there∣fore is no room for Benevolence. Nay I do not conceive how we can wish well to God so much as ex Hypothesi, on supposition that he were not happy in that respect wherein we would wish well to him. For the Supposition is impossible, and takes away the very Subject of our Benevolence. For if God were not completely Happy, he would not be what he is, but some other Be∣ing.

8 I would by no means straiten or retrench our Love to God, but am ra∣ther for inlarging and multiplying its Chanels as much as may be, and there∣fore if any think that God may be lov'd with Love of Benevolence, Let them enjoy and (if they can) act ac∣cording to their Notion. For my part I cannot bring my self to any clear conception of it, and I am very scrupulous in venturing upon any thing

whereof I have no distinct Idea. Which ought to be Apology sufficient for me, if I make Love of Desire to be the only Love, wherewith we are obliged to love God.

9 And that we are obliged thus to love him, I shall briefly make out from the consideration of our own Nature, and from the Nature of God. As to our own Nature, I consider that our Thirst after good or Happiness in ge∣neral is so natural, so necessary, and so vehement, that as at present we can neither suspend, nor moderate, nor in the least interrupt it, so we can ne∣ver expect fully to quench or extinguish it, but in the enjoyment of that Object, which has all that happiness in it, on which the whole Bent of our Soul is so strongly set.

10 From the strength and invinci∣ble necessity of this our Inclination to good in general, I conceive 'twill fol∣low that 'tis highly Reasonable, that that Being wherein is all this happi∣ness,

to which we indefinitely are in∣clined, ought to be lov'd and desired expressly by us, and not only so, but with the very same love wherewith we love happiness it self. For otherwise we should contradict our first and grand Appetite, and act against the very Frame and Constitution of our Nature.

11 This admitted, I consider second∣ly that God is that Full and rich Be∣ing, that has all this happiness in him. He is not only the Cause of all good, but the very Essence and Nature of it. He is (as the Divine Philosopher stiles him) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 good it self, Lovely it self, and Desirable it self. He is indeed the First Desira∣ble as well as the First Intelligible, and as we see and understand all things in him, so in him we desire all that we desire. In short, he is the Complement and perfection of good, the End and the Centre of the whole Intelligent Creation, and all that we can desire or

enjoy; and consequently as we cannot Love beyond him, so we ought not to love short of him. St. Austin has words to this purpose worth Citing. Summa Bonorum Deus. Neque infra remanen∣dum nobis est, neque ultra quaerendum. Alterum enim periculosum, alterum nul∣lum est- God is the Sum of all good. We are neither to fix on this side of him, nor to seek any thing beyond him,* 1.9 the former is dangerous, and the lat∣ter is nothing.

12 And as we are obliged to love God, so ought we to love him beyond all other things whatsoever. We can∣not indeed love him as he is lovely at all, nor can we love him to our utmost till we shall see him as he is, but we may & must now prefer him in our love. Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy Heart, with all thy Soul, with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; so runs the Com∣mandment. And very just we should. For if even in Particular goods Order requires that the most lovely should be

loved most, much more ought we to love him who is the very Essence of good, good it self, beyond all Derivative and secondary good. For there is here no Proportion or Comparison at all.

13 And for the same cause we can never love God too much. As mode∣ration has here no excellence, so excess has here no place. An Infinite Desir∣able can never be too much desired. God is the Measure of all Love, every thing being lovely only so far as it par∣ticipates of him, and consequently the Measure of loving him is to love him without Measure. The Philosopher sayes well in his Politics, that the Ap∣petite of the End is alwaies with∣out end or Term,* 1.10 and that bounds and stints are only in those things that are in order to the End. God therefore being our End we can never love him to excess, no nor the Angels in Heaven neither. Indeed the thing is Absolutely as well as Relatively im∣possible, for as the Narrowness of our

Nature will hinder us from loving him enough, so the infinite Fulness of his own makes him uncapable of being lov'd too much.

14. And thus much for the Love of God. The next thing that we are to desire is the good of the Community. This next to God is the greatest possi∣ble good. For 'tis the good of the whole, than which nothing can be great∣er. The good of the Community is the End, the Measure, the Accomplish∣ment and the final result of all private goods. Hither they all point, and here they all conspire and concentre. And consequently this is the greatest Beauty, the greatest Order, and the greatest Harmony that can possibly re∣sult from the Creature, and is the very next Resemblance of the Perfection of God, who is all in all.

15 This therefore being the greatest Delectable good in it self, it ought to be so also to us, who are to love and desire this good of the Community be∣yond

all private good whatsoever. Nay we ought to desire private good no further than as 'tis conducive to, or at least consistent with the Public Interest. For I consider Society as a Musical Instrument, consisting of va∣riety of strings of different sizes, and strain'd up to different pitches, some of whose Sounds, though ungrateful in some junctures, are yet Musical as they stand in relation to others, and in or∣der to a Common design. Now tho 'tis Natural to desire the grateful sound of every string singly, were this equal∣ly conducing to the harmony of the whole, yet certainly no body is so un∣reasonably absurd, as to desire that this or that Discord should be turned into a sound singly more grateful, to the prejudice of the general harmony, which is of infinitely greater Conse∣quence, than the single gratefulness of one or two Particular Strings.

16 And this is the Case of us men in Society, and this ought to be our mea∣sure.

We ought to consider our selves as so many strings of one great Instru∣ment, and not affect any Pitch or De∣gree more grateful to our selves, to the prejudice of the common harmony, the good of the Community, which is the most delectable good, and ought by us to be most Cordially tender'd, and Principally regarded. Especially con∣sidering that this is the good which God himself cheifly proposes, and prin∣cipally regards both in the Creation and government of the nniverse.

17 And now since the Desire of the End necessarily includes the Desire of the Means, the next Object of our De∣sire must be all things which have a Natural Connexion with the good of the Community. And here 'tis sup∣posed in the first place, that there are some things that have this Natural connexion with it. And 'tis necessary so to suppose. For as God cannot make a natural World according to any particular system whatsoever, but there

will necessarily arise upon it some cer∣tain Relations and habitudes of a∣greement and disagreement; some Mo∣tions will naturally make for its order and Perfection, and some against it. So is it impossible for God to make an Intellectual word, that is, to constitute Society in any particular condition, Scheme or posture, but Relations of a∣greeable and disagreeable will natu∣rally and necessarily arise; some things will naturally make for its order and convenience, and some things will be as naturally contrary to it. And this without any arbitrary interposition of God by the mere natural result and necessity of things. For to recur a∣gain to the instance of a Musical In∣strument, let an Instrument be so and so made, so and so strung, and so and so tuned, and some certain strokes up∣on it will necessarily be harmonical, and other some as necessarily dishar∣monical. But now let the Instrument be tuned another way, and the Rela∣tions

of convenience and disconveni∣ence will alter, the same strokes, that were before disharmonical, may be now harmonical, and so on the contra∣ry. But yet still some strokes will be naturally agreeable and some disa∣greeable, let the Instrument be set which way you please. The Applica∣tion of this to Society is too obvious to insist upon.

18 To proceed therefore, it being supposed that there are some things, which have a natural connexion with the good of the Community, the next obligation of our Love will be, that whatsoever has this natural connexion be will'd and desired by us. For as the good of the Community is the greatest Delectable good, so that which has a natural Connexion with it is the greatest Proffitable good, and is there∣fore to be lov'd with the same love wherewith we love the good of the Community it self, wherein is also im∣plied that whatever has an opposite

Relation is in the same manner to be hated and abhorred. For this is the general Reason of Moral good and E∣vil, of Vertue and Vice, and the Prime Fundamental Law of Nature, which never can cease of expire, however the Particular Instances may change ac∣cording to the variation of the Intel∣lectual Systeme: As I have more fully shewn in another Discourse,* 1.11 and shall therefore here no further enlarge upon it.

19. And now because with relation to the present posture of the Intellectual world, there are some particular things in Specie, which have this natural con∣nexion with the interest of the Com∣munity, such as Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, Patience, Humility, Vera∣city, Fidelity and the like; hence it comes to pass that these are to be lov'd and will'd by us, by vertue of that general Canon, that whatever natu∣rally serve to the good of the Commu∣nity is to be loved, to which these are

reduced as special Instances and exem∣plifications.

20 But I do not think my self ob∣liged to descend to a particular prose∣cution of these or any other vertues, it being not my design to insist upon Particulars, but only to lay down such general Principles, upon which a more Particular Scheme of Morality may be erected, or into which those Parti∣cular Morals which are already extant may and ought to be resolv'd. And besides having brought the Reader in∣to the Road, I think I may now be ex∣cused from attending him any fur∣ther, and shall therefore advance to some other Theoryes of more remote and uncommon observation.

21 Having therefore fix'd the gene∣ral Bounds of Duty by shewing what we must desire, I proceed to consider the Bounds of Liberty by shewing what we may desire. Now the Measures of this are either General or Particular. The general Measures are two. The

First is, that we may desire any thing that is not contrary to what we must desire. From this arises the second ge∣neral Measure, which is that we may desire any thing that is not contrary or Prejudicial to the good of Society.

22 Now as to the Particular Mea∣sures, there is too much variety in them to be all minutely and punctually consider'd. And besides it would be a needless as well as a tedious undertak∣ing. I shall therefore only touch up∣on the more considerable Instances, and such as have not been made the subject of ordinary speculation. And the first Instance of our Liberty which I shall consider, is that we may desire Pleasure. First because the Desire of it is Necessary and invincible, implant∣ed in us by the Author of our Nature, and which we can no more devest our selves of, than we can of any the most essential part of our constition. 2ly Be∣cause pleasure as such in the common Nature of it is singly and simply good,

and in no respect or combination evil. It is singly and simply good, because convenient and agreeable, and in no respect or combination evil, because as such not against the good of the Community.

23 For if pleasure as such were against the good of the Community, then eve∣ry Particular pleasure would be so, be∣cause every particular Pleasure par∣takes of the common nature of plea∣sure, which would then be enough to render it evil, the least defect being a sufficient reason to make any thing so. But now this is so far from being true, that not only some Pleasures are laudable and excellent, but on the contrary no particular pleasure is evil so far as Pleasure, but only by reason of some accidental Combinations and Circumstances, wherein some higher In∣terest is opposed by it. Now this is so far from making against Pleasure, that it makes strongly for it. For if the enjoyment of particular pleasures be

then only and in such Instances and Circumstances restrain'd, when the in∣terest of some greater Happiness is thereby cross'd, it follows that plea∣sure it self is a thing principally re∣garded and provided for by God; and consequently that it is good in it self, and therefore may be desired by us.

24 So much as to the Desire of Plea∣sure in general, or as such. Now con∣cerning Particular Pleasures I propose these two general Canons, which I think will hold in all Instances whatsoever. First that that Pleasure which has no trouble or pain annex'd, may, nay in∣deed cannot but be embraced; as on the contrary, that Pain which has no Pleasure annex'd is to be avoided. The other Canon is, that that pleasure which either hinders a greater plea∣sure, or causes a greater pain is to be nill'd and avoided, as on the contrary that pain which either takes off a greater Pain, or causes a greater plea∣sure is to be will'd and embraced. By

these two general Canons we are to re∣gulate our desire of particular plea∣sures.

25 But now of Particular Pleasures, some are Intellectual and some are Sensual. As to Intellectual Pleasures there is no question to be made, but that any of them may be desired as to their kind, only there are some Mea∣sures to be observ'd with reference to their Degree, Time, Place, and other Circumstances which are too numerous to define, and withal too obvious to need it, and may therefore be left to the Discretion of common Prudence to determine according to the two pre∣ceding general Canons.

26 But now concerning sensual plea∣sure, especially that eminent Species of it which we call Venereal, there is more difficulty. Of this it may be doubted whether it be in its self Evil or no. Some we know among the An∣cients have expressly thought so, and upon this ground have condemn'd the

use of Marriage, as namely, the Sect of the Essenes among the Jews, Tatia∣nus, Marcion, Manichaeus and others. And though these were censured as He∣reticks, yet nothing more common e∣ven among Orthodox and approv'd Writers, than to let fall such expressi∣ons, from which the same conclusion will follow. For when they tax the immorality of some particular instan∣ces of Sensual Pleasure (suppose Adul∣tery or Fornication) they don't ground their charge wholely upon those Civil inconveniences, which either of them bring upon Society in their respective Circumstances, but resolve part of their immorality into sensuality as such, ab∣stracted from those other ill Conse∣quences. They condem them not on∣ly as unjust, as injurious, as inconveni∣ent to the Public, &c. but also as Sen∣sual: Now if any particular sensual pleasure be evil as sensual, then 'twill unavoidably follow that sensual plea∣sure as such is evil.

27 And that it is so, a man might be further induced to think, when he observes that in the Divine Writings (not to say any thing of our Common way of Discourse) such peculiar Epi∣thets of Infamy are given to certain Instances of sensual Pleasure, which can belong to them on no other score than as as Sensual. Nay and as if here lay the very Point of the Immorality, they often receive a Denomination from the Sensual Pleasure, but never from the injustice, unfaithfulness or the like. Thus is Adultery call'd the sin of Vncleanness. And Adulterers are common call'd unclean Persons, Filthy, brutish, &c. In like manner David in his Penitentials for that sin insists cheif∣ly upon the sensual part of it, and ac∣cordingly speaks of washing, cleansing, and making clean. From all which a man would be tempted to gather that the Moral ilness of Adultery were at least partly to be resolv'd into the sen∣suality of it, and consequently that

sensual pleasure is in it self or as such evil.

28 And this seems yet more proba∣ble from the consideration of a cer∣tain Instance of Sensual Pleasure, where∣in there seems to be nothing besides the mere sensuality. As namely vo∣luntary Pollution. And yet this is uni∣versally condemn'd as immoral, and consequently sensual pleasure seems to be in it self evil.

29. As it does yet further from those sharp invectives, which the Moral wri∣ters of all ages have ever used against it as a low, base, brutish and dishono∣rable thing, and from that Shame which naturally attends it, even in Circum∣stances professedly lawful, whereby men seem naturally conscious of some Moral incongruity in the thing purely as such.

30 But now to all this I need oppose but these two things. First that if sen∣sual pleasure were evil in it self or as such, it would be so in all its Instances.

This is an undeniable Consequence. But now that it is not so in all its In∣stances, is plain from the Divine In∣stitution of Marriage. And therefore it is not evil in its self. For it must not be thought (as some seem to fancy) that Marriage makes that good which was in it self evil. For if once evil in it self, it must eternally and universal∣ly be so, and consequently even in Marriage it self, that as to Sensual Plea∣sure being the same with Fornication or Adultery. But sensual pleasure is not evil in Marriage, therefore not in it self or as such. This is Demonstra∣tion.

31 To this I further add that even the grossest Pleasure of Sense, is one of the remoter Participations of God. For it must be granted to be at least a Na∣tural good, and every particular good be it what it will, is a Ray and Emana∣tion of the universal good. But now nothing of God can be simply and ab∣solutely evil. And besides, I consider

that in the Human frame God has pre∣pared Organs and Instruments for the use of Sensual Pleasure, and that he has also given us Natural Appetites and Inclinations to it. Whereby it appears that God has provided for the gratifi∣cation of the Animal as well as the Di∣vine life. And though this is to be chiefly nourish'd, yet the other is not to be starv'd. For it is a Tree of Gods own planting, and therefore the Fruit of it may be good for Food, as well as Fair to the eye. For there can be nothing simply evil in the Paradise of God. As tis finely made out by the excellent Doctor More in several places of his Con∣jectura Cabalistica, where the Reader may find this Argument copiously and very excellently managed.

32 I conclude therefore that Sensual Pleasure is not in its own simple Na∣ture evil, and Consequently that no Particular Instance of it is evil barely as being Sensual (for if so then sensual pleasure as such would be evil) but

only as it stands invested with some Circumstances, which make it incon∣sistent with some higher good, the good of society. Thus in voluntary Pollu∣tion there is a deordination from the End of Nature, Generation, and here∣in consists its evil, not in its being a sensual pleasure. And accordingly we find that those other Pleasures of sense, which are not appropriated by Nature to any peculiar end, are in their use wholely indifferent, as using rich Per∣fumes, drinking delicious Wines, &c. Thus again in Fornication, though the end of generation may be here serv'd, yet the ends of Convenient Education cannot. And herein lies the evil of this, not in its being an act of sensuality or a sensual Pleasure.

33 But because there are some that are ready to call in question the na∣tural immorality of simple Fornication, and those that do allow it are scarce resolv'd where to fix it, 'twill not be amiss to prosecute this a little further.

The best Account that I know of this matter, is that which is given by Tho. Aquinas,* 1.12 and indeed I think it very Full, rational and satisfa∣ctory. And because I cannot do it in better words, I will give it in his own. It is to be consider'd (sayes he) that in those Animals, in which the Fe∣male alone is sufficient for the bringing up of the young, the Male and Female af∣ter Copulation remain no time together, as in Dogs. But among those Animals in which the Female is not sufficient for the bringing up of the young, the Male and Female after Copulation remain to∣gether, as long as is necessary for the Edu∣cation and Instruction of the young. As it appears in some Birds, whose young ones can't get their living presently af∣ter they are brought forth. For since Birds don't nourish their young with milk (which Nature has made ready at hand, as in Beasts) but are forc'd to go forrage abroad for Meat, and besides to cherish their young while they feed them, the Fe∣male

would not be sufficient alone for all this. And therefore by the order of Pro∣vidence the Male among such Creatures is Naturally inclined to abide with the Female for the Education of the young. Now 'tis plain that in Human kind the Woman would by no means suffice alone for the Education of the Child, since the necessity of Human life requires many things which cannot be supplied by one only. It is therefore convenient accord∣ing to Human Nature that the Man af∣ter Conjunction should abide by the Wo∣man, and not presently depart, and take up indifferently with any body, as 'tis among those that Fornicate. Neither will the case be alter'd by the womans be∣ing so rich as to be able to nourish her child by ber self. Because the Natural Rectitude of Human actions is not to be measured according to those things, which happen by Accident in one Individual, but according to those things which fol∣low the whole Species. Again it is to be consider'd, that in Human kind the Off-spring

does not only need nourishment as to the body, like other Animals, but al∣so Instruction as to the Soul. For other Animals have Natural Instincts by which they may provide for themselves. But now man lives by Reason, and must at∣tain to discretion by long experience. Whence it becomes necessary that Children be instructed by their experienc'd Pa∣rents. Nor are they capable of this In∣struction assoon as they are born, but af∣ter a considerable time, and chiefly when they come to years of Discretion. For to this Instruction a great deal of time is required, and even then too by reason of the violence of Passion by which the Iudgment is perverted, they will want not only to be instructed, but to be subdued. Now for this the Woman alone is not suf∣ficient, but this is rather to be the work of the Man, whose Reason is better able to instruct, and his strength to Correct. 'Tis necessary therefore in Human kind to take care of the Off-spring not for a short time as in Birds, but for a conside∣rable

space of life. And therefore where∣as tis necessary in all Creatures that the Male abide with the Female as long as the Office of the Male is requisite for the Off-spring, 'tis natural to mankind that the Man associate not for a little while but alwaies with one determinate wo∣man. And this Society we call Matri∣mony. Matrimony is therefore natural to mankind. And Fornicarious mixture, which is besides Matrimony, is against the good of Man, and for this reason must of necessity be a sin.

34 Thus this excellent and most ex∣act Theorist, whose words I should not have transcribed at length, were they not of more than ordinary weight and moment. By this it appears, that Simple Fornication is naturally im∣moral, and wherein its Immorality lies. Not in its being a Sensual Plea∣sure, but in its being so circumstan∣tiated as not to comport with the good of society. And what I observe here in particular of simple Fornication, the

same may be said of any other forbid∣den Instance of Sensual Pleasure, that they are not evil as sensual, but upon the Consideration of some Accident or Circumstance, whereby they inter∣fere with the Publick interest.

35 To the Objections therefore on the other side I answer, first that it must be own'd that nothing is more common, even among approv'd Wri∣ters, than when they tax the immora∣lity of some particular Instances of sen∣sual pleasure to condemn them un∣der the Formality of their being sen∣sual. But herein is their mistake, and if men will talk confusedly of things, and assign false causes for true ones, who can help it?

36 To the second I answer, that when the Scripture gives such peculiar Epithetes of Infamy to some instances of sensual pleasure, that can belong to them on no other score than as sensu∣al, it must be confess'd that the sen∣sual part is then tax'd. But then this

is not, must not be understood as to the kind, but as to the Degree. Not the degree of Pleasure, but the degree of Affection, it being a plain Argument, that men are too much set upon Sen∣sual Pleasure, when for the sake of it they will adventure to gransgress Or∣der, and trespass against the good of Society. And this indeed is a culpable sensuality.

37 To the third I answer, that in that certain condemn'd Instance of sensual pleasure wherein there seems to be nothing besides the mere sensual perception, there is really something besides, tho not according to a Physi∣cal, yet according to a Moral Estima∣tion. For it is not barely a sensual pleasure, but a sensual pleasure deor∣dinated from the end of God and Na∣ture, namely, generation, for which it was design'd. And in this Deordina∣tion not in the sensuality consists its na∣tural evil and Moral Turpitude.

38 To the fourth I answer that those

severe declamations which the Mora∣lists of all Ages have made against sen∣sual pleasure in general, as a low, base, brutish and dishonourable thing, must either be understood Comparatively, with respect to the higher character of Intellectual Pleasures, or they are ill grounded and unreasonable. And then as to the shame, which naturally attends the acting of this sensual plea∣sure in all its instances, though it may in the first place be question'd whether this shame be from Nature or no, and not rather from Education and Arbi∣trary usages, yet for the present I will suppose it natural, and the Account of it I conceive must be this, it being a thing of vast consequence and Moment to the interest of Sociable life, that man should be propagated in a decent and regular way, and not as Brutes are, God thought it convenient for this purpose to imbue our Natures with this impression of shame with respect to venereal pleasure in general. Not be∣cause

this sensual delectation is in its own nature simply evil, but lest our Inclination to sensual pleasure in gene∣ral should betray us into those instances of it which are so. Which this natu∣ral impression was intended as a curb to prevent. By all which it plainly ap∣pears notwithstanding all the intrica∣cy, wherewith some confused Thinkers have entangled this matter, that Sen∣sual, even the grossest sensual pleasure cannot be in its own nature and as such evil, and consequently that it may be desired by us in such convenient Circumstances, wherein no higher good is opposed.

39 Now from this Hypothesis it will follow first, that Original Concupiscence must be far otherwise stated than usu∣ally it is. It is commonly understood to be a vicious disposition or Deprava∣tion of Nature, whereby we become inclined to evil. Now if you ask, what evil. They tell you, tis Carnal or sen∣sual pleasure. But now (as it has been

abundantly demonstrated) this is not simply and in its own nature evil, but only as 'tis Circumstantiated. And this original Concupiscence is not so par∣ticular (as being a blind Appetite) as to point to sensual pleasure in this or that Circumstance, but is carried only to sensual pleasure in common or as such. Which being not evil, neither can the inclination that respects it be evil or sinful, every Act or Inclination being specified from its Object. It must not be said therefore, that this Origi∣nary Concupiscence, or natural Im∣pression toward sensible good, is formal∣ly evil and sinful, the most we can al∣low is, that it is an Occasion of evil, the strong tendency we have to sensual pleasure in common, being very apt to betray us to consent to the enjoyment of it in inconvenient Instances and Cir∣cumstances.

40 Another Consequent from the Premises is this, that the Duty and ver∣tue of Mortification does not consist

(as 'tis vulgarly apprehended) in re∣moving and killing the natural Desire of sensual pleasure. For the natural Desire of sensual pleasure is not evil, its Object not being so, and consequently not to be eradicated. But that it con∣sists in such a due Repression and Di∣scipline of the Body, that our natural desire of sensual pleasure in Common may not carry us to the express willing of it in such instances as are against Or∣der, and the good of Society.

SECT. III. The Measures of Love of Benevolence, particularly of Self-love.

1 HAving prescribed some general Measures for the Regulation of the first great Branch of Love, Love of Concupiscence, I come now to set bounds to the other Arm of the same great Sea, Love of Benevolence. And because this is first divided into Self-love and Charity, or wishing well to ones self, and wishing well to some other Being, I shall in the first place state the Measures of regulating self-love.

2 This sort of Love is generally the most irregular of any, and that which causes irregularity in all the rest. We love our selves First, and last, and most of all. Here we alwaies begin, and here we most commonly end, and so immoderate are we in it that we prose∣cute

our own private interest, not only without any respect to the Common good, but oftentimes in direct Oppo∣sition to it, and so we can but secure to our selves a Plank, care not what becomes of the Vessel we sail in. This is the great Sucker of Society, and that which robbs the Body Politick of its due nourishment, and drains the Com∣mon Fountain to feed our own lesser Streams. Nay so foolishly immode∣rate and inordinate are we in the love of our selves, that we prefer our own little interest not only before greater of the Public, but before greater of our own, and love our Bodyes better than our Souls, a lesser interest that's present better than a greater that's di∣stant, tho equally sure, ond infinitely greater. In short, tis from the inor∣dinateness of this one Principle, Self-love, that we ruin the good of the Community here, and our own selves both here and hereafter. Here there∣fore is great need of Regulation.

3 Now I suppose the Measures of Self-love may all be reduced to this one in general, viz. that self-love is ne∣ver culpable, when upon the whole matter all things being taken into the Account, we do truely and really love our selves. It is then only culpable, when we love our selves by halves, and in some par∣ticular respects only to our greater dis∣advantage in others of more impor∣tance. And because this we generally do, hence it comes to pass that self-love is commonly taken in a bad sense, as if 'twere a thing evil and irregular in it self. But that's a mistake, Self-love is a Principle and Dictate of Nature, and the Instrument of attaining to that Happiness, which is the End of our Creation, and consequently can never be faulty, when upon the whole mat∣ter all things consider'd, it is a true Love of our selves,

4 Now to make it so, three things are required. First that we do not mistake our true selves by wishing well

to, or consulting the welfare of our worser part in prejudice to our better, by feeding the Brute and starving the Man. This would be to love our selves in a little, and to hate our selves in much, and would therefore upon the whole, better deserve the name of self-hatred than self-love. If therefore we would love our selves truely and re∣gularly, we must learn in the first place not to mistake our true selves.

5 The next requisite is, that we do not mistake our true Interest, by wil∣ling to our selves a lesser good, when the having it will cost us the loss of a greater. This is properly that Foolish Exchange condemn'd by our B. Saviour; 'Tis to gain a World, and loose a Soul; and what gain's that? This is indeed the Bargain of Fools and Madmen, and yet such Bargains we usually make, and what adds to the folly, think that we love our selves all the while. But this is not to love our selves truely, and therefore not Regularly.

6 The third and last Requisite for the Regulation of self-love is, that we do not will any good to our selves, that is not consistent with the good of the Community. And that not only be∣cause the Publick good is of greater Consequence than any Private good can be, but also because that which is against the good of the Community, cannot be upon a final Consideration of things really for the good of any Particular Person in it. For the good of the whole is the good of the Part, and the evil of the whole is the evil of the Part, and all private Interest is so twisted, complicated and imbarqued with the Publick, that there is no pre∣judicing this without prejudicing that. This indeed may not be the present and immediate effect, but 'twill prove so in the consequence and final up∣shot. For Society is like an Arch in a Building, where one Stone supports an∣other, and in supporting others they support themselves. And so on the

contrary, should they undermine one another, they would at length by con∣sequence undermine themselves. He therefore that out of love to himself prosecutes any private interest to the Prejudice of Society, trespasses against his own good as well as that of the Community, and when all is com∣puted, cannot be said truely and really to love himself. The Sum is, to make our self-love Regular and according to Order, we must take care not to mistake our true selves, nor our true Interest, and that we don't prejudice the Publick welfare, and then we can never love our selves too much.

SECT. IV. The Measures of Common Charity.

1 COncerning Common Charity. I consider that the Measures of it may all breifly be absolv'd in these two, the Object of it, and the Order of it. As to the Object of Charity, 'tis of a ve∣ry great and diffused latitude, and takes in first all men, whether good or bad, Friends or Enemies, Neighbours or Strangers, and in all Respects, whe∣ther as to Soul or Body, name or goods &c. It extends also in some Measure to the very Irrational Creatures, it be∣ing one of the Characters of a good man in Scripture to be Merciful to his Beast. Nay it reaches to the Angeli∣cal Natures themselves, and indeed to the whole Intellectual, Rational and Sensitive world that are capable of the least degree of Benefit.

2 In all this there is no Difficulty,

only it may be here question'd, whe∣ther the Devils and Damn'd Spirits are to be comprehended within the Sphere of our Charity? To which I answer, that there are two things that may ren∣der any Being uncapable of being an Object of our Charity or wishing well to. Either Perfect Fulness, or Perfect Indigence. Now 'tis the Perfection of Indigence to be reduced to such a De∣gree of want as not to be in a Capacity of ever being releiv'd. The former is the Condition of God, which makes him uncapable of being made the ob∣ject of our Benevolence, as was ob∣serv'd before, the latter is the case of Devils and Damn'd Spirits: And for this reason we cannot will any good to them, as not being capable of any. For we cannot exert any act of Love which we know to be in vain and to no pur∣pose at all, let the incapacity proceed either from extream Fulness or ex∣tream Indigence; for what is there that should excite any such Act? And be∣sides

if we could possibly wish well to such Beings, yet I don't see how we may do it lawfully and Regularly. For our will would not be then conforma∣ble to Gods, but directly opposite to it, and besides we should disapprove, at least tacitly and interpretatively, the Iustice of his waies, by thus loving them whom he extremely hates, and Blessing them whom he curses and abandons for ever.

3 Thus far of the Object of our Cha∣rity. Now concerning the Order of it, let these general Measures be observ'd. First that we wish well to him most, who is most likely to be serviceable to the Publick, supposing the good which we will him, to be such, as by the hav∣ing it, he become more capable of serv∣ing the Publick. Thus had I the Di∣sposal of an Ecclesiastical Benefice, which is a thing wherein the good of the Publick is highly concern'd, I ought certainly to bestow it upon him who I thought would do most good in it. Tho

at the same time I had never so many Friends or Relations that wanted it. For this is a sure and never failing Rule, that the good of the Publick is alwaies to be prefer'd before any Private inte∣rest whatever.

4 Secondly that of two that are e∣qually serviceable to the Publick, we will this good wherein the Publick is concern'd, to him that is most Indigent; for after the Publick exigence is pro∣vided for, private necessity comes in to be regarded. But if both equally ser∣viceable and equally Indigent, then we are to will it to him that is most our Neighbour, Friend, or Relation, or any other way indear'd to our Affe∣ction.

5 But thirdly, supposing the good to be such that the Interest of the Public is not concern'd who has it, then I am only to consult the good of the Person to whom I will it, and consequently here Equity will require that the Pre∣ference be given to those that are near

me before strangers, and among those that are near to those that are nearest, whether by Nature, Choice, or Place, or in any other Respect. And among strangers 'tis equitable that the Indi∣gent be prefer'd in our Charity before the Rich, the good before the Bad, and the more good before the less good, and the like. But still with this neces∣sary Reserve, that all other things be equal between them.

6 For 4ly, 'tis utterly unreasonable, that I should prefer the Convenience of my Friend before the Necessity of my Enemy. No, I ought to do the contra∣ry, and prefer the Necessity of my worst enemy before the Convenience even of my Dearest Friend. Thus I would leave my Friend in the Mire, to save my enemy from drowning. For in this and such like cases the greatness of the Necessity compensates for the want of merit in the Person.

7 The last general Measure that I shall prescribe is, that as we ought not

to prefer any man's convenience be∣fore another man's necessity, so neither ought we to prefer any man's own con∣venience before his own necessity. My meaning is, that we ought to consider our Neighbours true and best Interest, will and do him that good which he stands most in need of, and not do him a little kindness which will end in a greater mischief. Hence it follows that we ought to tender the Interest of his Soul, more than the good of his Body; the Direction of his conscience more than the ease and security of it; that we stick not to prick and launce him in order to his Cure; and (when both can't be done) that we chuse ra∣ther to proffit him than to please him. For this is true Charity, tho a severer sort of it, and he is a Fool, who when saved from drowning, complains of be∣ing pluckt out of the water by the hair of his head.

SECT. V. The Measures of Friendship.

1 I Am now come to my last Stage, where I am to give Measures to the greatest Rarity, and the greatest Excellency in all the world. For indeed among all Human enjoyments nothing is so Rarely acquired, so Dearly possess'd, and so unhappily lost as a True Friend.

2 Indeed true Friendship is so great a Rarity, that I once thought it hard∣ly worth while, to prescribe Measures to a thing that so seldom happens, and when it does, those few excellent Per∣sons, that are fit for so Sacred a union, can never want to be instructed how to conduct it. But then considering withal the great excellency, and useful∣ness of it to human life, I could not forgive my self so considerable an O∣mission, as the passing by the Regula∣tion

of so noble a Charity.

3 I call it Charity, for 'tis a special Modification of it, and differs no other∣wise from common Charity, than as 'tis qualify'd by some particular Mo∣difications and Circumstances, as was above described. It is a Sacred Inclo∣sure of that Benevolence, which we owe to all Mankind in Common, and an Actual exercise of that kindness to a few, which we would willingly shew to all, were it practicable and consistent with our Faculties, Opportunities, and Circumstances. 'Tis indeed a kind of Revenging our selves upon the Narrow∣ness of our Faculties, by exemplifying that extraordinary Charity upon one or two which we both owe, and are also ready and disposed, but by reason of the scantiness of our condition, are not sufficiently able to exercise towards all. We are willing that even this our love should be as extensive and dif∣fused as the Light, (as for Common Cha∣rity, that must and ought to be so) but

then finding that the Rayes of it would be too faint and weak, to give any bo∣dy any considerable warmth, when so widely spread and diffused, we are fain to contract them into a little com∣pass to make them burn and heat, and then our Charity Commences Friend∣ship.

4 Now as to the Measures of Friend∣ship, these have been already so amply and excellently stated by the Seraphic Pen of a great Prelate of our Church, in a just Discourse upon this Occasion, that there needs nothing to be further added; nor should I offer to write an Iliad after such an Homer, did I not think it more necessary to the Intire∣ness of this work in general, than to make up any defect in this Particular Part, which that excellent Author has not supplied. I shall therefore be the more brief and sparing in this Account.

5 Now I suppose all that is necessa∣ry for the Regulation of Friendship may conveniently be reduced to these

three general considerations. First what Measures are to be observed in the Contracting of Friendship. 2ly What Measures are to be observ'd in the con∣ducting or maintaining it. 3ly What Measures are to be observ'd in the dis∣solving of it.

6 In the contracting of Friendship our first care must be to make such a choice as we shall never have cause to repent of. For when ever we cease to love a Friend, 'tis great odds if we do not mortally hate him. For 'tis hard to maintain a Mediocrity; and nothing can reflect more upon our Prudence and Discretion, than to hate him whom we once thought worthy of our highest love.

7 Now that we may not repent of our Choice, the Measures to be observ'd are these. First, that the Person whom we mark out for a Friend, be a good and vertuous Man. For an ill man can neither long love, nor be long be∣lov'd. Not by a good man to be sure,

nor indeed by one as bad as himself. For this is a true Observation, that however men love evil in themselves, yet no man loves it in another, and tho a man may be a Friend to Sin, yet no body loves the Sinner. And according∣ly we find that the Friendships of wick∣ed men are the most temporary and short-lived things in the world, and in∣deed are rather to be call'd Conspira∣cies than Friendships. And besides their Interests will draw them several waies, and so distract and divide their union; for vice is full of Variety and Contra∣diction, sets one and the same man at odds with himself, much more with another. But now Virtue is a thing of oneness, simplicity and uniformity, and indeed the only solid Foundation for Friendship.

8 The next Measure is that we chuse a Person of a sweet, liberal and oblig∣ing humour. For there are a thousand little endearments and compliances in the exercise of Friendship, that make

good Nature and necessary as rigid virtue and Honesty. Strict vertue in Friend∣ship is like the exact Rules of Mathe∣maticks in Musical compositions, which indeed are necessary to make the Har∣mony true and regular, but then there must be something of Ayre and Delica∣cy in it too, to sweeten and recommend it, or else 'twill be but flat and heavy.

9 The next Measure to this purpose is that we chuse a Person of a humour and disposition as nigh our own as we can. This will make our friendly Com∣munications both more pleasant and more lasting. The other qualities are as the Materials in Building, this an∣swers to Figure and shape. And unless the Materials be of an agreeable and correspondent figure, though otherwise never so good, the structure will nei∣ther be sightly to the eye, nor hold long together.

10 One thing more I would have re∣member'd in the contracting of friend∣ship, and that is, that we don't make

our selves over to too many. Marriage which is the strictest of Frienships ad∣mits but of one, and indeed inferiour Friendship admits not of many more. For besides that the Tide of Love, by reason of the contractedness of our faculties, can't bear very high when di∣vided among several channels, 'tis great odds but that among many we shall be deceiv'd in some, and then we must be put upon the inconvenience of Repentance and retractation of choice, which in nothing is so uncomely and inconvenient as in friendship. Be kind therefore to all, but Intimate only with a few.

11 Now the Measures of conducting and maintaining friendship may be such as these. 1. That we look upon our Friend as another self, and treat him accordingly. 2. That we love him fervently, effectually and constantly. 3. That we use his conversation fre∣quently, and alwaies prefer it. 4. That we trust him with our Secrets and most

important concerns. 5. That we make use of his help and service, and be not shy of being obliged to him. 6. That we don't easily entertain any Jealou∣sies or Suspicions of him. 7. That we defend his Reputation when we hear it wrongfully charged. 8. That we wink at those small faults which he re∣ally has. 9. That we take the Freedom to advise, and if need be, to reprove him, and that we be well contented to take the same usage from him a∣gain. 10. That we freely pay him that Respect and just Acknowledgment that's due to his Merits, and that we shew our selves pleased when the same is done by others. 11. That we do not envy him when advanced above us, nor despise him when fallen beneath us. 12. That we relieve him plentifully and liberally when reduced to any streights or exigencyes. And lastly, that we alwaies prefer the good of his Soul before any other interest of his, and make it our strictest concern to pro∣mote

his Happy condition in the other world. This indeed is the most excel∣lent and necessary Office of Friend∣ship, and all without this is but of lit∣tle signification.

12. And thus much for the Condu∣cting of Friendship. I proceed now to the Measures that are to be observ'd in the Dissolution of it. And here two things come to be consider'd, the Cause, and the Manner of dissolving it. And first, 'tis supposed that there may be a Cause for the Dissolution even of Friendship. The wise man tells us, that for some things every Friend will de∣part, and Marriage, which is the strict∣est Frindship, has its Divorce. For tis with the union of two Friends, as with the union of Soul and Body. There are some degrees of distemperature that, although they weaken and di∣sturb the union, yet however they are consistent with it, but then there are others again, that quite destroy the Vital Congruity, and then follows Sepa∣ration.

13 Now as to the Cause, that may justify a Dissolution of Friendsh, it can be no other than something, that is directly contrary to the very Design and Essence of Friendship, such as a notorious Apostacy to vice and wick∣edness, notorious Perfidiousness, deli∣berate Malice or the like. To which (were I to speak my own sense) I would add, a desperate and resolv'd conti∣nuance in all this, For I think as long as there is any hopes of amendment, the man is rather to be Advised than De∣serted.

14 But if hopeless and irreclaim∣able, we may and must desert him. But let it be with all the tenderness imagi∣nable, with as much unwillingness and reluctancy as the Soul leaves her over-distemper'd Body. And now our great∣est care must be that our former Dear∣ness turn not to inveterate Hatred. There is great danger of this, but it ought not to be so. For tho the Friend be gone, yet still the Man remains, and

tho he has forfetted my Friendship, yet still I owe him common Charity. And 'twere well if we would rise a little higher, and even yet pay him some lit∣tle respect, and maintain a small un∣der-current of Affection for him, upon the stock of our former dearness and Intimacy. For so the deceased Ghost loves to hover for a while about her old Companion, though by reason of its utter discongruity, it be no longer fit for the mutuall intercourses of Life and Action.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Psal. 16.
• * 1.2

  Psal. 42.
• * 1.3

  Psal. 119.
• * 1.4

  Psal. 73.
• * 1.5

  1.2.
• * 1.6

  1.7.
• * 1.7

  5.8.
• * 1.8

  Dan. 10.
• * 1.9

  Lib. De Mor. Eccl.
• * 1.10

  Lib. 1. cap. 6.
• * 1.11

  Consid. upon the Nature of Sin.
• * 1.12

  Lib. 3. con. gent. cap. 122.