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HAving pass'd over the two first Stages of the Intellectu∣al Conduct of Human Life, that of the End, and that of the Means; and reflected upon the Irregulari∣ties of each, by shewing how both are generally mistaken and mis∣placed; I am now arrived to the Third and Last, which consists not in the choice of the Object, or of
the Method to it (that belonging to the two former) but in the De∣gree of Affection wherewith they are prosecuted. Which part of our Intellectual Conduct, as it is equal∣ly Capable of being faulty, so I shall here make it my business to shew that it is actually as faulty and irregular, if not more than either of the two former. And the fault that I tax it with, is, A too impor∣tunate and over-earnest Pursuit after Knowledge in General.
The Charge of this Reflection is of a larger compass and extent than either of the two Preceding, those being directed against such as either misplace the Object, or else mistake the Method of Learn∣ing and Knowledge; but this takes in both together, and others also not concerned in either of the former. For not only those that err in the placing of Learning, or in the method to it, but also those who are Right in both, come under
the Censure of the Present Refle∣ction, they all agree in this, in being too importunate and vehe∣ment in the Pursuit of Knowledge.
Now in the making out the Truth of this Charge, We must here also according to the Method observ'd in the two former Refle∣ctions, first lay down a common measure of Proceeding, by stating the due Bounds of our Present Affection to, and search after Know∣ledge, Or, how far it becomes man to imploy himself in the Pro∣secution of Learning and Know∣ledge? the due stating of which Question will be a certain direction to us in the Determination of this, whether our general Inquest after Knowledge be Immoderate or no. Now for the Determination of the first it will be necessary to draw up the true State or Hypothesis of man according to the Posture wherein he now stands. Which I shall do distinctly in these follow∣ing Considerations.
First I consider, that the utmost Pitch of Knowledge man by his ut∣most endeavours can arrive to in this world is very inconsiderable. God indeed has given us Reason enough to distinguish us from the Brute part of the Creation, and we may improve it so far as to distinguish our selves from One ano∣ther, and so one man may deserve to be call'd Learned and Knowing in comparison of another that is either Naturally more ignorant, or more unimproved; but absolutely speaking, the most that any or all of us either know or can know here is of little or no Consideration. What we know of God is but little, for as the Apostle says, we see through a Glass, darkly; what we know of our selves perhaps is Less, and what we know of the world about us is not much. We have seen but a few of Gods works,* 1.1 as the wise man observes, and we under∣stand yet fewer. There are almost
an infinite number of things which we never so much as thought of, and of most things we conceive very darkly and uncertainly, and there is not one thing from the greatest to the least, which we do or can under∣stand thoroughly. Those that ap∣ply their whole study to any one thing, can never come to the End of that one thing, for not only every Science but every particular of it has its unmeasurable depths and recesses; and 'tis confess'd by a great inquirer into the Nature of Antimony (as 'tis related by the Honourable Mr. Boyle) that 'tis impossible for one man to understand throughly that one single Mineral only.* 1.2 And if a man I cannot understand All of so little, how little must he under∣stand of All! Suppose further, that all the Knowledge of the Learned were put together, 'twould weigh but Light, for what one Art or Science is there that is brought to any tolerable Perfection? And if the Common Stock be so little,
how small a Pittance is it that must fall to every particular Man's share! And where is that Man who after all his Poring and Stu∣dying, is able to answer all the Questions, I will not say which God put to Iob,* 1.3 but which may be askt him by the next Idiot he meets?
'Twere an endless undertaking to represent at large the little that we know, or are capable of know∣ing. Nor do I design to turn a se∣cond Agrippa, and entertain your Ladyship with a long Harangue about the Vanity of Humane Sci∣ences, only give me leave to touch upon two notorious instances of our Ignorance, and in that very Science which is pretended to be at the very Vertical Point of Im∣provement. 'Tis Concerning the the Maximum and the Minimum Naturale, the Greatest and the Least thing in Nature. As to the first, the Question is whether the Exten∣sion
of the Universe be Finite or Infinite? If you say 'tis Positively Infinite, besides the difficulty of conceiving how any thing can be so extended, 'twill follow that God himself cannot add the least further Dimension to it. If you say 'tis Finite, suppose your self in the utmost extremities of it, and try whether it be possible for you to dis-imagin further Extension. Then as to the Second, the Questi∣on is whether every, even the Least assignable Part of matter be infinitely Divisible or no? If you say yes, then 'twill unavoidably follow that the least Atom will have as many Parts as the whole World. If you say no, then you must say that Matter may be Divi∣ded so long till at last you come to a Part that does not contain more other Parts, if so, then I enquire has this uncontaining Part Figure, or has it not? If not, then 'tis in∣finite, Figure being only the Ter∣mination of Quantity. But if it
has, then it has more other Parts above, below and of each side, and consequently may again be divi∣ded, contrary to what you sup∣pos'd. So that you see here are Desperate Difficulties on both sides, say what you will you are equally baffled, and yet 'tis most certain that one only can be true, they being two opposite parts of a Contradicti∣on, but which is so, is beyond the Capacity of Humane understanding to determine.
The like Difficulties we meet with when we inquire concerning Time, whether it be Infinitely divisi∣ble, or only into Moments? And so again in the Business of Motion, whether there be any such thing as the Extream Degree of Swiftness and Slowness, or no? Neither of which can be defined without ma∣nifest Absurdity. But 'tis superflu∣ous, as well as endless, to display the particulars of our Ignorance, tho indeed when all Accompts are
cast up, that will be found to be our best Knowledge. This only in General, our Life is so short, our Progress in Learning so slow, and Learning in it self so long and te∣dious, and what we do or can know so very little, that the Pa∣trons of Scepticism had much more reason to conclude from the Dis∣ability of our Facculties and the slightness of our Attainments, than from the uncertainty and Instability of Truth, that there is no Know∣ledge.
Secondly, I consider, that as we can here know but Little, so even that very little which we do, serves more to our Trouble and Disquiet, than to our Pleasure and Satisfacti∣on. And here comes in that ex∣perimental Reflection of the Wise Man,* 1.4 In much Wisdom is much Grief, and he that increases Know∣ledge, increases Sorrow. This Pro∣position is not true, Absolutely con∣sider'd, Knowledge being the Per∣fection
of Human Nature, the Image of God,* 1.5 and the Principal In∣gredient of our Future Happiness; but only with relation to the pre∣sent State and Posture of Man. And in this respect it is abun∣dantly true. First, because the more we know, the more we shall discover of our Ignorance, (that being the chiefest thing we learn by our study) which we shall find to be of an infinitely larger Sphere than our Knowledge, and consequently shall be more troubled for what we do not know, than pleas'd with what we do. Second∣ly, because the Prospect of what yet further remains to be known will inflame our Thirst after it. For Wisdom says of her self, They that Eat of me shall yet be Hungry, and they that Drink of me shall yet be Thirsty. Which tho it be a great Commendation of Wisdom, and an Argument of her Inexhaustible excellence, yet 'tis withal a great instrument of Punishment to those
who can attain to so little of it, as cannot satisfie that thirst which it has inflamed. Thirdly, because the more a Man improves his thinking faculty, the more apt he will be to be disgusted and offended with the follies of Society; as the most delicate Touch is the soonest put to pain. There being a thou∣sand impertinencies that will strike very disagreeably upon a discerning mind which won't so much as affect a grosser understanding.
But the Principal Ground of this Assertion, and which, did not the quickness of your Ladyship's Apprenhension oblige me to Bre∣vity, I could be Voluminous upon, is this. 'Tis most certain that Man is now placed in the Midst of Vani∣ties and unsatisfying Objects, and and that his True good is not with∣in his reach, and consequently whatever Pleasure he takes in those things that are, is purely owing to his Ignorance of their Vanity. Well,
if so, then Vae Sapienti, woe be to the Wise Man. This is not a Place to be Wise in. There is nothing here Solid enough to endure the Test of Wisdom. The Wise Man cannot find a Paradice here, tho the Fool can. The more he knows the more he discovers the Vanity of all pretended Enjoyments, and the more he does this, the more he streightens and retrenches his De∣lights, and the more he does this, the more he retires and withdraws himself from all Worldly Diversi∣ons, and this sets him the more a Thinking and Musing, and this again presents to his mind a fresh and more lively Conviction of the Worlds Vanity, and this makes him again retrench his Delights, and so on in this returning Circle, till at length he finds nothing but his bare Wisdom to delight in. And a little more Thinking makes him see the Vanity of that too. And now all's gone. To dispatch this part in one word, this is the Fruit of
being Wise, to be able to taste no∣thing that's Present, nor to flatter ones self with the Prospect of what is to come, which is a state of hor∣rible Privation and Sterility. This is the thorough Wise Mans Lot, and every advance in Wisdom is a step towards this Condition So true is it, that he who increases Wisdom, increases Sorrow, while in the mean time the Fool Laughs, and is Merry.
Thirdly, I Consider, that if our Knowledge could yield us more Satisfaction than it occasions Trou∣ble, yet our Life is so short, and so incumber'd, that we can make but little of the enjoyment, so little, that 'tis not answerable to the meer Labour we undergo in acquiring it. All the Morning of our days is spent in the Prelimina∣ries of Learning, in Learning Words and Terms of Art, wherein there is nothing but toil and drudgery, and before we can taste any of the
Fruits of the Tree of Knowledge, before we can relish what is Intel∣lectual and Rational in it, our Sun is got into the Meridian, and then it presently begins to decline and our Learning with it; our Light, our Strength, and our Time make haste to consume, nothing increa∣ses now but the Shadows, that is our Ignorance and Darkness of mind, and while we consider and look about us, the Sun Sets, and all is concluded in the Darkness and Shadow of Death. But often∣times the Sun is intercepted by a Cloud long before it Setts, and we live backward again, grow weak and Childish, Silly and forgetful, and unlearn faster than we learnt; or if it chance to shine bright to the last, then we improve too much, and grow too wise for our selves, and reject the greatest part of what we learnt before, as idle and insigni∣ficant. So that we are under a Necessity of unlearning in a short time most of what we have so dearly
learnt, either through forgetful∣ness, or improvement of Iudgment.
Fourthly, I Consider, that there is no Necessity of our being so won∣derfully Learned and Knowing here. 'Tis neither Necessary as injoin'd by God, nor as a Means to any considerable End. We can be Good, and we can be Happy without it. And as to the Interest of Commu∣nities and Public Societies, 'tis Civil Prudence and Honesty, and not Learning which makes them Happy. And lest any advantage in our after State should be alledged for its Necessity, this makes it more unnecessary than any Considerati∣on besides. For tho we are never so unlearned now, provided we know enough to do our Duty, and live well, we shall in a short time arrive to such a degree of Know∣ledge as is requisite to our Supream Perfection, to which our Present Learning cannot add, and from which our Present Ignorance will not Diminish. I do not say this
will be immediately upon our dis∣charge from the Body, there being some reasonable Controversie about that, (which would be too great a Digression at present to pursue) tho 'tis most certain that even then there must needs be great inlarge∣ments of Understanding; However 'tis most unquestionable that this our Intellectual Accomplishment can be no further off than our en∣joyment of the Beatific Vision. We shall then commence instantane∣ously Wise and Learned, and be fully possess'd of the Tree of Know∣ledge, as well as of the Tree of Life. For then that Glass through which we now see Darkly shall be laid aside, and there shall be no o∣ther but the Speculum Deitatis, the Glass of the Divinty, which is no other than the Ideal World, which shall be now more intimately united to us, and more clearly dis∣play'd before us. And tho even now there shall be Degrees of Knowledge according to the vari∣ous
Participiation of the Ideal Light, yet the variety of this Dis∣pensation shall not proceed by the degree of our Knowledge in this Life, but by some other Measure. For,
Fifthly, I Consider, that tho there is no necessity of our being so very Learned and Knowing, yet there is an Absolute Necessity of our being Good and Vertuous. This is Neces∣sary both ways, as Commanded by God, and as a Means to our Final Perfection. And besides 'tis necessary Now, there being no other opportunity for it. If we don't know here, we may know here∣after, and shall infalliably do so if we are but Good here; but if we be not good here, we shall neither be Good, Happy, nor Knowing hereafter. The Main opportunity for Know∣ledge is after this Life, but the only opportunity for being good is Now. And if we take care to improve this, we are sufficiently secure of the other, and of whatever else ap∣pertains
to the Perfection of our Natures. But if this be neglected all is lost. This therefore is indis∣pensably necessary, and 'tis the only thing that is so, and 'tis necessary Now, necessary not only to our Happiness in General, but also to that of our Intellectual Part in Particular. For,
Sixthly, And lastly I Consider, that thus stands the Case between God and Man. First, Man is sup∣posed to be made in a State of In∣nocence and Perfection, in perfect Favour and Communion with God, his true Good, and in a Capacity so to Continue. From this excel∣lent state he is supposed to Fall, and by his Fall so to disable himself that he cannot by his own strength Repent and Live well, and so to provoke God, that tho he could and did Repent, yet he would not be Pardon'd and Accepted, without Satisfaction made to Divine Justice. This satisfaction Man is supposed
not able to make, nor any other Creature for him. Whereupon God in great Mercy and Pitty is sup∣posed to ordain a Mediator, his own Son, God and Man, between himself and his Laps'd Creature, who by the Sacrifice of himself should Effect two things, answerable to the double Necessity of Man, first make Repentance available, which otherwise would not have been so; and secondly Merit Grace for him that he might be able to Repent. And this is what we are to under∣stand by the Restoration or Redemp∣tion of Man, which thus far is Vni∣versal and Inconditionate.
But still notwithstanding all that this Mediator has done for him, Man is supposed only so far restored, as to be put in a Pardonable and Reconcilable State (for as for our being actually and immediately re∣conciled by the Death of Christ, that's a silly, fond, Antinomian con∣ceit, and no way consistent with
the Great Mystery of Godliness) I say Man is yet only in a Capacity or Possibility of Pardon and Recon∣ciliation, which is then, and then only reduced to act, when he actu∣ally performs the Conditions of Re∣conciliation, when he Believes, Re∣pents and leads a good Life, with which he may, and without which he shall not be Pardon'd and Saved, notwithstanding that Christ has Dy'd for him. The design of whose Death was not to make a good Life unnecessary, but only to render it Efficacious and Available, not to procure a Priviledge of being saved without it (as some fancy) but that we might be Saved with it. If this Qualification be wanting, we shall be so far from being any thing ad∣vantaged from the Redemption pur∣chas'd by our Mediator, that we shall be Accountable for it, to the great aggravation both of our Guilt and Misery. It therefore highly concerns Man to improve with all diligence this short and only oppor∣tunity
of Making his Great Fortune, to adorn his mind with all Moral and Religious Perfections, and his Life with all good actions, since with this he may be Happy in all his capacities, and without it he shall not only fall into a state of unutterable Misery, but be also ac∣countable for the Possibility he had of escaping it, for neglecting so great Salvation, so great an Oppor∣tunity of being saved.
These things being Premised concerning the present Hypothesis or state of Man, First, that he can there know but very little, Second∣ly, that even that little Knowledge which he can attain to serves more to his Trouble than Satisfaction, and so is not only Vanity, but also Vexation of Spirit. Thirdly, that supposing it as Pleasant as may be, yet such is the shortness and in∣cumbrance of his Life, that the enjoyment of it is not answerable to the Labour of acquiring it.
Fourthly, that there is no Necessi∣ty of such a deal of Learning and Knowledge, either as to this World, or to the next, and that e're long he shall have his fill of Knowledge in the Beatifick Vision of the Ideal World, one glance whereof shall instruct him more, than an Eternal poring upon all the Books in this, and undistinguish the greatest Doctor from the most ignorant Peasant. Fifthly, that there is an Absolute Necessity of his being Good and Vertuous, this being the condition not only of his Happiness in ge∣neral, but also of the accomplish∣ment of his Vnderstanding in par∣ticular. And that Now is the only opportunity for it. Sixthly, and lastly, that the Attainment of Hap∣piness and Intellectual Perfection upon this Condition was the Pur∣chase of his Saviours Death, who has also Merited Grace for his as∣sistance in the Performance of it. Which if he neglect, he shall not only miss of Happiness, but be
also answerable for so Great and so Dear an opportunity of gaining it; From these Premises 'twill I think follow with no less than Mathemati∣cal Evidence.
First, that Learning and Knowledge is not the thing for which God de∣sign'd Man in this Station, nor consequently the End or Reason of his bestowing upon him those in∣tellectual and Rational Powers which he has. For had this been the End and Design of God he would have made it more Possible for him, and withal more his In∣terest and Concern, to attain it.
Secondly, 'twill follow that the End for which God intended Man here, and the Reason why he made him a Rational Creature, was that he might Live vertuously and well, so serve him here, that he might be rewarded with Happiness and perfect Knowledge hereafter; Ha∣ving furnish'd him with Intellectual abilities sufficient for this, tho not
for the other. Thirdly and lastly, 'twill follow that the Principal care and concern of Man both because of his own interest, and out of com∣pliance with the Designs of God, ought to be to Live a good and regular Life, to accomplish the Moral part of his Nature, to subdue his Passions, to rectifie his Love, to study Purity of Heart and Life, in one word, to perfect Holiness in the fear of God, and (which is what we have been hitherto inquiring after) that he ought to busy him∣self in the Study of Learning and Knowledge no further, than as 'tis conducive to the Interest of Religion and Vertue.
This therefore is the Measure to be observ'd in our prosecution of Learning and Knowledge. We are to Study only that we may be good, and consequently ought to prose∣cute such Knowledge only as has an aptness to make us so, that which the Apostle calls the Truth, which is after Godliness. For that's
the only business we have to do in this World. Whatever Knowledge we prosecute besides this, or further than 'tis conducive to this end, tho it be absolutely consider'd, never so excellent and Perfective of our Ra∣tional part, yet with respect to the present Posture and Station of Man, 'tis a Culpable Curiosity, and an unaccountable Vanity, and only a more Solemn and laborious way of being Idle and Impertinent.
And this will be found (if well examin'd) to be nothing different from the censure of the Wise Preacher. And I gave my heart to to know Wisdom, says he, and I per∣ceiv'd that this also is vanity and vexation of Sptrit. Not that he now first applied himself to the study of Wisdom. No, he had been inspired with that before, and and by the help of it had discover'd the vanity of all other things. But that Wisdom which saw through all other things, did not as yet per∣ceive the Vanity of it self. He
therefore now gave his Heart to Know Wisdom, that is, to reflect upon it, and Consider whether this might be excepted from his general censure, and struck out of the Scroll of vanities. And upon deep re∣flection he found that it could not, and that even this also was as much a vanity as any of the rest. Now this Proposition of Solomon's cannot be understood Absolutely (Know∣ledge being an undoubted Perfecti∣on of Human Nature) but only with respect to the present posture of Man in this World. Neither can it be understood of all kind of Knowledge even in this Life, some kind of Knowledge being necessary to qualifie him for Happiness in the next. It must therefore Neces∣sarily be understood of all that Knowledge which contributes not to that great End. So that from these two Necessary Limitations the sense of Solomon's Proposition (if it have any) must be this; that to Man in this present juncture all
Knowledge that does not Contri∣bute to the interest of his After∣state, is downright Vanity and Vex∣ation of Spirit.
For, to what purpose should we Study so much, considering that after all we are able to Know so little, considering that even that little is enough to trouble and disquiet us, considering that our Life is as much too short for the enjoying what Knowledge we have, as for compassing what we would have, and withal considering that there lies no manner of Obligation or Necessity upon us to do thus. But (which is what I would most of all inculcate) to what purpose ima∣ginable should we be so busy, and vehement in the pursuit of Learn∣ing, of any Learning, but what is of use to the Moral Conduct of our Life, considering these two things, First, that 'tis but to stay a little while and we shall have all that Knowledge Gratis, from the Com∣munications
of the Ideal World, which we so unsuccessfully drudge for here, to the neglect of more im∣portant and concerning exercises. And Secondly, considering that there is such an absolute necessity of being Good, and of Living well, and that this short uncertain Life is the only time for it, which if neg∣lected, this great work must lie undone for ever? Upon the former consideration this Studious, Bookish humour is like laying out a great Sum of Money to purchase an Estate which after one weak, drop∣ping Life will of Course fall into hand. And I am sure he would be reckon'd Fool or Mad that should do so. And upon the latter, 'tis as if a Man that was Riding Post upon Business of Life and Death, should as he passes through a Wood, stand still to listen to the Singing of a Nightingale, and so forget the main and only business of his Journey.
'Tis most certain that the two Cases here supposed, are as great instances of Folly and Impertinence as can well be conceiv'd, and yet (however it comes to pass that we are not sensible of it) 'tis certain that they are very applicable to the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life as 'tis generally managed. And tho we are all ready enough to call such men Fools as shall do as in the two mention'd instances is sup∣posed, yet 'tis most certain that we do the very same or worse, that we are too much concern'd in the Ap∣plication of the Parable, and that of most of us it may be truly said, Thou art the Man.
For I demand, what difference is there between him that now labours and toils for Learning and Knowledge, which in a little time he shall be easily and fully possest of, and him that dearly buys an estate which would otherwise come to
him after a short interval? what difference is there, but only this, that he that buys the estate, tho he might have spared his Money, yet however he gets what he laid out his Money for; his expence indeed was needless, but not in vain. Where∣as he that drudges in the pursuit of Knowledge, not only toils for that which in a short time he shall have with ease, and in abundance, but which after all he can't compass in any considerable measure, and so undergoes a vain as well as unne∣cessary Labour. And is therefore the greater Fool.
Again I demand, what diffe∣rence is there between him who when he is imploy'd upon business of Life and Death shall alight from his Horse, and stand Idling to hear a Nightingale Singing in the Wood, and him who having an Eternity of Happiness to secure by the right ordering of his Life and Manners, and having only this Point of time
to do it in, shall yet turn Vertuoso, and set up for Learning and Curi∣osity. 'Tis true indeed the Nightin∣gale Sings well, and 'twere worth while to stand still and hear him, were I disingaged from more con∣cerning affairs, but not certainly when I am upon Life and Death. And so Learning and Knowledge are excellent things, and such as would deserve my Study, and my Time, had I any to spare, and were more at leisure, but not certainly when I have so great an interest as that of my final state dependi••g upon the good use of it. My Business now, is not to be Learned, but to be good.
For is my Life so long, am I so over-stock'd with Time, or is my depending interest so little, or is it so easily Secured, that I can find leisure for unnecessary Curiosities? Is this Conduct agreeable to the pre∣sent station and Posture of Man, whose entrance into this World,
and whose whole stay in it, is pure∣ly in order to another state? Or would any one imagin this to be the condition of Man by such a Conduct! Shall a Prisoner who has but a few days allow'd him to make a Preparation for his Trial, spend that little opportunity in Cutting and Carving, and such like Mechanical Contrivances? Or would any one imagin such a Man to be in such a Condition, near a doubt∣ful Trial of Life and Death, whom coming into a Prison he finds so imploy'd? And yet is there any thing more Absurd and Imperti∣nent in this, than in the present Supposition, than to have a Man who has so great a Concern upon his Hands as the Preparing for Eternity, all busy and taken up with Quadrants, and Telescopes, Furnaces, Syphons and Air-Pumps?
When we would expose any Signal Impertinence, we common∣ly illustrate it by the Example of
Archimedes, who was busy in making Mathematical Figures on the Sands of Syracuse while the City was taking by Marcellus, and so though there were Particular Orders given for his safety, lost his Life by his unseasonable Study. Now I confess there was imperti∣nence and absurdity enough in this instance to consign it over to Poste∣rity. But had Archimedes been a Christian, or otherwise assured of the great concerns of another World, I should have said, that the Main of his Impertinence did not lie here, in being Mathemati∣cally imploy'd when the Enemy was taking the City, but in laying out his Thoughts and Time upon such an insignificant unconcerning Study, while he had no less a con∣cern upon him than the securing his Eternal Interest. Which must be done now or never. Nothing certainly is an Impertinence, if this be not, to hunt after Learning and Knowledge in such a juncture as this.
Sure I am, and your Ladyship too very well knows, that many other Proceedings in the Conduct of Life are condemn'd of Vanity and Impertinence upon the very same grounds, tho not half so in∣consistent with the Character of Man, nor so disagreeable to his pre∣sent Posture in this World, For is not the World full of invectives, and have not the Pens of Moral Writers been all along imploy'd against those that apply themselves to Secular acquirements, spend their short and uncertain Lives, which ought to be imploy'd in the Pursuit of an infinitely higher In∣terest, in gaping up and down after Honours and Preferments, in long and frequent attendances at Court, in raising Families, getting Estates and the like? These things I say and such like are condemn'd and censured not only upon the stock of their particular Viciousness, as Crimes of Ambition or Covetousness
respectively, but for what they have in Common, as they are mis∣pendings of Time, and unconcern∣ing Excentrical imployments.
But now I would fain know, whether any of these Misconducts of Life be more expensive of our Time, more remote and alien from the main business of it, more un∣relating to our Grand Concern, and consequently more Impertinent, than to be busily imploy'd in the Nice∣ties and Curiosities of Learning: And whether a Man that loiters away Six Weeks in Court-Attend∣ances for a place of Honour, be not every whit as accountably imploy'd with respect to the End of Man in the other World, and his Business in this, as he that shall spend so much time in the Solution of a Mathe∣matical Question, as M. Descrates I remember confesses of himself in one of his Epistles. And why then the Prosecution of Learning should be the only thing excepted from the
Vanities and Impertinencies of Life I have not head enough to un∣derstand.
And yet so it is. All other Ex∣centrical unconcerning Occupati∣ons are cried down meerly for be∣ing so, as not according with the present Character and State of Man. This alone is not contented with the reputation of Innocence, but stands for positive merit and ex∣cellence, for Praise and Commenda∣tion. To say a Man is a Lover of Knowledge, and a diligent inquirer after Truth, is almost as great an Encomium as you can give him, and the time spent in the Study, tho in the search of unedifying Truth, is reckon'd almost as laudably be∣stow'd as that in the Chapel, and (so inconsistent with its self is Human Judgment) 'tis Learning only that is allow'd not only to divide, but to devour the greatest part of our short Life, and is the only thing that with Credit and
Public allowance stands in Competi∣tion with Religion and the study of Vertue. Nay, by the most is pre∣ferr'd before it, who would rather be counted Learned, than Pious.
But is not this a strenge and un∣reasonable Competition? It must indeed be confess'd that the Per∣fection of Man is double, of the In∣tellectual as well as of the Moral Part, and that Knowledge is a very Divine Excellence. But certainly Rectitude of Will is a greater Or∣nament and Perfection than Bright∣ness of Vnderstanding, and to be Good is more Divine than to be Wise and Knowing, that being the Principal, perhaps only difference between an Angel and a Devil. And tho Solomon's Choice be uni∣versally applauded, yet I think that of Mary is to be preferr'd before it, and (to use the Expression of the Excellent Monsieur Poiret) that 'tis better like an Infant without much reasoning to Love much,* 1.6 than like the
Devil to Reason much without Love.
But suppose Knowledge were a much Diviner excellence than 'tis, suppose it were more Perfective of, and Ornamental to Human Nature than the Habit and Practice of Vertue, yet still this Competition would be utterly against Reason. For 'tis to be consider'd (as I have already suggested) that the Former we can't have now in any Measure, and shall have it hereafter without Measure, but the latter we may have now (for we may Love much tho we can't know much) and can∣not have it hereafter. Now the Question is, whether we ought to be more Solicitious for that Intel∣lectual Perfection which we can't have here, and shall have hereafter, or for that Moral Perfection which we may have here, and cannot hereafter? And I think we need not consult an Oracle, or conjure up a Spirit to be resolv'd of this Question.
And this one Solitary Considera∣tion (much more in Conjunction with the other parts of the Human Character) I take to be sufficient to justifie the Truth of what mea∣sure we have prescribed to our In∣tellectual Conduct, that we ought to prosecute Learning and Know∣ledge no further than as 'tis condu∣cive to the great Ends of Piety and Vertue. And consequently that when ever we study to any other Purpose, or in any other Degree than this, we are unaccountably impertinently, I may add Sinfully imploy'd.* 1.7 For this is the whole of Man, to fear God and keep his Com∣mandments, the whole of Man in this Station, and consequently this ought to be the only Scope of all his Studys and Endeavours.
And accordingly 'tis observable that the Scripture whenever it makes mention of Wisdom with any mark of Commendation, it always means by it either the very Practice
of Religion and Vertue, or such Knowledge at least, that has a near and strong influence upon it; thereby implying that that is the only Wisdom which becomes the study of Man. Remarkable above the rest to this purpose is the 28th Chapter of Iob, where having run through several instances of Natural Knowledge,* 1.8 at length says he, But where shall Wisdom be found? And where is the place of understand∣ing? As much as to say that in none of the other things mention'd did consist the Wisdom of Man. Then it follows,* 1.9 Man knoweth not the Price thereof, neither is it found in the Land of the Living,* 1.10 The Depth saith, it is not in me, and the Sea saith it is not in me. Not in the Depths of Learning,* 1.11 nor in the Recesses of Speculation, seeing it is hid from the Eyes of all Living, and kept close from the Fowls of the Air, from Men of high and Towring Notions,* 1.12 and sublime Theories. Destruction and Death say, we have heard the Fame thereof
with our Ears. As much as to say, that after this Life, and then only, unless perhaps about the hour of Death, Men begin to have a true sense and Lively Savoury Relish of this Wisdom. But in the mean time,* 1.13 God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the place thereof.* 1.14 And unto Man he said, be∣hold the Fear of the Lord that is Wisdom, and to depart from Evil, that is understanding. To Man he said. Had it been to another Crea∣ture, suppose an Angel, in a state of Security and Confirmation, he would perhaps have recommended for Wisdom the Study of Nature, and the Curiosities of Philosophy, but having to do with Man, a Pro∣bationary and unfixt Creature, that shall be either Happy or Miserable according as he demeans himself in this short time of Trial, the only Wisdom he advises to such a Crea∣ture in such a Station, is to look well to his Moral Conduct, to study Religion and good Life.
And now (Madam) since we are upon Scripture-Authority (for indeed so little has this matter been consider'd, that I have scarce any other to follow) will your Ladyship give me leave in further Confirma∣tion of the Measure propos'd, to commend to your Consideration two great Scripture-Examples, both of Men Eminently Wise, and of a Learned Education. The Men I instance in are Moses and St. Paul. The latter of which professedly de∣clares that he determin'd to know nothing,* 1.15 but Iesus Christ and him Crucify'd, that is, nothing but what concerns either the Faith or the Practice of Christianity. And the former complaining of the gross Ignorance of the People committed to his charge, and desiring they would become wiser, breaks out into this Passionate Wish, O that they were Wise,* 1.16 that they under∣stood this, that they would consider their latter End.
Moses had been bred a Scholar, as well as a Courtier, and was well instructed in all the Secrets of the Aegyptian Philosophy, which was then the best in the World. Besides, he was himself a wise Man, a Man that besides the advantages of Pharaoh's Court, had the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 himself for his Tutor, and convers'd personally with his maker, and therefore must needs be sup∣posed to know what was true Wis∣dom. But now this he does not make to consist either in the Ac∣complishments of Courtly Educa∣tion, or in the deep Mysteries of Philosophy, but in the considerati∣on of our latter End. He wishes that his People were Wise, and to this End he does not wish that they were as Well-bred as he, or as Learned as he, but only that they understood this, this one thing, that they would consider their latter End. Which he makes the Summary and Abstract of all Wis∣dom.
Much like that of Plato, when he defines Philosophy to be, The Theory of Death.
And here, if your Ladyship will dispence with a short digression, a digression from the immediate Thred of my Discourse, tho not from the general Design of it, I would upon this occasion briefly represent to you what an excellent part of Wisdom it is for man seri∣ously to consider his latter end. To make this distinctly appear, I shall proceed upon these two grounds: First, That the Conside∣ration of Death is the most proper exercise that a wise man can be employ'd about. And Secondly, that this is the most compendious way of making him wise that is not so.
And First, it is the most proper exercise that a wise man can em∣ploy himself about. For Wisdom consists in a due estimation of
things; and then things are duly estimated, when they are measured and rated, first as they are absolute∣ly in themselves; and secondly, as they stand in Relation to us. If they are great and extraordinary then they deserve to be consider'd for their own sakes; and if they nearly relate to us, then they de∣serve to be consider'd for ours. And upon both these accounts, Death and its consequences are highly deserving a wise mans Thoughts and Reflections.
For first, they are great and ex∣traordinary Transactions, barely as in themselves consider'd, and as such would deservedly ingage the most attentive consideration, even of a stander by, of any other indif∣ferent Being, suppose an Angel, that can be no otherwise concerned in it, than as tis a great Event, a Noble Scene of Providence, a matter of Wonder and Curiosity. I say upon this single Account Death
with its consequences is as fit a sub∣ject for the Contemplation of a Wise man as auy in Nature.
Or if there be within the Sphere of Nature things of a greater and more Bulky appearance, yet cer∣tainly there is nothing wherein man is so nearly concern'd, so high∣ly interessed as in Death. Since upon the manner of this depends his Eternal Happiness or Ruin. There is therefore nothing that so much deserves to be consider'd by him. Whether therefore we regard the Absolute greatness of the thing, or its Relative greatness with re∣spect to us, as we are interessed and concerned in it, but especially if we weigh both, the consideration of Death is as proper an Exercise as a Wise man can be imploy'd about.
And as 'tis so fit an imployment for him that is wise already, so se∣condly is it the most compendious way of making him wise, truly
wise, that is not so. For all wis∣dom is in Order to Happiness, and to be truly wise, is to be Wise unto Salvation. Whatever Knowledge contributes not to this, is quite be∣side the Mark, and is as the Apostle calls it, Science falsly so called. The Knowledge itself is vain, and the Study of it is impertinent.
Now the only way to Happi∣ness is a good life, and consequently all wisdom being in Order to Hap∣piness, that's the only wisdom that serves to the promoting of good life, according to that of Iob be∣fore cited, And to man he said, be∣hold the fear of the Lord that is wis∣dom, and to depart from evil is un∣derstanding. That therefore is the most compendious way of making a man wise, that soonest makes him good, and reduces his mind to a moral Regularity. And nothing does this so soon and so well as the serious and habitual consideration of Death. And therefore says the
wise man, Remember Death and Corruption, and keep the Command∣ments. The shortest Compendium of Holy living that ever was given. As if he had said, Many are the Precepts and Admonitions left us by wise and good men, for the mo∣ral Conduct of life, but would you have a short and infallible Directory of living well? why, remember Death and Corruption; Do but re∣member this, and forget all other Rules if you will, and your Duty if you can.
And what is here remarked by one wise man is consented to by all. Hence those common Practises a∣mong the Antients of placing Se∣pulchres in their Gardens, and of using that celebrated Motto, Me∣mento Mori. Hence also that Mo∣dern as well as Antient Custom of putting Emblems of Mortality in Churches, and other Public places, by all which tis implied that the Consideration of Death, is the
greatest security of a good life. As indeed it must be upon this general ground, because it does that at a Blow, which other considerations do by Parts, and gives an entire defeat to the three great Enemies of our Salvation at once. It sets us above the Temptations of the World the Flesh, and the Devib. For how can the World captivate him, who considers he is but a stranger in it, and that he must shortly leave it! How can the Flesh insnare him who has his Sepulchre always in his Eye, and reflects upon the cold lodging he shall have there! And how can the Devil prevail upon him, who remembers always he must dye, and then enter upon an unchangeable State of Happiness or Misery, ac∣cording as he has either resisted or yeilded to his Temptations! Of so vast consequence is the constant Thinking upon Death above all other things that fall within the compass even of useful and Practi∣cal Meditation, and so great Rea∣son
had Moses for placing the Wis∣dom of Man in the Consideration of his latter End.
But to return (if being still in pursuit of my general design, I may well be said to be out of the way) I now perswade my self that from the Character I have drawn of Man and his present Circumstan∣ces, together with those Reflecti∣ons built upon it, and interwoven with it, and lastly from Divine Authority, the measure we have given is so well Establish'd, that if your Ladyship be not yet, you ought to be convinc'd that however Na∣turally desirous we may be of Knowledge, yet that this Appetite is to be govern'd as well as those that are Sensual; that we ought to indulge it only so far as may tend to the Moralizing our Souls, and the conducting our Lives, and the fitting us for that Happiness which God has promised not to the Learned, but to the Good. And
that if it be gratify'd to any other purpose, or in any other Measure than this, our Curiosity is imperti∣nent, our study immoderate, and the Tree of Knowledge still a forbid∣den Plant.
And now (Madam) having fix'd and Stated the Measure of our pre∣sent Affection to, and Inquiry after Learning and Knowledge, which I think is Establish'd upon irrefutable Principles, I may leave it to your Ladyship to consider how much 'tis observ'd in the general Conduct of our Studies. Tis plain that 'tis not observ'd at all. For these two things are too Notorious to need any more for their Proof than only to look abroad into the World. First, that very little of that which is generally made the subject of Study has any manner of Tendency to Living well here, or Happily hereafter. And Secondly, that these very studies which have no Religious or Moral influence upon
Life, do yet devour the greatest part of it. The Best and Most of our Time is devoted to Dry-Learn∣ing, this we make the Course of our Study, the rest is only by the by, and 'tis well if what is Devotional, Practical or Divinely-relishing, can find us at leisure upon a Broken piece of a Sunday or Holiday. But the Main Current of our Life runs in Studies of another Nature, that don't so much as glance one kind Aspect upon good living, 'tis well if some of them dont hinder it. I am sure St. Austin thought so,* 1.17 and makes it part of his Penitentials. And yet to these our youth is dedi∣cated, in these we imploy our riper years; nor do we see the vanity and impertinence of it in old Age. And then when we dye, this very thing makes one great part of our Funeral Elegy, that we were so dili∣gent and indefatigable in our studies, and so inquisitive in the search of Knowledge, perhaps that we pro∣cured an early interment by it, when
according to the Principles before laid down, we were as imperti∣nently imploy'd all the while, as if we had been so long picking Straws in Bedlam. I say as imper∣tinently, tho perhaps not so inno∣cently. The Sum of all comes to this: The measure of prosecuting Learning and Knowledge is their usefullness to good Life. Conse∣quently all Prosecution of it beyond or beside this End is impertinent and immoderate. This has been fully pro∣ved by evident Principles. But now of this sort is the general prosecution of Learning and Knowledge, as is plain by appealing to the general Conduct of Study. The Conclusi∣on therefore unovoidably follows. That the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life is justly chargeable with an immoderate and imperti∣nent pursuit of Knowledge. Which was the Proposition to be made out, and I am sorry to see it so well proved.
Eccl. 43.
Nat. Hist. p. 13.
Job. 38.
Eccles. 1.18.
Colos. 3.10.
Cogitat. Ration. de Deo. p. 62••.
Eccles. 12.13.
V. 12.
V. 13.
V. 14.
V. 21.
V. 22.
V. 23.
V. 28.
1 Cor. 2.
Deut. 32.29.
Confess. Lib. c. 1.16.