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BEING Naturally more than ordinarily disposed to Thought∣fulness, and from the circumstan∣ces of my present Solitude and Retirement further invited to it; I began one day to fall into a deep Meditation upon the Conduct of my own, and of Humane Life. What Reflections I made upon
my own, are too peculiarly Cal∣culated for my proper Circum∣stances, to be of any General use, and therefore I shall not trouble you with them. But as for those past upon the conduct of Humane Life, I think they are of too general use, and withal of too Weighty Consequence, not to be Communicated. These therefore I shall think worth while to draw up into a little more orderly form than wherein they were first con∣ceived, and present to your Ladyships Consideration.
First then I consider that the Conduct of Human Life must be to the End of Human Life, which is the same with the End of Man, which is Happiness. This conduct therefore must be and and necessa∣rily is, in Gross to Happiness. But now whereas there are two Fa∣culties or Powers of Man, by the right ordering of which this Hap∣piness is to be attain'd, Vnder∣standing
and Will, therefore more immediately and distinctly, this Conduct of Human Life is in or∣der to the Government and exer∣cise of these two Faculties, the due Regulation of which is the Im∣mediate End, to which Human Life is to be Conducted. There is therefore a double conduct of Human Life, Intellectual and Moral.
As to the Moral Conduct of Hu∣man Life, I do not intend at pre∣sent to spend any Reflections up∣on it. Not because 'tis Unexcep∣tionable, but because 'tis too Ob∣noxious, the general Impertinence and Irregularity of it being too open and exposed, to need any. And besides 'tis a Butt, that has been Shot at so often, ever since Preaching and Writing has been in the World, that 'tis now so thick-set with holes, that there is scarce room left to fasten a new Arrow in it.
〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉2. The undue and irregular method of prosecuting what is really Perfective of it.
3. The too Importunate and over-earnest pursuit after Know∣ledge in General.
These are the three Cardinal Irregularities, I have observ'd in the Intellectual Conduct of Hu∣man Life, and upon each of these I shall bestow a Reflection.
The business of this first Re∣flection shall be to Tax the General Conduct of Human Life, for placing Learning and Know∣ledge, in such things as are little or nothing Perfective of the un∣derstanding. This I confess to be a Charge of more than ordinary Severity and Boldness; because it fastens an Imputation of Folly up∣on the Learned Order (for with them only is my present Concern) and not only so, but also in that very thing wherein they think their Wisdom and Intellectual ac∣complishment
consists, and upon which they value themselves above the rest of Mankind. To question their Conduct in any thing else, would be but a trivial Charge, and such as they would not only readily Pardon, but Ac∣knowledge; it being a common thing with Learned Men not only to own, but studiously to affect Ig∣norance in things besides their Profession, as in Secular business, the common Affairs of Life, the Mysteries of Trades and the like. But to censure them as defective in that one thing they pretend to, to make that their Blind-side where they think they see clear∣est; to maintain that they are not only not really wise and know∣ing, but that generally they don't so much as know what true Knowledge is, and that they generally place it in such things as contribute little or nothing to the Perfection of that, whereby they really excel the Brutes, and
would be thought to excel the Common sort of Men; this is so high, and so disobliging a charge, that I fear those who from the force of what shall be here urg'd, may be convinc'd of the Truth of it, will hard∣ly forgive the Boldness of it.
But as high a charge as it is, I question not but that it may be, and will be here made good. And that it may appear to be true, we will first of all by way of Address or Preparation, consider what antece∣dent grounds of probability there are, that men should generally place Learning and Knowledge in such things as are little or nothing perfective of the rational Part; and then in the second place we will proceed directly to prove that they do so.
As to the first, your Ladyship can∣not be so little acquainted either with hidden Springs, or outward Workings of humane Nature, as not
to have observ'd that however strong and uuiversal is the desire of Knowledge, yet men are general∣ly more in Love with the Fame and Reputation of it, than with the thing it self. There are indeed here and there a few humble retired Souls that are otherwise disposed, and like your Ladyship are so far from loving the Fame and Credit of knowledge before knowledge it self, that they don't love it at all, but are content to court Wisdom privately, and enjoy their own Light in the Dark.
For it may be they consider that be their Attainments what they will, Fame is a thing of infinite un∣certainty and contingency, that it depends more upon the Hu∣mours of men, or some more secret unaccountable Fate, than upon real excellency and merit, that some have the luck to be popular and cry'd up for no∣thing, when in the mean while others that are really and highly
deserving can scarce keep their Heads above Contempt; that the World is seldom just to true Merit, and that nothing is weigh'd in a falser Ballance than real excellency, whether Moral or Intellectual; and that there is little reason to expect it should ever be otherwise as long as Envy and Ignorance hold the Scales. Then again it may be they con∣sider with themselves, that sup∣pose true worth were secure of Reputation, yet what a poor slender good is it! For what is it to be talk'd of, or pointed at? Should a Man be never so Popular the Antipodes will never hear of him, or if they do, what is he the better for what is said of him there? And should his Fame, like the Sun, Travael round the whole Globe, besides that he is but Master of a Point when he has All, he can enjoy no more of it but just what he hears, which is inconsiderable.
And yet as inconsiderable as it is, 'tis like to be his whole Porti∣on. For as for Posthumous Glory, it comes too late to be any thing valuable. He will either not be sensible of it, or despise it. For certainly it must needs be mightily beneath the im∣provements of a separate state to put any value upon the in∣judicious praises of poor Mortals here below. Or suppose that a Deceas'd Spirit could take any delight in reflecting upon the Fame he has left behind him, yet 'tis to be considered that the Fashion of this world passes away, that those in whose praises he outlives himself, must also shortly dye, and that then his Fame will have a Funeral, as well as him∣self.These perhaps, or such like Considerations, may prevail with your Ladyship and a few more thinking Persons, to have but a very cold and indifferent regard for the Reputation of Learning
and Knowledge: But as for the generality of mankind it must be own'd that they are fond of it to a strange degree, and are more concern'd to be accounted Wise and Learned, than really to be so. Otherwise I question whether our Libraries would be so full as they are.
But now, tho the generality of men be so passionately and keenly set upon the fame of being Lear∣ned and Knowing, yet (so little hath Nature design'd to gratify this ambitious humour) there are but a very few that have either a Genius and inclination for Learning it self, or a capacity of attaining to it. Not an Inclination, because there is a great variety in the Specula∣tive, as well as Moral inclinations of men, one being naturally dispo∣sed to this sort of study, and ano∣ther to that, whereas true Know∣ledge whatever it be (which shall be consider'd in its due place) is of
one determinate kind or nature in general, and consequently must require a certain peculiar frame and disposition of mind. Not a capacity, because the generality of men are known to have but indif∣ferent Intellectuals, suited to the exigencies of common life, when as true knowledge (what ever it be) must be supposed to be a thing of uncommon difficulty, and the study of it a work fit only for sub∣limer wits, the more elevated and Awaken'd part of Mankind.
Now put these two things to∣gether, that almost all men would fain be thought Learned and Knowing, and that there is but here and there one that is Natu∣rally made and fitted for true Knowledge, and then consider what is like to be the result of this Complication. Why, the Latter Few may succeed well in the search of what they were naturally quali∣fied for, and having attain'd to a
Competency of true Knowledge, such as is Perfective of the Un∣derstanding, they find themselves under no Temptation to place it in any thing else, or to bring into Credit any other sort of know∣ledge. Because having arrived so far, they are either wise enough to undervalue the Fame of being Learned, or else despair not of at∣taining it by their Proficiency in True Knowledge. Here therefore they take up their rest.
But now what shall we do with the others? Are they to be per∣swaded that they are not of a Make for the Study and attain∣ment of Learning? You'll find it tough work to convince them of that. But suppose it possible that they could be made sensible that they are not like to Com∣mence very Learned and Know∣ing, yet all the World shall never be able to perswade them to lay aside that Natural itch of being
so accounted. But you'll say, tho this Inclination be too Natural and inbred to be quite laid aside, yet there's hopes it may be Go∣vern'd. No nor that neither. They must put in for the Prize, and 'tis in vain to disswade them from it. But they must despair of ever winning it in a fair way, being supposed not able to reach the Tree of Knowledge. True. They have therefore but one way left, and that is, to turn the Tables, and cry up something or other for Learning which they are capable of. No matter whether it deserve that name, that is, whether it be really perfective of the Rational Part or no, 'tis enough if they can reach it. For those that can't com∣pass true Riches, and yet will have the Name and credit of it, are put upon the Necessity of Coyning and Counterfeiting.
And truly this Supposition seems to me so very reasonable,
that were experience altogether Silent in the Case, and were I utterly unacquainted with the State of Learning in the World, yet if I had a Draught given me of Human Nature, and were told how much the Ambition of being esteem'd as Learned and Knowing exceeds both the Desire and the Ability to be so, and were then ask'd what I thought would be the Intellectual Conduct of Human Life, I should without any further enquiry conclude that in all pro∣bability Men would generally place Learning and Knowledge in such things as signifie little or nothing to the Perfection of the understanding.
But from grounds of Proba∣bility that they should do so, let us proceed to prove directly that they do so. Now in this Charge there is something supposed, and something asserted. The supposi∣tion is that there are some things,
the knowledge of which is little or nothing Perfective of the un∣derstanding. The Assertion is, that Learning is generally placed in the knowledge of such things. The Proof of the Supposition will ingage my Pen upon the discussion of a very Gurious and weighty Question, wherein the Perfection of the understanding does consist, or what it is that is Perfective of the Understanding? Which when we have duly fix'd and stated, we shall then have a certain Measure to go by in the Proof of the Assertion.
To the Question then I answer, that the Perfection of the Under∣standing, as that of the will, is either Formal or Objective. The Formal Perfection of the under∣standing, as that of the will, is no other than its Exercise or Operati∣on, which is Thinking and Percep∣tion, as that of the other is Willing and Chusing. According to the
vulgar Maxim, that the Perfecti∣on of every thing is its Operation, which must be understood only of the Formal Perfection. The Ob∣jective Perfection of the under∣standing is Truth, as that of the will is Good. The Result of these two Perfections joyn'd together, is what in the understanding we call Knowledge, and what in the will we call Vertue.
Our concern is not at present with the Formal, but with the Ob∣jective Perfection of the understand¦ing. This we have said in general to be Truth, as that of the will is Good. And thus far there is neither Dif∣ficulty, nor Controversie. All there∣fore that further remains to be here considerd, is, what Truth that is which is the Objective Per∣fection of the understanding, or, what Truth that is, in the Know∣ledge of which the Perfection of the understanding does consist,
Now since there is so great a Proportion and Correspondence between the understanding and the will, and the Perfection of each, the first entrance we shall make upon the Resolution of this Questi∣on shall be to consider, what good that is which is the Objective Per∣fection of the will, or, what good that is in the desiring and embra∣cing of which the Perfection of the will does consist. Which being determin'd, will afford at least a Fair Ground and Occasion, tho not an infallible Measure for the de∣termination of the other.
Here then 'twill be necessary to premise a Consideration of the Kinds of good. The most general distribution of which I conceive to be into these two, Necessary and Contingent good. By necessary good I understand that which can∣not but be good, that which is always and immutably good. And
this comprizes under it the good of the End which is desireable for it self, commonly called Pleasant good. And the good of the Means, which has an immutable con∣nexion with it, and is desirable for the other, commonly call'd Profitable Good. By Contingent good I understand that which may, or may not be good, and is good, whenever it is so, only upon a Po∣sitive account, because enjoyn'd by the Will of a Competent Au∣thority. This can never be the good of the End, or a self-desirable Good; nor can it be such a good of the Means as has a Natural and immutable connexion with it; but is always an Arbitrary and Muta∣ble Means.
This being briefly premised, I shall venture to assert that that good which is the Objective Per∣fection of the Will is Necessary Good. Either that which is Self-desirable, as God the Universal, or
any other particular pleasant good. Or else that which has an immuta∣ble Connexion with it, as Moral good. As for Contingent good, that is no otherwise perfective of the Will, than in the force and vertue of the necessary good. For Obedience to a positive Law is no otherwise a Vertue, than as 'tis in∣cluded in some general natural Law, whereof 'tis a contingent in∣stance. Which is also the ground commonly assign'd by Casuists, why Human Laws oblige in Conscience. According to that of Aquinas, Lex Humana Obligat in Conscientia, quatenus participat legem aeter∣nam & Naturalem. An Human Law obliges in Conscience as much as it partakes of the Eternal and Na∣tural Law. That is, as far as it is founded, or relies upon the immu∣table will of God and the Dictate of Natural Reason.
This is too plain to need much Proof, though not so plain but
that it may be demonstrated. If then a Reason be demanded why the objective Perfection of the Will is only necessary, not contin∣gent good, 'twill be sufficient to say, that that only is Perfective of the Will, which naturally, and of it self, makes it Happy, and wherein she can acquiesce with sa∣tisfaction and delight. But this is only necessary good, that which is essentially, intrinsically, and im∣mutably good, either as the End, or as having a Natural Connexion with it, either of which involves Happiness. As for contingent good, that is supposed to be of it self indifferent as to Happiness, and tho by positive Ordination it may be made a condition of it, yet still it contributes to it only as an Arbitrary Means, which has no inward goodness in it self, and whose whole Moral Excellency is deriv'd from some general Law of Reason, whereof 'tis an instance by accident, and in vertue where∣of
it obliges.* 1.1 Thus Moses's stri∣king the Rock, had nothing mo∣rally good or perfective of the Will in it, but only as 'twas an Instance of that General Law of obeying the Divine Will in all things. Nor did the Vertue of Moses consist, pro∣perly and strictly speaking, in stri∣king the Rock, but in Obeying God by striking the Rock.
By this it appears what good that is, in the desiring and embra∣cing of which the Moral Perfecti∣on of the Will does properly and ultimately consist. That it is Ne∣cessary, not Contingent good. Whence we may take instruction how to state the Perfection of the under∣standing, which we shall do by following the same Common Mea∣sure. First then be it here also premised, that as in relation to the Will, all good is either Necessary or Contingent, so in relation to the Understanding, all Truth is either Necessary or Contingent. For be∣sides
the immediateness of the Opposition, which is Contradicto∣ry, I further consider, that that must be the Adaequate division of Truth which is of Being, Truth being a property of Being, and such a one, as tho formally and Abstractly different (for the sub∣ject must never be included in the Precise Reason of the Property) is yet Materially, and Concretely the same with it. But now Ne∣cessary and Contingent is the Ade∣quate Division of Being, therefore also of Truth.
By Necessary Truth I under∣stand that which cannot but be True, that which is always and immutably True. Such is God among Simple Truths, who is im∣mutably what he is, and all the Divine Ideas which (as I have else∣where abundantly explain'd it) are the very Essence of God,* 1.2 as vari∣ously imitable or participable, thus or thus. Such also among Complex
Truths are all Propositions of Eter∣nal Truth, whether Absolute or Hypothetical, with all their regu∣lar Inferences and Conclusions, which (as I have also elsewhere shewn) are nothing else but the Divine Ideas themselves as they respect each other according to their several immutable Habitudes and Combinations.* 1.3
By Contingent Truth I under∣stand that which may or may not be True, that whose Truth depends not upon the Essence of God. (That Ground and Pillar of all Necessary Truth) but only upon his Meer Will and free Pleasure, either decreeing or permitting. Such among Simple Truths are all Created Beings, the whole Ectypal World, and all things in it, which tho made according to the Eternal and Immutable Patterns of the Divine Ideas or Archetypal World, yet in themselves are Temporary and Mutable. Such also among
Complex Truths are all those Pro∣positions the Terms of which have no Essential or Immutable Con∣nexion with each other, but are so and so combined and related, meerly by the Decree or Permis∣sion of him, who is the Author of whatever is besides himself.
Under the First order of Truths are comprehended all those things which are the Matter of those Arts and Sciences which are built upon Stable and immoveable Foundati∣ons, which depend not upon the System of the Present World, but were antecedent to it, and might have been study'd before 'twas made, and according to which the World it self was made, such as Theology, Metaphysics, Morality, Geometry, &c. together with all those unchangeable Rules and Measures of Reason and Conse∣quence which are to be used about them all, which is the Subject of that Art or Science we call
Logic. Under the second order are comprehended all Matters of Fact, all Temporary Events, all Natural or Artificial Effects, &c. Which are the Matter of all Ar∣bitrary and Mutable Sciences; as History, Chronology, Knowledge of Tongues, &c. Which began with this Mundan System, and stand or fall with it.
Now as that good which is Primely and properly Perfective of the Will is Necessary good, so following the same Proportion I shall not doubt to assert, that that Truth which is Primely and Pro∣perly Perfective of the Under∣standing is also Necessary Truth. And as Contingent good is no o∣therwise Perfective of the Will, than in the Force and Vertue of the Necessary good (as was above Explain'd) so likewise Contingent Truth, is no otherwise Perfective of the understanding than in the Force and Vertue of Necessary
Truth, that is, of the Divine Ideas wherein 'tis contain'd. As for Example, when I Speculate some Particular Artificial Triangle which is a Contingent Simple Truth, it is no otherwise Perfective of my Understanding than as it is beheld in its Necessary and Im∣mutable Nature, or (which is all one) in the Divine Idea. And thus again when I form a Proposi∣tion concerning this Triangle, by ascribing to it some Property or other, which is a Contingent Complex Truth, this again is no otherwise Perfective of my Un∣derstanding than as it belongs to, and is beheld in the Nature of a Triangle in Common, which is Necessary and Immutable, being no other than an Idea, or a De∣terminate Mode of the Divine Omniformity. So that at length the Perfection of the understand∣ing is resolv'd into the Knowledge of Necessary Truth, which is its only Objective Perfection; that
which is Contingent being no way perfective of it, but only in ver∣tue of the other.
I am (Madam) very sensible how strange and Paradoxical this way of Philosophizing will seem to those who are either unaddict∣ed to Meditation in general, or not conversant in Theories of this kind, and therefore for their sakes, rather than for any inevidence of the Argument, I will give some Proof and Confirmation of it, which I will so order, that it shall be an Explanation at the same time. I will therefore first shew that 'tis so, and secondly, how and why 'tis so. That it is so I prove thus: First, I suppose that God was once when there was nothing be∣sides God. Again, I suppose that as the Being of God did go before all other being in Order of time, so in Order of Nature it was ante∣cedent even to the Will of Crea∣ting, putting, or permitting any
thing. Again, I suppose that there was therefore then no other Truth but necessary Truth, that is, the Divine Ideas with their se∣veral Habitudes and Complicati∣ons. I suppose again, that there∣fore God must be consider'd as knowing then only these necessary Truths. And yet I suppose again, that God was as perfect then as he is now; and consequently, that the Divine Vnderstanding was as perfect then as now, the Nature of God requiring not only that he should be Absolutely Perfect, but that he should be so in himself. Whence I infer, that therefore the whole Perfection of the Divine Understanding is to be resolv'd in∣to the sole knowledge of Necessary Truths, and that the knowledge of Contingent Truth gives no Perfecti∣on to it, any otherwise than as 'tis beheld in that which is necessary, as was said before.
From this Process of Reasoning,
I presume 'tis sufficiently evident, that the Objective Perfection of the Divine Vnderstanding is only Necessary Truth, which I take in the first place to be a strong ground of presumption, that the Perfecti∣on of Human Vnderstanding does also consist in the same. But to make it further plain that it does so, I suppose again, that nothing were to exist but only God, and one Intelligent Being; and that this Intelligent Being had the full and perfect fruition of God. Upon this supposition I enquire, whether this Intelligent Being would be perfectly Happy or no? Without all question he would, as enjoying an All-sufficient Good. Well, if so, then he must be perfectly happy in his Vnderstanding. And yet 'tis most certain, that he could then have the knowledge of very little more than Necessary Truth; for all that he could possibly know be∣sides, would be only that he him∣self did exist, and that he knew
these Necessary Truths, and that he was happy in the knowledge of them, and the like. And lest the knowledge of such Contingencies should be thought any Accumu∣lation to his Happiness, we will carry our Hypothesis a little fur∣ther, by supposing that this Intel∣ligent Being were not to attend to any of his own Perfections, or to any of those few Contingent Truths resulting from them, but were only to Contemplate God and the Divine Ideas; and then I demand whether his understanding would be sufficiently perfected or no? 'Tis necessary to answer in the Affirmative, whence 'tis also as necessary to conclude, that the only Objective Perfection of our understanding is Necessary Truth.
This I think sufficient to prove that 'tis so. I shall now briefly explain the Mode of it, by shew∣ing how and why 'tis so; and I ac∣count for it after this manner.
Necessary Truth is the same with the Divine Ideas; and accordingly Plato, I remember, calls Science a Participation of Ideas, and the Divine Ideas are the very Essence of God, as 'tis variously imitable according to its Omniformity: Ne∣cessary Truth therefore is no other than the Essence of God, the very Substance of the Divinity. More particularly, it is the same with the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the second Per∣son in the Holy Triad, who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as Philo speaks, the Archetypal Seal, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Intellectual World,* 1.4 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Archetypal Paradigme, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Idea of Ideas. Whom also the Scripture represents as the Wisdom of his Fa∣ther, and as the Light of the World, and who inlightens every Man that comes into it, not only Effici∣ently (as 'tis vulgarly understood) but also Formally, he himself be∣ing the Truth, and the Light, in which we see all things.
These things (Madam) I only hint to you, referring you for fur∣ther satisfaction to your deserved∣ly admired Monsieur Malebranche in his de la Recherche de la Verité, and to a Treatise of mine call'd Reason and Religion; where I have purposely treated of the Divine Ideas, and of our seeing all things in them: In which however whatever is deficient shall be supplied in ano∣ther Latin Treatise of a larger compass, now under my hands, and which I shall communicate to the World e're long (if God please to continue my Life and Health) under the Title of Theoria Mundi Idealis, sive Metaphysica Platonica.
However, lest I should be thought to proceed upon a preca∣rious ground, I will here give you one short and evident Demonstra∣tion that Necessary Truth is the very Essence of God, and then advance. That God is the cause
of whatever is besides himself, or that whatever is, is either God or the ef∣fect of God, is a clear and acknow∣ledg'd principle. Upon which I thus argue: Necessary Truth is either God, or the Effect of God. But it is not the Effect of God, therefore it is no other than God himself.
That it is not the Effect of God, is evident from the many Absur∣dities that would follow upon that Supposition. For first, God would be then a Necessary Agent; for if Necessary Truth be an Effect, 'tis a Necessary Effect, and a Necessary Effect must have a Necessary Cause. Again, God would not only be a Necessary Agent, but also (which is worse) an Vnintelligent Agent. The consequence is unavoidable, for if Truth be the Effect of God, then antecedently to the effecting of it, there was no Truth, and consequently no Knowledge. Again, if Necessary Truth be the Effect
of God, then the Perfection of the Divine Understanding must be supposed to depend upon some∣thing that is not God; nay, upon something Created by God. 'Twill follow again, that God has made something which he cannot de∣stroy. And lastly, to add no more, if Necessary Truth be the Effect of God, then there will be something Necessary, Immutable, and Eternal, &c. besides God. The Consequences are all plain, and so are the Absurdities. The last of which appeared so great to the Excellent Monsieur Poiret, a stiff Opposer of your beloved Male∣branche, and of the Ideal Philoso∣phy,* 1.5 that he urges this as one Ar∣gument against the very being of Necessary Truth, because then there would be something Necessa∣ry besides God, not considering that this Necessary Truth is really one and the same with God him∣self. And this alone puts by the force of his Argument against the
being of Necessary Truth, which however is sufficiently conclusive to the purpose we now aim at, that Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God. For if it were, then his Absurdity would come in, and there would be something Necessary besides God. Since then Necessary Truth is not the Effect of God, it remains by Ver∣tue of the premised Disjunction, that it must be no other than the very Substance and Essence of the Deity.
I further consider, that the Essence of God is intimately and immediately united to the mind of Man; this is plain from Scripture, which tells us that in God is our Life, our Motion, and our Being. And from Philosophy, which assures us, that what pervades all things, must needs be immediately united with every thing.* 1.6 And for this, you have the Authority of your excellent Malebranche, who there∣fore
calls God the Place of Spirits, as Space is the Place of Bodies.
Now upon these two Supposi∣tions, that Necessary Truth is the same with God himself, and that the Essence of God is immediately united to the Mind of Man, 'tis easie to Conceive how and why Necessary Truth should be the Objective Perfection of our Un∣derstanding; since to make an Object Perfective of the Faculty, nothing else is requisite, than that it be its proper Good, and that it be intimately Present to it. And this will also sufficiently give us to understand that Contingent Truth cannot be the Objective Perfection of the Mind; first, because that is a Created Being, whereas God alone is our proper Good. And secondly, because 'tis without us, and cannot be immediately united to our minds, without which condi∣tion, were it never so Perfective otherwise, it could contribute
nothing to the Perfection of our Understandings.
And thus have I given a full Resolution to that Curious and Important Question which the Proof of my Supposition ingaged me upon, and which is to be the Measure of what follows in this Reflection. It is plain from hence, that there are some things the Knowledge whereof is little or nothing perfective of the under∣standing. For as I have shewn, 'tis not Contingent but Necessary Truth, wherein the Perfection of the Understanding does consist. Whence it follows that True Learn∣ing ought to be placed in the Knowledge of Necessary Truth, in the Comprehension of those Arts and Sciences whose Foundations are not Arbitrary, but Stable and Immutable, and in understanding the Eternal and Unchangeable Laws and Measures of Reason and Consequence. He therefore is the
truly Learned and Knowing Man, who has furnish'd his Mind with bright and clear Ideas, lodg'd them orderly and regularly in his Head, and settled the Relations and Consequences of one to ano∣ther. He that is able to think clearly and distinctly (for so much a Man knows, as he distinctly understands, and no more) to judge truly and solidly, and to reason dependently and conse∣quentially. In short, he that sees most of the Divine Ideas, is most familiarly conversant in the Intelli∣gible World, and has the largest and the clearest view of the Field of Truth. This I hold to be Learning, and Intellectual Per∣fection, and besides what Argu∣ments I have alledged in behalf of this Hypothesis; it is further Confirmed by the Authority of Plato, when he makes the Happi∣ness or Perfection of Man (for 'tis all one) to consist in the Contem∣plation of Ideas.
But notwithstanding the un∣questionable Certainty of the Pre∣mises, this is not that Measure which the generality of the World has thought fit to proceed by. Learning is generally placed in the Knowledge of Contingent, not of Necessary Truth. For your Ladyship very well Knows that the World does not esteem him a Learned Man whose Learning has Clear'd his understanding, who is arrived to clearness and Di∣stinctness of Conception, and is a thorough Master of Notion and Discourse. No, 'twill cost great Pains, great Labour of Mind, and anxiety of Thinking to arrive to this Pitch. Nor will all the Pains in the World do, unless a Man be Naturally made for it, unless he be of a Notional Complexion, and has had his Head cast in a Meta∣physical Mould. Whereupon this Attainment is like to be the Lot of a very Few. This therefore
must not be Learning, but some∣thing else must, that lies more within Common reach, tho of no real Moment to the Perfection of the understanding. Such (as I have shewn) are Contingent Truths, and yet Learning is generally placed in the Knowledge of these.
For first, 'tis reckon'd a notable point of Learning to understand variety of Languages. This alone gives a Man a Title to Learning without one Grain of Sense; and on the other side, let a Man be an Angel for Notion and Discourse, yet unless he can express the same thoughts in variety of words, he may go for a Rational, but will by no means be esteem'd a Learned Man. And this brings to my mind a Passage which I met with not long since in London, where being in Company with an Ingenious French Man, I ask't him of what repute M. Malebranche was with
the Learned in France? He told me, that he was look'd upon as a great Master of Notion and Specu∣lation, but as a Man of no great Learning. I ask'd him, why? Be∣cause, said he, he understands but few Languages. How much that excellent Authors Talent may lie that way I am not concern'd. But whatever it be, the most Learned of them all must give me leave to say, that I would rather be Master of a Quarter of his Sense, than of all the Languages that may be form'd out of the Alphabet. But is it not a strange thing that so much Stress should be laid upon such a Triflle? For what am I the better for being able to tell what 'tis a Clock in several Languages? What does this signifie to the Per∣fection of my understanding? Words are purely in order to Thought and Sense, and therefore are of no further value than as they serve as helps either to Learn, or to Communicate the other. To
affect them therefore for them∣selves, is to turn the Means into the End, than which nothing is more absurd. And yet this vain peice of Pedantry has prevail'd all the World over, and with some to that degree, that they have con∣founded Ideas with Words, and have made all Science to terminate in the latter. Thus the Philoso∣phers of the Nominal way, and particularly Mr. Hobbs who makes Reason to be nothing else but Sequela Nominum, a well order'd Train of Words. Never certainly was there a grosser peice of Ido∣latry, nor a plainer Argument of the great degeneracy of Mankind. And tho all the Multipliers of Tongues are not Comprehended under this latter charge, yet it may concern them to consider, how great a Folly it must needs be, to place Learning in that, which is one of the greatest Curses upon Earth, and which shall utterly Cease in Heaven.* 1.7
Again, it passes for an extraor∣dinary part of Learning to under∣stand History, that is, in other words, to know what a company of silly Creatures, call'd Men, have been doing for almost this 6000 years. Now what is my under∣standing the Perfecter for know∣ing this? I deny not but that there are some matters of Fact, as the more remarkable Turns of Eccle∣siastical History, together with the greater revolutions of the Civil World, that may be of Moment to be known, not that the knowledge of them as such is Learning, or Perfective of the understanding, but because by discovering to us the Conduct of Divine Providence they supply us with occasions of adoring and glorifying the wisdom and goodness of God. I am not therefore against the knowing these things, but only I would not have men think themselves the Wiser or more Learned for such Knowledge.
For 'tis one thing to say that a thing deserves to be known, and another to say that 'tis Learning or Wisdom to know it. For a thing may deserve to be known, not as perfecting the understanding, but meerly as touching upon our Inte∣rest. I grant therefore that it may be of Consequence to know some Historical passages, if we are any way concerned in them, and so it may to know the Clock has struck One, if I have appointed an Assig∣nation at that time; but sure the bare naked Theory of the Clock's having struck one, can add but little to the stock of my Intel∣lectual Perfection. The most tri∣vial matter of Fact in the World is worth knowing, if I have any concern depending upon it; and the greatest without that is utterly insignificant. So that 'tis not from the perfecting of our Vnderstanding, but from the Relation they have to our Interest, that these things de∣serve to be known.
This is sufficiently plain from the Measure we have premised, by which no Truth is perfective of the understanding but only Necessa∣ry Truth. But to address my self more Convincingly to the great Magnifiers of History, I shall only desire their answer to this one Question. Suppose such and such Matters of Fact, on the knowledge of which they Found their title to Learning, and perhaps, glory more in the knowing them, than the Actors themselves did in the doing them. Suppose, I say, such mat∣ters of Fact had never been done; suppose Fabius had never Wea∣ther'd out Hannibal by Delays; nor Cyrus took Babylon by drain∣ing the River into the Ditches, what loss or diminution would this have been to the Perfection of their Understandings? They cannot say it would have been any. And why then should the knowing them now they are done, be reck∣on'd
as an Intellectual Improve∣ment? And yet we find that 'tis so, and that Men study these things not only for their use (for that I allow) but for their meer Theory, placing Learning in such History, which has nothing to commend it but only that it tells you such and such things were done. Of this impertinent sort is the greatest part of the Roman and Grecian History, which (had not the World Voted it for Learning) would no more concern a Man to know, than that a Bird has dropt a feather upon the Pyrenoean Mountains.
Again, it goes for a Notable piece of Learning to understand Chronology, to be able to adjust the intervals and distances of Time, to know when such an Action was done, when such a Famous Man flourish'd, and who and who were contemporary, and the like. Now I deny not, but that while Men
live in this World, they may be concern'd to have some acquaintance with these things, by reason of some interest or other that de∣pends upon it. It may therefore, I say, for some purposes, be con∣venient to know that. For in∣stance, there is a twofold Aera (or date) of the Victory at Actium, the one reckon'd from the Fight at the Promontory of Actium, ac∣cording to the account of Dio and Xiphilinus; the other from the taking of Alexandria, and the Death of Cleopatra, according to Ptolemy, Iosephus, Eusebius, and Censorinus. But however, concern∣ing this may be, with respect to its usefulness, yet certainly as to any Intellectual Perfection that accrues by it, it must needs be a very unedifying Stuffage of Mind; and yet 'tis counted a great Accom∣plishment and Enrichment of it.
Another thing there is which passes for wonderful Learning,
which I cannot well reduce either to Necessary or Contingent Truth, for indeed it does not belong to Truth at all, and that is our Sophisti∣cal way of Disputation. And in∣deed it may well be call'd so, for as 'tis generally manag'd, 'tis no∣thing but meer Quibbling and Jesting, not Arguing but Punning. For suppose the Question be, Whether he that has Faith shall be saved? No says the Opponent, If the Damn'd have Faith, then not every one that has Faith shall be saved; But the Damn'd have Faith. Therefore, &c Here 'tis plain that the Word Faith, tho it has Something in Common in both Propositions, yet according to the intire Idea signifies one thing in one Proposition, and another in another. And why then is not the whole Proceedure to be re∣jected as Idle and Impertinent? As for downright Fallacy and Equivocation where there is a Manifest Ambiguity (as between
Dog and Dog, one signifying a Celestial Sign, and the other a Terrestial Animal) this is every where despised and laught at as un∣becoming both the Acumen and the Gravity of a Disputant. And we think we have sufficiently dis∣charged our hands of such an Argument, by Crying out that these are Four Terms in the Syllo∣gism. But now I would fain know whether it be not the same to all real purposes in the foremention'd Instance, which is after the Com∣mon way of our Scholastic Dispu∣tation? Is not Faith and Faith there, as much an Ambiguity as Dog and Dog here? For my part I can perceive but this only Dif∣ference, that Dog and Dog have nothing in Common but the Name, whereas Faith and Faith have some Generical Part wherein they agree. But what does this Mend the Matter? For tho there be some Generical Agreement, yet take 'em according to their whole
Ideas, that is, take the Generical part with its Contracting Difference, and 'tis plain that they signifie two different things, and conse∣quently that there is really as great an Ambiguity here as there. And this we plainly Confess when we come to Distinguish. For what is a Distinction but a Pointing out of an Ambiguity? What is it else but to say, that such a thing is True in this Sense, but not in that, True in that Sense wherein the Point of the Question is not con∣cern'd, but not in that wherein it is. No? why then, notwithstand∣ing the Generical Agreement the Procedure is as fallacious and Im∣pertinent as when the Question be∣ing about Star-Dog, the Opposition is about Land-Dog. And yet (such is the inconsistency of Human Judgment) the one is counted Tri∣fling, and the other Serious Ar∣guing. Whereas indeed no Argu∣ing can be so, but where the Terms of the Question are first Defined
(as is done in Geometry) and then always used according to the first Stated Sense. All Disputing any otherwise than so, must necessari∣ly be nothing else but meer Pun∣ning, only much worse than what is in common use, because 'tis Pun∣ning when a Man Pretends to be Serious. And yet this is made a considerable Part of our Academi∣cal Education and Learning. And to this I add this further Remark, that 'tis reckon'd a notable Excel∣lence to be able to Spin out an Argument to a great length, and he is counted the best Arguer that can thus Pun longest. Whereas indeed did a Man speak to the Purpose, Brevity would be his greatest Excellence.
There are many other things which the unaccountable humour of the World has turn'd up for Learning, which Ignorance will never be the better for, and which Wisdom does not need. Thus 'tis
counted Learning to have tumbled over a multitude of Books, espe∣cially if great ones, and old ones, and obscure ones, but most of all, if Manuscripts; the recovery of one of which is reckon'd so much added to the Commonwealth of Learning, as they call it. A Well-read Man signifies the very same as a Learned Man in most Mens Dictionaries, and by Well-read they dont mean one that has read well, that has clear'd and improv'd his understanding by his reading, but only one that has read a great deal, tho perhaps he has puzzled and confounded his Notions by doing so. Thus again it goes for Learning, to be acquainted with Mens Opinions, especially of the Ancients, to know what this or that Philosopher held, what this or that Author says, tho perhaps he says nothing but what is either Absurd, or Obviously True. Thus for instance, what can be more Absurd than that Fancy of Empe∣docles,
that there are two Semi-circles compassing betwixt them the Earth, one whereof was com∣posed of Fire, the other of Air, and that the former made the Day, and the latter Night? And yet to know this is Learning. And what again is more obviously true, than that Grave Doctrine of Aristotle, that Privation must go before the introduction of the Form in all Generation? And yet 'tis Learn∣ing to know that he taught thus, tho it be a thing so plain, and so near the Surface, that a Child can't miss of it. To know the thing is nothing, because so plain and easie, but to know that Aristotle held it, that's the Learning. Nay, to instance in a matter of greater difficulty, tho I know very well, and am able to demonstrate the grounds of the Atomical Philosophy, or the Motion of the Earth, or the Circulation of the Blood, yet I shall not be admitted into the Or∣der of the Learned, unless I am
able to tell that Moscus the Phoeni∣cian invented the first, and that Democritus and Leucippus after∣wards improved it, and that the two latter owe their discovery to Copernicus and Harvey. So much more Learned an atchievement is it to know Opinions than things; and accordingly, those are reck∣on'd the most Learned Authors, who have given the greatest Spe∣cimens of this kind of Knowledge. Thus is Picus Mirandula more ad∣mired for the Examination he has made of the Doctrine of the Pa∣gans, than any of them were for what they deliver'd; and Plutarch has got more Credit from the History he gives of their Opinions, in the 2d Tome of his Works, than from any of his Rational and Moral Discourses. And were he not accounted Learned for the Former, I question whether the Latter (tho far more excellent than they are) would ever have given him that Title.
Now (Madam) what an hard and unreasonable imposition is this, that tho I am able to Think and Write never so much like an Angel my self, yet I must not be accounted a Man of Learning, unless I can tell what every whim∣sical Writer has said before me! And how hard will this fall upon those, whose lot is to breathe in the last Ages of the World, who must be accountable for all the Whims and Extravagancies of so many Centuries? And yet this is made so great a part of Learning, that the Learning of most Men lies in Books rather than in Things; and among Authors, where one writes upon Things, there are twenty that writes upon Books. Nay, some have carried this odd humour on so far, that 'tis thought Learning to know the very Titles of Books, and their several Editions, with the time and place, when and where they were Printed. And I have
met with several my self, that have valued themselves not a little upon this Mechanical faculty, tho they knew no more of what was in them, than they do of what is written in the Rolls of Destiny.
From this placing of Learning in the Knowledge of Books, pro∣ceeds that ridiculous Vanity of Multiplying Quotations, which is also reckon'd another piece of Learning, tho they are used so unseasonably and impertinently, that there can be no other end in them, but only to shew that the Author has read such a Book. And yet 'tis no such Convincing Evidence of that neither, it being neither New nor Difficult, for a Man that's resolv'd upon it, to quote such Authors as he never Read nor Saw. And were it not too Odious, as well as Obvious a Truth, I could name to your La∣diship, some of those Author-Mongers, who yet pass for Men
of shrewd Learning, and vast Reading.
These, and many other such things (for 'twere endless to reckon up all) are by the Majority of the World Voted for Learning, and in these we spend our Education, our Study, and our Time, tho they are all of them Contingent Truths, that are not Perfective of the Understanding (nothing being so but only Necessary Truths, or the Divine Ideas, the Eternal 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Word and Wisdom of the Father) and also most of them impertinent and unconcerning ones. So that in short, the Charge of this Reflection amounts to thus much, That Learning is generally placed in the Knowledge of such things, which neither the Intel∣lectual Perfection, nor any other Interest of Man is concern'd to know.
Exod. 17.6.
Vid. Rea∣son and Re∣ligion. Pag. 82.
Vid. the same Trea∣tise. Pag. 203.
〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 3.
Cogitatio∣nes Ratio∣nales de Deo p. 296.
De la Re∣cherche de la verite p. 208.
1 Cor. 13.8.