Reason and religion, or, The grounds and measures of devotion, consider'd from the nature of God, and the nature of man in several contemplations : with exercises of devotion applied to every contemplation / by John Norris ...

THE SECOND PART. Wherein the Grounds and Measures OF DEVOTION Are Consider'd from the Nature of Man.

By Iohn Norris, M. A. and Fellow of All-Souls Colledge in Oxford.

LONDON, Printed in the Year MDCLXXXIX.

Contemplation I. Of Man, consider'd as a Crea∣ture.

I.

IN Man, as thus consider'd, I find these four things involv'd, First, That he was once Nothing. Second∣ly, That from Nothing he became Something. Thirdly, That he was made Something, and is what he is by and from God. Fourthly, That he so depends upon Gods continual Influence for the continuation of that Being which he receiv'd from him, that should God but never so little withdraw it, he must necessa∣rily fall back into his first Nothing.

II.

First, then I consider that Man was once Nothing, which is the same as to say, That once he was

not, or that he was not always. This is too acknowledg'd a Proposi∣tion to need any laborious Proof, but however for satisfaction sake, I thus demonstrate it. If Man were al∣ways he would be a necessary Being. For since every thing is necessary while it is, and since there is no assignable Point of Duration wherein that which always is, is not, it fol∣lows that if man were always, he would be a necessary Being. But now that Man is not a necessary Be∣ing, I prove thus.

III.

Man has not his Being from him∣self, but from some other Being; For if he had it from himself, he would never have limited his own Being, and consequently would have had all other Perfections as well as Existence. But that he has not is plain, because he is an Amorous and Desiring Being, and is continually reaching out and aspiring to some further Excellence, which is a cer∣tain Argument of Indigency. Whence it follows that he had not Being from himself.

IV.

He must therefore have it from some other Being, that is, He must therefore exist, because some other Being will have him to exist. If then the Ground and Reason of mans existing be the Will and Pleasure of some other Being, then Man must so far exist necessarily, as 'tis neces∣sary that that other Being should will his existence. Since the necessi∣ty of the Effect depends upon the necessity of the Cause: To shew therefore that Man does not necessa∣rily exist, 'twill be enough to shew that 'tis not necessary that any such Being should will his Existence; which I do thus.

V.

'Tis not necessary that any Being should effectually will that which is not necessarily Lovely. But Man is not necessarily Lovely; therefore 'tis not necessary that any Being should effectually will the Being of Man. The first Proposition is Self-evident. The second will be made so, by considering that necessary

Loveliness is the highest degree of Loveliness, and the highest degree of Loveliness, supposes the highest degree of Excellence; that which is lovely in the highest degree, must be excellent in the highest degree, every thing being lovely so far as it is ex∣cellent. But now man is not Excel∣lent in the highest degree, because he aspires to higher excellence (as was said before) and therefore neither is he Lovely in the highest degree, and therefore not Necessarily Love∣ly. Which was the Minor Proposi∣tion. The Conclusion therefore fol∣lows, that 'tis not necessary that any Being should effectually will the be∣ing of Man. And therefore also 'tis not necessary that Man should exist, the reason of Mans existing being founded upon the will of some other Being, as was supposed. And if Man does not exist necessarily, then he did not exist always; and if not always, then once he was not, which was the thing to be here made out.

VI.

The next thing to be consider'd is that Man became Something from Nothing: Which is the same as to say that he was not made out of any Pre-existent Matter or Substance. This, tho it be more strictly veri∣fy'd of the Soul of Man, which in no sense was raised into being from any pre-existent substance, but came im∣mediately from Nothing to be what it is, yet it is also verify'd to all in∣tents and purposes in respect of his Body, which tho it be not immedi∣ately from Nothing as the Soul is, yet Mediately it is, it being form'd not from matter eternally Pre-exist∣ing, but from Matter which once was Nothing, it being impossible that there should be any eternally pre-existing matter, or that Matter should always have been, for the very same Reason that Man could not have been always; which having al∣ready set down, I shall not again re∣peat it.

VII.

The third thing involv'd in Mans

being a Creature, is that he was made something, and is what he is by and from God. This will be thus Demonstrated. All Being is either Being Essentially, that is, Being it self, or Being by Participation. Now Being it self is God, as has been shewn before: And there can be but one Being it self, as was also shewn before. Therefore all Beings besides this one Being it self, besides God, are Beings by Participation. Now whatever is in any thing by Parti∣cipation, is caused in it by that to which it Essentially belongs. Man therefore being a Being by Partici∣pation, must necessarily be from and by Being it self; that is, from and by God.

VIII.

Should it be here Objected that Nothing hinders, but that a thing may be found without that which is not of the Reason or Essence of it, as a Man suppose without Learning. And that this Habitude of being caused by Being it self, or God is not of the essence of Beings, because

they may be conceiv'd without it. And that therefore nothing hinders but that there may be some Beings that are not from God. To this I answer, That tho this Habitude does not make any part of the Idea or Essence of those beings which are caused, yet it is necessarily conse∣quent to it. For to be a Being by Participation does as much vertually involve its being caused, as a Trian∣gle involves this Affection, that any two sides of it taken together are greater than the third. So that such a Being can no more exist without being caused, than a Triangle can exist without this Affection. But whereas the Habitude of being cau∣sed, is not of the Reason of Being Sim∣ply, or as such, therefore there is a Certain Being that is not caused, which is God.

IX.

The same Conclusion, that Man has his Being from God, may be fur∣ther proved from this Consideration, that none can possibly Create but God, The truth of which Proposi∣tion

is generally founded upon the Distance that is between Being and not Being, which they say is infi∣nite, and therefore it must require an Infinite Power to educe a thing from one to the other. But this is an obscure way of arguing, and I must profess that I do not so clearly understand it as to be satisfy'd whe∣ther it be conclusive or no; and therefore I shall rather chuse to say, that the most universal effect must have the most universal cause. But now among all Effects, to make a thing to be Simply is the most Uni∣versal. And this is Creation, which implies not only a production of this or that Being, or of a Being ac∣cording to this or that Nature or Quality, (for this is also done in Ge∣neration and Alteration) but also of Being Absolutely: For the immedi∣ate Terms of Creation are from not being to be, and then afterwards comes in to be this or that, thus or thus. Creation therefore is the most Universal Effect that is, and conse∣quently it must be reduced into the

most Universal Cause that is, which is God. Therefore God only can Create, therefore all Creatures are from God, and consequently Man receives his Being from no other but God.

X.

'Tis now further to be consider'd, that as man receives his being from God, so he depends upon God's con∣tinual influence for the continuation of it, insomuch, that should God never so little withdraw it, he must necessarily fall back into his First Nothing. For besides, that to con∣tinue in being is as much an Vniver∣sal Effect as to make to be, and con∣sequently must be resolv'd into the same Universal Cause, which is God. I further consider, that Being by Participation is wholly and intirely from Being it self. Now every Ef∣fect depends upon its Cause as far as it is its Cause. If a Partial Cause, then it depends upon it Partially, if an Intire Cause, than it depends up∣on it Intirely. Since therefore Be∣ing by Participation is wholly and

intirely from Being it self, it follows that it must depend wholly and in∣tirely upon it, and if so, then it must depend upon it for every minute of its Existence, as well as for the very first Instant of it; otherwise it would not depend upon it wholly and in∣tirely (as is supposed) there being something in reference to which it would be Independent.

XI.

* 1.1I further consider with Cartesius, that since the Time of our Life con∣sists of innumerable Parts, every one of which does by no means depend upon that which went before, from our existing a little before it, does no way follow that we shall exist Now. I say, it does no way fol∣low, that because we existed a little before, we shall therefore exist now; or that because of our existing now, we shall exist afterwards, there be∣ing no necessary Connexion between the Moments themselves, whereof our Duration is made up. If there∣fore we do exist in several Instants or Nows of Time, this must be from

some Cause which conserves us, and as it were gives us being in every one of those Nows or Moments. But this cannot be our selves, first, for the reason alledg'd by Cartesius, be∣cause we are not Conscious of any such Power, which undoubtedly we should be, if we had it. And Se∣condly, because we might then have given our selves the First Now or Mo∣ment of existence as well as any of the Rest. For the First Now of Ex∣istence differs no otherwise from any of the rest but only as to Novitas Essendi, or the Newness of existing, which is only an extrinsical Relation, and such as adds nothing to the diffi∣culty or greatness of the Effect; which being the same on both hands, the Cause must also be of equal Force and Vertue. But we could not give Being to our selves (as was before proved) and therefore neither are we able to Conserve our selves in being. The Cause therefore by which we are Conserv'd in being, must be the same which gave us Being, that is, God; without whose continued In∣fluence

we can no more go on in our Existence, than we could at First Be.

XII.

This I cannot better illustrate than by that dependence which an Image in the Glass has upon the Face whose Reflexion it is. The Image is not only caused by the access of the Face to the Glass, but does also so necessa∣rily and substantially depend upon and subsist by its Presence, that at the first removal of it, it immedi∣ately vanishes and disappears. And so 'tis with us, we are not only at first brought into being by God, but do also all along so depend upon his Influence for the carrying on our being through the several Distinct Moments of time, that should this Influence but never so little be with∣drawn or intercepted, we should immediately sink down into our First Nothing.

XIII.

And were it not thus, 'twould be impossible that God should ever An∣nihilate. For Annihilation cannot be done by any Positive Act, because

the Term of Annihilation is, not be∣ing Simply. But now every Posi∣tive Act tends to being. So that even Physical Corruption is not a Positive Motion, but only in as much as at the Exclusion of one Form another is introduced by way of Concomitancy. Much less therefore can Annihilation be Positive. If therefore God be able to Annihilate it can be only by Privation, that is, by suspending that Influence upon which we depended for every Mo∣ment of our Existence; and with∣out which we cannot exist. And thus Iob expresses the Mode of An∣nihilation, when he says,* 1.2 O that it would please God to destroy me, that he would let loose his hand, and cut me off.

XIV.

As for the Particular Mode of our dependence upon God, and what this Divine Influence is whereby we are Conserv'd in being, this is a Theory much above our Capacity to Comprehend, and therefore I shall not much employ my Curio∣sity about it. But might I have

leave to Divine, I would say, That the Creature depends upon God af∣ter some such way as the Image in the Glass does upon the Face. That this Ectypal World is only the I∣mage or Reflexion of the Archety∣pal or Ideal World, and so depends upon it, and subsists by it, as all o∣ther Images do upon their Originals. And that the Presentialness of this Ideal World must be supposed to be some way or other intercepted in or∣der to the Annihilation of either this whole Ectypal World, or of any particular Creature in it. And this seems to have good foundation in Scripture, which says, that all things are upheld, or born by the Word of God's Power, that is, by the Di∣vine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.3 the Ideal or Archetypal World; by whom also in the same place, the Worlds are said to have been made.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

GReat is the advantage that may be made hence, to the pur∣poses of Devotion. For, first, if Man was once nothing, this lays a very proper and reasonable ground for Humility and Poverty of Spirit. 'Tis usually thought a very humbling consideration, to remind a Person of the meanness of his Original. But, now, what Original can be so mean as to come from nothing? Now this is the condition of Man. He had his Rise from nothing, and derives his Pedegree, by his Mothers side, from Darkness and Emptiness. And tho•• now by the Omnipotence of his Creator he is something, yet still he holds his being as precari∣ously as he first receiv'd it, and de∣pends as much for his existence up∣on the Will of his Creator, as Light does upon the Sun. God spake the word, indeed, before he was made; but to unmake him, he need only be silent, and not sustain him by the Word of his Power. And shall that

Being be Proud which was once no∣thing, and needs only a meer Nega∣tive to bring him to nothing again? No, says the wise Man, Pride was not made for man: nor furious anger for them that are born of a woman.

Secondly, As this affords us grounds of Humiliation, as to our selves, so we have hence reason to adore and magnifie that Power which was so great as to be able, and that Good∣ness which was so great as to be wil∣ling to bring us from nothing to something.

And since all this proceeds whol∣ly from God, to whom we not on∣ly owe our beings, but our whole perseverance in being; hence in the last place appears the great equity of giving up our whole selves, our Soul, Body and Spirit, to the Ser∣vice and Glory of that God in whom we live, move, and have our being; which, considering the great Benefit of Creation, and the Right which God thereby acquires over us, must needs be a very reasonable Service and Sacrifice.

The Aspiration.

MY God, my Creator, how can I be ever sufficiently humble, when I consider that I once was not; when I consider that even thou with all thy Omnipotence can'st not reduce me to a lower degree of no∣thing than that from whence thou took'st me! When I consider that I still so depend upon thee, that I cannot subsist one moment without thee! What a vanity, what a shadow, what a nothing then am I, who once was not, and now am only because Thou art, and can no longer stand in being than supported by the Arm of thy Power!

O my God, I know not whether of the two I ought more to Adore and Magnifie, either that Power that could raise me from nothing, to be what I am, or that Goodness which could determine that Power to so strange and wonderful a Production. One deep, O my God, calleth upon a∣nother, and my thoughts are all lost and swallow'd up in both.

Praise and Adoration be to thee, O my great and good God, for 'twas from thy Power and Goodness that I receiv'd my Being. Thou art he that took me out of my Mothers Womb, and then also wast my hope when I hanged yet upon my Mothers Breast. I have been also left unto thee ever since I was born: thou art my God even from my Mothers Womb. My Soul still hang∣eth upon thee: thy right Hand does up∣hold me. Thou holdest my Soul in life, and sufferest not my Feet to slip.

To thee then, O Father of Spirits, I give up and devote my whole self, for I am intirely from thee, intirely by thee, and therefore intirely thine. How then can I ever offend thee, or rebel against thee, with those Powers which thou hast given me, and dost still uphold and maintain in me! My God, I will not, but as thou art he whose I am, so thou shalt be he whom I will ever serve. Free me therefore, O God, from my Passions, and make me but once my Own, and I will then ever be Thine. Amen.

Contemplation II. Of Man consider'd as an Intel∣ligent Creature.

I.

IN the Creation of Man there are two things cheifly to be remark∣ed, First, The Councel and Delibe∣ration of the Blessed Trinity, ex∣pressed in these words: Let us make man. Secondly, The immediate Pat∣tern or Platform, according to which he was to be made, expressed in these words, In our Image, after our own likeness. Now both these denote the peculiar excellency of human Nature; but especially the latter: for what can make more for the excellency of Man's composi∣tion, than to say, that he was made after the Divine likeness.

II.

This Divine likeness, not to men∣tion any other instances of resem∣blance,

I take to be most conspi∣cuous in this, that as in the Divine Nature there are two Processions; one by way of Intellect, which is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Word, and the other by way of Love, which is the Holy Spirit. So likwise in the human Na∣ture there are as it were two Pro∣cessions, and that of the same kind too as in the Divine, Vnderstanding and Love. By these two Noble and Divine Powers branching forth from the Soul, Man chiefly resembles God, and becomes a little Image of the Trinity.

III.

My business at present is only with the first of these, namely, the Vnderstanding of Man, or to consi∣der Man as an Intelligent Creature. Here therefore I shall shew, first, the Kinds of human Knowledge; Se∣condly, the Mode of it. Now, as to the Kinds of human Knowledge, I consider, that since Knowledge in general (as was before noted) is a Comprehension of Truth,* 1.4 as many ways as a Man may comprehend

Truth, so many ways he may be said to know. Now a Man may comprehend Truth, either as to Sim∣ple Essences, or as to their Complex Ha∣bitudes, or as to the Dependence that is between one Habitude and ano∣ther. The first of these is what we usually call Apprehension, the se∣cond is what we call Judgment, and the last is what we call Dis∣course. Thus we are authorized to speak by the Schools, who ascribe Judgment and Discourse to the Un∣derstanding; tho' I am rather of Monsieur Malebranche his mind,* 1.5 that there is no other Operation of the Intellect but only Perception, and that Judgment and Discourse more properly belong to the Will, as be∣ing an embracing of, and an adhe∣sion to Truth. But then, withal, it must be acknowledg'd, that there is a threefold Perception. One whereby I perceive a simple Ob∣ject, without any relation which may be call'd a simple Perception. Another, when I perceive the rela∣tions of simple Essences, which may

be called a Judicial Perception. And a third, when I perceive the rela∣tion that is between those relations, which may be call'd a Rational Perception. This is the whole La∣titude, and full Compass of the In∣tellect, and that which belongs to Intellect in common, whether Hu∣man or Divine.

IV.

For I think it no absurdity to say, that in this sense God has Reason and Discourse. For 'tis most certain that he does not only perceive the simple Essences of things, and their relations, but also the relation that is between those relations. Only there is this difference, that God perceives all this at once, with one intire simple view; whereas Man is fain to open his prospect by degrees, by advancing step by step from one proposition to another in the field of Truth. Which, tho' it has ap∣propriated to it self the name of Reason, yet I think it does not be∣long to the nature of Reason in ge∣neral, but is rather an accidental de∣fect

of it, such as proceeds from the narrowness of created, or of such or such created Capacities. This must not therefore be made necessary to Reason (that being sufficiently salv'd in perceiving the relation that is between the Habitudes of things) but only to human Reason.

V.

And thus much as to the Kinds of human Knowledge. I come now to explain the Mode of it, by shew∣ing how Man understands. This perhaps will appear a desperate un∣dertaking at first sight, but I think the difficulty proceeds more from the prejudices of our Education than from the remoteness of the Theory. For were we not other∣wise prepossest from the Principles of the vulgar Philosophy, what would be more familiar and obvi∣ous than to conclude that we see and know all things in God? This is a Notion which I very early light∣ed upon, by the Natural Parturiency of my own mind, before I had con∣sulted with any Authors that might

imbue me with it. But afterwards I met with some that confirm'd me in it. For it is a Notion very fre∣quently touch'd upon by Platonists; by Plotinus, by Proclus, by Marsili∣us Ficinus, by St. Austin, by the late French Philosopher Du Hamel, in his Book De Mente Humana, and is sometimes glanced at by Aquinas himself, but by none that I know of so copiously, so purposely, and so dextrously managed, as by the incomparable Monsieur Malebranche, who, I think, has established the truth of it beyond all cavil or ex∣ception, as well as reasonable doubt∣ing. I shall therefore, for the clear∣ing of this Argument, first give a short and summary account of what that excellent Person has meditated upon it, and then subjoin some fur∣ther considerations of my own to the same purpose.

VI.

* 1.6First then Monsieur Malebranche lays down this preparatory Position, that those Objects which are with∣out the Soul, cannot be perceiv'd

by themselves, but by the Media∣tion of Ideas. This Proposition is most unquestionable, taking Ideas in a large signification for Images or Representations of things. For things that are perceiv'd must be some way or other Present to the Soul, either by themselves or by the Representa∣tives. And since they are not by themselves, they must by their Ideas. And so much is acknowledg'd on all sides. Here therefore being no Con∣troversie, there needs no more Proof.

VII.

This premised, he thus proceeds. It is therefore necessary that these Ideas which we have of Objects without, should either proceed from those Objects: Or that our Mind has a Pow∣er of Producing those Ideas. Or that God should produce them with the Mind when he creates it, or that he should produce them as often as we think of any Object. Or that our Mind should possess in it self all the Perfections which it sees in things. Or lastly, that it be united to some Absolutely Per∣fect

Being, that includes in him∣self all the Perfections of Crea∣ted Beings. By one of these ways we must necessarily perceive what∣ever we perceive.

VIII.

The first is according to the vul∣gar Philosopy, which teaches that external Objects send forth certain Species like themselves, and that these Species are carried by the external Senses to the common Sensory, and that then they are resined, and spritu∣alized by the help of that which they call Intellectus Agens, and so become Intelligible, then are receiv'd into the Intellectus Passivus, and then are actually understood. This certainly is either very profound sense, or very profound nonsense, one of the two, and is rather like the Anatomical Account how the Chyle is turn'd into Blood, than like a Metaphysical account of the way of understanding. But that this Hy∣pothesis cannot be true, our Au∣thor shews from the impossibility of Objects sending sorth such Spe∣cies,

which he proves first from the Impenetrability of Bodies. Which must needs hinder that these Spe∣cies which are nothing else but Corporeal effluvias, should possess the same Vbi, which yet must be, if, by them Objects are render'd visi∣ble, because the whole Medium, and every part of it, must be supposed full of them.

IX.

This he proves, Secondly, from the change or variation of the Spe∣cies. For 'tis most certain, that the nearer the Object, the greater it shews. But now what should after∣wards diminish this Species, and what is become of those parts where∣of it consisted, when it appear'd greater? And what is it that so sud∣denly augments it, when 'tis be∣held through a Telescope?

X.

The same he proves further from the consideration of a perfect Cube, all the Species of whose sides are unequal, and yet the sides them∣selves are equally square. And Last∣ly,

he sensures it as an unconcei∣vable supposition, that a Body should continually send forth Spe∣cies every where, so as to fill e∣very Point of such vast spaces, and yet not be sensibly diminish'd. This first Hypothesis therefore can∣not be true,

XI.

The second is, that our Mind has a Power of Producing these Ideas. This he also shews to be false from the Absurdity that would thence follow, which is that Man would then be able to Create. The con∣sequence he proves by shewing that these Ideas are Real Beings, because they have real Properties, and dif∣fer one from another, and repre∣sent things really different. And that they are also Spiritual Beings, and that then Man would be able to Create more Noble Entities than the Material World, which is the workmanship of God.

XII.

Our Author further shews that our Mind would not use this Crea∣tive Power, though She had it, from the Instance of a Painter. For as a Painter, though never so skil∣ful, cannot represent a Creature which he never saw, and whereof he has no Idea; so a Man cannot form the Idea of an Object, unless he first knows it, that is, unless he has an Idea of it, which does not depend upon his own will. Now if he already has the Idea of that Object, certainly he knows it, and then it is to no purpose for him to form again a new Idea of it. 'This Power therefore of Produ∣cing Ideas is given to Man in vain, therefore it ought not to be given, therefore this second Hypothesis is not true.

XIII.

The third is, that God produces these Ideas, either with the Mind, or whenever we think of any Ob∣ject. That this cannot be true as to the first part, he shews from the

Infinite number of Ideas which must be supposed in proportion to the Infinite number of things, which he exemplifies in Mathematical fi∣gures, and the Combinations thence arising. 'Tis not in the first place probable that God should create so many things with every Soul; But Secondly, suppose he should, and the Mind, were a Magazine of all manner of Ideas, yet 'twould be an invincible Difficulty to shew how the Mind among such an Infinite number of Ideas, should be able, and that so readily, to pick out those which it has occasion for. It ought not therefore to be said that Ideas are Created with us.

XIV.

And there is as little ground to suppose that God does every mo∣ment produce in us as many several Ideas, as we conceive things. For besides that this has already been sufficiently overthrown in the other, 'tis further to be consider'd, that we must then always actually have in us the Ideas of all things, seeing

that at all times we can will to think of all things: Which we could not do if we had not already a confuse Perception of them, that is, unless an Infinite number of Ideas were continually before our Minds. For we can not be willing to think of that whereof we have no Idea. But we cannot have all this Infinity of Ideas at once in our selves, therefore this third Hypothesis is not true.

VX.

The fourth is that the Mind needs no other thing but it self for the Perception of Objects, and that by Contemplating it self and her own Perfections, She can perceive all External Objects. This is the boldest Assertion of all, and is full of Impiety as well as Absurdity. They that will maintain this must be ob∣liged to say that the Mind of Man has in it self the Perfections of all things, since it cannot see in it self what it has not in it self, and then they would do well to consider whether this be not to make a

God of the Soul; For 'tis God on∣ly who has in himself the Perfecti∣ons of all things, and who there∣fore sees by his own Light.

XVI.

Having thus overthrown these four Hypotheses concerning the Mode of our understanding, Our most Ingenious Author proceeds to the remaining one, that we see all things in God. Which though it be suffi∣ciently establish'd in the overthrow of the rest, yet he goes on to a more immediate and direct proof of it. In order to which he pre∣mises two Postulatums which he had before prov'd, First, that God has in himself the Ideas of all things. This he had before concluded from Gods creating all things, which he could not do without having in himself the Ideas of all things. And this I have also demonstra∣ted in my fifth Contemplation, by a distinct Argument taken from the being of Necessary and Eternal Truths. The second Postulatum is that God is intimately by his Presence uni∣ted

to our Minds, so that God may be said to be the Place of Spirits, as Space is the Place of Bodies. These two things being supposed, it is most certain that the Mind may see all things in God, if God will be pleased to display these Ideas to her, there being then nothing to hinder it. And that 'tis the will and Pleasure of God so to do, ra∣ther than create an Infinite num∣ber of Ideas in every Mind, he thus proves.

XVII.

First, from the general Oeconomy of the universe, wherein 'tis obser∣vable that God never does that by difficult ways, which may be done by simple and easie ways: that is, God never does any thing in vain, and without Cause: When there∣fore God may by himself open and exhibit to us all things barely by willing that we should see those Ideas which are in him, 'tis no way probable that to obtain the same end, he should produce such an in∣finite Multitude of Ideas as are ne∣cessary

to that variety and multipli∣city of Knowledge, that is in all Created Minds.

XVIII.

This Mode of Intelligence our Author further recommends, by considering that by this way Cre∣ated Minds are placed in the greatest dependence upon God that can possi∣bly be. For upon this Hypothesis we cannot only see nothing but what God will let us see, but we can also see nothing but what God exhibits to us to be seen. Neither can our Minds be said sufficiently to depend upon God in all its ope∣rations, if they are supposed to have all that is necessary for action, that is, to have in themselves the Ideas of all things always present.

XIX.

This again he more strongly in∣forces by an Argument taken from the Manner of our Minds perceiving all things. For we all find by certain experience that when we are mind∣ed to think of any particular thing, we first cast our eyes about upon

all Beings, and then at last, ad∣here to the consideration of that Object, which we intended to think upon. Now 'tis past all que∣stion that we cannot desire to see any Object, but we must see it al∣ready, although Confusely, and after a general kind of a way. So that since we can desire to see all Ob∣jects, now this, now that, hence it will certainly follow, that all Beings are Present to our minds. But now all Beings cannot any other way be present to the mind, but because God is present to it, who in the Simplicity of his Being com∣prehends all beings. The same may be further confirm'd from the Per∣ception of Vniversals. Which the mind could not well be supposed able to represent unless it saw all Beings included in One. For since every Created thing is an Individu∣al, no one can say that he perceives any thing Created, when he per∣ceives, suppose, a Triangle in gene∣ral. This well deserves to be con∣sider'd.

XX.

Again our Ingenious Author ar∣gues from the Idea which we have of Infinite. For 'tis plain that we perceive Infinites, though we do not comprehend it, and that our mind has a very Distinct Idea of God, which it could not have but by its union with God. Since 'tis absurd to suppose that the Idea of God should be from any thing that is Created.

XXI.

He further Considers that the Mind has not only an Idea of In∣finite, but that it also has it before it has any Idea of finite. For we conceive Infinite Being, barely by conceiving Being, without consider∣ing whether it be finite or Infinite. But now to conceive any finite Being, we must detract something from that general Notion of Being, which by consequence must be An∣tecedent. Our mind therefore per∣ceives nothing but in the Idea which it has of Infinite. And this Idea is so far from being form'd

from a Confuse heaping together of the Ideas of special Beings, as Philo∣sophers commonly pretend, that all those Special Ideas are nothing else but Participations from the general Idea of Infinite. Even as God does not hold his Being from the Crea∣tures, but all Creatures subsist only by him.

XXII.

He adds one Argument more which he thinks will go for Demonstration, with those who are used to Ab∣stract ways of Reasoning. It is impossible that God in any of his actions should have any Principal End different from himself. This is a Common Notion with every Attentive Thinker. And the Scrip∣ture suffers us not to doubt but that God made all things for himself. It is necessary therefore that not only our Natural Love, that is, the mo∣tion which he produces in us, should tend towards himself, but that more∣over that Knowledge and Light, which he bestows upon our mind should open and exhibit to us something

that is in himself. For whatsoever comes from God cannot be for any other besides God. If God should Create a Mind and give it the Sun, suppose, for its Idea, or immediate Object of Knowledge, God would then make that Mind for the Sun, and not for himself.

XXIII.

God therefore cannot make a mind to know his Works, unless that mind do in some manner see God when it sees his Works; so that I may venture to say, that if we did not some way or other see God, we should see nothing at all. Even as if we did not love God; that is, if God did not continually impress upon us the love of good in gene∣ral, we should love nothing at all. For since this Love is the same with our will, we cannot Love or will any thing without him, since we cannot love Particular goods but by determining towards those goods that motion of Love which God gives us towards himself. We love therefore nothing but by that ne∣cessary

love by which we are mo∣ved towards God, and we see no∣thing but by that Natural Know∣ledge which we have of God. And all those Special Ideas which we have of the Creatures, are nothing else but Limitations of the Idea of the Creator, as all the motion of our Will towards the Creatures are no∣thing else but Determinations of that motion which is toward the Creator.

XXIV.

He appeals last of all to Scripture, which in divers places gives abun∣dant confirmation to this Hypothe∣sis. As when we are said,* 1.7 not to be sufficient of our selves, to think any thing as of our selves, but that our sufficiency is of God. Again, God is said to have shewn unto the Gentiles what might be known of him.* 1.8 Again, God is call'd,* 1.9 the father of lights. God is also said, by the Psalmist, to teach man Knowledge. Lastly, He is said,* 1.10 to be the true light, which inlightens every man that comes into the world.

XXV.

From all which, he concludes, that God is the Intelligible World, or the Place of Spirits, as the Material World is the place of Bodies. That these Spirits receive their Modifica∣tions, or Sensations, from his Power, and find their Idea's in his Wisdom, and by his Love are moved by all orderly motions; and that in God we have our Life, our Motion, and our Being. According to that of St. Paul,* 1.11 He is not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being.

XXVI.

And thus in as short a compass as I could comprize it, have I given a summary account of what the excellent Monsieur Malebranche has at large delivered upon this Theo∣ry, of our seeing all things in God. I shall now further establish it by some other considerations of my own.

XXVII.

That all our Intellectual Percep∣tion is by Ideas, that is, not by the

immediate presence of things them∣selves, but by something that inti∣mately and immediately represents them to our mind, is a thing plain in it self, and by all so acknow∣ledged. And that all the Idea's of things, with their respective habi∣tudes and relations are in God, I have abundantly proved; and also as to the manner, explained in my Contemplation of the Divine Om∣niscience. The thing now to be con∣sider'd is, whether we do not see and know whatever we see and know in God; that is, whether those Idea's which are in God, be not the very Idea's which we see, and the immediate Object of our Knowledge and Perception.

XXVIII.

That it is so, besides what Mon∣sieur Malebranche has offered upon this Argument, I further prove by considering, first, That since Know∣ledge is comprehension of Truth, if the Truth which I comprehend be in God, and in him only, then I must be said to see and know what∣ever

I see and know in God. This is a plain and easie consequence. And that the Truth which I com∣prehend is in God only, I thus make out.

XXIX.

The nature of Truth consists in a certain mutual respect or habi∣tude of simple Essences one to ano∣ther. But these relations which I comprehend, and which are the same with Truth, are not verified of the simple Essences, as they are in their External and Natural subsi∣stencies, but as they are in the Di∣vine Idea's. I deny not but that there may be relation between things in their natural subsistencies, but I say that is not the relation which I primely and directly behold when I contemplate Truth. For, first, things according to their Na∣tural subsistencies are Temporary, and once were not, but the relation which I behold is Eternal, and was from everlasting; and consequently cannot be the relation of things ac∣cording to their subsistence in Na∣ture.

Again, the Essences of things, as to their Natural subsistence, may cease to be, but the relation which I behold is Immutable and Immortal, and will be ever the same. Again, things as they are in Nature, are not, even while they are, accord∣ing to that exactness according to which we discern some certain re∣lations to belong to them. Thus for instance, when I define a right Line to be that which lies equally between its two Points, is there, can there be any such Line in Nature to which this relation may belong? This relation therefore is not the relation of any Line in Nature, but of a Line in Idea. And so 'tis in all other instances; the relations which we behold are not the rela∣tions of any Natural, but of Ideal Entities. These are the things which are properly related, other things are so only by accident and redu∣ctively as they come under these. And 'tis the relation of these which we properly discern, and which are the prime, direct, and immediate ob∣ject

of our Perception, the relati∣ons of other things come under a secondary discernment, and they are only so far beheld, as they are be∣held in these.

XXX.

And this is what the Schools them∣selves must of necessity come to, if they would but attend to the conse∣quence of what they affirm, when they say, That Science is not of Sin∣gulars, but of Vniversal and Abstract Natures. For where are these Uni∣versal Natures? Not in this Ecty∣pal World. Whatever is here, is Sin∣gular, this or that. It must be there∣fore in the Ideal or Archetypal World, that is, in the Divine Na∣ture, as exhibitive of that which is created, where these Universal Natures, which are the proper ob∣jects of Science, are to be found. And consequently, 'tis in God that we know all the Truth, which we know.

XXXI.

And this very Notion Aquinas had once plainly light upon, how∣ever

he came afterwards to lose it. For, says he, in express terms, It is necessary to say that the human Soul knows all things in their Eternal Rea∣sons, by the participation of which we know all things. For that Intellectual Light which is in us, is nothing else but a participated similitude of that increated Light in which the Eternal Reasons are contain'd.* 1.12 This is almost as plain an acknowledgment of our seeing all things in God as one would wish; and differs little or no∣thing from that celebrated Defini∣tion Plato gives of Knowledge, which he calls, A Participation of Ideas.

XXXII.

But to proceed, if the Truth which we see be not in God, I would fain know whence has it its Vnity and Identity, its Steddiness and Immutability, its Everlastingness and Perpetuity? Whence is it that 'tis alike discern'd by different minds, and by the same mind at different times? We have nothing in our selves but what is flux and mutable,

and the things without us are as mutable and uncertain as we our selves. Again, whence is it that Truth is present in all places, and that independently upon our thinking or knowing? For, suppose all the Men and Angels in the World should suspend thinking, yet the existence of Truth would not be thereby suspended, but remain as it was before. For by thinking we do not make Truth, but only per∣ceive it as it is in it self, by attend∣ing to that Light which shines up∣on us, and is intimately present with us. Truth therefore will exist and be always the same, whether we think or no; which is a plain Argument that tho' it be in us, yet 'tis nothing of ours, nor is at all de∣pendent upon our understandings, but only upon his who is necessarily, and is in all places, and is Truth it self.

XXXIII.

This conclusion may be further inferr'd from the Permanency and Im∣mutable Stability of simple Idea's.

I find in my mind certain Idea's of a fix'd and unalterable Nature, such as I can neither add any thing to, or at all diminish from. Thus for instance, the Idea of a Triangle has a determinate and immutable Na∣ture, such as is not in my power any way to alter. I can, indeed, cease to think of a Triangle, and con∣vert my mind to the speculation of some other Figure. But whensoever I do think of a Triangle, I cannot help representing it to my mind af∣ter one and the same determinate way. Which is a certain Argu∣ment that this Idea is not of my own raising or forming, for then it would be Arbitrary, and I might vary it at pleasure; but that 'tis an absolute Nature, distinct from, and independent on my Understanding; and, indeed, that 'tis no other than the Divine Essence it self, after a special mode of Exhibition or Imitability: for nothing but God himself is ab∣solutely Immutable. He only being that Father of Lights, in whom is no varying, nor shadow of turning.

XXXIV.

This, again, may be further ar∣gued, from our desire of Knowledge, and from the manner of our attain∣ing to it. As to the desire of Know∣ledge, I remark this, That among all the things which are knowable, there is not one which I may not, nay, which I do not actually desire to know. But now I cannot have any desire of that whereof I have no manner of Knowledge. For de∣sire proceeds from Knowledge, and consequently pre-supposes it. I must therefore be supposed to have alrea∣dy some Knowledge of all that I de∣sire to know; that is, I must have a confuse Knowledge of that which I desire to know clearly and di∣stinctly. And therefore since I de∣sire to know, or may desire to know every thing clearly and di∣stinctly, I must be allowed to have a confuse Knowledge of every thing. But, now, how can this be, but by my having all things actually pre∣sent to my mind? And how can this be, but by my having a confuse

glance of that Being in whom are all things, and who is All?

XXXV.

Then as to the manner of our at∣taining to Knowledge, 'tis a thing in the first place worth considering, How a Child comes to learn his first Language. To know a Lan∣guage, is to know that such a word is to go as a sign for such a thing. Now of words there are some to which the thing that an∣swers is material and sensible. O∣thers, again, there are to which the things that answer are purely Intel∣lectual. This premised, I demand how a Child comes to understand the first Language which he learns? You will say, by frequent hearing the word repeated, when at the same time the thing is pointed to, he begins at length to collect that such a word is to go for such a thing; and so to call a Table, a Ta∣ble, and a Stool, a Stool. True, this serves well enough to explain how we may learn the meaning of such words to which something

sensible answers. But this won't at all help us out in accounting for the understanding words which sig∣nifie pure Intellectual Notions. For these cannot be pointed at when I hear the word, as in the other case, because not present, nor sensible, and therefore should the word be never so often said over to me, I might indeed grow familiar with the sound, but I should never be able thence to understand that this word is to be joined as a sign to such an Idea. As for instance, should I hear this word Vertue repeated to me daily, I should in a little time come to be acquainted with the sound, so as to know it again from any other sound; but sure were I to hear it to Eternity, I should never thence be instructed among all those Intellectual Idea's which I have, which was signifi'd by that word, neither of them being to be pointed to when I heard the sound. And yet we find by experience that Children do make a shift to find out this, and that they learn the

meaning of such words whose I∣dea's are Intellectual, almost as soon as they do the other, and that at an Age when their observation is next to none at all. But how they come to do this is an amazing thing to consider. And truly I have no o∣ther way to solve the difficulty, but by supposing that as often as they hear such words to which the No∣tions that answer are purely Intel∣lectual; and consequently not be pointed at when the word is spoken: God then, who is never wanting in necessaries, supplies the part of the Teacher, by exhibiting such a part of the Ideal World to the mind of the Child, as is signi∣fied by such an arbritrary sign. And this exhibition being thus oc∣casionally vouchsafed by God when∣ever such words are repeated, has the same effect to make the Child understand the meaning of words, whose Notions are purely Intellectual, as pointing to the sensible Object has to make him know the meaning of words which signifie things material and sensible.

XXXVI.

Pass we next from knowledge of words to knowledge of things. This knowledge we get and increase by Study. Now Study is nothing else, but a close application of mind to the speculation of Truth. The more intent we are in our view of Truth, the more we discover of it. And not only so, but the more in∣tensly we speculate it, the more uniform we are in our judgments about it. The more we think, the more we come to agree in our thoughts. Now this plainly argues, that Truth is one absolute and se∣parate Nature, independing upon our understandings; and, yet with∣al, intimately and constantly pre∣sent to them: For, otherwise, how could it be thus in our power at any time to apply our minds to the speculation of it? Now, what can this one independing, and ever-pre∣sent Nature be, but God? To know Truth therefore is to know God: and Divinity is a larger Study than we are aware of.

XXXVII.

Further, I consider, that since God has made Man after his own Image and likeness, 'tis highly ratio∣nal to believe that we imitate him in our Vnderstandings; Understand∣ing being one of the principal parts of Man. And how can we duly imitate him in our Understandings, unless we be supposed to know and perceive after the same general way that God knows and perceives. But now the mode of the Divine Un∣derstanding, is by consulting the Ideal World, that is, himself as va∣riously imitable and exhibitive of things. Thus 'tis most certain God knew and perceived before the Pro∣duction of this Ectypal World, there being then no other mode of Per∣ception imaginable. And thus he must be supposed to perceive now and ever, there being no varying or shadow of turning in God, much less from better to worse, as it would be, should God be supposed before the Creation to know by and in himself, and afterwards by any

created or foreign Ideas. It is therefore congruous to suppose that as God knows and perceives all things in himself, so Man who is after the Divine image knows and perceives all things in God.

XXXVIII.

Again, 'tis highly rational to be∣lieve that we Know and Perceive Now after the same manner, though not in the same degree, as we shall hereafter in Heaven. As the eye sees after the same manner, though not in the same measure, by night as it does by day. For the state of Glory is not the Destruction, but only the Perfection and exaltation of the state of Nature. But now 'tis certain this shall be the mode of our Vision and Preception here∣after, we shall then see all things in God, for says the Psalmist, With thee is the well of life,* 1.13 and in thy light shall we see light. And there∣fore we may with reason conclude that this is the mode of our Pre∣sent Intelligence, and that now al∣so we see Light in the Light of God.

And accordingly says the Apostle, now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face: where observe that our Present Vision does not dif∣fer from our Future as to the Ob∣ject, but only as to the Degree of Charity. God is the Object of both, only now he is seen through a Glass, that is through the Veil of our Mor∣tal Flesh, whereas then the Veil shall be remov'd, and our vision of him shall be Clear and Perfect.

XXXIX.

Lastly, I consider that I always think of Being in general. Particu∣lar Beings indeed I think of, or not think of at Pleasure, but Being in general is ever before my mind, and I cannot possibly remove it from me. For there is the same Proportion in our understanding that is in our Love. There is variety and vicissitude in our love of Par∣ticular goods, sometimes we love them, sometimes we do not love them, sometimes we love this, some∣times that, sometimes more, and sometimes less; but our love of good

in general is necessary, constant, and uniform. And there is the same measure in our Thinking. Particu∣lar Beings we think of by intervals and with variety. But we always and uncessantly think of Being in general. And when we think of Particular Beings, we don't so much depart from Being in general, as confine and determin our minds to some certain Perfections of it. Nay when we think that we think of nothing, our mind is then most full and Pregnant of wandring, In∣determinate, Indefinite Idea of Be∣ing in general. This I evidently experiment in my self, and I que∣stion not that whoever attends to the operations of his mind will find the same: Now I demand whence should this come to pass that I am thus necssarily deter∣min'd at all times, and in all Places to think of Being in general, but on∣ly from this, that Being in general is inseparably united to my mind, and intimately Present to it, as be∣ing always, and every where.

XL.

But now Being in general is the same with God, as has been shewn in the Former part. If therefore Being in general be united to my Soul, then God is united to my Soul. And not only so, but also more in∣timately united to it than any thing else can be, because there is no∣thing else that I necessarily think of, whereas I do necessarily think of God. And if God be so inti∣mately united to my Soul, how can I otherwise conclude but that 'tis in him that I see all that I see? For in what else can I see it, no∣thing being so intimately Presenti∣al to me as God? And in what else need I see it, God having in him∣self the Ideas of all things, as was before proved.

XLI.

Now as to Scripture-Authority, besides what Monsieur Malebranche has alledged, I further offer to be consider'd, First, that God is not only said to enlighten our minds, and all our Illumination is every

where ascribed to him, but it is al∣so particularly ascribed to the se∣cond Hypostasis of the Blessed Trini∣ty, who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the word or in∣ward conception of God, or the Ideal World. Thus in the 8th of the Proverbs, there is described a Sub∣stantial Wisdom (which can be no other but the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who is the Wisdom of the Father) concer∣ning which it is said, The Lord possess'd me in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the Be∣ginning (and so St. Iohn, In the Be∣ginning was the word) or ever the earth was: When there were no Depths I was brought forth (there's the Eternal Generation) when there were no Fountains abounding with Water. Before the mountains were settled; before the Hills was I brought forth. While as yet he had not made the Earth, nor the Fields, nor the highest part of the dust of the World. When he prepared the Heavens I was there, when he set a Compass upon the face of the Deep.

When he establish'd the Clouds above. When he Strengthen'd the fountains of the Deep. When he gave to the Sea his Decree, that the waters should not pass his Commandment, when he ap∣pointed the Foundations of the Earth. Then was I by him, as one brought up with him, and I was daily his delight, rejoycing always before him. This I think will readily be ac∣knowleg'd to be a plain and Gra∣phical Description of the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Ideal World. Now of this same Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it is also said in the same Chapter,* 1.14 Counsel is Mine, and sound Wisdom, I am un∣derstanding. By me Kings reign, and Princes decree Iustice. By me Prin∣ces rule, and Nobles, even all the Iudges of the Earth. And again v. 20. I lead in the way of Righte∣ousness, in the midst of the Paths of Iudgment. And again chap. 9. says the same substantial Wisdom, whoso is simple let him turn in hither, (that is, to the Intellectual Feast which she is there said to have pre∣pared) and to him that wants un∣derstanding

she says, Come eat of my bread, and drink of the wine which I have mingled.

XLII.

By this it is as plain as any thing can be, that is figuratively expres∣sed, that all our illumination proceeds from the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the substan∣tial wisdom of God. But St. Iohn speaks more plainly; This is the true light which inlightens every man that comes into the world. Now true Light, is here the same as only Light, and implies that all other pretended lights are false ones. Again says our Lord, I am the light of the world. And, I am the way, the truth, and the life. And again says our Lord in his Pray∣er, Sanctifie them through thy truth, thy word is truth: Which is not meant of the written Word, but of the Substantial and Eternal Word, as appears from the Context. Last∣ly, the Apostle says expresly of this Divine Word, that he is made unto us Wisdom.* 1.15 Which is exactly accord∣ing to our Hypothesis that we see all things in the Ideal World, or Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

XLIII.

I might add a great deal more to this purpose, but I think that from these considerations, joyn'd with those of Mr. Malebranche, 'tis clear, even to Demonstration that Man is not his own Light, or a Light to himself, and also that no other Creature can be a Light to him, but that he sees and knows all things in the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or Ideal World, which is that true Light within him so much talkt of by Enthusiasts, who by a kind of blind Parturiency of mind have confusedly glanc'd at what we have here more distinctly explain'd. That all our Light and Illumination pro∣ceeds wholly from him who at first said, let there be light, that we see so much of Truth as we see of God, that the Ideas which are in God are the very Ideas which we see, and that the Divne 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is our Wisdom, as well as the Wisdom of his Father. So absolutely necessa∣ry is the Doctrine of Ideas, when rightly stated to the explaining the

Mode both of Divine and Human Knowledge, without which I shall venture to affirm that they can neither of them be explained or un∣derstood.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

SInce then God is that Intelligi∣ble Light, in which we see and know, and since we see and know so much Truth as God is pleased to discover to us of himself, we may hence collect to the advan∣tage of Devotion, First, What lit∣tle Reason the Wisest of us all have to be proud of our understanding and knowledge. We are generally more apt to be proud of our under∣standings than of any thing else about us, but this we have least reason to be proud of, there being according to the preceding Hypothesis no o∣ther difference between a Wise Man and a Fool, but only that God is pleased by his in-dwelling Ideas to illuminate one more than another, or to discover more of himself to

one than he does to another. And if so, then to be proud of my know∣ledge, is to be proud that I am more dependant upon God than a∣nother Man is, which indeed is a very proper Argument for Humi∣lity, but a very Absurd one for Pride.

Hence again we may collect how reasonable 'tis that we should Bless, Praise and Adore God as the sole Author of all our Light and Know∣ledge, as our immediate Teacher and Instructer, and that to him we should always address our selves in Prayer for further illumination.

Lastly, 'twill hence follow that we ought always most carefully to attend to the Dictates of this Light within us, that we ought to look upon all Truth as Divine Reve∣lation, and on as our Reason a Divine Monitor, as the Angel of God's Pre∣sence. And accordingly to be very careful how we transgress any of his clear Dictates, that we grieve not this Angel lest he smite us, that we do nothing against him, lest he for∣sake us.

The Aspiration.

MY God, my Light, what is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou so regardest him? But much more, What is Man that he should so regard himself? that he should regard him∣self for that which is least of all his own, his Knowledge and Wisdom? For, O God, we are not a Light to our selves, but 'tis thou, O God, art our Light, and in thy Light do we see Light.

O my Wonderful Counsellour, with what Humility and Poverty of spi∣rit ought I to reflect upon the rich∣est endowments of my mind, since I see only by thy Light, and depend upon thee for what I Know, as much as for what I am: And how un∣worthy should I be of thy Divine Light, should I be puffed up through the Abundance of this thy Revelation.

Not unto me therefore, O my God, my Light, not unto me, but

to thy greatness and goodness be the Praise and the Glory. For 'tis thy Word, thy Eternal Word, that is a Lantern unto my feet,* 1.16 and a light unto my paths. The Lord is my light and my salvation,* 1.17 and it is he that reacheth Man Knowledge. I will therefore thank the Lord for giving me warning,* 1.18 my reins also chasten me in the night-season.

Lighten my Darkness thee, I be∣seech, O Father of Lights, and shine upon me more and more with the Brigthness of thy glory.* 1.19 O send out thy light and thy truth, that they may lead me,* 1.20 and bring me unto thy holy Hill, and to thy dwelling.

Shew the light of thy countenance upon thy servant,* 1.21 and teach me thy Statutes. O let the Angel of thy Presence go always before me in this my Pilgrimage, and grant that I may always attend and give heed to his Counsel and Direction, that so walking in thy Light here, I may for ever live, and for ever rejoyce in the full and open Light of thy Countenance hereafter, Amen.

Contemplation III. Of Man, consider'd as an A∣morous Creature.

I.

TRuth and good Employ, the whole capacity of Man, who seems to be purely designed and made for the contemplation of the former, and for the desire and frui∣tion of the latter. Having there∣fore consider'd Man as an Intelli∣gent Creature, or as he is a Contem∣plator of Truth, I shall now proceed to consider him as an Amorous Creature, or as he is a desirer of Good.

II.

The management of this subject ingages me upon the consideration of these four things. First, What love or desire is, or wherein the ge∣neral

Nature of it does consist? Secondly, That Love or Desire is in Man, or that Man is an Amorous Being. Thirdly, Whence Man has this Affection, or what is the pro∣per cause of it. Fourthly, and last∣ly, After what manner this Affecti∣on has it self, or how it stands pro∣portion'd to that cause.

III.

Now as to the First, I say that the general nature of Love consists in a motion of the Soul towards good.* 1.22 But this I have sufficiently explained in a distinct Treatise upon this occa∣sion, to which I shall chuse rather to refer my Reader, than to trou∣ble him or my self with needless re∣petitions.

IV.

As to the Second, That there is such a motion in Man, I need say no more, but that we are intimate∣ly conscious of it, as much as we are of the motion of our Heart, or Lungs, or of any other Physical Impression in or about us. All there∣fore that I shall further insist upon

shall be the two last things: First, What is the proper cause of this mo∣tion in Man. And, Secondly, After what peculiar manner this motion has it self, or stands proportioned to that cause. To these two En∣quiries I shall confine my present Contemplation.

V.

As to the cause of this motion in Man, which we call Love or Desire, I consider that it must be the same that is the cause of all the Physical motion in the Universe. Now Physical motion is resolv'd in∣to a double cause, an occasional cause, and an efficient cause. The occa∣sional cause of Physical motion is emptiness or vacuity. For in that which is absolutely full there can be no motion, because of the Im∣penetrability of Bodies. The effi∣cient cause of Physical motion is either particular or universal. The particular is, the pressure or impulse of particular Bodies one against a∣nother. The universal is, no other than God himself, who in the Crea∣tion

of the World (as the Cartesian Philosophy rightly supposes) di∣spenced a certain portion of moti∣on and rest to matter, which he still preserves the same by his Almighty Power. So that if one part of mat∣ter cease to be moved, so much motion as was in that is transferred to another part: And if the moti∣on of one decreases or be dimi∣nished, it is compensated in ano∣ther. And so the same measure of motion is always conserved in the Universe. And unless God be sup∣posed to be the Author of motion, 'twill be impossible to give any ac∣count of the Original of it. For neither can Bodies move themselves, nor can they be moved by one ano∣ther on to Infinity. We must there∣fore at last come to a first Mover unmoved, which is God. And so A∣ristotle calls God, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first Mover unmoved.

VI.

And thus in the same Propositi∣on, the motion of Love is also re∣solvable into a double cause, an oc∣casional

cause an an efficient cause. The occasional cause of this moti∣on, as of the other, is emptiness or vacuity. For Love or Desire is founded upon Indigence and Self-insufficiency of the Soul, which ha∣ving not within it self enough to content it, is forced to go out of it self for supplies. And so Aristotle in his Ethics, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Desire is the fulfilling of In∣digence. And accordingly we find that the more weak and indigent any Person is, still the more abound∣ing in desire. Thus Children are more profuse in their desires than Adult Persons, Women than Men, and the Sick more than those who are in Health. This is well sha∣dowed forth in Iotham's Parable, wherein the Bramble is represented as more ambitious than either the Olive-tree,* 1.23 Fig-tree, or the Vine. For he presently accepted of that Empire which they had all de∣clined. Where there is no Indi∣gence there is no room for Desire; and accordingly God, who is an

absolutely full Being, can no more admit of desire, than a place that is absolutely full can admit of mo∣tion.

VII.

As to the efficient cause of this Moral motion, it is also double, as in Physical Motion. It is either Particular or Universal. The parti∣cular efficient cause, are particular goods, whether Sensual or Intel∣lectual. Which act upon the Soul, and answer to the pressure or im∣pulse of particular Bodies in Natu∣ral motion. The Universal effici∣ent cause, is the Universal Good, or God, whom we suppose to have imprinted a certain stock of moti∣on upon the Intellectual World, as he did upon the Natural. Which he also conserves and maintains by his Omnipotence, as he does the other.

VIII.

For, I consider, that there is the same necessity of a first Mover in Moral, as there is in Natural mo∣tions. And upon the very same

grounds. But now tis impossible that there should be any other first Mover besides God. And therefore whatever intermediate causes there may be of this motion, it must at last be resolved into an impression of God upon our Souls, whom therefore I call the Vniversal effici∣ent cause of Love.

IX.

And so much for the cause of this motion in Man. I come now to consider the last Enquiry, namely, after what peculiar manner this motion has it self, or how it stands proportioned to its cause. I do not mean its occasional cause, that being not so properly a cause as a condition, but its efficient cause. Now this being double, Particular and Universal Good; the question in more explicite terms will be, af∣ter what peculiar manner our Love stands affected or proportioned to Particular and Universal Good.

X.

Now in answer to this, I consi∣der, first, That since God is the

first Mover in the motion of Love, he must necessarily determine this motion toward himself, or make himself the term of this motion. And the only term too; it being impossible that God should act for any end different from himself. Whence it follows, that Universal good, or good in general, is the only good to which we are directly and properly moved by God.

XI.

Hence again it follows, that good in common, or God, must be the Primary and Adequate Term or Object of Love. This being the only good to which we are direct∣ly moved by God. I say directly, for God moves us to particular goods only by moving us to good in gene∣ral, which is not to move us to them directly, but by accident and indi∣rectly. God cannot move us directly to any thing but himself, that is to Universal good, or good in gene∣ral, which therefore must be the Primary and Adequate Term or Object of Love.

XII.

And this we sensibly experiment as well as rationally conclude. For 'tis plain that we are conscious to our selves of our loving good as good, or good according to its com∣mon Nature, before we love this or that good in particular. And we are further conscious, that when we do love any particular good, 'tis only for the sake of the Univer∣sal good. We love it only because we find in it something of the com∣mon Nature of good, and the more we find of that, the more we love it. So that 'tis by that love where∣by we love good in common, that we love any particular good. And were it not for this Universal good we should be able to love nothing. Which by the way is a plain argu∣ment of the real existence of such Vniversal good, and consequently that there is a God.

XIII.

For, indeed, to speak out in short what I would have, as we under∣stand all things in God, so 'tis in

God we love whatever we love. And as when we understand, the Divine Ideas are that which we di∣rectly and properly perceive, and Created Beings are only so far per∣ceiv'd as they are of a similar nature with those Ideas, and so vertually contain'd in them. So when we Love, universal good, good in com∣mon, or God is that which we di∣rectly and properly love, and Crea∣ted goods, or Particular goods are only so far loved as they resemble and participate of the nature of that universal good, to which the moti∣on of our love is Directly and Pri∣marily determined. So that Parti∣cular goods are as much loved in the universal good, as Particular Beings are seen and perceiv'd in the univer∣sal Being.

XIV.

I further consider that as we are determin'd to good in general Pri∣marily and Directly, so also the mo∣tion whereby we are by God deter∣min'd to it is necessary, invincible and irresistable. There is nothing in

nature more necessary, no nor so necessary and invincible as that mo∣tion whereby we are carried forth to good in general. Here the Soul must not pretend to the least sha∣dow of Liberty, having no more command over this motion, than she has over the motion of the Sun. 'Tis not easie to conceive how God himself should fix this motion, but 'tis plain that Man cannot any way command it.

XV.

But there is not the same neces∣sity of Determination in our moti∣on towards Particular good. I say not the same. M. Malebranche will allow none, but 'tis plain that some there is. For since we are invincibly determin'd to the Love of good in general, we must needs love good as such, and consequently in every degree of Participation, the general Reason of good being in some mea∣sure or other found in every degree of Particular good. Loving there∣fore good as good we are necessari∣ly

determin'd to love every degree of good, and consequently every particular good, with a Natural Love, so far as we consider it as good.

XVI.

But because this Particular good is not the Greatest good, and con∣sequently in some junctures may come into competition with a grea∣ter, hence it comes to pass that we may upon the whole have more reason to will and refuse it, than to will and embrace it, and so are not determin'd necessarily to an Abso∣lute, effectual and thorough love of it, though yet we must love it as good with a natural love as be∣fore.

XVII.

For 'tis impossible that we should ever nill Good, as we nill Evil, any more than we can will Evil as we will Good. But as our willing of Evil is always with a mixture of willing, though willing may in some jun∣ctures prevail, so our nilling of good is always with a mixture of willing,

though in some junctures nilling may prevail: we cannot hate good with a Pure Hatred, though it be only a lesser good, any more than we can love evil with a Pure Love, though a lesser evil.

XVIII.

Whenever therefore by the Com∣petition of goods we are ingaged to nill any Particular good, we do also will it at the same time. But in different respects. We will it as good, and we nill it as a lesser good, we will it secundum quid, according to a certain respect, and we nill it simply and Absolutely: that is in other words, though we have some reason to will it, namely its proper good, in which respect we necessari∣ly will it, and consequently always, yet we have more reason to nill it in the present juncture, as standing in competition with a greater good, and the stronger motive takes place as to Absolute and Effectual love or choice.

XIX.

This I cannot better illustrate than by the example of Weights in a Ballance. For though that Scale which has most weight in it, weighs down, yet it must needs be allow'd that the other Scale does also weigh and press downwards, though not effectually, because otherwise as much weight would be required to make it weigh effectually down as if it were quite empty. And thus 'tis in the present case. Though for the Prevalency of Reasons in some junctures the Scale may weigh down for the nilling of good, yet the other Scale also presses, though not effectually. And this is what the Schools term a Velleity, or Na∣tural Inclination. And 'tis with this Velleity, or natural inclination, that we are necessarily determin'd to love even Particular good; but we are not necessarily determin'd to love it absolutely and effectually, because there is no particular good, but what may come in Competi∣tion with a greater, and then there

will be more Reason to nill it than to will it, and the heaviest Scale will weigh down.

XX.

And thus have I shewn after what peculiar manner our Love stands affected or proportion'd to Particular and Universal good. The difference consists in these two things. Vniversal good is the Pri∣mary and Direct Object of our Love, but our Love tends towards Parti∣cular good only secundarily and in∣directly, for the sake of what it has of the Universal. Then again there is Difference as to the Necessity of the Determination, as well as to the Primariness of it. There is in∣deed Necessity on both sides, but not in like manner. We are neces∣sarily determin'd to Love universal good Absolutely and Thoroughly. The Scale does not only weigh here, but weighs down. But we are not de∣termin'd to love any Particular good Absolutely and Thoroughly, but only to love it with a Natural Inclinati∣on

or Velleity. And to such a love of it we are as necessarily deter∣min'd, as we are to the love of uni∣versal good; but the Actual Choice of it is not necessary, there being no Particular good to the Absolute and Effectual love, of which we are invincibly determin'd.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

THE Amorousness of Humane Nature, as we have here con∣sider'd it, contains in it many and great incitements to Devotion. For First, since the Occasional Cause of our love is Indigence and Empti∣ness, we have great reason to be humble and lowly in Spirit, espe∣cially considering that we are continually admonish'd of this our Indigence, as often as we are Conscious to our selves that we love.

Again, since God is the Princi∣pal Efficient Cause of Love, and the first mover in all Moral as well as Natural motion, it is highly rea∣sonable that he should be Princi∣pally loved by us from whom we receive our Love, and that we should be mighty careful how we pervert this Divine Impression to any undue object.

Again, since God moves us Di∣rectly and Primarily only to him∣self, and since universal good is therefore the Primary and Direct Object of our Love, hence it will follow that we ought also to make God the Primary and Direct Ob∣ject of our Love, and that we ought to Love nothing for it self, but only in and for God.

And lastly, since we are necessa∣rily determin'd to love good in general, Absolutely and Effectually, by such a motion as we can nei∣ther resist, nor any way Command or Moderate; hence it appears

how highly necessary it is that we should expllicitly fix all that Love upon God, as having all that good in him to which we aspire with a Blind, Confuse and Indefinite, though Necessary Appetite.

The Aspiration.

MY God, My Love, how ab∣surd a thing is it that an Amorous Creature should be a Proud Creature! My Love is occasion'd by my Indigence, and I cannot Love, but I am minded of that Indigence; how ill then would Pride become me, having so much reason to be humble, and that rea∣son so continually set before me!

Divine Fountain of Love, 'tis from thee I receive all my Love, and upon whom should I place it but upon thee? The fire that de∣scends from Heaven, where should it be spent but upon the Altar?

Thou hast a Right, O my God to all my Love, for I cannot love thee with any Love but what is thy own. O then do thou Regulate this thy own Divine Impression, and grant I may never sin against thee, by the abuse of that Love which thou hast given me. I thank thee, O Father, Lord of Heaven and Earth, for doing so much towards the guidance and Regulation of my Love, as to carry me Directly on∣ly to Universal good, thereby teaching me that I ought to make thee the only Direct and Primary Object of my Love. My God, I will love as thou teachest me, the First and Direct Motion of Love shall be towards thee, and whate∣ver I love besides thee, I will love only in and for thee.

I thank thee, also My God, for that thou hast made it so necessary for me to love universal good. Thou, O God, art this universal good, and I ought to love thee with the very same Love where∣with

I love Happiness it self. O that I were as necessarily inclined to love thee, as I am to love Hap∣piness! I do not desire to be trusted with any Liberty in the Love of thee. But this, my God, I can∣not hope for, till I shall see thee as thou art. O let me therefore love thee to the utmost Capacity of a Free Creature. Thou, O God, hast set no Bounds to my love of thee, O let not me set any. My God, I do not, I love thee with all my Heart, Soul, Mind and Strength. Lord thou knowest all things, thou knowest that I love thee.

Contemplation IV. Man consider'd as an Irregular Lover.

I.

HItherto we have considered Man as God made him. He was made by God, a Creature, an Intelligent Creature, and an Amorous Creature. The two first of which import the Perfection of God actu∣ally participated by him, in as much as in him he not only lives, moves and has his Being, but in him has all his Vnderstanding also. The last imports in him a tendency to the Divine Perfection; which is also an actual Perfection of his own Na∣ture, and such as God also has therein implanted. And thus far is Man wholely the Divine Wor∣manship,

and carries in him the Image of him that made him. Let us now consider him as he has made himself, and is as it were his own Creature.

II.

Now thus to consider Man, is to consider him as an Irregular Lover. And to do this fully, and to the purpose intended, Three things will be requisite. First, To shew what it is to be an Irregular Lover. Se∣condly, Hw prone and apt Man is to Love Irregularly. Thirdly, That Man himself is the Author of this proneness of his to Irregular Love.

III.

In relation to the first, if it be demanded, What it is to be an Ir∣regular Lover? I answer in one word, That 'tis to be a Fool. Sin and Folly, Sinner and Fool, are words in Scripture of a like signification, and are indifferently used one for the other. And we are taught in the Schools of Morality, that every

Sinner is ignorant. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, says the Socratical Proverb. Indeed, Sin has its Birth in Folly, and eve∣ry step of its progress is Folly, and its conclusion is in Folly. But this will appear more distinctly from the consideration of these two things. First, Of the absurdity and madness of the choice which every Irregular Lover makes. And, Se∣condly, The error and mistake that must necessarily precede in his Judgment, before he does or can make it.

IV.

As for the absurdity of his choice, 'tis the greatest that can be ima∣gined. For what is it that he chuses? 'Tis to do that which he must and certainly will repent of, and wish he had never done, either in this World, for its illness and sin∣fulness; or, in the next, for its sad effects and consequences. 'Tis to de∣spise the Authority, Power, Iustice and Goodness of God: 'tis to trans∣gress his Commands, which are

good and equitable, and in keeping of which there is present, as well as future reward. 'Tis to act against the Frame of his Rational Nature, and the Divine Law of his Mind: 'tis to disturb the Order and Har∣mony of the Creation, and by Ex∣tra-lineal motions to violate the Sa∣cred Interest of Society. 'Tis, lastly, to incur the Anger of an Omnipo∣tent and Just God, and to hazard falling from his Supreme Good and the last end of his Being, and the being ruined in his best Interest to all Eternity.

V.

All this the Irregular Lover part∣ly actually incurs, and partly puts to the hazard in every wrong mo∣tion of his Love. And for what is all this? Is it for any considera∣ble interest, for any thing that bears something of proportion, and may pretend to competition and a rival Weight in the opposite Scale of the Ballance? No. 'tis only for a shadow, for a trifle, for the gratifica∣tion

of some baser appetite, for the acquirement of some little interest, which has nothing to divert us from adhering to that which is tru∣ly our best, but only that poor ad∣vantage of being present, tho' at the same time its vanity be present with it.

VI.

And now is this a choice for a wise Man, for a Man of common Sense? Nay, is it a choice for a Man in his right Wits to make? Were a Man to beg an Estate, would one need a better demonstra∣tion of a Man's being a Fool, than such a procedure as this? If there∣fore absurdity of choice be any ar∣gument of folly, the Irregular Lo∣ver is certainly a very great Fool.

VII.

But his folly will further appear if we consider, Secondly, the error and mistake that must necessarily pre∣cede in his Judgment before he does or can make such a choice. All

irregularity of Love is founded up∣on ignorance and mistake. For as 'tis impossible to chuse evil as evil in general, so is it no less impossible to chuse or will any particular kind of evil, as evil; and consequently, 'tis impossible to will the evil of sin as such, (the Devil himself can't love sin as sin.) If therefore it be chosen, it must be chosen under the appearance of good, and it can have this appearance no otherwise than as considered as a lesser evil, (for that's the only way whereby an evil may appear good or eli∣gible.) And so it must be consider'd before it be chosen.

VIII.

He therefore that chuses sin, con∣siders it at the instant of commis∣sion, as a lesser evil. And therein consists his error and mistake. He is either habitually or actually ignorant. He either has not the habitual knowledge of all those things which should preserve him in his duty, or at least he has not the actual con∣sideration

of them. For 'tis that which must bring him to repentance. And 'tis impossible a Man should sin with the very same Thoughts, Convictions and Considerations about him, as he has when he repents. This I say is no more possible than for a Ballance to move to contrary ways with the same Weight, and in the same Posture. He therefore that sins, wants that consideration at least to keep him in his duty, which when he repents, brings him to it. And is therefore ignorant and mistaken.

IX.

The sum of this matter is, who∣ever thinks sin a lesser evil, mi∣staken in his judgment. But who∣ever commits sin, does then think it a lesser evil: therefore whoever commits sin is mistaken in his judgment; so great is the folly of Irregular Love, both in reference to the absurdity of the choice, and to the error and mistake of the chuser. And so great reason has every Ir∣regular

Lover to take up that con∣fession of the Psalmist, So foolish was I, and ignorant: and even as a beast before thee, Psal. 73.

X.

Having thus considered what it is to be an Irregular Lover, let us now in the Second place consider how prone and apt Man is to be guilty of Irregular Love. 'Tis the grand disadvantage of our Mortal condition, to have our Soul con∣sorted with a disproportionate and uncompliant Vehicle, and to have her aspiring Wings pinn'd down to the ground. We have a mixt consti∣tution, made up of two vastly dif∣ferent substances, with Appetites and Inclinations to different Ob∣jects, serving to contrary Interests, and steering to opposite Points. A compound of Flesh and Spirit, a thing between an Angel and a Beast. We lug about with us a Body of sin; and the Earthly Tabernacle weighs down the mind. We are at perpetual War and Defiance with

our selves, divided like the Planeta∣ry Orbs, between contrary motions and imperfect tendencies, and like a factious State, distracted and di∣sturbed with a swarm of jarring and rebellious Passions. The Spirit in∣deed is willing, but then the Flesh is weak. We have, 'tis true, a Law in our Minds, but then we have al∣so another in our Members, which wars always, and most times pre∣vails against that of our Mind, and brings us into captivity to the Law of sin; so that as the Apostle says, we cannot do the things which we would.

XI.

But, notwithstanding this strong invigoration of the Animal Life, push∣ing us still on to the enjoyment of sensible good, were our Intellectual part always awake, and equally at∣tentive to that Divine Light which shines within her, Man would al∣ways love regularly, tho' with the reluctancy of an imperfect motion to the contrary. But 'tis far other∣wise.

We do not always equally attend to the Divine Illumination, but the light of our Understand∣ings is often under an Eclipse, and so does not shine upon our wills with an equal and uniform bright∣ness. Hence it comes to pass that our judgments and apprehensions of things are various and changea∣ble. And from this variety and changeableness of our Iudgements, proceeds great variety and change∣bleness in our Wills.

XII.

Now this being the condition of Man, he must needs be very prone and liable to Irregular Love. For being always strong inclined to sen∣sible good, and not having the Eye of his attention equally open and a∣wake, he will be often apt to be actu∣ally ignorant of what he habitually knows, and (especially in the heat of a temptation) to judge sensible good a greater good than that which is Moral and Divine, and conse∣quently the want of sensible good to be a greater evil than sin, and so

rather than want the enjoyment of sensible good he will consent to the commission of sin, which through want of due attention he then erro∣neously thinks the lesser evil of the two.

XIII.

Thus apt and obnoxious is Man to Irregular Love. But that which most of all aggravates the badness of his condition, is that 'tis all owing to himself, and that he himself is the sole Author of this his proneness to Irregular Love. 'Tis a point Uni∣versally received, That the present state of Man is not that state where∣in God first made him, but a state of degeneracy and depravation. And, indeed, 'tis no way congruous to sup∣pose that God could with the Ho∣nour of his Attributes send such a piece of Work immediatetly out of his Hands, as Man is now. And if God could not make Man at first in such a state as he is now in, then neither could he subject him to it without sin. For, if he could subject him to it without sin, then he might as well have made him so at first;

but, 'tis supposed that he could not make him so at first, and therefore neither could he subject him to this condition without sin. And if not without sin, then not without sin really and truly committed by him. For, to subject him to this conditi∣on for the sake of sin arbitrarily im∣puted only, is the same as to do it without any sin at all. 'Tis necessa∣ry therefore to pre-suppose some re∣al sin or other in Man as the cause of this his depravation and great proneness to Irregular Love.

XIV.

But, now whether every Man sinned in his own Person for him∣self, and so was his own Adam, ac∣cording to the Hypothesis of the Pre-existentiaries; or, whether one common Person sinned for all the rest, as 'tis more vulgarly held, I shall not here take upon me to de∣termine. 'Tis sufficient to say, in ge∣neral, that 'tis necessary to presup∣pose some Sin or other in man, truly and properly Speaking, as the Cause of this his Depraved and Miserable

Condition. And they that can Intel∣ligibly make out Original Sin, as 'tis usually term'd, to be such, may make use of that Hypothesis. But, if that be not intelligible, then we must of necessity come to Pre-ex∣istence. However it be, this only I contend for at present, that some sin or other must be supposed in Man antecedent to this his conditi∣on, and that tis through his own fault that he is so prone to Irregular Love.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

THIS whole Contemplation serves very much to the grea∣test Humiliation and Mortification of Man, both before God, and all his Fellow-Creatures. For, if Irregular Love be so monstrous a deformity, and so great a folly, and if Man be so very prone to Irregular Love, and is also himself the Author of that proneness, what stronger Combinati∣on of Argument can there be ima∣gined, for Humility and Lowliness of

Spirit. For this is the worst that can be said of any thing, and is the Sum and Abstract of all that's base and vile.

It may also, Secondly, be argued from the great evil of Irregular Love, and from our great proneness to be guilty of it, that it highly concerns us to have constant recourse to God in Prayer, for his Divine aid and as∣sistance, against falling into that which is so great a Folly, and so great a Mischief, and which by an Infirmi∣ty of our own contracting we are so very apt to fall into.

The Aspiration.

TO thee, O my God, belongs Praise and Adoration, for endowing me with those excellent Powers of Vnderstanding and Love, but to me Shame and Confusion of face, for misapplying the one, and not attending to the Dictates of the other.

I blush, O my God, and am asha∣med to think that my nature should stand so much inclined to irregular

Love, a thing so full of Mischief and Folly, but much more that I my self should bring my self into such a state of impotence and depravation. My heart sheweth me the great Foulness and Abomi∣nableness of Sin, and yet I find my self over prone to commit it. So Foolish am I and Ignorant, and even as a Beast before thee.

But I desire, O my God, to be yet more vile. I am not vile e∣nough in my own eyes, though too much so in thine. Nor can I ever be vile enough in my Opinion, for being so vile in my Nature. Strike me then I beseech thee with a deep, and with a lively sense of my own Wretchedness, and make me as Humble as I am Wicked.

And since, through the Infirmity of my flesh, I am so apt to err in the conduct and application of my Love, O hold thou up my goings in thy Paths, that my Footsteps slip not. Make me always to attend to that Divine Light of thine within my Breast, and let the victorious sweetness of thy Grace out-charm

all the relishes of sensible good. But above all, Keep thy Servant from Presumptuous sins, lest they get the Dominion over me. And let all these words of my mouth, and this whole meditation of my heart be always accep∣table in thy sight,* 1.24 O Lord, my strength and my redeemer. Amen.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Medit. De Prima Phi∣losop. Medit. 3.
• * 1.2

  Job 6.
• * 1.3

  Heb. 1.
• * 1.4

  Contemp. 5.
• * 1.5

  De inqui∣rend. verit. lib. 1. cap. 2.
• * 1.6

  Pe inqui∣rend. verit. l. 3. part. 2. c. 1.
• * 1.7

  2 Cor. 3.5.
• * 1.8

  Rom. 1.19.
• * 1.9

  James 1.17.
• * 1.10

  Joh. 1.9.
• * 1.11

  Act. 17.28.
• * 1.12

  Part. 1. Q. 84. Ar. 5.
• * 1.13

  Psal. 36.
• * 1.14

  Ver. 14.
• * 1.15

  1 Cor. 30.
• * 1.16

  Psal. 119.
• * 1.17

  Psal. 27.
• * 1.18

  Psal. 16.
• * 1.19

  Heb. 1.
• * 1.20

  Psal. 43.
• * 1.21

  Psal. 119.
• * 1.22

  Vid. Theo∣ry and Re∣gulation of Love.
• * 1.23

  Judg. 9.15.
• * 1.24

  Psal. 19.