Reason and religion, or, The grounds and measures of devotion, consider'd from the nature of God, and the nature of man in several contemplations : with exercises of devotion applied to every contemplation / by John Norris ...

The Introduction.

I.

THERE being nothing of grea∣ter consequence, to the high∣est Interest of Man, than the know∣ledge of God and Himself, I thought I could not better employ my Soli∣tude, either for my Own or for the World's advantage, than in exerci∣sing my severest Contemplations up∣on these two great and important Subjects, the Nature of God, and the Nature of Man.

II.

It must indeed be confess'd, that there is nothing whereof we have or can have so little knowledge, as of these two things; and 'tis much to be lamented that there should lie our greatest Ignorance, where we are most concern'd to know. But thus it is: That of our selves, which we are best acquainted with, is

least of all our selves: and the un∣known part of this little World is much greater than the known. We know but little of our Bodies, but infinitely less of our Souls. God has not given us any Idea of the latter, and whatever we can bor∣row from our Senses will never be able to supply that defect. For there is a greater distance and dis∣proportion between an Immaterial substance and a Sensible, than be∣tween one sensible and another. But now the understanding the nature of one sensible will not suffice to make us understand the nature of a∣nother. For a Man born Blind will ne∣ver from his understanding of Sounds come to understand Colours. Much less therefore will our understand∣ing of Sensible things help us to un∣derstand the nature of Immaterial substances.

III.

And if not of Immaterial sub∣stances in general, much less will it serve us to understand the Essence of the great God, which infinitely

transcends all other Immaterial sub∣stances. The Idea of God is least capable of all Spiritual Beings, to be form'd out of sensible phantasms. For I consider that by how much the more our Mind is raised to the Contemplation of Spiritual things, by so much the more we always ab∣stract from sensibles. But now the highest and last term of Contempla∣tion is, the Divine Essence. Whence it follows necessarily, that the Mind which sees the Divine Essence, must be totally and thoroughly absolv'd from all commerce with the Cor∣poreal Senses, either by Death, or some extatical and rapturous Abstra∣ction. So true is that which God said to Moses, Thou can'st not see my face, for there shall no man see me, and live, Exod. 33.20.

IV.

So far therefore are we from de∣riving any Idea of God from our Senses, that they are our greatest Impediment in Divine Contempla∣tions. So great, that we cannot any other way clearly apprehend the

Essence of God while we are lodg'd in the Prison of our Senses. God cannot give us a distinct view of himself while we hold any com∣merce with our Senses. For he that knows exactly what proportion our present condition bears to his own Divine Glories, has told us, That no Man shall see him, and live. We must therefore for ever despair of conceiving the Divine Essence clear∣ly and distinctly, not only from our Senses, but even with them.

V.

Not that there is any darkness or obscurity in God. No, God is the most knowable Object in himself. For he is the First Being, and there∣fore the First Truth, and there∣fore the First Intelligible, and conse∣quently the most Intelligible. One Apostle says that he dwells in light;* 1.1 and another, that he is light, and that there is no darkness at all in him.* 1.2 God therefore consider'd in his own Nature is as well the most Intelligi∣ble, as the most Intelligent Being in the World.

VI.

The difficulty therefore arises not from the obscurity of the Object, but from the disproportion of the Fa∣culty. For our Understandings stand affected to the most manifest Objects, as the Eye of a Bat to the light of the Sun, as the Philosopher observes in his Metaphysics. God dwells in light,* 1.3 as the Apostle says, but then 'tis such as no Man can approach unto; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 he inhabits unapproachable light, or a Light which cannot be come at, not for its di∣stance (for he is not far from every one of us) but for its brightness.* 1.4 The very Angels are forc'd to veil their faces when they see it, but for Mortals, they cannot so much as come nigh it. The short is, God is too Intelligible to be here clearly un∣derstood by an Imbody'd understand∣ing; and too great a Light hinders vision, as much as Darkness.

VII.

But tho' we cannot here have a clear and distinct knowledge either of God or our Selves, yet we may

know so much of both as may serve the ends of Piety and Devotion. We may by attending to that general Idea of God, which is by himself imprinted on our Minds, learn to unfold many of the Perfections of his Glorious and Invisible Essence; and tho' we cannot see his face and live, yet his back-parts (we know) were once seen by a Mortal capaci∣ty, and so may be again. And for our selves, tho' God has not given us any Idea of our own Souls, yet the powers and operations, the con∣dition, circumstances, and accidents of our Nature, are things that may fall within the Sphere of Human consideration. And from both these we may derive Measures for our due behaviour towards the Great God. And this is the design of the pre∣sent Contemplations, viz. to con∣sider so much of the nature of God, and the nature of Man, as may afford sufficient Grounds and Measures for true Piety and Devo∣tion.

VIII.

By Devotion here I do not meerly understand that special disposition or act of the Soul, whereby we warm∣ly and passionately address our selves to God in Prayer (which is what is commonly meant by Devotion) but I use the word in a greater Latitude, so as to comprehend under it, Faith, Hope, Love, Fear, Trust, Humility, Submission, Honour, Reverence, Adora∣tion, Thanksgiving, in a word, all that Duty which we owe to God. Nor by this acceptation do I stretch the word beyond what either from its rise it may, or by frequent use a∣mong the Learned it does signifie. Devotion is a devovendo, from devo∣ting, or giving up ones self wholly to the Service of another. And ac∣cordingly those among the Heathens who deliver'd and consign'd them∣selves up to Death, for the safety of their Country, were call'd Devoti. And so in like manner for a Man to give up himself wholly and intirely to the Service of God, and actually to demean himself towards him in

the conduct of his life, as becomes a Creature towards his Creator, is Devotion. And in this Latitude the word is used by Aquinas,* 1.5 who de∣fines Devotion to be, A will readily to give up ones self to all those things which belong to the Service of God.

IX.

This is what I here understand by Devotion, and of which I intend in the following Contemplations to assign the Grounds and Measures from the Nature of God, and the Na∣ture of Man. But before I proceed to inforce and direct Devotion from these two particular Subjects of Contemplation, I think it not im∣proper to consider a little by way of preparation, how much Contem∣plation or Meditation in general contributes to the advantage of De∣votion.

X.

They that make Ignorance the Mother of Devotion, cannot suppose Contemplation any great friend to it. For the more a Man Contem∣plates, the more he will know, and

the wiser he grows, the less apt up∣on their supposition he will be for Devotion. But I would ask the Men of this fancy this one Question. Is Devotion a Rational thing, or is it not? If not, Why then do they re∣commend Ignorance or any thing else in order to it. For it may as well, nay better, be let alone. But if it be a Rational thing, then they must either say, that the more a Man considers, the less he will discover the Reasons of it; or that the more he discovers the Reasons of it, the less he will be persuaded to the practice of it. Both which propo∣sitions are absurd and ridiculous enough to be laught at, but too ri∣diculous to be seriously refuted.

XI.

But to shew how much Contem∣plation serves to the advantage of Devotion, we need only consider, that Devotion is an act of the Will, that the Object of the Will is good apparent, or good understood, and consequently that every act of the Will is influenc'd and regulated by

consideration. Devotion therefore is as much influenc'd by consideration as any other act of the Will is: And therefore I cannot but admire at the Disposers of the Angelical Hierarchies, for making the Sera∣phim excel in Love and Devotion, and the Cherubim in Knowledge. As if Knowledge were not the best pre∣parative for Devotion.

XII.

I deny not but that Knowledge and Devotion often go assunder, and the Wisest are not always the Devoutest. But then this is not owing to the natural and direct influence of Know∣ledge, but comes to pass only occa∣sionally and accidentally, by reason of some other impediment: sup∣pose Pride, Lust, Covetousness, or some such indisposition of Mind, which is of more force and preva∣lency to lett our Devotion, than Knowledge is to further it. And then no wonder that the heavier Scale weighs down. But still Know∣ledge has a natural aptness to excite Devotion, and will infallibly do it

if not hinder'd by some other cause. So that we may take this for a ne∣ver-failing Rule, That all other things being equal, the more know∣ing and considering, still the more Devout. And in this sense also that of the Psalmist will be verifi'd,* 1.6 while I was musing the fire kindled.

The Great God so inlighten my Mind, and so govern my Pen, that by these my Meditations I may illustrate his ineffable Excellence, and kindle holy flames of Devotion, both in my Self, and in my Reader. To him therefore I Pray in the words of Moses, I beseech thee, shew me thy glory, Amen.

Contemplation I. Of the general Idea of God.

I.

GOD never at any time disco∣ver'd so much of himself in so few words, as when he said to Moses, enquiring by what Name he should stile him, to make him known to the Children of Israel, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Isra∣el, I AM hath sent me unto you, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 i. e. not as we ren∣der it in English, I am that I am, but, I am that am, or, I am he that am. And so the Seventy read it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I am he that is.

II.

This is the Sacred and Incommu∣nicable Name of the Great God, that which contains in it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, all the Fulness of the Godhead, all the Treasures of the Di∣vinity.

By this Name he is distin∣guish'd not only from false Gods, but from all other Beings whatsoever. I am he that am, says God, imply∣ing that he is after some very Emi∣nent and Peculiar Manner, and that nothing else besides him truly is. This therefore denotes the great E∣minence and Peculiarity both of the Essence and of the Existence of God. Here therefore I shall take my ground, and shall hence deduce and unfold, 1. The general Idea or No∣tion of God. 2ly. Some of those chief Excellencies and Perfections of his which may have a more strong and immediate Influence upon our Piety and Devotion.

III.

In the present Contemplation I am concern'd for no more than only to six the general Idea or Notion of God. This is of extraordinary mo∣ment to the clearness and distinct∣ness of our following Contemplati∣ons, for unless we take the right thred at first, the whole progress will be nothing else but error and confusion.

IV.

Now as to the general Idea or first Conception of God, this has been Universally understood to be, that he is a Being absolutely Perfect. This I say has been made the gene∣ral Notion of God in all the Meta∣physics and Divinity that I have yet seen. And particularly it has been imbraced by two Authors of extra∣ordinary Speculation, Cartesius and Dr. More, whose Authority in this matter claims a peculiar deference, because they are Men that Philoso∣phize with a free and unaddicted ge∣nius, and write not as they read, but as they think.

V.

This Opinion, because embraced by many, and some of them great Patrons, I once took for a Theorem of unquestionable Truth. But up∣on a more narrow inspection, I find it necessary to dissent from it, tho' it be call'd singularity to do so. For however plausible it may at first view appear, I think there is no less an Objection than plain Demon∣stration

against it. Which I make out upon these grounds.

VI.

First I consider that the Idea of a thing is that formal conception or inward word of the Mind, which expresses or represents the Essence or Nature of a thing. Then again, by the Essence of a thing, is meant that which ought to be first conceiv'd in a thing, and to which all other things are understood as superadded. I say which ought to be first conceiv'd, because in fixing the Essence of a thing, not the arbitrary or acciden∣tal, but the natural order of Con∣ception is to be attended to. Whence it follows, that the Idea of a thing is that which expresses that which is first of a thing in order of con∣ception.

VII.

This being granted, it does hence evidently follow, That that which is not first to be conceiv'd in the na∣ture of a thing, but supposes some∣what there before it in order of conception, cannot be the Idea of

that thing, tho' it be never so ne∣cessarily and inseparably joyn'd with it. For if it were, then something would be the Idea of a thing, which is not first in order of conception; which is against the definition of such an Idea.

VIII.

For, to illustrate this by an ex∣ample, Who will say that the Idea of a Triangle consists in this, that any two of its sides, taken toge∣ther, are greater than the third re∣maining? This is, indeed, a neces∣sary affection of a Triangle, but it must by no means be allow'd to be its Idea, because 'tis not what we first conceive in it, that being this, viz. that which is comprehended by three right Lines. Which being the first thing conceiv'd, is therefore the true Idea of a Triangle.

IX.

Now that to be a Being absolute∣ly perfect, is not the first conceiva∣ble in God, but supposes something before it in the Divine Nature, is plain from hence, because it may be

proved a priori, or by way of a causal dependence from something in the same Divine Nature. That it may be thus proved I shall make appear in my second Contemplation, where I shall make it my profest business actually to prove it. At present I suppose it, and upon that supposition do, I think, rightly conclude, that to be a Being absolutely perfect, can∣not be properly the Idea of God. For the Consequence of my Argument will, I suppose, be acknowledg'd by all, the only difficulty is concerning the Proposition it self: but the Proof of this I reserve to the next Contem∣plation.

X.

If it be in the mean time objected, That to be a Being Absolutely Per∣fect, is involv'd in the Notion of God; and that 'tis an Idea that can belong to no other Being, and that therefore it must be the Idea of God. To this I answer, 1. That a thing may be involv'd in the Notion of a thing either Formally and Explicitly, or else Vertually and Implicitly.

Whatever is involv'd Formally and Explicitly in any Idea, is Essential to that Idea. But not what is in∣volv'd only vertually and implicitly. Thus 'tis vertually and implicitly in∣volv'd in the Idea of a Triangle, that it has three Angles equal to two Right ones, and yet we don't there∣fore make this the Idea of a Trian∣gle, because 'tis not there Formally and Explicitly, but only Vertually and Potentially. But now to be a Being Absolutely perfect is not in∣volv'd in the Notion of God Formal∣ly and Explicitly, but only Vertual∣ly and Potentially (as will appear in the next Contemplation) and con∣sequently 'tis hence more rightly concluded, that the Idea of God does not consist in this, that he is a Being Absolutely Perfect.

XI.

To the second part of the Obje∣ction I answer, that 'tis not enough to make a thing the Idea of a thing, because it can belong to no other Being. For then to be Circumscri∣ptively in a place must be the Idea of

a Body, and to be Risible must be the Idea of a Man, for these are sup∣posed to belong to no other Beings. No, the most that ought to be con∣cluded hence, is, that such things are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 strict properties, such as immediately and necessarily flow from the Essence of the subject; not that they are the very Essence it self. When therefore 'tis said that to be a Being Absolutely perfect can belong to no other but God, all that may be hence concluded is, that 'tis an Essential, and consequently Incommu∣nicable Property of God to be a Being absolutely perfect, but not that there∣in the Idea of God does consist.

XII.

If then this be not the Idea of God, wherein shall we fix it? It must be in something which we first conceive in God, and which is the Basis and Foundation of whatever we ascribe to him, whatever we think or say of him. It must be in something that in some measure expresses and represents his Essence. And where shall we look for this but in his Name,

that great Name whereby he reveal'd himself to Moses, and whereby Moses was to make him known to his own people, who were then ignorant of him? In this Name of God I suppose his Essence and Idea to be couch't.

XIII.

Here therefore I find my self in∣gaged in these two considerations. First, Why the Idea of God should be lodg'd in his Name. Secondly, What this Idea of God is, which is there lodg'd. That the Idea of God is lodg'd in his Name, I am induced to believe upon these grounds. First, Because I think it highly reasonable to suppose in general, That when∣ever God gives a name to any thing, 'tis such as expresses its nature. Not that words signifie naturally, but that God makes choice of such a word whose signification natural∣ly expresses the thing, tho' 'twas through Arbitrary institution that it first came by such a signification. In this sense, I say, 'tis highly rea∣sonable to believe, that God always names things according to their na∣tures.

For is it consistent with the Accuracy of Infinite Wisdom to mis-call any thing? No, as he knows the number of things, so is he as well skill'd in their natures. And there∣fore, says the Psalmist,* 1.7 He telleth the number of the stars, and calleth them all by their names. That is, by such significant names as express their several Powers and Influences.

XIV.

Secondly, I consider, That as 'tis highly decorous and reasonable in general, that God should call things by such names as express their na∣tures; so there is here a particular reason why he should express his own Essence in this his name. For thus stood the case: The Children of Israel had been now a long while conversant among the Egyptians, who were the greatest Idolaters and Polytheists in the World, there they had been used to variety of Gods, who were also call'd by va∣riety of names. Hereupon, says Mo∣ses to God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say un∣to

them, the God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his Name? what shall I say unto them? Implying that it was necessary (as indeed it was) that God should notifie himself by such a Name, as would distinguish him from all the Gods of the Heathen, that is, by a Proper and Essential Name. Whereupon, says God to Moses, I am that am. Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I am hath sent me unto you.

XV.

It being therefore concluded, that the Idea of God must be lodg'd in this his Name; let us now consider what this Idea of God is which is there lodg'd. And for this we must attend in the first place to the true sense and signification of this Name of God, I am that am, or, I am. Now this can signifie no other, but Being it self, or Vniversal Being, or Being in General, Being in the Ab∣stract, without any restriction or li∣mitation. As if God had said, You enquire who I am, and by what

Name I would be distinguish'd. Know then, that, I am he that am, I am Being it self. This therefore must express the Essence, and consequent∣ly this must be the Formal Conception and Idea of God.

XVI.

But this must be further explain'd, before it be further confirm'd. In or∣der to which, I consider, that as, in every particular order or kind of Being there is a Universal Nature, under which all singulars are com∣prehended, and whereof they all partake: as for instance, there is the Nature or Essence of a Circle or Triangle in common, as well as this or that particular Circle or Trian∣gle. So in Beings consider'd as Be∣ings, there is Being in general, U∣niversal Being, Being it self, or the Essence of Being, as well as this or that Being in particular.

XVII.

Again I consider, that all other U∣niversals or Abstract Essences are re∣ally distinct from, and exist out of those singulars whose Essences they

are. This must of necessity be allow'd, whatever the Peripatetics remon∣strate to the contrary. Things must exist in Idea before they do in Na∣ture, otherwise 'twill be impossible to give an intelligible account of the stability of Science, and of propositi∣ons of Eternal Truth. But this I have already demonstrated in my * 1.8 Metaphysical Essay, and shall have an occasion further to discourse of it when I come to treat of the Om∣niscience of God. Here therefore supposing it, I say, That as all other Universals or Abstract Essences are really distinct from, and exist out of those Singulars whose Essences they are; so in like manner there is Be∣ing it self, or the Essence of Being, really distinct, and separately ex∣isting from all particular Beings.

XVIII.

And now that the Essence and I∣dea of God does consist in this Be∣ing it self, or this Essence of Being, will be further confirm'd from this Consideration, That as all other U∣niversal Natures or Essences are no∣thing

else (as I have already else∣where,* 1.9 and shall hereafter again prove) but the Intellect of God, which as variously imitable, or par∣ticipable, exhibits all the general Or∣ders and Natures of things; so this Being it self, or this Essence of Be∣ing, what can it be else, but the ve∣ry Essence of God, containing in it the whole Plenitude and Possibility of Being, all that is, or can be?

XIX.

And that this is the true Idea and Essence of God, to be Being it self, is further plain, because 'tis the first conceivable in God. For the proof of this, That it is the first conceiva∣ble in God, I might appeal to expe∣rience. For, let any Comtemplative Person try whether this be not the first thing he conceives when he hears the Name of God. But I de∣monstrate it thus. The first thing which is conceivable in God, must be the first thing that can absolutely be conceiv'd. But Being it self is the first thing that can absolutely be conceiv'd. Therefore Being it

self is the first thing which is con∣ceivable in God.

XX.

The Assumption, I suppose, will pass unquestion'd with all. For what can we possibly conceive be∣fore Being it self? The Proposition I prove thus. God is the first; or, there is nothing before God And therefore the first thing which is conceivable in God, must be the first thing that can absolutely be conceiv'd. Otherwise there would be some∣thing before God, which is against the supposition. The conclusion therefore follows, That Being it self is the first thing which is conceiva∣ble in God; and consequently, that the true Idea God, is Being it self; which was the thing to be proved.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

IF then God be Being it self, there is Infinite reason why we should Love, Fear, Reverence, and Adore him. For what an inlarged, indeter∣minate, transcendental, universalized

thing is Being it self! There is a vast Amplitude in the degrees of particular Beings, and inconceivable almost is the disproportion between an intelligence of the highest or∣der, and a peice of dead impove∣rish'd matter. But what is this to the disproportion between the high∣est particular Being, nay all the par∣ticular Beings that are or can be, and Being it self? This is that which truely is, all other things are but shadows and phantasms. Being it self is its own Basis and Foundation, the great contrariety to nothing, the sted∣dy and inmost support and esta∣blishment of all things that have Being, and the fountain of all that can be. 'Tis an Ocean without a Shore, a depth without a bottom. In short, 'tis such an immense Amplitude as a Man cannot duly think of without the profoundest impressi∣ons of awe and reverence, humi∣lity and self-annihilation, love and wonder, fear and great joy.

The Aspiration.

O Thou whose Name is Iehovah, who art the very Essence of Being, who art Being it self, how can I ever sufficiently Love, Fear, Reverence and Adore thee! Thou art above all the Affections of my Heart, all the motions of my Will, yea and all the conceptions of my Vnderstanding. No sooner do I be∣gin to think of thee, but I am plunged beyond my depth, my thoughts are all swallow'd up and overwhelm'd in their first Approach to thy Essence, and I shall sooner lose my self than find thee.

O dreadful Excellence, I tremble to think of thy Essence, my soul turns her self from thee, She can∣not look forward, She pants, She burns, She languishes, is beaten back with the light of thy Glories, and returns to the familiarity of her own Darkness, not because She chuses it, but because She is Weary.

O soveraign greatness, how am I impoverish'd, how am I contracted, how am I annihilated in thy Pre∣sence. Thou only art, I am not, Thou art all, I am nothing. But 'tis well, O my God, that I am no∣thing, so thou art all; 'tis well I am not in my self, so I am in thee.

O Being it self, 'tis in thee that I live, move, and have my being. Out of thee I am nothing. I have nothing, I can do nothing. I am but little and inconsiderable with thee, and what then should I be without thee? To thee therefore I devote and dedicate my whole self, for I am wholly thine. I will ever live to thee, since I must ever live in thee. And oh let my Beloved be ever Mine, as I am, and ever will be His. Amen.

Contemplation II. That God is a Being absolute∣ly Perfect, proved from the Preceding general Idea of God.

I.

FRom the Essences of things slow all their Attributes and Perfe∣ctions. Having therefore in the preceding Contemplation fix'd the Essence and Idea of God in Be∣ing it self, I shall now in the first place hence deduce that he is a Be∣ing absolutely perfect. This has been hitherto taken for the very formal conception and Idea of God, and accordingly has been made the ultimate ground and foundation to prove all his other Perfections, but has rather been supposed than pro∣ved it self. But now I make this the first general Attribute of God,

to be a Being absolutely Perfect: The proof and deduction of which from his Idea is the concern of the present Contemplation.

II.

Let us therefore reassume the Idea of God, which if we attend to, we shall discern that absolute per∣fection is vertually involv'd in it, and consequently that God is a Being absolutely Perfect. The Idea of God, as we have shewn, is Being it self. Now I consider in the first place that Being it self contains in it all the degrees of Being, and con∣sequently all possible Perfection. The Argument in form runs thus. What∣ever has all the degrees of Being has all Perfection.

But Being it self has all the de∣grees of Being.

Therefore Being it self has all Per∣fection.

III.

The proof of the first propositi∣on will depend upon this, that Per∣fection is nothing else but degree of Being. If this be once made out,

then it plainly follows that what∣ever has all the degrees of Being has all Perfection. Now to prove that Perfection is nothing else but degree of Being, I consider first that all Perfection is by Addition. For the more Perfect any thing is, the more it has. But now all Addi∣tion is by the Accession of something that really is. For nothing, though never so often repeated, will add no∣thing. And therefore Perfection is nothing else but a further degree of Being.

IV.

This I confirm by considering further that every thing is perfect just so far as it is, and according to the mode of Being, so is the mode of perfection. Thus vertue is no otherwise the perfection of a Man than as he is vertuous, nor strength than as he is strong. And so in all other instances according as any thing is, so is its Perfection. And so on the contrary, all imperfecti∣on is want of Being, and every thing is just so far imperfect as it

is not, some way or other. Now if every thing be so far perfect or imperfect respectively as it either is, or is not, then it clearly follows that perfection it self is nothing else but degree of Being.

V.

Again I consider, that 'tis impos∣sible that perfection should be any thing else but degree of Being. For there is nothing in the world but Being. If therefore one thing be more perfect than another, it must be, it can be for no other reason but because it has more degrees of Being, there not being any thing else whereby it may exceed. For I think the case is here as in Num∣bers. One number excceds another not by any vertue or quality of another kind, but only by the mul∣tiplication of the same units. And so one Being exceeds, or is more perfect than another, not by any thing which is not Being, but only by having more units or degrees of Being. Bare, meer Being is as 'twere an unit, the lowest perfection; and

the only way to make it more per∣fect is multiplication, by adding to it more of the same units. And consequently perfection is nothing else but degree of Being.

VI.

This Proposition being sufficient∣ly clear'd, that Perfection is nothing else but a Degree of Being, and con∣sequently the other, that whatever has all the degrees of Being has all Perfection; let us now consider whether Being it self has all the De∣grees of Being. That it has so, will thus appear: Being it self is indeter∣minate in being, and consequently has all the degrees of Being. The Argument reduced to Form is this: Whatever is indeterminate in being has all the Degrees of Being.

But Being it self is indeterminate in being: Therefore Being it self has all the degrees of Being.

VII.

And first, that whatever is inde∣terminate in being has all the degrees of Being is certain, for the whole Power and Plenitude of Being can be

but indeterminate or infinite, there is nothing beyond that, and there∣fore that which is indeterminate in being, is adequate to the whole Pow∣er and Plenitude of Being; and con∣sequently has all the Degrees of Be∣ing.

VIII.

And now that Being it self is in∣determinate in being is as certain. For what should bound it. Nothing can be bounded but by something that is before it: Which I thus de∣monstrate. To bound or limit a thing is to give it such a definite por∣tion of Being and no more. Now to give such a definite portion of Be∣ing and no more, implies giving of Being Simply, and that is the same as to be a Cause, and every Cause is before the effect, and consequently nothing can be bounded but by something that is before it. But now what is before Being it self? Being it self is the first thing that can be conceiv'd: And therefore as that which is First in any kind, cannot be bounded by any thing in that

kind, so Being it self, which is Ab∣solutely First, cannot be bounded by any thing at all, because 'tis before all things. Indeed this or that par∣ticular Being may well be bounded, because it partakes so much and no more of Being it self, or the Essence of Being. But Being it self having nothing before it from whence it might receive limits, must of neces∣sity be unlimited in being, and con∣sequently have all the Degrees of Being.

IX.

And that Being it self has all the Degrees of Being, I further deduce from this Consideration; All Abso∣lute and Universal Natures or Es∣sences, have all the Perfection of their respective Orders and Kinds. And it cannot be otherwise, since they are abstracted from particular Subjects, whose deficiency in recei∣ving is the ground of all that defect and imperfection which is in all Con∣crete Entities. Thus this or that particular Musical Composition, or this or that particular Vertuous

Man, are of a limited excellence, because they partake of Harmony and Vertue to such a certain Mea∣sure. But now suppose Harmony it self, or Vertue it self, should exist Separately in the very Essence, they would necessarily have all the possi∣ble degrees of Harmony and Vertue. And accordingly 'tis as reasonable to conclude that Being it self has all the degrees of Being. Whence it fol∣lows, that Being it self has all Per∣fection, and consequently that God, who is Being it self, is Absolutely perfect.

X.

Now if to this it be Objected, That those things which only are, are the most imperfect, and that therefore Being it self is most imper∣fect; and that therefore if God be Being it self, he will be so far from being Absolutely Perfect, that he will be the most imperfect Being of any. I answer, That if those things which only are, were therefore im∣perfect because of the imperfection of Being Absolutely, as the Objection

supposes, the Consequence would then be as is objected. But they are therefore only imperfect, because they partake of Absolute Being, ac∣cording to its most imperfect degree, which is only to exist. They are not therefore imperfect as they are, but as they are not. As they are they are Perfect, for to be is to be so far Perfect, and to be Absolutely is to be Absolutely Perfect. God therefore who Absolutely is, is Absolutely Perfect.

XI.

The same Conclusion I further demonstrate by this Order or Rea∣soning: That must needs be Abso∣lutely Perfect which has no imper∣fection: All imperfection is want of Being, and therefore that must needs have no imperfection which is utter∣ly removed from not being, and that must needs be utterly removed from not being which has all Be∣ing, and that must needs have all Being, which is Being it self; and therefore that which is Being it self must needs be absolutely Perfect;

God therefore who is Being it self, is also an absolutely Perfect Being. Which was the Proposition to be proved.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

IF then Perfection be only degree of Being, and if God be Infinite in Being because being it self, and consequently has all the degrees of Being, and consequently all Per∣fections, it will hence follow, that we own and acknowledge this ab∣solute Perfection of his by a suita∣ble exercise of all our Powers and Faculties. For this is but strict Ju∣stice. And that therefore we con∣template his Superlative Excellence with the deepest Awe, Reverence, and Admiration; that we love and desire him with the full bent and spring of our Souls; that we fix and concenter upon him all our Passions and Affections; that we make him our end and center, the center of our desires, and the end of our actions; that we despise our selves and the

whole Creation in comparison of him; and that lastly we so study to please this absolutely Perfect Being, that we may at last be admitted to the glorious communications of his Infinite Perfections.

The Aspiration.

MY Lord and my God, with what awful apprehensions do I con∣template thy Perfections! how am I struck, dazled, and confounded with the light of thy Glories! Thy Be∣ing standeth like the strong Moun∣tains, and thy Perfections are like the great deep. How can I think of thee without wonder and asto∣nishment, and how can I think of any thing else but thee!

O thou Circle of Excellency, thou endless Orb of Perfection, where shall I begin to love thee? Thou art alto∣gether Lovely; oh that I were also alto∣gether Love. My God, I desire nothing but to love thee, and to be loved by thee. Thou art all Fair, my Love, there is no spot in thee. My beloved is

Light, and in him is no Darkness at all; Let him therefore kiss me with the kisses of his mouth, for his love is better than wine.

My Great God, how do I despise my self and the whole Creation when I once think upon thee! Whom have I in Heaven but thee, and there is none upon Earth that I desire in compari∣son of thee. Thou alone dost so fill my Thoughts, so ravish my Affecti∣ons, that I can contemplate nothing but thee, I can admire nothing but thee, and I can love nothing but thee. Nor do I think my Soul strai∣ten'd in being confined to thee, for thou, O my God art All.

O my God,* 1.10 I have lookt for thee in holiness, that I might behold this thy power and thy glory. I can now see it but in a Glass darkly, but thou hast told us that those who are pure in heart shall hereafter see thee face to face. Grant therefore I may so love fear, and serve thee here, that I may behold thee, and enjoy thee, as thou art in thy Infinite Self, for ever here∣after. Amen.

Contemplation III. That therefore all the Perfecti∣ons of particular Beings ex∣ist in God, and that after a more excellent manner than they do in particular Beings themselves.

I.

IN the preceeding Contemplati∣ons it has been shewn, that the Essence and Idea of God consists in Being it self, and that therefore God is a Being absolutely Perfect. I now further consider, that from the same ground it may be concluded, that all the Perfections of particular Be∣ings exist in God, and that after a more excellent manner than they do in particular Beings themselves. And first that all the Perfections of particular Beings do exist in God.

II.

This I collect thus from the Idea of God. If Being it self be there∣fore absolutely Perfect because it has all the degrees of Being, as has been proved, then by the same propor∣tion it plainly follows, that if Being it self has all the degrees of Being that are in all particular Beings, it must have all the Perfection that is in all particular Beings. This con∣sequence I say is undeniable, because Perfection is nothing else but de∣gree of Being. And that Being it self has all the degrees of Being that are in all particular Beings, might be sufficiently concluded from this, That it has all the degrees of Being Simply and Absolutely; which was proved before. But I further in∣fer it thus:

III.

Being it self is the cause of all particular Beings, for all particular Beings are what they are by par∣taking of Being it self: And if Be∣ing it self be the cause of all par∣ticular Beings, then it must be also

the cause of all the degrees of Being that are in particular Beings, for these can no more rise up into act from themselves, than the particu∣lar Beings themselves can. And if Being it self be the cause of all the degrees of Being that are in parti∣cular Beings, then it must have in it self all those degrees; for nothing can communicate what it has not. The short is, Whatever is in the ef∣fect must pre-exist some way or other in that cause upon which it wholly depends. But now if Being it self be the cause of all the de∣grees of Being that are in particu∣lar Beings, then particular Beings wholly depend upon Being it self; and consequently whatever Perfection is in particular Beings, must exist in Being it self, which was the first proposition to be proved.

IV.

The next is, That the Perfections of particular Beings do exist in God after a more excellent manner than they do in the particular Beings themselves. For the Prerogative of

God above his Creatures does not consist meerly in this, That there are more Perfections in God than he ever did, or will, or can commu∣nicate to his Creatures, but that he has also those very Perfections which they have in a more emi∣nent manner.

V.

There is indeed a great deal of Perfection and Beauty in the World, enough to affect the Curious with the greatest Pleasure, and the Reli∣gious with the greatest Devotion. And therefore St. Austin discoursing upon that place of St. Paul to the Romans,* 1.11 where the Gentiles are said to know God, but yet not to glo∣rifie him as God; Whence could they know him? says he, From the things which he has made? For do but ask the Beauty of the Sea, ask the Beauty of the dilated and diffused Air, ask the Beauty of the Heavens, ask the Order of the Stars, ask the Sun cla∣rifying the Day with his Brightness, ask the Moon tempering the darkness of the following Night with her Splen∣dor,

ask the Animals which move in the Waters, on the Earth, and in the Air. The Souls which lie hid, the Bodies that are perspicuous, the visi∣ble things that are to be govern'd, and the invisible Governors; Ask all these, they will all of them give Answer, Behold, look upon us, we are Fair. Their Beauty is their Confession. Who made these Mutable Fairs, but the Immutable Fair? But he that would be more sensibly affected with the Beauty of the Universe, let him con∣sult that excellent Draught which the Roman Orator has given of it,* 1.12 which I take to be as fine a Descri∣ption as ever was made, either by his, or any other Pen.

VI.

And 'tis highly reasonable, that there should be a great deal of Beau∣ty in the Creation, since the World was made by him who is Being it self, and consequently Beauty it self, and who must needs imprint his own likeness upon the things which he has made. For if God must have all the Perfections which are in the

Creature, then God can communi∣cate no other Perfections to the Creature than what he has him∣self, (he himself having all) and consequently the Creature must par∣take of the likeness of God. And therefore it may be said, That God made not only Man, but the whole World, in a larger sense, after his own Image: and as Art imitates Na∣ture, so Nature imitates God. The short is, If God has All of the Crea∣ture, then the Creature must have something of God, and therefore must in some degree resemble him. And says Plato in his Timaeus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He would have all things come as nigh himself as might be. And to the same effect Aquinas,* 1.13 Res omnes Creatae sunt quaedam imagines primi Agentis; All craated things are cer∣tain Images of the first Agent.

VII.

But tho' Nature imitates God, yet it happens here, as in most o∣ther imitations, the Extract comes far short of the Original. God does

not only excel the Creatures in ha∣ving degrees of Being, which he will not, cannot communicate to them, but also in having their Per∣fections in a more excellent man∣ner than they have themselves. Thus that Beauty which charms the Eyes of the Amorous, exists more excel∣lently in God than in the sweetest Face which they admire. And that Harmony which dissolves the Soul into Raptures and Extasies, has a much more perfect Existence in God than in the most agreeable Sounds that can possibly conspire together. The Creature is very unlike God, even where it resembles him, and accordingly the Scripture sometimes makes mention of a likeness that is between God and his Creatures, as when it says,* 1.14 Let us make man af∣ter our own likeness. Again at ano∣ther time it utterly disowns it, as when it says, To whom then will ye liken God, or what likeness will ye compare unto him?* 1.15

VIII.

And that things should thus fall short of God, even in that very re∣spect wherein they resemble him, is no more than what Reason will con∣clude necessary. For God being the very Essence of Being, or Being it self, and therefore indeterminate in Being, and therefore also in Perfecti∣on, it follows that he has not only all Kinds of Perfection, but that every Kind of Perfection which he has must needs be as excellent as is possible in that Kind. Thus for in∣stance, The Beauty that is in God must be as perfect as 'tis possible for Beauty to be, and so the Harmony that is in God must be as perfect as 'tis possible for Harmony to be. That is in other words, The Beauty which is in God must be Beauty it self, and the Harmony which is in God must be Harmony it self.

IX.

But now 'tis impossible that things should exist in the Creature after such a rate as this. As they are not Be∣ing it self, but Particular Beings, so

every Perfection that is in them is not that Perfection it self, in the Ab∣stract, but only Particular, Deriva∣tive and Concrete. They are Beau∣tiful and Harmonical, but not Beau∣ty it self, not Harmony it self. Beauty it self can no more be Communica∣ted to the Creature than Being it self can. All the Essences and Ab∣stract Natures of things are in God, or rather the very same with God (as I shall shew when I consider the Omniscience of God) and they are but One, they cannot be Communicated, or Multiplied. Their Images indeed may, but they themselves cannot, for they are the same with God. There may be many Beautifuls, or Particular Beauties, but there can be but one Beauty it self.

X.

The Beauty therefore that is in the Creature is only a slender Sha∣dow or Reflection of that Beauty it self which is in God, who is the Idea or Essence of Beauty. And as it is Derivative from it, so it exists con∣tinually by it, and in it, and is every

way as much depending upon it as the Reflexion in the Glass is upon the Face whose Reflexion it is. And as Beauty has a more excellent way of existence in the Face it self, than in the Glass, so has it a far more perfect way of subsisting in God than in any Face or thing whatsoever. For all things are Reflections from him, and the whole Creation is but as 'twere one great Mirrour or Glass of the Divinity.

XI.

I end this Contemplation with a very remarkable passage to this pur∣pose out of St. Austin.* 1.16 Tu ergo Do∣mine fecisti ea qui pulcher es, pul∣chra sunt enim. Qui bonus es, bona sunt enim. Qui es, sunt enim. Nec ita pulchra sunt, nec ita bona sunt, nec ita sunt sicut tu Conditor eorum, cui Comparata, nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt. Thou there∣fore O Lord hast made these things, who art fair, for they are fair. Who art good, for they are good. Who Art, for they are. But neither are they so fair, neither are they so good,

neither are they so as Thou their Maker, in Comparison of whom, they are neither fair, nor good, nor are they at all.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

THis may be very much im∣prov'd to the advantage of Devotion. For the great Let to De∣votion is our Love of Particular and Sensible good. 'Tis a Charge that may be fasten'd upon the best of us all, more or less, that we are Lovers of Pleasure more than Lovers of God. And the Love of Pleasure Naturally alienates us from the Love of God. And therefore says St. Iohn,* 1.17 Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. And to shew the great inconsistency that is between the Love of the World and the Love of God, he further tells us, If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. But now if we could be but once perswaded that all the Per∣fections of Particular Beings exist in

God, and not only so, but after a more excellent manner than they do in Particular Beings themselves, we should certainly be very much taken off from the love of Particular and Sensible good; we should not be such gross Idolaters as we are in adoring Created Beauty, but should adhere to God with more Unity and intire∣ness of Affection. Sure I am that there is great Reason we should do so, when we consider, that let the good of the Creature be never so Charming, the very same we may find in God with greater Perfection. We can propose nothing to our selves in the Creature, but what God has more perfectly and more abundantly. To what purpose then should we go off from him, since Change it self can give us no variety, and we can only Court a New Object, not find a New Happiness.

The Aspiration.

NO, My Fair Delight, I will ne∣ver be drawn off from the Love of thee by the Charms of any of thy Creatures. Thou art not on∣ly infinitely more excellent than they, but hast their very excellencies in a more perfect manner than they have or can have. What Temptation then can I have to leave thee? No, O my Fairest, I want Temptation to recommend my Love to thee. 'Tis too easie and too cheap a fidelity to adhere to thee, My first Love, when by Changing I can gain no more.

Thou, O Soveraign Fair, hast adorn'd thy Creation with a Tin∣cture of thy Brightness, thou hast shin'd upon it with the light of thy Divine Glory, and hast pour'd forth thy Beauty upon all thy Works. But they are not Fair as Thou art Fair, their Beauty is not as Thy Beauty.* 1.18 Thou art Fairer, O my

God, than the Children of Men, or the Orders of Angels, and the Arrows of thy Love are Sharper than theirs. They are indeed,* 1.19 My God, thy Ar∣rows are very Sharp, and were we not too securely fenc'd about with our thick Houses of Clay, would wound us deeper than the Keenest Charms of any Created Beauties. But these every day Wound us, while we stand proof against thy Divine Artillery, because these are Sensible, and thine only Intelligible, these are visible to our Eyes, thine only to our Minds, which we seldome convert to the Contemplation of thy Beau∣ties.

But, O thou Infinite Fair, did we but once taste and see, did we but Contemplate thy Original Beauty, as we do those faint Images of it that are reflected up and down among our fellow Creatures, as thy Charms infinitely exceed theirs, so would our Love to thee be Wonderful, passing the Love of Women.

Contemplation IV. Of the Attributes of God in general; particularly of the Vnity of God: which is pro∣ved from his Idea.

I.

COncerning the Attributes of God in general, I have no more to offer than what is commonly taught in the Schools; from which I find no reason to vary, and of which this I think is the summ and substance, first, That the Essence of God is in it self, one only general, simple and intire Perfection, and that therefore the Divine Attributes are not to be consider'd as Acci∣dents really distinct from the Divine Essence, and if not from the Di∣vine Essence, then not from them∣selves neither.

II.

But however, Secondly, Since this Divine Essence which in it self is one and the same general Perfection, does exert and display it self various∣ly in its Operations, by reason of the Diversity of Objects, the At∣tributes of God are by us conceiv'd distinctly. Not that they are so in respect of God, with whom they are really one and the same, and con∣sequently so also among themselves, but only with respect to our manner of conception.

III.

For, Thirdly, The Essence of God displays it self variously (as was ob∣serv'd before) according to the di∣versity of Objects. But now the narrowness of our Faculties will not permit us to represent such a vari∣ous and manifold display of Perfecti∣on in one, simple and adequate con∣ception. We are fain therefore to supply this defect, by framing seve∣ral inadequate conceptions, where∣by we represent God partially and imperfectly; and which we found

upon his different Operations; eve∣ry one of which is conceiv'd as pro∣ceeding from a different Perfection in God, corresponding to that parti∣cular Operation.

IV.

Now tho' this diversity be not re∣al with respect to God, who is one and the same Nature, without com∣position or complication of Being, but only with respect to variety of Objects and Modes of Operation, yet this is a sufficient ground for di∣stinct conceptions; every one of which may admit of a peculiar de∣finition or explication. The summ is, The Attributes of God are all one and the same as to the thing sig∣nifi'd, but not as to the manner of signification. Or, to word it more Scholastically, they may be mutu∣ally affirm'd of one another in sensu identico, but not in sensu formali. And thus must we be contented to think and talk of God while we see him here in a Glass darkly, till he shall reveal himself to us more perfect∣ly, and we shall see him as he is,

and know him as we our selves are known.

V.

This being premised concerning the Attributes of God in general, I proceed now to Contemplate some of those particular Attributes of his, which may derive the greatest in∣fluence upon our Piety and Devo∣tion. And among these, I first con∣sider the Vnity of God, by which I understand not a Generical, or Spe∣cifical, but a Numerical Vnity, in op∣position to Plurality or Multiplica∣tion. That is, That there is One, and but One Onely God.

VI.

The Vnity of God has been ever more question'd than his Existence, and there have always been more Polytheists than Atheists. But for my part, I should sooner be an A∣theist than a Polytheist, for I think it a greater absurdity, that there should be more Gods than one, than that there should be none at all. And I can't imagine how such a wretched absurdity as Polytheism

should ever obtain so much as it has both in the Gentile and Christian World, since without the assistance of any other considerations, it may abundantly be refuted and con∣cluded impossible from the very Idea and Formal conception of God.

VII.

The Idea of God, is Being it self, and Being it self can be but One; which I thus demonstrate. What∣soever is Infinite in Being, can be but One, but Being it self is Infi∣nite in Being; therefore Being it self can be but One. That Being it self is Infinite in Being, we have prov'd in the Second Contemplation. The Proposition, That whatsoever is Infi∣nite in Being can be but One, is plain. For if there were more Infi∣nites, one must be distinguish'd from another, otherwise they could not be more: for not to be distinguish'd, is to be the same. And if one must be distinguish'd from another, then one must have some degree of Being which the other has not; For by what else can any thing be distin∣guish'd?

And if one must have some degree of Being, which the other has not, then to every one of these sup∣posed Infinites, some degree of Being must be wanting namely, that where∣by they are destinguish'd. And if so, then none of them would be infinite in Being. Therefore Plurality of In∣finites in Being, is a contradictious self inconsistant Notion, and such as cannot be admitted by any person that knows what he affirms.

VIII.

But further, Being it self has all the degrees of Being, as all other Abstract and universal Natures have all the perfection of their respective Orders. But now what has all the degrees of Being cannot possibly be multiplied. For 'tis a flat contra∣diction that more than one should have all the degrees of Being. In∣deed it may be communicated, and there may result as many Particu∣lar and Derivative Beings, as Be∣ing it self is capable of being Par∣ticipated. But it cannot be multi∣plied, because it has all the degrees

of Being. And thus 'tis in all other Abstract Essences, they may be Communicated, but they can't be multiplied. Thus there may be many Particular Beauties by the va∣rious participation of Beauty it self. But suppose Beauty it self to exist, it could not be multiplied; there can be but one Beauty it self, be∣cause it has all the degrees of Per∣fection belonging to its Nature. And beyond all there is nothing.

IX.

For to him that would add ano∣ther Beauty it self, I would pro∣pose this Question. Has this super∣added Beauty all the Perfection of the first, or has it not? If not, then 'tis not Beauty it self, for that is supposed to have all the Perfection belonging to Beauty. If it has, then 'tis the very same with the other, and consequently 'tis impos∣sible there should be any more than one Beauty it self. And why is the multiplication of Individuals impossible, but only for this reason, because every Individual has all the

Perfection belonging to that Indivi∣duated Nature. Which therefore does not admit of Plurality or Mul∣tiplication. And consequently Be∣ing it self having as much all the degrees of Being as any Individual has all the Perfection of that In∣dividuated Nature, is no more ca∣pable of Plurality or Multiplicati∣on than any Individual is. There is therefore but one Being it self, and therefore but one God. Which was the thing to be prov'd.

The use of this to Devotion.

SInce then there can be but one God, as we have reason in the first place to admire and adore that universal Perfection of his Nature, which renders him uncapable of multiplication, so in the next place we may be hence admonish'd how reasonable it is that we should rest and depend wholly upon him, dis∣claiming and renouncing all false Gods. And that lastly, we should love him intirely and undividedly,

with all our Heart, Mind and Strength, without admitting any other into Partnership or Rivalship with him: which unity and in∣tireness of Devotion we could not maintain, were there more Gods than one. For no one could then have right to exact all our ser∣vices, nor could we be obliged, or able, to direct all our services to any one of them. And much less could we do so to all, since (as our Sa∣viour tells us) no man can serve even two masters. Mat. 6.24.

The Aspiration.

O Thou Mighty One-All, who art too great to be multipli∣ed, and yet too full not to be com∣municated, what a Greatness, what a Fulness is this of thine! O Rich Solitude, how unlike is all Created Excellence to thine! Other things are to be admired for their Num∣bers, Thou for thy oneness and sin∣gularity, they glory in their multi∣tudes,

but 'tis the Prerogative of thy Perfection to be Alone.

In thee, my only Centre, I rest, upon thee I wholly depend, for I have none in Heaven but thee, and none upon Earth in comparison of thee. I utterly renounce therefore all absolute Power and Supremacy besides thine, and I will fear none but thee, and obey none but thee. Thou only shalt have Dominion over me, I am only thine, and thee only will I serve.

Many, O God, are the Beauties which thou hast made, and thy whole Creation is fill'd with thy Glory.* 1.20 There are threescore Queens, and fourscore Concubines, and Virgins without number; But my love, my un∣desiled, is but one. Take then to thy self the Empire of my Heart. For all that deserves the name of Love there shall be thine. O that it were more inlarged for thy re∣ception: But thou shalt have it all, and I will love thee with my whole Heart, though that whole be but little.

O my only Delight, other Gods besides thee, and other Lords be∣sides thee, have often usurp'd a Dominion over me. But my Heart is now fix'd, O God, my Heart is fix'd. It is fix'd upon thee, and how can it ever wander out of the Sphere of thy Beauty! Or what Beauty is there whose influ∣ence may vye with thine? Or how can I love any but one, when that one, and none but that one, is Infi∣nitely Lovely.

Contemplation V. Of the Omniscience and Omni∣presence of God.

I.

THE unity of God I have de∣monstrated in the preceding Contemplation. And now to obvi∣ate a scruple that may thence arise, namely, how one single solitary Being should be sufficient to pre∣side over all the Motions of the Natural, and all the Affairs of the Moral World, I thought it conve∣nient to proceed next to some of those Attributes, which, when well consider'd, will make it plain, that this Being, though but one, is a∣bundantly qualifi'd for the Govern∣ment and Management of the whole Universe. And among these, the Omniscience and Omnipresence of God are most eminent and conspicuous,

which I shall here therefore joyntly Contemplate.

II.

And first of the Omniscience of God. This is a most wonderful and amazing Attribute, consider it which way we will, for it denotes no lesse than a full knowledge and thorough comprehension of all the things that either are, have been, or shall be. But in the way that I shall now consider it, 'twill appear clothed with peculiar Circumstan∣ces of Admiration, and is indeed a Theme more sit for the Contempla∣tion of an Angel, than for the Pen of a mortal Theorist. Here there∣fore I must beg the peculiar Atten∣tion of my Reader, and above all the peculiar assistance of that Spirit which searcheth all things, yea, the Deep things of God.* 1.21

III.

Now in treating of God's Omni∣science, I shall do two things, First, prove that he is Omniscient, Se∣condly, represent the manner of his Omniscience. To shew that

God is Omniscient, I must first consider what Knowledge is in ge∣neral. Now this I define to be in short, a Comprehension of Truth. For the clearer understanding of which, the Distinction of Truth must be attended to. Truth then is either of the Object, or of the Subject. And both these are again subdivi∣ded. For Truth of the Object is either Simple, whereby a Being is really what it is. Or Complex, which denotes those necessary Habitudes or Respects, whereby one thing stands affected toward another as to Af∣firmation or Negation. Then as for Truth of the Subject, we under∣stand by it either a just Conformity between the Understanding and the Object, which is Logical Truth, or between the Words and the Under∣standing, which is Moral Truth or Veracity.

IV.

The Truth with which we are here concern'd, is Truth of the Ob∣ject. For to know is so to compre∣hend things both as to their Simple

Natures, and as to their Habitudes and Relations, as to Compound what is really Compounded, and to Di∣vide what is really Divided. To have our Understandings thus ac∣commodated to the Respects and Habitudes of things, is Knowledge. As for Truth of the Subject in the second sense, as it signifies a Confor∣mity between the Words and the Understanding, we have here no∣thing to do with it, as being altoge∣ther foreign to our present purpose. And in the first acceptation, as it signifies a just conformity between the Understanding and the Object, 'tis but another word for Knowledge. For Truth of the Subject in this sense is the conformity of the Mind to Truth of the Object. And so also is Knowledge. To Know therefore, is to think of things conformally to their Simple Natures and Mutual Habitudes, or, as I first defined it, to Comprehend Truth.

V.

This being premised, That Know∣ledge is nothing else but a Compre∣hension of Truth, that is, the having things in the Mind with the same Relations of Composition or Divisi∣sion, as they stand mutually affect∣ed in themselves, I thus argue: That Being which Comprehends all Truth is Omniscient.

But God Comprehends all Truth.

Therefore God is Omniscient.

The first Proposition is plain from the Definition of Knowledge. The Conclusion therefore depends whol∣ly upon the proof of the Second; namely, that God comprehends all Truth.

VI.

Now for the Demonstration of this Proposition, I desire but this one Postulatum, that there are Eter∣nal and Necessary Truths, that is, that there are eternal and immuta∣ble Relations and Habitudes of things toward one another, by way of Af∣firmation or Negation. This is what, I suppose, any body will give

me for the asking, tho I have no great reason to be over-thankful for it, it being a thing so very unque∣stionable, and withal a Proposition of this unlucky Quality, that 'tis as much establish'd by the Denial of it, as by the Affirming it. For should any Sceptical Person be so hardy as to say that there is no such thing as Eternal and Necessary Truth, I would ask him this Question: Was that Proposition always true, or was it not? If it was not always true, then there was once Eternal and Necessary Truth, and if once so; then ever so: But if it was always True, then by his own Confession, there is such a thing as Eternal and Necessary Truth. This therefore must be allow'd.

VII.

It being therefore supposed that there are Eternal and Necessary Truths, the next Proposition that I shall lay down is this, that the simple Essences of things must be also Eternal and Necessary. For the proof of which Propositi∣on

I consider first, that as Truth of the Subject depends upon, and necessarily supposes Truth of the Object, so Truth of the Object Complex depends upon, and neces∣sarily supposes Truth of the Object Simple: That is in other Words, The Habitudes and Relations of Simple Essences, depend upon and necessarily suppose the Reality of their respective Simple Essences. As therefore there can be no such thing as Truth of the Subject, without Truth of the Object, to which it may be conformable; so neither can there be Truth of the Object Complex without Truth of the Object Simple, that is, there can be no mutual Habitudes or Relations of things as to Affirmati∣on or Negation, without the Rea∣lity of the things themselves.

VIII.

For I consider that these Habi∣tudes and Respects, as to Affirma∣tion or Negation, wherein consists objective Truth Complex, do re∣sult from the Simple Essences, and

can no more subsist by themselves than any other relations can; for the existence of which the Schools themselves make it necessary that they have their subject and term, upon the Position of which they immediately result, and upon the destruction of which they as imme∣diately cease. As other relations therefore cannot subsist without the existence of subject and term, so nei∣ther can these habitudes as to Affir∣mation or Negation, subsist without the real existence of the Essences themselves so related.

IX.

But this perhaps will be better il∣lustrated by a particular Instance. Let then this be the objective Truth Complex, Two Circles touching one another inwardly cannot have the same common Centre. This is a true Pro∣position. But I here demand, How can it possibly have this certain ha∣bitude of Division or Negation, un∣less there be two such distinct sim∣ple Essences as Circle and Centre. Certainly there can be no Reference

or Relation where there is nothing real to support it.

X.

This Point therefore being gain'd, That truth of the Object Complex depends upon, and necessarily sup∣poses truth of the Object Simple, and that there can be no mutual habitudes or relations of Essences, as to composition and divisition, without the Simple Essences them∣selves: hence it will necessarily fol∣low, that whensoever the one does exist, the other must exist also; and consequently, if the one be Eternal, the other must be also Eternal. And thus (to recur to the former In∣stance) if this be a Proposition of Eternal Truth, viz. Two Circles touch∣ing one another inwardly cannot have the same common Centre, then the two distinct Simple Essences of Cir∣cle and Centre must have an eter∣nal and necessary existence. The short is, there can be no connexi∣on or relation between things that are not, or that do not exist, for be∣ing with this or that habitude to

another thing, implies simple Being, and for one thing to be another, in∣fers and supposes it to be simply. And if there can be no connexion or re∣lation between things that are not, then also there can be no Eternal connexion or relation between things that have not an Eternal Existence. For things cannot be related before they are. But there are such Eter∣nal habitudes and relations, there∣fore the simple Essences of things are also Eternal. Which was the Proposition next to be proved.

XI.

I know very well this is not ac∣cording to the Decrees of the Peri∣patetic School, which has long since condemn'd it as Heretical Doctrine, to say, that the Essences of things do exist from Eternity. But I have Meditated much upon these things, and I must needs say, that I think it a very certain and very useful Theorem, and that 'tis utterly im∣possible to give an intelligible ac∣count of the Stability of Science, or how there should be Propositions of

Eternal Truth, but upon this Hypo∣thesis. And I should be thankful to any of the Peripatetic Dissenters who would undertake to shew me how there may.

XII.

I know they endeavour to do it by telling us (and 'tis the only Plea they have to offer) that these habi∣tudes are not attributed absolutely to the simple Essences as in actual being, but only Hypothetically, that whensoever they shall exist, they shall also carry such relations to one another. There is, says the Peri∣patetic, only a conditional connexi∣on between the Subject and the Pre∣dicate, not an absolute position of either. This goes smoothly down with the young Scholar at his Lo∣gic Lecture, and the Tutor applauds his distinction, and thinks he has thereby quitted his hands of a very dangerous Heresie.

XIII.

But now to this I return the same Answer (for I need give no other) that I have in my Metaphysical Essay.

First, I say, that these habitudes are not (as is supposed) only by way of Hypothesis, but absolutely attri∣buted to the simple Essences, as actu∣ally existing. For, when I say, for instance, that every part of a Cir∣cle is equally distant from the Cen∣tre; this Proposition does not hang in suspence, then to be actually ve∣rifi'd when the things shall exist in Nature, but is at present actually true, as actually true as ever it will or can be; and consequently I may thence infer, that the things them∣selves already are. There is no ne∣cessity, I confess, they should ex∣ist in Nature, which is all that the Objection proves, but exist they must. For of nothing there can be no affection.

XIV.

But, Secondly, Suppose I grant what the Objector would have, that these habitudes are not absolutely attributed to the simple Essences, but only by way of Hypothesis. Yet I don't see what he can gain by this concession. For certainly thus

much at least is attributed to the simple Essences at present, that when∣soever they shall exist, such and such habitudes will attend them. I say, thus much is attributed actually, and at present. But now let any Peri∣patetic of 'em all tell me how any thing can any way be said of that which is not. And besides, 'tis a weak evasion to say that things are not related thus or thus as actually existing, but only conditionally, sup∣posing their existence. For I deny that any thing can be any way re∣lated that does not actually exist. And 'tis as good as a contradiction to say otherwise. When therefore the Peri∣patetick talks of a conditional con∣nexion between the Subject and the Predicate, and that neither is put absolutely, I say, that the connexion is as absolute as it can or ever will be, and that a non-existing subject cannot have any Predicate, or be any way related. And all this I bind upon him by a principle of his own, that of nothing there can be no affection. And let him unwind himself if he can.

XV.

Having thus far clear'd our way by making it evident, that the sim∣ple Essences of things are Eternal. The next thing that I consider is, that since they are not Eternal in their Natural subsistencies, they must be Eternal in some other way of subsisting. And that must be in some understanding, or by way of Ideal subsistence.

XVI.

For there are but two conceiva∣ble ways how any thing may exist, either out of all understanding, or within some understanding. If there∣fore the simple Essences of things are Eternal, but not out of all un∣derstanding, it remains they must have an Eternal existence in some understanding. Which is what I call an Ideal subsistence. There is therefore another way of existing besides that in Rerum Natura, name∣ly in the Mundus Archetypus, or the Ideal World, where all the Rationes rerum, or simple Essences of things have an Eternal and Immutable ex∣istence,

before ever they enter upon the Stage of Nature.

XVII.

I further consider, That this un∣derstanding wherein the simple Es∣sences of things have an Eternal ex∣istence, must be an Eternal under∣standing. For an Essence can no more Eternally exist in a Tempora∣ry understanding, than a Body can be infinitely extended in a finite space. Now this Eternal under∣standing can be no other than the understanding of God. The sim∣ple Essences of things therefore do Eternally exist in the understanding of God.

XVIII.

But the mode of this must be further explain'd. For it being an unquestion'd Truth, that God is a simple and uncompounded Being; and consequently, that there is no∣thing in God that is not God him∣self: as the Schools also rightly have pronounc'd, We must not conceive these simple Essences as accidents in∣hering in God, or as Beings really

distinct from God, this not com∣porting with the simplicity of the Divine Nature.

XIX.

These simple Essences of things therefore can be nothing else but the Divine Essence it self consider'd with his Connotation, as variously representative or exhibitive of things, and as variously imitable or partici∣pable by them. As the Divine Es∣sence is thus or thus imitable or par∣takeable, so are the Essences of things distinguish'd specifically one from another; and according to the multifariousness of this Imita∣bility, so are the possibilities of Be∣ing. From the degrees of this Imi∣tability, are the orders and degrees of Being, and from the variety of it, is their multiplicity.

XX.

The simple Essences of things, thus existing in the Divine Essence, according to these modes of Imita∣bility and Participation, are what we are taught in the Platonic School to call Idea's. These, in the Lan∣guage

of the Divine Philosopher, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first Intelligi∣bles, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the mea∣sures of the things that are, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the things that truly are, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Eter∣nal patterns, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, things which are always the same add unchangeable, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, things that are not generated, but are always; and again 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that were neither generated, nor will be destroyed. Concerning which, thus Cicero, Haec Plato ne∣gat signi, sed semper esse, & ratione & Intelligentia contineri. These, Pla∣to denies ever to have been generated, but that they always are, and are con∣tain'd in Reason and Intelligence.

XXI.

Further, These Essences of things, or Ideas thus existing in God, are the true and proper Objects of all Sciences, and (if I may use the A∣postle's expression in another case) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.22 the pillar and ground of truth. These

supposed, 'tis easie to account for the Stability of Science, and for Propositions of Eternal Truth, but without them 'tis absolutely impos∣sible. For all things in their Natu∣ral Subsistencies are Temporary, Flux, Mutable and Corruptible, and what is so can never stand under E∣ternal and Immutable relations.

XXII.

Further, These Essences are the Specifical Models and Platforms of all the things that are in this Ecty∣pal World. According to these E∣ternal Exemplars were they made; and as is their Conformity to these Measures, so is their Perfection. For 'tis impossible that God should make a World with Counsel and Design, unless he make it according to something, and that can be nothing else but something existing within himself, something in this Ideal and Archetypal World. For as Aquinas well observes, In all things that are not made by chance, the Form must ne∣cessarily be the end of Generation. But now the Agent does not act for the

Form,* 1.23 but only as far as the Simili∣tude of the Form is in him.

XXIII.

And what if I should further say, that this Ideal World, this Essence of God consider'd as variously ex∣hibitive and representative of things, is no other than the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ths Second Person in the ever Bles∣sed Trinity. This I think highly agreeable to Reason, for I know of no Hypothesis that would so intel∣ligibly make out the Eternal Gene∣ration of the Son of God; For ac∣cording to this account, the Son of God must be a Substantial and Multifarious thought of God the Father, and how this may be gene∣rated, and yet be co-eternal with God the Thinker, is not very hard to conceive. Since, if an Angel had been Eternal, his thought must have been so too.

XXVI.

I shall add in confirmation of this Notion, a signal passage of the great Platonist Marsilius Ficinus, thus dis∣coursing of the Eternal Generation

of the Son of God. Omnis vita pro∣lem suam,* 1.24 &c. Every Life first ge∣nerates its offspring within it self be∣fore it does abroad without it self, and by how much the more excellent the Life is, by so much the more in∣wardly to its self does it generate its offspring. So the vegetative life both in Trees and in Animals generates first the Seed, and the Animal within its own Body, before it casts forth either abroad. So the Sensitive, which is more excellent than the Vegetative life, brings forth by the fancy an Image or Inten∣tion of things in it self, before it moves the Members, and forms them in External Matter. But this first Birth of the fancy, because 'tis in the very Soul, is therefore nearer to the Soul than the Birth of the Vegeta∣tive life, which is not in the Soul, but in the Body. So again, the Rational life, which is more excellent than the Sensitive, brings forth in it self the Reason both of things, and of it self, as it were an offspring, before it brings it into the light, either by Speech or Action. This first Birth of Reason is

nearer to the Soul than the Birth of Fancy. For the Rational Power is re∣flected upon its own Birth, and by that upon it self, by seeking, knowing, and loving its own act and it self, which is not done by the Fancy. So again, the Angelical life, which is more excellent than the Rational, brings forth in it self, by a kind of Divine Instinct, the Notions of it self and of things, before it discharges them upon the Matter of the World. This Birth is more inte∣rior to an Angel, than Reason is to her, because 'tis neither derived from External Objects, nor changed. Where∣fore the Divine life being the most eminent and fruitful of all, must needs generate an Offspring more like her self than any of the rest: and this it generates in it self by understanding, before it brings forth any thing with∣out. God therefore perfectly under∣standing himself, and in himself all things, he conceives in himself a per∣fect Notion of himself, and of all things, which is the equal and full Image of God, and the more than full Exemplar or Pattern of the World, &c.

XXV.

Thus is this Notion of the Ideal World, or of the Essence of God, being variously exhibitive and re∣presentative of the Essences of things, made use of by this great Theorist, to explain both the Nature of the Second Person of the Trinity, and the Mode of his Eternal Genera∣tion. And I think it does both much better than any other, and indeed as far as conceivable by hu∣man understanding. So highly use∣ful is this Doctrine of Idea's, when rightly understood, to unsold the profoundest Mysteries of the Chri∣stian Religion as well as of Philoso∣phy: And so great reason had St. Au∣stin to say,* 1.25 Tanta vis in Ideis con∣stituitur, ut nisi his intellectis, sapi∣ens esse nemo possit. There's so much moment in Idea's, that without the understanding of these, no Man can be Wise.

XXVI.

And I further consider, that this is no less according to the Voice of Scripture than of Natural Reason.

St. Iohn speaking of the second Person of the Trinity, says, In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God. He says also that all things were made by him, or according to him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And he further says that he is the true light, that lightens eve∣ry man that cometh into the world. Now what can this signifie but this Ideal World, or the Essence of God as variously exhibitive and represen∣tative of things? For observe, he calls him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which here signi∣fies the same as the inward con∣ception or Idea, he says that he was in the Beginning, and that he was with God, and that he was God, and that all things were made by him; Thus far it must be allow'd that the agreement is very exact. As for the last part of the chara∣cter, How this can be said to be the true Light which lightens every Man that comes into the World, this I shall explain when I come to consider the Nature of Man, who as I shall shew, sees and knows

all that he sees and knows in this Ideal World, which may therefore be said to be his Light.

XXVII.

Again, this second Person is said to be the Wisdom of his Father, to be the Character of his Person, both which expressions denote him to be the same with this Ideal World. And by him God is said to have made the Worlds:* 1.26 that is according to the eternal Exemplars or Plat∣forms in this Ideal World. To which I may add by way of over∣plus, that noble Description of the Eternal and Substantial Wisdom given us in the 7. Chap. of the Book of Wisdom. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Breath (or Vapour) of the Power of God, and an Efflux (or Emanation) from the glory of the Al∣mighty, a clear Mirrour (or Look∣ing-glass) of his active Energory ver∣tue, and the Image of his goodness. And what can all this be but the

Essence of God as Exhibitive, the Ideal World? Lastly, I would have it considered how what our Savi∣our says of himself, I am the Truth, and what the Apostles says of him, that he is the Wisdom of his Fa∣ther, can be verifi'd any other way but by this Hypothesis.

XXVIII.

I have the longer insisted on this to shew not only the Truth of this Ideal World, and that the Essences of things have eternal Existence in it, but also how very useful this Noti∣on is for the Establishment of the Divinity of Christ, and for the expli∣cation of his Eternal generation from the Father, which is also a further confirmation that the Notion is true and Solid. So great aguard is true Platonism against Socinianism.

XXIX.

Hence also we may be instructed how to understand that common Axiom of the Schools, that the Truth of every thing is its confor∣mity to the Divine understanding. This must by no means be under∣stood

of the Mind of God as Con∣ceptive, that is, as reflecting upon himself as Exhibitive, for the Truth of the Divine Intellect as Concep∣tive, depends upon its conformity with the truth of things, not the truth of things upon that. But it must be meant of the Mind of God as Exhibitive, that is, of this Ideal World, for upon this all Truth depends, and every thing, and every Proposition is so far true as 'tis conformable with it. For indeed the Intellect of God, as Ex∣hibitive is the Cause and Measure of all Truth.

XXX.

And, 'twas for want of the help of this Notion that that Keen Wit, Discartes blunder'd so horribly in stating the dependence of Proposi∣tions of Eternal Truth, upon the Intellect of God. He saw it 'twas necessary (as indeed it is) to make God the cause of Truth, and that truth must some way or other de∣pend upon him. But then he makes it depend upon the Mind of

God as Conceptive, and that things are so only because God is pleas'd so to conceive them. And this he carries so high, as to say, that e∣ven in a Triangle, three Angles would not have been equal to two Right ones, had not God been pleased so to conceive and make it. Now I am for the dependence of truth upon the Divine Intellect as well as he, but not so as to make it Arbitrary and Contingent, and Consequently not upon the Divine Intellect as Conceptive, but only as Exhibitive. That is, that things are therefore True in as much as they are conformable to those stan∣ding and immutable Ideas, which are in the mind of God as Exhibi∣tive, and Representative of all the whole Possibility of Being.

XXXI.

Now if after all, this Ideal way of things subsisting from all Eternity in God, should seem strange (as I suppose it will to those who are unexercised in these Contemplati∣ons) I shall only further say, First,

that it must be infinitely more strange that there should be Eter∣nal Truths, that is, Eternal Relati∣ons and Habitudes of simple Essen∣ces, or things, without the Co-eter∣nal existence of the things them∣selves so related. For what should support such Relations? The sim∣ple Essences therefore must exist eternally, if their Relations do? and where can that be but in the Mind of God?

XXXII.

Secondly, I say that this Ideal way of subsisting, ought not to seem such a Bugbear as some make it, since 'tis necessary not only for the salving of Propositions of Eter∣nal Truth, before their Subjects exist in Nature, but even when they do. For even while things have a Natural subsistence, the Propositi∣ons concerning them are not, can∣not be verifi'd according to their Natural, but according to their Ideal subsistencies. Thus we demonstrate several Propositions concerning a Right Line, a Circle, &c. when yet

in the mean time 'tis most certain, that none of these are to be found in Nature, according to that exactness supposed in our Demonstration. Such and such Affections therefoe do not belong to them, as they are in Nature, and therefore they must belong to them as they are in the Ideal World, or not at all.

XXXIII.

And if this be true in Propositi∣ons, whose Subjects exist in Nature, much more is it in Eternal Proposi∣tions, whose simple Essences have not always a Natural existence. These can no otherwise stand, but by supposing the Co-eternal existence of Simple Essences in the Ideal World.

XXXIV.

I shall add but this one Conside∣ration more upon this Head, that there is no greater sign of the soundness of a Truth, than when its profest Adversaries do unawares fall in with it. And this I take to be the case here. The Schoolmen who stand devoted to the Authori∣ty

of Aristotle, do notwithstanding by a kind of blind Parturiency, light oftentimes upon such Notions, which if thoroughly sifted must needs come to the same with what we have hitherto contended for. For I would fain know what they can mean else by the celebrated Glass of the Divinity? What can this be but the Ideal World representing all the Essences of things? And what else can they mean when they say (as they commonly do) of Science, that it is not of Singulars, as being flux Temporary, mutable and contingent, but of Abstract and Vniversal Natures? What is this but in other words to confess the ne∣cessity of Eternal Essences or Ideas existing out of and before those Sin∣gulars whose Essences they are, in order to the salving the stability of Science? Thus do these Men stumble upon Truth blindfold, but not dis∣cerning her through he veil, they let her go again.

XXXV.

Nay, even Aristotle himself after all his zealous opposition of Plato's Ideas has in the fourth of his Me∣taphysics come about to him again, and cross'd the very Road which he studied so carefully to avoid. For discoursing against the Sceptics who allow'd no certainty of Science, he first shews the ground of their mis∣take to consist in this, that they thought Singulars and Sensibles ex∣isting without, to be the only Ob∣jects of Science. His words are, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. The Original of these Mens mistake was this, because Truth is to be lookt for in things, and they conceiv'd the only things to be Sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the Indeterminate Na∣ture. Wherefore they perceiving all the Nature of Sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirm'd concerning that which is not the same, but changeable, concluded that there could be no Truth

at all, nor certainly of Science. Those things which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same.

XXXVI.

Thus having open'd the grounds of this Sceptical Doctrine, in opposi∣tion to it, he thus adds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. we would have these Men therefore to know, that there is another kind of Essence of things, besides that of Sensibles, to which belongeh, neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all.

XXXVII.

Observe here, that Aristotle does not deny the Consequence of the Sceptic's Argument. No, he allows if the Essences of things are not steddy and immutable, that there can be no certainty of Science. But he denys his minor Proposition, and tells him that he goes upon a wrong Hypothesis, in supposing that there are no other Essences of things but Singulars and Sensibles, in op∣position to which he says, that there are other Essences of things

which are immovable, incorrupti∣ble, and in generable. And that 'tis upon these that all Science is foun∣ded. Now who would desire a better Establishment of Platonic I∣deas, than what Aristotle himself has here given? Let any Intelligent Person judge whether this be not a plain giving up the cause. So hard is it for a Man not to contradict himself, when once he comes to contradict Truth.

XXXVIII.

It being now from the Premises sufficiently concluded, that the I∣deas or Simple Essences of things have an Eternal existence in God, and the manner of this their exi∣stence being sufficiently explain'd, the next advance of my Contem∣plation is this, that since all the Simple Essences of things do exist in the mind of God, there must al∣so be the Repository of all their seve∣ral Habitudes and Respects, these naturally arising from the other, by way of Natural Result. For as the Relations of Essences cannot exist

without the Essences themselves, so neither can the Essences exist with∣out being accompany'd with such their Essential Relations. And as before we argued from the Positi∣on of the Habitudes to the Position of the Simple Essences, so now we may as well argue from the Posi∣tion of the Simple Essences to the Position of their Habitudes.

XXXIX.

Thus for instance, as from this Eternal Habitude, viz. that a Circle of such a determinate Circumfe∣rence will have such a determinate Diameter, I may conclude, that the Essence of such a Circle does eter∣nally exist, so again supposing such a Circle to exist, 'tis as necessary it should retain such a Diameter. And so in all other instances, the Essence argues and infers the Habitude, as well as the Habitude does the Es∣sence. For 'tis here as in all other Relations which immediately result upon the position of the Subject and Term.

XL.

This admitted, I now consider that there is now nothing wanting to infer the Omnisciency of God. For since the simple Essences of things do all exist in God, and since these are ever accompany'd with all their Habitudes and Relations, and since these are nothing else but Truth, it follows that all Truth is in God. I say God comprehen∣ding within himself all the Ideas and Essences of things with all their possible references and Respects, comprehends all Truth, the whole field of Truth within himself, which is the same as to be Omniscient, Knowledge being nothing else but a Comprehension of Truth, as was be∣fore defined.

XLI.

And thus we have not only pro∣ved the Omniscience of God, but in a great measure represented the manner of it. Concerning this there∣fore I shall only further remarque that the manner of the Divine Knowledge is the most Noble and

Perfect, that can possibly be con∣ceiv'd. For 'tis not by any derivative Phantasms, or Secondary Images of things, but per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by the very immediate and essential Presence of the things them∣selves. He has all his Knowledge at the first hand, he sees, nay he is possest of the very Essence of things, he is the very Source and Foun∣tain of all Truth, nay he is Truth it self. And besides, his Knowledge is all simple and uncompounded, without Reasoning and inferring, premising and concluding, for he has ever before him in one simple view the whole Field of Truth, and with one single Act of Intuiti∣on glances through the whole Pos∣sibility of Being. For this Word of God, this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who is the Essential Wisdom of his Father, is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two∣edg'd Sword, piercing even to the di∣viding assunder of Soul and Spirit, and of the joynts and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the Heart. Neither is there any

Creature that is not manifest in his sight.* 1.27 But all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him, with whom we have to do.

LXII.

Thus is this one single solitary Being; God, qualifi'd for the go∣vernment of the World upon the account of his Knowledge. He is so also in respect of his being Pre∣sent to the World he is to grovern. For he is Omnipresent, as well as Omniscient: which is the next At∣tribute of God, which in this Con∣templation I undertook to consider.

XLIII.

The Omnipresence of God has been more question'd than any one of his Attributes, both among the Antients, and among the Moderns. Aristotle in his Metaphysics says that the first Mover must necessari∣ly be either in the Centre, or in the Circle or Circumference. That is, ac∣cording to him, either in the mid∣dle of the Earth, or in the Extreme Heaven. And the latter has by most of the old Philosophers been

assign'd for his Residence. In the Church, the more Antient Iews con∣fin'd him to the Temple of Ie∣rusalem. And of late years this Doctrine of the Partial and limited Presence of God has been renew'd by Vorstius, Professour of Divinity at Leyden, who asserts that God is only in Heaven as to his Essence, and elsewhere only in respect of his Wisdom, Power and Provi∣dence.

XLIV.

But that God is every where Es∣sentially Present, both in every part of the World, and also in all Extra mundan Spaces, is most cer∣tain from the very Idea of God. 'Tis impossible that Being it self should be excluded from any part of Being. For every part of Being partakes of, and subsists in and by Being it self. And besides Being it self is indeterminate in being (as was proved in the second Contem∣plation) but now what is indeter∣minate in Being, is also indetermi∣nate in existing, for existing follows

Being as the Act of it, and to exist indeterminately is the same as to be Omnipresent. God therefore who is Being it self, is also an Omnipre∣sent Being.

XLV.

Cncerning the manner of this Om∣onipresence of God I think I may safe∣ly determine that he is every where present, not only Vertually and Ef∣ficaciously by his Wisdom and Power, but also Substantially and Essentially. For Power and Wisdom is not any thing really different from the Es∣sence of God. Neither can the Power of God be conceived to be any where, but his Essence must be there too. But after what special manner this Essence of God is Om∣nipresent, whether by way of an In∣finite Amplitude and Extension, as some think, or else by way of a Point, so as to be whole in the whole, and whole in every part of the World, as others will have it, I neither know, nor shall offer to determine. Such Knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me, I can∣not

attain unto it. 'Tis sufficient to know, that God is so every way Immense and Omnipresent, as not to be included in any place, nor to be excluded from any. For the rest, we must say with the Psalmist, Great is the Lord,* 1.28 and greatly to be praised: and his greatness is un∣searchable.

The use of this to Devotion.

THE Consideration of the Di∣vine Omniscience and Omni∣presence, is of excellent use to all the purposes of a Christian life, as well as to the Interest of Devoti∣on in particular.* 1.29 I am the Almigh∣ty God, walk before me, and be thou perfect, says God to Abraham. Im∣plying that the best Method of Per∣fection, was to live as in the sight and presence of God. And so the Psalmist,* 1.30 I have set God always be∣fore me, therefore I shall not fall. Implying, that if any thing would keep him from falling this would. For can there be any greater re∣straint

upon our actions, any stron∣ger preservative against sin, than du∣ly to consider the Presence and In∣spection of God? In virtutis oculis vivendum; so said the Ancients, We must live as in the Eyes of Vertue. They thought it an excellent expe∣dient against Vice to have the Idea of Vertue always before one. And so no doubt it is. Nay, we see less will do, and that the Morals of Men are very much secured by living in the Eye of the World.* 1.31 Nay, Seneca goes lower yet, and tells us, That Magna pars peccatorum tolleretur, si peccaturis testis assisteret. A great deal of our wickedness would be pre∣vented, if as Men were about to sin, one single witness were to stand by. But, alas, what are such expedients as these to the Omniscience and Omni∣presence of God? No consideration certainly is comparable to this. Will a Man commit Murther in the open Court, before the Face of his Judge? Nay, shall the presence of a Child divert thee from sinning? A Child that knows not the differ∣ence

between good and evil, that wants understanding to censure and condemn what he sees, and has nei∣ther Authority nor Power to pu∣nish thee. Shall such a one deter thee from sin, and dash in pieces the frame of thy ill designs, and da∣rest thou sin before thy God? Da∣rest thou do works of Darkness in the presence of him who is pure Light, and in whom there is no Darkness at all? Darest thou rush on when the Angel of God's Pre∣sence stands in the way with a drawn Sword? The Psalmist says, Tremble thou earth at the presence of God,* 1.32 and darest thou sin in his Pre∣sence? No, thou wouldst not dare, if thou didst well consider it. 'Tis a consideration, this, That if well heeded, and attended to, would give a Law to our privacies and retire∣ments, compose the inmost recesses of our Minds, and not suffer a Thought or Passion to rebel. We should then stand in awe and not sin, and be as composed in our Closets as in a Theatre, or a Religious As∣sembly.

For, indeed, to him that considers God as every where pre∣sent, and a strict observer of him and his actions, every place is a Tem∣ple, and accordingly he will put off his Shooes from his Feet, cleanse and purifie his affections, because the place whereon he stands is Holy Ground.

Thus advantagious is the influ∣ence of these two Considerations to good life in general; as for their special usefulness to Devotion, we may hence collect, First, That we ought to have our Minds always in a Divine Frame and Temper, and always composed with the greatest Awefulness and Reverence, Serious∣ness, Gravity and Silence of Spirit, as being ever in the Presence, and under the direct Inspection of the Great God.

Secondly, That we ought to pray to him with all Humility and Re∣verence, both of Soul and Body, and with an humble confidence of being heard by him where-ever we are, or however we deliver our

selves, whether by Vocal or Mental Prayer.

Thirdly, That we ought in our Prayers to use great fixedness and attention of Mind, without any wandrings, or impertinent mixtures of foreign thoughts, which are ne∣ver more ready to croud into our Minds, than when we are at our Devotions, and yet are never so ab∣surd as then.

Fourthly, That we ever commend our Cause to God, who sees and knows all things, and be well sa∣tisfi'd with his Judgment and Ap∣probation, when ever our Innocence is falsly charged by the World.

And, Lastly, That we ought ne∣ver to repine, or be discontented at the Affairs of the World, but rather trust and rely upon the All-wise con∣duct of him who sees from end to end, knows how to bring Light out of Darkness, and disposes all things sweetly.

The Aspiration.

O Lord, thou hast searched me out, and known me, thou know∣est my down-sitting, and mine up-rising, thou understandest my thoughts long before. Thou art about my Path, and about my Bed, and spiest out all my ways. For, lo, there is not a word in my Tongue, but thou, O Lord, knowest it altogether. Thou hast fashion'd me behind and before, and laid thine Hand upon me. Whither shall I go then from thy Spirit? Or whither shall I go then from thy Presence? If I climb up into Heaven, thou art there, If I go down to Hell, thou art there also. If I take the Wings of the Morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the Sea, even there also shall thy Hand lead me, and thy right Hand shall hold me. If I say, perad∣venture the Darkness shall cover me, then shall my Night be turn'd to Day. Yea, the Darkness is no Darkness with thee, but the Night is as clear as the Day; the Darkness and Light to thee are both alike.

Do thou then, O my God, so im∣print the Sense of this thy Omni∣science and Omnipresence upon e∣very Faculty and Power of my Soul, that I may ever think, speak, and act as in the Light of thy All-seeing Eye, and as immediately sur∣rounded, and intimately possessed with the Glory of thy Presence. O fill me with the profoundest Awe and Reverence, compose my levi∣ties, confirm my doubtfulness, and fix my wandrings, and make me e∣ver satisfied with the Methods of thy Wise Providence.

And when by the Meditation of this thy Knowledge and Presence, I shall learn to demean my self in any measure as I ought: grant that up∣on the same consideration, I may content my self with thy Divine Ap∣probation and Allowance, whatever I am thought of in Man's Judgment. Finally, O my God, Grant I may so set thee before me here, that I may not be afraid to appear before thee hereafter. Amen.

Contemplation VI. Of the Omnipotence of God.

I.

THE next Attribute, whereby this One God becomes qua∣lifi'd for the Government of the U∣niverse, is his Omnipotence. Where∣by may be understood, and com∣monly is, a Power of doing what∣soever is possible to be done. But in this there is some difficulty, from which we must disengage our No∣tion.

II.

For, whereas every thing that is possible, is made the Object of the Divine Power, a nice enquirer may here demand, What do you mean by Possible? For Possible has its de∣nomination from Power, and there∣fore must be measured either in re∣lation to created Power, or in rela∣tion to increated Power. If in rela∣tion

to the first, then for God to be able to do all that is possible, will amount to no more, Than that he can do whatever a Creature can do. But, if in relation to the second, then for God to be able to do all that is possible, will be the same as to say, That he can do whatever he can do. Which would be a very notable discovery. And, besides, according to this measure, a Man might truly say, that God were Omnipotent; tho' at the same time he should deny that he could Cre∣ate any thing besides the present World: because he could then do all that is possible, there being no∣thing then but this World so deno∣minated from the Divine Power,* 1.33 as Suarez rightly infers.

III.

To satisfie therefore this difficul∣ty, we must find out another sense of the word Possible, than what is taken from denomination to any Power. I consider, therefore, that a thing may be said to be possible Ab∣solutely and Negatively, from the ha∣bitude

of the simple Idea's them∣selves, as well as from relation to any Power which may so denomi∣nate it. My meaning is, That there are some Idea's whose habitude is such to one another, that they may admit of composition: there are others, again, whose habitude is such that they cannot admit of composi∣tion, but stand necessarily divided. The first of these I call Possible, the second I call Impossible. Possible, therefore in this sense, is the same as that which involves no repug∣nance. And therefore, to avoid all Ambiguity, setting aside the Word Possible, I shall chuse rather to ex∣press the Omnipotence of God by calling it a Power of doing what∣ever involves no repugnancy or contradiction.

IV.

Now, that God is thus Omnipo∣tent (not to seek out after other Arguments) I thus demonstrate from the Idea of God. Being it self is the proper, full and adequate cause of Being, for whatever is, so

far as it is, it partakes of Being it self, as was before proved. Now if Being it self be the proper, full and adequate cause of Being, then its effect must extend to all those things which are not repugnant to the Nature and Reason of Be∣ing. For if it did extend only to some certain Ones, then Being it self would not be the proper, full, and adequate cause of Being, as is supposed, but only of this or that particular Being. And if it extends to all things that are not repugnant to the Reason of Being, then it must extend to all but not being: For not being only is regugnant to the Reason of Being. God, therefore, who is Being it self, can do all, that does not involve in it the Reason of not being; but these are only con∣tradictions: God therefore can do whatever does not imply a contra∣diction, and is therefore Omnipo∣tent. Which was the thing to be proved.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

FRom the Omnipotence of God, we may take occasion to make these Conclusions. First, That we ought to revere and fear him above all the things in the World, and endeavour by the utmost services of a well-order'd life to make him our Friend, considering what a fearful thing it is to fall into the Hands of an Omnipotent Enemy. I will fore∣warn you whom you shall fear,* 1.34 says our Saviour, fear him, which after he has killed, has power to cast into hell, yea I say unto you, Fear him.

Secondly, That when once we have made God our Friend, and en∣gaged him on our side, we then fear no Created Power, whether Hu∣man or Diabolical. For if an Omni∣potent God be with us, what need we care who is against us. We ought rather to say with the Psalmist, tho' I walk through the valley of the sha∣dow of death,* 1.35 I will fear no evil: for thou art with me, thy rod and thy staff comfort me.

Lastly, We ought upon Conside∣ration of this great Attribute of God, to repose a firm trust and confidence in all his Promises, tho' never so contrary to the Ordinary Laws of Nature, and to the common Measures of Human Probability. Since our concern is with him, who is the God of Nature, and with whom (as the Angel tells us) no∣thing shall be impossible.* 1.36

The Aspiration.

WIth thee, O my God, is Pow∣er and Strength, and with thee ought to be Dominion and Fear. My flesh trembles for fear of thee: and I am afraid of thy Iudg∣ments. Thou art Terrible, O my God, as well as Lovely, but thou art also Lovely in thy very Terrour. Turn away thine eyes from me,* 1.37 for they have overcome me; they have overcome me with their Dread, as well as with their Beauty; For, as thou art Beautiful, O my Love, as Tirzah, Comely, as Jerusalem; so art

thou also Terrible, as an Army with Banners.

O my Omnipotent Love, with what safety, as well as delight, do I sit under thy Shadow! Thou hast brought me into thy Banquetting-House, and thy Banner over me, is Power as well as Love. Thy Love is stronger than Death; what need I sear, thy left Hand is under my Head, and thy right Hand does im∣brace me; And why then should any dread approach me? The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom then shall I fear? He is the strength of my life, of whom then should I be afraid.

O, my God, why is not my Faith like thy Power? Thou canst do all things; And why is my Faith li∣mited? Let me imitate thee, O my God, in this thy Infinity: and grant me such a Victorious, such an Omni∣potent Faith, that as to thee nothing is too hard to do, so to me nothing may be too hard to believe. Amen.

Contemplation VII. Of the Divine Iustice and Veracity.

I.

FRom the Omnipotence of God, I proceed to the Consideration of his Iustice, this being as necessa∣ry a qualification in the Governour of the whole World as the other. Now, by Justice in this place, I understand particular, not Univer∣sal Justice. And of particular Ju∣stice, not that which is Commuta∣tive (for this has no place in God; for,* 1.38 as the Apostle says, Who has first given to him, and it shall be re∣compensed to him again?) but that which is Distributive, and consists in a constant will of dispensing to every Person according to his de∣serts.

II.

This Iustice of God is the same in the moral World, as Order and Pro∣portion is in the Natural. 'Tis gi∣ving to every thing its due place and station, and disposing it accor∣ding to its Nature and Condition. For as the Beauty of the Natural World arises from Proportion, so does the Beauty of the Moral World arise also from due Order and Pro∣portion; and as God has strictly ob∣serv'd this Rule in the making of the World, having made all things in Number, Weight and Measure, so we may be sure he proceeds by the same Standard in the Government and conduct of it, though the ex∣actness of this latter is not so obvi∣ous to our observation, as that of the former, nor are we so well able to judge of the Moral, as of the Natural Geometry of God.

III.

Now that God is thus Just, al∣ways acting according to true Or∣der and Proportion, may sufficiently be made out from this single Con∣sideration.

All Order and Proportion (as every one I suppose will readily grant) is, in it self consider'd, love∣ly and desirable. If so, then it cannot be nill'd or refused for it self, or as such. If so, then whene∣ver it is refused, it must be refused for the sake of some other greater good. If so, then this other grea∣ter good must be, either the pri∣vate interest of the Refuser, or some other Private Interest, or the Pub∣lick Interest. But neihter of these can here find any admission. It cannot be for the Private Interest of the Refuser, who is here supposed to be a Being absolutely Perfect; and consequently not capable of proposing to himself any self-end. And cannot be for the Publick In∣terest, for the greatest Interest of the Publick consists in Order and Proportion. Neither can this Order be violated for the Interest of any other Private Person, because that is not a greater, but on the contrary, an infinitely less good, Order and Proportion being the good of the

Publick, which is always greater than any Private whatsoever. Since therefore Order and Proportion cannot be violated by God for any of these ends, nor for its own sake, it being as such lovely and desira∣ble, as was supposed, it follows that Order and Proportion cannot possi∣bly be violated by God at all, and consequently 'tis necessary that God should always effectually Will Order and Proportion, which is the same as to be Iust.

IV.

By this Justice, or Will of follow∣ing Order and Proportion, God stands ingaged not to punish an Innocent Creature, or to afflict him with any evil greater than that good which he has conferr'd upon him: Within that compass indeed he may, for that is only to deduct from that Happiness, every degree of which was a free favour. But he cannot impose the least grain or scruple of evil upon him beyond the good conferr'd, without some demerit of the Creature. Much

less will this Justice of God permit that he should predetermin an In∣nocent Creature, without respect to any Crime, meerly for his own will and pleasure, to everlasting mi∣sery. He that can make this consi∣stent with God's Justice, or any Ju∣stice in the World, had need be a ve∣ry good Reconciler.

V.

But now whether God's Justice obliges him to punish the Sinner, as well as not to punish the Innocent, is a thing that will admit of more questi∣on. This has been argued with great Contention between some Schools, and is too disputable to be posi∣tively determined. For my part I am more inclined to think that the Nature of God obliges him to punish sin some where or other, and that vindicative Iustice is Essential to him.

VI.

That it is so far Essential to him that he cannot but punish an impe∣nitent Sinner, few I believe will question. For nothing in the World

can be imagined more against Order and Proportion than that a Sinner should be pardon'd without Repen∣tance. But further, 'tis highly pro∣bable that sin could not have been, pardon'd even with Repentance, had there not also been Satisfaction made to God for it. 'Tis plain de facto, that God would not re∣mit sin without satisfaction, and that too the highest imaginable: Which makes it very probable that he could not. For is it reasonable to think that God would deliver up his only and beloved Son to that bitter dispensation, if, with the safety of his Justice, he could have pardon'd us, meerly for our Repen∣tance, without such a costly sacrifice? And that he could not, does not that Prayer of our Saviour argue, which he used in his Agony? Fa∣ther, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: Which is as much as if he had said, Father if the sin of Man may be remitted any other way than by way of suffering, I desire I may not suffer. This I think is the

Obvious sense of the Words. But this Prayer of his, was not gran∣ted by the removal of the Cup, and may I not thence conclude that 'twas impossible it should be re∣moved?

VII.

And I further consider that God necessarily hates sin with an infinite hatred, as a thing that is diametrical∣ly opposite to his own Essential sancti∣ty, and to those great Ends which he cannot but propose in the regulati∣on of the universe. But how he should thus hate it, and yet not shew this his hatred by punishing it, is not easie to conceive. And besides, it seems agreeable to the Laws of Order and Proportion, that so great a Dis-harmony as Sin, should never go wholly unpunish'd, but that the Publick happiness, of which Sin is a violation, should be both repair'd, and secured by the exaction of some satisfaction.

VIII.

If it be said, that every one may remit as much as he please from his

own Right, and that then much more may God. I answer, that Right, is either Right of Domi∣nion, or Right of Office. From Right of Dominion, when alone, no doubt any person may remit what he pleases, but not from Right of Office, or from Right of Dominion, when joyn'd with Right of Office. Now there is great reason to be∣lieve that the exacting of Punish∣ment for sin, is not in God a Right of Dominion only, but also a Right of Office; that is, that God does not punish only as supreme Lord, but as a Iudge; and as a Iudge, 'tis con∣gruous to suppose that he may be ob∣liged to punish. Obliged, not by any Law or Power superiour to him∣self, but by the Essential Rectitude of his own Nature and Will: Which by obliging him to regard the Pub∣lic Order and Interest, may by consequence oblige him to animad∣vert upon those who transgress against it.

IX.

And thus far of the Justice of God, whereby he deals uprightly and equally with all his Creatures, and renders to every one his own, according to their Works, good or bad, without any Partiality or Re∣spect of Persons. The next thing I consider in God is his veracity, whereby all his words are confor∣mable to his Mind and Intention, and all his performances conforma∣ble to his words: Whereby he most assuredly makes good all his Cove∣nants, Promises and Threatnings, and cannot possibly deceive his Creatures any more than he himself can be deceived.

X.

That there is this veracity in God we may be assured from the All-sufficiency and Perfection of his Being. For all Fraud and Deceit is grounded upon Inigence and In∣firmity. No Man deceives meerly for deceivings sake, but to serve a turn, to relieve a Necessity. And such a Necessity too as cannot be

reliev'd any other way. For Fraud is not only a Remedy, but the last Remedy; men never betake them∣selves to tricks, but when they can't compass their Ends by Plain-dealing. But now none of these things can be incident to God, who being above all Indigence and Infirmity, must of consequence be as much above all Falshood and Deceit.

The Vse of this to Devotion.

COnsidering then that God is thus strictly Iust, True and Faithful, 'tis rational hence to con∣clude, first, how much it concerns us to Fear him, and to beware how we render our selves Obnoxious to this his Justice.

Secondly, That we ought always to rest intirely satisfy'd in the Divine Dispensations, knowing that 'tis im∣possible but that this Judge of the whole Earth should do Right.

And lastly, That we ought rea∣dily and firmly to believe him in all the Manifestations of his Mind and

Will, and particularly that we ought to repose a strong Confidence in his Covenants and Promises, being well assured that he is Faithful who has promised.

The Aspiration.

MY God, My Iudge, who art Righteous in all thy ways, and Holy in all thy works, I delight to think of thee, tho' I am too guil∣ty to contemplate thee, in this thy Attribute, without Fear and Trem∣bling. For there is Iudgment as well as Mercy with thee that thou shouldst be Fear'd. O enter not into Iudgment with thy Servant, for in thy sight shall no man living be Iustify'd.

My God, how strangely Impious are they who dare say or think that the way of the Lord is not equal! My God, I am none of those, nor will I ever be of that profane number. I will ever acquiesce in the Equity of thy Dispensations, whether I am able to comprehend it or no. For I know tho' Clouds and Darkness

may sometimes be round about thee, yet Righteousness and Judgement are always the Habitation of thy Seat.

I readily and firmly assent, O my God, to all the Declarations thou hast made of thy Mind and Will. I believe all thy Predictions, all thy Promises, and all thy Threatnings, that they shall be fulfill'd all in their Season. I know that nothing but Truth can proceed from thee who art Truth it self: I know that thou, O God, can'st not deceive us, O grant that we may not deceive our selves. Amen.

Contemplation VIII. Of the Divine Goodness and Philanthropy.

I.

I shall now close up these my Con∣siderations of God, with a Medi∣tation upon the Divine Goodness, by which I understand a Propension of doing good to his Creatures by the Communication of his own good or happiness. But here upon my first entrance, I find my self plunged be∣yond my Depth. It is an immense Ocean which no Line can fathom, and where the Sight loses it self in a long boundless Prospect. This is that Attribute which in a peculiar manner adorns and accomplishes the Divine Nature, and renders it Ami∣able and Lovely, as well as Venera∣ble and Adorable. This is the high∣est

Repast of Angels, and the pecu∣liar entertainment of Contemplative Souls, many of which who had no other guide to follow but the Clue of their own Reasonings, have long since observed that Goodness is the Principal; and, as I may say, the Divinest Attribute of the Deity.

II.

This the Gentile Theology intend∣ed by making Love the most anci∣ent of all the Gods. And accord∣ingly we find in the Platonic Trini∣ty (which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) that the first place is assign'd to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which they conceive after the manner of an immense and most pure Light, continually dissusing and Communicating its invigora∣tive Beams. And this was that which the fine Platonist Boethius al∣luded to, in that celebrated and gra∣phical description of God, when he call'd him Fons Boni Lucidus, the Lucid Fountain of Good. And there is an ancient Cabalistical Table supposed to be borrowed from the Pythagoreans, which represents in a

visible Scheme the Order of the Di∣vine Perfection, wherein 'tis obser∣vable that Goodness is seated in the Supreme Circle, which they call Chether or the Crown, thereby inti∣mating that goodness presides over, and gives Laws and Measures to all the other Attributes of God.

III.

And indeed it does so: For thus God's Power serves to execute the Dictates of his Wisdom, and his Wisdom is employ'd in finding out Objects, Methods and Occasions, for the exercise of his Goodness. Nay, even Justice it self, which at first seems to thwart and reprimand the inclinations of Goodness, will notwithstanding be found upon near∣er inspection, sweetly to conspire and accord with it, nay (what seems a greater Paradox) to be one of the Instances and Exemplifications of it. For God never punishes but when Order, that is, the good of the Uni∣verse requires it, and consequently never but when upon the whole 'tis best to do so. So that God's good∣ness

will still be the Chether, the Crown of all his Perfections.

IV.

Plato calls God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Idea or Essence of Goodness. A very high expression. But says not the Scripture also the same? For when it defines God, it does not say he is Wisdom or Power, but that he is Love. Not Loving, but Love it self. And our Saviour in Answer to him that call'd him good Master, tells us, There is none good but One, that is God. As if this Divinest At∣tribute were that Honour, of which God is said by the Prophet to be so Jealous, that he will not give it to another:* 1.39 not to any of the Sons of Men, no not to the Son of Man.

V.

And indeed God may well be Jealous of this his Honour, since goodness is that Attribute which does not only render the Deity most lovely to us, but is also most peculi∣arly beloved by Himself. 'Tis his Favourite and darling Excellence, that which he seems most of all to

delight in, and to value as the very Flower and Beauty of all his Excel∣lence. And therefore when Moses desired to have a sight of his Glory, his Answer to him was, I will make my goodness pass before thee.

VI.

And how much God is in Love with this his Attribute, we may conclude from the great use and ex∣ercise of it. God has exercised his goodness more than all the rest of his Attributes, so that the Stream rises almost as high as the Fountain, and the Instances and Exemplifications of it are almost as infinite as it self. The Material Fabrick of the World is the Emanation of the Divine good∣ness, and who can tell how large that is, or where the utmost boun∣daries of it are fix'd? Then as for the Intellectual part of the Creation, how fruitful has the Divine good∣ness been, and what a Numerous Progeny has it brought forth! Who can number the Lords Host?* 1.40 Thou∣sand thousands minister unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stand

before him. All these drink of the same inexhaustible Well of Life, of this Lucid Fountain of good; and with perpetual Anthems of Praise cele∣brate the bounty of their Maker.

VII.

But altho those higher Orders of Spirits, who are seated near the Spring-head of Bliss, enjoy a greater share of the Divine Goodness, and being as it were in a direct Position to that All-glorious Sun, must needs drink in more plentiful and more vigorous Effusions of his Light, yet Man, the Younger Brother, seems in some respects to be the Darling of Heaven, and to be Priviledg'd with some peculiar Tokens of Favour. I shall chuse to instance in two. One is, That Man is admitted to the Grace of Repentance, and has the ad∣vantage of Second thoughts, whereas God spared not the Angels that sinn'd.* 1.41 The other is, That Man had the Honour to be Hypostatically United with the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Second Person of the B. Trinity. So that what was figuratively spoken by God in the

Case of Adam, is here in some mea∣sure really verify'd, Behold Man is become as one of us;* 1.42 whereas he re∣fused to take upon him the Nature of Angels.

VIII.

These indeed are the two greater Lights that shine most conspicuously in the Firmament, and such as when alone consider'd, would wind up a con∣templative Spirit to that Extatic Admi∣ration of the Psalmist,* 1.43 Lord what is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou visitest him! But there are also a multitude of lesser Stars, many of which we do not observe, tho we feel and thrive un∣der their Influence; and those which we do we cannot number. God's Favours are too quick for our Ac∣counts, and the Heavenly Manna falls so thick about our Tents, that we want opportunity to gather it up.

IX.

But that I may Sail by some Com∣pass in so wide and boundless an Ocean, I consider that the Effects

of God's goodness to Man may be distributed into these two Kinds in general, Giving and Forgiving. Those of giving again are of two sorts: Either such as are to be conferr'd upon us after our Work is done, by which I understand the Rewards of Heaven, or such as are given us by way of Earnest, or Anticipation.

X.

I begin with the last of these, where the first thing that offers it self to our consideration is the Colla∣tion of our Being; which I do not understand as it is generally taken in the Schools, namely, For naked and abstract Existence, For thus to Be Absolutely has no manner of intrinsic good in it, but is only a Foundation or Capacity of a good or evil State Indifferently. And this methinks is so very plain, that I should much wonder how so many Metaphysical Heads could espouse the contrary, were it not found to be a convenient Device for the Maintenance of that absurd Paradox, that 'tis better to Be, tho in Extreme Misery, than not to be;

which Proposition was also intended for the support of another, every whit as absurd, viz. That God may consistently with his Goodness and Justice, inflict eternal Misery upon an Innocent Creature. For since he may (as all grant) Annihi∣late an Innocent Creature, 'twill follow that he may with less appear∣ance of Injustice, inflict on him eter∣nal Misery, Annihilation (according to these mens Metaphysics) being the greater evil of the two. And that for this notable Reason, because he that is, tho never so miserable, en∣joys some good, viz. that of Exi∣stence, whereas he that is not, has none at all.

XI.

But now, besides that the good of Simple being, may be outweigh'd by Super-induced evils, and that then to Be all consider'd, would not be good but evil, as I could easily shew were it my present concern further to ingage in that Controver∣sie; I say, besides this, I do not al∣low the Truth of the first Assertion,

that to be has any intrinsic good in it. And therefore when I begin the Catalogue of the Divine Favours, with the Collation of our Being, I do not understand by the Phrase meerly our being brought into Act indefinitely (existence as such inclu∣ding neither good nor evil in it) but our being made such certain Essences or Natures, consisting of such Powers and Faculties as are re∣quisite to constitute such an Order of Beings as according to such a Mode of Imitability or Idea, is re∣presented in the Divine Understand∣ing, and which we distinguish by the Name of Mankind.

XII.

Now the Nature of Man involves much good and perfection in it, and consequently for God to give it Exi∣stence is an Act of Goodness as well as of Power. For tho there be (as I suppose) little or no deference to be paid to that popular Argument, which would derive an Obligation of gratitude upon Children toward their Parents, from their receiving

their Being from them, because there is no kindness here design'd to those Persons who in the Event (perhaps) are profited, but before were not so much as known; yet our case is quite otherwise, as to our receiving our Being from the Father of Spirits. For he both knew whom he was to oblige, when he gave us Being, and intended it as a kindness to us, ha∣ving no Interest of his own to pro∣mote by it. Which are the two Qualifications required by Seneca, in his Book De Beneficiis, to make up the Nature of such a Benefit as shall lay an Obligation upon the Receiver.

XIII.

Now both these Requisites being eminently found in God, it follows that his Kindness in giving us Being, receives its Estimate from the value and excellency of the thing bestow'd, which cannot appear little if we consider, that such was the Dignity and Excellency of Humane Nature, that it occasion'd deliberation in Heaven, and was thought worthy of the Council of the Trinity. If we consider, that Man is the most

Noble part of all the visible Crea∣tion, the Abstract and Compendium of the Universe. That he is a Crea∣ture form'd after the Image of the Great God, endow'd with an excel∣lent and immortal Spirit, and re∣sembling his Maker, as in other re∣spects, so in some measure in this, that he can and must needs be hap∣py both in the direct Operations of his Nature, and in the reflexive acts of Contemplation upon the dignity of his Essence. To give therefore Being to such an accomplish'd Crea∣ture as this, is ipso facto, without Consideration of any further design, a very signal act of Love and Bene∣ficence.

XIV.

Another very signal instance of the Divine Goodness to Man is our Preservation, whether we consider it in the more Metaphysical way of the Schools, as that uninterrupted Influx, which they call Continued Creation, whereon we depend as Essentially as the Image in the Glass does upon the Object; or whether

we consider it after the more popu∣lar acceptation, as it denotes the Conduct and Superintendency of God's Providence, whereby he so dis∣poses of the Events and Issues of things as either to keep off from us what would incommode our wel∣fare, or to work out a more impor∣tant good from those evils which he suffers to befal us.

XV.

And here it would be matter of wonderful curiosity, and pleasing astonishment, could we but discern from end to end those manifold turns and fetches, those Stratagems and Intrigues, that Plot of Providence which is engaged for our preserva∣tion through the various Occuren∣cies of Life. Could we but see what a Labyrinth, what a Maze we tread, and what reason there is for every turning,* 1.44 were but our Eyes open'd (as the Young mans were at the Prayer of Elisha) to see the Bright Host of Auxiliary Spirits that incamp about us, to see with what care and concern the good Angels contest on

our behalf against the Powers of Darkness,* 1.45 as the Guardian Angel of the Jews did against the Prince of Persia, and how many dangers both Gostly and Bodily we escape through their Protection, could we I say see all this—But we may be content to want the curiosity, so long as we enjoy the Benefit, and rest satisfi'd with what the Psalmist assures us of in general, that the Angel of the Lord tarrieth about them that fear him,* 1.46 and delivereth them.

XVI.

Another considerable instance of the Divine Goodness to Man, is seen in the Provision made by Pro∣vidence for the necessaries and Con∣veniences of Life, such as Food and Raiment, and the like. This was first exemplifi'd in the Order of the Creation, wherein 'tis to be obser∣ved that the Creation of Man was reserved for the work of the Sixth day, till the World was both Created and Furnish'd for his reception; till the Heavenly bodys were prepared to guide him by their Light, and

the Earth to feed him with her Fruits, and then God brings in Man into the World, like a Noble guest to a Table richly spread and set out with Delicacys.

XVII.

I dare not heighten this conside∣ration so far as some do, who af∣firm all things to have been made meerly for the use of Man. For al∣though (as 'tis well noted by the French Philosopher) upon a moral account,* 1.47 it be of good use to say that God made all things for our sakes, it being a consideration that would serve to excite in us a grea∣ter Love and Gratitude towards him, and although in some corrected Sense it be true, in as much as we may make use of all things to some good purpose or other, either as Ob∣jects to employ our Philosophy upon, or as Occasions to Magnifie the good∣ness and Power of our Creator, yet to say that all things were so pre∣cisely made for us as to exclude all other purposes, besides that 'tis too boldly to determin concerning the

Ends of God, and to indulge a fond opinion of our selves, 'tis al∣so plainly absurd and unphilosophi∣cal, there being questionless many things in the World so far from af∣fording any real use to Man, that they never have been or shall be so much as seen or understood by him.

XVIII.

However thus far we may ven∣ture to determin, and more we need not require, that God had a special regard to Man in the Creati∣on of the World, whom he has con∣stituted Lord of the inferiour part of it, that (as the Psalmist says) he cover'd the Heavens with Clouds, and prepared Rain for the Earth, and made the Grass to grow upon the Mountains,* 1.48 and Herbs for the use of Man.

XIX.

But besides this general and Pri∣mary designation of things for the use of Man, there is a more Parti∣cular and Seconday work of Provi∣dence to be observ'd in the so ma∣naging

and Ordering of Affairs, that every Man may have a tole∣rable Portion of the good things of this Life. And this is effected not by leaving all things in Common, or giving every Man a right to e∣very thing, for this would be of pernicious consequence, as tending both to the perpetual disturbance of the Public Peace, and to the utter neglect and Disimprovement of Na∣ture; but by the limits and inclo∣sures of Property, whereby care is taken that every Man shall either have somthing of his own, or be maintain'd by the Provisions of those that have. So that some way or other God provides for every mem∣ber of this his great Family, and though he does not always at our desire bring Quails,* 1.49 and fill us with the Bread of Heaven, yet he fur∣nishes every one that travels in this Wilderness with a Viaticum suffici∣ent to carry him through his Jour∣ney; and though he does not grant him his own wish, yet he grants him that of a Wiser Man, and

feeds him with food convenient for him.* 1.50

XX.

But these are but Prefatory Fa∣vours, Dawnings of goodness, and little Essays of the Divine Love if Compared with those last displays of his Bounty, those Consummati∣ons of Kindness which attend Man in the other World, when God shall give him everlasting felicity, and make him glad with the joy of his Countenance.* 1.51 When he shall with∣draw his hand from the Clift of the Rock,* 1.52 and shew him all his Glory. When he shall remove the Bounds from the Mount of his Presence, and admit him to the Comprehensions of an Intuitive Beatitude. This is that great Portion; that Final Pa∣trimony which is laid up for Man, and which (as our Saviour says) shall be given to those,* 1.53 for whom it is prepared. To those, who do not by their own default forfeit their Inheritance with the Saints in Light.

XXI.

And thus far of those effects of the Divine Goodness to Man, which are manifested by giving. The next is that of forgiving. This is that peculiar Instance of Favour, whereby Man stands di∣stinguish'd from the rest of the Sons of God, as the great Favo∣rite of Heaven. For though the Angels were all Partakers of God's Love and Bounty, yet 'twas Man alone that was made choice of to be the Object of his Mercy. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Says Nemesius.* 1.54 For 'twas Man alone, among all Rational Beings, who had the Priviledge of being p••••don'd by Repentance. A Favour extraordinary, whether we consider the great Benefit that accrues to Man by it, in being freed from the Curse of the Law, and resto∣red to a capacity of arriving to that Happiness, for which he was first designed, or the wonderful

means of effecting it. For that God should bow the Heavens and come down, empty himself by taking upon him the Form of a Servant, and humble himself yet further, by becoming Obedient even unto Death, this is that Stupendious un∣utterable instance of Mercy, that Mystery of Goodness, which the Angels desire to look into, which they admire and cannot Compre∣hend, Sound and cannot Fathom, and which while they Contemplate, Man enjoys.

The use of this to Devotion.

HAving now tasted and seen in some Measure how good and gracious the Lord is, let us now apply this speculation to the ad∣vantage of Devotion. This I shall do, First, by considering what may be collected to this purpose from the Goodness of God in General; Secondly, by the shewing how the several Instances of the Divine Goodness point out to us the ex∣ercise of several Devotional vertues. And first since God is so good a Be∣ing, and so good to Man, 'twill be∣come us in the first place to ba∣nish all superstitious slavish Fears and jealous apprehensions of him, considering that 'tis more for the Honour, and more according to the Will of so Good a Being, to be heartily loved, than servilely fear'd, and that 'tis Love and not Fear that has the Honour to fulfil the whole Law.

Secondly, God being so Good, and having shewn so much Good∣ness to us, 'twill highly become us in the next place to acknowledge this his Goodness by all the ways we can, especially by these Three, Praying to him, Depending on him, and Praising him. By every one of these, we acknowledge God's Good∣ness, either directly, or by conse∣quence; but most of all by the last, which ought therefore to be principally regarded. This I the ra∣ther take notice of, because 'tis a thing wherein we are generally de∣fective, for we are all apt to be more zealously affected in our petitionary Prayers, than in our giving Thanks. And the reason, I suppose, is, be∣cause our Prayers are for our selves, but giving Thanks is to God. But certainly this is a great fault, and proceeds from that root of all evil, self-love; we ought rather to ad∣dress our selves to God with more Application and Devotion in our Praises than in our Prayers. For he that Praises, glorifies God more

than he that Prays; for he that Prays, does only hope that God will be good to him, but he that Praises, does actually acknowledge that he is already so. There is more excellence in Praise than we are commonly aware of. To Believe, Pray and Trust is the work of Earth, but to Adore and Praise is the work of Heaven. But not so as to be reserv'd till we come thi∣ther. No, we must begin it here, or we shall never do it hereafter. 'Tis the only retribution God ex∣pects from us for all his Goodness, to be blessed for his Blessings; and unless we do this, we shall be guil∣ty of the highest injustice and in∣gratitude imaginable, and of such a vileness, as all the Praying in the World will never countervail.

But as we are obliged to act thus from God's Goodness in general, so the several Instances of the Divine Goodness point out to us the exer∣cise of several Devotional Vertues. For example, when a Man consi∣ders God as the Author and Preser∣ver

of his Being, what inference can be more natural, than that he should present unto him himself, his Soul and Body to be a reasonable, holy and lively Sacrifice, that he should employ all his Powers and Faculties in the Service, and to the Glory of him that gave them, and love him with all his Heart, Mind, Soul and Strength? Again, when he considers the guard which Gods Holy Angels keep over him, and the many Deliverances vouchsafed him through their Protection, What in∣ference can be more obvious than that he rest secure under this de∣fence of the most High, and abide with confidence under the shadow of the Almighty, that he sing Praises to God in the multitude of these his strong Mercies, and be ever mind∣ful of that saying, Grieve not the Angel, lest he smite thee: do nothing against him, lest he forsake thee. A∣gain, when he considers the plenti∣ful provision God has made for him as to this life, that his Lot is fall'n to him in a fair ground, and that

he has a goodly Heritage, what is more naturally to be inferred than that he offer up to God the Sacri∣fice of Thanksgiving, for all the Methods, Conveyances and Instru∣ments of his Bounty, and that he trust his Providential care for his fu∣ture maintainance. Again, when he considers that weight of Glory prepared for him in the other World, What can be more natural for him, than with Angels and Archangels, and all the Company of Heaven, to Laud and Magnifie his Glorious Name, and to press forward to some degrees of excel∣lency, in the Service of him who has thus prevented him with such ex∣cesses of Kindness, such depths of unsearchable Love. Lastly, when he considers those astonishing Mi∣racles of the Divine Mercy and con∣descension in the Redemption of the World, in the Assumption of our Nature, and the humble submission of our Blessed Lord to the Pains and Dishonours of the Cross, what can be more natural, than that af∣ter

an Hymn of Praise and Adora∣tion to him that sitteh on the Throne, and to the Lamb, he look upon himself now as no longer his own,* 1.55 but as bought with a Price; and accordingly glorifie God in his Body and Spirit, which are God's, that he dishonour not that Nature which is made one with the Divi∣nity, and advanced above the Sera∣phims; and that lastly, he endea∣vour to copy out some of the imi∣table strokes of his Saviours Humi∣lity, and (in the Apostle's Phrase) let the same mind be in him which was in Christ Iesus.

The Aspiration.

O My great and good God, who art good in all thy Greatness, and whose chiefest Greatness is to be Good, How can I possibly think amiss of thee, distrust thee, or har∣bour any jealous apprehensions con∣cerning thee? And how unworthy should I be of this thy Goodness if I should!

But, O God, my Love, 'tis my infirmity to be afraid of that Ex∣cellence which I should rather love, for my love of thee is not yet per∣fect enough to cast out all fear; but blessed be thy Goodness, who in the midst of my fears and doubtful sur∣mises art pleased to remind me of thy Nature, and to say to my Soul, as thou didst once to the dissident Disciples, It is I, be not afraid.

The Voice of my Beloved! I will therefore turn my fears to love, and

love more than I ever yet feared or loved.* 1.56 I will also magnifie thee, O God, my King: and I will praise thy Name for ever and ever. Every day will I give thanks unto thee: and praise thy Name for ever and ever. For I have tasted and seen how gra∣cious thou art, and I find it is a good thing to Praise thee: and that 'tis a joyful and pleasant thing to be Thankful. I know, O my God, that thy Goodness is as much above my Praise, as thy Greatness is above my Comprehension. My Praises can add nothing to thee, neither can I Praise thee according to thy Good∣ness. But, O my God, I will Praise thee according to my strength, and I know that the same Goodness of thine, which is too great to be prai∣sed worthily, is also too great not to accept our unworthy Praises.

My God, I know thou requirest from me only the Praises of a Man, but I am troubled that I cannot Praise thee as an Angel. O that I were now in Heaven, if 'twere on∣ly

that I might Praise thee as thy Angels Praise thee: This, O my God, I will do hereafter, my gratitude shall run then as high as theirs, and it shall be as lasting too; it shall last as long as thy Goodness and my Being lasts; and as thy Mer∣cy, so my Praise shall endure for ever.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Tim. 6.16.
• * 1.2

  John 1.5.
• * 1.3

  Tim. 6.16.
• * 1.4

  Act. 17.27.
• * 1.5

  22 dae Q. 82. A. 1.
• * 1.6

  Psal. 39.
• * 1.7

  Psal. 147.
• * 1.8

  Vid. Collecti∣on of Mis∣cellan.
• * 1.9

  Metap. Essay.
• * 1.10

  Psal. 63.
• * 1.11

  Serm. 149.
• * 1.12

  De Nat. Deorum. Lib. 2.
• * 1.13

  Lib. 3. Con. Gent. cap. 19.
• * 1.14

  Gen, 1.
• * 1.15

  Isai. 40.18.
• * 1.16

  Lib. 11. Confes. cap. 4:
• * 1.17

  Joh. 2.15.
• * 1.18

  Psal. 45.
• * 1.19

  Psal. 45.
• * 1.20

  Cant. 6.
• * 1.21

  1 Cor. 2.
• * 1.22

  1. Tim. c. 3.
• * 1.23

  Prim. Part. Q. 15. Ar. Prim.
• * 1.24

  Tom. 1. pag. 18. cap. 13.
• * 1.25

  Tom. 4. p. 548. Q. 46.
• * 1.26

  Heb. 1.
• * 1.27

  Heb. 3.12.
• * 1.28

  Psal. 145.
• * 1.29

  Gen. 17.
• * 1.30

  Psal. 16.
• * 1.31

  Epist. 11.
• * 1.32

  Psal. 114.
• * 1.33

  Disp. 30. Sect. 17.
• * 1.34

  Luke 12.5.
• * 1.35

  Psal. 23.4.
• * 1.36

  Luke 1.37.
• * 1.37

  Cant. 6.5.
• * 1.38

  Rom. 11.35.
• * 1.39

  Isa. 42.8.
• * 1.40

  Dan. 7.10.
• * 1.41

  Pet. 2.4.
• * 1.42

  Heb. 2.16.
• * 1.43

  Psal. 8.
• * 1.44

  2 King. 6.17.
• * 1.45

  Dan. 10.
• * 1.46

  Psal. 34.
• * 1.47

  Princip. Phil. p. 50.
• * 1.48

  Psal. 147.
• * 1.49

  Psal. 105.
• * 1.50

  Pro. 30.
• * 1.51

  Psal. 21.
• * 1.52

  Ex. 33:
• * 1.53

  Matt. 10.
• * 1.54

  De Nat. Hom. p. 22.
• * 1.55

  1 Cor. 6.
• * 1.56

  Psal. 145.