Reason and religion, or, The grounds and measures of devotion, consider'd from the nature of God, and the nature of man in several contemplations : with exercises of devotion applied to every contemplation / by John Norris ...

Contemplation V. Of the Omniscience and Omni∣presence of God.

I.

THE unity of God I have de∣monstrated in the preceding Contemplation. And now to obvi∣ate a scruple that may thence arise, namely, how one single solitary Being should be sufficient to pre∣side over all the Motions of the Natural, and all the Affairs of the Moral World, I thought it conve∣nient to proceed next to some of those Attributes, which, when well consider'd, will make it plain, that this Being, though but one, is a∣bundantly qualifi'd for the Govern∣ment and Management of the whole Universe. And among these, the Omniscience and Omnipresence of God are most eminent and conspicuous,

which I shall here therefore joyntly Contemplate.

II.

And first of the Omniscience of God. This is a most wonderful and amazing Attribute, consider it which way we will, for it denotes no lesse than a full knowledge and thorough comprehension of all the things that either are, have been, or shall be. But in the way that I shall now consider it, 'twill appear clothed with peculiar Circumstan∣ces of Admiration, and is indeed a Theme more sit for the Contempla∣tion of an Angel, than for the Pen of a mortal Theorist. Here there∣fore I must beg the peculiar Atten∣tion of my Reader, and above all the peculiar assistance of that Spirit which searcheth all things, yea, the Deep things of God.* 1.1

III.

Now in treating of God's Omni∣science, I shall do two things, First, prove that he is Omniscient, Se∣condly, represent the manner of his Omniscience. To shew that

God is Omniscient, I must first consider what Knowledge is in ge∣neral. Now this I define to be in short, a Comprehension of Truth. For the clearer understanding of which, the Distinction of Truth must be attended to. Truth then is either of the Object, or of the Subject. And both these are again subdivi∣ded. For Truth of the Object is either Simple, whereby a Being is really what it is. Or Complex, which denotes those necessary Habitudes or Respects, whereby one thing stands affected toward another as to Af∣firmation or Negation. Then as for Truth of the Subject, we under∣stand by it either a just Conformity between the Understanding and the Object, which is Logical Truth, or between the Words and the Under∣standing, which is Moral Truth or Veracity.

IV.

The Truth with which we are here concern'd, is Truth of the Ob∣ject. For to know is so to compre∣hend things both as to their Simple

Natures, and as to their Habitudes and Relations, as to Compound what is really Compounded, and to Di∣vide what is really Divided. To have our Understandings thus ac∣commodated to the Respects and Habitudes of things, is Knowledge. As for Truth of the Subject in the second sense, as it signifies a Confor∣mity between the Words and the Understanding, we have here no∣thing to do with it, as being altoge∣ther foreign to our present purpose. And in the first acceptation, as it signifies a just conformity between the Understanding and the Object, 'tis but another word for Knowledge. For Truth of the Subject in this sense is the conformity of the Mind to Truth of the Object. And so also is Knowledge. To Know therefore, is to think of things conformally to their Simple Natures and Mutual Habitudes, or, as I first defined it, to Comprehend Truth.

V.

This being premised, That Know∣ledge is nothing else but a Compre∣hension of Truth, that is, the having things in the Mind with the same Relations of Composition or Divisi∣sion, as they stand mutually affect∣ed in themselves, I thus argue: That Being which Comprehends all Truth is Omniscient.

But God Comprehends all Truth.

Therefore God is Omniscient.

The first Proposition is plain from the Definition of Knowledge. The Conclusion therefore depends whol∣ly upon the proof of the Second; namely, that God comprehends all Truth.

VI.

Now for the Demonstration of this Proposition, I desire but this one Postulatum, that there are Eter∣nal and Necessary Truths, that is, that there are eternal and immuta∣ble Relations and Habitudes of things toward one another, by way of Af∣firmation or Negation. This is what, I suppose, any body will give

me for the asking, tho I have no great reason to be over-thankful for it, it being a thing so very unque∣stionable, and withal a Proposition of this unlucky Quality, that 'tis as much establish'd by the Denial of it, as by the Affirming it. For should any Sceptical Person be so hardy as to say that there is no such thing as Eternal and Necessary Truth, I would ask him this Question: Was that Proposition always true, or was it not? If it was not always true, then there was once Eternal and Necessary Truth, and if once so; then ever so: But if it was always True, then by his own Confession, there is such a thing as Eternal and Necessary Truth. This therefore must be allow'd.

VII.

It being therefore supposed that there are Eternal and Necessary Truths, the next Proposition that I shall lay down is this, that the simple Essences of things must be also Eternal and Necessary. For the proof of which Propositi∣on

I consider first, that as Truth of the Subject depends upon, and necessarily supposes Truth of the Object, so Truth of the Object Complex depends upon, and neces∣sarily supposes Truth of the Object Simple: That is in other Words, The Habitudes and Relations of Simple Essences, depend upon and necessarily suppose the Reality of their respective Simple Essences. As therefore there can be no such thing as Truth of the Subject, without Truth of the Object, to which it may be conformable; so neither can there be Truth of the Object Complex without Truth of the Object Simple, that is, there can be no mutual Habitudes or Relations of things as to Affirmati∣on or Negation, without the Rea∣lity of the things themselves.

VIII.

For I consider that these Habi∣tudes and Respects, as to Affirma∣tion or Negation, wherein consists objective Truth Complex, do re∣sult from the Simple Essences, and

can no more subsist by themselves than any other relations can; for the existence of which the Schools themselves make it necessary that they have their subject and term, upon the Position of which they immediately result, and upon the destruction of which they as imme∣diately cease. As other relations therefore cannot subsist without the existence of subject and term, so nei∣ther can these habitudes as to Affir∣mation or Negation, subsist without the real existence of the Essences themselves so related.

IX.

But this perhaps will be better il∣lustrated by a particular Instance. Let then this be the objective Truth Complex, Two Circles touching one another inwardly cannot have the same common Centre. This is a true Pro∣position. But I here demand, How can it possibly have this certain ha∣bitude of Division or Negation, un∣less there be two such distinct sim∣ple Essences as Circle and Centre. Certainly there can be no Reference

or Relation where there is nothing real to support it.

X.

This Point therefore being gain'd, That truth of the Object Complex depends upon, and necessarily sup∣poses truth of the Object Simple, and that there can be no mutual habitudes or relations of Essences, as to composition and divisition, without the Simple Essences them∣selves: hence it will necessarily fol∣low, that whensoever the one does exist, the other must exist also; and consequently, if the one be Eternal, the other must be also Eternal. And thus (to recur to the former In∣stance) if this be a Proposition of Eternal Truth, viz. Two Circles touch∣ing one another inwardly cannot have the same common Centre, then the two distinct Simple Essences of Cir∣cle and Centre must have an eter∣nal and necessary existence. The short is, there can be no connexi∣on or relation between things that are not, or that do not exist, for be∣ing with this or that habitude to

another thing, implies simple Being, and for one thing to be another, in∣fers and supposes it to be simply. And if there can be no connexion or re∣lation between things that are not, then also there can be no Eternal connexion or relation between things that have not an Eternal Existence. For things cannot be related before they are. But there are such Eter∣nal habitudes and relations, there∣fore the simple Essences of things are also Eternal. Which was the Proposition next to be proved.

XI.

I know very well this is not ac∣cording to the Decrees of the Peri∣patetic School, which has long since condemn'd it as Heretical Doctrine, to say, that the Essences of things do exist from Eternity. But I have Meditated much upon these things, and I must needs say, that I think it a very certain and very useful Theorem, and that 'tis utterly im∣possible to give an intelligible ac∣count of the Stability of Science, or how there should be Propositions of

Eternal Truth, but upon this Hypo∣thesis. And I should be thankful to any of the Peripatetic Dissenters who would undertake to shew me how there may.

XII.

I know they endeavour to do it by telling us (and 'tis the only Plea they have to offer) that these habi∣tudes are not attributed absolutely to the simple Essences as in actual being, but only Hypothetically, that whensoever they shall exist, they shall also carry such relations to one another. There is, says the Peri∣patetic, only a conditional connexi∣on between the Subject and the Pre∣dicate, not an absolute position of either. This goes smoothly down with the young Scholar at his Lo∣gic Lecture, and the Tutor applauds his distinction, and thinks he has thereby quitted his hands of a very dangerous Heresie.

XIII.

But now to this I return the same Answer (for I need give no other) that I have in my Metaphysical Essay.

First, I say, that these habitudes are not (as is supposed) only by way of Hypothesis, but absolutely attri∣buted to the simple Essences, as actu∣ally existing. For, when I say, for instance, that every part of a Cir∣cle is equally distant from the Cen∣tre; this Proposition does not hang in suspence, then to be actually ve∣rifi'd when the things shall exist in Nature, but is at present actually true, as actually true as ever it will or can be; and consequently I may thence infer, that the things them∣selves already are. There is no ne∣cessity, I confess, they should ex∣ist in Nature, which is all that the Objection proves, but exist they must. For of nothing there can be no affection.

XIV.

But, Secondly, Suppose I grant what the Objector would have, that these habitudes are not absolutely attributed to the simple Essences, but only by way of Hypothesis. Yet I don't see what he can gain by this concession. For certainly thus

much at least is attributed to the simple Essences at present, that when∣soever they shall exist, such and such habitudes will attend them. I say, thus much is attributed actually, and at present. But now let any Peri∣patetic of 'em all tell me how any thing can any way be said of that which is not. And besides, 'tis a weak evasion to say that things are not related thus or thus as actually existing, but only conditionally, sup∣posing their existence. For I deny that any thing can be any way re∣lated that does not actually exist. And 'tis as good as a contradiction to say otherwise. When therefore the Peri∣patetick talks of a conditional con∣nexion between the Subject and the Predicate, and that neither is put absolutely, I say, that the connexion is as absolute as it can or ever will be, and that a non-existing subject cannot have any Predicate, or be any way related. And all this I bind upon him by a principle of his own, that of nothing there can be no affection. And let him unwind himself if he can.

XV.

Having thus far clear'd our way by making it evident, that the sim∣ple Essences of things are Eternal. The next thing that I consider is, that since they are not Eternal in their Natural subsistencies, they must be Eternal in some other way of subsisting. And that must be in some understanding, or by way of Ideal subsistence.

XVI.

For there are but two conceiva∣ble ways how any thing may exist, either out of all understanding, or within some understanding. If there∣fore the simple Essences of things are Eternal, but not out of all un∣derstanding, it remains they must have an Eternal existence in some understanding. Which is what I call an Ideal subsistence. There is therefore another way of existing besides that in Rerum Natura, name∣ly in the Mundus Archetypus, or the Ideal World, where all the Rationes rerum, or simple Essences of things have an Eternal and Immutable ex∣istence,

before ever they enter upon the Stage of Nature.

XVII.

I further consider, That this un∣derstanding wherein the simple Es∣sences of things have an Eternal ex∣istence, must be an Eternal under∣standing. For an Essence can no more Eternally exist in a Tempora∣ry understanding, than a Body can be infinitely extended in a finite space. Now this Eternal under∣standing can be no other than the understanding of God. The sim∣ple Essences of things therefore do Eternally exist in the understanding of God.

XVIII.

But the mode of this must be further explain'd. For it being an unquestion'd Truth, that God is a simple and uncompounded Being; and consequently, that there is no∣thing in God that is not God him∣self: as the Schools also rightly have pronounc'd, We must not conceive these simple Essences as accidents in∣hering in God, or as Beings really

distinct from God, this not com∣porting with the simplicity of the Divine Nature.

XIX.

These simple Essences of things therefore can be nothing else but the Divine Essence it self consider'd with his Connotation, as variously representative or exhibitive of things, and as variously imitable or partici∣pable by them. As the Divine Es∣sence is thus or thus imitable or par∣takeable, so are the Essences of things distinguish'd specifically one from another; and according to the multifariousness of this Imita∣bility, so are the possibilities of Be∣ing. From the degrees of this Imi∣tability, are the orders and degrees of Being, and from the variety of it, is their multiplicity.

XX.

The simple Essences of things, thus existing in the Divine Essence, according to these modes of Imita∣bility and Participation, are what we are taught in the Platonic School to call Idea's. These, in the Lan∣guage

of the Divine Philosopher, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first Intelligi∣bles, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the mea∣sures of the things that are, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the things that truly are, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Eter∣nal patterns, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, things which are always the same add unchangeable, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, things that are not generated, but are always; and again 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that were neither generated, nor will be destroyed. Concerning which, thus Cicero, Haec Plato ne∣gat signi, sed semper esse, & ratione & Intelligentia contineri. These, Pla∣to denies ever to have been generated, but that they always are, and are con∣tain'd in Reason and Intelligence.

XXI.

Further, These Essences of things, or Ideas thus existing in God, are the true and proper Objects of all Sciences, and (if I may use the A∣postle's expression in another case) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2 the pillar and ground of truth. These

supposed, 'tis easie to account for the Stability of Science, and for Propositions of Eternal Truth, but without them 'tis absolutely impos∣sible. For all things in their Natu∣ral Subsistencies are Temporary, Flux, Mutable and Corruptible, and what is so can never stand under E∣ternal and Immutable relations.

XXII.

Further, These Essences are the Specifical Models and Platforms of all the things that are in this Ecty∣pal World. According to these E∣ternal Exemplars were they made; and as is their Conformity to these Measures, so is their Perfection. For 'tis impossible that God should make a World with Counsel and Design, unless he make it according to something, and that can be nothing else but something existing within himself, something in this Ideal and Archetypal World. For as Aquinas well observes, In all things that are not made by chance, the Form must ne∣cessarily be the end of Generation. But now the Agent does not act for the

Form,* 1.3 but only as far as the Simili∣tude of the Form is in him.

XXIII.

And what if I should further say, that this Ideal World, this Essence of God consider'd as variously ex∣hibitive and representative of things, is no other than the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ths Second Person in the ever Bles∣sed Trinity. This I think highly agreeable to Reason, for I know of no Hypothesis that would so intel∣ligibly make out the Eternal Gene∣ration of the Son of God; For ac∣cording to this account, the Son of God must be a Substantial and Multifarious thought of God the Father, and how this may be gene∣rated, and yet be co-eternal with God the Thinker, is not very hard to conceive. Since, if an Angel had been Eternal, his thought must have been so too.

XXVI.

I shall add in confirmation of this Notion, a signal passage of the great Platonist Marsilius Ficinus, thus dis∣coursing of the Eternal Generation

of the Son of God. Omnis vita pro∣lem suam,* 1.4 &c. Every Life first ge∣nerates its offspring within it self be∣fore it does abroad without it self, and by how much the more excellent the Life is, by so much the more in∣wardly to its self does it generate its offspring. So the vegetative life both in Trees and in Animals generates first the Seed, and the Animal within its own Body, before it casts forth either abroad. So the Sensitive, which is more excellent than the Vegetative life, brings forth by the fancy an Image or Inten∣tion of things in it self, before it moves the Members, and forms them in External Matter. But this first Birth of the fancy, because 'tis in the very Soul, is therefore nearer to the Soul than the Birth of the Vegeta∣tive life, which is not in the Soul, but in the Body. So again, the Rational life, which is more excellent than the Sensitive, brings forth in it self the Reason both of things, and of it self, as it were an offspring, before it brings it into the light, either by Speech or Action. This first Birth of Reason is

nearer to the Soul than the Birth of Fancy. For the Rational Power is re∣flected upon its own Birth, and by that upon it self, by seeking, knowing, and loving its own act and it self, which is not done by the Fancy. So again, the Angelical life, which is more excellent than the Rational, brings forth in it self, by a kind of Divine Instinct, the Notions of it self and of things, before it discharges them upon the Matter of the World. This Birth is more inte∣rior to an Angel, than Reason is to her, because 'tis neither derived from External Objects, nor changed. Where∣fore the Divine life being the most eminent and fruitful of all, must needs generate an Offspring more like her self than any of the rest: and this it generates in it self by understanding, before it brings forth any thing with∣out. God therefore perfectly under∣standing himself, and in himself all things, he conceives in himself a per∣fect Notion of himself, and of all things, which is the equal and full Image of God, and the more than full Exemplar or Pattern of the World, &c.

XXV.

Thus is this Notion of the Ideal World, or of the Essence of God, being variously exhibitive and re∣presentative of the Essences of things, made use of by this great Theorist, to explain both the Nature of the Second Person of the Trinity, and the Mode of his Eternal Genera∣tion. And I think it does both much better than any other, and indeed as far as conceivable by hu∣man understanding. So highly use∣ful is this Doctrine of Idea's, when rightly understood, to unsold the profoundest Mysteries of the Chri∣stian Religion as well as of Philoso∣phy: And so great reason had St. Au∣stin to say,* 1.5 Tanta vis in Ideis con∣stituitur, ut nisi his intellectis, sapi∣ens esse nemo possit. There's so much moment in Idea's, that without the understanding of these, no Man can be Wise.

XXVI.

And I further consider, that this is no less according to the Voice of Scripture than of Natural Reason.

St. Iohn speaking of the second Person of the Trinity, says, In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God. He says also that all things were made by him, or according to him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And he further says that he is the true light, that lightens eve∣ry man that cometh into the world. Now what can this signifie but this Ideal World, or the Essence of God as variously exhibitive and represen∣tative of things? For observe, he calls him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which here signi∣fies the same as the inward con∣ception or Idea, he says that he was in the Beginning, and that he was with God, and that he was God, and that all things were made by him; Thus far it must be allow'd that the agreement is very exact. As for the last part of the chara∣cter, How this can be said to be the true Light which lightens every Man that comes into the World, this I shall explain when I come to consider the Nature of Man, who as I shall shew, sees and knows

all that he sees and knows in this Ideal World, which may therefore be said to be his Light.

XXVII.

Again, this second Person is said to be the Wisdom of his Father, to be the Character of his Person, both which expressions denote him to be the same with this Ideal World. And by him God is said to have made the Worlds:* 1.6 that is according to the eternal Exemplars or Plat∣forms in this Ideal World. To which I may add by way of over∣plus, that noble Description of the Eternal and Substantial Wisdom given us in the 7. Chap. of the Book of Wisdom. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Breath (or Vapour) of the Power of God, and an Efflux (or Emanation) from the glory of the Al∣mighty, a clear Mirrour (or Look∣ing-glass) of his active Energory ver∣tue, and the Image of his goodness. And what can all this be but the

Essence of God as Exhibitive, the Ideal World? Lastly, I would have it considered how what our Savi∣our says of himself, I am the Truth, and what the Apostles says of him, that he is the Wisdom of his Fa∣ther, can be verifi'd any other way but by this Hypothesis.

XXVIII.

I have the longer insisted on this to shew not only the Truth of this Ideal World, and that the Essences of things have eternal Existence in it, but also how very useful this Noti∣on is for the Establishment of the Divinity of Christ, and for the expli∣cation of his Eternal generation from the Father, which is also a further confirmation that the Notion is true and Solid. So great aguard is true Platonism against Socinianism.

XXIX.

Hence also we may be instructed how to understand that common Axiom of the Schools, that the Truth of every thing is its confor∣mity to the Divine understanding. This must by no means be under∣stood

of the Mind of God as Con∣ceptive, that is, as reflecting upon himself as Exhibitive, for the Truth of the Divine Intellect as Concep∣tive, depends upon its conformity with the truth of things, not the truth of things upon that. But it must be meant of the Mind of God as Exhibitive, that is, of this Ideal World, for upon this all Truth depends, and every thing, and every Proposition is so far true as 'tis conformable with it. For indeed the Intellect of God, as Ex∣hibitive is the Cause and Measure of all Truth.

XXX.

And, 'twas for want of the help of this Notion that that Keen Wit, Discartes blunder'd so horribly in stating the dependence of Proposi∣tions of Eternal Truth, upon the Intellect of God. He saw it 'twas necessary (as indeed it is) to make God the cause of Truth, and that truth must some way or other de∣pend upon him. But then he makes it depend upon the Mind of

God as Conceptive, and that things are so only because God is pleas'd so to conceive them. And this he carries so high, as to say, that e∣ven in a Triangle, three Angles would not have been equal to two Right ones, had not God been pleased so to conceive and make it. Now I am for the dependence of truth upon the Divine Intellect as well as he, but not so as to make it Arbitrary and Contingent, and Consequently not upon the Divine Intellect as Conceptive, but only as Exhibitive. That is, that things are therefore True in as much as they are conformable to those stan∣ding and immutable Ideas, which are in the mind of God as Exhibi∣tive, and Representative of all the whole Possibility of Being.

XXXI.

Now if after all, this Ideal way of things subsisting from all Eternity in God, should seem strange (as I suppose it will to those who are unexercised in these Contemplati∣ons) I shall only further say, First,

that it must be infinitely more strange that there should be Eter∣nal Truths, that is, Eternal Relati∣ons and Habitudes of simple Essen∣ces, or things, without the Co-eter∣nal existence of the things them∣selves so related. For what should support such Relations? The sim∣ple Essences therefore must exist eternally, if their Relations do? and where can that be but in the Mind of God?

XXXII.

Secondly, I say that this Ideal way of subsisting, ought not to seem such a Bugbear as some make it, since 'tis necessary not only for the salving of Propositions of Eter∣nal Truth, before their Subjects exist in Nature, but even when they do. For even while things have a Natural subsistence, the Propositi∣ons concerning them are not, can∣not be verifi'd according to their Natural, but according to their Ideal subsistencies. Thus we demonstrate several Propositions concerning a Right Line, a Circle, &c. when yet

in the mean time 'tis most certain, that none of these are to be found in Nature, according to that exactness supposed in our Demonstration. Such and such Affections therefoe do not belong to them, as they are in Nature, and therefore they must belong to them as they are in the Ideal World, or not at all.

XXXIII.

And if this be true in Propositi∣ons, whose Subjects exist in Nature, much more is it in Eternal Proposi∣tions, whose simple Essences have not always a Natural existence. These can no otherwise stand, but by supposing the Co-eternal existence of Simple Essences in the Ideal World.

XXXIV.

I shall add but this one Conside∣ration more upon this Head, that there is no greater sign of the soundness of a Truth, than when its profest Adversaries do unawares fall in with it. And this I take to be the case here. The Schoolmen who stand devoted to the Authori∣ty

of Aristotle, do notwithstanding by a kind of blind Parturiency, light oftentimes upon such Notions, which if thoroughly sifted must needs come to the same with what we have hitherto contended for. For I would fain know what they can mean else by the celebrated Glass of the Divinity? What can this be but the Ideal World representing all the Essences of things? And what else can they mean when they say (as they commonly do) of Science, that it is not of Singulars, as being flux Temporary, mutable and contingent, but of Abstract and Vniversal Natures? What is this but in other words to confess the ne∣cessity of Eternal Essences or Ideas existing out of and before those Sin∣gulars whose Essences they are, in order to the salving the stability of Science? Thus do these Men stumble upon Truth blindfold, but not dis∣cerning her through he veil, they let her go again.

XXXV.

Nay, even Aristotle himself after all his zealous opposition of Plato's Ideas has in the fourth of his Me∣taphysics come about to him again, and cross'd the very Road which he studied so carefully to avoid. For discoursing against the Sceptics who allow'd no certainty of Science, he first shews the ground of their mis∣take to consist in this, that they thought Singulars and Sensibles ex∣isting without, to be the only Ob∣jects of Science. His words are, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. The Original of these Mens mistake was this, because Truth is to be lookt for in things, and they conceiv'd the only things to be Sensibles, in which it is certain there is much of the Indeterminate Na∣ture. Wherefore they perceiving all the Nature of Sensibles to be moveable, or in perpetual flux and mutation, since nothing can possibly be verified or constantly affirm'd concerning that which is not the same, but changeable, concluded that there could be no Truth

at all, nor certainly of Science. Those things which are the only objects of it, never continuing the same.

XXXVI.

Thus having open'd the grounds of this Sceptical Doctrine, in opposi∣tion to it, he thus adds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. we would have these Men therefore to know, that there is another kind of Essence of things, besides that of Sensibles, to which belongeh, neither motion, nor corruption, nor any generation at all.

XXXVII.

Observe here, that Aristotle does not deny the Consequence of the Sceptic's Argument. No, he allows if the Essences of things are not steddy and immutable, that there can be no certainty of Science. But he denys his minor Proposition, and tells him that he goes upon a wrong Hypothesis, in supposing that there are no other Essences of things but Singulars and Sensibles, in op∣position to which he says, that there are other Essences of things

which are immovable, incorrupti∣ble, and in generable. And that 'tis upon these that all Science is foun∣ded. Now who would desire a better Establishment of Platonic I∣deas, than what Aristotle himself has here given? Let any Intelligent Person judge whether this be not a plain giving up the cause. So hard is it for a Man not to contradict himself, when once he comes to contradict Truth.

XXXVIII.

It being now from the Premises sufficiently concluded, that the I∣deas or Simple Essences of things have an Eternal existence in God, and the manner of this their exi∣stence being sufficiently explain'd, the next advance of my Contem∣plation is this, that since all the Simple Essences of things do exist in the mind of God, there must al∣so be the Repository of all their seve∣ral Habitudes and Respects, these naturally arising from the other, by way of Natural Result. For as the Relations of Essences cannot exist

without the Essences themselves, so neither can the Essences exist with∣out being accompany'd with such their Essential Relations. And as before we argued from the Positi∣on of the Habitudes to the Position of the Simple Essences, so now we may as well argue from the Posi∣tion of the Simple Essences to the Position of their Habitudes.

XXXIX.

Thus for instance, as from this Eternal Habitude, viz. that a Circle of such a determinate Circumfe∣rence will have such a determinate Diameter, I may conclude, that the Essence of such a Circle does eter∣nally exist, so again supposing such a Circle to exist, 'tis as necessary it should retain such a Diameter. And so in all other instances, the Essence argues and infers the Habitude, as well as the Habitude does the Es∣sence. For 'tis here as in all other Relations which immediately result upon the position of the Subject and Term.

XL.

This admitted, I now consider that there is now nothing wanting to infer the Omnisciency of God. For since the simple Essences of things do all exist in God, and since these are ever accompany'd with all their Habitudes and Relations, and since these are nothing else but Truth, it follows that all Truth is in God. I say God comprehen∣ding within himself all the Ideas and Essences of things with all their possible references and Respects, comprehends all Truth, the whole field of Truth within himself, which is the same as to be Omniscient, Knowledge being nothing else but a Comprehension of Truth, as was be∣fore defined.

XLI.

And thus we have not only pro∣ved the Omniscience of God, but in a great measure represented the manner of it. Concerning this there∣fore I shall only further remarque that the manner of the Divine Knowledge is the most Noble and

Perfect, that can possibly be con∣ceiv'd. For 'tis not by any derivative Phantasms, or Secondary Images of things, but per 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by the very immediate and essential Presence of the things them∣selves. He has all his Knowledge at the first hand, he sees, nay he is possest of the very Essence of things, he is the very Source and Foun∣tain of all Truth, nay he is Truth it self. And besides, his Knowledge is all simple and uncompounded, without Reasoning and inferring, premising and concluding, for he has ever before him in one simple view the whole Field of Truth, and with one single Act of Intuiti∣on glances through the whole Pos∣sibility of Being. For this Word of God, this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, who is the Essential Wisdom of his Father, is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two∣edg'd Sword, piercing even to the di∣viding assunder of Soul and Spirit, and of the joynts and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the Heart. Neither is there any

Creature that is not manifest in his sight.* 1.7 But all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him, with whom we have to do.

LXII.

Thus is this one single solitary Being; God, qualifi'd for the go∣vernment of the World upon the account of his Knowledge. He is so also in respect of his being Pre∣sent to the World he is to grovern. For he is Omnipresent, as well as Omniscient: which is the next At∣tribute of God, which in this Con∣templation I undertook to consider.

XLIII.

The Omnipresence of God has been more question'd than any one of his Attributes, both among the Antients, and among the Moderns. Aristotle in his Metaphysics says that the first Mover must necessari∣ly be either in the Centre, or in the Circle or Circumference. That is, ac∣cording to him, either in the mid∣dle of the Earth, or in the Extreme Heaven. And the latter has by most of the old Philosophers been

assign'd for his Residence. In the Church, the more Antient Iews con∣fin'd him to the Temple of Ie∣rusalem. And of late years this Doctrine of the Partial and limited Presence of God has been renew'd by Vorstius, Professour of Divinity at Leyden, who asserts that God is only in Heaven as to his Essence, and elsewhere only in respect of his Wisdom, Power and Provi∣dence.

XLIV.

But that God is every where Es∣sentially Present, both in every part of the World, and also in all Extra mundan Spaces, is most cer∣tain from the very Idea of God. 'Tis impossible that Being it self should be excluded from any part of Being. For every part of Being partakes of, and subsists in and by Being it self. And besides Being it self is indeterminate in being (as was proved in the second Contem∣plation) but now what is indeter∣minate in Being, is also indetermi∣nate in existing, for existing follows

Being as the Act of it, and to exist indeterminately is the same as to be Omnipresent. God therefore who is Being it self, is also an Omnipre∣sent Being.

XLV.

Cncerning the manner of this Om∣onipresence of God I think I may safe∣ly determine that he is every where present, not only Vertually and Ef∣ficaciously by his Wisdom and Power, but also Substantially and Essentially. For Power and Wisdom is not any thing really different from the Es∣sence of God. Neither can the Power of God be conceived to be any where, but his Essence must be there too. But after what special manner this Essence of God is Om∣nipresent, whether by way of an In∣finite Amplitude and Extension, as some think, or else by way of a Point, so as to be whole in the whole, and whole in every part of the World, as others will have it, I neither know, nor shall offer to determine. Such Knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me, I can∣not

attain unto it. 'Tis sufficient to know, that God is so every way Immense and Omnipresent, as not to be included in any place, nor to be excluded from any. For the rest, we must say with the Psalmist, Great is the Lord,* 1.8 and greatly to be praised: and his greatness is un∣searchable.

The use of this to Devotion.

THE Consideration of the Di∣vine Omniscience and Omni∣presence, is of excellent use to all the purposes of a Christian life, as well as to the Interest of Devoti∣on in particular.* 1.9 I am the Almigh∣ty God, walk before me, and be thou perfect, says God to Abraham. Im∣plying that the best Method of Per∣fection, was to live as in the sight and presence of God. And so the Psalmist,* 1.10 I have set God always be∣fore me, therefore I shall not fall. Implying, that if any thing would keep him from falling this would. For can there be any greater re∣straint

upon our actions, any stron∣ger preservative against sin, than du∣ly to consider the Presence and In∣spection of God? In virtutis oculis vivendum; so said the Ancients, We must live as in the Eyes of Vertue. They thought it an excellent expe∣dient against Vice to have the Idea of Vertue always before one. And so no doubt it is. Nay, we see less will do, and that the Morals of Men are very much secured by living in the Eye of the World.* 1.11 Nay, Seneca goes lower yet, and tells us, That Magna pars peccatorum tolleretur, si peccaturis testis assisteret. A great deal of our wickedness would be pre∣vented, if as Men were about to sin, one single witness were to stand by. But, alas, what are such expedients as these to the Omniscience and Omni∣presence of God? No consideration certainly is comparable to this. Will a Man commit Murther in the open Court, before the Face of his Judge? Nay, shall the presence of a Child divert thee from sinning? A Child that knows not the differ∣ence

between good and evil, that wants understanding to censure and condemn what he sees, and has nei∣ther Authority nor Power to pu∣nish thee. Shall such a one deter thee from sin, and dash in pieces the frame of thy ill designs, and da∣rest thou sin before thy God? Da∣rest thou do works of Darkness in the presence of him who is pure Light, and in whom there is no Darkness at all? Darest thou rush on when the Angel of God's Pre∣sence stands in the way with a drawn Sword? The Psalmist says, Tremble thou earth at the presence of God,* 1.12 and darest thou sin in his Pre∣sence? No, thou wouldst not dare, if thou didst well consider it. 'Tis a consideration, this, That if well heeded, and attended to, would give a Law to our privacies and retire∣ments, compose the inmost recesses of our Minds, and not suffer a Thought or Passion to rebel. We should then stand in awe and not sin, and be as composed in our Closets as in a Theatre, or a Religious As∣sembly.

For, indeed, to him that considers God as every where pre∣sent, and a strict observer of him and his actions, every place is a Tem∣ple, and accordingly he will put off his Shooes from his Feet, cleanse and purifie his affections, because the place whereon he stands is Holy Ground.

Thus advantagious is the influ∣ence of these two Considerations to good life in general; as for their special usefulness to Devotion, we may hence collect, First, That we ought to have our Minds always in a Divine Frame and Temper, and always composed with the greatest Awefulness and Reverence, Serious∣ness, Gravity and Silence of Spirit, as being ever in the Presence, and under the direct Inspection of the Great God.

Secondly, That we ought to pray to him with all Humility and Re∣verence, both of Soul and Body, and with an humble confidence of being heard by him where-ever we are, or however we deliver our

selves, whether by Vocal or Mental Prayer.

Thirdly, That we ought in our Prayers to use great fixedness and attention of Mind, without any wandrings, or impertinent mixtures of foreign thoughts, which are ne∣ver more ready to croud into our Minds, than when we are at our Devotions, and yet are never so ab∣surd as then.

Fourthly, That we ever commend our Cause to God, who sees and knows all things, and be well sa∣tisfi'd with his Judgment and Ap∣probation, when ever our Innocence is falsly charged by the World.

And, Lastly, That we ought ne∣ver to repine, or be discontented at the Affairs of the World, but rather trust and rely upon the All-wise con∣duct of him who sees from end to end, knows how to bring Light out of Darkness, and disposes all things sweetly.

The Aspiration.

O Lord, thou hast searched me out, and known me, thou know∣est my down-sitting, and mine up-rising, thou understandest my thoughts long before. Thou art about my Path, and about my Bed, and spiest out all my ways. For, lo, there is not a word in my Tongue, but thou, O Lord, knowest it altogether. Thou hast fashion'd me behind and before, and laid thine Hand upon me. Whither shall I go then from thy Spirit? Or whither shall I go then from thy Presence? If I climb up into Heaven, thou art there, If I go down to Hell, thou art there also. If I take the Wings of the Morning, and remain in the uttermost parts of the Sea, even there also shall thy Hand lead me, and thy right Hand shall hold me. If I say, perad∣venture the Darkness shall cover me, then shall my Night be turn'd to Day. Yea, the Darkness is no Darkness with thee, but the Night is as clear as the Day; the Darkness and Light to thee are both alike.

Do thou then, O my God, so im∣print the Sense of this thy Omni∣science and Omnipresence upon e∣very Faculty and Power of my Soul, that I may ever think, speak, and act as in the Light of thy All-seeing Eye, and as immediately sur∣rounded, and intimately possessed with the Glory of thy Presence. O fill me with the profoundest Awe and Reverence, compose my levi∣ties, confirm my doubtfulness, and fix my wandrings, and make me e∣ver satisfied with the Methods of thy Wise Providence.

And when by the Meditation of this thy Knowledge and Presence, I shall learn to demean my self in any measure as I ought: grant that up∣on the same consideration, I may content my self with thy Divine Ap∣probation and Allowance, whatever I am thought of in Man's Judgment. Finally, O my God, Grant I may so set thee before me here, that I may not be afraid to appear before thee hereafter. Amen.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1 Cor. 2.
• * 1.2

  1. Tim. c. 3.
• * 1.3

  Prim. Part. Q. 15. Ar. Prim.
• * 1.4

  Tom. 1. pag. 18. cap. 13.
• * 1.5

  Tom. 4. p. 548. Q. 46.
• * 1.6

  Heb. 1.
• * 1.7

  Heb. 3.12.
• * 1.8

  Psal. 145.
• * 1.9

  Gen. 17.
• * 1.10

  Psal. 16.
• * 1.11

  Epist. 11.
• * 1.12

  Psal. 114.