A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

Of the advantages of Thinking.

MAN being the only Creature here be∣low design'd for a sociable life, has two facultys to distinguish him from other Créatures, Thinking and Speaking. The one, to fit him for the society of others; and the other, to qualify him also for his own. As to the latter of these Facultys, there's no fear of its gathering rust for want of use. We are rather apt to speak too much; and the most Reserv'd have reason to pray with the Psalmist, Set a watch O Lord before my mouth, and keep the door of my lips.

But the former, is that which generally lies fallow and neglected; as may be guess'd from the intemperate use of the other. There are few indeed, that are capable of thinking to any great purpose: but among those that are, there are fewer that employ this excellent Ta∣lent. And for ought I know, however strange it may seem, among the Ingenious and well educated there are as few Thinkers as among the Herd of the vulgar and illiterate. For ei∣ther they live a Popular life; and then what for business, pleasures, Company, visits, with a world of other impertinencys, there's scarce

room for so much as a Morning reflexion. Or else, they live retir'd, and then either they doze away their time in drowsiness and brown stu∣dys; or, if brisk and active, they lay them∣selves out wholely upon devouring books and making Common places, and scarce entertain their Solitude with a Meditation once in a Moon.

But 'tis merely for want of Thinking that they can allow themselves in doing so. For by a little of this, they would soon discover that of all the Methods of improvement that can be used, there is none so advantagious as Thinking; either for our Intellectuals or our Morals; to make us wiser, or to make us better. And first, for our Intellectuals. 'Tis the per∣fection of our Rational part to know; that is, to be able to frame clear and distinct conce∣ptions, to form right Judgments, and to draw true consequences from one thing to another. Now besides that the Powers of the mind are made more bright, vigorous, and active by use, as all other facultys are; there is this further advantage, that by habitual thinking the ob∣ject is made more familiar to the understand∣ing, the Habitudes and relations of Ideas one towards another, by frequent comparing, be∣come more visible and apparent; and conse∣quently, 'tis more easy to divide what ought to be divided, and to compound what ought to be compounded; wherein consists the

sum of all Truth and Science.

Reading is indeed very excellent and useful to this purpose; but Thinking is necessary. This may do without the other, as appears in the first Inventors of Arts and Sciences; who were fain to think out their way to the Recesses of Truth; but the other can never do, without this. Reading without thinking, may indeed make a rich Common place, but twill never make a rich head; it may, indeed, bring in a great store of Hyle, but 'tis yet without form and void, till Thinking, like the Seminal spirit, agitates the dead shapeless lump, and works it up into figure and symmetry.

But of what advantage Thinking is to the advancement of Knowledge, will further ap∣pear by considering some of the chief impedi∣ments of it; and how they are removed by Thinking. And the first that I shall mention, is the Prejudice of Infancy. We form infinite rash judgments of things, before we duly un∣derstand any thing; and these grow up with us, take root, spread and multiply; till, after long use and custom, we mistake them for com∣mon notions and dictates of nature; and then we think it a crime to go about to unlearn or eradicate them. And as long as we stand thus affected, we are condemn'd to errours and per∣petual wandrings. So great reason had the excellent Des-Cartes to lay the foundation of his Philosophy in an Equipoise of mind; and

to make the removal of these Prejudices the very entrance and beginning of wisdom.

But now when a man sets upon a course of Thinking, nothing will be so obvious as to consider, that since we come so late to the per∣fect use of our reason; among those many judg∣ments we have made, 'tis very likely the major part are false and erroneous. And this is a fair step to the shaking off those infant-Prejudices; at least he will be thereby induc'd not to be∣lieve any thing the rather, because he had given it such early entertainment. From this gene∣ral reflexion he proceeds to examin the things themselves. And now he is a capable Judge, can hear both sides with an indifferent ear, is determin'd only by the moments of truth▪ and so retracts his past errours, and has the best Mo∣ral security against any for the future.

Another great hindrance to knowledg is the wrong perception of things. When the simple Ideas of our minds are confus'd, our Judg∣ments can never proceed without errour. 'Tis like a fault in the first concoction, which is ne∣ver corrected in either of the other. For how can I judge whether the Attribute agree to the subject, it my notion of both be confus'd and obscure? But now, the only cause of the con∣fusedness of our notions, next to the natural inability of our faculties, is want of Attention and close application of mind. We don't dwell enough upon the object; but speculate it tran∣siently

and in hast; and then, no wonder that we conceive it by halves. Thinking therefore is a proper Remedy for this defect also.

Another great hindrance to knowledg is am∣biguity of Terms and Phrases. This has bred a world of confusion and misunderstanding, e∣specially in controversys of Religion; a great many of which, if thoroughly sifted and well compared, will be found to be mere verbal con∣tentions. As may appear from what the ex∣cellent Monsieur Le Blanc has perform'd in this kind. But now, this is owing merely to want of thinking. There is a latitude in the Phrase; and one writer not sufficiently attending to that determinate sense of it which his Adver∣sary intends, very hastily and furiously denys what the other does not affirm; and he again as furiously affirms what this does not deny. So that they are really agreed all along, and yet fight on like Fools in the dark. And there is no hopes they will ever be reconciled, till ei∣ther they will take the pains to think them∣selves, or some body else will be so kind, as to think for 'em.

Another great hindrance to knowledg is an over-fond and superstitious deference to Authori∣ty, especially that of Antiquity. There is no∣thing that cramps the Parts, and fetters the understandings of men like this strait-lac'd hu∣mour. Men are resolv'd never to outshoot their forefathers mark; but write one after another,

and so the dance goes round in a circle; and the world is never the wiser for being older. Take an instance of this in the School-men, and in the best of them, Aquinas. 'Tis pleasant to see how that great Wit is oftentimes put to't to maintain some unlucky Authorities, for the salving of which he is forced to such shifts and expedients which he must needs (should he dare to think freely) see through and discern to be false; and yet such a slave was he, that he would rather lose truth, than go out of the Road to find it. This also makes men, other∣wise senseful and Ingenious, quote such things many times out of an old dull Author, and with a peculiar emphasis of commendation too, as would never pass even in ordinary con∣versation; and which they themselves would never have took notice of, had not such an Au∣thor said it. But now, no sooner does a man give himself leave to think, but he perceives how abusurd and unreasonable 'tis, that one man should prescribe to all Posterity: that men, like beasts, should follow the foremost of the Herd; and that venerable non-sense should be prefer'd before new-sense: He considers, that that which we call Antiquity, is properly the nonage of the world; that the sagest of his Authoritys were once new; and that there is no other difference between an antient Author and himself, but only that of time; which, if of any advantage, 'tis rather on his side, as living in a more re∣fined

and mature age of the world. And thus having cast off this Intellectual slavery, like one of the brave 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 mention'd by Laertius, he addicts himself to no Author, Sect or Party▪ but freely picks up Truth where-ever he can find it; puts to Sea upon his own bottom; holds the Stern himself; and now, if ever, we may expect new discoverys.

There are other notable impediments to the improvement of knowledg, such as Passion, In∣terest, fear of being tax'd with inconstancy, scorn of being inform'd by another, Envy, the humour of Contradiction, and sometimes Flat∣tery in applauding every thing we hear, and the like. Now as to the manner how all these are remov'd by thinking, it may suffice to sav in general, that they are all obviously absurd and ridiculous; and however unthinking men may be abused by them, yet a free and close Thinker must needs quickly perceive that they are so: and there is no better Moral way that I know of to be quit of ill habits, than the be∣ing convinc'd of their Folly and Mischief.

But the greatest advantage of thinking is yet behind, that it improves our Morals as well as our Intellectuals; and serves to make us Bet∣ter, as well as Wiser. This is in a great mea∣sure included in the other. All therefore that I shall further remark concerning it is this, that considering the great influence the under∣standing has upon the will, there are but two

things necessary to preserve us in our duty. First an habitual Theory of what we ought and ought not to do; and of all the motives and engagements to the one and to the other. Se∣condly an actual and clear presence of all this to the mind, in every Instant of action. And this is for the most part the thinking man's con∣dition. He does not only Habitually know, but actually attends both to his Duty, and to all the engagements for its performance. He has those Considerations almost always present with him which to others are the Principles of Repentance; and this keeps him in his Duty, which brings others to it; and makes him live like those Righteous persons of whom our Sa∣viour says, that they need no Repentance.

Of the Care and Improvement of Time.

TO be careful how we manage and em∣ploy our Time, is one of the first Precepts that is taught in the School of Wisdom, and one of the last that is learn'd. The first and leading dictate of Prudence is, That a Man pro∣pose to himself his true and best interest for his End; and the next is, That he make use of all those means and opportunities whereby that end is to be attain'd. And betwixt these two there is such a close connexion, that he who does not do the latter, cannot be supposed to intend the former. He that is not careful of his actions, shall never perswade me that he se∣riously proposes to himself his best interest, as his end, for if he did, he would as seriously ap∣ply himself to the regulation of the other as the means. And so he that is not careful of his Time, cannot in reason be supposed to be care∣ful of his Actions; for if he were, he would certainly have a special regard to the opportu∣nity of their performance.

But, as I observ'd in the beginning, though this Precept be one of the Elementary dictates of Prudence, and stands written in the first page

of the Book of Wisdom; yet such is the sottish∣ness and stupidity of the World, that there is none that is more slowly learn'd. And 'tis a pro∣digious thing to consider, that, although a∣mong all the Talents which are committed to our Stewardship, Time upon several accounts is the most precious, yet there is not any one of which the generality of men are more pro∣fuse and regardless. Tho it be a thing of that inestimable value, that 'tis not distributed to us intirely, and at once, like other Blessings, but is dealt out in minutes and little parcels, as if man were not fit to be trusted with the intire possession of such a choice Treasure, yet there are very many that think themselves so overstock'd with it, that instead of husbanding it to advantage, the main business of their thoughts is how to rid their hands of it, and accordingly they catch at every shadow and opportunity of relief; strike in at a venture with the next Companion, and so the dead Com∣modity be taken off, care not who be the Chap∣man. Nay, 'tis obvious to observe, that even those persons who are frugal and thrifty in eve∣ry thing else, are yet extremely prodigal of their best Revenue, Time; Of which alone (as Seneca neatly observes) 'tis a Vertue to be Co∣vetous.

Neither may this Censure be fastned only upon the unthinking multitude, the Sphere of whose Consideration is supposed to be very nar∣row,

and their Apprehension short-sighted; but I observe that many of those who set up for Wits, and pretend to a more than ordinary sagacity, and delicacy of Sense, do notwith∣standing spend their Time very unaccountably, and live away whole days, weeks, and some∣times months together, to as little purpose (tho it may be not so innocently) as if they had been asleep all the while. And this they are so far from being ashamed to own, that they freely boast of it, and pride themselves in it, thinking that it tends to their Reputation, and commends the greatness of their Parts, that they can support themselves upon the Natural stock, without being beholden to the Interest that is brought in by Study and Industry.

But if their Parts be so good as they would have others believe, sure they are worth im∣proving; if not, they have the more need of it. And tho it be an Argument of a rich mind, to be able to maintain it self without labour, and subsist without the advantages of Study, yet there is no man that has such a portion of Sense, but will understand the use of his Time better than to put it to the trial. Greatness of Parts is so far from being a discharge from Industry, that I find Men of the most exquisite Sense in all Ages were always most curious of their Time: Nay, the most Intelligent of all Created Beings (who may be allow'd to pass a truer estimate upon things than the finest

Mortal Wit) value Time at a high rate. Let me go (says the Angel to the importunate Pa∣triarch) for the day breaketh. And therefore I very much suspect the excellency of those mens Parts, who are dissolute and careless mis-spend∣ers of their Time: For if they were men of any thoughts, how is it possible but these should be some in the number? (viz.)

That this Life is wholly in order to another, and that Time is that sole opportunity that God has given us for transacting the great business of Eternity: That our work is great, and our day of work∣ing short, much of which also is lost and ren∣der'd useless, through the cloudiness and dark∣ness of the Morning, and the thick vapours and unwholesome foggs of the Evening; the ignorance and inadvertency of Youth, and the Diseases and Infirmities of Old Age: That our portion of Time is not only short, as to its du∣ration, but also uncertain in the possession: That the loss of it is irreparable to the loser, and profitable to no body else: That it shall be severely accounted for at the great Judg∣ment, and lamented in a sad Eternity.

He that considers these things (and sure he must needs be a very unthinking man that does not) will certainly be choice of his Time, and look upon it no longer as a bare state of dura∣tion, but as an Opportunity; and consequently will let no part of it (no considerable part at least) slip away either unobserv'd or unimprov'd. This

is the most effectual way that I know of to se∣cure to ones self the Character of a Wise-man here, and the reward of one hereafter. Where∣as the vain Enthusiastic Pretenders to the Gift of Wit, that trifle away their Time, betray the shallowness and poverty of their Sense to the dis∣cerning few; or whatever they may pass for here among their fellow Mortals, do most in∣fallibly make themselves cheap in the sight of Angels.

Of Solitude.

IT has been urg'd as an Objection, by some Atheistical Persons, against the existence of a God, that if there had been such a perfect Being, who was compleatly happy in the enjoy∣ment of himself, he would never have gone a∣bout to make a World. Now, tho this Obje∣ction contributes nothing to the support of A∣theism (the design of God in Creating the World being not to increase his happiness, but to Communicate it) yet it proceeds upon this true supposition, That Society is a Blessing. It is so, and that not only respectively, and in re∣ference to the present circumstances of the World, and the Necessities of this Life, but al∣so simply, and in its own Nature; since it shall be an Accessory to our bliss in Heaven, and add many moments to the weight of Glory. Neither will the truth of this assertion be at all weaken'd by alledging that no benefit or advantage ac∣crues to God by it, for that it becomes unbene∣ficial to him (tho a Blessing in its own nature) is purely by accident, because God eminently containing in himself all possible good, is un∣capable of any New Accession.

And as Society is in its own nature an instru∣ment of Happiness, so is it made much more so

by the indigencies and infirmities of Men. Man, of all Creatures in the World, is least qualify'd to live alone, because there is no Creature that has so many necessities to be reliev'd. And this I take to be one of the great Arts of Pro∣vidence, to secure mutual amity and the reci∣procation of good turns in the World, it being the Nature of Indigency, like common dan∣ger, to indear men to one another, and make them herd together, like Fellow-Sailors in a Storm. And this indeed is the true case of Mankind, we all Sail in one bottom, and in a rough Sea, and stand in need of one anothers help at every turn, both for the Necessities and Refreshments of Life. And therefore I am ve∣ry far from commending the undertaking of those Ascetics, that our of a pretence of keep∣ing themselves unspotted from the World, take up their quarters in Desarts, and utterly aban∣don all Human Society. This is in short (to say no more of it) to put themselves into an incapacity either of doing any good to the World, or of receiving any from it: and cer∣tainly that can be no desirable state. No, this Eremetical way of Living is utterly incon∣sistent with the Circumstances and Inclinations of Human Nature; he must be a God, Self∣sufficient and Independent that is fit for this state of absolute and perfect Solitude, and in this rigorous sense, It is not good for man (tho in Pa∣radice it self) to be alone.

But tho Society, as 'tis opposed to a state of perfect and perpetual Solitude, be a Blessing, yet considering how little of it there is in the World that is good, I think it advisable for eve∣ry man that has sense and thoughts enough, to be his own Companion, (for certainly there is more required to qualifie a man for his own company than for other men's) to be as fre∣quent in his Retirements as he can, and to communicate as little with the World as is con∣sistent with the duty of doing good, and the discharge of the common offices of Humanity. 'Tis true indeed (as Seneca says) Miscendae & al∣ternandae sunt Solitudo & frequentia: Solitude and Company are to have their turns, and to be interplaced. But Wise-men use to dedicate the largest share of their Lives to the former, and let the best and most of their Time go to make up the Canonical Hours of Study, Meditation and Devotion. And for this, besides the pra∣ctice of Wise-men, we have the Authentic exam∣ple of our B. Lord himself, Who, as 'tis rea∣sonably supposed (for he had pass'd the thirtieth year of his Life before he enter'd upon the stage of Action, and then also sought all opportuni∣ties to be alone, and oftentimes purchas'd Re∣tirement at the expence of Night-watches) al∣lotted the greatest part of his little Time here on Earth to Privacy and Retirement; and 'tis highly probable, would have liv'd much more reservedly, had not the peculiar business of his

function made it necessary for him to be con∣versant in the World. The inclination of our Lord lay more toward the Contemplative way of Life, tho the interest of Mankind engaged him oftentimes upon the Active. And 'tis ve∣ry observable, that there is scarce any one thing which he vouchsafed to grace with so many marks and instances of favour and respect as he did Solitude. Which are thus summ'd up by the excellent Pen of a very great Ma∣ster of Learning and Language; It was Solitude and Retirement in which Jesus kept his Vigils; the desart places heard him pray, in a privacy he was born, in the Wilderness he fed his thousands, upon a Mountain apart he was transfigured, upon a Mountain he died, and from a Mountain he ascended to his Father. In which Retirements his Devotion certainly did receive the advantage of convenient circumstances, and himself in such dispositions twice had the opportu∣nities of Glory.

Indeed, the Satisfactions and Advantages of Solitude (to a person that knows how to im∣prove it) are very great, and far transcending those of a Secular and Popular Life. First, as to Pleasure and Satisfaction, whosoever consi∣ders the great variety of mens humours, the peevishness of some, the pride and conceited∣ness of others, and the impertinence of most; he that considers what unreasonable terms of Communion some persons impose upon those

that partake of their Society; how rare 'tis for a man to light upon a Company, where, as his first Salutation, he shall not presently have a Bottle thrust to his Nose; he, I say, that considers these and a thousand more grievances, wherewith the folly and ill nature of men have conspired to burthen Society, will find, take one time with another, Company is an occa∣sion of almost as much displeasure as pleasure. Whereas in the mean time the Solitary and Contemplative man sits as safe in his Retire∣ment as one of Homer's Heroes in a Cloud, and has this only trouble from the follies and ex∣travagancies of men, that he pitties them. He does not, it may be, laugh so loud, but he is better pleas'd: He is not perhaps so often merry, but neither is he so often disgusted; he lives to himself and God, full of Serenity and Con∣tent.

And as the Pleasures and Satisfactions of So∣litude exceed those of a Popular Life, so also do the Advantages. Of these there are two sorts, Moral and Intellectual; to both which So∣litude is a particular friend. As to the first, it is plain that Solitude is the proper opportunity of Contemplation, which is both the Founda∣tion and the Perfection of a Religious Life. It is (as the same excellent Person forecited says elsewhere of a single Life) the huge advantage of Religion, the great opportunity for the Retire∣ments of Devotion, which being empty of Cares is

full of Prayers, being unmingled with the World is apt to converse with God, and by not feeling the warmth of a too forward and indulgent Nature, flames▪ out with holy Fires, till it be burning like the Cherubim and the most extasy'd Order of holy and unpolluted Spirits. And for this reason 'twas that the Anciente chose to build their Al∣tars and Temples in Groves and Solitary▪ Re∣cesses, thereby intimating▪ that Solitude was the best opportunity of Religion.

Neither are our intellectual advantages less indebted to Solitude. And here, tho I have in a great measure anticipated this consideration (there being nothing necessarily required to compleat the Character of a Wise-man, besides the knowledg of God and himself) yet I shall not confine my self to this instance, but deduce the matter further, and venture to affirm that all kinds of Speculative knowledg as well as practical, are best improved by Solitude. In∣deed there is much talk about the great bene∣fit of keeping Great men company, and there∣upon 'tis usually reckon'd among the disadvan∣tages of a Country life, that those of that con∣dition want the opportunities of a Learned Con∣versation. But to confess the truth, I think there is not so much in it as people generally imagine. Indeed, were the Souls of men lodg'd in transparent cases, that we might read their thoughts; would they communicate what they know, were it the fashion to discourse learned∣ly,

'twere worth while to frequent the Cabals of Great men: But when it shall be counted a piece of errant Pedantry, and defect of good breeding to start any Question of Learning in Company; when every man is as shy of his Notions as of a Fairy-treasure; and makes his Head not a Repository or Exchequer of Know∣ledg, but a Grave to bury it in: A man may be a constant attendant at the Conclaves of Learned men all his life long, and yet be no more the wiser for't than a Book-worm is for dwelling in Libraries. And therefore, to speak ingeniously, I don't see for my part wherein the great advantage of great Conversation lies, as the humours of men are pleas'd to order it. Were I to inform my self in business, and the management of affairs, I would sooner talk with a plain illiterate Farmer or Trades-man than the greatest Vertuoso of The Society; and as for Learning (which is the only thing they are supposed able to discourse well of) that in point of Civility they decline: So that I find I must take refuge at my Study at last, and there redeem the Time that I have lost among the Learned.

Of Courage.

A Ristotle in his Morals begins the Doctrine of Vertues with Courage; which has found work for his Interpreters to assign the reason of his method. But, methinks, there is no great need they should either study or differ much about it. For certainly, among all the Ver∣tues this will justly challenge the Precedency, and is the most Cardinal and fundamental part of Morality. This Vertue is pre-required to the susception of all the rest. For the very en∣trance into the School of wisdom and a ver∣tuous course is a state of Discipline, Difficulty and Hardship. And therefore 'tis sapere aude, a great piece of daring and boldness to set up for a good man: especially, if to the proper difficulties and Agonies of a Vertuous engage∣ment, we add those calamities and straits it oftentimes exposes us to, through the malice and folly of the world. So that as Plato writ upon his School 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Let none enter here that understands not Mathematics, it may be set as a Motto upon the School of Ver∣tue, Let none enter here that wants Courage.

And as 'tis necessarily requisite to the susce∣ption of all other vertues, so is it their main support, guardian and establishment. Without

this, every other Vertue is precarious, and lies at the mercy of every cross accident. Without this, let but a Pistol be held to the breast, and the severest Chastity will be frighted into com∣pliance, the most Heroic Friendship into trea∣chery, and the most ardent Piety into renun∣ciation of God and Religion. There is nothing among all the frailnesses and uncertaintys of this sublunary world so tottering and unstable, as the vertue of a Coward. He has that within him that upon occasion will infallibly betray every vertue he has; and to secure him from sin, you must keep him from Temptation. This was the Principle the Devil went upon in his en∣counter with Job, Do but put forth thy hand, (says he to God) and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. He was right e∣nough in the Proposition, tho mistaken in the application.

Having now seen the usefulness of this great Vertue, 'twill be worth while to enquire a lit∣tle into its Nature. And that the rather, be∣cause 'tis not only variously and falsly appre∣hended by the many, but too confusedly and darkly deliver'd even by Moralists themselves.

That which with the Vulgar passes for Cou∣rage, is certainly nothing else but stupidity, desperateness or fool-hardiness; a brutish sort of Knight-errantry in seeking out needless en∣counters, and running into dangers without fear or wit; which is so far from having the

fore-mention'd property of Courage, of being a guardian, and security of our Vertues, that 'tis in it self a sin.

But are we like to have a better account of it from the Moralists? why they tell you that it is a Mediocrity between Fear and Boldness; So Aristotle in his Ethics. But then as for de∣fining what this Mediocrity is (wherein the ve∣ry point of the business lies) you are as much to seek as ever.

Others will tell you that 'tis a firmness of mind in sustaining evils, and undertaking dangers. Accordingly they assign two parts of Courage Sustinere & Aggredi. Thus Epictetus and the School of the Stoics. But what it is thus firm∣ly to sustain or undertake an evil, and what evils are to be thus sustain'd or undertaken, they either could not, or have not thought fit to ac∣quaint us.

In order therefore to the settling the Point in hand, I consider 1st in general, that Cou∣rage has evil of Pain for its object, which in some circumstances is to be chosen or submit∣ted to. Whence I form this general Idea of Courage that 'tis a firm and peremptory reso∣lution of Mind to chuse evil of Pain in right circumstances, or when 'tis truly eligible. This Definition I confess runs in general Terms, much like one of Aristotles, but I intended it for no other. Only it has this advantage above his, that it lays a Foundation for one that is more particular.

For 'tis but here to subjoin when an evil is truly eligible, and the Idea of Courage will be sufficiently determinate and express. Now to make a thing eligible 'tis necessary that some way or other it appear good; evil being no way eligible under its own formality. And to make an evil put on the nature and appearance of good, two things are necessary. 1st that it be a lesser evil than some other, and 2ly that the chusing of it be a necessary Medium for the preventing of that other. Then, and in no o∣ther case, is evil truly eligible: and consequent∣ly, we shall not be mistaken in the Idea of Cou∣rage, if we define it to be such a firm and con∣stant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or disposition of mind, whereby a man is fix'd and determin'd never to dread any evil, so far as to decline it when the chusing it is the only remedy against a greater. And this is most eminently signalized in the case of Mar∣tyrdom, when a man submits to the greatest evils of Pain to avoid that much greater one of Sin. This is the very summity and perfection of Courage, that which an Hannibal or a Sci∣pio could never equal in all their gallantry and feats of war: and I dare venture to pronounce, that he who would rather dye or part with any worldly interest than commit a sin, can never be a Coward.

And here I cannot but take notice of a false notion of Honour and Courage whereby the world has been generally abused; especially

those men that make the highest pretensions to both. According to these mens Measures of things, 'tis sufficient reason to post a man up for a Coward if he refuse a Duell; And to merit a badge of Honour from the Herald's Office if he accept it. These men would be ready to laugh at me, I know, as a lover of Paradoxes, should I tell them that their characters must be quite transposed to make them true. And yet I can∣not help it, so it falls out that he who declines the Duell is indeed the man of Honour and Courage, and he who accepts it is the Coward. For he who declines it, despises the obloquy and scorn of the world that he may approve himself to God and his own Conscience, would rather be pointed and hiss'd at, than be damn'd; and so chuses a lesser evil to avoid a greater. But he that accepts the Duel, so dreads the loss of his credit among those whose good opinion is of no value, that to avoid it he chuses to incur sin and damnation; and so chuses a greater evil to avoid a less. And if this be Courage, we must strike it out of the Catalogue of the Vertues, for nothing is so, that is not under the direction of Prudence; much less what is down-right Folly and the very exaltation of Madness.

Of Seriousness.

SInce I began to consider so far as to make Reflections upon my self, the most early and prevailing▪ disposition which I observ'd was an Inclination to Seriousness, and since I con∣sider'd the nature of things and the circum∣stances of Human life, I found I had reason to thank the kind influence of my birth for mak∣ing that my Temper, which otherwise I must have been at more cost to acquire.

For tho it be generally reckon'd only as a Semi-vertue, and by some as no vertue at all, yet certainly nothing is of greater advantage both as to Intellectual and Moral attainments than to be of a serious, composed and recollect∣ed spirit. If it be not it self a vertue, 'tis at least the Soil wherein it naturally grows, and the most visible mark whereby to know those that have it. This is that whereby a Man is chiefly distinguish'd from a Child, and a Wise man from a Fool. For (as the Son of Si∣rac observes) a man may be known by his look, and one that has understanding by his countenance when thou meet'st him. And again speaking of levity and dissoluteness of behavi∣our, A man's attire, excess of laughter and gaiety shew what he is, that is, it shews he is none of

the wisest. And that this was his true meaning we may be assured from another Character of his, where he expresly makes the signs of wis∣dom and folly to consist in these two propertys, (viz.) that a Fool lifts up his voice with laughter, but a Wise man does scarce smile a little.

There is indeed a near Relation between Se∣riousness and Wisdom, and one is a most excel∣lent Friend to the other. A man of a serious sedate and considerate temper as he is always in a ready disposition for Meditation (the best improvement both of knowledg and manners) so he thinks without disturbance, enters not upon another Notion till he is master of the first, and so makes clean work with it. Where∣as a man of a loose, volatile and shatter'd hu∣mour thinks only by fits, and starts now and then in a Morning interval, when the serious mood comes upon him, and even then too let but the least trifle cross his way, and his desul∣torious fancy presently takes the Scent, leaves the unfinish'd and half-mangled notion, and skips away in pursuit of the new game. So that altho he conceives often, yet by some chance or other he always miscarrys, and the issue proves Abortive.

Indeed nothing excellent can be done with∣out Seriousness, and he that courts wisdom must be in earnest. S^t James assures us that 'tis to no purpose for a wavering and unstable man

to pray, because he shall be sure not to speed. And as 'tis in vain for such a one to Pray, so is it in vain for him to study. For a man to pre∣tend to work out a neat scheme of thoughts with a magotty unsettled head, is as ridiculous and non-sensical as to think to write streight in a jumbling Coach, or to draw an exact Picture with a Palsy hand. No, he that will hit what he aims at must have a steddy hand as well as a quick eye, and he that will think to any pur∣pose, must have fix'dness and composedness of humour, as well as smartness of parts.

And accordingly we find that those among the Philosophic Sects that profess'd more than ordinary eminency in wisdom or vertue, as∣sumed also a peculiar gravity of Habit, and solemnity of Behaviour, and the most sacred and mysterious rites of Religion were usually perform'd with silence; and that not only for decency, but for advantage. Thus the Italians who are the gravest are also the most ingenious people under heaven, and 'tis a known obser∣vation of Aristotle's concerning melancholy, that it furthers Contemplation and makes great Wits. Thus again the Discipline of Silence was a considerable part of the Pythagoric institu∣tion, and we have it storied of our B. Lord him∣self who was the wisdom of his father, that he never laugh'd.

But because a solemn deportment may som∣times disguise an unthinking mind, and grave

in some men's Dictionarys signifies the same as Dull, I shall put the Character a little more home, and define more closely wherein the true Idea of Seriousness consists, or what it is to be in good earnest a serious man.

And 1st I shall remove it from the neighbor∣hood of those things which by their symboli∣zing with it in outward appearance prove often∣times the occasion of mistake and confusion. It does not therefore consist in the morosity of a Cynic, nor in the severity of an Ascetic, nor in the demureness of a Precisian, nor in the deadness and sullenness of a Quaker, nor in the solemn meen of an Italian, nor in the slow pace of a Spaniard; 'Tis neither in a drooping head, nor a mortify'd face, nor a Primitive Beard.

'Tis somthing very different and much more excellent than all this that must make up a serious man. And I believe I shall not misre∣present him if I say he is one that duly and im∣partially weighs the moments of things so as neither to value Trifles, nor despise things re∣ally excellent. That dwells much at home and studys to know himself as well as Books or men;

that considers why he came into the world, how great his business and how short his stay in it, how uncertain 'tis when he shall leave it, and whither a sinner shall then betake him∣self when both Heaven and Earth shall fly from the presence of the Judg. That con∣siders God as always present, and the Folly

of doing what must be repented of, and of go∣ing to Hell when a man may go to Heaven. In one word, that knows how to distinguish be∣tween a moment and eternity.

This is to be truly serious, and however the Pretenders to gaiety and lightsomness of Hu∣mour may miscall and ridicule it by the names of Melancholy, dullness and stupidity &c. He that is thus affected cannot miss of being wise and good here, and happy hereafter. And then 'twill be his turn to laugh, when the others shall mourn and weep.

Of the slightness of all Secular, and the importance of minding our Eternal, Interest.

IDleness and Impertinence, a doing of no∣thing or of nothing to the purpose, are always signs of a vain, loose, and inconsiderate spirit, but they are never more so, than when there is some very momentous and weighty business to be done. The man that sleeps away his happy Retirements, or with the Roman Emperor spends them in killing flies, betrays a great deal of weakness and incogitancy, but should he do the same at the Bar, when he's to plead for his life, he would certainly be thought a mere change∣ling or mad-man.

And yet this I fear will prove the case of the most of those who stile themselves Rational. For besides that the generality of men live at random, without any aim or design at all, and those that propose some ends seldom take up with any that are important and material, or if they do, they seldom proportion their care to the weight of things, but are serious in trifles, and trifling in things serious, I say besides all this, there is nothing relating purely to this

world that can deserve the name of Business, or be worth the serious thoughts of him who has an immortal Soul, and a Salvation to work out with fear and trembling. The greatest secu∣lar affairs and interests are but Specious Trifles, and all our designs and emploiments about em Excentrical Motions, and solemn impertinen∣cies.

And yet this is made the Center of all our stu∣dys and endeavours, the great Bent of the world points this way, hence are taken the measures of Wisdom and Prudence, and Religion it self is forced to truckle to worldly Policy. Whereas in the mean time there is an Affair of grand importance, and wherein all mankind are deeply concern'd, and such as really deserves all that care and solicitude, which we lavish a∣way upon other things, and infinitely more (tho perhaps it might be secured with less) and yet this is the thing which by many is utterly neg∣lected, by the most is least cared for, and by none sufficiently regarded. So that considering the general practice of the world, I think there are very few in it to whom that will not be a very proper and seasonable admonition, which our B. Lord gave to his sollicitous and overbusy Disciple, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things, but one thing is needful.

To cure therefore (if possible) this great fol∣ly, I have two Propositions to offer; 1st that no

interest relating purely to this present world is of any great moment or concern to man, 2ly that to be very careful of our final interest, and to make sure to our selves a happy eternity is indeed a thing of vast moment and impor∣tance.

The first of these I know will seem very strange and paradoxical to one that takes a prospect of mankind, and contemplates the great stirr and hurry of the world, the Plottings of Statesmen, the Emulations of Courtiers, and the Ambition of Princes, how busy men are in their several concerns, what variety of designs are on foot, with what trembling eagerness they are prosecuted, and what grief attends our dis∣appointments. Sure after such a Scene as this one would be tempted to think, that there must be somthing very considerable in Human life, and that men had notable interests here at stake, it being a reproach to human nature that the world should so generally combine to make such ado about nothing.

But yet that this is their folly, not to insist upon

that universal vanity which the wise and great Trier of the world has charged upon it, that Hope defer'd makes the heart sick, and yet Fruition does not cure it, that we are disappointed in our enjoyments as well as in our losses, and yet that 'tis our hard fate to weep at the Funeral of our departed Pleasures, tho we were little the happier for them when

we had them; that our greatest pleasures are most transient, and great mirth always ends in heaviness and demission of spirit, that the more we love or enjoy the more we venture, and put our selves further within the reach of Fortune; that the greatest men are not always the most contented, and that they who are most envy'd by others think themselves more fit for their Pity;

not to insist I say on these or the like considerations, I shall fix only upon one, whereby I think twill plainly appear that there can be no interest relating purely to this world, that is of any great moment or concern to man. And that is the shortness and uncer∣tainty of our abode here.

The life of man in the Book of Wisdom is com∣pared to a shadow. Now besides that the re∣semblance holds in many considerable respects, as in that it is partly Life and partly Death, as the other is partly Light and partly Dark∣ness, in that like a shadow whereever it passes it leaves no track behind it, in that it seems to be somthing when indeed it is nothing, in that 'tis always altering and ends on a suddain, and when at its full height and prime is often near∣est to Declension, as a shadow is to disappear when at full length, there is yet another in∣stance of resemblance, which has a more parti∣cular aptness to our present purpose. The sha∣dow can continue no longer at the utmost than the light of the Sun keeps its residence above

the Horizontal line, which is but a little portion of time, but it may fall much short of that pe∣riod by the interposition of a cloud, and when that may be is as uncertain as the weather, and depends upon a thousand accidents.

And thus 'tis with our lives. No man can lengthen out his days beyond that natural Term which is set him by the temperament of the first Qualitys, which yet are of such jarring and unsociable natures that they can't dwell long together in a vital amity. But then how far, and how many ways, he may fall short of that compass, depends upon so many hidden causes, and so many little accidents that it may be rec∣kon'd among the greatest of uncertaintys. So that there is nothing in all human life so frail and uncertain as life it self.

A consideration sufficient to depretiate and vilify all the entertainments and interests of the Animal life, and to call off our care from the objects of secular Happiness tho there were no other vanity in them. For were they never so good and solid in themselves, yet the Foun∣dation on which they stand is so weak and rot∣ten, that 'tis dangerous leaning hard upon them. They would be even upon this supposi∣tion like Nebuchadnezzar's statue, made up in∣deed of rich metal, but founded upon feet of clay. And upon this account they are to be e∣steem'd as vile and contemptible as they are ruinous.

This is a consideration indeed that has but little effect in the world, and the reason is be∣cause few give any serious heed and attention to it. They know it indeed habitually, and must confess it if put to the question, but it lies Dor∣mant in 'em, and they seldom actually attend to it. And therefore 'tis that the voice bids the Prophet Isaiah, Cry and proclaim it aloud that all flesh is grass, and all the goodliness thereof as the flower of the field. He is bid to cry aloud, thereby intimating both the importance of the thing, and the general stupidity of men in not considering it.

But if men would but often and seriously me∣ditate upon the shortness and uncertainty of life, I perswade my self they would not set their hearts much upon any thing in it, but would look upon all its Pleasures, Honours and Profits with the same indifferency that the hasty Tra∣veller does upon the specious fields and mea∣dows which he passes by. For to what purpose I pray, should man who holds his Tenement here by such a short and unstable Tenure, that can't live long and may dye presently, be so busy and thoughtful about worldly concerns? The ancient Patriarchs, tho their span was so very much longer than ours, thought it hardly worth while to build houses, but contented themselves to grow gray in Tents; and what do we mean who in comparison to them are but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Pindar calls us) people for a day, by plunging

our selves so deeply into care and trouble? Is there any thing among the actions of either Brutes or Mad-men so silly and irrational as this?

But to be a little particular, to what purpose should man who walketh in a vain shadow, dif∣quiet himself also thus in vain, and be so gree∣dy in heaping up riches when he can't tell who shall gather them? To what purpose should a man trouble both the world's and his own rest to make himself great? For besides the empti∣ness of the thing, the Play will quickly be done, and the Actors must all retire into a state of e∣quality, and then it matters not who personat∣ed the Emperor, or who the Slave. To what purpose should a man be very earnest in the per∣suit of Fame? He must shortly dye, and so must those too who admire him. Nay I could al∣most say, to what purpose should a man lay himself out upon study, and drudge so labo∣riously in the Mines of Learning? He's no sooner a little wiser than his Brethren, but Death thinks him ripe for his sickle, and for ought we know after all his pains and industry, in the next world an Ideot or a Mechanic will be as forward as he. To what purpose lastly does a Tyrant oppress his people, transgress those bounds which wise Nature has set him, invade his neighbor's Countrys, deprive the innocent and peaceable of their Liberty, sack Cities, plunder Provinces, depopulate Kingdoms and

almost put the foundations of the Earth out of course, to what purpose is all this? Thou Fool, says our B. Saviour, this night thy Soul shall be re∣quired of thee, and then whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?

There is certainly nothing in all Nature so strange and unaccountable as the actions of some men. They see, as the Psalmist speaks, that wise men also dye and perish together as well as the ignorant and foolish, and leave their riches for others, and yet they think (at least act as if they did) that their houses shall continue for ever, and that their dwelling places shall endure from one generation to another, and call their lands after their own names.

This they think is their wisdom, but the Psal∣mist assures them 'tis their foolishness, and such a foolishness too as makes them comparable to the Beasts that perish, however their Posterity may praise their saying. And certainly the Learned Apostle was of the same mind, when from this Principle, The time is short, he dedu∣ces the very same conclusion we have hitherto pleaded for, that we should be very indifferent and unconcern'd about any worldly good or e∣vil, that they that have wives should be as tho they had none, and they that weep as the they wept not, they that rejoice as tho they rejoiced not, they that buy as tho they possest not, and they that use this world as not abusing it, for the fashion of this world passes away. It does so, and for that reason

there is nothing in this life to be very much lov'd, or very much fear'd, especially if we con∣sider what a grand interest we have all of us at stake in the other world. For as 'tis▪ with the suf∣ferings so is it with the enjoyments of this pre∣sent time, they are neither of them worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed.

We have seen how frivolous and unconcern∣ing the greatest affairs of this world are, how unworthy to be made the objects of our solici∣tude, much more to be the Business of our lives, we have weigh'd them in the Ballance, and they are found wanting. But man is a Creature of brisk and active facultys, and is there no em∣ployment for him? yes, as God has furnish'd him with Powers, so also has he assign'd him a work, and such a one too as is to be perform'd with Fear and Trembling. There is a good fight to be fought, there is a whole Body of sin to be destroy'd, there are Passions to be mortify'd, Habits to be unlearnt, Affections to be purify'd, Vertuous and holy dispositions to be acquired, Acts of vertue to be opposed against Acts of sin, and Habits against Habits, in a word there is a Heaven to be obtain'd, and a Hell to be avoid∣ed. This indeed is a great work, and of great concernment to be done, and such as calls for our principal, (I could almost say our whole) care and diligence. The great necessity of which for more distinctness sake, I shall represent in a few Considerations.

And Ist, it highly concerns us to be very careful concerning our final interest, because of the vast, the infinite Moment of the thing. For certainly it can be no less whether a man shall be Damn'd or Saved, eternally Happy, or eter∣nally Miserable. No man certainly that thinks at all, can think this an indifferent matter, or if he does he will one day be sadly convinc'd of the contrary, when he shall curse the day of his Birth, and wish for the Mercy of Annihilation. The lowest conception we can frame of the condition of the Damn'd, is an utter exclusion from the Beatific presence of God. And tho the non-enjoyment of this be no great punish∣ment to sensual men in this state and Region of exile, who perhaps would be content that God should keep Heaven to himself, so he would let them have the free use of the Earth, yet hereafter when the Powers of their Souls shall be awaken'd to their full vigour and acti∣vity, when they shall have a lively and thorough apprehension of true Happiness, and of the in∣finite Beautys of the Supreme good, there will arise such a vehement Thirst, such an intense longing in the Soul, as will infinitely exceed the most exalted languishments of Love, the high∣est Droughts of a Fever. The Soul will then point to the Center of Happiness with her full bent and verticity, which yet she shall find ut∣terly out of her reach, and so full of Desire and full of Despair she shall lament both her Folly

and her Misery to eternal ages. And who is able to dwell even with these everlasting Burnings?

But 2ly as an Argument for our great Care we may consider, that as the interest is great, so a more than ordinary care is necessary to secure it. And that upon several accounts. Ist because our Redemption by Christ is not our immediat and actual discharge from sin, (as the Antinomians would have it) but only an in∣stating us into a Capacity of Pardon and Recon∣ciliation, which is to be actually obtain'd by the performance of Conditions, without which we shall be so far from being the better for what has been done and suffer'd for us, that our Con∣demnation will be so much the heavier for neg∣lecting to finish so great Salvation.

2ly, Because the Conditions of our Salvation tho temper'd with much mercy and accommo∣dation to human infirmity, are yet so difficult as to engage us to put forth our whole might to the work. A great part of Christianity is ve∣ry harsh to Flesh and Blood, however to the Habituated Disciple Christ's yoke may be easy and his burthen light. And accordingly the Path that leads to life is call'd narrow, and the gate (tho open'd by our Saviour) is yet so strait that we are bid to strive to enter in at it. And the Righteous scarcely are sav'd.

Again, because there is a strong confederacy against us among the Powers of darkness. We have a very potent and malicious enemy, who

envys man should arrive to those happy man∣sions from whence himself by transgression fell; And accordingly, there is a great woe pro∣nounc'd by the Angel against the inhabitants of the earth, because the Devil is come down among them having great wrath. And this is made by the Apostle himself an Argument for more than ordinary care and circumspection. Be sober, says he, be vigilant, because your ad∣versary the Devil walks about as a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour.

Again, because we have but a little time for this our great work, and that too very preca∣rious and uncertain. Our glass holds but very little sand tho 'twere to be all spent, and drawn out in the running. But there are also several accidental impediments that may intercept its passage; And therefore as this was alledg'd as an argument for indifferency about the things of this world, so for the same reason, it con∣cerns us to be eminently careful in the grand business of the next. He that duly considers how many persons dye suddainly, how many more may, and that none can engage for it that he himself shall not, must needs confess himself ex∣tremely concern'd to improve this short, this uncertain opportunity, this only time of Proba∣tion, and to work with all his might while 'tis day, before the night come, when no man can work.

Lastly, it concerns us to use a more than or∣dinary care and diligence in securing this our

great interest, because after all our Care and Vigilancy, all our strictnesses and severitys, we don't know the just and precise measures of Qualification, and how much Trimming of our Lamps is requisite to fit 'em for the Sanctuary of God. For tho we are well assured in general from the terms of the Evangelical Covenant, that if we repent we shall be forgiven, yet there is a great Latitude in Repentance, and what degree in some cases will be available, is a se∣cret God has kept to himself. For we don't know the full heinousness of our Sins, nor how far God was provoked by 'em, nor consequent∣ly by what degrees of sorrow and amendment he will be appeas'd. And 'tis most certain there is a mighty difference. To Simon Magus 'twas almost a desperate case: If peradventure the thoughts of thy heart may be forgiven thee. And some are said to be sav'd with fear, & as it were pull'd out of the fire. And we know what the great Apostle has said, I know nothing by my self, yet am I not thereby justify'd. All which argues a great latitude and variety even in necessary preparations, and how to state the matter exactly we don't know, and therefore as far as we are able should be sure to do enough, for we may easily do too little, and can never do too much in a matter of such high impor∣tance.

From all which I conclude, Ist that those who withdraw themselves (as far as is consistent

with charity and the prosecution of the public good) from the noise, hurry and business of the world, that they may apply themselves more serenely and entirely to a life of Devotion and Religion, and more freely and undistractedly attend upon the grand concern of another world, act very wisely and prudently. For this is wisdom, to take a right estimate of things, to proportion our care to their value, and to mind that most which is most concerning. This is what the Apostle commends, to lay aside every weight, that we may be the surer to win the great prize, and so to run as to obtain. This lastly is the very part which Mary chose, and which our Lord assures us shall never be taken away from her.

Again I conclude, that all those who are ei∣ther wholly negligent of this their grand inte∣rest, or that do not principally regard it, and as our Saviour speaks, in the first place seek the kingdom of God, that are more intent upon this world than the next, that will venture to play the knave for a little preferment, that make use of Religion as an instrument for secular designs, in one word, that in any kind forfeit their great interest in the other world, for a little in this, are the greatest Fools in nature. This Measure I confess will take in a great many, and some perhaps who would think it a great affront to be reckon'd of the number. But it can't be help'd, the charge is most unquestionably true,

and they themselves however conceited of their wit and parts now, will once be of the same opinion, when they shall say, we Fools thought his life madness.

God grant we may all so number our days, and so compare our two interests, as to apply our hearts to greater wisdom.

A METAPHYSICAL ESSAY TOWARD THE Demonstration of a GOD, From the Steddy and Immutable nature of Truth.

A Metaphysical Essay &c.

SECT. I. How difficult a thing 'tis to demonstrate a God by any new medium, and how far the present Essay may pretend to do so.

1. IT has been the curious emploiment of so many and so excellent Pens to demon∣strate the Existence of a God, and this they have done with such variety of Arguments, Moral, Physical and Metaphysical, that howe∣ver easy it may be to contrive new Postures, and ring other Changes upon the same Bells, 'tis yet almost as difficult to find out an Argu∣ment for the proof of a God that has not been used already, as to resist the Cogency of those that have. So that here if any where, that of Solomon is more than ordinarily verify'd, The thing that has been it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the Sun.

2. The newest indeed that has of late years appear'd to the world is that of the celebrated Des-Cartes, taken from the Idea of God con∣sider'd both absolutely in its self, as including all kinds and degrees of Perfection and conse∣quently

Existence, and as 'tis subjected in the mind of man, which (as he contends) could never have had such an Idea, were there not somthing which had all that Perfection in it Formally or eminently, which is in the Idea ob∣jectively.

3. Now tho this Procedure of his be extra∣ordinarily fine and subtile, and such as (to the first part at least) will appear no less strong and concluding to any capable and indifferent Person, that considers it as 'tis managed at large by its ingenious Author, yet this was not a No∣tion newly excogitated but only revived by him. For Aquinas had before lighted upon the former and refused it, and he is beholding to St. Austin and the School of the Platonists for the latter.

4. I speak not this to diminish one ray from the glory of that incomparable Speculatist. That which I remark here is not the Barren∣ness of his Invention, but that of the exhausted Subject. The matter had been squeez'd before to the last drop, and his only fault was that he was not born sooner. Which might be a suffi∣cient Apology if this Procedure of mine prove not entirely new and unblown upon. Whether it be or no 'tis not possible (without examining all the books in the world) absolutely to deter∣min. This much I believe I may venture to say, that 'tis no where universally receiv'd, nor by any that I know of industriously and pro∣fessedly

managed, and that lastly 'tis as new as the matter will now afford, and consequent∣ly as any man in reason ought to expect.

SECT. II. The various acceptations of Truth, and which that is which is made the ground of the present Demonstration.

1. HAving undertaken to demonstrate the Existence of God from the steddy and immutable nature of Truth, I am first to distin∣guish the Equivocalness or latitude of the word, and then to point out to that determinate part, which I intend for the ground of my Demon∣stration.

2. The most general Partition of Truth is into Truth of the Thing and Truth of the under∣standing, or (according to the language of the Schools) Truth of the Object and Truth of the Subject. Both of these again have a double sub∣division. For by Truth of the Object may be understood either that Transcendental verity which is convertible with Ens, and runs through the whole Circle of Being whereby every thing is really what it is, which is simple Truth. Or else certain Relations and Habitudes of things one towards another whether Affirmatively or Negatively, which is Complex Truth.

3. And so again by Truth of the Subject may be understood either a due conformity between the understanding and the Object, when I com∣pound what is compounded, and divide what is divided, which is Logical Truth. Or else a due conformity between the words and the un∣derstanding, when I speak as I think, which is Moral Truth or Veracity.

4. Now the Truth, upon whose immutable Nature I build the Demonstration of a God, is not that of the Subject, but that of the Object. Nor that neither according to its simple and Transcendental acceptation, but as it signifies certain immutable relations and habitudes of things one towards another by way of Affirma∣tion and Negation, which is Truth of the Object Complex.

SECT. III. That there are such Relations and Habitudes of things to∣ward one another, and that they are steddy and immutable.

1. TWo things are here asserted, 1st that there are Relations and Habitudes of things towards one another, and 2ly that they are steddy and immutable. First I say, there are certain relations and habitudes betwixt thing and thing. Thus there is a certain habi∣tude between some Premises and some Conclu∣sions,

for any thing will not follow from any thing; between some Objects and some Facul∣tys; between some ends and some means; be∣tween some Subjects and some Predicates, and the like.

2. This is as true as that there is any such thing as Truth. For Truth is nothing else, but the Composition or Division of Ideas according to their respective Habitudes and Relations. And without Truth there can be no such thing as Knowledg, for knowledg is Truth of the Sub∣ject; 'tis a man's thinking of things as they are; and that supposes Truth of the Object. Which whosoever denies, contradicts himself, and establishes the Proposition which he de∣sign'd to overthrow; and consequently, uni∣versal Scepticism is the very extremity of non∣sense and inconsistency.

3. And as there are certain habitudes and relations between things; so aly some of them are steddy and immutable, that never were made by any understanding or will, nor can ever be unmade or null'd by them; but have a fixt and unalterable 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from everlasting to everlasting. And consequently there are not only Truths, but eternal Truths.

4. As first in general, 'tis a Proposition of ne∣cessary and eternal Truth, that there must be ever such a thing as Truth, or that somthing must be True, for let it be affirm'd or denyed, Truth thrusts in upon us either way. And so 2ly

there are many particular Propositions of eter∣nal and unchangeable Verity, as in Logic, that the Cause is always before the Effect in order of Nature; in Physics, that all local motion is by succession; in Metaphysics, that nothing can be and not be at once; in Mathematics, that all right Angles are equal, that those lines which are parallel to the same Right line are also pa∣rallel to each other, &c. These and such like are standing and irrepealable Truths, such as have no precarious existence, or arbitrarious de∣pendence upon any will or understanding what∣soever; and such as all Intellectual operations do not make, but suppose; it being as much a∣gainst the nature of understanding to make that Truth which it speculates, as 'tis against the nature of the eye to create that light by which it sees, or of an Image to make that Ob∣ject which it represents.

SECT. IV. That since there are Eternal and immutable Veritys or Ha∣bitudes of things, the simple essences of things must be also, eternal and immutable.

1. HAving gain'd this Point that there are eternal and immutable Veritys or Ha∣bitudes of things, the next will be, that upon this Postulatum it necessarily follows that the Simple Essences of things must be also eternal and immutable. For as there can be no Truth of the Subject without Truth of the Object to which it may be conformable (as was before observ'd) so neither can there be Truth of the Object Complex without Truth of the Object Simple.

2. This will appear undeniably true to any one that attends to the Idea of Objective Truth Complex, which is nothing else but certain Ha∣bitudes or Respects betwixt thing and thing as to Composition or Division. For how can there be any such Habitudes or Relations without the Simple Essences themselves from which they re∣sult? As for instance, how can any Mathema∣tical Proposition, suppose that of Euclid, that if two Circles touch one another inwardly they have not the same common Center, have this habitude, unless there be two such distinct sim∣ple Essences as Circle and Center? These Habi∣tudes

can no more subsist by themselves than any other Relations can, they must have their Simple Essences as the other have their Subject and Term, upon the position of which they im∣mediatly result.

3. If therefore there can be no Truth of the Object Complex without Truth of the Object Simple, and there can be no Habitudes and Re∣lations of Composition and Division without the simple Essences themselves, it follows that whensoever the one does exist the other must exist also, and consequently if the one be eter∣nal the other must be eternal also, and so (to recur to the former instance) if it be a Proposi∣tion of eternal Truth that if two Circles touch one another inwardly they have not the same Common Center, the two distinct simple Es∣sences of Circle and Center must be from Eterni∣ty also, and consequently the simple Essences of things are eternal and immutable, which was the point to be here demonstrated.

SECT. V. That the Simple Essences of things being not Eternal in their Natural subsistences, must be so in their Ideal sub∣sistences or realitys.

1. FRom the eternity of essential Habitudes we have demonstrated the necessity that the simple essences of things should be eter∣nal. And now since they are not eternal (as is too plain to need Proof) in their natural sub∣sistencys, it follows that they must be eternal in their Ideal subsistencys or realitys.

2. For there are but two conceivable ways how any thing may exist, either out of all un∣derstanding, or within some understanding. If therefore the simple Essences of things are eter∣nal but not out of all understanding, it remains they must have an eternal existence in some un∣derstanding, or rather they are the same with that understanding it self, consider'd as va∣riously exhibitive or representative according to the various modes of Imitability or Participa∣tion, which is the true Notion of Ideas as 'tis ge∣nerally express'd both by Platonists and School∣men, and as I have more at large explain'd it in my Letter of Ideas, to which for brevitys sake I refer.

SECT. VI. That there is therefore an Eternal Mind or understanding, Omniscient, Immutable and endow'd with all possible Perfection, the same which we call God.

1. THis evidently follows from the Conclu∣sion of the foregoing Section, for if the simple Essences of things have a real and eternal existence in some understanding, what consequence can be more plain than that there is a Mind or understanding eternally existing? An Essence can no more eternally exist in a Tem∣porary understanding, than a Body can be in∣finitely extended in a finite space. The mind therefore wherein it does exist must be eternal; there is therefore in the first place an Eternal Mind.

2. 'Twill follow also in the next place that this Mind is Omniscient as well as Eternal. For that Mind which is eternally fraught with the simple Essences of things, must needs contain al∣so in it self all the several Habitudes and Re∣spects of them, these necessarily arising from the other by way of Natural result. For as be∣fore, the Argument was good from the Habi∣tudes of things to their simple Essences, so is it as good backwards from the simple Essences of things to their Habitudes. But these are the same with Truths. That Mind therefore which

has all these has all Truths, which is the same as to be Omniscient.

3. 'Twill follow hence also in the next place, that this Mind is Immutable as well as Omnisci∣ent and Eternal. For if that Mind which has existing in it self from all eternity, all the sim∣ple Essences of things and consequently all their possible Scheses or Habitudes should ever change, there would arise a new Schesis in this Mind that was not before, which is contrary to the supposition. 'Tis impossible therefore that this Mind should ever undergo any muta∣tion, especially if these eternal Ideas and Ha∣bitudes be one and the same with this Mind, as I have already hinted and elsewhere proved.

4. Lastly 'twill follow that this Mind is not only Eternal, Immutable and Omniscient, but that in a word 'tis endow'd with all possible per∣fection. For to have, and it self to be all the Essences and Habitudes of things is to have and to be all that can possibly be, to be the rule and measure of all perfection, to be supreme in the Scale of Being, and to be the Root, and Spring of all Entity, which is the same as to be God. This Mind therefore so accomplish'd is no other than God, and consequently there is a God, which was the thing I undertook to demonstrate.

Post-script.

THis Essay has lain by me a considerable time, and I have lately review'd it with all the coldness and indifferency of a Stranger, and with more severity perhaps than I am like to meet with from the most Prejudiced Reader. I have turn'd it and view'd it on all sides, and, after the most deliberate and impartial scruti∣ny that I could make, I must needs own, that I am not conscious of the least flaw in the whole Procedure.

I know but of one place that is liable to any reasonable exception, and that is in the fourth Section. The Proposition there maintain'd is this, that since there are eternal and immutable Veritys or Habitudes of things, the simple Essences of things must be also eternal and immutable. Here it may be objected, that these Habitudes are not attributed absolutely to the simple Es∣sences as actually existing, but only Hypotheti∣cally, that whensoever they shall exist, they shall also carry such Relations to one another. There is you'l say only an Hypothetical Connexion between the Subject and the Predicate, not an absolute Position of either.

But in answer to this I say first, that these Habitudes are not (as is supposed) only by way

of Hypothesis, but absolutely attributed to the simple Essences as actually existing. For when I say, for instance, that every part of a Circle is equally distant from the Center, this Propo∣sition does not hang in suspence, then to be ve∣rify'd when the things shall exist in Nature, but is at present actually true, as true as it ever will or can be; and consequently, I may thence in∣fer that the things themselves already are. There is no necessity, I confess, they should exist in Nature, (which is all that the Objection proves) but exist they must. For of Nothing there can be no Affections.

But 2ly, suppose I grant what the Objector would have, that these Habitudes are not ab∣solutely attributed to the simple Essences, but only by way of Hypothesis; yet I don't see what he can gain by this concession. For thus much at least is attributed to the simple Essences at present, that whensoever they shall exist, such and such Habitudes will attend them. I say, thus much is attributed actually, and at present: But now how can any thing be said of that which is not? There is therefore another way of existing besides that in rerum Natura; name∣ly, in the Mundus Archetypus or the Ideal world, where all the Rationes rerum or simple Essences of things whereof there are standing and immu∣table Affirmations and Negations, have an eter∣nal and immutable Existence, before ever they enter upon the stage of Nature.

Nor ought this Ideal way of subsisting to seem strange, when even while things have a Natural subsistence, the Propositions concern∣ing them are not verify'd according to their Natural, but according to their Ideal subsist∣ences. Thus we demonstrate several Proposi∣tions concerning a right line, a Circle &c. and yet 'tis most certain that none of these are to be found in Nature according to that exactness supposed in the Demonstration. Such and such Attributes therefore belong to them not as they are in Nature, but as they are in their Ideas. This is a Notion very frequently glanc'd at by Saint Austin, and 'tis the Conclusion of Aquinas, that the Soul Omnia vera cognoscit in rationibus aeternis, Part. 1. Qu. 84. Art. 5. And of late years this Notion has been much im∣prov'd by the ingenious Philosopher Du Hamel in his book De Mente humana. And if this be true in Propositions whose Subjects are in Na∣ture, much more is it in eternal Propositions, whose simple Essences have not always a natu∣ral existence. These can no otherwise be veri∣fy'd but by the coeternal Existence of simple Es∣sences in the Ideal world.

One thing I have more to add in the vindi∣cation of this Essay; Whereas in the 3d Section it was asserted that the nature of Truth is sted∣dy and immutable, and such as has no preca∣rious existence or arbitrarious dependénce up∣on any understanding whatever, and yet in the

5th Section 'tis affirm'd that it owes its exi∣stence to some mind or other; lest one part of this Meditation should be thought to clash a∣gainst another, I thought it requisite to adjust this seeming contradiction. For the clearing of which, we must be beholding to that cele∣brated Distinction of the Platonic School, of the Divine Mind into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Con∣ceptive and Exhibitive. Truth does by no means depend upon any mind as Conceptive, whether Human or Divine, but is supposed by it, which is the sense of the 3d Section. But upon mind as Exhibitive it may and does ultimately de∣pend; so that if there were no God or Eternal Mind, there could be no Truth, which is the sense of the 5th Section. So that here is no con∣tradiction, but all Harmony and Agreement. See more of this in my Letter of Ideas.

THE CHRISTIAN LAW Asserted and Vindicated. OR, A general Apology for the Christian Religion, both as to the Obligativeness and Reasonableness of the Institution.

THE CHRISTIAN LAW Asserted and Vindicated, &c.

1. I Design here to consider two things con∣cerning Christianity:

• 1st, That it is a state of Service,
• 2ly, That it is a Reasonable Service.

The eviction of these two Propositions will con∣tain both the Assertion of the Christian Law and its Vindication, and be a plenary justifica∣tion of its Divine Author from the imputation of two sorts of Adversarys, those that reflect upon his Wisdom, by supposing that he requires nothing to be done by his servants, and those that reflect upon his goodness, by supposing him a Hard Master, and that he requires unreason∣able performances.

2. I begin therefore with the 1st Proposition concerning the Christian Institution, that it is a service. It is most certain that the Christian Religion according to the genuine sense and design of its Divine Author, is the most wise and excellent Institution that could possibly be framed, both for the glory of the Divine At∣tributes,

and the best Interests of Mankind. And without Controversy (if we take it as 'tis exhi∣bited to us in the inspired writings) great is the Mystery of Godliness. But if we consult the perverse glosses and Comments of some of our Christian Rabbins, and take our measures of the Christian Religion from those ill-favour'd Schemes and Draughts of it we meet with in Dutch Systemes, as some Christians are the worst of men, so will their Religion ap∣pear to be the worst of Religions, a senseless and ridiculous Institution, not worthy the Con∣trivance of a wise Politician, much less of him who is the Wisdom of the Father. It fares here with Christianity as with a Picture, that is drawn at so many remote hands, till at length it de∣generates from the Original Truth, and wants an under-title to discover whose it is. And in∣deed whatever Declamations are made against Judaism and Paganism, the worst enemys of the Christian Religion are some of those that pro∣fess and teach it. For if it be in reality as some (who call themselves Orthodox) describe it, I may boldly say, that 'tis neither for the reputa∣tion of God to be the Author of such a Reli∣gion, nor for the interest of men to be guided by it, and that as sin took occasion by the Law, so may it (and that more justly) by the Gospel too, to deceive and ruin the world; by that Gospel which was intended as the Instrument both of its temporal and eter∣nal welfare▪

3. For if you look upon Christianity as some men are pleas'd to hold the Perspective, it is no way accommodated for the promotion of Ho∣liness and Vertue, but is rather a perfect Dis∣charge from all duty, and a Charter of Licen∣tiousness. For among other misrepresentations of the Gospel this is one, (and I think the most pernicious one that the Sophistry of Hell could ever suggest) that it requires nothing to be done by its Proselytes. A Notion so ridiculous and mischievous as is fit for none but a profane Epicure to embrace, who may be allow'd to make his Religion as idle and Sedentary as he does his God. Nay, 'tis not only ridiculous and mischievous, but in the highest measure Anti∣christian. For what greater Antichristianism can there be than that, which strikes not only at some of the main branches, but at the very Root of Christianity, and at once evacuates the entire purpose and aim of the Gospel.

4. But to set this mark upon the right fore∣head, there are three sorts of men that come in some measure or other under this Charge. The first are the Antinomians, who are impu∣dent and ignorant enough in express terms to assert, that the Sacrifice and Satisfaction of Christ does wholly excuse us from all manner of Duty and Obedience, as if we Libertins of the Gospel were so far from being bound to work out our Salvation with fear and trembling, that we are not to work at all; and as if the

Design of Christ's coming were only to satisfy for the transgressions committed against the old Covenant, and not at all to introduce a new one, and to discharge us from the Obliga∣tion of the Moral as well as Ceremonial Law.

5. Nay some there are among them that carry the business yet higher, and exclude not only the Repentance and good works of men, but even the Mediation of Christ himself, at least the necessity of it, by supposing an Anti∣cipating Justification or Pardon from all eter∣nity, which they found upon the secret decree and Counsel of God.

6. The next that have a share in the fore∣mention'd Charge are those, who make Chri∣stianity a matter of bare speculation, and think all Religion absolv'd in Orthodoxy of Opinion; that care not how men live but only how they teach, and are so over intent upon the Creed, that they neglect the Commandments. Little considering that Opinion is purely in order to Practise, and that Orthodoxy of judgment is necessary only in such matters, where a mistake would be of dangerous influence to our actions, that is in Fundamentals. So that the necessity of thinking rightly is derived from the necessity of doing rightly, and consequently the latter is the more necessary of the two.

7. I am as ready to grant as the most zealous stickler for Orthodoxy can desire, that our under∣standings are under obligation in Divine mat∣ters,

but withall I think it absurd that the Ob∣ligation should terminate there, since then 'twould follow, 1st that all Theological Science were merely speculative, 2ly that we are bound to exact Orthodoxy in all speculations, (there being then no reason why in one and not in an∣other) and 3ly, (which is the greatest absurdity of all) that we are obliged and tied up to no purpose, because nothing is effected by it. When∣ever therefore we are obliged to soundness of Judgment, 'tis purely in order to the regula∣tion of our Practise, and consequently solitary Orthodoxy does not satisfy its own end, much less that of Christianity. For to what purpose serves the Direction of the Compass, if there be neither wind nor sail to carry on the vessel to the Haven.

8. But there are yet another sort of men who are justly chargeable with expunging all Duty from the Christian Institution; I mean the Solifidians, who under a pretence of ad∣vancing the merits of the Cross, and the free∣ness of the Divine Grace, require nothing of a Christian in order to his Justification and acce∣ptance before God, but firmly to rely on the satisfaction and merits of Christ, and without any more ado to apply all to himself. And here∣in, they do not only contradict the general de∣sign and particular expresses of the Gospel, but trespass against all Logic and common sense. They contradict the Gospel, in requiring no∣thing

but faith, whereas that (as we shall see anon) equally requires obedience. And they con∣tradict common sense in requiring such a Faith. For they put the Conclusion before the Premi∣ses, and make that the first act of faith which supposes others, and in due order ought to be the last. And besides, they make that act of Faith contribute instrumentally towards the ef∣fecting of Justification, which in order of na∣ture is consequent to it, and supposes it already effected. For I must be first Justify'd before I can rightly believe that I am so, otherwise I shall believe a false Proposition, since (as the most elementary Logician well knows) the certitude of the subject does not make but suppose that of the object.

9. But I could dispense with the unphilosophi∣calness of this their Hypothesis were it not with∣all unchristian, and utterly destructive of all Pie∣ty and Vertue. The great mischief is, they un∣ty the cords of Duty, and exclude the necessity of Obedience as really and effectually, tho not so formally and expresly as the Antinomians do. For they require nothing but Faith to qualify a man for Pardon, and tho afterwards for mo∣desty's sake they come in halting with good works, yet 'tis at such a time when they might as well have left them out. 'Tis when the grand business (for which alone they could be neces∣sary) is over, when the man is number'd among the children of God, and his lot is among the Saints.

And to say here that good works are necessary to Salvation tho not to Justification, is a Myste∣ry above my conception, or rather an absur∣dity below my further notice. Nor will it salve the matter to say that they are necessary to de∣clare our Justification before men, or to ascer∣tain it to our selves and the like, for alas what does such a necessity amount to? No more than this, that they are necessary for such ends which themselves are not necessary. And besides, how can they declare or ascertain our Justification when they are not the conditions of it? So that 'tis plain both from the lateness of the time when, and from the incompetency of the grounds for which they insert good works, that they put them merely out of Complaisance, not be∣cause they think them necessary, but because they are ashamed to declare expresly that they are not. Which appears yet further from the nature of those works they are at length pleas'd to insert. They are such (for there is nothing that these men are so much affraid of as me∣riting) as are much short of that sincerity and perfection which is required by the Gospel. For 'tis notorious that they set the state of Re∣generation so low that 'tis consistent with the dominion and prevalency of sin. A bare relu∣ctancy of the Spirit (tho foil'd in the conflict) against the flesh, is esteem'd a sufficient mark of a Regenerate person; and this every sinner that has the least Remains of Conscience, the

least Twilight of natural light left him must needs have; for no man loves sin for it self, nay he hates it as 'tis in it self absolutely an evil, only he chuses and wills it Comparatively to a∣void (as he then thinks) a greater evil.

10. Thus as the Jewish Doctors did the Law, do these men make the Go∣spel, of none effect by their Traditions, and would questionless, were our Lord now on earth, have a severer woe pronounc'd against them as Perverters of a more excellent, a more perfect Institution. Strange, that men should corrupt and ridicule so admirable a Dispensation, and turn so great a grace of God into wantonness! That there should be some 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Go∣spel which unlearn'd and unstable men might wrest to their own destruction is no very hard matter to imagine, but that men should at once pervert the whole scope and design of it is prodigious as well as Antichristian, a Myste∣ry of wonder as of Iniquity. And have these men the face to declaim against the Papists for leav∣ing out one of the Commandments, when as they draw a black stroke over the whole Table? Nay further, have they the face to call them∣selves Christians, and that of the Purer sort too, who thus evacuate the Mystery of Godliness? By the same figure of speech might the Heathen Emperours assume that sacred name, when they endeavour'd to persecute it out of the world. Nay much more plausibly, for they on∣ly

lopt off the Branches, but these strike at the very Root of Christianity, they applied their forces against the Professours of the Christian Religion, these against the Religion it self, and (what aggravates the malice) not as open ene∣mys, but as Treacherous Friends, under the de∣mure pretence of Purity, Orthodoxy and Saint∣ship. They cancel the laws of Christ and at the same time pretend to advance his kingdom, call him Master, kiss and betray him. And how can it now be expected that these men should be more forward than they are to yield obedi∣ence to the King, who have found out an Expe∣dient to slip their necks out of Christ's yoke, and have made the Gospel in a worse sense, a Dead letter than the Law?

11. But certainly the gate that leads to Hea∣ven is much straiter than these men are pleas'd to make it, otherwise there would be no need of striving to enter in at it. There are things to be done, as well as to be believ'd and understood under the Evangelical dispensation, and Christianity is a Service as well as a Profession. To the clearing and esta∣blishing of which Proposition I shall consider the Gospel under a double Capacity, 1st as a Law, and 2ly as a Covenant. And first as a Law. 'Tis most certain that Christ was a Law∣giver as well as Moses, only as he was an Introducer of a better Hope, so he re∣quired better and sublimer Services. The ad∣vantage

of Christianity does not consist in hav∣ing any abatements of Duty, for Christ was so far from diminishing or retrenching the Moral Law (for 'tis of that I speak) that he improv'd every part of it to higher senses than the most exquisite of the Jewish Doctors understood, or at least conceiv'd themselves obliged to; As is evi∣dent from his divine Sermon on the Mount, which for the Perfection and Sublimity of its Precepts St. Chrysostom calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Top and Height of Philosophy.

12. And that he thus improv'd the Law of Moses, besides the evidence of Comparison, we have his own express word for it: I came not to destroy the Law but to perfect, com∣pleat or fill it up. For so the word (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) properly signifies. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or rude draught was Moses his part, but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or the painting to the life was Christ's. Moses drew out the main lineaments, the Ske∣leton of the Picture (which was therefore call'd the Body of Moses) but 'twas Christ that fill'd up all its intervals and vacuitys, and gave it all its graces, Air and Life-touches. And this is no more than what the Analogy of the Christian dispensation required. The great end and design of God incarnate was to perfect Ho∣liness, as well as to retrieve Happiness, to ad∣vance the Interests of the divine life, and make us Partakers of the Divine nature, and accordingly as he himself was the express

image of his Fathers Person, so 'twas requisite he should consign to us an express image, a cor∣rect Copy of his Fathers will. He was to make us better men, and accordingly, 'twas fit he should give us a better law, a Law that could not be satisfy'd but by such a Righteousness, as should exceed even the strictest among the Jews, that of the Pharisees. So that we are by no means releas'd, but rather more deeply enga∣ged in Duty by the Gospel, as 'tis a Law.

13. Nor 2ly are we releas'd by it as 'tis a Co∣venant. Here indeed begin the Abatements of the Gospel, not as to Duty and Obligation, for the Gospel makes all that our Duty which the Law did and more only (which in short is the true difference between the two Covenants) it does not make the strict and exact performance of it the Measure, the ultimate Measure where∣by we are to stand or fall, but admits of Pardon which the Law knew nothing of. Not of ab∣solute Pardon, for then the Gospel would be a Covenant without a Condition, nor of Pardon without Repentance and actual reformation of Manners, for then the Gospel as a Covenant would interfere with it self as a Law, but upon the sole Conditions of Faith and Repentance. For 'tis a great mistake to think that we are a∣ctually Justify'd or pardon'd by the satisfaction of Christ; this wou'd be the most ready expe∣dient to verify the false charge of the Scribes and Pharisees, and make him in their sense a

Friend to Publicans and Sinners, to encourage all manner of vice and immorality, and to turn the Mystery of Godliness into a Mystery of Iniqui∣ty. No, Christ in this sense has redeem'd no man. All that he either did or could in wis∣dom do for us as satisfying, was in short to in∣state us in a Capacity and Possibility of Par∣don and Reconciliation, by procuring a grant from his Father, that Faith and Repentance should now be available to Justification, which without his satisfaction would not have been accepted to that purpose. Whereby it appears that he was so far from superseding the necessi∣ty of Repentance and good works, that he de∣sign'd only to make way for the success of them; He did so much that Repentance might not be in vain, and he did no more that it might not be needless. And thus does the wisdom as well as the goodness of God lead us to Repentance, by so ordering the matter, that we may obtain Pardon with it, and not without it, which are the two strongest engagements to action in any concern, that our Reason either demands, or our deliberation can suggest.

14. This I conceive to be the true Hypothe∣sis and state of Christianity, which I might yet further confirm by infinite Authoritys from Scripture, which every where presses the neces∣sity of good works as Conditions to our Justifica∣tion and acceptance before God, but I think the more rational and unprejudiced part of the

world are pretty well satisfy'd in that Point, and know how to accommodate St. James and St Paul better then some late Reconcilers. And besides, the wisdom of the Hypothesis sufficient∣ly approves it self; 'Tis such as becomes the Perfections of the Divine Nature to exhibit to the world, and which the Angels may well desire to look into. For 'tis at once fitted to the necessitys of man, and to the Honour of God, to the infirmitys of the Animal life, and to the advancement of the Divine, to the relief of the Sinner and to the suppression of sin. Here Mercy and Truth meet together, righ∣teousness and peace kiss each other. The Sacrifice of the Altar does not prejudice the Ballance of the Sanctuary, and the Divine Justice is so sa∣tisfy'd that the necessity of Holiness and Obe∣dience remains secured. Much is forgiven, and much is to be done, Duty continues as fast as e∣ver, and even the Law of Liberty is a Service.

15. And now that this may not be thought a Hard saying, and make some of Jesus his Dis∣ciples to go back (as once they did) and walk no more with him when they hear of Duty and somthing to be done, I shall now proceed to de∣monstrate the Reasonableness of that Service which Christianity requires of us, which was the 2d general Proposition I proposed to speak to.

16. Religion is so very agreeable both to the Inclinations and Discoursings of Human Na∣ture,

that as none is capable of being Religious but a rational creature, so 'tis almost impossi∣ble for a creature to be indued with Reason and not to be Religious. Hence 'tis that there is no Nation so barbarous and degenerate but what has some Religion or other, and tho ignorant of the true Object as well as manner of wor∣ship, yet rather than wholly abstain from Re∣ligious applications will adore implicitely, and erect an altar 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to the unknown God.

17. Nay so great a congruity is there be∣tween Religion and the radical notices and sentiments of a human Soul, that all mankind except only some few distorted and Anomalous heads (for there are monstrositys in the Soul as well as in the Body) are unanimously agreed up∣on the fundamental and substantial Maxims of it, which for their correspondency to our ratio∣nal Natures are usually distinguish'd by the name of Natural Religion. For there are Pra∣ctical as well as Speculative Principles, and that he who does no hurt is to receive none is as evi∣dent a Proposition in Morality, as that the whole is greater than its part is in the Mathe∣matics, or that nothing can be and not be at once, is in the Metaphysics.

18. And as Religion and Natural Religion carry such a strict conformity to our Rational facultys, so does Reveal'd Religion too. All the lines of this as well as of the other point all the way at, and at last concentre in the Happi∣ness

and welfare of mankind. 'Tis a persuance of the same excellent end, only by more close and direct means. For God in all his intercour∣ses with us does accommodate himself to our natures, and as he will not forcibly determin us to good because he has made us free, so neither does he require any thing from us but what is good and consistent with Reason, because he has made us Rational. And altho we cannot by this Candle of the Lord find out some of the great and wonderful things of his Law (for herein consists the formal difference between Natural and Reveal'd Re∣ligion) yet when they are once proposed to us, they are highly approv'd by our Intellectual re∣lish, and strike perfect unisons to the voice of our Reason, so that even the Animal man (for 'tis of him the Apostle there speaks) consents to the Law that it is good.

19. And indeed were it not so, it would be as unfit for God to propose, as hard for man to receive, since even the Prudence of a Nation is by no one thing either more justify'd or con∣demn'd, than by the good or ill contrivance of its Laws. Shall not then the law-giver of the whole world enact that which is right, as well as the Judge of all the Earth do right? Shall he not be as wise in the framing of his law, as he is Just in the Execution of it? God in contriving the Mechanism of the material world displaid the excellency of his Divine Geo∣metry,

and made all things in Number, Weight and Measure. He establish'd the world by his wisdom, and stretch'd out the hea∣vens by his discretion. And shall he not govern the Intellectual world with as much wisdom as he made the Natural one? Questionless he does, and the law, which he has prescrib'd to us, is as perfect and excellent, as that whereby he wrought the Beauty and Order of the universe. For the Lord is righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works. He has accom∣modated his Statutes and Judgments both to the infinite perfection of his own Nature, and both to the actual perfection and capacity of ours. God is a spirit and accordingly (as the Apostle tells us) the Law is Spi∣ritual. Man is Rational, and accordingly the Homage he is to pay to him that made him so, is no other than a. Reasonable Service.

20. But to be as compendious, and yet with∣all as just and distinct as may be in so copious and plentiful a Subject, I consider, that as the whole rational nature of man consists of two facultys, understanding and will (whether re∣ally or notionally distinct I shall not now di∣spute.) So Christianity, whose end is to perfect the whole man and give the last accomplish∣ment both to our Intellectual and Moral pow∣ers, will be wholly absolv'd in these two parts, things to be believ'd and things to be done. If therefore in both these it can acquit it self at

the Bar of Reason, the Conclusion is evident that it is a Reasonable Service.

21. First then as to the things which are to be believ'd. Now these are either the Autho∣rity and Truth of the whole Christian Institu∣tion, or the Truth of particular Mysterys con∣tain'd in it. The Ist of these will appear to be a reasonable Object of faith two ways, Ist from the nature of its Design and its excellent apt∣ness to compass it, and 2ly from extrinsic Argu∣ments and collateral circumstances. And Ist, 'tis recommended to us by the nature of its De∣sign, and its excellent aptness to compass it. It is (according to the precedent representa∣tion) a very wise and rational Hypothesis, above the reason of man indeed at first to contrive, but such as when proposed it must needs ap∣prove and acquiesce in, as at once the Power and Wisdom of God, because (as I first observ'd, and shall hereafter more plainly demonstrate) 'tis so admirably fitted to the Honor of God, and to the necessitys of man, thereby verifying that double part of the An∣gelical anthem at the appearance of its Divine Author, and at once bringing glory to God on high, and on earth Peace to men of good will.

22. And as it appears thus rational in its ge∣neral Idea or Structure, and thereby speaks it self worthy of God, so 2ly that it came actually from him no Rational person can doubt, that

considers that conjugation of Arguments, that cloud of witnesses whereby its divine Original stands attested. Such as are the variety of Pro∣phecys and Prefigurations, their punctual and exact accomplishment in the Author of this In∣stitution, his Birth, Life, Miracles and Do∣ctrine, his Passion, Death, Resurrection and Ascension, with all the wonderful Arrear and train of Accidents that ensued for the Confir∣mation of Christianity, such as the wonderful Sustentation, Protection, increase and Conti∣nuation of Christs little flock the Christian Church, the miraculous assistances and miracu∣lous actions of the Apostles, the Harmony of the Evangelists, the Constancy and Courage of his first Witnesses and Martyrs, the defeat of the Infernal Powers in the silencing of Oracles, the just punishment that lighted upon his ene∣mies, and lastly the completion of all Prophe∣cies that proceeded out of his divine mouth while on earth, which I shall here only point at in general, and leave to the inlargement of e∣very man's private meditation.

23. Then as for the particular mysterys con∣tain'd in Christianity, I know but of three that threaten any distarbance to our Philosophy, and those are the three Catholic ones mention'd by St. Athanasius, the Trinity, the Hypostatic union and the Resurrection. Now concerning the two first I observe, that they are indeed above the adequate comprehension of our Reason, but

not contrary or repugnant to it. For as we can∣not conceive how these things can be, so neither do we positively and clearly perceive that they cannot be, as we do in contradictions and things contrary to reason. But as to the last, I don't in the least understand why it should be thought a thing incredible that God (whose very notion involves Omnipotence) should raise the Dead. 'Tis true, we are as ignorant how this can be as in either of the former Articles, but that it absolutely may be there is much plainer evidence, especially to those who think it reasonable to believe a Creation. Which if taken according to strictness of notion, for a Production of somthing out of nothing, is most confessedly a greater and more difficult per∣formance (as to the nature of the work) than the Raising of the Dead can be. Or if more largely for producing somthing out of prae∣existent but naturally unapt matter, yet 'tis still at least equal with it. He that with the bare energy of his omnipotent word could inspirit the dead, stupid, void and formless masse, and make it move into a frame so elegant and har∣monious, that the mere Contemplation of its Beauty and Order has by many Philosophers been thought a sufficient entertainment of life, may easily be presumed to be able to do the same in the lesser world, and with effect to say to a rude and disorder'd heap of dust, the Chaos of a human body, stand up and live.

24. But after all, were this Article of the Resurrection much more thickset with difficul∣ties than it is, yet would we, before we venture to determine against its possibility, sit a while and consider, that we are nonplus'd at a thou∣sand Phaenomenas in nature, which if they were not done, we should have thought them abso∣lutely impossible (as for instance to go no fur∣ther, the Central libration of the Earth) and now they are, we cannot comprehend 'em, that we have seen but a few of Gods works and understand yet fewer, and lastly that as the possibility of the effect is above the com∣prehension of our Reason, so the Power of the Agent is much more so, we should discern great reason to be cautious how we set limits to the Divine Omnipotence, and should rather sup∣port our Faith against all Objections with that universal Salvo of the Apostle, I know whom I have believ'd.

25. I descend now from the things that are to be believ'd to the things that are to be done in the Christian Religion. And that those may appear to be a Reasonable Service, I consider first in general, that the Christian Law is no∣thing else but the Law of Nature retriev'd, ex∣plain'd and set in a clearer light. Christ indeed added some new Precepts that were not in the Law of Moses, but not any that were not in the Law of Nature. That he only restored and rescued from the Sophistications of ill Princi∣ples,

and the corruptions of degenerate man∣ners. For the clearer understanding of which Proposition 'tis to be observ'd, that the Law of Nature was twice retriev'd, by Moses and by Christ. Moses did it imperfectly, with a shaking hand, and with a rude Pencil; He adopted 'tis true, into his Table as many of Natures Laws as were necessary to the present state and ca∣pacity of the Jewish people, but he did not ex∣haust the whole Code and Digest of Nature. For there are many Instances and Branches of the Natural Law which are no way reducible to the Mosaic Tables, unless hook'd in by long tedious consequences, which as the Law never intended, so neither is one of a thousand able to deduce them from it, as appears in the in∣stances of Gratitude to Benefactors, Love to Enemys, Forgiveness of Injurys, Humility and the like, which are excellences of the first Ma∣gnitude in the Imperial constitutions of Nature, but not transcribed in the Copy and Extract of Moses, as too refined for the grossness of that Age, for the hardness of the Jewish people, and for the Infancy of that Dispensation.

26. This therefore was reserv'd for the work of a Diviner Prophet, who should retrieve the Law of Nature to the full, and restore it as at the Beginning. For he came (as he te∣stifys of himself, and as was before ob∣serv'd to another purpose) to fill up Moses his Law, which implies that it was imperfect and

deficient; and wherein should its defectiveness consist, but in wanting somthing of the Natu∣ral Law. The Christian Law therefore is only the Law of Nature retriev'd.

27. This being premised, 'tis but now to con∣sider what the formal notion of the Law of Nature is, and we have found out one general measure whereby to judge of the Reasonable∣ness of the Christian Law. Now by the Law of Nature I suppose we all understand certain Practical Maxims or Dictates, the observing or transgressing of which, considering the present system of the universe, have a natural conne∣xion with the well or ill being of man, either as to his private or political capacity. I say, considering the present system of the universe. For no question, God might have so contrived the Order and Scheme of the Creation, as that many of those things which are now for the in∣terest, might have been for the disinterest of mankind, as he might have so framed the tex∣ture of a human body, that what is now whol∣some and soveraign, might have been poison∣ous and pernicious; and in this respect I con∣ceive the Law of Nature may be said to de∣pend upon the arbitrary will of God, and to be mutable at his pleasure. But yet it still remains immutably true in the general, that whatsoe∣ver has such a natural ordination to or conne∣xion with the well or ill being of mankind, is good or evil respectively. This is the standard

of morality and immorality, and the essential difference between Vertue and Vice. And 'tis as immutably true that some particular instan∣ces should have such a natural connexion, stante rerum Hypothesi, during the present state and order of things. Now whatever has so, is an essential branch of the Law of Nature, and obliges us to act or not to act respectively to the Term of its Ordination. So that Bonum hone∣stum is that which in the order of things is Bo∣num utile, and conduces as a Natural Medium to Felicity, which is the End of man.

28. Hence then it follows, that the Christian Law which is nothing else but the Law of Na∣ture retriev'd, consists only of such practical maxims, which carry a natural relation to the true interest and well being of mankind, and consequently contains nothing in it but what is reasonable, very reasonable to be done. But to evince this more particulary 'twill be requi∣site to take a cursory view of the Christian Law. And this I shall consider first, as I find it summ'd up in general by our B. Saviour in answer to the Lawyers Question, what he should do to inherit eternal life, and secondly, in some of those par∣ticular instances of it which seem most to cross the present interest of mankind.

29. As to the Ist, the summe which our B. Saviour gave of it was this: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy Soul, and with all thy mind,

and thy Neighbor as thy self. These he told him were the two great Commandments, and that there were none greater than these: and cer∣tainly none more reasonable. For since man is not his own end, but has an Amorous Principle within him which transports him to good with∣out himself, since he is not a Central and self∣terminating Being, but by the weight of his af∣fections gravitates and inclines to somthing further, what is more Reasonable than that he fix upon God as his Center, who is as well the End as the Author of his Being? And since what∣ever portion of his love is not directed hither, will necessarily light (for it cannot be idle, and must fix somwhere) upon disproportionate and vain Objects, which neither deserve it nor can satisfy it, and consequently will but vex and torment him, what can be more Reasonable than that he unite and concenter all the rays of his affection both Intellectual and sensitive up∣on God, and according to the strictest sense of this great Commandment love him with all his heart, Soul and mind? Vision and Love make up the full composition of our Celestial Happi∣ness hereafter, and they are the nearest ap∣proach we can make to it here.

30. Nor is the 2d great Commandment less reasonable than the first. The truest and most effectual way a man can take to love himself, is to love his neighbor as himself. For since man is a necessitous and indigent Creature (of all

Creatures the most indigent) and since he can∣not upon his own solitary stock supply the ne∣cessitys of his nature (the want of Society be∣ing one of them) and since of all Creatures here below none is capable of doing him either so much good or so much harm as those of his own species, as 'twill be his best security to have as many Friends and as few Enemys as he can, so, as a means to this, to hate and injure none, but to love and oblige all, will be his best Poli∣cy. So far is the state of Nature from being (ac∣cording to the Elements of the Leviathan) a state of Hostility and war, that there is no one thing that makes more apparently for the inte∣rest of mankind than universal Charity and Benevolence. And indeed, would all men but once agree to espouse one anothers interests and prosecute the public good truly and faith∣fully, nothing would be wanting to verify and realize the Dreams of the Golden Age, to anti∣cipate the Millennial Happiness, and bring down Heaven upon Earth. Society would stand firm and compact, like a Mathematical frame of Ar∣chitecture, supported by mutual dependencys and coherences, and every man's kindnesses would return again upon himself in the Circle and Reciprocation of Love.

31. But besides this Consideration of Interest, there is another which equally contributes to recommend this Law of universal Benevolence, and perhaps with more sweetness of insinua∣tion

than the former, and that is Pleasure. These two are put together by the Psalmist, who tells us, that 'tis both good and pleasant for Brethren to dwell together in unity. There is certainly a most Divine pleasure in the acts and expresses of Benevolence, so that if God may be said to take pleasure in any one thing besides the richness of his own infinity, it must be in the Communication of it. Sure I am, no man can do good to another without recreating and feasting his own spirit; nay, even the most happy and self-sufficient man who as to his interest has the least need to be kind and obliging, yet as to his Pleasure has the greatest. For he enjoys his happy state most when he communicates it, and takes a Partner with him into his Paradise, and receives a more vigorous joy from the Reflexion, than from the Direct incidency of his Happiness.

32. I might here take occasion to shew the Reasonableness of Justice and Honesty, with other particular Branches of this great Law, but the necessity of these is so notorious (no So∣ciety being able to subsist without them) and withall so attested by the common vote and ex∣perience of the world (it being the business of all human Laws, and the end of all Civil Go∣vernment, to engage men to the observance of them) that I shall not need to make any Plea in their behalf. Instead therefore of lend∣ing any further light to what shines already so

conspicuously by its own, I shall now proceed to justify the Christian Law in some of those in∣stances which seem most to cross the present in∣terest of mankind.

33. There are some Precepts of the Christian Law which seem directly and in their whole kind to be against the interest of man. (For as for those which may accidentally and in some junctures of Circumstances, I shall consider them afterwards.) Now these I shall derive from that Abstract of Christian Philosophy the di∣vine Sermon on the Mount. The 1st instance shall be in the Precept of Meekness, which our Divine Lawgiver has extended so far as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that we resist not evil; which is not to be understood in Prejudice either of the Civil sword, or of legal Prosecu∣tions for the reparation of injurys (for this would be to give the worst of men a continual advantage against the best) nor of public wars between distinct kingdoms (for they being un∣der no common jurisdiction, have no other ex∣pedient whereby to right themselves when in∣jured) but only as to Private persons, who by vertue of this Precept are not permitted (un∣less in apparent danger of life, for then the Law of self-preservation takes place, the Bene∣fit of other laws being not at hand) I say are not permitted to retaliate evil, but obliged ra∣ther with their Divine Master to give their backs to the smiters, and their

cheeks to them that pluck off the hair.

34. Now this may seem a very disadvanta∣gious and inconvenient command, in as much as it may be said by tying up our hands, to ex∣pose us to all manner of contumelies and af∣fronts, and invite the ill treatments of rude and disingenious spirits. But whoever seriously con∣siders the matter will find, that pure and sim∣ple revenge is a thing very absurd, and very productive of ill consequences, and in some re∣spects, worse than the first injury. For that may have some ends of profit and advantage in it, but to do another man a diskindness merely because he has done me one, serves to no good purpose, and to many ill ones. For it contri∣butes nothing to the reparation of the first in∣jury (it being impossible that the Act of any wrong should be rescinded, tho the permanent effect may) but instead of making up the breach of my Happiness, it increases the objects of my Pity, by bringing in a new misery into the world more than was before, and occasions fresh re∣turns of malice, one begetting another like the encirclings of disturb'd water, till the evil becomes fruitful and multiplies into a long suc∣cession, a Genealogy of mischiefs. And by this time I think the man has reason to repent him of his Revenge, and to be convinc'd of the E∣quity of the Law which forbids it.

35. The next instance I shall mention, is that of loving enemies. This runs higher than the

former, that being only negative, not to re∣turn evil, but this positive to do good. A strange precept one would think, and highly contra∣dictory to Reason as well as Nature. But whoe∣ver considers the great usefulness of Love and Benevolence to the interest of Society, will quickly perceive, that he ought not to be dis∣ingaged from the observance of so necessary a Duty upon so slight a ground as anothers de∣fault in it. I grant 'tis neither Reasonable nor possible to love an enemy for being so, (that is no proper motive of love) but yet 'tis very rea∣sonable to love the man notwithstanding his enmity. Because the necessity of Charity is so indispensable, that it ought to oblige in all ca∣fes. And besides, as by this means all enmity is certainly prevented on one side (which is of very great consideration to the public peace) so is it the likelyest method to bring over the other. Kindnesses will at length prevail upon him, who is proof against all the sense of Duty and Conscience, and the coals of fire which are heap'd upon his head (when nothing else will do it) will melt him down into Love and Sweetness.

36. There is one instance more, wherein the Christian Law seems not to consult the interest of human life, and that is in the matter of Di∣vorce, which our Saviour allows in no case but that of Adultery. Now this also seems to be one of the hard sayings. For the natural propen∣sion

to procreation is not to be satisfy'd out of marriage, and marriage by this appendage seems to be such a Burthen, that the Disciples might well say, if the case of a man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry. But yet upon consideration, this also will ap∣pear to be a very Reasonable confinement. For 1st, all the supposable inconveniences of this restraint may be in a great measure prevented by prudent and wise Choice. But suppose they cannot, yet 2ly, as 'twould be most advisable for some men to marry tho with this restraint, so is marriage with this restraint better for So∣ciety than without it. For were there liberty of divorce upon other grounds, every petty dis∣like would never want a pretence for a Dissolu∣tion, and then the same inconveniences would ensue as if there were no such thing as the ma∣trimonial Institution, such as diminution of af∣fection to children, neglect of their education and the like; besides the perpetual quarrels and animositys between the parties themselves so divided, and their respective relatives, all which would bring more inconveniencys upon Socie∣ty, than those which are pretended to be avoid∣ed by distending and enlarging the licence of Divorce.

37. Now if to this Apology for the reason∣ableness of Christianity taken from its condu∣civeness and natural tendency to the interest of Human life, we further add, the Dominion

and Right that God has over us, the great Be∣nefits wherewith he has already prevented us, and the exceeding weight of glory laid up in Reversion for us; And would we further consi∣der, that Holiness has a natural Ordination to the Happiness. of Heaven as well as of Earth, that 'tis among the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the things that accompany or are essen∣tially retaining to Salvation, so that would God in mercy dispense with it as a Conditionary, yet we could not be happy without it as a natural Qualification for Heaven; Further yet, would we consider the great easiness as well as mani∣fold advantage of Christianity, that many in∣stances of Duty are agreeable to the inclina∣tions of Nature, and that where there is a Law in our members that runs▪ counter to that of the mind, we have the aids and assistances of grace; that God has required nothing of us but what is substantially within the verge and compass of Human nature; For to believe, re∣pent and love, are all natural acts, we believe some storys, we repent of some follys, we love some men, and God obliges us but to believe him, to repent of follys against him, and to love him. The Acts are the same for their substance, tho not in their determination. Lastly, would we consider how much all this is confirm'd by the Argument of Practice and Experience, that the Devil has more Apostates than Christ, that the number of those who leave sin, and come

over to vertue, is much greater than of those that leave vertue and come over to sin, (which is the Apology that the Platonist Simplicius makes for vertue) the Conclusion would be pla∣ced beyond the reach of controversy that Chri∣stianity is a Reasonable Service, and that the Precepts of our excellent Lawgiver both begin, continue and end with a Beatitude.

38. I can now foresee but one Objection of any moment which the Argument of this Dis∣course is liable to, which is, that altho vertue and vice have a natural ordination to the Hap∣piness and Misery of life respectively, yet it may so happen by the intervening of some ac∣cidents, that this connexion of things may be broken off, and that a man may be a loser by vertue, and a gainer by vice, as in the instan∣ces of martyrdom and secure theft. And here the Question will be, whether it be then reasonable to act vertuously and unreasonable to do the contrary. To this I answer, 1st that it may be justly question'd (notwithstanding the inter∣vention of any accidents) whether a man may be vertuous to his disadvantage, or vicious to his advantage, even as to this present state, con∣sidering the internal satisfaction and ácquies∣cence, or dissatisfaction and molestation of spi∣rit that attend the practice of vertue and vice respectively. But supposing he may, then 2ly I reply, that here come in the rewards and pu∣nishments of another life to supply the natural

sanction of the law. Then 3ly, to the second instance I offer this in peculiar, that altho in some circumstances I might be dishonest to my present gain, yet 'tis very reasonable that all should be obliged to the law of Justice. Because if every one should be permitted to use secret Frauds (and all may as well as one) the evil would come about again, even to him whom we just now supposed a gainer by his theft, and as to the public 'twould be all one as if there were no Property, and then for want of encou∣ragement and security, the final issue of the matter would be an utter neglect and disim∣provement of the Earth, and a continual di∣sturbance of the public peace. So that when all's done Honesty is the best Policy, and to live most happily is to live most vertuously and re∣ligiously. So true is that of the Psalmist, I see that all things come to an end, but thy Commandment is exceeding broad.

39. From what has been hitherto discours'd, I shall now briefly deduce some practical infe∣rences and conclude. Since then our Religion is so Reasonable a Service, 'twill follow hence in the first place, that there may be a due exer∣cise and use of Reason in divine matters, and that whatsoever is apparently contrary to Rea∣son ought not to be obtruded as of Divine Au∣thority, nor be accounted as any part of the Chri∣stian Religion. An Inference wherein the Faith of the Church of Rome is not a little concern'd.

40. 'Twill follow 2ly, that no man ought to be persecuted, or have any external violence done him for his Religion, supposing that by overt acts he give no disturbance to the Public. For since God has required nothing of us but what is agreeable to our Reason, why should man?

41. 'Twill follow 3ly, that sin is the very Height and Extremity of Folly and Disingenuity. Of Folly, because it crosses and defeats the ex∣cellent end of Man, which is to live happily and commodiously. And of Disingenuity, be∣cause 'tis committed against him, who when he might by vertue of his supream Dominion have imposed upon us arbitrary Laws, (as that given to Adam) or hard and severe ones (as that to Abraham) has been graciously pleas'd to make nothing the Condition of our Happi∣ness, but what upon other accounts would have been most advisable to be done. This certain∣ly will render sin exceeding sinful, and leave the sinner without the least shadow of an excuse. We commonly derive the aggravations of sin from the greatness of God, but without question his goodness will supply us with as many, and in this sense also 'twill be true to say, as is his Majesty, so is his Mercy.

42. Lastly hence 'twill follow, that we ought to perform this Rational will of God with An∣gelical alacrity and constancy, partly for its own excellency as 'tis a persuance of our interest,

and partly out of gratitude and generosity to God, for giving us such excellent Laws, in keep∣ing of which there is so great Reward. For not only the End of our Religion is Happiness, but even her very ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. Quintilian I remember, inquiring why former ages afforded better O∣ratours than the latter, resolves the Problem into this, because there were then greater en∣couragements and rewards. And if great en∣couragements will make good Orators, why should they not make good men? Let us then make it our daily endeavour as we do our dai∣ly Prayer, that this excellent will of God may be done here on Earth as it is in Heaven, and the more we do so, the more we shall still be convinc'd that it is our Reasonable Service.

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING PERSEVERANCE IN HOLINESS.

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING Perseverance in Holiness.

1. ALL that is of any moment for the full Discharging of this Subject, will be absolv'd in these three Considera∣tions. 1st, that man has one way or other suffi∣cient power to persevere in a course of Holiness if he will; otherwise all exhortations would be in vain. 2ly, that 'tis also possible for him to fall from a state of Holiness; otherwise they would all be superfluous. And lastly, by shewing him what vast encouragements, what infinite engagements he has to stand.

2. I begin with the first, that man has one way or other sufficient power to persevere in a course of Holiness if he will. Where by Perse∣verance, I do not understand a continuedly uni∣form, equal course of obedience, and such as is not interrupted with the least act of sin, (for this is a perfection not to be hoped for, under the disadvantages of mortality) but only such a constancy of obedience as excludes all contrary Habits, and likewise all such acts of sin as are

said directly to wast the Conscience, those I mean, which are committed against the clear and express Dictate either of natural Reason, or supernatural Revelation. And withall (to compleat the Character) such an Obedience as is attended with a sedulous care and hearty en∣deavour to correct and subdue even those pit∣tiable infirmitys, which can never be wholly put off in this state, but will always adhere like spots to the brightest Star in the Firmament. This I conceive to be all one with that disposition of Soul which with more compendiousness we u∣sually call sincerity, in opposition to a perfect and sinless obedience. Now that man has suffi∣cient power to persevere in such a course of life as is here described, (not to call in the assistance of any other Argument) seems to me evident∣ly demonstrable from this single consideration, that to be found in the state above mention'd is the condition of the New-Covenant, upon the fulfilling of which, all our hopes of Pardon and Salvation depend. I do not say 'tis the indi∣spensable Condition of our Salvation, that we persevere uninterruptedly even in this state of E∣vangelical Righteousness (it being possible for a man after an interruption of a salvable state to recover into it again, as is plain from the case of David, St. Peter and many others) but that we be found finally in this state is the Con∣dition of our Salvation. For if the Righteous man turneth away from his Righteousness, and

committeth iniquitys and dies in them, the righ∣teousness that he hath done shall not be mention'd, in the sin that he hath sinn'd shall he dye. Well then, if Salvation be not to be had out of this state, then it follows, that it must never become impossible to a man without his own fault to be found in it, since 'tis repugnant to the very na∣ture of a Covenant (much more of this great Covenant of mercy) to have a condition an∣nex'd to it, which in some circumstances, and that without our fault may prove impossible.

3. The Condition then of this new Covenant must be as possible to man in this state of dege∣neracy, now his locks are shaven and his great strength is departed from him, as the Condition of the first Covenant was to him in his primi∣tive might and vigour. Do this and live, is equal∣ly common to both, the only difference lies in the This that is to be done, not in the possibility of the performance. Or if there are degrees of possibility, the advantage ought to lie on this side, this being (as was hinted before) a Cove∣nant of Grace and Mercy.

4. Well then, if to be found finally in the state above describ'd be the indispensable con∣dition of our Salvation, and if for that very reason (as it has been prov'd) it must not in any circumstance become impossible without our fault, it unavoidably follows, that 'tis also pos∣sible to persevere in it without interruption, be∣cause otherwise we having not the disposal of

our own lives, it will oftentimes prove impos∣sible for us (and that without our own fault) to be found finally in that state which is the Con∣dition of Salvation; which is contrary to the supposition. The short is (to speak all in a word) the possibility of being found in a salvable state cannot be sufficiently secured, without a possi∣bility of always persevering in it, and therefore I conclude it possible for a man to do so, which was the thing I undertook to prove.

5. But now lest man upon a survey of his na∣tural strength, and of the Auxiliarys of the Di∣vine grace, should pronounce himself absolute∣ly impregnable, and should begin to say in his heart (as the Psalmist did in another case) I shall never be remov'd, thou Lord of thy goodness hast made my hill so strong, 'tis high time to turn the Perspective, and give him a more near, full and distinct view of his Condition, that instead of stretching himself upon the ••ed of security, he may learn to work out his Salvation with fear and trembling. Which we shall do, by ad∣vancing to the 2d thing proposed, which is, that altho man has sufficient power to perse∣vere if he will, yet 'tis also possible for him to fall from a state of Holiness. Navigat enim ad∣huc, for he is still upon the waters, and tho with the use of diligence and prudent conduct he may decline both rocks and shallows, yet if he venture to sleep within the vessel which he should govern, upon a groundless presumption that an

Angel will be his Pilot, and that he shall be in∣fallibly steer'd to the right Point by the arm of Omnipotence, he may notwithstanding the past success of his voyage, and his confidence of the future, be shipwrackt even within sight of the Haven.

6. I confess, when I consider with what strength and combination of Argument Chri∣stianity both as to Faith and Practice does ap∣prove it self to be the most Rational thing in the world, when I consider the nobleness of its Original (God being its Author) the excellency of its nature (it being most agreeable to, and perfective of our best facultys) its wholsome ef∣fects and operations (the interests of Kingdoms and States as well as of private persons depend∣ing upon it) and lastly, the greatness of its End, which is no less than everlasting Bliss and Hap∣piness, I say when I consider all this, I am rea∣dy to conclude it the most prodigious thing in nature that so very few should be in love with the Beauty of Holiness, were I not immediatly surprised with a greater Miracle, which is, that many of those few after some considerable pro∣gress in vertue retract their best choice, and af∣ter the good Angel has brought them within sight of the Mountain of Safety, look back upon the Region of wickedness.

7. This certainly is a Condition no less strange than deplorable, and calls for our wonder as well as our Pity. 'Tis true indeed, ignorance of the

sweets of Religion may something lessen the wonder of not embracing it, and the Food of Angels may lye neglected on the ground so long as men wist not what it is, but for those who are once enlightned, and have tasted of the Heavenly gift, and are made partakers of the Ho∣ly Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, one would think it as difficult for such to fall away, as the Apostle assures us 'tis to renew them again to Re∣pentance.

8. But such is the imperfection and unsted∣diness of Human Nature that from the begin∣ning of things there have been instances of this kind. Paradise could not preserve man in his innocence, and the Garden of the Lord degene∣rated into a Wilderness. Neither is this to be ob∣serv'd only in man, who sits in the lowest form of Intellectual Beings, but the very Angels also, who are greater in power and might are charged with Folly for leaving their own habitation. Those bright sons of the morn∣ing could not long endure to be Happy, but grew giddy with the sublimity of their station and fell from the Heights of Glory. And altho the blessed inhabitants of that serene and peaceful mansion are now (as 'tis piously be∣liev'd) fully confirm'd in Holiness and Happi∣ness, yet man like this sublunary Region which falls to his lot to inherit, is still nothing else but a Scene of Changes and Revolutions, but in no∣thing

so changeable, as in that wherein he ought to be most fixt, the practice of Vertue and Religion. 'Tis a narrow and a rugged path, and he that treads surest is not secure from falling.

9. This will plainly appear to him that con∣siders, that no Habit tho contracted by never so great a repetition of acts does necessitate the faculty, but only disposes it to act with greater facility, and consequently leaves it still indiffe∣rent to opposite operations. Whence 'tis easy to conceive, that an Habit of Holiness may by degrees be abolish'd by contrary actions. For as this Habit was at first begotten by frequent acts, so may it be destroy'd by opposite ones, and (what is more) a contrary Habit may be at length produced.

10. This I say is very possible in the ordinary course of things, and that God should inter∣pose here with an irresistible power to prevent it, we have no grounds from Scripture or reason to expect, and therefore 'twou'd be a most intole∣rable presumption to rely upon it. My grace is sufficient for thee was the utmost degree of con∣solation vouchsafed to the chosen Vessel; He had God's faithfulness engaged for it, that he should not be tempted above his strength, but yet notwithstanding this sufficiency, it must have been possible for him to have fall'n from his own stedfastness, otherwise I cannot imagine to what purpose he should 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 keep under his body, and bring it into subjection, and

all for this reason, lest that by any means when he had preacht to others, he himself should be a cast-away.

11. What, did the Angels let fall their Crowns of glory, and shall man pretend to Indefectibili∣ty? Indeed the Platonists tell us of an order of Beings call'd 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 minds, units and self-goodnesses, whom they suppose to be the closest draught of their Maker, and the Master-piece of the whole Creation. And these they say are essentially and in their own nature immutable, and the reason that they assign for it is, because they are pure, uncompounded spirits, and utterly abstract from matter. And altho these are the only Creatures which they affirm to be essentially immutable, yet they al∣low a gift or Priviledge of Perseverance to cer∣tain men. But then they are such as (according to their Hypothesis of Pre-existence) were not sent down into these bodys for any faults com∣mitted in another state, but who came hither either out of generosity, or by divine dispen∣sation to be guides and examples of Heroic ver∣tue in the world. And these they say are secure of remaining good and vertuous, and of return∣ing to their native Country again.

12. Now as to the first opinion of theirs, I can by no means make it part of my Creed. For to be essentially immutable, I take to be the in∣communicable property of the Father of Lights with whom is no variableness or shadow of turn∣ing,

and who is the same yesterday, to day and for ever. No Creature how excellent soever can lay claim to this divine prerogative. And this I find acknowledg'd by a Person of great worth, and one who in other points was very Platoni∣cally given; But here he has deserted his Ma∣ster, as is to be seen in his Book 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 And the generality of Christian writers seem to conspire with Origen in this, in∣asmuch as they hold not only a Lapse of An∣gels in general, but withall suppose him who is now the Prince of Devils, to have been once an Angel of the highest Order.

13. As to their latter opinion (not to med∣dle with the Hypothesis upon which 'tis found∣ed) I do not absolutely deny but that to some men who have for a long time given excellent proof of their obedience, and with unwearied resolution fought the Lord's Battels, God may at length vouchsafe such a plentiful portion of grace and so stablish them with his Free Spi∣rit, that they shall never depart from him, partly to reward their past fidelity, and partly, that they may become burning lamps to give constant light in the Temple of God. For since 'tis confess'd on all hands, that God by way of punishment does withdraw his grace from some obstinate sinners, and give them up after a long abuse of his mercy to the fulfilling of their own lusts, 'tis but what the Analogy of reason re∣quires, to suppose on the other hand that God

may be so favourable to some of his most emi∣nent servants, who have for a long time well acquitted themselves in the severest trials, as at length to give his Angels a peculiar charge over them to keep them in all their ways. And this sup∣position seems not a little countenanc'd from what the Spirit says to the Church of Philadel∣phia, Because thou hast kept the word of my Patience, I also will keep thee from the hour of temptation which shall come upon all the world, to try them that dwell upon the earth.

14. But altho this be granted, yet it makes nothing against our present assertion, as every one must acknowledg that attends to these two Considerations. 1st, that these are extraordi∣nary instances of the Divine favour, vouchsafed only to extraordinary persons, and to extraordi∣nary purposes, and consequently when we treat of Gods ordinary dealings with the sons of men, must not come into computation. And 2ly, that even these extraordinary persons whom we suppose to be at length thus highly favour'd, were notwithstanding for a great part of their lives in a defectible condition, and that they are now no longer so, is supposed to be the reward of their past fidelity, so that they may say with the Psalmist, This I had because I kept thy Commandments.

15. What hinders then, but that it be con∣cluded possible for t•••• generality of men at all times, and for all men at some times to fall from

a state of Holiness, and after they have tasted the liberty of the sons of God, to become again the servants of corruption? And sure those that assert the contrary destroy not only the excel∣lency, but the nature of obedience, defeat and evacuate the design of all Scripture exhorta∣tions, which would be as impertinent upon their supposition, as to exhort him to continue to live who is Immortal, pervert the order of things, arrogating to themselves in this state of Proba∣tion the portion of confirm'd Saints, and lastly assume to themselves more, than many of the great Masters of Theology will allow to our B. Saviour himself in the days of his flesh. Did our Saviour seem to shrink at the apprehension of his sad hour, and to be at a stand whether he should drink off his bitter cup? Did his danger seem so considerable, that he was fain to betake himself to his great Antidote Prayer, and bor∣row courage from the consolation of an Angel? And does mere man sit careless and uncon∣cern'd, secure of the issues of eternity? See the indecorum, the Lord is in his Agony, & the Disci∣ples sleep on and take their rest. But I think I have said enough to awaken them out of their dan∣gerous slumber, and to convince them that all is not so safe as they dream, and that notwith∣standing the present firmness of their station, there is still left a possibility of falling.

16. But now lest this possibility of falling be reduced to act, I proceed to consider the vast

encouragements, the infinite engagements that he who is Holy has to be holy still. And these I shall chuse to represent to him in these two general Considerations. 1st, that he has made the best choice that he could possibly have made, and consequently, 'tis against all the reason in the world that he should rescind it. And 2ly, that if notwithstanding he does rescind it, he will not only lose the advantage of his best choice, but incur an opposite portion of mise∣ry, and that in a greater measure than other sin∣ners. These I take to be the most proper Con∣siderations to inforce the grand Duty of Perse∣verance.

17. The consequence of the first Argument proceeds upon this Principle, that that choice which is best is not to be rescinded. This Pro∣position is so evident that it can hardly admit, much less need any proof, and 'tis practically confess'd by every man throughout the whole tenour of his life. For no man retracts his choice 'till he has alter'd the Dictate of his understan∣ding (for otherwise he would chuse evil under the very Formality of evil) and has entertain'd other apprehensions of the object than he had when he first chose it. And this is that which makes up the entire notion of Repentance, which is nothing else in its precise Idea, when abstract∣ed from particular matter, but a Retractation of a former choice, proceeding from the altera∣tion of the Practical Dictate, disallowing that

now, which was before approv'd. For this a man never does 'till he thinks he has reason to do so. And upon this account 'tis, that God is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and cannot properly repent, be∣cause his understanding being infinite and rea∣ching out to all the possibilitys of things, must needs dictate to his will after one uniform and constant manner, it being impossible he should either discover somthing afterward which he did not comprehend at first, or lose the appre∣hension of somthing which he did. But the un∣derstanding of man being finite and imper∣fect at the best, and oftentimes corrupted and biass'd by the Passions, has at several times dif∣ferent apprehensions of things, and being som∣times under and somtimes out of the cloud, di∣ctates to the will as the Sun shines upon the Earth, with a disuniform and unequal light. Whereupon (as it frequently happens in Courts and Senates) many Decrees are enacted, which at the next Session are repeal'd again, tho with this unhappiness, that somtimes her second thoughts are worse than her first, and that she somtimes retracts that which she should perse∣vere in, as well as perseveres in that which she should retract. But whatever the Retraction really be, 'twas always thought for the best when made, so that he that repents him of his Holi∣ness, as well as he that repents him of his sin, does it upon the change of his Practical Dictate, judging that not to be best now, which before

was so pronounc'd, and consequently, they both own the Truth of the foremention'd Principle, that that choice which is best is not to be re∣scinded.

18. This being firm, all the business in que∣stion now will be, whether he that is Holy has made the best choice or no. And if it shall ap∣pear that he has, then by the Principle just now laid down he ought not, nay he cannot be so much a Contradiction to himself as to rescind it. Now to convince him that he has made the best choice, I desire him to consider, 1st that he has chosen that which God had chosen for him before, so that his choice stands recom∣mended to him by the Authority of infinite and unerring wisdom. And this is foundation e∣nough to warrant a certain (tho implicit) per∣swasion that it must needs be best for him. I say best for him, for God being already possess'd of all possible perfection, cannot act any thing for any self-advantage, and therefore whatsoever he does is for the good of his Creatures. For there is this difference (as Divine Plato excel∣lently well observes) between the Divine love and created love, that the one springs from In∣digency, and the other from fullness and redun∣dancy. And therefore as God did not at first speak this world into being, to raise himself a monument of Power and divine Architecture, so neither does he govern the Rational part of it by the Precepts of Religion out of any self-design,

as if he feasted his nostrils with the perfumes of the Altar, or his ears with the accents of an Hal∣lelujah. For can a man be profitable to God, as he that is wise may be profitable to himself? Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that thou art righteous? or is it gain to him that thou makest thy way perfect? No certainly, and there∣fore when he chalk'd out the ways of Righteous∣ness and Holiness for man to walk in, it could not be for any self end, but purely for the good of man, and consequently (if infinite wisdom be to be trusted) it must be his best choice to be Holy.

19. Secondly let him consider, that the Pra∣ctice of Religion consults a man's whole interest, and partly of its own nature and partly by di∣vine constitution, tends to make him happy in all his capacitys, and consequently must needs be his best choice. As for impious and unjust Practises, if they do at any time promote a man's private and secular interest, yet 'tis always both at the expence of the public, and of his own e∣ternal welfare, and then, what will it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his own Soul? But now this is the peculiar gain of godliness, that it has the promise both of this life and of that which is to come, that it conduces to our advantage both here and hereafter. Interest and Duty are immediatly link'd together in this life, and every Vertue has a natural Sanction of Reward and Punishment respectively attending

it, as I could easily demonstrate, but that it has been already done by many excellent hands, and particularly with Mathema∣tic evidence by a late writer of our own. And altho it happen somtimes through the unreasonableness and injustice of men that Duty and Interest interfere, and that Vertue be defeated of the Portion she is naturally endow'd with, yet she shall recover her own again at the great Assize, at the day of the revelation of the righteous Judgments of God. And altho instead of being rewarded it be our fortune to suffer for righteousness sake, yet we Christians know that it entitles us to one of our Saviours Beatitudes, and we are also well assured from one whose case it was to be so dealt with, that the suffer∣ings of the present time are not worthy to be com∣pared with the glory that shall be reveal••d, and that our light affliction which is but for a moment, worketh for us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. So that whatever difficultys and hardships Religion may somtimes engage a man in, yet when the whole account is cast up, he will find the Practise of Religion as gainful, as the belief of it is rational, that to be Holy is his best choice, and that he has infinite reason to pray in the words of Balaam, Let me die the death of the Righteous, and let my last end be like his.

20. And now one would think, that one who has so great and so apparent reason for his choice as the Religious man has, should not ea∣sily be brought to retract it, and say with those in Malachi, it is vain to serve God, and what pro∣fit is it that I have kept his ordinances? But because 'tis observ'd to be the Nature of Man to be more strongly affected with Punishments than Rewards, I shall for his better establishment in the purposes of Holiness present him with the 2d general Consideration, which is, that if not∣withstanding the excellency of his choice he does retract it, he will not only lose the advan∣tages of it, but also incur an opposite portion of misery, and that in greater measures than other sinners.

21. That he will lose the advantages of his first and best choice, is plain from the whole te∣nour of the Gospel, Perseverance to the end be∣ing the express condition of Salvation. And that he will incur an opposite portion of mise∣ry, is plain from the double Sanction of Re∣wards and Punishments wherewith God has bound us to the observance of his otherwise suf∣ficiently profitable Laws. And altho this be sufficient in the severest trials to preserve us from Apostasy, and when flames of fire surround us to secure our footing in the Holy ground, yet thus far is but to dye the common death of sin∣ners, and to be visited after the visitation of the Impenitent. But now if the Lord make a new

thing, and the Desertor of Piety be punish'd in a greater measure than other sinners, then shall ye understand that this man has provoked the Lord.

22. And that he shall be so punish'd is the peculiar consideration which I shall now insist upon, and which I prove from the heinousness of his crime, Apostasy having in it many de∣grees of evil beyond the common state of sin. For if after they have escaped the Pollutions of the world through the knowledg of the Lord and Sa∣viour Jesus Christ, they are again entangled there∣in and overcome, the latter end is worse with them than the beginning. For it had been better for them not to have kuown the way of Righteousness, than after they have known it to turn from the Holy Commandment deliver'd unto them.

23. But to represent the heinousness of Apo∣stasy a little more particularly, and that this sin above all others may appear to be exceeding sin∣ful, let me desire the unthinking man to con∣sider, 1st, that he that falls back from a course of holy living, does in a special manner grieve the holy Spirit of God. He sacrilegiously takes that from him which he had once most solemn∣ly consecrated to his service, he defiles the seat of his residence, alienates it to profane uses, blots out the Tetragrammaton of the Temple, and suffers it to be no longer Holiness to the Lord. He disinherits his God, disturbs his rest, and forces him to leave the habitation whereof he had once said, This shall be my rest for ever,

here will I dwell for I have a delight therein. Add to this affront of the H. Spirit that resided in him, that he grieves the Angels that attended him, and with much concern and hopes mini∣ster'd to his Salvation. Those disappointed and unsuccessfull Guardians with sorrow cry out to one another as the Angels did in the Jewish Temple, when through many profanations it was no longer fit for their charge, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 let us depart hence. Neither does he disappoint the Tute∣lar Ministers of his Salvation only, but causes universal grief in Heaven. Those kind and compassionate Spirits who before rejoyc'd at his Repentance and Conversion, and began to reckon upon the new accession they should have to the Quire of Heaven, now tune their Harps to the strains of sorrow and lament the disappoint∣ment of their hopes.

24. Consider secondly, that to the sin of Apostasy is added the circumstance of inexcu∣sableness. The man has enter'd within the veil, has seen the inner Beautys of the Holy place, and has been taught the secrets of the king∣dom, his understanding has been instructed, and his will has been entertain'd, he has given proof of his Powers and abilitys and has con∣quer'd the steepest part of the Mount his diffi∣cultys lessen and his strength encreases; so that if now he retreat and slide back to the bottom of the hill, he has nothing whereby to excuse

himself either before God or man, but stands in the highest sense of the phrase 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 self-condemn'd. We generally make some al∣lowances for the miscarriages of those who were never enlightned, and have had no acquain∣tance with the substantial delights of Religion, and the satisfaction of sober counsels, because indeed they knew no better, but when we are told that the wisest of men after a censure of Va∣nity pass'd upon the whole Creation, and a long application of his mind to the excellent Theo∣ries of Moral and Divine Knowledg, was yet to∣ward the evening of his life when the Sun drove hard and the shadows encreas'd, drawn aside by strange women, and that his wisdom departed from him like the Dream wherein it was given him, this indeed we may lament, but cannot excuse.

25. Consider thirdly, that he who falls from a state of Holiness must needs do strange vio∣lence to his Reason. If he be a new Convert he cannot sure without great reluctancy defile that Temple which he has so lately swept and garnish'd. And if he be a Saint of some consi∣derable standing, sure he must be the more un∣willing to break off a long-dated innocence for the unsatisfying pleasure of a moment. For tho (as 'tis well observ'd by Plutarch) men of despe∣rate and bankrupt fortunes have little regard to their expences, because should they save them the tide of their estates wont rise much the

higher, and so they think it impertinent to be frugal, when there's no hopes of being rich. Yet they that see their heaps begin to swell, and that they are within the neighborhood of wealth, think it worth while to be saving and improve their growing stock. But then after a long thrift and sparing, to throw away the hard purchase of many years in one nights gaming, is one of the Prodigys of Folly and Indiscre∣tion. And yet this is the very case of him that lets go his integrity.

26. Consider fourthly and lastly, that the A∣postate has the greatest ingratitude imaginable to aggravate his folly. Indeed every sinner is a very ungrateful person, because he trespasses against his best Friend and Benefactor, against him that made him, against him that died for him, and against him that follows him with the daily offers of his grace and lays stratagems of mercy for his reformation. But the Back sliding man sins against greater mercys, endearments and obligations yet. He has liv'd in the service of his Lord, has receiv'd the earnest of his Spi∣rit, he has been of his Family, nay more, he has been call'd his Friend, he has eaten with him at his Table, he has dwelt under the en∣dearments of familiar converse, he has been with him in his Banquetting house where the Banner that was over him was Love, he has pligh∣ted his faith, given his heart and said with Pas∣sion, My Beloved is mine and I am his, so that to

turn Renegade now is the greatest beseness and ingratitude conceivable, 'tis to betray his Lord and Master after the obligations of Intimacy and Discipleship, 'tis to break the tables of his law after he has been with him on the Mount, and seen the back parts of his glory.

27. Since therefore the Apostate has so ma∣ny peculiar circumstances to aggravate his crime beyond the guilt of common sinners, of how much sorer punishment suppose ye shall he be thought worthy who has thus trodden under foot the Son of God, and has counted the blood of the Covenant wherewith he was sanctify'd an unholy thing, and has done despite to the Spirit of Grace? which was the last general consideration.

28. What now remains, but that upon a se∣rious consideration of the Premises, He that is Holy think himself highly concern'd to be Ho∣ly still. That he lift up the hands that hang down; and sstrengthen the feeble knees, that he hold fast that which he has, that no man take his Crown, that he unravel not his holy vows, nor put him∣self back in the accounts of eternity, that he be not frighted or laught out of his Religion, since 'tis his best and wisest choice, and will be found to be so in spite of all the profane drol∣lery of supposed wits, in the day when wisdom shall be justify'd of all her wisdom. For then shall the Righteous man stand in great boldness before the face of such as have afflicted him and made no account of his labours. And they shall say within

themselves, this was he whom we had somtimes in derision and a proverb of reproach; we fools count∣ed his life madness, and his end to be without ho∣nour. How is he number'd among the children of God, and his lot is among the Saints! Wherefore again, let him that is Holy be Holy still. Let him but maintain his station during his short warfare here on earth, and he shall be hereafter confirm'd both in holiness and happiness, and be fix'd in that Center where he shall for ever rest. For so says the Spirit to the Chur∣ches, Him that overcometh will I make a Pillar in the Temple of my God, and he shall go no more out.

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING HEROIC PIETY, Wherein its Notion is stated and its Practice recommended.

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING HEROIC PIETY.

1. SInce the Practice of Religion in general is not only the Natural Instrument of our present Happiness, but also the only and indi∣spensable condition of our Future, one would think there were but little left for the Orator to do here, the naked efficacy of Self-love, and a serious consideration of our true and main In∣terest, being sufficient to engage us upon Re∣ligious performances. But he that shall under∣take to recommend the Practice of Heroic Pie∣ty, has a much heavier task, not only because he perswades to higher degrees of Vertue, but because he is to address himself wholly to a weaker Principle. For since our interest is se∣cured by the performance of necessary Duty, there remains nothing but a Principle of Gene∣rosity to carry us on to the higher advances, the more glorious Atchievements in Religion. And what small probability there is that it will of∣ten do so, may appear from the ill success of the former and more prevailing Principle. For if

the greatest interest imaginable can prevail with so very few to perform what is indispensa∣bly necessary to secure it, sure there is little hopes that Generosity, which is a much weaker Principle, should engage many upon greater performances.

2. But yet, notwithstanding these discou∣ragements, since our Blessed Saviour has taught us to pray, not only for the performance of God's will in general, but that it be done on Earth as it is in Heaven; that is, with the greatest zeal, readiness and alacrity, with all the degrees of Seraphic ardency that frail Mortality is capable of, I think a Perswasive to Heroic Piety may be a proper and useful undertaking; it being very reasonable we should make that the object of our endeavours, which our Saviour thought fit to make the matter of our Prayers.

3. In discoursing upon this subject, I shall proceed in this Method. 1. I shall state the no∣tion of Heroic Piety, and shew what I mean by it. 2. I shall demonstrate that there is such a thing. And 3. I shall offer some Perswasives to recommend the practice of it.

4. The Notion of Heroic Piety will be best understood by considering what the Moralists mean by Heroic Vertue. For the one carries the same proportion in Religion that the other does in Morality. But before I proceed to explain the Thing, I suppose it will not be amiss to give some short account of the Name. That it is de∣rived

from the Greek word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is very obvious, all the difficulty is concerning the derivation of the Greek word it self. And here I find the Grammarians are very much divided; some de∣rive it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but that seems somwhat hard; others derive it from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because 'twas supposed by the Ancients that the Souls of the Heroes had their abode in the Air, where they had a near prospect of human affairs; and ac∣cordingly Xenon in Laertius, lib. 7. calls Heroes the Souls of wise men separated from their Bo∣dies, and ranging about in the Air; others de∣rive it from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because the Heroes are a kind of terrestrial Gods, according to that definition which Lucian gives of an Hero, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, one that is neither God nor man, but a compound of both. Others derive it from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the name of Juno, who was the President Goddess of the Air, intimating thereby either the Habitation, or the light ae∣real Nature of the Heroes. And this Etymolo∣gy I remember is approv'd of by St. Austin, lib. 10. de Civ. Dei, cap. 21. But methinks the most natural and significant one is that of Plato, who derives it from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because of that ardent and passionate Love which the Heroes are supposed to have for God. And as the word Hero is very doubtful as to its Etymology, so is it also various in its acceptation. Somtimes it is attributed to illustrious and eminent Personages while living, such as act and live above the ordinary strain of

Mortality, and render it a very disputable Point whether they are Gods or men. A Character which Homer gives of the great Hector, Iliad ••••.

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

And in this sense the word Hero is used by He∣siod,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—

Somtimes by Heroes are meant the Souls of wise and good men departed, as is evident from the fore-cited testimony in Laertius. But in the Platonic Philosophy by Heroes is understood a middle sort of Being, inferiour to those whom they stile the Immortal Gods, and superiour to Man; as is to be seen at large in Hierocles.

5. Beyond these three acceptations of the word, I do not know of any other. But this is certain, that in whatsoever sense it is used, it always denotes somthing great and extraordi∣nary. So that from hence 'tis easie to collect what is meant by Heroic Vertue, (viz.) Such a ve∣hement and intense pursuance of a mans last and best end, as engages him upon such excel∣lent and highly commendable actions, which advance him much above the ordinary level of human Nature, and which he might wholly o∣mit, and yet still maintain the Character of a

good man. Aristotle in his Ethics l. 7. c. 1. calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that Vertue that is above us. By which, I suppose, he does not mean that it is above our reach and unattainable, but that it is above our obligation, and that when it is attain'd, it will elevate us above our selves.

6. In proportion to this Notion of Heroic Vertue, I understand by Heroic Piety those ex∣cellent degrees and eminences of Religion, which, tho to arrive at be extremely laudable, yet we may fall short of them without Sin, God having not bound them upon us as parts of Du∣ty, or made them the Conditions of our Salva∣tion, but only recommended them by way of Counsel, and left them as instances of Generosity. Of this sort are those high and singular Exer∣cises of Religion which are the fruits and effects of a profound and steady contemplation of God: Such as are the passionate applications of Seraphic Love, acts of ecstatic joy and compla∣cency in the Perfections of the Divine Nature, holy transports of Zeal and Devotion, Praise and Adoration: earnest contentions and very numerous returns of Prayer, actual references of our most natural and indifferent actions to Gods glory, extraordinary works of Charity, great severities of Mortification and Self-deni∣al, abstemiousness from many lawful Pleasures, perpetual Celebacy, and whatsoever else are the excellent products of a contemplative and affe∣ctionate Religion.

7. Thus far of the Notion of Heroic Piety. I come now to my second Undertaking, which was to shew that there is such a thing. Tho uni∣versality and sincerity of Obedience be indi∣spensably required of every Christian, and con∣sequently every part of Religion obliges under the penalty of Damnation as to its kind, yet that there may be some degrees to the attain∣ment of which we are not so obliged, will evi∣dently appear from the proof of this one single Proposition, That every one is not bound to do what is best. The reasonableness of which Pro∣position appears from the very nature of the thing; for since that which is Best is a Superla∣tive, it necessarily supposes the Positive to be good: And if so, then we are not bound to that which is best, for if we were, then that which is only good would be evil, (it being short of what we are bound to) which is contrary to the sup∣position.

8. This Argument I take to be Demonstra∣tive, and therefore 'twould be a kind of Super∣erogation in me to alledge any more. But how∣ever, for the clearer eviction and stronger con∣firmation of this Assertion, I farther consider, that the Scripture consists of Counsels as well as Commands. Now if some things are matter of Counsel onely, 'tis obvi∣ous to conclude two things. 1. From their being counsell'd, that they are good (no∣thing being matter of Counsel but what is so)

and secondly, from their being only counsell'd, that they do not oblige, and consequently, that there are some degrees of good that we are not obliged to.

9. It is farther observable, that in Scripture there is mention made of a threefold Will of God. Rom. 12. 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, That Will which is good, that which is well∣pleasing, and that which is perfect. The first of these denotes absolute Duty, the two last the various degrees of Perfection and Heroic Excel∣lence. Thus for St. Paul to preach the Gospel to the Corinthians, was an Act of strict Duty which he could not leave undone without in∣curring that woe which he annexes to the omis∣sion of it, 1 Cor. 9. 16. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But to preach without charging them was an instance of Generosity, and in that respect there was room for boasting. Thus again, for a Jew to al∣lot the tenth part of his Revenue every third year toward the relief of the Poor, was an act of express Duty, and in doing of that, he would but satisfie the obligation of the Law; But now if in his charitable contributions he should ex∣ceed that proportion, according to the degrees of the excess, so would the degrees of his Perfe∣ction be. Thus again in the matter of Devo∣tion, daily Prayer is generally concluded to be a Duty, and by some Criticks that it be twice perform'd, in proportion to the returns of the

Jewish Sacrifices, Morning and Evening; But now if a more generously disposed Christian should add a third time, or out of abundance of zeal should come up to the Psalmist's resolution of (Seven times a day will I praise thee) this would be a free-will Offering, well pleasing and of sweet savour, but not commanded.

10. From these and many other instances, which, if necessary, I could easily produce, it plainly appears that Religion does not consist in an indivisible point, but has a Latitude, and is capable of more and less, and consequently there is room for voluntary Oblations and Acts of Heroic Piety.

11. I know it is usually objected here, that what is supposed to be thus Heroically perform'd, is inclusively enjoyn'd by vertue of those compre∣hensive words, (Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy Soul, &c.) But, I conceive, that all which is intended by that phrase, will amount to no more than, First, a sincere love of God, as 'tis opposed to that which is partial and divided; and secondly, such a de∣gree of loving him, as admits of nothing into Competition with him. And thus far reach the Boundaries of indispensable Duty, it being im∣possible that he who does not love God in this sense and degree, should keep his Command∣ments. But beyond this, there are higher de∣grees, which, because we may fall short of with∣out sin, are the more excellent when attain'd.

So that in this Precept of loving God, as in all other instances of Religion, there is a great la∣titude, it being very possible for two Persons to love God sincerely and with their whole Soul, and yet in different measures (which is observ'd even among the Angels, the Seraphins having their name from their excess of Love) nay, for the same Person always to love God sincerely, and yet at some times to exceed himself, and with his Saviour (who to be sure never fail'd of ne∣cessary Duty) to pray yet more earnestly.

12. There is another Objection yet behind, which I think my self concern'd to answer, as well in my own defence as that of my Argument. Some perhaps may be so weak to imagine, that by asserting such a thing as Heroic Piety, and that a Christian may do more than he is com∣manded, I too much favour the Doctrine of Supererogation. But I consider, that for a Man to do more than he is commanded, is an ambigu∣ous expression, and may denote either that he can perform the whole Law of God and more, or that, tho he fail of his Duty in many Instan∣ces, and consequently with the rest of Mankind, is concluded under Sin; Yet in some others he may exceed it, by pressing forward to some de∣grees of excellency he is not obliged to. I do not assert the former of these, but the latter. And I think I have sufficiently proved, that there are certain degrees in Religion, which we are not obliged to under Pain of Sin, and con∣sequently

that he who arrives so far, does (ac∣cording to the latter notion of the Phrase) do more then he is commanded.

13. Having in the foregoing Periods stated the Notion of Heroic Piety, and demonstrated that there is such a thing, I proceed now to my third and last undertaking, which was to offer some Perswasives to recommend the Practise of it. First then, I consider that Religion is the Perfection of a Man, the improvement and ac∣complishment of that part of him wherein he resembles his Maker, the pursuance of his best and last end, and consequently his Happiness. And will a man set bounds to his Happiness? Will he be no more happy than he is command∣ed, no more than what will just serve to secure him from a miserable Eternity? Is not Happi∣ness desirable for it self, as well as for the avoid∣ing of Misery? Why then do we deal with it as with dangerous Physic, weighing it by Grains and Scruples and nice Proportions? Why do we drink so moderately of the River of Paradise, so sparingly of the Well of Life? Are we afraid of making too nigh advances to the State of An∣gels, of becoming too like God, of antedating Heaven? Are we affraid our Happiness will flow in too thick upon us, that we shall not bear up against the Tide, but sink under the too power∣ful enjoyment? Hereafter indeed, when we are blest with the Beatific Vision, and the Glories of the Divine Brightness shall flash too strong upon

our Souls, so that our Happiness begins to be lessen'd by its greatness; We may then with the Angels that attend the Throne, veil our Faces, and divert some of the too exuberant blessed∣ness: But now in this Region we are far enough from being under the Line, there is no danger of such Extremity, but rather the contrary, and therefore it would be now most advisable for us to be as Happy, and to that end, as Religious as we can.

14. Secondly, I consider, that since God, out of the abundance of his overflowing and commu∣nicative Goodness, was pleas'd to create and design man for the best of Ends, the fruition of himself in endless Happiness, and since he has prescribed no other Conditions for the attain∣ment of this Happiness; but that we would live happily here in this State of Probation, having made nothing our Duty but what would have been best for us to do whether he had comman∣ded it or no, and has thereby declared, that he is so far only pleas'd with our Services to him as they are beneficial to our selves; this must needs be a most endearing engagement to one that has the least spark of Generosity or Ingenuity, to do somthing for the sake of so good a God, beyond the Measures of Necessity, and the re∣gards of his main and final Interest. This is the only Tribute of Gratitude we are capable of paying God for giving us such good, such rea∣sonable, and righteous Laws. Had the condi∣tions

of our eternal welfare been never so hard, arbitrary, and contradictory to our present Happiness, yet mere interest would engage us to perform necessary Duty, and shall we do no more out of a principle of Love to our excellent Lawgiver, for making our present Happiness the Condition of our future? Shall the Love of God constrain us to do no more then what we would do merely for the Love of our selves? shall we stint our Performances to him, who sets no Measures to his Love of us? Can our Generosi∣ty be ever more seasonably employ'd than in endeavouring to please him in extraordinary Measures, whose Pleasure is to see us happy even while we please him? For so is the will of the wise and good Governour of the World, that in serving him we should serve our selves, and like Adam in his dressing and cultivation of Para∣dise, at the same time discharge the Employ∣ment which God sets us about, and consult our own Convenience: So that it fares with us in our religious Exercises as with the Votary that sacrifices at the Altar, who all the while he pleases and serves his God, enjoys the perfumes of his own Incense.

15. Thirdly, I consider, that every man has a restless Principle of Love implanted in his Nature, a certain Magnetism of Passion, where∣by (according to the Platonic and true notion of Love) he continually aspires to somthing more excellent than himself, either really or

apparently, with a design and inclination to perfect his Being. This affection and disposition of Mind all Men have, and at all times. Our o∣ther Passions ebb and flow like the Tide, have their Seasons and Periods like intermitting Fea∣vers. But this of Love is as constant as our Ra∣dical heat, as inseparable as thought, as even and equal as the Motions of Time. For no man does or can desire to be happy more at one time than at another, because he desires it always in the highest degree possible. 'Tis true, his Love, as to particular objects, may increase or decrease, according to the various apprehensions he has of their excellencies; but then, like Motion in the Universe, what it loses in one part it gains in another; so that in the whole it remains al∣ways alike, and the same. Now this Amorous Principle which every man receives with his Soul, and which is breath'd into him with the breath of Life, must necessarily have an object about which it may exercise it self, there being no such thing in Love (if in Nature) as an Ele∣ment of Self-sufficient Fire. For tho we may ea∣sily and truly frame an abstract notion of Love or Desire in general, yet if we respect its real existence, we shall as soon find First Matter without Form, as Love without a particular Ob∣ject. And, as 'tis necessary to the very being of Love that it have an object, so is it to our con∣tent and happiness, that it be a proportionate and satisfying one; for otherwise that passion

which was intended as an instrument of happi∣ness, will prove an affliction and torment to us. Now there is but one such object to be found, and that is God. In the application of our Pas∣sions to other things, the advice of the Poet is exceeding necessary,

Quicquid amas cupias non placuisse nimis. Martial.

That we should be very cautious how far we suffer our selves to be engaged in the love of any thing, because there is nothing but disappointment in the enjoyment, and uncertainty in the possession. We must needs therefore be miserable in our Love, unless God be the object of it. But nei∣ther is our happiness sufficiently secured by mak∣ing God the object of our Love, unless we con∣center our whole affections upon him, and (in the strictest sense of the Phrase) love him with all our Heart and with all our Soul. For otherwise, whatever portion of our Love does not run in this Channel, must necessarily fix upon dispro∣portionate and unsatisfying objects, and conse∣quently be an instrument of discontent to us. 'Tis necessary therefore to the compleating of our happiness, that that object should engross all our affections to it self, which only can satis∣fie them; and (according to the comparison of an ingenious Plato∣nist) that our minds should have the same habi∣tude

to God that the Eye has to Light. Now the Eye does not only love Light above other things, but delights in nothing else. I confess, such an absolute and entire Dedication of our love to God as this, is not always practicable in this Life. It is the priviledg and happiness of those confirm'd Spirits who are so swallow'd up in the Comprehensions of Eternity, and so perpe∣tually ravish'd with the Glories of the Divine Beauty, that they have not the power to turn a∣side to any other object. But tho this Superla∣tive Excellency of Divine Love be not attaina∣ble on this side of the thick darkness, it being the proper effect of open Vision, and not of Con∣templation; yet however, by the help of this latter, we may arrive to many degrees of it, and the more entire and undivided our love is to God, the fewer disappointments and dissatisfa∣ctions we shall meet with in the World, which is a very strong engagement to Heroie Piety.

16. Fourthly, I consider, that the degrees of our Reward shall be proportionable to the de∣grees of our Piety: We shall reap as plentifully as we sow, and at the great day of Retribution, we shall find, that besides the general Collation of Happiness, peculiar Coronets of Glory are prepared for Eminent Saints. Indeed, all hearty and sincere lovers of God and Religion shall partake of the glories of the Kingdom; but some shall sit nearer the Throne than others, and en∣joy a more intimate perception of the Divine

Beauty. All the true Followers of Jesus shall in∣deed feast with him at the great Supper, but some shall be placed nearer to him than others, and still there shall be a Beloved Disciple that shall lean on his Bosom. I know this Doctrine concerning different degrees of Glory, is (and indeed what is there that is not) very much que∣stion'd by some, and peremptorily deny'd by o∣thers; but since it is so highly agreeable to the goodness and bounty of God, and to the Catho∣lic Measures of Sense and Reason; and is so mightily-favour'd, if not expresly asserted in many places of Scripture, I shall not here go a∣bout to establish the truth of it, but taking it for granted, do urge this as another considera∣tion of great moment, toward encouraging the practice of Heroic Piety.

17. Fifthly, and lastly, I consider, that We have indeed but very little time to serve God in. The Life of man at longest is but short, and considering how small a part of it we live, much shorter. If we deduct from the Computation of our Years (as we must do, if we will take a true estimate of our Life) that part of our time which is spent in the incogitancy of Infancy and Childhood, the impertinence and heedlesness of Youth, in the necessities of Nature, Eating, Drinking, Sleeping, and other Refreshments; in business and worldly Concerns, engagements with Friends and Relations, in the offices of Ci∣vility and mutual intercourse; besides a thou∣sand

other unnecessary avocations: we shall find that there is but a small portion left even for the Retirements of Study, for our improvement in Arts and Sciences, and other intellectual ac∣complishments. But then if we consider what great disbursements of our time are made upon them also, we shall find that Religion is crowded up into a very narrow compass; so narrow, that were not the rewards of Heaven matter of ex∣press Revelation, 'twould be the greatest Presum∣ption imaginable to hope for them upon the condition of such inconsiderable Services. Since then our time of serving God is so very short, so infinitely disproportionate to the rewards we expect from him, 'tis but a reasonable piece of ingenuity to work with all our might, and do as much in it as we can: to supply the poverty of Time by frugal management and intenseness of affection, to serve God earnestly, vigorously, and zealously; and in one days Devotion to abbre∣viate the ordinary Piety of many years. 'Tis said of the Devil, that he prosecuted his malicious designs against the Church with greater earnestness and vigour, because he knew he had but a short time. And shall not the same consideration prevail with a generous Soul to do as much for God and Religion, as the Devil did against them? 'Tis a shame for him that has but a short part to act upon the Stage, not to perform it well, especially when he is to act it but once. Man has but one state of Probation,

and that of an exceeding short continuance, and therefore, since he cannot serve God long, he should serve him much, employ every minute of his life to the best advantage, thicken his De∣votions, hallow every day in his Kalendar by Re∣ligious exercises, and every action in his Life by holy references and designments; for let him make what haste he can to be wise, Time will out-run him. This is a Consideration of infinite moment to him that duly weighs it; and he that thus numbers his days, will find great reason to apply his heart to more than ordinary degrees of Wisdom.

CONTEMPLATION AND LOVE. OR, The Methodical Ascent of the Soul to God, by steps of Meditation.

—Nisi ad haec admitterer, Non fuerat operae pretium nasci.

Senec. Nat. Quaest. l. 1.

Contemplation the First.

That 'tis necessary Man should have some end.

1. IN the Depth of Solitude and Silence, hav∣ing withdrawn my self not only from all worldly Commerce, but from all thoughts con∣cerning any thing without my own Sphere; I retire wholly into my self, and there speculate the Composition of my Intellectual nature.

2. And here besides that faculty of Perception whereby I apprehend objects, whether Material or Immaterial, without any Material species; (which in the Cartesian Dialect I call Pure Intel∣lect) and that other of apprehending objects as present, under a corporeal image or represen∣tation; (which I distinguish from the other power of Perception by the name of Imagina∣tion) I say, besides these two, I observe an Ap∣petitive Faculty, whereby I incline to Apparent good; and that either by a bare act of Propen∣sion, or endeavour to unite with the agreeable object; which answers to Pure Intellect, and may be call'd Will or rather Volition) or by such a propension of the Soul as is also accompany'd with a Commotion of the Blood and Spirits; which answers to Imagination, and is the same with the Passion of Love.

3. And of this I further meditate, and by self reflexion experiment, that altho the Perceptive Faculty be not always in actual exercise, or at least not in the same degree of it. (For, if ac∣cording to the Cartesian Hypothesis there be no intermission of Cogitation, yet 'tis most certain that its applications are not always equal and uniform) tho this I say be true as to the Perce∣ptive; yet, I find by attending to the opera∣tions of my nature, that the Appetitive faculty is not only always in Act, but in the same de∣gree of intension and Application. As it never has any total intermission, so neither is it sub∣ject (as indeed every thing else in man is) to ebbs and flows, but acts uniformly as well as con∣stantly. This Amorous Biass and Endeavour of the Soul is like that stock of Motion which the French Philosopher supposes the Universe at first endow'd with, which continues always at the same rate, not to be abated or increas'd. Not that this equality of Love is to be understood in reference to particular objects, any more than that of Motion in reference to particular Bodyes; but only, that it gains in one part, as much as it loses in another, so as in the whole to remain equal and uniform.

4. For however various and inconstant I may be in my love of particular objects, accord∣ing to the various apprehension I have of their respective excellencyes; yet certainly I persue Happiness in general with the same earnestness

and vigour, and do not love or wish well to my self more at one time, than at another.

5. And indeed since all my inconstancy in the prosecution of particular objects proceeds from the variety of my Apprehensions concern∣ing their Excellency; and the only reason why I withdraw my Affection from this or that thing is, because I discern or suspect that Happiness not to be there which I expected, it is hence plainly argued à posteriori, that I stand at all times equally affected towards Happiness it self. As he that is therefore only variously affected toward the means according as he variously ap∣prehends their serviceableness to the End, may be truly said to affect the End it self always alike.

6. Nor can it possibly be otherwise than that I should thus point at Happiness with an equal Verticity; because I always affect it in the high∣est degree that is possible, which admits of no Latitude. For I consider my self here as a neces∣sary Agent, and accordingly as such can nei∣ther suspend the whole Act, nor any one degree of it, but must needs operate to the utmost stretch of my Power. This Spring of my Soul (my Appetitive Faculty) is always at its full bent, and accordingly presses and endeavours with its whole Elasticity.

7. For since Good or Happiness is the utmost object of my Appetitive, it must needs employ its whole Power, otherwise so much of it as is

not in act will be for ever uncapable of being so; (there being nothing left beyond that to bring it into act) and consequently will be planted in me in vain, which I think absurd to admit; and therefore find it necessary to con∣clude that my Appetitive is wholly employ'd in the love of Happiness; or that I always love it to the utmost capacity of my faculty.

8. Since therefore I find in my self an Appe∣titive Faculty which is always in actual exercise, and that after an even and equal measure; and not only so, but also in the very Height of acti∣vity and Invigoration; I am by the clue of Me∣ditation further led to conclude, that there must be some Center for this Weight; some ob∣ject or other, either within or without me, of such ample, copious and solid excellence as may answer to the full extent of my desires, bear the whole stress of my inclining Soul, and such as may well deserve to be call'd the End of man.

9. For I cannot think it any way consistent with the goodness of that great Being which call'd me out of the womb of Nothing to what I am, to plant in me such an Amorous Principle which at no time lies Dormant, but is always e∣qually awake, and acting with the utmost ple∣nitude of its vigour, supposing there were no proportionable object in the whole Latitude of Entity for it to fix and bottom upon. It being only a greater preparation and qualification for misery to have inlarged Faculties and Ap∣petites

when there is nothing to afford them a∣greeable satisfaction. Which however some may be justly subjected to for their after-deme∣rit, can yet never be reasonably suppos'd to be the Antecedent will of God.

10. And this I am further induced to believe, when I consider how the great Author of Na∣ture has made provision for the entertainment of our animal Faculties and particular Appe∣tites: All our senses, Seeing, Hearing, Tasting, Smelling and Touching, have their proper ob∣jects and opportunities of pleasure respectively. Which makes it very unlikely that our great and general Appetite of being Happy, should be the only one that is disinherited and unpro∣vided for. Especially considering that the en∣joyment and indulgence of any of the rest is then only and in such instances and circumstan∣ces restrain'd, when the greater interests of Hap∣piness are thereby cross'd and defeated. Which argues, that the true Happiness of Man is the thing chiefly regarded by God; and conse∣quently, that there is a Provision for that great Appetite of his of being Happy, as well as for any of the rest.

11. Which is yet further confirm'd to me, when I consider, that there is an exemplification of it in the material part of the universe. The most ponderous Body that is has its Center to∣wards which it always presses, and in which it settles with full acquiescence. Now since there

is somthing in Spiritual Beings which corre∣sponds to weight in Bodies, (according to that of St. Austin, Amor tuus est Pondus tuum) the Analogy of the thing perswades me to think that there is also somthing which shall be to them in the nature of a Center.

12. And as the contrary is inconsistent with the Divine goodness, so neither can I reconcile it to the Wisdom of him who made all things in Number, Weight and Measure, to be so much out in his Proportions as to create an Appetite too high, vigorous, and craving, for the excel∣lency and fullness of any object. This would be like making a Body too heavy for the Cen∣tral Poise; or as if the Spring of a Watch should be made too strong for the wheel, or any other such disproportionate operations: which nei∣ther comports with the Geometry of the Divine Mind, nor with the exact Harmony of his other works.

13. The Conclusion therefore from these Pre∣mises is, that Man is not as a Body for ever, roll∣ing on in an Infinite vacuity; or as a Needle continually trembling for an embrace: but that he has his proper end and Center; to which 'tis possible for him to arrive, and in which as im∣possible for him when once arrived, not fully to Acquiesce.

The Prayer.

MY God, My Creator, who by that active Principle of Love and immense Desire thou hast interwoven with my Nature, hast given me fair grounds to conclude that there must be some End on which I may fix and Cen∣ter with the full stress of my Faculties; point out to me by the guidance of thy Spirit this my true End, direct me in the persuance, and bring me to the attainment of it. Let me nei∣ther mistake my true Center, nor by any irre∣gular or oblique motion decline from it. But as thou hast appointed me for Happiness, and fur∣nish'd me with natural Capacitys of receiving it, so let it be thy good pleasure to possess my Soul with such a serious and diligent Concern for my great interest, that I may not by any de∣fault of mine fail of that excellent good which will fill all the emptinesses of my Soul, leave no desire unsatisfy'd, and no trouble I can under∣go in the quest of it unrewarded. O suffer me not to be disappointed of that excellent, that only good: but as thou hast made me aspire towards it infinitely, so grant I may enjoy it eternally, for thy great love and goodness sake,

Amen.

Contemplation the Second.

That 'tis impossible Man should be his own end.

1. BEing from my yesterdays Contempla∣tion of my Intellectual Nature, and the stock of desires therein implanted, led to this Conclusion, that 'tis necessary man should have some end; I now consider that 'tis but to carry on the thred of the same Contemplation a little further, and 'twill as evidently appear, that 'tis impossible man should be his own end.

2. For while I stand fix'd in the Contempla∣tion of my self, I observe that I have this Ap∣petitive Principle, not only in such a manner as answers to Weight in Bodies, but also so as to be analogous to gravitation, that is, to Weight not only in actu primo, but in actu secundo, as it denotes such an inclination of Body whereby not only one part presses against another, but whereby the whole leans and endeavours to somthing beyond the bounds of its own circum∣ference.

3. For besides Acts of self-complacency, where∣by I delight and please my self in the perfe∣ctions of my Nature, and turn as it were upon my own Axis; I find in me a great deal of Ex∣tatical Love, which continually carryes me out

to good without my self; which I endeavour to close and unite with, in hopes of bettering my present state, and of supplying from without what I seek, but cannot find within.

4. Hence therefore I conclude that I am not (whatever complacencies I may somtimes take in my self) a Central or self-terminative Being, it being as impossible that what is so should love any thing without, (as love is taken for Desire or Aspiring to good) as that a Body should gravitate in the Center. That which loves any thing without, wants somthing within. If therefore I gravitate I am off from the Center, consequently not my own Center.

5. And that I cannot ever Center in my self and be my own End, is yet further evidenc'd to me, when I contemplate the great Disproportion between my Appetitive and all my other Perfe∣ctions whether of Body or of Mind. I desire both more kinds of pleasure than they all can afford, and more Degrees of pleasure in the same kind. Which must necessarily be, because my Desires are extended to all possible good, but my reall endowments and perfections are infi∣nitely short of that extent. And by conse∣quence, my Desires cannot be cramp'd within the narrow bounds of my own Sphere, but will of necessity run out farther, even as far as there is good without it.

6. And as there is a manifest disproportion between my stock of self-perfection and my Ap∣petitive,

as to its objective Latitude (viz.) the kinds and degrees of Happiness; so is there no less as to the intenseness of its Acts. This Appe∣titive of mine (as was remark'd in the preceding Contemplation) is always in an equal invigo∣ration, and burns with an even and uniform heat; but I have not within my self fuel enough to maintain this flame in an equal height. I always equally desire, but I am not always e∣qually desirable: partly because I am somtimes (even in my own partial judgment) in a Con∣dition of less excellence both as to my Morals and Intellectuals than at other times; and part∣ly, because the stock of my Perfections tho 'twere possible they could be always alike as my Desires are, yet being both Finite in Nature; and Few in Number, cannot bear a long and unin∣terrupted enjoyment, and appear still equally grateful under it, any more than a short Poem tho in it self equally excellent, can please equal∣ly after a Million of Repetitions.

7. Hence it comes to pass, that I do not al∣ways take an equal Complacency in my self, but am oftentimes (especially after long retire∣ments) apt to be melancholy and to grow wea∣ry of my own company; so that I am fain to lay aside my self (as it were) for a while, and relieve the penury of Solitude with the variety of Company, and so whet my appetite toward my self as I do toward my meat, by Fasting and abstemiousness.

8. Since therefore I always desire equally, but not my self; (being not upon the two ac∣counts before mention'd always equally de∣sirable) it follows, that the steddiness and even∣ness of this my Flame must depend upon some other Fuel, good which is without me. And con∣sequently, I do not terminate in my self, and so am not my own End.

The Prayer.

MY God, my Creator, who hast in thy great wisdom furnish'd me with Desires too large and vehement for the other Perfections of my Nature, and hast thereby made it impossi∣ble that I should ever be my own End; grant me effectually to consider the Barrenness and insufficiency of my own Nature, and how un∣able I am upon my own solitary stock to satisfy the importunity of my Soul: that so I may not be transported with vain complacencies▪ nor endeavour to bottom my self upon such a Cen∣ter as will moulder away under me and deceive me. Let me ever weigh my self in a true Bal∣lance, and be as observant of my imperfections as of my excellencies. Let me be ever thank∣full for the one, and humble for the other. What ever else I am ignorant of, O grant me

a true understanding of my self; that I may not to the vanity of my Nature add levity of Spirit, nor become despicable in thy eyes by being too pretious in my own.

Amen, Amen.

Contemplation the Third.

That 'tis impossible that any other Created good should be the end of man.

1. HAving by the light of Contemplation discover'd the necessity of man's hav∣ing some end, and the utter impossibility of his ever being his own End; I am now concern'd to look beyond the Orb of my own Perfections, and to consider, whether the whole Latitude of the Creation can afford any good that will ter∣minate the Amorous Bent of my Soul, and where∣in I may sweetly and securely rest as in my end or Center.

2. And this I am the more induced to en∣quire into, first, because I observe that the ge∣nerality of men and those some of the most sa∣gacious, thinking, and inquisitive, do persue many interests in this visible and sublunary world (which yet is the most cheap and incon∣siderable part of the Creation) with as much fervency, vigour and assiduity, as they could possibly do were it the true End of man. So that

one would think by the quickness of their motion they were nigh the Center.

3. Secondly, because I observe concerning my self, that there are some few things in the world which I love with great passion, and de∣light in with somthing like satisfaction and ac∣quiescence. Such as are Conversation with select Friends, or men of harmonical and tunable dis∣positions; reading of close and fine-wrought Discourses, solitary walks and Gardens, the magnificence of the Heavens, the Beauty of the Spring; and above all, majestic and well com∣posed Music. Which last, could I enjoy it in its highest perfection and without interruption, would, I am apt to fancy, terminate my desires and make me happy; at least I am well assured I should pity more than I should envy.

4. Thirdly, because I consider that the great Author of Nature is brought in by Moses com∣mending upon a deliberate review all the works of his hands. That which before the divine In∣cubation was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Solitude and inanity, af∣ter the Spirit had moved upon the waters he pronounc'd 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Superlatively good. So very Superlatively good, that even the glory of Solo∣mon, in the judgment of him who was both greater and wiser than he, was not comparable to one of Nature's meanest flowers. And if the Beauty and variety of the Creature was so con∣siderable as to merit approbation from him that made it, what is there of our Love and Com∣placency

that it may not challenge? That which can but please God, may well be sup∣pos'd able to satisfy man: That wherein the Creator delights, the Creature one would think might fully rest and acquiesce in.

5. By such considerations as these when sole∣ly attended to, I have been somtimes almost prevail'd upon to think that there is good e∣nough in the Creation of God, if amass'd toge∣ther and fully enjoy'd, to employ the whole activity of my Love, and fix the entire weight of my Soul. But yet when I consider experience, and compare the Aspirations of my Nature with the goodness of the Creation, I am driven to conclude, that altho the Creatures of God (whatever the Manichees say to the contrary) are all good enough to afford matter for enter∣tainment and praise, yet they cannot detain and give Anchorage to the Soul of man. The mo∣tion of the Appetite may be somwhat resisted by created good, and its force a little broken, but it will soon sink through, like a stone through a watery medium. Some repast may be found in the Creature; but as for complete satisfaction and termination of desires the Sea saith it is not in me, and the Depth saith it is not in me. All that God ever did or ever can make will prove insufficient for this purpose, and come under that decretory Sentence of the wise Preacher, Vanity of Vanitys, all is Vanity.

6. And this is first confirm'd to me from ex∣perience, and that not my own only, but of all mankind. For as the weight of my affections (as was observ'd in yesterdays Contemplation) is extatical and inclines to good without my self; so does it press beyond that which is created too; and consequently argues, that the Creation without me can no more be my Center, than I can be to my self.

7. For not to insist upon the great Emptiness of Fruition, that every flower in this Paradise of God shrinks assoon as touch'd; that whatever Reversions and Prospects of happiness we may have, 'tis yet seldom known that any man pro∣nounces himself tolerably happy in the present; that men are not pleas'd with that themselves, for which they envy another: not to insist, I say, on these and the like, did every any man, tho never so fortunate in his designs and never so well pleas'd in his attainments, find himself able to confine his desires within the sphere of that good he was possess'd of? 'Tis true indeed, he may desire no more of the same, he may have so much of Riches as to desire no more Riches, so much of Honour as to desire no more Honour; but he cannot have so much of any thing as not simply to desire on further. That is in short, he may be satiated, but not satisfy'd.

8. And this we have confirm'd by the inge∣nuous confession of one, who dug as low for this Treasure as ever man did or could, that ran∣sack'd

the whole Creation, and seem'd to make it his profess'd business to extract if possible this divine Elixir, not as a Voluptuary but as a Phi∣losopher, for Experiment and Curiosity more than for sensuality and pleasure. But what was the issue? Why, after the chargeable Operation the deluded Chymist sits down, recounts his gains, and finds this to be the sum of them, that his judgment indeed was inform'd, but not that his desires were satisfy'd; that he had with all his cost bought only this piece of wisdom, to know the vanity of the Creation so far as to give o're all further search, and lose no more time, cost and labour in a fruitless experiment.

9. And that what this great Enquirer after Happiness experimented is every mans case, I am further assured, when I contemplate that the greatest Favorites of Fortune, those who have had the world at command, and could en∣joy all that is good in it with almost as little trouble as 'twas created, at a words speaking, have yet all along been subject to melancholy, especially after some notable enjoyment, as the Grecian Hero wept when he had conquer'd the world. Now what should the cause of this be, but that they find themselves empty in the midst of their fullness; that they Desire further than they enjoy; that however every sense about them be feasted to the Height, yet their remains a ge∣neral Appetite, that of being Happy, which is not satisfy'd; and not only so, but because they

suspect withall (as indeed they have very good reason, having tasted the utmost of Natures en∣tertainment) that it never shall be. And from this Desire and Despair proceeds their melan∣choly and dejection of Spirit. And to this pur∣pose I call to mind a very remarkable story recorded by Eusebius Nierembergius, in his book De Arte Voluntatis, concerning an East∣ern Emperour, who was minded to try the same experiment upon his son as Solomon did upon himself, and to see how far the accom∣modations of Life might go towards true Feli∣city. He accordingly train'd him up from his infancy in magnificent Apartments, studiously remov'd from him all pitiable objects that he might not have so much as a Notion of misery, humour'd him in every Punctilio, and furnish'd him with whatsoever he either did wish for, or might be suppos'd to take pleasure in; till at length the unfortunately Happy young man ob∣serving himself to be still in Desires, and that in a state of all possible worldly affluence, could no longer flatter himself with imaginary Pro∣spects, but concluded that no condition would ever mend the matter, and so fell into extreme Melancholy and Despair.

10. Now I consider, that if mean Persons on∣ly were subject to Melancholy, the Desire from whence it proceeded might be accounted for another way; namely, from their not having so much of created good as if possess'd might be

thought sufficient to satisfy. But when men that sit on the top of Fortune's wheel, and drink at the head fountains of Nature, are yet liable to melancholy dejections, 'tis to me a plain ar∣gument that the cause of this melancholy, their Desires, proceeds from a Deficiency in the things themselves; not that they are straitned in their possessions, but that the things which they pos∣sess are weigh'd in the Ballance and found wanting.

11. Thus far is this Truth attested to by Ex∣perience. But I am yet further assured of it when I compare the Aspirations of my Nature with the goodness of the Creation; for when I do so, I find they are very disproportionate. 'Twas a Celebrated Problem among the ancient Mytho∣logists, what was the strongest thing, what the wisest, and what the greatest? Concerning which 'twas thus determin'd, that the strongest thing was Necessity, the wisest was Time, and the great∣est was the Heart of Man. And well may that be call'd the greatest thing whose capacity can take in the whole Creation, and yet like the immense space, remain still an unreplenish'd Em∣ptiness.

12. For my Desires are circumscribed with no limits, but run on indefinitely to all possible good. But now the good of the Creation, like the Creation it self, is bounded; the very notion of a Creature involving imperfection, as much as Body does Circumscription and termination. Hence therefore I conclude, that not only all

the good of the Creation tho collected toge∣ther into Extract and Spirit by the Chymistry of its great Author, would be insufficient to afford me perfect Satisfaction; but that 'tis not in the Power of him that is Omnipotent to Create any good that can satisfy my Desires, any more than to create a Body that shall fill Immense space. And consequently, that 'tis impossible that any created good should be the end of man.

The Prayer.

MY God, My Creator, who hast made all things for the present Entertainment, but nothing for the End of Man; grant I may ever justly discern between the goodness and the vanity of thy Creatures, that I may not either by not heeding to the former become unthank∣ful, or by not heeding to the latter, become I∣dolatrous. O keep this Conviction still awake in me how insufficient all created good is to∣wards true Felicity; that I may not any longer with the mistaken Votaries of thy Son's Sepul∣cher, seek the Living among the Dead, Light in the Regions of Darkness; and that I may no longer labour for that which is not bread. Let me not add care, labour and toil to the misery of unquench'd Thirst and unsatisfy'd Desires:

but since I am certain never to find Rest in the bosom of thy Creation, grant I may be so wise at least, as not to weary my self more in the fruitless persuit of it. Withdraw, I beseech thee, my expectations of Happiness from all the works of thy hands: and fix them there on∣ly, where there is no disappointment or delu∣sion, even in the true Center of all Desire: for the sake of thy tender compassions,

Amen.

Contemplation the Fourth.

That God who is the Author of man, is likewise his true End and Center.

1. WHen I Contemplate the Nature of man, and consider how the Desire of Happiness is interwoven with it; that Love is strong as Death and im∣portunate as the Grave; that there is a vehement and constant Verticity in the Soul towards per∣fect good, which begins assoon, and is as im∣mortal as her self; and withall, how dispropor∣tionately this Amorous disposition of the Soul is gratify'd by any entertainment whether do∣mestic or forreign she can meet with in the Cir∣cle of created good: I find it necessary to con∣clude, that the great Being who commanded me to exist, is so every way perfect and all-suf∣ficient as to answer that vast stock of desires our Natures come fraught withall into the world; since otherwise (which is absurd to sup∣pose) of all the Creatures in it Man would be the most miserable.

2. For what man of thoughts is there, who af∣ter a thorough Conviction that he can neither get rid of his desires, nor among the Provisions of Nature have them fully gratify'd, would not

immediatly throw up his Title to Immortality, if he thought himself arriv'd to the Meridian of his Happiness, and that he must never expect to be in a better Condition than he is? For to have enlarg'd desires and nothing to satisfy them, is such a contrivance for misery, that 'tis thought by some to be the Portion of Hell, and to make up the very Formality of Damnation.

3. But to our great Consolation 'tis wholly in our own power whether it shall be always so with us, or no. There is a Being whose perfe∣ctions are answerable to our Desires. He that made us can satisfy every Appetite he has plan∣ted in us, and he that is Happy in reflecting up∣on himself can make us so too, by the direct view of his Glory. He can entertain all our facultys; our understandings as he is Truth, and our wills as he is goodness; and that in the Highest de∣gree, because he is infinite in both. He can more than employ all our Powers in their utmost Ele∣vation, for he is every way Perfect and all-suf∣ficient, yea he is altogether Lovely.

4. But to evince more particularly and di∣stinctly that God is the true End of man, I shall consider, whether the conditions requisite to his being so are found in him. Now these can be no other than these two in general, 1st, that he be absolutely good and perfect in himself, so as to be able to fill and satisfy the whole ca∣pacity of our Desires; and 2ly, that he be wil∣ling that man shall partake of this his Tran∣scendent

Fullness, so as actually one time or other to fix the weight of his Appetite and be∣come his Center. If therefore these two con∣ditions are found in God, he has all that is re∣quisite to make him our End. And that they are, is now to be made appear.

5. First then, that God is absolutely good and perfect in himself, so as to be able to fill and satisfy the whole capacity of our desires. There are several Topics in the Metaphysics from whence I might infer this, but I shall con∣fine my present speculation to this one, that God is the First Being. This is a very reasona∣ble Postulatum; it being too obvious to need any proof, that there is a First Being, or, that by the First Being is meant God. It remains therefore, that we try what advantage may be made of it.

6. When therefore I consider God as the First Being, I am from thence in the first place led to conclude, that he has eminently and in a most excellent manner in himself all kinds and degrees of perfection, that exist loosely and se∣perately in all second Beings. And that, not only because the Effect cannot possibly exceed the vertue of the cause, any more than it can proceed from no cause: (which is the ground Cartesius builds upon, when he proves the exi∣stence of God from the objective reality of his Idea) but because I further observe that in the Scale of Being all ascension is by addition, and,

that what is dispers'd in the Inferiour, is collect∣ed, and that after a more excellent manner, in the Superiour. Thus in Vegetables there is bare life, in Sensitives Vegetative life and sense, in Rationals Vegetative life sense and reason: and all this either formally or eminently with In∣telligence in Angels. And since there is such an Harmonical Subordination among second Be∣ings, so that the Superiour contains all the per∣fection of the Inferiour, with a peculiar excel∣lence of its own superadded; I think I have fair grounds to conclude, that the absolutely First Being has in his rich Essence all the scatter'd excellencies of the subordinate ones in a more perfect manner than they themselves have, with some peculiar excellence of his own besides.

Now tho a Being thus accumulatively per∣fect and excellent, would be beyond all Con∣ception, great and glorious, and would employ an Eternity in Contemplation and Love; we have yet seen but an Arme of this Sea of Beauty, and been enlightned only with the Back-parts of his Glory. For if God be the First Being, as is here supposed, I may further conclude that he is also the First Good: (Good and Being being convertible, and every thing having so much Good in it as it has of Entity and no more) and if he be the First Good, I cannot see how this Conclusion can be avoided, that he is Infinitely Good.

8. For I consider, that the First Good can have no Cause of that Goodness which it has: otherwise, it being necessary that the Cause of Good should be Good, it would not be the First. And if the First Good can have no cause of its Goodness, it can likewise have no cause of the Termination of it, since what has no cause abso∣lutely and simply, cannot have a cause in any particular respect; and if it has no cause of its Termination it must necessarily be interminate or infinite, and Consequently God, who is the First Good, is infinitely Good.

9. And now breath a while my Soul; and consider what a rich Mine of Good thou hast Sprung. Thou hast found out a Being, who is not only the Ideal as well as Efficient cause of all created excellence; but who is Infinitely Good and excellent. This is he whose great Perfe∣ction not only contains and infinitely exceeds, but Eclipses and quite Extinguishes all the Beau∣ty of the Creature; so that (as the express Image of this great Excellence informs us) there is none Good, but one, which is God. This is he whose Good is incomprehensible by the understand∣ing, and inexhaustible by the will and affecti∣ons of man. This is the celebrated 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Aristotle, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Plato, and the El Shaddai of the Hebrews. This is the great 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the universal Plenitude, whose Hap∣piness is consummated within his own Circle; who supports himself upon the Basis of his own

All-Sufficiency, and is his own End and Center.

10. And now what is there more requisite to qualify him for being mine also but this only; that he be willing that man shall partake of this his transcendent fullness, so as actually one time or other to fix the Weight of his Appetite; which was the second Condition.

11. And that this is also found in God, I think I have sufficient assurance from these two things; the Absolute Perfection of his Nature; and those express Revelations he has made of his Will, as to this particular. As for the Na∣ture of God, it involves, as in Notion and Con∣ception, so likewise in Truth and reality, (as was above demonstrated) absolute and infinite Perfection; and consequently, includes a Be∣neficent and Communicative disposition; this be∣ing a Perfection.

12. Nor does the Superlative eminency of the Divine nature only argue him to be Com∣municative, but to be the Most Communica∣tive and Selfdiffusive of all Beings. For, as all Kinds, so all degrees of excellency must of necessity be included in a Being absolutely and infinitely perfect, such as God is. Whence it will also follow, that he is not only the most Communicative of all Beings, but that he will also Communicate himself: and not only so, but in such an ample and liberal measure too, as entirely to satisfy the most aspiring & reach∣ing Appetite of man; Since Otherwise some

degrees of Communicativeness & consequent∣ly of Excellence would be wanting; which is absurd to suppose in a Being absolutely perfect. Especially considering, that those importunate desires of Human nature are of his own plant∣ing, which as it firmly assures us of his being able, so is it no less cogent an Argument for his being willing to be our Center; it being incre∣dible that so infinite an Excellence should plant in man such desires, as either he could not or would not satisfy.

13. And of this willingness of God that man should partake of his fullness, so far as to bot∣tom upon it, and acquiesce in it, there is yet further assurance from many express Revela∣tions of his good pleasure to that purpose. Which consist of two kinds, express words, wherein he professes himself passionately desirous of the Salvation and happiness of man; and two very notable and signal Acts; namely, the consign∣ing to the world a copy of his Will, as a Chart to direct us to the true Haven of Rest and An∣chorage; and the sending his Beloved Son from the mansions of glory to dislodge the angry Guardian of Paradise, and re-open for us an Entrance into the joy of our Lord. By both which kinds of revelation he has given us the highest assurance imaginable, that he designs not to engross and monopolize the Perfections of his rich essence, but that he is heartily willing to admit man to a participation of that excellent

good, wherein he himself is Happy; to give him (as the Psalmist expresses it) everlasting fe∣licity, and make him glad with the joy of his coun∣tenance.

14. To which Considerations I might fur∣ther add, that this excellent communicative∣ness of the Divine nature is typically represent∣ed and mysteriously exemplify'd by the Porphy∣rian Scale of Being. For as there the lower de∣grees are determin'd and contracted, but the Higher more common and extensive, so is it in the real Scale of Being. The inferiour, which are either matter, or complicated and twisted with matter, are more contracted, narrow, selfish and illiberal; but the superiour as they are less immers'd in and allay'd with matter, so are they more open, diffusive and free. For indeed all contraction and consinement is from mat∣ter, but 'tis Form and Spirit that is the Root of all freeness and inlargement. And thus we see in bodys; the more of kin they are to Spirit in subtilty and refinement, the more spreading are they and self-diffusive. Whereupon Light, which of all Bodys is nearest ally'd to Spirit, is also most diffusive and self-communicative. God therefore, who is at the very top of all Being, who is an absolute, mere and Spiritual Act, and who lastly is such a pure Light as in which there is no darkness at all, must needs be infinitely self∣imparting and Communicative; & consequent∣ly, wants nothing to qualify him to be the true End and Center of Man.

The Prayer.

MY God, my Happiness, who art as well the End as the Author of my Being; who hast more perfection than I have desire, and art also seriously willing to quench my great Thirst in the Ocean of thy Perfection; I beseech thee shew me thy Glory. Withdraw thy hand from the Clift of the rock, and remove the bounds from the Mount of thy Presence, that I may see thee as thou art, face to face, and ever dwell in the light of thy Beauty. I have long dwelt with Vanity and Emptiness, and have made my self weary in the persuit of Rest. O let me not fail at last, after my many wandrings and dis∣appointments, to be taken up into this true and only Ark of repose and security, where I may for ever rest, and for ever bless the Author of my Happiness. In the mean time strike, I be∣seech thee, my Soul with such lively and ravish∣ing apprehensions of thy excellencies, such bright irradiations of thy divine light, that I may see enough to love thee infinitely, to de∣pend on thee for my happiness entirely, to live upon holy hopes and comfortable expectations, and to bear up my Spirit under the greatest Ari∣ditys and dejections with the delightfull pro∣spect of thy Glorys. O let me sit down under

this thy shadow with great delight, till the fruit of thy Tree of life shall be sweet to my tast. Let me stay and entertain my longing Soul with the Contemplation of thy Beauty, till thou shalt condescend to kiss me with the kisses of thy mouth, till thou shalt bring me into thy banquet∣ting house, where Vision shall be the support of my Spirit, and thy Banner over me shall be Love. Grant this O my God, my Happiness, for the sake of thy great love, and of the Son of thy love, Christ Jesus.

Amen.

Contemplation the Fifth.

Two Corollaries hence deduc'd: the first whereof is, that God is therefore to be loved with all possible application and ele∣vation of Spirit, with all the heart, soul and mind.

1. AMong the Perfections of human nature the faculty of desiring or reaching out after agreeable Objects is not the least consider∣able, and 'tis the peculiar glory of man to be an Amorous, as well as a Rational Being. For by this he supplies the defects of his nature, not only enjoys the good he unites with, but digests it as it were into himself and makes it his own, and relieves his domestic poverty by forreign ne∣gotiation.

2. But tho the Pathetic part of man be one of the noblest perfections he is furnish'd with, yet so generally faulty are we in the due appli∣cation and direction of this noble faculty, that to be pathetically and amorously dispos'd is lookt upon by some not as a Perfection but as a Disease of the Soul, and is condemn'd by a whole order of men as inconsistent with the Character of wisdom, according to that Stoical Apho∣rism, Amare simul & sapere ipsi Jovi non datur.

3. But certainly, Eve was intended as a Help for Adam, tho in the event she prov'd the in∣strument

of his seduction; and our Passions were given us to perfect and accomplish our natures, tho by accidental misapplications to unworthy objects they may turn to our degradation and dishonour. We may indeed be debased as well as innobled by them, but then the fault is not in the large Sails, but in the ill conduct of the Pilot, if our Vessel miss the Haven. The Tide of our love can never run too high, provided it take a right Channel; our Passion then will be our highest Wisdom: and he was no Stoic that said, as the Hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my Soul after thee O God. And again, my Soul is athirst for God. And a∣gain, my Soul breaketh out for fervent de∣sire. And again, whom have I in Hea∣ven but thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of thee.

4. Being therefore from the foregoing Pe∣riods arrived to this Conclusion, that God is the true End and Center of man, I think I ought now to let loose the reins of my affections, to unbay the current of my Passion, and love on without any other boundary or measure than what is set me by the finiteness of my natural powers.

5. 'Tis true indeed, whenever we turn the Edge of our desire towards any Created good, 'tis Prudence as well as Religion to use caution and moderation, to gage the Point of our affe∣ctions lest it run in too far; there being so much

emptiness in the enjoyment, and so much hazard in the Possession. When we venture to lean up∣on such objects we are like men that walk upon a Quagmire, and therefore should tread as light∣ly as we can, lest it give way and sink under us.

6. But how excellent a Vertue soever Mode∣ration may be in our concernments with other objects, we have nothing to do with it in the love of that Being who is our End and Center. There is here danger but of one Extreme, and that is of the defect. We can love but finitely when we have lov'd our utmost; and what is that to him who is infinitely lovely? Since there∣fore our most liberal proportions will be infi∣nitely short and scanty, we ought not sure to give new retrenchments to our love, and cut it yet shorter by frugal limitations.

7. For if God be our End and Center he must necessarily have all that good in him which we can possibly desire; and if so, then he is able to stay and satisfy all our Love; and if so, then nothing so reasonable as that he should have it all. We are therefore to love him with all pos∣sible application and elevation of Spirit, with all the heart, Soul and mind. We should collect and concenter all the rays of our love into this one Point, and lean towards God with the whole weight of our Soul, as all that is ponder∣ous in nature tends with its whole weight toward the Center. And this we should do as directly as may be, with as little warping and declension

the Creature as is possible. For so also 'tis to be observ'd in nature, that not only all weight or Pondus tends toward the Center, but that also it moves thither as nigh as it can in a direct and perpendicular line.

The Prayer.

MY God, my Happiness, who art fairer than the Children of men, and who thy self art very Love as well as altogether lovely, draw me and I will run after thee. O wind up my Soul to the highest pitch of Love that my facultys will bear, and let me never alienate any degree of that noble Passion from thee its only due ob∣ject. Quench in me all terrene fires and sensual relishes, and do thou wound me deep, and strike me through with the arrows of a divine Passion, that as thou art all Beauty and Perfection, so I may be all Love and Devotion. My heart is rea∣dy O God, my heart is ready for a Burnt offer∣ing; send down then an holy fire from above to kindle the Sacrifice, and do thou continual∣ly fan and keep alive, and clarify the flame, that I may be ever ascending up to thee in de∣vout breathings, and pious Aspirations, till at length I ascend in Spirit to the Element of Love, where I shall know thee more clearly

and love thee more Seraphically, and receive those peculiar coronets of glory thou hast re∣serv'd for those that eminently love thee,

Amen.

Contemplation the Sixth.

The second Corollarŷ: that therefore God is ultimately to be refer'd to in all our actions, and that he is not to be used by us, but enjoyed.

1. AS there is nothing of greater and more universal moment to the regular ordi∣nation of human life, than rightly to accom∣modate the Means and the End, and to make them uniform and Symbolical; so is there no∣thing wherein men are more universally pec∣cant and defective, and that not only in Pra∣ctice, but also in Notion and Theory.

2. For altho to do an ill action for a good End, and to do a good action for an ill End, are generally acknowledg'd alike criminal, yet concerning this latter 'tis observable, that men usually think the morality of their actions suf∣ficiently secured, if the End proposed be not in its own nature specifically evil. Whereas in∣deed there is yet another way whereby an End may become evil, namely, by being rested in when 'tis not the last, without any further re∣spect or reference. By this undue and ill-plac'd

Acquiescence, an End that is otherwise in its own intrinsic nature good, upon the whole com∣mences evil. For tho it be good to be chosen, it is yet ill to be rested in.

3. For indeed 'tis against the order and oe∣conomy of things as well as against the perfe∣ction of Religion, that any End should be ulti∣mately rested in but what is truly the last. Now the last end of action can be no other than that which is the last end of the will which is, the Spring of action. This therefore being God (as appears from what I have already contempla∣ted) it follows, that he ought to be the ultimate End of all our actions, that we ought not in any of our motions to stop short of this Center, but in all our actions to make a further reference either actual or habitual, and according to that of the Apostle, whether we eat or drink to do all to the glory of God.

4. For what can be more absurd and incon∣gruous than to turn the Means into the End, and the End into the Means, to enjoy what ought to be only used, and to use what ought to be enjoyed? God is our last End, and therefore must not be desired for any thing but himself, nor used as a means to accomplish any other Design. Which also concludes against all those who make Religion a Point of Secular interest, and a tool of State-policy, whereas that ought to prescribe, and not receive measures from any Human affairs.

The Prayer.

MY God, my Happiness, who art the last end of my Desires, the very utmost of all Perfection, and beyond whom there is no good, be thou the last end of my Actions too, and let them all meet and unite in thee as lines in their Center. Grant I may set thee before me in all my thoughts, words and actions, let my eye of Contemplation be always open, and what∣ever intermedial designs I may have, let my last aim be thy glory. And O let me never be so low sunk, base and wicked, as to make Religion an instrument of worldly policy, nor to dishonour thee and my own Soul by such a mercenary Pie∣ty. But do thou always possess my mind with such a due value for thy infinite excellency, that I may refer all things to thee, and thee and thine to nothing, but love and embrace thee for thy own self, who in thy self alone art alto∣gether lovely,

Amen, Amen.

A DISCOURSE UPON ROMANS. 12. 3.

—Not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; But to think soberly according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of Faith.

1. THERE is nothing wherein men are so much divided from one another as in Opinions, and nothing where∣in they more unanimously conspire than in thinking well of themselves. This is a Humour of so Catholic a Stamp, and universal Empire, that it may seem to challenge a place among those Elements of our Constitution, those Essentials of our nature which run throughout the whole Kind, and are partici∣pated by every Individual. For should a man take the Wings of the Morning, and travel with the Sun round the Terrestrial Globe, he would hardly find a man either of a Judgment so dif∣ficult to be pleas'd, or of accomplishment so lit∣tle

to recommend him, that was not notwith∣standing sufficiently in love with himself, how∣ever he might dislike every thing else about him; And without question that arrogant and peevish Mathematician who charged the grand Architect with want of skill in the Mechanism of the World, thought he had play'd the Artist well enough in himself, and as to the Harmony of his own frame acquitted the Geometry of his Maker.

2. And as men are thus naturally apt to think well of themselves in general, so there is no∣thing wherein they indulge this Humour more than in the Opinion they have of the Goods of the Mind, and among these there is none which has so great a share of their Partiality, as their Intellectual faculty. The Desire of Knowledg is not more natural then the Conceit that we are already furnish'd with a considerable Measure of it, and tho a particular Sect were Characte∣riz'd by that Appellation, yet all mankind are in reality, Gnostics. For as tis (ingeniously ob∣serv'd by the excellent Cartesius) nothing is more equally distributed among men than the Intellectual Talent, wherewith every one fancies himself so abundantly stockt, that even those who have the most unsatiable De∣sires, and whom Providence could not satisfy in any one thing else, are notwithstanding as to this Dispensation of Heaven well enough con∣tent, complain not of the dull Planet that in∣fluenc'd

their Nativity, or wish their minds more richly endow'd than they are. And altho there are a generation of men who use to be very elo∣quent in setting out the degeneracy of human nature in general, and particularly in decy∣phering the Shortness of our Intellectual Sight, and the defects of our now diminish'd under∣standing, yet should a man take them at their word, and apply that Verdict to themselves in particular which they so freely bestow upon the whole Species, no men in the world so full of re∣sentment and impatience as they; and I dare affirm notwithstanding their Harangues upon the Corruption of Human Nature, could all mankind lay a true claim to that Estimate which they pass upon themselves, there would be little or no difference betwixt laps'd and per∣fect Humanity, and God might again review his image with paternal Complacency, and still pronounce it good.

3. Nor is it at all to be wonder'd that Self-Conceitedness should be of such an unlimited and Transcendental Nature as to run through all Sorts and Classes of men, since the cause of it, Self-love, has such an universal Jurisdiction in our hearts. 'Tis most natural and necessary for every man (and indeed for every Intelligent Being) to be a Lover of himself, and to covet whatsoever any way tends to the perfection of his Nature. And as 'tis necessary for every man to be thus affected towards himself, so is this

the only Disposition of mind wherein Man acts with Constancy and Ʋniformity. Our other Pas∣sions have somtimes their total intermissions, and at best their increases and decreases, but this is always at Full, and stands drawn out to the ut∣most Stretch of its Capacity. No man loves him∣self more at one time than at another, and that because he always loves himself in the highest Degree that is possible. More than all good he cannot wish to himself, and less than all he will not, nay I had almost pronounc'd it impossible for Omnipotence it self which stays the proud waves of the Ocean, and blocks up its violent efforts with barrs and doors, to say unto this Passion, hitherto shalt thou come but no further, or to set any other bounds to it besides those of all possible good.

4. Now Man being such an infinite Lover of himself, is easily brought to believe that he is really Master of many of those excellencies and perfections, which he so passionately wishes a∣mong the inventory of his possessions. For there is this notorious difference betwixt Self-love and the Love of others, that whereas the Love of others supposes an opinion of their excellency, the love of our selves begets it. We love others because we think well of them, but (so prepo∣sterous is the method of Self-love) we think well of our selves because we first love our selves. So that now upon the whole, considering how ne∣cessarily and vehemently every man is carried

on to the love of himself, and what a natural product Self-conceit is of Self-love, 'tis much to be fear'd, that as we cannot set any bounds to the love of our selves, so we shall hardly set due ones to our Opinions of our selves, and con∣sequently the most mortify'd and resign'd Man of us all, has no reason to think himself uncon∣cern'd in this Admonition of the Apostle.—Not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of Faith.

5. 'Tis supposed that the Apostle in these words had respect to the then prevailing Here∣sy of the Gnostics, a sort of men that pretended to great Heights of divine Knowledg, to close intimacies and familiarities with God, and up∣on that presumption grew so haughty and inso∣lent as to despise dominions, and speak evil of dig∣nities, and withall so careless and secure, as to defile the flesh, and indulge themselves all man∣ner of Sensuality, as you may see their Chara∣cter in the Epistle of St. Jude. Nay of such tur∣bulent ungovernable Principles and profligate manners were these men, that some of the Lear∣ned (and particularly an eminent Di∣vine of our own Church) have adven∣tured to write upon their Fore-heads, Mystery, and to place them in the Chair of Anti-Christ. As an Antidote therefore against this Poison, the Apostle who through the A∣bundance of Revelation had himself been in dan∣ger

of being exalted above Measure, and expe∣rimentally knew how prone human nature is to swell and plume upon a Conceit of its own excellencies, thought it expedient to advise his Charge at Rome (the place which Simon Magus the Author of that proud Sect had (as Eusebius tells us) made choice of to be the Scene of his Magical Operations) to mode∣rate and sober thoughts of themselves, and be∣ing to teach them a Lesson of Humility, he modestly ushers it in with a Preface of his Com∣mission and Authority. For I say (says he) through the grace given unto me to every man that is a∣mong you not to think of himself more highly, &c.

6. The Discourse which I design upon these words shall be comprized within these limits.

First, I observe that we are not at our own liberty to entertain what Opinions we please concerning our selves, but that we ought to regulate them by some Standard. Which I col∣lect from the former part of the Text, Not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to think soberly.

7. Secondly, I observe that the Standard whereby we are to regulate our Opinions con∣cerning our selves are those excellencies and perfections which we are really indow'd with, which I collect from the latter part of the Text, according as God has dealt to every man the mea∣sure of Faith.

8. And in the third place I shall consider the Absurdities and ill Consequences of trans∣gressing this Standard, whereby it shall appear how highly reasonable this Admonition of the Apostle is, and so conclude with a practical Ap∣plication of the whole in relation to our selves, and the present occasion.

9. I begin with the first Proposition, That we are not at our own liberty to entertain what Opi∣nions we please concerning our selves, but that we ought to regulate them by some Standard.

10. The Acts of the understanding are by some men thought as free from all Law as the Acts of the will are from all necessity, and according∣ly they give every one a Toleration to abound in his own sense and (provided his actions be con∣formable to the Rule) to think what he please. Now since a Man cannot be accountable for an Opinion of himself in particular, unless it be first granted that he is under a Law as to the Acts of his understanding in general, before I can proceed any farther I find it necessary to lay down this Preparatory Position, That we are under an Obligation as to the Acts of our understanding, or (which is all one) that we are accountable for them. Nay I believe I may venture higher, and affirm that the understand∣ing is not only under Obligation, but that 'tis the Primary and immediat Subject of it. For the proof of which Paradox, I desire the Patrons of the Intellectual Libertinism to consider, that

that must be the Primary and immediat sub∣ject of all Obligation which is so of Liberty. Now that this cannot be the Will, I suppose will be acknowledg'd a clear consequence, if the Will necessarily follows the Practical Dictate of the Understanding. And that it does so, I think there is Demonstration.

11. 'Tis an unquestionable Axiom in all the Schools of Learning in the world, that the Ob∣ject of the Will is apparent good; Now appa∣rent good in other words, is that which is ap∣prehended or judg'd to be good, and if so, then it follows that the Will cannot but conform to the Dictate of the Understanding, because otherwise somthing might be the object of the Will that is not apprehended good, which is contrary to the supposition. In short, the Will (as Aquinas has well expressed it) is the Conclu∣sion of an Operative Syllogism, and follows as necessarily from the Dictate of the Understand∣ing as any other Conclusion does from its Pre∣mises, and consequently cannot be the imme∣diat subject of Liberty, and consequently not of Obligation.

12. But then are we not involv'd in the same difficulty as to the understanding? Does not that act with equal (if not more) necessity than the Will? So I know it is ordinarily taught. But if this be absolutely and universally true, I must confess it above the reach of my Capacity to salve the Notion of Morality, or Religion, or

to find out an expedient how the Foundations of the Intellectual world should not be out of course. For since 'tis evident both from the preceding Demonstration, and from experi∣mental Reflection, that the Will necessarily acts in Conformity to the Dictates of the Un∣derstanding, if those very Dictates are also wholly and altogether necessary, there can be no such thing as a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the man is bound hand and foot, has nothing left whereby to ren∣der him a Moral Agent, to qualify him for Law or Obligation, Vertue or Vice, Reward or Punishment. But these are Absurdities not to be indured, and therefore I conclude ac∣cording to the Rules of right Reasoning, the Principle from which they flow to be so too.

13. To clear up then the whole Difficulty with as much Brevity and Perspicuity as in a matter of this intricacy is possible, I shall no longer consider the Understanding and Will as Faculties really distinct either from the Soul it self, or from one another, but that the Soul does immediatly understand and will by it self, without the intervention of any Faculty what∣soever. And that for this demonstrative reason in short, because in the contrary Hypothesis, either Judgment must be ascribed to the Will, and then the will immediatly commences Un∣derstanding, or the Assent of the will must be blind, brutish, and unaccountable, both which are as great Absurdities as they are true Conse∣quences.

This being premised, I grant that as the Soul necessarily wills as she understands, so likewise does she necessarily understand as the Object appears. And thus far our sight termi∣nates in Fatality, and Necessity bounds our Ho∣rizon. That then that must give us a Prospect beyond it, must be this, that altho the Soul ne∣cessarily understands or judges according to the Appearance of things, yet that things should so appear (unless it be in Propositions that are self-evident, as that the whole is greater than any one part, or the like) is not alike necessa∣ry, but depends upon the degrees of Adverten∣cy or Attention which the Soul uses, and which to use either more or less is fully and imme∣diatly in her own power. And this indifferency of the Soul as to attending or not attending I take to be the only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the bottom and foundation into which the Morality of every action must be at length resolv'd. For a farther proof as well as Illustration of which Hypothe∣sis let us apply it to a particular case and try how well it will answer the Phaenomena. In the case then of Martyrdom, I look upon sin as an evil, and not only so but (while I attend fully to its Nature) the greatest of evils. And as long as I continue this Judgment 'tis utterly impos∣sible I should commit it, there being according to my present apprehension no greater evil for the declining of which I should think it eligi∣ble. But now the evil of Pain being presented

before me, and I not sufficiently attending to the evil of Sin, this latter appears to be the les∣ser evil of the two, and I accordingly pro hic & nunc so pronounce it, and in Conformity to that judgment necessarily chuse it. But because 'twas absolutely in my power to have attended more heedfully there was Liberty in the Principle, the mistake which influenc'd the action was vincible, and consequently the action it self im∣putable. This Hypothesis however strange it may seem to those that have sworn Faith and Alle∣giance to the Dictates of the Schools, I believe will be the more approv'd the more it is exa∣min'd, and that not only as rational and con∣sistent in it self, but also as a refuge from those Absurdities which attend the ordinary Solu∣tions. Neither is this account wholly unlicens'd by Authority, for I find some hints and intimations of it in the School of Pla∣to, where the reason why those middle sort of Beings call'd Heroes are not so uniformly pure as the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is as∣sign'd to be because they do not so equally at∣tend to the Beauty of the Supream Good.

14. From what has been said it appears plain∣ly that the Morality of every human action must be at length resolv'd into an immediat in∣difference that the Soul has of attending or not attending, and consequently that we are not only under Obligation as to the acts of the Un∣derstanding, but that all Obligation begins there.

15. Having thus clear'd the way by the Proof of this Preparatory Position, that we are under Obligation as to the acts of the Understanding in general, I may now proceed to consider that our opinion of our selves is one of those acts of the Understanding which are subject to Law, or in other terms, that we are not at our own li∣berty to entertain what Opinions we please con∣cerning our selves, but that we ought to regulate them by some Standard. Now the general rea∣son of this is, because 'tis of great moment and influence in relation to our Practice, what Opi∣nion we entertain concerning our selves. In∣deed there are many acts of the Understand∣ing which tho originally free, yet fall under no Obligation by reason of the Indifferency of the Matter, as in things of pure and naked Specu∣lation. These are the unforbidden Trees of the Garden, and here we may let loose the Reins and indulge our thoughts the full Scope. Thus there is no danger of Heresy in asserting or de∣nying the Antipodes, nor is Orthodoxy concern'd whether the Moon be habitable. But altho to mistake a Star be of no consequence to the Theorist that sits immured in his Study, yet it may be to the Pilot that is to Steer his Course by it. There are other things which have a practi∣cal Aspect, and here 'tis not indifferent what we think, because 'tis not indifferent what we do. Now among these the Opinion of our selves is to be reckon'd, as having a great influence up∣on

our well or ill demeaning our selves respe∣ctively, as will more minutely and particularly appear when we come in the third and last place to consider the absurdities and ill consequences of transgressing the Standard prescribed, and therefore I shall defer the farther prosecution of it till then, and in the mean while proceed to the second Observable, Namely,

That the Standard whereby we are to regulate our Opinions concerning our selves, are those ex∣cellencies and perfections which we are really en∣dow'd with. Which is collected from these words, according as God has dealt to every man the mea∣sure of Faith.

16. In the former part of the Text there was indeed a Restraint laid upon our Opinions con∣cerning our selves, but it was general only and indefinite. But here the ground is measured out, and the Boundaries precisely set. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that's the great Ecliptic Line which is to bound the Career of our most forward and Self∣indulging Opinions. If we keep within this com∣pass our motion is natural and regular, but if we slide never so little out of it, 'tis unnatural and portentous. Or to speak with greater Sim∣plicity, he that judges of himself according to those excellencies, whether Moral or Intelle∣ctual, which he really has, does 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 thinks soberly, and he that thinks him∣self indow'd with any Kind or Degree of Excel∣lence which really he has not, does 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, thinks of himself more highly than he ought to think.

17. Here then are Two things to be consi∣dered.

• First that we may proceed so far as this Stan∣dard.
• And Secondly, That we may not go beyond it. First, That we may proceed so far.

18. It has been taught by some of the severe Masters of Spiritual Mortification, That we ought to take up the most low and abject thoughts of our selves that are possible, to be conscious of no manner of excellency in our selves, and con∣sequently not to be affected with the least Self∣complacency; That we ought to account our selves to be Nothing, to have nothing, to be worth nothing, but to be very refuse and off-scouring of all things. And this they call the Mystical Death, or the Spiritual Anni∣hilation. Now whatever degrees of excellency this may have (which I shall not now dispute) 'tis most certain it can have nothing of Duty. For tho it may, and oftentimes is required of a man to think the Truth, yet he can never be under an Obligation to be mistaken. Besides, 'Tis hard to conceive how any man (especially one that dwells much with himself, and heed∣fully reflects upon the actings of his own mind) should be master of any considerable excellen∣cy, and yet not be conscious of it. And besides, That very degree of Attention which is required

that a man should not think himself more ac∣complish'd than indeed he is, will also infal∣libly hinder him from thinking he is less. 'Tis true indeed Moses knew not that his Face shone, after he had been conversing with God on the Mount. He saw not the Orb of glory that stream'd from him, and wondred what it was that made him so dreadful to the people. But 'tis not so with the Soul, whose reflexive faculty will not fail to give her information of her most retir'd and reserv'd accomplishments. 'Tis not with the Lesser, as with the Greater World, where whole Tracts and Regions (and those some of the best too) lye undiscover'd. No, Man can∣not be such a Stranger to his own Perfections, such an America to himself. For who can know the things of a man, if not the Spirit of man which is in him. And accordingly we find that the ig∣norance of our selves with which Mankind has been hitherto so universally tax'd, runs quite in another Channel, and does not consist in overlooking any of those indowments which we have, but in assuming to our selves those which we have not.

19. I confess (were it possible) I should think it advisable for some persons to be ignorant of some of their excellencies, and like the Sun not to reflect home to their own Sphere of light; Not that I think in the least unlawful to be fully con∣scious of ones own worth, but only I consider that some men have not heads strong enough

to endure Heights, and walk upon Spires and Pinnacles. But if they can stand there without growing vertiginous, they need not question the lawfulness of the station, they are still within the Region of Humility. For 'tis not every think∣ing well of ones self that falls in with the notion of Pride, but only when there is more of Opinion than there is of Worth. 'Twas this that was the Condemnation of the Apostate Angel, not that he took a just complacency in the eminency of his Station, but that he vainly arrogated to himself what was not his due, in that he said, I will ascend into Heaven, I will exalt my throne above the Stars of God, I will sit upon the sides of the North, I will ascend above the heights of the Clouds, I will be like the most High. 'Twas for this that the Angel of Death drew upon Herod, not because he was pleas'd with the sineness and success of his Oratory, but because he was not so just to God as the People were to him, but lookt upon himself as the Head∣fountain of his own perfections, and so gave not God the glory.

20. But now if we take care to proportion our estimation of, and our Complacencies in our selves to the measure of our endowments, and if we look upon those very endowments not as originary and independent but as derivative from the Father of lights from whom every good and perfect gift descends, and accordingly refer all to Gods glory, and with

the Elders in the Revelations take off our Crowns from our Heads and cast them at the foot of the Throne, we have not only the express words of the Text, but likewise all the reason in the world to warrant the So∣briety of our Opinions. For, this is but to have a right and exact understanding of ones self. And why may not a man be allow'd to take a true Estimate of himself as well as of another man? Or why should a man think an excellen∣cy less valuable because 'tis in himself? The Happiness of God consists in seeing himself as he is; he reflects upon the Beauty of his Essence, and rejoyces with an infinite Complacency. Now certainly that wherein consists the Happiness of the Creator, cannot be a Sin in the Creature. Be∣sides, I would fain know why a man may not as lawfully think well of himself upon the Score of his real worth, as desire that others should think well of him for the same reason? And that he may do the latter is confess'd as well by the Practice, as by the common Suffrage of Mankind. For otherwise what becomes of that good Reputation which Solomon says is rather to be chosen than great Riches, and of which the Best and Wisest men of all ages had ever such a tender, such a passionate Regard? Nay 'tis lookt upon as a very Commendable thing to be so affected, and the contrary is censured as the mark of a dissolute and unmoraliz'd tem∣per. Only there is a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to

be observ'd in this as well as in the former, and as we are not to stretch out our selves beyond our measure, so must we take care with the great Apostle, not to give others occasion to think of us above that which they see us to be. Besides, if we may not be allow'd to take the full Height of our own Excellencies, how shall we be able to give God thanks for them? The Elders must know they wear Crowns before they can use them as Instruments of Adoration, and Herod must be conscious of the right Genius of his Oratory, before he can give God the Glory. Again in the last place, if a man may not have leave to take Cognisance of his own Deserts and to value himself accordingly, what will become of that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which the A∣postle speaks of, the answer of a good Conscience towards God, which is nothing else but a Sentence of Approbation, which a man passes upon himself for the well managing of that Talent of Liberty which God has en∣trusted him with? Now this is the Reward of Vertue, and therefore certainly not contrary to it.

21. Neither is this Self-esteem only the Re∣ward of Vertue but also the Cause of it too, and consequently 'tis not only allowable, but also highly needful that we should think Honorably of our selves. 'Tis a frequent Observation among Moral and Divine Writers, That most if not all

the Sins which men commit, proceed from want of a due sense of the Dignity of their Nature. And consequently a due reflection upon a man's own Worth, must needs be a strong Preserva∣tive against whatsoever would stain its Glory. Shall such a man as I flee? was the pow∣erful consideration that buoy'd up the sinking Spirits of Nehemiah. And 'tis one of the Capital Precepts of Pythagoras's Morals (and perhaps one of the best too that was ever given to the World)—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Above all things reverence thy self. And 'twas the Saying of another of the Sons of Wisdom, Let not the Reverence of any man cause thee to sin. Which it certainly will do, unless we ob∣serve the former Rule, and reflect with due Re∣verence upon our own Worth and Dignity.

22. From these Considerations (not to urge any more) it seems to me very evident, that 'tis not only lawful but in some respects highly Expedient, that our Opinions of our selves should rise up so as to be of a Level with our Excel∣lencies, whatsoever they are. Let one of the Scales be mounted never so high, yet if there be a proportionable Weight in the Other, the Ballance moves regularly, and as it should do. VVe may then proceed so far as this Standard.

23. But Secondly, VVe must not go beyond it. For all beyond this is Pride. Pride, that turn'd the Angels out of Heaven, Adam out of Paradice, and levell'd the great King of Baby∣lon

with the Beasts that perish; and which is nothing else but an Intemperate Opi∣nion of our selves, which consists either in as∣suming to our selves any Excellency which we have not, or in Over-rating what we have. Tho indeed in Strictness of Notion this latter falls in with the former, For to Over-rate what we have, is indeed to assume some Degree of good which we have not. Here then begins our Re∣straint, the Reasonableness of which will appear from the Absurdities and ill Consequences which attend the transgressing of this Standard, and which in the third and last place I come now to consider.

24. I shall observe only the most notorious; and these I shall reduce to these Three general Heads.

First, That it unqualifies us for the perform∣ance of many Duties.

Secondly, That it betrays us into many sins.

And Thirdly, That it frustrates all methods of Reformation. Of these very briefly.

25. First an excessive opinion of our selves (and that is so which surpasses the measure of our real worth) unqualifies us for the perform∣ance of many Duties; and that both in relation to God, our Neighbour and our Selves.

First in relation to God.

26. As Folly leads to Atheism, so does an over∣weening opinion of our own Wisdom or any o∣ther excellency to Profaneness. For as the Fool

has said in his heart there is no God, so it is said in another place That the ungodly is so Proud that he careth not for him. Pride then is altogether inconsistent with that Subje∣ction, Honour and Veneration which we owe to God. For how can he submit his passions to the Authority of the Divine Will who has made a Law of his own? And as it indisposes us for all active, so likewise for all passive Obedience, for how can he suffer that with Patience, which he thinks he does not deserve in Justice? Or how can he submit with resignation to the seeming unevennesses of Providential Dispensations, the equality of which because he cannot discern, he must in honour to his own understanding deny? And upon the same ground it unqualifies us for Faith in many of the Divine Revelations. For how can he Captivate his understanding to My∣steries, who thinks it a dishonour to own any, and is resolv'd to believe no farther than he can comprehend?

27. Lastly, It unqualifies us for Gratitude towards God, and consequently puts a Bar to all those good actions which we would other∣wise perform upon that Principle. And by this it becomes a Multiplied, a Legion evil. For how can he acknowledg an Obligation pass'd upon him by Gods Favours, who calls them not by that name, but esteems them as Rewards and Payments, and inverting the Protesta∣tion of the good Patriarch, thinks him∣self

worthy of the greatest of his mercies.

28. Then Secondly, In relation to our Neigh∣bour, it unqualifies us for Obedience to Civil Government. For how can he submit to the Wisdom of his Superiours, and pay an impli∣cite deference to the Occult reasons of State, who thinks himself wiser than a whole Senate, and disputes even the ways of Providence? Pride was ever observed to be the Mother of Faction and Rebellion, and accordingly St. Jude makes it part of the Character of the Proud Gnostics, To despise Dominions and speak evil of Dignities.

29. Again, It unqualifies us for those acts of Justice which consist in a due observation of our Neighbours Merits, and a deference of exter∣nal Respect proportionable to that observation. For how can he be at leasure to take notice of anothers worth, who is so wholly taken up in the contemplation of his own? Let the Reputa∣tion of his best Friends (if it be possible for a Proud man to have any) be in never so great danger, he like Archimedes, is so overbusie in admiring the Creatures of his own brain, those Draughts and Ideas which he has form'd of him∣self there, that he regards not the Ruin that is about him. Or if he does, he is so far from ap∣pearing in their defence (as in Justice he ought) that he rather rejoyces at their Spots as Acces∣sions to his own brightness.

30. Again, It unqualifies us for the Offices of Humanity, and Civil Behaviour, and all

kinds of Homilitical virtue: for how can he treat those with any tolerable Civility, whom he looks down upon as a whole Species below him?

31. Lastly, it unqualifies us for Gratitude toward our Benefactors. For how can he think himself obliged by man, who counts God his Debtor?

32. Then Thirdly, In relation to our Selves, here is this grand ill consequence of an immo∣derate self-esteem, that it unqualifies us not on∣ly for higher attainments, but even for the ve∣ry endeavours of improvement, and so cuts short and bedmarfs all our excellencies. 'Tis the Ob∣servation of Cicero, Multi ad scientiam perve∣nissent nisi se jam pervenisse credidissent, The Opinion of the Proud man has so far got the start of the real worth, that the latter will never overtake the former.

33. And as the immoderate esteem of our Selves unqualifies us for the performance of ma∣ny Duties, so does it also in the second place Betray us into many Sins.

34. First, Into all those sins which are con∣trary to the foremention'd Vertues respective∣ly. And besides them into many more, such as are presumption and security, vexation and discontent, contempt of others (tho at the same time it exposes us to theirs) Anger and Conten∣tion, Malice and Revenge. For the Proud man is not content to be his own private Admirer,

but quarrels with all others that are not of his perswasion, and with the Tyrant of Babylon kindles a fire for those who will not fall down and worship the Image which he has set up.

35. Neither does the Leprosy stop here. But as it betrays us into many sins, so in the Third and last place (which is the most dismal Con∣sequence of all) It frustrates all Methods of Re∣formation. Gods judgments will but exaspe∣rate and inrage him, because he thinks he does not deserve them, and his Mercies will not in∣dear him, because he thinks he does. Advice he thinks he does not need, and Reproof he cannot bear. Besides he thinks so well of himself al∣ready, that he wonders what you mean by ad∣vising him to become better, and therefore as he does not endeavour after any of those excel∣lencies which he thinks he has, so neither can he dream of mending those faults which he thinks he is not guilty of: Thus is the man Seal'd up to iniquity, and deeply lodg'd in the strong holds of sin, where nothing that has a Salutary Influence can come nigh him. And in this he resembles the first Presidents of his Folly, who from Angels transform'd themselves into De∣vils, and fell beyond the possibilities of reco∣very.

36. These are some of the fruits of this Root of Bitterness, and tho more might be named, yet these I think sufficient to justify this Admo∣nition of the Apostle to every man, not to think

of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to think soberly, according as God has dealt to eve∣ry man the measure of faith. Let us then all en∣deavour to conform our opinions concerning our selves to this Standard. Let us not stretch our selves beyond our natural dimensions, but learn to entertain modest and sober thoughts of our own excellencies and endowments, and mortify our understandings as well as our sensi∣tive affections. And thus shall we compleat our Lent Exercise by joyning the mortification of the Spirit to that of the flesh, without which the greatest Austerities wherewith we can afflict the latter, will not be such a Fast as God has cho∣sen. For what will it avail to macerate the Bo∣dy, while the principal part the Soul remains unmortify'd? The Humility of Moses must con∣spire with his Forty days Fasting to qualify a man for Divine Intercourses, to make him the Joy of Angels, the Friend of God. Thus then let us accomplish the Refinings of our Souls, and fill up the Measure of our Mortifications. To which end let us add this one further Consi∣deration to what has been already said, that Humility in the Judgment even of the High and Lofty one that inhabits Eternity, is a Vertue of such great Excellency, and singular advan∣tage to the happiness of Mankind, that our Blessed Saviour came down from Heaven to teach it, that his whole life was one continu'd Exercise of it, and that he has dignify'd it with

the first place among his Beatitudes. Let us then, as many as profess the Religion of the Hum∣ble and Crucify'd JESUS, make it our strict Care that we neglect not this his great Com∣mandment, nor omit to Copy out this Princi∣pal Line, this main stroke of the Pattern he has set us. Especially let us of this place who are set among the greater Lights of the Firma∣ment, and whose profession and business is to contemplate Truth, and to think of things as God made them, in Number, Weight and Mea∣sure, labour in the first place to take just and true Measures of our Selves, that our Knowledg puff us not up, nor our Height become our Ruin.

CONSIDERATIONS UPON THE NATURE OF SIN. Accommodated to the ends both of Speculation and Practise.

Considerations upon the Nature of Sin, &c.

SECT. I. Of the division of Sin into Material and Formal, and of the reality and necessity of that Distinction.

1. TO make this our Discourse about Sin more clear and distinct, before we enter upon its Nature 'twill be requisite to premise somthing con∣cerning the double acceptation of the word. For nothing can be defined before it be distin∣guish'd.

2. I observe therefore, that Sin may be con∣sider'd either abstractedly, for the bare act of Obliquity, or concretely with such a special de∣pendence of it upon the will as renders the A∣gent guilty, or obnoxious to punishment. I say with such a special dependence of it upon the will; for not every dependence of an action upon the will is sufficient to make it imputable, as shall be shewn hereafter. The former of these, by those that distinguish more nicely, is call'd transgressio voluntatis, the latter transgressio vo∣luntaria, or according to the more ordinary distinction the former is the material, the lat∣ter the formal part of Sin.

3. This distinction is both real and necessa∣ry. 1. it is real, because the Idea or conception of material sin is not only distinct from the Idea of formal sin (as it may be in things really the same) but when consider'd as alone does posi∣tively exclude the other. For this notion, a bare act of Obliquity, does not only prescind from, but also positively deny such a special depen∣dence of it upon the will as makes it imputa∣ble for punishment.

4. Now as it is a certain sign of Identity when the Idea of one thing necessarily includes the Idea of another, so is it of real distinction when the Idea of one thing in any case positively ex∣cludes the Idea of the other. There may in∣deed be distinct conceptions of one and the same thing, whereof there are different Pro∣pertys or Degrees, but then one does only ab∣stract from, and not in any case positively exclude the other. Which when it does it is an evident sign of real distinction.

5. But the greatest Argument of real distin∣ction is separability and actual separation. For nothing can be separated from it self. And this also has place here. For the material part of sin may actually exist without the formal. That is, there may be an act of obliquity, or an irre∣gular act without any guilt deriv'd upon the Agent, or to speak more strictly, without that special dependence of the act upon the will which is the foundation of that guilt. This is

evident in the case of fools and mad men.

6. And as this Distinction is real, so also is it very useful and necessary. 1st in the notion, to prevent ambiguitys and fallacys, that might a∣rise from the use of the word (sin). As when St. John says, he that commits sin is of the Devil, certainly 'twould be a fallacy to argue hence that every mere act of obliquity is Diabolical, because a sin, since not material but formal sin was the thing intended in Saint John's Proposition.

7. 2ly in the thing, for the honour and vin∣dication of the Divine Attributes. Particular∣ly from the damning of Infants merely for the corruption of nature, commonly call'd Origi∣nal sin; It being repugnant to the measures of Justice and the Dictates of Common Sense, that the bare doing an irregular act, or the bare hav∣ing an irregular propension should be punish∣able at all, much more with eternal damnation, as it must be if every dependence of an action upon the will be enough to render it imputable, that is, if every material be also a formal sin. This I say would be very unjust, because such irregular acts are no more a man's own than those committed by another man.

8. But it is certain that God does not proceed by such measures; as may be gather'd from the Oeconomy of his severest dispensation, the Law. For when he forbad murther with such strictness and severity, as to order the murtherer 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

SECT. II. A more particular and explicit consideration of Material sin, and what it adds to the general nature of evil.

1. AFter our Distinction of sin into Material and Formal, and our justification of that distinction, it follows that in the next place we give some more particular and explicit ac∣count of the nature of Material sin. That it is an irregular act in general, was intimated be∣fore, but to speculate its nature more thorough∣ly we must set it in a clearer light, and define what it is that makes an action irregular. And the account which I shall give of this, I shall ground upon that Definition of St. John, who tells us that sin is a transgression of the Law. So that transgression of the Law is the irregularity of an action, and is more explicitly the Mate∣rial part of sin.

2. Thus far in general. But now to make Transgression of the Law fully adequate and commensurate to Material sin, so as to extend to all kinds of it, it concerns us in the next place to enquire, what is here to be understood by (Law) and upon the right stating of this, will depend the whole Theory of Material sin.

3. By Law therefore in the first place, is to be understood that which is Positive, that is, any rule of action prescribed to us by God, consi∣der'd only as prescribed. Any action so prescri∣bed, be it otherwise never so indifferent for the matter, puts on the force of a Law from the Au∣thority of the Prescriber, and every transgres∣sion of such a Rule is Sin.

4. But the Transgression of Law in this nar∣row sense of the word will not comprehend all the kinds of Material sin. For altho Positive Law creates the first difference in some things, yet it does not in all. For had God never made any Positive Law yet the doing of some actions would have been sin, nay there was sin where there was no Positive Law, as may be probably collected from the fall of Angels. But where there is no Law there is no Transgression. There must be therefore some other law besides Posi∣tive Law.

5. By Law therefore 2ly is to be understood the Law of Reason, that Candle of the Lord that lights every man that comes into the world in his passage through it. This is twofold. For 1st, by the Law of Reason may be under∣stood that Original stock of rational Tendencys or practical sentiments which prevent all Dis∣course and reasonings about what is to be done, and answer to Speculative Principles. For as the Animal and sensitive Nature is not only fur∣nish'd with Sense and Perception, but also with

certain connatural instincts and impressions, whereby Animals are directed and inclined to sensitive good, so for the guardianship and se∣curity of Vertue, against the danger either of ignorance or inadvertence▪ God has furnish'd the Rational nature not only with the faculty of reasoning, but with certain common Principles and Notions, whereby 'tis inclined to the good of the Reasonable life. This is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 so much talkt of, and that which men ge∣nerally mean by the Law of Nature.

6. Or else 2ly, by the Law of Reason may be understood a Power, which a Rational Crea∣ture has of finding out by discoursing from first Principles what is fit to be done, and of reflect∣ing upon the reasonableness of those Moral Anticipations and impressions, which he before entertain'd, tho he knew not upon what ground.

7. These two make up the adequate notion of the Law of Reason, but we are not yet come to the adequate notion of Law. For if the Law of Reason be taken in the first sense for a stock of Moral Anticipations implanted by God in the Soul, this will be but another branch of Po∣sitive Law. For Light of Nature and Light of Scripture are but different modes of Divine re∣velation, and neither of these can be the ulti∣mate Reason, into which the Morality of every action is to be resolv'd.

8. But if the Law of Reason be taken in the latter sense, for a Power which a Rational

Creature has of finding out by discourse what is reasonable to be done, this will of necessity lead us higher, namely to consider that there are certain antecedent and independent apt∣nesses or qualitys in things, with respect to which they are fit to be commanded or forbidden by the wise governour of the world in some posi∣tive Law, whether that of internal or external Revelation, or both.

9. We are therefore in the next place to re∣solve these antecedent aptnesses of things into their proper ground, or to assign what that is which makes an action fit to be commanded or forbidden. Which when we have done we are advanced as high as we can go, and have found out that supreme, eternal and irreversible Law, which prescribes measures to all the rest, and is the last Reason of good and evil.

10. That therefore which makes an action fit to be commanded or forbidden by the wise governour of the world, can be nothing else in general, but its respective tendency to prompt or hinder the attainment of some certain end or other, which that governour proposes. For all action being for some end, and not the End it self, its aptness to be commanded or forbid∣den must be founded upon its serviceableness or disserviceableness to some end. So much in general.

11. I further consider, that this end must be that which is simply and absolutely the best and

greatest. For no other is worthy of God. Now certainly there is none better or greater than the universal good of the whole Sisteme of things, which is therefore to be regarded and prose∣cuted to the utmost both by God and all other Intelligent Beings.

12. And hence arises this first and great Ca∣non or Law, that whatever naturally tends to the promotion of the common interest is good and apt to be commanded, and whatever natu∣rally tends to the disinterest of the public, is evil and apt to be forbidden. This is the great Basis of Morality, the fixt and immutable stan∣dard of good and evil, and the fundamental Law of Nature.

13. And because there are some actions in spe∣cie, which with relation to the present systeme both of the Material and Intellectual world, have such a natural connexion with the further∣ance or prejudice of this great end, therefore these by way of Assumption under the two gene∣ral Propositions are intrinsecally and naturally good or bad, and are thereby differenc'd from those that are made so only by arbitrary Consti∣tution. Tho yet in one respect these are arbi∣trāry too, in as much as they depend upon such a particular Hypothesis of the world which was it self arbitrary, and which if God should at any time change, the relations of actions to the great end might change too; that which now naturally makes for the common advantage,

might as naturally make against it, and conse∣quently, that which is now good might have been then evil. But still the two great Hinges of Morality stand as fixt and as unvariable as the two Poles; whatever is naturally conducive to the common interest is good, and whatever has a contrary influence is evil. These are pro∣positions of eternal and unchangeable verity, and which God can no more cancel or disanull than he can deny himself.

14. So that now to analyze the immorality of any action into its last Principles; If it be en∣quired why such an action is to be avoided, the immediat answer is, because 'tis sin: if it be ask'd why 'tis sin, the immediat answer is, because 'tis forbidden, if why forbidden, because 'twas in it self fit to be forbidden, if why fit, because na∣turally apt to prejudice the common interest: if it be ask'd why the natural aptness of a thing to prejudice the common interest should make it fit to be forbidden, the answer is, because the common interest is above all things to be regarded and prosecuted: if farther a reason be demanded of this, there can no other be given but because 'tis the best and greatest end, and consequently, is to be desired and prosecuted not for the sake of any thing else, but purely for it self.

15. So that now the last Law whereof sin is a Transgression, is this great and Supream Law concerning the prosecution of the common in∣terest. And every sin is some way or other, di∣rectly

or indirectly a transgression of this Law. Those against any Moral Precept, directly, and those against a Precept merely Positive, indirect∣ly, because 'tis for the common good that the Supreme Authority be acknowledg'd and sub∣mitted to, let the instance wherein Obedience is required, be in it self never so indifferent.

16. If it be now objected that according to these measures there will be no difference be∣tween Moral and Physical evil, contrary to the common distinction between malum Turpe and malum Noxium, the one as opposed to bonum utile, and the other as opposed to bonum hone∣stum; I answer, that I know of no good or evil but of the end and of the means. Good of the end is what we call bonum jucundum, good of the means is what we call utile. Evil of the end there is properly none, but that only is evil which is prejudicial to it. Indeed the old ma∣sters of Morality discours'd of moral good and evil as of absolute natures, and accordingly, nothing so common among them as to talk of Essential Rectitudes, and Essential Turpitudes. But I think it greater accuracy to say, that Moral good and evil are Relative things, that bonum honestum is one and the same with that which is truly utile, and that Malum Turpe is that which is naturally against the profit of the Community. And herein I assert no more than what the great master of the Latin Philosophy and Eloquence professedly contends for through∣out

the whole third book of his Offices. And therefore instead of evading the Objection, I freely own its charge, and affirm that there is no difference between Moral and Physical evil, any otherwise than that Physical evil extends to all things in nature which obstruct Happi∣ness, whereas Moral evil is appropriated to A∣ctions that do so.

SECT. III. The second part of the Discourse, which briefly treats of Formal sin, with the requisites▪ necessary to its consti∣tution. Where also 'tis enquired, whether the Nature of sin be positive or privative.

1. WE are now come to the second part of our Discourse, where we are to treat of the nature of Formal Sin, that is, of Sin consider'd not abstra∣ctedly for the mere act of Obliquity, but Con∣cretely with such a special dependence of it up∣on the will as serves to render the Agent guilty, or obnoxious to punishment.

2. And here the first thing to be observ'd is, that altho material sin does neither in its notion nor in its existence include formal sin, yet for∣mal sin does always include the other. Tho there may be a transgression of the Law with∣out formal sin, yet the latter always supposes the former, and as St. John says, whoso∣ever committeth sin, transgresses also the Law.

3. But that which formal sin adds over and above to material, and under whose respect we are now to consider it, is the connotation of that special dependence of it upon the will which

derives guilt upon the Agent. So that for a De∣finition of formal sin we may say, that it is an irregular action, or a transgression of the law, so depending upon the will, as to make the A∣gent liable to punishment. This is in the Phrase of St. John 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to have sin, that is, so as to be accountable for it, for he speaks of that sin which upon confession God is faithful and just to forgive, and consequently not of material, (for where there is no guilt there can be no Remission) but of formal sin.

4. From this general notion of formal sin, proceed we to enquire what that special depen∣dence is that makes an irregular action formal∣ly a sin. And here 'tis in the first place supposed, that not every dependence of an action upon the will is sufficient to make it imputable. And with very good reason. For otherwise the a∣ctions of Infants, Fools and Madmen would be imputable, for these (as indeed all actions) have some dependence upon the will, at least as a Physical Principle.

5. To be positive therefore, that an irregular action may so depend upon the will as to de∣rive guilt upon the Agent, 'tis necessary first, that it proceed from the will as from a free Principle; Free not only in opposition to coa∣ction (for so all the actions of the will are free) but in opposition to necessity or determination to one part of the contradiction. That is in one word, 'tis necessary to the imputableness

of an action that it be avoidable. To this pur∣pose is that common saying of St. Austin, Nemo peccat (that is formaliter) in eo quod vitare non potest. And great reason the Father had to say so, for he that cannot avoid transgressing the Law is not so much as capable of being obliged by it (because no man can be obliged to what is impossible) and if he be not obliged by it, certainly he cannot Morally and Formally break it. A thing which the Patrons of Physical Predetermination would do well to consider.

6. But when I make it necessary to the im∣putableness of an action that it be freely exert∣ed, I would not be understood of an immediat Freeness. For certainly those rooted and con∣firm'd sinners, who have by long use reduced themselves under a necessity of sinning, are ne∣ver the more excusable for the impotence they have contracted. If there was Liberty in the Principle 'tis sufficient.

7. The next requisite, and that which gives the last and finishing stroke to Formal sin is, that it proceeds from the will sufficiently instruct∣ed by the understanding. That is, to make a man sin formally 'tis requisite that he has not only a Power of avoiding that action, which is a transgression of the Law, but that he also know it to be a Transgression of the Law, at least that he be in a capacity so to do, that so he may be induced to exert that Power. And 'tis also necessary that he know that he commits it, that

is, he must have or at least be in a capacity of having, both notitia Juris and notitia Facti.

8. The former of these depends upon that common Principle that Laws do not oblige till they are publish'd, according to that known Ma∣xime of the Canon Law, Leges constituuntur cum promulgantur, and that of the Civilians, Leges quae constringunt hominum vitas intelligi ab omni∣bus debent. And the latter also depends upon the equity of the same Principle, tho somewhat more remotely, for without this the Law, with relation to that particular instance, cannot be said to be properly known. For altho I know such a species of action (suppose Adultery) to be a transgression of the Law, yet if I know not that by such a particular instance I commit it, I cannot be said to know that this my action is a Transgression of the Law; and consequently (supposing this my ignorance invincible) am wholly excusable; as appears in the case of Abimelech when he took Abraham's wife.

9. So that to the Constitution of Formal sin these two things are required, 1st, that the Transgressor have a Power either immediatly, or at least in the Principle of not doing that action which is a Transgression: 2ly, that he either do or may know that act to be a Transgression of the Law, and likewise, that he know when he commits it. And thus have I shewn the rise, pro∣gress and maturity of sin; I have presented to

view both the imperfect Embryo and the full pro∣portion'd and animated Monster. All which I shall briefly comprize in that compendious de∣scription of St. James, Lust when it is con∣ceiv'd bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is finish'd, bringeth forth death.

10. There is one thing behind relating to the nature of sin in common, which I shall brief∣ly consider, and that is, whether its nature be Positive or Privative. The latter is generally held both by Metaphysitians, Moralists and Di∣vines, but upon what sufficient grounds I could never yet understand. The Formal part of sin without all Question is Positive, as is plain from the very notion of it. For it denotes only that special Dependence which an irregular act has upon the will, which is the same (as well as the common substance of the act) both in good and bad actions, and consequently alike Positive.

11. All the controversy therefore remains concerning the Material part of sin, whether that be Positive or Privative. And this too, not with respect to the mere Act (for that without question is positive) but with respect to the irre∣gularity of it.

12. Here then I consider, that according to the foregoing measures the irregularity of an action is not only its aberration from the Rule, but its crossing or going contrary to it. For 'tis not only its not promoting, but its opposing, or at least its natural aptness to oppose the greatest

and best of ends. So that 'tis not so properly an irregularity, as a contra-regularity. And therefore good and bad actions are not priva∣tively but contrarily opposed, and consequently both positive, for contrarys are always so.

13. For as to be in pain is not Privatively but contrarily opposed to being Happy (for Pain is something more than want of Happiness) so that action which causes Pain or misery is not Pri∣vatively but contrarily opposed to that which is effective of Happiness, and consequently is as Positive as the other.

14. Those sins which bid the fairest for Pri∣vation are sins of Omission. But even these, if we consider their Nature, will appear to be al∣so Positive. For to speak properly, their irre∣gularity does not lye in the not doing or the not willing to do what ought to be done, but in the willing not to do it. But to will the not doing of a thing is as positive as the willing to do it, as being not contradictorily or privatively, but con∣trarily opposed to it. The sins therefore of O∣mission are as Positive as those of Commission. The only difference is, that the Positiveness of sins of Commission lies both in the Habitude of the will, and in the executed act too, whereas the Positiveness of sins of Omission is in the Habitude of the will only.

15. And what is here determin'd concerning Moral evil, will, I suppose, hold equally true in all evil, except only that which is Absolute, that

is, whose evil is not its noxiousness to any thing else, but only the want of some constituent Per∣fection due to its self, according to that distin∣ction mention'd by Suarez in his Disputation de Malo, of Malum in se and malum alteri. This in∣deed does import no more than a Privation. And this I suppose might be the occasion of mi∣stake to those who first thought Moral evil to consist in a Privation only; for Absolute evil does so, and they (as I intimated above) took Moral evil to be a kind of absolute Nature.

16. Many things I know might be and are commonly objected against the Positiveness of sin, but I can think but of one that's worth con∣sidering, which is, that if Sin be positive it will be a real Entity, and if so, then we are press'd with a double absurdity, 1st that God will be the Author of it, as being the efficient cause of all Entity. 2ly, that it will be good, goodness being a necessary Affection of Ens.

17. To this I answer, 1st that I not only freely acknowledg, but contend that sin is a real Entity. But then I distingush of Entity. There are Physical, and there are Moral Entitys. By the latter (which alone needs explication) I understand certain modes of determination, superadded to Physical things or motions by intelligent Beings, in order either to the inte∣rest or disinterest of the universe.

18. This being premised, I answer to the first part of the objection by denying that it

hence follows that God is the Author of sin. God indeed is the Author of all Physical Beings and Motions, but not of those modes of determi∣nation superadded by Intelligent Beings, which I call Moral Entitys. As to the second, I grant the consequence, but deny the absurdity of it. For it is no absurdity that Moral evil should be Metaphysically good. For this Metaphysical, tran∣scendental goodness, which is the affection of Ens, is nothing else but a Being's having that essence whereof it is capable, or (as Suarez ex∣presses it) its having that perfection which is convenient to it. But this is very consistent with the nature of Moral evil, for this may have what belongs to its Idea as well as good, and 'tis the Perfection of sin to be exceeding sinful.

SECT. IV. Corollarys deduced from the whole. The foulness and defor∣mity of sin represented. That it is the greatest of evils. That no Formal sin can be in its self Venial. That in all probability Vindicative Justice is essential to God, hence deduced. A new Hypothesis for the reconciling of eter∣nal Punishments with the Divine Justice. That he who thoroughly understands and actually attends to the Na∣ture of sin cannot possibly commit it.

1. HAving thus far carried on the Theory of sin, we may now sit down, and take an estimate of its Foulness and Deformity. And methinks I am affrighted at the ugliness of the face which I have unmask'd, and am rea∣dy to start back from the distorted and ill∣boding monster. For however the magic of Self-love may reconcile men to their own faults, yet if we set the object at a more conve∣nient distance from the eye, and consider the Nature of sin irrespectively to our selves, 'twill certainly appear according to the precedent measures, to be the most deform'd, monstrous thing, that can either be found or conceiv'd in Nature.

2. For if we consider it in its full latitude, it is the highest 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Habitude of the will to the worst of objects; than which what can be

imagin'd more monstrous and absurd? If we consider it as a violation of Positive Law, what can be more indecorous than for a Creature to violate the commands, and trample upon the Authority of that awful excellence to whom he owes his life, his motion and his very being? If we consider it as a violation of the Law of Rea∣son, what can be more monstrous and unnatu∣ral than for a man to rebel against the vicarious power of God in his Soul, to refuse to live accord∣ing to that part of him whereby he is a man, to suffer the ferine and brutish part to get the As∣cendent over that which is rational and Divine, to refuse to be govern'd by those sacred Digests which are the Transcripts of the Moral Nature of God, and to act against the very frame and contexture of his being. Lastly, if we consider it as a Transgression against that great and So∣veraign Law of promoting the common Happi∣ness, what a monstrous evil must that be which crosses and opposes the best of ends, and which is also proposed by the best of Beings; that for the interest of an inconsiderable part (com∣monly ones self) justles the great wheel of So∣ciety out of its proper track, that by persuing a lesser in prejudice to a greater good, disturbs the order of things, dislocates the frame, and untunes the Harmony of the universe!

3. We may also hence conclude, that sin is the greatest evil that is, or that can possibly be. For it is contrarily opposed to the greatest pos∣sible

good, and consequently, must needs be the greatest evil. And besides, 'tis that which in no case or juncture whatsoever is to be commit∣ted, and therefore must be the greatest evil; be∣cause otherwise it might happen to come into competition with a greater, and so commence eligible, which is contrary to the supposition. Moreover, the greatness of this evil above all others is à posteriori further confirm'd from the greatness of the Sacrifice required for its attone∣ment. God could not, or at least thought not fit to remit it without the shedding of blood, and that too of the blood of God. So great a Fool is he, so little does he consider, that makes a mock at sin.

4. Again it may be hence collected, that no Formal sin can be in its own nature venial. For according to the former measures every For∣mal sin tho never so small, is a sin against the greatest Charity imaginable. For 'tis against that Charity whereby I ought to promote the ends of God, and prosecute the great interest of the universe. And consequently, cannot be in its own Nature venial, or pardonable without Re∣pentance.

5. Nay may I not further conclude accord∣ing to the preceding measures, that 'tis very probable that no sin could have been pardon'd even with Repentance, had there not been al∣so satisfaction made for it, and that vindicative Justice is essential to the nature of God? For

when I consider sin, I find it so diametrically contrary to the essential sanctity of God, and so destructive of that great End which he can∣not but propose, that he must needs hate it with an infinite hatred. But how he should do so, and yet not punish for it, is hard to under∣stand.

6. Upon these measures we may also find out a way of reconciling eternal punishments with Divine Justice. The great Objection is, what Proportion is there between a transient act of sin and eternal misery? And if there be none, how is it consistent with divine Justice to inflict the one for the other? This has been a great diffi∣culty, and has for a long time stood proof a∣gainst all solutions. But now if we consider sin as contrarily opposed to the greatest possible good, the good of the universe, and consequently as the greatest possible evil, its demerit will be such that we need not fear 'twill be over-punish'd e∣ven with eternal misery. For if any misery is to be endured rather than one sin to be com∣mitted, 'tis also just that any may be, when it is committed. For the equity of both depends upon sin's being the greatest evil.

7. The last Deduction which I shall make from the Premises is this, that he who thorough∣ly understands and actually attends to the nature of sin, cannot possibly commit it. For as long as he does so, he must look upon it as the great∣est evil, otherwise he cannot be said rightly to

understand it. And if he look upon it as the greatest evil he cannot chuse it, so long as he continues in that judgment, because the then chusing it would be the chusing of all that where∣by it exceeds other evils, gratis, which is the chusing of evil as evil, which is impossible.

8. Whosoever therefore consents to the com∣mission of sin passes first a wrong judgment upon it, has the light of his understanding darkned, and intercepted by a cloud of Passion, loses the pre∣sent Conviction of sin's being the greatest evil, and so commits it to avoid (as he then foolishly thinks) a greater. So that the cause and ori∣gine of all sin is ignorance, folly and inadvertence: there is a false Proposition in the understanding before there is any misapplication in the will, and 'tis through the swimming of the head that the feet slip and lose their station. And yet the sinner is no way excusable for this his decep∣tion, because 'tis the ignorance of that which he habitually knows, and he might have attend∣ed better, and 'twas his fault that he did not.

9. And 'tis the recovering and awaking up into this Conviction, that is the Principle of Repen∣tance and reformation of life. When a man by the aid of grace and the use of due attention, resumes his interrupted Judgment of Sins being the greatest evil, he then comes again to him∣self, forms new resolutions never to commit it, and returns to the wisdom of the just. So great reason had the Psalmist to

pray, O grant me understanding and I shall live.

THE PRAYER.

O My God, who art pure light and in whom there is no darkness at all, who art pure Love, and hatest nothing but sin, and hatest that infinitely, give me an heart after thine own heart, that I may also abhor it without mea∣sure, and without end. Open thou mine eyes that I may see those two wondrous things of thy Law, the Beauty of Holiness, and the deformity of sin. Inspire me with that Charity which seek∣eth not her own, that I may ever propose and follow that great and excellent end which thou proposest, that I may ever adhere to that which is simply and absolutely best, and never for any self-advantage disturb the order of thy Creation. O let me never so far abuse those facultys thou hast given me, as to thwart the designs of thy goodness and wisdom, and to interrupt that Harmony wherein thou so delightest. But let all my designs be generous, unselvish and sin∣cere, so as chiefly to rejoyce at the good of thy Creation, at whose very material Beauty the

Morning Stars sang together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy. Holy Father, 'tis thy will that this thy great Family should be prosper∣ous and happy, and the better part of it thy Angels, strictly conform to it; O let this thy will be done here on Earth as it is in Heaven, and grant that every member of this great Body may so study the good of the whole, that thou may'st once more review the works of thy hands, and with a Fatherly complacency pronounce them good. Grant this for the sake of him who gave his life for the Happiness of the world, thy Son Jesus,

Amen.

II.

GIve me wisdom that sitteth by thy throne, and reject me not from among thy chil∣dren. That wisdom which was with thee from the Beginning, which knoweth all thy works and was present when thou madest the world, and knew what was acceptable in thy sight and right in thy Commandments. O send her out of thy holy Heavens and from the throne of thy glory, that being present she may labour with me, that I may know and thoroughly con∣sider what an evil it is to affront thy Authority, to break through the bounds which thou hast set, to rebel against the most excellent and di∣vine part of my nature, and to oppose that

which thou lov'st, and which is of all things the most lovely. O let thy wisdom dwell with me, let my loins be always girt, and this my Light al∣ways burning, that I may never be deceiv'd through the deceitfulness of sin, nor seek death in the errour of my life. Thy words have I hid with∣in my heart that I might not sin against thee, O grant me understanding and I shall live. Keep I beseech thee this conviction still fresh and ful∣ly awake in me that Sin is the greatest of all evils, that so the fear of none may ever drive me to do the thing which thy Soul hates. Consi∣der and hear me O Lord my God, lighten mine eyes that I sleep not in death.

Amen, Amen.

Notes

• The Great Exem∣plar.
• Eccles. 19.
• Ecclus. 21.
• cap. 1. v. 7.
• Rev. 20.
• Prov. 13.
• Act. 8. 22.
• Jud. 22.
• Eccles. 1. 9.
• See my Letter of Ideas.
• 1 Tim. 5. 16.
• Rom. 7. 11.
• Mat. 15. 6.
• Luke 13. 24.
• Heb. 7. 19.
• Mat. 5. 17.
• Jud. 9.
• 2 Pet. 1. 4.
• Heb. 1. 3.
• 1 Pet. 1. 12.
• Prov. 20. 27. Hos. 8. 12.
• Rom. 7. 16.
• Gen. 1••. 25.
• Jer. 10. 12.
• Psal. 145.
• Rom. 7. 14.
• 1 Cor. 1. 24.
• Luke 2. ••4.
• Acts▪ 26. 8.
• Eccles. 43.
• 2 Tim. 1. 12.
• Mat. 5. 17.
• Mat. 22. 37. Mark 12. 30. Luke 10. 27.
• Psal. 133. 1.
• Mat. 5. 39.
• Isai. 50. 6.
• Mat. 19. 10.
• Heb. 6. 9.
• Psal. 119.
• Prov. 3. 17.
• Job 4. 18.
• lib. 1. c. 8.
• Rev. 3. 10.
• Psal. 119.
• Job. 22.
• Dr. Cum∣berland.
• Josephus de Bell. Jud. lib. 7.
• Rev. 3. 1••.
• Matt. 19. 20. and 21. 1 Cor. 7. 1, 6, 7, 25, 38. 2 Cor. 8. 10. and 9. 6.
• Theophylact.
• Marsilius Ficinus, Tom. 2. pag. 315.
• Rev. 12. 12.
• lib. 6. p. 537.
• Psal. 42.
• Psal. 119. Psal. 73. 24.
• Disser••. ••e Method. p. 1.
• Job 38. 10.
• Dr. Hammond.
• 2 Cor. 12. 7.
• Hist. Eccles. l. 2. cap. 13.
• See Hie∣rocles upon the Golden Verses of Py∣thagoras.
• 1 Cor. 4. 13.
• Isai. 14. 13.
• Acts 12. 23.
• James 1. 17.
• Rev. 4. 10.
• Prov. 22. 1.
• 2 Cor. 10. 13.
• 2 Cor. 10. 13.
• 2 Cor. 12. 6.
• 1 Pet. 3. 21.
• Neh. 6. 11.
• D••••. 4. 33.
• Psal. 10. 4.
• Gen. 22. 10.
• John 3. 8.
• John 3. 4.
• John 1. ••.
• Gen. 20.
• James 1. 15.
• Psal. 119.