A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

An Idea of Happiness, &c.

SIR,

1. THO you have been pleas'd to assign me the Task of an Angel, and in that Respect have warranted me to disobey you; yet, since a considerable part of that experimental Knowledg which I have of Happiness is owing to the Delight, which I take in your vertuous and endearing Friendship, I think 'tis but reasonable I should endeavour to give you an Idea of that, whereof you have given me the Possession.

2. You desire to know of me wherein the greatest Happiness attainable by man in this Life does consist. And here, tho I see my self engaged in a work already too difficult for me, yet I find it necessary to enlarge it: For, since the greatest Happiness, or Summum Bonum of this Life is a Species of Happiness in general, and since it is call'd (Greatest) not because ab∣solutely perfect and compleat; but inasmuch as it comes nearest to that which indeed is so, it will be necessary first to state the Notion of Happiness in General, and then to define where∣in that Happiness does consist which is perfect and compleat, before I can proceed to a Reso∣lution of your Question.

3. By Happiness, in the most general Sense of the word, I understand nothing else but an Enjoyment of any Good. The least Degree of Good has the same Proportion to the least De∣gree of Happiness as the greatest has to the greatest, and consequently as many ways as a man enjoys any Good, so many ways he may be said to be happy: neither will the Mixture of Evil make him forfeit his Right to this Ti∣tle, unless it either equals the Good he enjoys, or exceeds it: And then indeed it does; but the Reason is, because in strictness of Speaking, upon the whole Account the man enjoys no Good at all: For if the Good and the Evil be equal-balanc'd, it must needs be indifferent to that man either to be or not to be, there being not the least Grain of good to determine his Choice: So that he can no more be said to be happy in that Condition, than he could before he was born. And much less, if the Evil exceeds the Good: For then he is not only not happy, but absolutely and purely miserable: For after an exact Commensuration supposed between the Good and the Evil, all that remains over of the Evil is pure and simple Misery; which is the Case of the Damn'd: And when 'tis once come to this (whatever some Mens Metaphysics may perswade them) I am very well satisfied, that 'tis better not to be than to be. But now on the other side, if the Good does never so little out-weigh the Evil, that Overplus of Good

is as pure and unallay'd in its Proportion, as if there were no such Mixture at all; and conse∣quently the Possession of it may properly be call'd Happiness.

4. I know the Masters of Moral Philosophy do not treat of Happiness in this Latitude; nei∣ther is it fit they should: For their Business be∣ing to point out the ultimate End of Human Actions, it would be an impertinent thing for them to give any other Idea of Happiness than the highest: But however this does not hinder but that the General Idea of Happiness may be extended farther, even to the Fruition of any Good whatsoever: Neither is there any reason to find Fault with the Latitude of this Notion, since we acknowledg Degrees even in Glory.

5. In this General Idea of Happiness two things are contain'd. One is, some Good, ei∣ther real or apparent, in the Fruition of which we are said to be in some measure or other hap∣py. The other is the very Fruition it self. The first of these is usually called Objective Happi∣ness, and the latter Formal. Some I know di∣vide Happiness into these as distinct Species; but I think not so artificially: For they are both but constituent Parts, which joyntly make up one and the same Happiness: Neither of them are sufficient alone, but they are both equally necessary. That the last of these is a necessary Ingredient, I think no doubt can reasonably be made: For what would the greatest Good

imaginable signifie without Fruition? And that the former is likewise necessary is no less certain: For how can there be such a thing as Fruition without an Object? I grant 'tis not at all necessary that the Object be a real substan∣tial Good; if it appear so, 'tis sufficient.

6. From this Distinction of real and appa∣rent Good, some have taken occasion to distin∣guish of Happiness likewise into two sorts, real and imaginary: But I believe, upon a more nar∣row Scrutiny into the matter, 'twill be found, that all Happiness, according to its Propor∣tion, is equally real; and that that which they term Imaginary, too well deserves the Name, there being no such thing in Nature: For let the Object of it be never so Phantastic, yet it must still carry the Semblance and Appearance of Good (otherwise it can neither move the Ap∣petite nor please it, and consequently be nei∣ther an Object of Desire nor of Fruition;) and if so, the Happiness must needs be real, because the Formality of the Object, tho 'twere never so true and real a good, would notwithstanding lie in the Appearance, not in the Reality: Whe∣ther it be real or no is purely accidental: For, since to be happy can be nothing else but to en∣joy somthing which I desire, the Object of my Happiness must needs be enjoy'd under the same Formality as 'tis desired. Now since 'tis desired only as apparently good, it must needs please me when obtained under the same Notion. So

that it matters not to the Reality of my Happi∣ness, whether the Object of it be really good, or only apprehended so, since if it were never so real, it pleases only as apparent. The Fool has his Paradise as well as the Wise-man, and for the time is as happy in it; and a kind Delu∣sion will make a Cloud as pleasing as the Queen of Heaven. And therefore I think it impossi∣ble for a man to think himself happy, and (du∣ring that Perswasion) not really to be so. He enjoys the Creature of his own Fancy, worships the Idol of his Imagination, and the happiest man upon Earth does no more: For let the Cir∣cumstances of his Life be what they will, 'tis his Opinion only that must give the Relish. With∣out this, Heaven it self would afford him no Content, nor the Vision of God prove Beatific. 'Tis true, the man is seated at the Spring-Head of Happiness, is surrounded with excellent Ob∣jects; but alas, it appears not so to him; he is not at all affected with his Condition, but, like Adam, lies fast in a dead Sleep in the midst of Paradise.

7. The Sum of this Argument is this; Good is in the same manner the Object of Fruition, as 'tis of Desire; and that is not as really good in its own Nature, but as 'tis judged so by the Understanding: And consequently, tho it be only apparent, it must needs be as effectual to gratifie the Appetite as it was at first to excite it during that Appearance. So long as it keeps

on its Vizor and imposes upon the Understand∣ing, what is wanting in the thing, is made up by an obliging Imposture, and Ignorance becomes here the Mother of Happiness as well as of De∣votion: But if the man will dare to be wise, and too curiously examine the superficial Tinsel-Good, he undeceives himself to his own Cost, and, like Adam, adventuring to eat of the Tree of Knowledg, sees himself naked, and is ashamed. And for this reason I think it impossible for any man to love to be flatter'd: 'Tis true, he may delight to hear himself commended by those who indeed do flatter him; but the true reason of that is, because he does not apprehend that to be Flattery which indeed is so; but when he once throughly knows it, 'tis impossible he should be any longer delighted with it. I shall conclude this Point with this useful Reflection, That since every Man's Happiness depends wholly upon his own opinion, the foundatiou upon which all envious men proceed, must needs be either false or very uncertain. False, if they think that outward Circumstances and States of life are all the Ingredients of Happi∣ness; but uncertain however: For since they measure the Happiness of other Men by their own Opinion, 'tis mere Chance if they do not misplace their Envy, unless they were sure the other Person was of the like opinion with themselves. And now what a vain irrational thing is it to disquiet our selves into a dislike

of our own Condition, merely because we mi∣stake another Man's?

8. Thus fa•• of the Notion of Happiness in General; I now proceed to consider that Hap∣piness which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Plato speaks) sound and entire, perfect and compleat. Con∣cerning the general Notion of which, all men, I suppose, are as much agreed as they are in the Idea of a Triangle. That 'tis such a State than which a better cannot be conceiv'd: In which there is no Evil you can fear, no Good which you desire and have not; That which fully and constantly satisfies the Demand of every Appetite, and leaves no possibility for a desire of Change; or to summ it up in that com∣prehensive Expression of the Poet,

Quod sis esse velis, nihilque malis.

When you would always be what you are, and (as the Earl of Roscommon very significantly ren∣ders it) do Rather nothing.

9. This I suppose is the utmost that can be said or conceiv'd of it, and less than this will not be e∣nough. And thus far we are all agreed. For I sup∣pose, the many various Disputes maintained by Philosophers concerning Happiness, could not respect this general Notion of it, but only the particular causes or means whereby it might be acquired. And I find Tully concurring with me in the same Observation, Ea est beata vita (says he) quaerimus autem non quae

sit, sed unde. The difficulty is not to frame a conception of a perfectly happy State in the general, but to define in particular wherein it confists.

10. But before I undertake this Province, I think it might not be amiss to remove one Pre∣judice, which, because it has gain'd upon my self sometimes in my Melancholy Retirements, I am apt to think it may be incident to other men also. It is this, Whether after so many Disputes about, so many restless endeavours af∣ter this state of perfect Happiness, there be any such thing or no. Whether it be not a mere Idea, as imaginary as Plato's Common-wealth, as fictious as the Groves of Elysium. I confess, this suspicion has oftentimes overcast my mind with black thoughts, damp'd my Devotion, and as it were, clipp'd the Wings of my Aspi••ing Soul. And I happened to fall into it upon a serious reflection on the nature of Fruition in the seve∣ral Periods and Circumstances of my Life. For I observ'd according to my Narrow experience, that I never had in all my Life the same thoughts of any good in the very time of the enjoying it as I had before. I have known when I have promised my self vast Satisfactions, and my imagination has presented me at a di∣stance with a fair Landskip of Delights, yet when I drew nigh to grasp the alluring Happi∣ness, like the Sensitive Plant it contracted it self at the touch, and shrink'd almost to nothing in

the Fruition. And though after the Enjoyment is past, it seems great again upon Reflection as it did before in Expectation, yet should a Plato∣nical Revolution make the same Circumstances recur, I should not think so. I found 'twas ever with me as with the Traveller, to whom the Ground which is before him, and that which he has left behind him seems always more curious∣ly embroider'd and delightsome, than that which he stands upon. So that my Happiness, like the time wherein I thought to enjoy it, was always either past or to come, never present. Methought I could often say upon a Recollection, How happy was I at such a time! Or when I was in expectation. How happy shall I be if I compass such a design! But scarce ever, I am so. I was pretty well pleas'd methought while I expected, while I hoped, till Fruition jogg'd me out of my pleasing slumber and I knew it was but a Dream. And this single Considera∣tion has often made me even in the very pursuit after Happiness, and full career of my Passions, to stop short on this side of Fruition, and to chuse rather with Moses upon Mount Nebo to entertain my fancy with a remote Prospect of the Happy Land, than to go in, and Possess it, and then Repine. How then shall Man be hap∣py, when setting aside all the Crosses of For∣tune, he will complain even of Success, and Fruition it self shall disappoint him!

11. And this melancholy reflection bred in me a kind of Suspicion, that for all that I knew it might be so in Heaven too. That although at this distance I might frame to my self bright Ideas of that Region of Bliss; yet when I came to the Possession of it, I should not find that perfect Happiness there which I expected, but that it would be always to come as 'tis now, and that I should seek for Heaven even in Heaven it self. That I should not fully acquiesce in my condition there, but at length desire a Change. And that which confirm'd me the more in this unhappy Scepticism, was, because I consider'd that a great number of excellent Beings who enjoyed the very Quintessence of Bliss, who were as happy as God and Heaven could make them, grew soon uneasy and weary of their State and left their own Habitation. Which argues that their Happiness was not perfect and compleat, because otherwise they would not have desired a Change, since that very desire is an Imper∣fection. And if Happiness be not compleat in Heaven, sure 'tis impossible to be found any where else.

12. Before therefore I proceed to define wherein perfect Happiness does consist, I think it necessary to endeavour the removal of this Scruple, which, like the flaming Sword, forbids entrance into Paradice. In order to which, I shall enquire into the true Reason why these Sublunary good things when enjoyed do neither

answer our expectations, nor satisfy our Appe∣tites. Now this must proceed either from the nature of Fruition it self, or from the Imper∣fection of it, or from the Object of it, or from our selves. I confess, did this defect proceed from the very nature of Fruition (as is supposed in the Objection) 'tis impossible there should be any such thing as perfect Happiness, since 'twould faint away while enjoy'd, and expire in our embraces. But that it cannot proceed thence, I have this to offer, Because Fruition being no∣thing else but an Application or Union of the Soul to some good or agreeable Object, it is im∣possible that should lessen the good enjoyed. In∣deed it may lessen our estimation of it, but that is because we do not rightly consider the nature of things, but promise our selves infinite Satis∣factions in the enjoyment of finite Objects. We look upon things through a false Glass, which Magnifies the Object at a distance much be∣yond its just Dimensions. We represent our fu∣ture enjoyments to our selves in such favourable and partial Ideas which abstract from all the inconveniencies and allays which will really in the Event accompany them. And if we thus o∣ver-rate our Felicities before-hand, 'tis no won∣der if they baulk our Expectations in the Frui∣tion. But then it must be observed, that the Fruition does not cause this Deficiency in the Ob∣ject, but only discover it. We have a better in∣sight into the Nature of things near at hand,

than when we stood afar off, and consequently discern those defects and imperfections, which, like the qualities of an ill Mistriss, lay hid all the time of Courtship, and now begin to betray themselves, when 'tis come to enjoyment. But this can never happen but where the Object is finite. An infinite Object can never be over∣valued, and consequenty cannot frustrate our Expectations.

13. And as we are not to charge Fruition with our disappointments but our selves (because we are accessory to our own delusion by taking false measures of things) so neither is the Ʋnsatis∣factoriness of any condition to be imputed to the Nature of Fruition it self, but either to the imperfection of it or to the finiteness of the Ob∣ject. Let the Object be never so perfect, yet if the Fruition of it be in an imperfect measure there will still be room for Ʋnsatisfactoriness, as it appears in our enjoyment of God in this Life. Neither can a finite Object fully satisfy us though we enjoy it never so thoroughly. For since to a full satisfaction and acquiescence of Mind 'tis required that our Faculties be always entertained and we ever enjoying: it is impossi∣ble a finite Object should afford this Satisfaction, because all the good that is in it (being finite) is at length run over, and then the enjoyment is at an end, The flower is suck'd dry, and we ne∣cessarily desire a Change. Whenever therefore our enjoyment proves unsatisfying, we may con∣clude,

that either the Object is finite, or the Fruition imperfect. But then how came the Angels to be dissatisfy'd with their Condition in the Regions of light and immortality, when they drank freely of the Fountain of Life proceeding out of the Throne of God, with whom is fulness of Joy, and at whose Right hand are Pleasures for evermore. Here certain∣ly there is no room either for the finiteness of the Object, or the imperfection of Fruition. And therefore their dissatisfaction can be imputed to no other Cause, than the Nature of Fruition in general, which is to lessen the good enjoyed, as was supposed in the Objection. This I confess presses hard, and indeed, I have but one way to extricate my self from this difficulty, and that is by supposing a State of Probation in the Angels. That they did not immediatly upon their Creation enjoy an infinite Object, or if they did, yet that 'twas in an imperfect measure. For should it be granted that they were at first con∣firmed in Bliss and compleatly happy both in re∣spect of Fruition and Object, as we suppose they are now, I cannot conceive it possible they should be dissatisfy'd with their Condition. This being repugnant to the Idea of Perfect Happiness.

14. Since then this dissatisfaction must be de∣rived either from the imperfection of the Frui∣tion, or the finiteness of the Object, and not from the Nature of Fruition in the general, to infer the possibility of perfect Happiness, there

needs no more to be supposed than the existence of a Being full fraught with infinite inexhausti∣ble good, and that he is able to Communicate to the full. There may be then such a thing as Perfect Happiness. The possibility of which may also be further proved (tho not explicated) from those boundless Desires, that immortal Thirst every man has after it by Nature: Con∣cerning which I observe, that nothing does more constantly, more inseparably cleave to our Minds than this Desire of perfect and con∣summated Happiness: This, as Plato patheti∣cally expresses it, is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the most excellent end of all our Endeavours, the great Prize, the great Hope. This is the Mark every Man shoots at, and tho we miss our Aim never so often, yet we will not, cannot give over; but, like passio∣nate Lovers, take Resolution from a Repulse. The rest of our Passions are much at our own Disposal; yield either to Reason or Time; we either Argue our selves out of them, or at least out-live them. We are not always in Love with Pomp and Grandeur, nor always dazzled with the glittering of Riches; and there is a Season when Pleasure it self shall Court in vain: But the desire of perfect Happiness has no Intervals, no Vicissitudes, it out-lasts the Motion of the Pulse, and survives the Ruins of the Grave. Many Waters cannot quench it, neither can the Floods Drown it: And now certainly God would

never have planted such an Ardent, such an im∣portunate Appetite in our Souls, and as it were interwoven it with our very Natures, had he not been able to satisfie it.

15. I come now to shew wherein this perfect Happiness does consist, concerning which, I affirm in the first place, that it is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. The greatest Fruition we have of God here, is imperfect, and consequently unsatisfactory. And as for all other Objects they are finite, and consequently, though never so fully enjoy'd, cannot afford us perfect Satisfaction. No; Man knoweth not the price thereof: Neither is it to be found in the Land of the Living. The Depth saith, it is not in me, and the Sea saith, it is not in me. The Vanity of the Creature has been so copiously discoursed upon, both by Philosophers and Divines, and is withall so ob∣vious to every thinking man's Experience, that I need not here take an Inventory of the Crea∣tion, nor turn Ecclesiastes after Solomon. And besides, I have already anticipated this Argu∣ment in what I have said concerning Fruition. I shall only add one or two Remarks concern∣ing the Objects of Secular Happiness, which are not so commonly insisted upon, to what has been there said. The first is this, that the Ob∣jects wherein Men generally seek for Happiness here, are not only finite in their Nature, but al∣so few in number. Indeed, could a Man's Life

be so contrived, that he should have a new Plea∣sure still ready at hand assoon as he was grown weary of the Old, and every day enjoy a Virgin Delight, he might then perhaps like Mr. Hobbs his Notion, and for a while think himself hap∣py in this continued Succession of new Acquisitions. But alas, Nature does not treat us with this Va∣riety. The compass of our enjoyments is much shorter than that of our Lives, and there is a Periodical Circulation of our Pleasures as well as of our Blood.

—Versamur ibidem atque insumus usque. Nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas.

Lucretius.

The Enjoyments of our Lives run in a perpe∣tual Round like the Months in the Kalendar, but with a quicker Revolution; we dance like Fairies in a Circle, and our whole Life is but a nauseous Tautology: We rise like the Sun, and run the same Course we did the day before, and to morrow is but the same over again: So that the greatest Favourite of Fortune will have Reason often enough to cry out with him in Seneca, Quousque eadem? But there is another Grievance which contributes to defeat our En∣deavours after perfect Happiness in the Enjoy∣ments of this Life; Which is, that the Objects wherein we seek it, are not only finite and few; but that they commonly prove occasions of

greater Sorrow to us than ever they afforded us Content. This may be made out several ways, as from the Labour of Getting, the Care of Keeping, the fear of Losing, and the like To∣picks, commonly insisted on by others; but I wave these, and fix upon another Account less blown upon, and I think more material than any of the rest. It is this, that altho the Ob∣ject loses that great appearance in the Fruition which it had in the expectation, yet after it is gone it Resumes it again. Now we, when we lament the loss, do not take our measures from that appearance which the Object had in the Enjoyment (as we should do to make our sor∣row not exceed our Happiness) but from that which it has in the reflexion, and consequently we must needs be more miserable in the loss then we were happy in the enjoyment.

16. From these and the like Considerations, I think it will evidently appear, that this perfect Happiness is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. Wherein then does it consist? I answer positively, in the full and en∣tire Fruition of God. He (as Plato speaks) is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Proper and Prin∣cipal end of Man, the Center of our Tendency, the Ark of our Rest. He is the Object which a∣lone can satisfy the appetite of the most Capa∣cious Soul, and stand the Test of Fruition to E∣ternity. And to enjoy him fully is perfect Fe∣licity. This in general, is no more than what

is deliver'd to us in Scripture, and was believ'd by many of the Heathen Philosophers. But the manner of this Fruition requires a more parti∣cular Consideration. Much is said by the School∣men upon this Subject, whereof, in the first place, I shall give a short and methodical ac∣count, and then fix upon the Opinion which I best approve of. The first thing that I ob∣serve, is, that 'tis generally agreed upon among them, that this Fruition of God consists in some Operation; and I think with very good Reason. For as by the Objective part of perfect Happiness we understand that which is best and last, and to which all other things are to be referr'd; So by the Formal part of it must be understood the best and last Habitude of Man toward that best Object, so that the Happiness may both ways satisfy the Appetite, that is, as 'tis the best thing, and as 'tis the Possession, Use, or Fruition of that best thing: Now this habitude whereby the best thing is perfectly possess'd, must needs be some Operation, because Operation is the ul∣timate perfection of every Being. Which Axion (as Cajetan well observes) must not be so under∣stood as if Operation taken by it self were more perfect than the thing which tends to it, but that every thing with its Operation is more perfect than without it.

17. The next thing which I observe, is, that 'tis also farther agreed upon among them, that this Operation wherein our Fruition of God

does consist, is an Operation of the Intellectual part, and not of the Sensitive. And this also I take to be very reasonable. First, because 'tis generally receiv'd, that the Essence of God cannot be the Object of any of our Senses. But Secondly, Suppose it could, yet since this Ope∣ration; wherein our perfect Happiness does con∣sist must be the perfectest Operation, and since that of the Intellectual part is more perfect than that of the Sensitive, it follows that the Opera∣tion whereby we enjoy God must be that of the Intellectual part only.

18. But now whereas the Intellectual part of man (as 'tis opposed to the Sensitive) is double, viz. That of the Ʋnderstanding, and that of the Will, there has commenced a great Controver∣sy between the Thomists and the Scotists, in which Act or Operation of the Rational Soul the Fruition of God does consist, whether in an Act of the Ʋnderstanding, or in an Act of the Will. The Thomists will have it consist purely in an Act of the Ʋnderstanding, which is Vision. The Scotists in the Act of the Will, which is Love. I intend not here to launch out into those Volu∣minous Intricacies and Abstrusities, occasioned by the management of this Argument: It may suffice to tell you, that I think they are both in the extream, and therefore I shall take the mid∣dle way and resolve the perfect Fruition of God partly into Vision and partly into Love. These are the two arms with which we embrace the

Divinity, and unite our Souls to the fair one and the good. These I conceive are both so essential to the perfect Fruition of God, that the Idea of it can by no means be maintained if ei∣ther of them be wanting. For, since God is both Supream Truth and infinite Goodness, he cannot be entirely possess'd but by the most clear knowledg and the most ardent love. And besides, since the Soul is happy by her Facul∣ties, her Happiness must consist in the most perfect Operation of each Faculty. For if Hap∣piness did consist formally in the sole Opera∣tion of the Ʋnderstanding (as most say) or in the sole Operation of the Will (as others) the Man would not be compleatly and in all respects Happy. For how is it possible a Man should be perfectly Happy in loving the greatest good if he did not know it, or in knowing it if he did not love it? And moreover, these two Ope∣rations do so mutually tend to the promotion and conservation of one another, that upon this depends the perpetuity and the constancy of our Happiness. For while the Blessed do 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Face to Face contemplate the Supream Truth and the infinite Goodness, they cannot chuse but love perpetually; and while they perpetually love, they cannot chuse but perpetually contemplate. And in this mu∣tual reciprocation of the Actions of the Soul consists the perpetuity of Heaven, the Circle of Felicity.

19. Besides this way of resolving our fruition of God into Vision and Love, there is a famous Opinion said to be broacht by Henricus Ganda∣vensis, who, upon a Supposition that God could not be so fully enjoy'd as is required to perfect Happiness, only by the Operations or Powers of the Soul, fancied a certain Illapse whereby the Divine Essence did fall in with, and as it were penetrate the Essence of the Blessed. Which Opinion he endeavours to illustrate by this Si∣militude. That as a piece of Iron, red hot by reason of the Illapse of the fire into it, appears all over like fire, so the Souls of the Blessed by this Illapse of the Divine Essence into them, shall be all over Divine.

20. I think he has scarce any followers in this Opinion, but I am sure he had a leader. For this is no more than what Plato taught before him, as is to be seen in his Discourses about the refusion of the Souls of good men into the Ani∣ma Mundi, which is the self-same in other terms with this Opinion. And the Truth of what I affirm may farther appear from an expression of that great Platonist Plotinus, (viz.) that the Soul will then be Happy when it shall de∣part hence to God, and as another and no longer her self shall become wholly his, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, having joyn'd her self to him as a Center to a Center.

21. That such an intimate Conjunction with God as is here described is possible, seems to

me more than credible from the Nature of the Hypostatic Union, but whether our Fruition of God after this Life shall consist in it, none know but those happy Souls who enjoy him, and therefore I shall determine nothing before the time. This only I observe, that should our Fruition of God consist in such an Union or rather Penetration of Essences, that would not exclude but rather infer those Operations of Vision and Love as necessary to Fruition; but on the other hand, there seems no such necessity of this Union to the Fruition, but that it may be conceiv'd entire without it. And therefore why we should multiply difficulties without cause, I see no reason. For my part I should think my self sufficiently happy in the clear Vi∣sion of my Maker, nor should I desire any thing beyond the Prayer of Moses, I beseech thee shew me thy Glory.

22. For what an infinite Satisfaction, Hap∣piness and Delight must it needs be to have a clear and intimate perception of that Primitive and Original Beauty, Perfection and Harmo∣ny, whereof all that appears fair and excellent either to our Senses or Ʋnderstandings in this Life is but a faint imitation, a pale Reflection! To see him who is the Fountain of all Being, containing in himself the perfection, not on∣ly of all that is, but of all that is possible to be, the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the first and the last, which is,

and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty! To see him of whom all Nature is the Image, of whom all the Harmony both of the visible and invisible World is but the Eccho! To see him, who (as Plato divinely and magnificent∣ly expresses it) is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The immense Ocean of Beauty, which is it self by it self, with it self, uniform, always existing! This certainly will affect the Soul with all the pleasing and ravish∣ing Transports of Love and Desire, Joy and De∣light, Wonder and Amazement, together with a settled Acquiescence and Complacency of Spirit only less infinite than the Loveliness that causes it, and the peculiar Complacency of him who rejoyces in his own fulness, and the Compre∣hensions of Eternity. We see how strangely our Sense of Seeing is affected with the Harmony of Colours, and our sense of Hearing with the Har∣mony of Sounds, insomuch that some have been too weak for the enjoyment, and have grown mad with the Sublimate of Pleasure. And if so, what then shall we think of the Beatific Vi∣sion, the pleasure of which will so far transcend that of the other, as God who is all over Har∣mony and Proportion exceeds the sweetest Me∣lody of Sounds and Colours, and the perception of the Mind is more vigorous, quick and pier∣cing than that of the Senses? This is perfect Happiness, this is the Tree of Life which grows in the midst of the Paradise of God, this is Hea∣ven,

which while the Learned dispute about, the Good only enjoy. But I shall not venture to Soar any longer in these Heights, I find the Aether too thin here to breath in long, and the Brightness of the Region flashes too strong up∣on my tender Sense; I shall therefore hasten to descend from the Mount of God, lest I grow giddy with speculation, and lose those Secrets which I have learnt there, the Cabala of Feli∣city.

23. And now, (Sir) I come to consider your Question (viz.) Wherein the greatest Happi∣ness attainable by Man in this Life does consist. Concerning which, there is as great variety of Opinions among Philosophers, as there is among Geographers about the Seat of Paradise. The Learned Varro reckons up no less than 288 se∣veral Opinions about it, and yet notwithstand∣ing the number of Writers who have bequeath'd Volumes upon this Subject to Posterity, they seem to have been in the dark in nothing more than in this, and (excepting only a few Plato∣nists, who placed Man's greatest End in the Contemplation of Truth) they seem to have un∣dertaken nothing so unhappily, as when they essay'd to write of Happiness. Some measure their Happiness by the high-tide of their Ri∣ches, as the Egyptians did the Fertility of the Year by the increase of the River Nile. Others place it in the Pleasures of Sense, others in Ho∣nour and Greatness. But these and the like

were Men of the common Herd, low groveling Souls, that either understood not the Dignity of Human Nature, or else forgot that they were Men. But there were others of a Diviner Genius and Sublimer Spirit,

Queis meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.

Who had a more generous blood running in their Veins, which made them put a just value upon themselves, and scorn to place their great∣est Happiness in that which they should blush to enjoy. And those were the Stoics and the Peri∣patetics, who both place the greatest Happiness of this Life in the Actions of Vertue, with this only difference, that whereas the former are contented with Naked Vertue, the latter require some other Collateral things to the farther ac∣complishment of Happiness, such as are Health and Strength of Body, a Competent Lively∣hood, and the like.

24. And this Opinion has been subscribed to by the hands of eminent Moralists in all Ages. And as it is Venerable for its Antiquity, so has it gain'd no small Authority from the Pen of a great Modern Writer (Descartes) who resolves the greatest Happiness of this Life into the right use of the Will, which consists in this, that a Man have a firm and constant purpose always to do that which he shall judge to be best.

25. I confess, the Practice of Vertue is a very

great instrument of Happiness, and that there is a great deal more true satisfaction and solid content to be found in a constant course of well living than in all the soft Caresses of the most studied Luxury, or the Voluptuousness of a Se∣raglio. And therefore I have oftentimes been exceedingly pleased in the reading of a certain Passage in that Divine Moralist Hierocles, where he tells you, that the Vertuous Man lives much more pleasantly than the Vicious Man. For (says he) all Pleasure is the Companion of Action, it has no Subsistence of its own, but accompanies us in our doing such and such things. Hence 'tis that the worser. Actions are accompanied with the mean∣er Pleasures. So that the good Man does not only excell the wicked Man in what is good, but has also the advantage of him even in Pleasure, for whose sake alone he is wicked. For he that chuses Pleasure with Filthiness, altho for a while he be sweetly and deliciously entertain'd, yet at last through the Eil∣thiness annexed to his Enjoyment, he is brought to a painful Repentance. But now he that prefers Vertue with all her Labours and Difficulties, though at first for want of use it sits heavy upon him, yet by the Conjunction of good be alleviates the Labour, and at last enjoys pare and unallay'd Pleasure with his Vertue. So that of necessity that Life is most unhappy, which is most wicked, and that most plea∣sant which is most vertuous.

26. Now this I readily submit to as a great truth, that the degrees of Happiness vary ac∣cording

to the degrees of Vertue, and conse∣quently that that Life which is most Vertuous is most Happy, with reference to those that are Vicious or less Vertuous, every degree of Ver∣tue having a proportionate degree of Happiness accompanying it, (which is all, I suppose, that excellent Author intends.) But I do not think the most Vertuous Life so the most Happy, but that it may become Happier, unless somthing more be comprehended in the Word (Vertue) then the Stoics, Peripatetics, and the generali∣ty of other Moralists understand by it. For with them it signifies no more but only such a firm 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or habitude of the Will to good, where∣by we are constantly disposed, notwithstanding the contrary tendency of our Passions, to per∣form the necessary Offices of Life. This they call Moral or Civil Vertue, and although this brings always Happiness enough with it to make ample amends for all the difficulties which at∣tend the practise of it: Yet I am not of Opi∣nion that the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life consists in it. But there is ano∣ther and a higher Sense of the Word, which frequently occurs in the Pythagorean and Pla∣tonic Writings, (viz.) Contemplation and the Ʋ∣nitive way of Religion. And this they call Divine Vertue. I allow of the distinction, but I would not be thought to derive it from the Principle, as if Moral Vertue were acquired, and this infused (for to speak ingeniously, infused

Vertue seem'd ever to me as great a Paradox in Divinity, as Occult qualities in Philosophy) but from the nobleness of the Object, the Object of the former being Moral good, and the Object of the latter God himself. The former is a State of Proficiency, the latter of Perfection. The former is a State of difficulty and contention, the latter of ease and ferenity. The former is employ'd in mastering the Passions, and regu∣lating the actions of common Life, the latter in Divine Meditation and the extasies of Sera∣phic Love. He that has only the former, is like Moses with much difficulty climbing up to the Holy Mount, but he that has the latter, is like the same Person conversing with God on the serene top of it, and shining with the Rays of anticipated Glory. So that this latter supposes the acquisition of the former, and consequent∣ly has all the Happiness retaining to the other, besides what it adds of its own. This is the last Stage of Human Perfection, the utmost round of the Ladder whereby we ascend to Heaven, one Step higher is Glory. Here then will I build my Tabernacle, for it is good to be here. Here will I set up my Pillar of Rest, here will I fix, for why should I travel on farther in pursuit of any greater Happiness, since Man in this Station is but a little lower than the Angels, one remove from Heaven. Here certainly is the greatest happiness, as well as Perfection attainable by Man in this State of imperfection. For since

that Happiness which is absolutely perfect and compleat consists in the clear and intimate Vi∣sion and most ardent Love of God, hence we ought to take our Measures, and conclude that to be the greatest Happiness attainable in this State, which is the greatest participation of the other. And that can be nothing else but the Ʋnitive way of Religion, which consists of the Contemplation and Love of God. I shall say somthing of each of these severally, and som∣thing of the Ʋnitive way of Religion, which is the result of both, and so shut up this Dis∣course.

27. By Contemplation in general (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) we understand, an application of the Understanding to some truth. But here in this place we take the word in a more peculiar sense, as it signifies an habitual, attentive, steddy application or conversion of the Spirit to God and his Divine Perfections. Of this the Masters of Mystic Theo∣logy commonly make fifteen Degrees. The first is Intuition of Truth, the second is a Retire∣ment of all the Vigour and Strength of the Fa∣culties into the innermost parts of the Soul, the third is Spiritual Silence, the fourth is Rest, the fifth is Union, the sixth is the Hearing of the still Voice of God, the seventh is Spiritual Slumber, the eighth is Ecstacy, the ninth is Rapture, the tenth is the Corporeal Appear∣ance of Christ and the Saints, the eleventh is the Imaginary Appearance of the Same, the

twelfth is the Intellectual Vision of God, the thirteenth is the Vision of God in Obscurity, the fourteenth is an admirable Manifestation of God, the fifteenth is a clear and intuitive Vision of him, such as St. Austin and Tho. Aqui∣nas attribute to St. Paul, when he was wrapt up into the third Heaven. Others of them reckon seven degrees only, (viz.) Taste, Desire, Satie∣ty, Ebriety, Security, Tranquility, but the name of the seventh (they say) is known only to God.

28. I shall not stand to examine the Scale of this Division, perhaps there may be a kind of a Pythagoric Superstition in the number. But this I think I may affirm in general, that the Soul may be wound up to a most strange degree of Abstraction by a silent and steddy Contempla∣tion of God. Plato defines Contemplation to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Solu∣tion and a Separation of the Soul from the Bo∣dy. And some of the severer Platonists have been of Opinion, that 'tis possible for a Man by mere intention of thought not only to with∣draw the Soul from all commerce with the Senses, but even really to separate it from the Body, to untwist the Ligaments of his Frame, and by degrees to resolve himself into the State of the Dead. And thus the Jews express the manner of the Death of Moses, calling it Os∣culum Oris Dei, the Kiss of God's Mouth. That is, that he breath'd out his Soul by the mere

Strength and Energy of Contemplation, and ex∣pired in the Embraces of his Maker. A Hap∣py way of Dying! How ambitious should I be of such a conveyance, were it practicable? How passionately should I joyn with the Church in the Canticles? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Let him Kiss me with the Kisses of his Mouth. Cant. 1. 2.

29. But however this be determin'd, certain it is, that there are exceeding great Measures of Abstraction in Contemplation, so great, that somtimes whether a Man be in the Body or out of the Body, he himsel can hardly tell. And consequently the Soul in these Praeludiums of Death, these Neighbourhoods of Separation, must needs have brighter glimpses, and more Beati∣fic Ideas of God, than in a state void of these Elevations, and consequently must love him with greater Ardency. Which is the next thing I am to consider.

30. The love of God in general may be con∣sidered either as it is purely intellectual, or as it is a Passion. The first is, when the Soul, upon an apprehension of God as a good, delectable, and agreeable Object, joyns her self to him by the Will. The latter is, when the motion of the Will is accompany'd with a sensible Com∣motion of the Spirits, and an estuation of the Blood. Some I know are of Opinion, that 'tis not possible for a man to be affected with this sensitive Love of God, which is a Passion, be∣cause

there is nothing in God which falls under our imagination, and consequently (the imagi∣nation being the only Medium of conveyance) it cannot be propagated from the Intellectual part to the Sensitive. Whereupon they affirm, that none are capable of this sensitive passion∣ate Love of God but Christians, who enjoy the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereby they know God has condescended so far as to cloath him∣self with Flesh, and to become like one of us. But 'tis not all the Sophistry of the cold Logi∣cians that shall work me out of the belief of what I feel and know, and rob me of the sweet∣est entertainment of my Life, the Passionate Love of God. Whatever some Men pretend, who are Strangers to all the affectionate heats of Religion, and therefore make their Philosophy a Plea for their indevotion, and extinguish all Holy Ardours with a Syllogism; yet I am firm∣ly persuaded, that our love of God may be not only passionate, but even Wonderfully so, and exceeding the Love of Women. 'Tis an Experi∣mental and therefore undeniable Truth, that Passion is a great Instrument of Devotion, and accordingly we find, that Men of the most warm and pathetick Tempers and Amorous Com∣plexions (Provided they have but Consideration enough withall to fix upon the right Object) prove the greatest Votaries in Religion. And upon this account it is, that to heighten our Love of God in our Religious Addresses, we en∣deavour

to excite our Passions by Music, which would be to as little purpose as the Fanatic thinks 'tis, if there were not such a thing as the Passionate Love of God. But then as to the Ob∣jection, I Answer with the excellent Descartes, that although in God who is the Object of our Love, we can imagine nothing, yet we can ima∣gine that our Love, which consists in this, that we would unite our selves to the Object beloved, and consider our selves as it were a part of it. And the sole Idea of this very Conjunction is e∣nough to stir up a heat about the Heart, and so kindle a very vehement Passion. To which I add, that although the Beauty or Amiableness of God be not the same with that which we see in Corporeal Beings, and consequently cannot di∣rectly fall within the Sphere of the imagination, yet it is somthing Analogous to it, and that ve∣ry Analogy is enough to excite a Passion. And this I think sufficient to warrant my general division of the Love of God into Intellectual and Sensitive.

31. But there is a more peculiar Acceptation of the Love of God proper to this place. And it is that which we call Seraphic. By which I understand in short, that Love of God which is the effect of an intense Contemplation of him. This differs not from the other in kind, but on∣ly in degree, and that it does exceedingly, in as much as the thoughtful Contemplative Man (as I hinted before) has clearer Perceptions and live∣lier

Impressions of the Divine Beauty, the lovely Attributes and Perfection of God, than he whose Soul is more deeply set in the Flesh, and lies groveling in the bottom of the Dungeon.

32. That the nature of this Seraphic Love may be the better understood, I shall consider how many degrees there may be in the Love of God. And I think the Computation of Bellarmin, lib. 2. de monachis, cap. 2. is accurate enough. He makes four. The first is to love God propor∣tionably to his Loveliness, that is, with an infi∣nite Love; and this degree is peculiar to God himself. The second is to Love him, not pro∣portionably to his Loveliness, but to the utmost Capacity of a Creature, and this degree is pecu∣liar to Saints and Angels in Heaven. The third is to love him not proportionably to his Loveli∣ness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Creature, absolutely consider'd; but to the utmost capa∣city of a Mortal Creature in this Life. And this (he says) is proper to the Religious. The fourth is to love him not proportionably to his Loveliness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Crea∣ture, consider'd either absolutely or with respect to this Life, but only so as to love nothing e∣qually with him or above him. That is, not to do any thing contrary to the Divine Love. And this is absolute indispensable duty, less than which will not qualify us for the enjoyment of God hereafter.

33. Now this Seraphic Love which we here discourse of is in the third degree: When a Man, after many degrees of Abstraction from the Animal Life, many a profound and steddy Meditation upon the Excellencies of God, sees such a vast Ocean of Beauty and Perfection in him, that he loves him to the utmost stretch of his Power; When he sits under his shadow with great delight, and his fruit is sweet to his Tast. Cant. 2. 3. When he Consecrates and Devotes him∣self whollly to him, and has no Passion for In∣feriour Objects. When he is ravished with the delights of his Service, and breaths out some of his Soul to him in every Prayer. When he is delighted with Anthems of Praise and Adora∣tion more than with Marrow and Fatness, and Feasts upon Alleluiah. When he melts in a Ca∣lenture of Devotion, and his Soul breaketh out with fervent Desire, Psal. 119. When the one thing he delights in is to converse with God in the Beauty of Holiness, and the one thing he desires to see him as he is in Heaven. This is Se∣raphic Love, and this with Contemplation makes up that which the Mystic Divines stile the Ʋni∣tive way of Religion: It is called so because it Unites us to God in the most excellent manner that we are capable of in this Life. By Union here I do not understand that which is local or presential, because I consider God as Omnipre∣sent. Neither do I mean a Union of Grace (as they call it) whereby we are reconciled to

God, or a Union of Charity, whereof it is said, he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God and God in him, Jo. 4. 16. The first of these being as common to the inanimate things as to the most Extasi'd Soul upon Earth. And the two last be∣ing common to all good men, who indeed love God, but yet want the excellency of Contempla∣tion and the Mystic Union. The Union then which I here speak of, is that which is between the Faculty and the Object. Which consists in some Habitude or Operation of one toward the other. The Faculties here are the Ʋnder∣standing and Will, the Object God, and the O∣perations Contemplation and Love. The result of which two is the Mystic Ʋnion. Which, ac∣cording to this complex Notion of it that I have here delivered, is thus most admirably represented by the excellent Bishop Taylour. It is (says he) a Prayer of quietness and silence, and a Meditation extraordinary, a Discourse without variety, a Vision and Intuition of Divine Excellencies, an im∣mediat entry into an Orb of light, and a resolu∣lution of all our Faculties into Sweetness, Affe∣ctions, and Starings upon the Divine Beauty. And is carried on to Extasies, Raptures, Suspen∣sions, Elevations, Abstractions and Apprehensions beatifical.

34. I make no doubt but that many an ho∣nest Pious Soul arrives to the heavenly Canaan, who is not fed with this Manna in the Wilder∣ness.

But though every one must not expect these Antepasts of Felicity that is vertuous, yet none else must. Paradise was never open but to a State of Innocence. But neither is that enough. No, this Mount of God's Presence is fenced not only from the profane, but also from the moderately vertuous. 'Tis the Privi∣ledge of Angelical Dispositions, and the Re∣ward of eminent Piety and an excellent Re∣ligion, to be admitted to these Divine Repasts, these Feasts of love. And here I place the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life, as being the nearest Approach to the State of the Blessed above, the outer Court of Heaven.

35. These (Sir) are my thoughts concern∣ing Happiness. I might have spun them out into a greater length, but I think a little Plot of ground thick-sown is better than a great Field which for the most part of it lies Fallow. I have endeavour'd to deliver my Notions with as much Perspicuity and in as good Me∣thod as I could, and so to answer all the ends of Copiousness, with the advantage of a short∣er Cut. If I appear singular in any of my No∣tions, 'tis not out of an industrious affectation of Novelty, but because in the composing of this discourse (the Meditation of a few broken hours in a Garden) I consulted more my own experimental Notices of things and private Reflections than the Writings of others. So

that if somtimes I happen to be in the Road, and somtimes in a way by my self, 'tis no won∣der. I affect neither the one nor the other, but write as I think. Which as I do at other times, so more especially when I subscribe my self

SIR,

Yours most affectionately, J. N.

All-Souls Colledge Apr. 18. 1683.

A Letter of Resolution concerning some Passages in the foregoing Treatise, to the same Person.

SIR,

1. THE kind Entertainment which you gave my Idea of Happiness, does not only incourage, but oblige me to endeavour the satisfaction of that Scruple, which the Perusal of it has occasion'd. I cannot but highly com∣mend your searching Curiosity, in desiring far∣ther satisfaction concerning a matter of so sub∣lime and excellent a Nature (for the Tree of Paradise is good for food, pleasant to the Eye, and a Tree to be desired to make one wise) tho you must give me leave to wonder that you would not enquire at a better Oracle. But since you are pleas'd to be of the Opinion, that few have made this Subject so familiar to their Medita∣tion as I have, I cannot with any pretence de∣cline your Request, tho perhaps by my perform∣ing it I shall work you into a contrary persua∣sion.

2. Sir, You say you should like my Notion concerning the r••ality of that which is usually

call'd Imaginary Happiness, that is, (as you well explain both your own and my meaning) that although the Object may be an Imaginary Good, yet the Happiness which consists in the Fruition of that Object, will not be Imaginary too, but real, and consequently, that 'tis impossible for a man to seem to himself to be happy, and not to be really so, all Happiness consisting in Opi∣nion. This Notion, you say, you should like rarely well, could you free your self from one difficulty which it engages you upon; (viz.) That hereafter, in the state of Glory, either one Saint shall think himself as happy as ano∣ther, or not; if not, this must needs occasion Envy or Discontent, but if one shall think him∣self as happy as another, then, according to my Hypothesis, that Opinion is the Measure of Hap∣piness, 'twill follow that he will really be so; and this brings in Equality of Happiness, which you look upon (and I think justly too) as another absurdity.

3. I confess, Sir, this Argument is pretty sub∣tle and surprizing, but I conceive the Knots of it may be untied by this Answer. First, it may be justly question'd, whether the first part of your Dilemma be necessarily attended with the appendant absurdity. 'Tis true indeed, not to think ones self as happy as another, is the Spring of Envy or Discontent among Men in this World, but whether this be he genuin and con∣stant effect of that Consideration, or whether it

ought not rather to be ascribed to the present Infirmities and Imperfections of Human Na∣ture, may admit Dispute. But in case this ab∣surdity does inseparably cleave to the first part, then I be take my self to the latter, and affirm, that in Heaven one Saint shall think himself as happy as another. Then, according to my own Notion (say you) it will follow that he is really so. No, I deny the consequence, the in∣validity of which will plainly appear by distin∣guishing the ambiguity of the Phrase. For this Expression, One Saint thinks himself as happy as another, may be taken in a double sense, ei∣ther that he thinks himself as happy as he him∣self thinks that other, or that he thinks himself as happy as that other thinks himself. I grant, should one Saint think himself as happy as ano∣ther in this latter sense of the Phrase, he would, according to my Hypothesis, really be so; so that this would bring in equality. And there∣fore in this Sense I deny the Proposition, and that without the least danger of splitting upon the first absurdity. But for the former Sense, that has no such levelling quality, for to say that I think my self as happy as I think another, a∣mounts to no more than this, that in my ap∣prehension another does not exceed me in Hap∣piness: but tho he does not in my apprehension, yet he may in reality, for tho my Opinion gives measures to my own Happiness, yet it does not to another Mans. So that one Saint may be

said to think himself as happy as another in the former sense, without equalling the Happiness of the Blessed, tho, I confess, I should much rather adhere to the contrary proposition, (viz.) that one shall not think himself as happy as ano∣ther, in case such an Opinion be not necessa∣rily attended with Envy or Discontent. Because it seems unreasonable to make them ignorant of the degrees of one▪ anothers Bliss, unless that ignorance be necessarily required to prevent the alledg'd absurdities. But I determin nothing in this point, my business was only to break the force of your Dilemma, and to shew that my Notion does not involve you in the difficulty supposed. This, Sir, is all that I think neces∣sary to say to a Person of your apprehension, and therefore I end these nice Speculations with this profitable reflection, that altho the Notion of Happiness be intricate and obscure, yet the means of attaining it are plain, and therefore 'twould be most advisable both for you and me chiefly to apply our selves to the lat∣ter here, and we shall understand the former with the best sort of Knowledge, that of Expe∣rience, hereafter.

Yours J. N.

Another Letter to the same Person, concerning the true Notion of Pla∣to's Ideas, and of Platonic Love.

Tanta vis in Ideis constituitur, ut nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse nemo possit.

Augustinus Tom. 4. Pag. 548. Q. 46.

SIR,

1. WERE I not as well acquainted with your singular modesty, as I am with your intellectual accomplishments, I should readily conclude, that your directing your enquiries to me proceeded not so much from a Curiosity to improve your own Know∣ledge, as to try mine. But when I consider that you are ignorant of nothing so much as of your own Worth and Abilities, I begin to think it possible that you may propose these Questions even to me out of a desire to be inform'd. Which way soever it is, I acknowledge my self to be obliged to you for affording me an opportuni∣ty of serving you, especially in such an Instance, where I cannot gratify your Request without

humouring my own Genius at the same time. For indeed to my apprehension, there is not a finer or more Sublime piece of Speculation in all Plato's Philosophy, than that of his Ideas▪ and that of his Love, tho it has undergone the same hard Fate with many other excellent Theories, first, to be either ignorantly misunderstood, or maliciously misrepresented, and then popularly vilify'd and decry'd.

2. To do right therefore to the name of this great Man, as well as to satisfy your Demands, I shall first propose the general mistake, and then rectify it, first present you with the suppos'd Opinion of Plato, and then with the true and genuin one. I begin with his Ideas, by which 'tis taken for granted by the generality of Wri∣ters, especially those of the Peripatetic Order, that he understood universal Natures or ab∣stract Essences subsisting eternally by them∣selves, Separate both from the mind of God and all singular Beings, according to which, as so many patterns, all Singulars are form'd. As for instance, that a Man, not this or that in particular, but a universal Man, or a Man in general, should exist by it self eternally, ac∣cording to which all particular Men were made. Sir, I suppose you can hardly forbear smiling at the odness of the Conceit, but as ridiculous as you may think it, 'tis said to be maintained by no less a Man than Plato, and has been thought of that moment too, that Multitudes of

great Men have set themselves very seriously to confute it as a dangerous Heresy, and have op∣posed it with as much zeal as ever St. Austin did the Manichees or the Pelagians.

3. But now, that this Opinion was not only for its Absurdity and Contradictiousness unwor∣thy of the contemplative and refin'd Spirit of Plato; but was also apparently none of his, I dare say any capable Person will be convinc'd that shall heedfully and impartially examine and compare the Works of Plato; And this A∣ristotle himself must needs have known (he having been his constant Auditour for twenty years together) but only he wanted a Shadow to fight with, and so father'd this monstrous Opinion upon his Master. And of this disinge∣nuity of Aristotle, together with other abuses, Plato himself complain'd, while alive, in these words; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as is recorded by Laertius in the Life of Aristotle.

4. And now, that the grossness of this Abuse may the more fully appear, I will in the next place present you with another Sense of Plato's Ideas, and such as by a more than ordinary ac∣quaintance with his Works, I know to be the true and genuin one. Know then that Plato considering the World as an effect of an intel∣lectual Agent, and that in the Operations of all other Artificers or rational Efficients there must be some form in the Mind of the Artificer pre∣supposed

to the VVork (for otherwise what dif∣ference will there be between a fortuitous effect and an intended one, and how comes the effect to be of this Species rather than another?) thought it necessary to suppose 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Eternal Forms, Models or Patterns, of all the Species of being in Nature existing in the Mind of God. And these he calls Ideas. I say existing in the Mind of God, for there is not the least Intimation in all Plato's VVorks of any such Ideas existing separately from the Di∣vine intellect, nor do the great Masters of Pla∣tonic Philosophy, Plotinus, Porphyrius, Procles, or any other that I know of make mention of any such Spectres and Ghosts of Entity. No, this Monster was hatch'd in Aristotle's Brain, and I believe did never enter Plato's Head so much as in a Dream. For he is not only silent about it, but does in several places expresly assert the contrary; Particularly in his Timaeus, where, of set purpose, he describes the Origin of the VVorld, he says that God made the VVorld according to that Pattern or Idea which he had in his Mind. The same you will find more am∣ply confirm'd in his Hippias, his Parmenides, and his sixth Book of Repub. and many other places. And these Ideas he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first Intelligibles, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Mea∣sures of the things that are, implying, that as all things were form'd according to these specifical Platforms; so their truth must be measured

from their Conformity to them. And in this Sense must be taken that Common Axiom of the Schools, that the Truth of a thing is its Con∣formity with the Divine Intellect, for it is in no other Sense Intelligible, as you will discern in the Process.

5. But now, lest you should imagine, that this Platonic Hypothesis of Ideas existing in the Divine Mind should ill comport with the Sim∣plicity of God, or clash with that approved Doctrine of the Schools, Nihil est in Deo quod non sit Deus, (which is another cavil of the Anti∣platonists) you are to understand that Plato by his Ideas does not mean any real Essence distinct from the Divine Essence, but only the Divine Essence it self with this Connotation, as it is va∣riously imitable or participable by created Be∣ings, and consequently, according to the mul∣tifariousness of this imitability, so are the possi∣bilities of Being. Which is as fine a Notion as was ever framed by the Mind of Man, and that it is his, you will find, if you consult his Par∣menides. And this will serve to help us out with another difficulty, for whereas Plato makes his Divine Ideas not only the exemplary causes of things, but also (which is a consequent to the former) the measure of their Truth, this may seem to fall in with their Opinion who make all Truth dependent upon the Speculative un∣derstanding of God, that is, that God does not understand a thing so because it is so in its own

Nature, but that a thing is therefore so because God is pleas'd so to understood it. Which is an Opinion full of mischief and absurdity, as you may see compendiously, and yet evidently demonstrated, in Dr. Rust's little Discourse of Truth. Now for the clearing this Difficulty, 'tis to be observed, that the Essence of God, ac∣cording to Plato, is distinguished into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Counterpart whereof in English is Conceptive and Exhibitive. By the Mind of God Exhibitive is meant the Essence of God as thus or thus imitable or participable by any Creature, and this is the same with an Idea. By the Mind of God Conceptive is meant a reflex act of God's Understanding upon his own Es∣sence as Exhibitive, or as thus and thus imita∣ble. Now if you consider the Divine Under∣standing as Conceptive or Speculative, it does not make its Object but suppose it, (as all Specula∣tive Understanding does) neither is the Truth of the Object to be measured from its Confor∣mity with that, but the Truth of that from its Conformity with its Object. But if you consi∣der the Divine Understanding as Exhibitive, then its Truth does not depend upon its Con∣formity with the Nature of things, but on the contrary, the Truth of the Nature of things depends upon its Conformity with it. For the Divine Essence is not thus or thus imitable, be∣cause such and such things are in being, but such and such things are in being, because the

Divine Essence is thus and thus imitable, for had not the Divine Essence been thus imitable, such and such Beings would not have been pos∣sible. And thus is Plato to be understood when he founds the Truth of things upon their Con∣formity with the Divine Ideas, and thus must the Schools mean too by that foremention'd Axiom concerning Transcendental Truth, if they will speak Sense, as I noted above.

6. And now, Sir, from Plato's Ideas thus ami∣ably set forth, the Transition methinks is very natural to Love. And concerning this I shall account in the same Method, first, by pointing out the popular Misapprehensions about it, and then by exhibiting a true Notion of it. Pla∣tonic Love is a thing in every bodies Mouth, but I find scarce any that think or speak accurately of it. The mistakes which I observe are chiefly these. Some of the grosser Understanders sup∣pose that Plato by his Love meant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Love of Males, but the Occasion of this Con∣ceit was from a passage in his Convivium, where he brings in Aristophanes speaking favourably that way. But he that shall from hence con∣clude Plato a prostitute to that vile Passion, may as well conclude a Dramatic Poet to be an A∣theist or a Whore-master, because he represents those of that Character. But that Divine Pla∣to intended nothing less than to countenance any such thing, is evident from the whole scope and purport of that Dialogue, and from other

places where he expresly condemns it, and re∣jects it with great abhorrence; particularly in the first of his de legibus, where he calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an unnatural attempt. Others by Platonic Love understand the Love of Souls, and this indeed has somthing of truth in it, only it is much too narrow and particular.

7. Others take Platonic Love to be a desire of imprinting any excellency, whether moral or intellectual, in the Minds of beautiful young men by Instruction, and so likewise of enjoy∣ing your own Perfections reflected from the Mind of another, mix'd with and recommend∣ed by the Beauty of the Body. According to the usual saying, Gratior è Pulchro, &c. And thus Socrates was said to love his beautiful Pu∣pils Phaedrus and Alcibiades. Others measure the Nature of Platonic Love, not from the Ob∣ject (to which they suppose it indifferent) but from the manner of the Act. And according to these, that man is said to love Platonically, that does Casso delectamine amare, love at a di∣stance, that never designs a close fruition of the Object what ever it be, whether Sensual or In∣tellectual, but chooses to dwell in the Suburbs, pleasing himself with remote Prospects, and makes a Mistress of his own Desire. And this is the receiv'd Notion, and that which Peo∣ple generally mean when they talk of Platonic Love. But this too is far enough from the right, for tho Platonic Love does not aim at

the fruition of sensual Objects, yet it designs the fruition of its own Object as much as a∣ny other Love does. That therefore which distinguishes Platonic Love, is not the manner of the act above-mention'd, but the peculia∣rity of the Object. And what that is must be collected from the Design of Plato in that Dialogue, where he treats purposely of it, his Convivium. Which is briefly to shew the man∣ner of the Souls ascent to God by love. For Plato makes the Happiness of Man to consist in the Contemplation and Love of God, whom he calls the Idea of Beauty. But now be∣cause this Idea of Beauty (God) is of too sub∣lime and refined excellency to be immediat∣ly fastned upon by our Love, he recommends to us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Method of Ascent, which is from loving the Beauty we see in Bodies, to pass on to the Love of the Beauty of the Soul, from the Beauty of the Soul to the Beauty of Vertue, and lastly from the Beau∣ty of Vertue, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to the immense O∣cean of Beauty, &c. For so have I observ'd a tender Infants Eye not enduring to gaze directly upon the too powerful Excellence of the Meridian Sun, chuse to entertain it self with the abatements of corrected and re∣flected Light, and take up with the feebler refreshments of lesser Beauties for a while, till at length the faculty grows more con∣firm'd,

and dares encounter the Sun in his Strength. And these are the Steps of the San∣ctuary. So that Platonic Love is the Love of Beauty abstracted from all sensual Appli∣cations, and desire of corporal contract, as it leads us on to the Love of the first origi∣nal Beauty, God; or more plainly thus, The Ascent of the Soul to the Love of the Di∣vine Beauty, by the Love of abstracted Beau∣ty in Bodies. This Love of abstracted Beau∣ty in Bodies he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Celestial Love, in opposition to that which he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is the same with that Pas∣sion commonly signify'd by the name of Love, (viz.) a desire of corporal contact a∣rising from the sight of Beauty. This last indeed is a very vile, brutish, unmanly af∣fection, and such as considering the vileness of our Bodies, one would think a man could never be charm'd into without the Magic of a Love-potion. But the former is an Angeli∣cal Affection, for certainly Beauty is a Di∣vine thing; It is (as the Platonic Author says of Wisdom) the pure Influence flowing from the Glory of the Almighty, and the Bright∣ness of the Everlasting Light: or in Plato's own Words, A Ray of God. And therefore the Love of abstract Beauty must needs be a very generous and divine Affection. Sir, I could be more large in my account, but I consider what 'tis I write, and to whom, and there∣fore

I think it high time to remit you to your own Thoughts, some of which I hope will be, that I am in a very eminent degree of Friendship,

Yours J. Norris.

A Letter concerning Love and Music.

SIR,

TO the first of your Enquiries concerning the true Idea of Love, and particularly that between Man and Woman, and wherein it stands distinguish'd from Lust, my Answer in short is this. That Love may be consider'd ei∣ther barely as a Tendency toward good, or as a willing this good to somthing capable of it. If Love be taken in the first Sense 'tis what we call Desire, if in the second, 'tis what we call Cha∣rity or Benevolence.

2. Then as to Desire, there is either an Intel∣lectual or a sensual desire, which denomination is not here taken from the Faculty, but from the Quality of the Object. That I call here an In∣tellectual Desire whose object is an Intellectual good, and that a sensual desire whose object is a sensual good. And this is that which Plato meant by his two Cupids. The latter of these is what we call Lust.

3. But then this again signifies either abstract∣ly and indifferently (viz.) a bare desire of Cor∣poreal pleasure, or else concretely and immo∣rally (viz.) a desire or longing after corporeal pleasure in forbidden and unlawful instances.

4. These things being thus briefly premised my next Resolution is this. That the Ordina∣ry Passion of Love, that which we mean when we say such a man or such a woman is in Love, is no other than plain Lust, if Lust be taken ac∣cording to the first signification, namely, for a sensual Desire, or a Tendency toward a sen∣sual good. But if Lust be taken in the latter sense, as a Tendency to corporeal pleasure in unlawful instances, that which our Saviour meant when he said He that looks upon a woman to lust after her, &c. then 'tis not necessary that the Passion we here speak of should be Lust, be∣cause then 'twould be a sin to be in Love, and consequently, there would be a necessity of sin∣ning in order to Marriage, because no man is supposed to marry but whom he thus Loves.

5. And now to your 2d Enquiry, whether Music be a Sensual or Intellectual pleasure, be∣fore this can be determin'd, the Idea of a Sen∣sual and Intellectual pleasure must be stated.

6. And 1st I observe that the precise diffe∣rence of a sensual pleasure cannot consist in this, that the Body be pleased or gratefully affected, nor of an Intellectual that the Mind be pleased. For by reason of the strict union of Soul and Body, one so sympathizes with the other, that these pleasures are always Mutual and compli∣cated. So that there is no pleasure of mind that does not also recreate the Body, and no pleasure of Body but whereof the Mind has its

share. And thus far there is agreement and re∣ciprocation. That then which is peculiar and discriminative must be taken from the Primary∣ness or Secondaryness of the Perception. That Pleasure therefore is an Intellectual Pleasure when the Soul is primarily and immediatly af∣fected, and the Body only secondarily and by participation. And that is a sensual pleasure when the Body is primarily and immediatly af∣fected, and the Soul only secondarily and by participation.

7. Now according to this Measure we must of necessity define the pleasure of hearing Mu∣sic to be properly Intellectual. Because the Soul is the part that is then primarily and imme∣diatly affected, and the Body only by result. And that for this evident Reason, because Mu∣sic consisting formally in Proportion, and Pro∣portion pleasing only as understood, that part must be primarily and directly pleased which is capable of understandiug. But this is not the Body but the Soul. 'Tis true indeed the ear may be directly pleased by a single sound, as the eye is recreated by a single Colour (suppose green) and this I grant to be a pleasure of sense as much as smelling or tasting, tho not so gross. But the Ear may no more properly be said to be pleased with the Proportion of sounds, or with sounds as proportionate, than the eye is with a Picture.

8. If it be here objected, that Music is a plea∣sure

of Sense because 'tis convey'd by the Ear, I reply that if this be sufficient to make a Plea∣sure Sensual, the most Intellectual pleasures we are here capable of may be call'd Sensual, as reading fine discourses, contemplating the Beauty of the Creation, attending to Mathe∣matical Diagrams and the like, because all these as well as Music are enjoy'd by the Mediation of the Senses.

9. But it matters not tho the Senses be the Instruments of conveyance, so the Soul be the part directly and primarily affected, which is the case here. For tho the Ear may be pleased with those single sounds which with relation to each other are really Harmonical, yet it is not, it cannot be pleased with them as such, or in that Formality. This is the sole Priviledge of the Mind, which as it can only judge of, so is it on∣ly capable of being pleas'd with Harmony.

10. And thus Sir you have my sentiments with as much Brevity and Clearness as I could use, and it may be, as the Matters would bear. I have now nothing further to add, but to re∣new the assurances of my being

Your Friend and Servant J. N.

A Letter concerning Friendship.

SIR,

1. TO your Question whether in propriety of speaking there may be strict Friend∣ship between a man and his wife, I answer first that the solution of this Question depends upon another, (viz.) what are the Requisites essen∣tially necessary to the Exercise of Friendship, and this Question likewise depends upon ano∣ther, (viz.) what is the true Notion or Idea of Friendship. This being rightly stated, 'twill be easy to discern what are the essential Requi∣sites, and consequently whether Man and Wife are capable Terms in this Relation or no.

2. Now as to the Idea of Friendship, I answer first in general, that Friendship is nothing else but Benevolence or Charity under some certain Modifications or accidental circumstances. Ac∣cidental I mean as to Charity, tho necessary and essential to Friendship. And thus far I think all Moralists are agreed. But now what these cer∣tain Modifications are, here they begin to be divided. 'Twould be too tedious a work to in∣sist here upon the variety of other mens Opi∣nions, and therefore I shall only briefly deli∣ver my own, which is, that all the Modifica∣tions of Charity necessary to the constitution of

Friendship may be well enough reduced to these three. 1. That it be in a special manner in∣tense, 2ly, that it be mutual, and 3ly that it be manifest or mutually known. Charity when cloth∣ed with these three Modifications immediatly commences Friendship. More than these it need not have, but of these not one may be spared, as will easily appear if you examine them se∣verally.

3. Now from this Idea of Friendship 'tis very obvious to deduce what are the Requisites ne∣cessary to Friendship, not in reference to its Idea (for that's already stated) but in reference to its Existence or actual Exercise, that is in one word, what are those Dispositions or Aptnesses in the Subject whether as to person, state or con∣dition, which may render it capable of Friend∣ship according to the foremention'd Idea. Now I say what these are may be easily collected from the Idea it self, as will appear if we consi∣der it distinctly according to those three Mo∣difications, and by applying the genus to each of them. For 1st whereas Friendship is said to be Charity in a special manner intense, hence I collect 1st, that it cannot be but between good men, because an ill man cannot have any true Charity, much less such an intense degree of it as is requisite to Friendship. So that Vertue in general is one Requisite. 2ly, hence I collect that a Friend must not be only according to the Character Lucan gives of Cato—rigidi ser∣vator

honesti, rigidly vertuous and honest, but he must be also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a man of a liberal, sweet, obliging temper, one of those good men of whom 'tis said in Scripture (by way of con∣tradistinction to the Righteous or rigidly honest) that some would even dare to dye for them. For tho I may have common Charity, nay more, a great Esteem for a man of plain honesty and in∣tegrity, yet I can never love him with that spe∣cial intenseness of Affection which belongs to Friendship, unless he be also of a beneficent, kind and obsequious temper. So that good na∣ture is another requisite. 3ly, hence I collect that there must be also (at least in a competent proportion) an agreeableness of humours and manners, for unless the materials be of an apt and correspondent figure, the building can nei∣ther be compact nor lasting, so that likeness of disposition is another Requisite. 4. hence I col∣lect that true Friendship cannot be among ma∣ny. For since our faculties are of a finite ener∣gy, 'tis impossible our love can be very intense when divided among many. No, the rays must be contracted to make them burn. So that ano∣ther Requisite is, that the Terms of▪ this Rela∣tion be few in Number.

4. These are all the Requisites that I can think of at present deducible from the first part of the Idea (viz. Charity in a special manner intense) As for fidelity in retaining secrets, con∣stancy of Adherence and the like, I think they

are vertually included in the first Requisite, it being hardly conceivable how a man can be good and vertuous that wants them. But if you think the Reduction not so obvious, you may if you please add them here in the fifth place as distinct Requisites, 'twill be all one. Thus far of the Requisites deducible from the first part.

5. To proceed. Whereas it is further said that Friendship is a Benevolence that's Mutual, there is but one general Requisite deducible from this, which is, that all the other be found in both (or if more) in all the persons supposed to be Friends. The third of which importing Relation will of necessity be so, for all Similitude is mutual. Lastly, whereas 'tis said that Friend∣ship is a Benevolence mutually known, all that will be Requisite upon this head is, that the Persons who are to be confederated in this u∣nion, have such opportunities of Converse or Correspondence, that they may be satisfy'd of the Degree and Reality of each others love.

6. Having thus stated the Idea of Friendship, and from thence deduced all the necessary qua∣lifications in the subject for its entertainment, I think I may now from the Premises venture to affirm that there may be strict Friendship be∣tween Man and Wife. For which of these Re∣quisites is it that they must necessarily want? As for your Objection taken from their inequa∣lity, I grant Equality is wanting both as to Sex

and as to Conjugal Relation, but neither is all Equality necessary. 'Tis not absolutely neces∣sary that Friends should stand upon a Level, either in respect of Fortune, State or Condition. This sort of Equality I grant is a good Prepa∣rative for a more easy Introduction of Friend∣ship, and 'tis also advantagious to the lasting∣ness of it, but yet 'tis dispensable. 'Tis like levelling the ground betwixt two rivers, it makes way for a more easy union, but yet 'tis possible from Earthquakes, Floods or other con∣tingencies they may be united without it. The only equality that is necessary is an equality of dispositions, an harmony of affections, but this may be in persons of unequal fortunes and con∣ditions. I confess, there can be no such thing as Friendship between persons of different qua∣lity if the Superiour takes advantage of his pre∣heminence or Authority, for then 'tis true what the Poet says, Si vis Sexte coli, non amabo.

7. But then 'tis not the being invested with superiority that is inconsistent with Friendship (for then Kings who have no equals but those of other Kingdom's with whom they cannot inti∣mately converse, would be the miserablest Crea∣tures alive) but the habitual use and exercise of it, and the standing upon its priviledges.

8. But there is no necessity that it should be so. Friendship may level those whom Fortune has made unequal, and the greatest Monarch in the world may find Opportunities to descend

from the throne of majesty to the familiar Ca∣resses of a dear Favorite, and unking himself a while for the more glorious title of Friend. 'Tis but to apply this to the particular case in hand, and you have a Solution to your Que∣stion. And now Sir from the Theory of Friend∣ship I shall most readily descend to the Practise of it when ever you please to employ the ser∣vice of

(Dear Sir)

Your most real Friend and Servant J. Norris.

The Copy of a Letter written to my Friend F. B. concerning the death of my dear Neece M. C.

My dear Friend,

1. SInce 'tis one of the happinesses of Friend∣ship to Communicate sorrow as well as to share in joy, that the one may be increas'd and the other diminish'd, I cannot but betake my self to this easy refuge, being at present in such a condition, as will need more relief and sup∣port than I can either give to my self, or receive from others.

2. The truth is, should I indulge my passion, I might find perhaps as much cause as he that did it, to curse the day of my Nativity. My pretty little dear Neece and Scholar, she whom I loved, admired and delighted in, she for whose sake I once thought life, as now I think death a Blessing, she (how shall I bring out that dismal word)—is dead.

3. She is, and has left a strange emptiness in my Soul (so large was the room she took up there) which nothing of this world's good can ever fill. I must needs own that I never was so deeply affected with any trouble in my life, nor did I ever think that it could be in the power of any temporal loss so much to discompose and unspirit my Soul. It is not a transient gust of pas∣sion, which like a little cloud would either soon

blow over, or spend it self in a momentary shower, but 'tis with my mind as with the face of the sky when 'tis all set to rain. Were it only an affe∣ction of the sensitive and Animal part, it would soon vanish like the phantastic colours of the Rain-bow, but my grief is of a more malignant kind, and penetrates even into the very Center of my Soul. 'Tis lodg'd (as Lipsius I remember emphatically phrases it) in ipsa animi mente, 'tis an ingrain'd, rational and Judicious sorrow.

4. I lament not on her account (for I cannot, without reflecting upon the divine goodness, question the happy state of one who was nothing but innocence and sweetness) but purely upon my own. And that I do in such a measure that—but 'tis in vain to go about to express it, for I lov'd her as I lov'd my own Soul, and however my sorrow may be blam'd for her now, yet I'm sure my love for her could not.

5. For she was a person (and you know I am not over-prone to admire) so peculiarly accom∣plish'd, as if Nature had design'd nothing else in her composition but to make one on purpose to be belov'd. As for her outward form, she was one of the studied and elaborate pieces of Na∣ture, and by the very air of her Countenance was markt out for an extraordinary Soul to in∣habit in. Nor was the Jewel unworthy of the case, for certainly she had as excellent a Spirit (one only excepted) as ever condescended to wear human flesh. Her parts were miraculous

and extraordinary, so extraordinary, that had not the youth and verdancy of her face contra∣dicted the ripeness of her discoursings, you would have thought her well in years.

6. And tho Art had little more to do where Nature had been so eminently liberal, yet so Co∣vetuous was she as well as Capable of improve∣ment, as if she meant to grasp all manner of knowledge, and leave nothing to a future state to add to her accomplish'd Soul. And indeed 'tis too incredible to be related, considering the shortness of the time (for her pulse had not beat thirteen years) what a wondrous progress her active Soul had made. Thus far only I shall ven∣ture in general, that had she lived to be as ripe in years as she was in parts and ingenious attain∣ments, she would have been the envy of her Sex, and the wonder of Mankind.

7. But yet the former of these would have been much abated by her admirable sweetness and good nature. A Quality as of it self most excellent, so that wherein she most excell'd. And here I must beg leave of all that I ever convers'd with to declare, that I never observ'd in any, such a free, generous, obliging and disinteress'd temper, which mightily sweetned and recom∣mended her parts, and made her not only ad∣mirable, but lovely.

8. And besides all this there were in her (as in Poetry) many errantes abditaeque veneres, wan∣dring and hidden graces that want a name, and

unexpressible Prettinesses, which yet were strangely moving, and of a charming influence. I am not conscious to my self of any partial fondness, or Rhetorical affectation in any one part of this Character, but as near as I can do speak the genuin, unprejudiced sense of my Soul. I hate to flatter the living, much more the dead, whose names are as sacred to me as their sepulchers. My only fault here (if any) is in the defect, for she was as much too good to be suffi∣ciently commended, as to be long enjoy'd.

9. And now (setting aside that particular re∣spect which she ever blest and honour'd me with) how can I chuse but be very passionately concern'd for the loss of such a rare and every way accomplish'd person! I cannot, and me∣thinks when I survey the suddain ruin of my pleasant, but shortliv'd gourd, I can hardly for∣bear justifying my grief as the inraged Prophet did his Anger, and like him am tempted to say, I do well to be sorrowful.

10. But I must not be so ill a Pilot as now the floods of Passion arise to throw away my tack∣ling, commit my Vessel to the winds, and run along with the tempest; satis naturae datum est, jam & Ratio suum asserat Principatum. For my ship begins to be cover'd with the waves, and therefore 'tis now high time to awake Reason from her dead sleep, that she may rebuke the winds and the Sea, that they may be calm and still. 'Tis dangerous to indulge any longer, the tumult of

the Passions runs high, and the unruly Faction presses hard upon the gate of the Palace, 'tis therefore time for the Soveraign Faculty to come forth in her imperial robes, & suppress the mu∣tiny.

11. In order therefore to the quieting of my passions, and the resettlement of my discom∣pos'd Soul, I consider, First, that grief is the most absurd and senseless of all the Passions, yea of all the things in the world, and utterly un∣becoming a Creature that makes the least pre∣tension to Reason. Because 'tis resolvable into no rational Principle; for whatever is so must be, or at least appear to be either an End or a Means. But this can pretend to neither. Not to be end, for nothing is so but what is good, but this is in no respect good, and in many respects evil. Not to be a Means, because it effects nothing, but is altogether vain and fruitless. And indeed it cannot but be so, because 'tis of a thing past, which even to Omnipotence it self is impossible to be alter'd. Our other Passions are to some pur∣pose, and aim at some end. Love to enjoy, An∣ger to revenge, Fear to avoid, and the like; But this Passion, grief, serves to no end or purpose in the world, and it cannot be its own end be∣cause (as I said before) it is in no respect good. It is therefore utterly absurd and unreasonable.

12. Again I consider, that suppose grief were not so vain and ineffective a thing as 'tis, but that it could make some alteration in things,

yet it cannot alter any one event for the bet∣ter, and therefore to what purpose should I in∣dulge it? For since we acknowledg a Being of an infinite Wisdom, Power and Goodness to sit at the Helm of the universe, it must be conse∣q̄uently acknowledg'd that the course of this world is steer'd to the best advantage of the whole, and however ignorant we may be how to justify particular Phenomena's, yet we must (if we will be consistent with our former conces∣sion) at least implicitly believe that all things are as well as they can possibly be. Certain it is (whatever some Male-contents may think) the world is govern'd with as much wisdom as 'twas made, and as the natural world stood the test of the divine Criticism, so will the Moral one too. God upon review would pronounce this as good as he did the other, and why should not we? yea we should, if we could see this excellent Drama from end to end as he does; we should then dis∣cern that all those dispensations which sepa∣rately taken appear harsh and unequal, yet in Concatenation and together conspire to the Beau∣ty and Interest of the whole. This will be our portion hereafter, in the mean time 'twill be our greatest wisdom to trust that of God, and believe that implicitly as to the thing, which we cannot discern as to the manner. And this I take to be the most rational foundation of Re∣signation and Acquiescence in the divine pleasure, which is grounded upon a Consideration of his

infinite Wisdom and Goodness. When we resolve our wills into his merely for this reason, because we pay so much deference to his perfections, as to think, that if we knew as much as he, we should not wish things to be otherwise than they are. And this is highly specify'd in the Saints in Heaven, who through that near and intimate view which they have of God's perfections are so intirely conformable to his will, that they can dispense not only with the eternal loss but dam∣nation of their friends without the least grief or resentment. I confess, this eminency of resig∣nation is no more attainable in this life than any other part of Celestial happiness, but yet an heedful and attentive meditation of this Ar∣gument may do much towards it; And howe∣ver difficult it be to reduce it to Practise, yet 'tis most certain in the Theory that granting the superintendency of an infinite and unpreju∣dic'd understanding, and that every calamity is (as Euripides somwhere calls it) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sent from God, to grieve at any misfor∣tune is to grieve that things are as they should be. Which is one would think, too absurd for him to be guilty of who is defined to be a Ra∣tional Creature.

13. Again I consider, that as that which I call an affliction is (as certainly as God is Wise and Good) for the best in reference to the whole Systeme of things, so for all that I know it may be most conducive to my interest in particular.

In as much as by it I may either obtain a great∣er good, or avoid a greater evil. Thus a Ship∣wreck made Zeno a Philosopher, and the Mes∣senger of Satan proved and Antidote to the great Apostle against pride and vanity of Spirit. And perhaps there was in me some evil and un∣mortify'd quality or other of so malignant a nature that it could not be cured by a less se∣vere Application. For certainly God is not so ill a Physitian as not to weigh the Ingredients of his bitter Cup, before he mingles it into a draught, that it may be proportionable to the strength of the disease as well as of the Patient.

14. Again I consider, that as this affliction may be one of the Arrows of love, and in the de∣signation of God be intended for my particular good, so 'tis most certain that by wise conduct I may extract good out of it if I will, and turn it to my greater advantage. Plato I remember somwhere compares the life of man to a game at Tables. And indeed the comparison is wor∣thy the wisdom of its Author, and full of my∣stic and important truth. For as there what Cast we shall have is not in our power, but to ma∣nage it well, that is. So is it with man in the concerns of life. 'Twas not in my power whe∣ther this Affliction should befall me or not, but 'tis in my power to manage it for my advantage now it has befall'n me. I can use it as an Op∣portunity of shewing my Vertue, as an Occa∣sion of withdrawing my affections from the

world confidering the uncertainty of the best objects in it, of increasing my love to God, and his love to me here, and his rewards to me here∣after. And to this purpose I consider the story of Abraham, who for his readiness to part with his beloved Son at the demand of God, became the Favorite and Friend of his maker, and ob∣tain'd this emphatical promise from him, In blessing I will bless thee.

15. Again I consider, that altho by the loss of this excellent Creature a great breach be made upon my happiness, yet the remainder of what I enjoy is much greater than the evil which I suffer, so that upon the whole the Scale weighs down for happiness. My Condition is still better than that of many others, who yet think them∣selves happy. And therefore for me to pine and lament because I am not so happy as I was, or may be, becomes neither the Philosophy of a Scholar, nor the Humility of a Christian, and up∣on the same Principle I may continue to lament even when I am in Heaven. Rather let me a∣dore the bounty of God for filling my Cup so full, than be discontented because it does not run over.

16. Again I consider with the great Apostle that the time is short, and that therefore I should weep as if I wept not. 'Twill not be long e're I shall enjoy the Beatific Vision of God and (if af∣ter that the fruition of any Creature can be of any moment) the Society of even this dear per∣son.

In the mean while I have one Artifice more whereby to solace my self, and that is, by entertaining the same apprehension of what I enjoy as I should do if I did not enjoy it. I think with my self, how miserable I should be if I wanted several of those Blessings which I have, particularly if I had not been bred a Scholar, and thereby been qualify'd to be my own Com∣forter. And by vertue of this Consideration I set a higher value upon what I enjoy, and conse∣quently find the less miss of what I do not.

17. This is my Consolatio Philosophica, where∣by I allay and fix the violent fermentation of my Passions. To which I might add many po∣pular Arguments, as that 'tis as natural to dye as to be born, that 'tis incident not only to man but to the whole Creation, the fashion of this world passes away, that 'tis envious to think that our loss which is our friend's gain, that occasions of grief in this world are many, and therefore not singly to be much lamented, that 'tis a shame for Reason not to be able to conquer that which must at length yield to time, and the like. But these I shall be content only to mention, part∣ly because I don't fancy much to be Topical, and partly because I think my other supports strong enough to bear the stress of the most weighty sorrow.

18. And now the result of all these conside∣rations is this. I am fully and intirely satisfy'd with the accomplishment of the divine plea∣sure,

and tho before 'twas my hearty prayer that (if possible) this Cup might pass from me, yet I now as chearfully subscribe to the other clause, Nevertheless not as I will but as thou wilt. I am thoroughly convinc'd both of the absur∣dity and undecency of my former sorrow, and tho not so much a Stoic as to condemn all the passions, yet I do this of grief as freely as any of that rigid School, and therefore will no longer defile my self for the Dead. Lev. 21. 1. If any grief can be now reasonable, it must be because I have griev'd so much, for I am conscious that I have thereby exceedingly betrayd the great∣ness of my Soul. Homer indeed thought it not unworthy the Character of his great Hero A∣chilles to bring him in passionately bewailing the death of Patrōclus. His expression (as I re∣member) is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 he wept hideously. But certainly our Saviour was of another mind, when he said to his Disciples upon the occasion of his own death (and certainly if any thing could justify sorrow that would) Let not your hearts be troubled.

19. But yet after all I must needs say, tho I have pretty well by this time argued my passions into a Calm, that 'tis a great venture to love any thing well in this world, and that I am resolv'd for the sake of this dear person never to ingage my passions very far in the love of any thing again.

Quicquid amas cupias non placuisse nimis

shall be my Motto as long as I live, and I will follow the excellent rule of the Royal Philoso∣pher M. Antoninus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and reduce my self as near as I can to a simplicity, and de∣light in as few things as may be. So shall I more undividedly adhere to my last and best end, and lye less at the mercy of fortune.

20. But (Sir) however I contract my love, you may assure your self of the same room you ever had in the affections of

Your true Friend J. Norris.

FINIS.

Notes

• lib. 3. de Fin.
• Revel. 26.
• Job 28.
• Enn. 6. lib. 9. cap. 10.
• Exod. 33. 18.
• Rev. 1. 8.
• The Great Exemplar, pag. 60.