A collection of miscellanies consisting of poems, essays, discourses, and letters occasionally written / by John Norris ...

An Idea of Happiness, &c.

SIR,

1. THO you have been pleas'd to assign me the Task of an Angel, and in that Respect have warranted me to disobey you; yet, since a considerable part of that experimental Knowledg which I have of Happiness is owing to the Delight, which I take in your vertuous and endearing Friendship, I think 'tis but reasonable I should endeavour to give you an Idea of that, whereof you have given me the Possession.

2. You desire to know of me wherein the greatest Happiness attainable by man in this Life does consist. And here, tho I see my self engaged in a work already too difficult for me, yet I find it necessary to enlarge it: For, since the greatest Happiness, or Summum Bonum of this Life is a Species of Happiness in general, and since it is call'd (Greatest) not because ab∣solutely perfect and compleat; but inasmuch as it comes nearest to that which indeed is so, it will be necessary first to state the Notion of Happiness in General, and then to define where∣in that Happiness does consist which is perfect and compleat, before I can proceed to a Reso∣lution of your Question.

3. By Happiness, in the most general Sense of the word, I understand nothing else but an Enjoyment of any Good. The least Degree of Good has the same Proportion to the least De∣gree of Happiness as the greatest has to the greatest, and consequently as many ways as a man enjoys any Good, so many ways he may be said to be happy: neither will the Mixture of Evil make him forfeit his Right to this Ti∣tle, unless it either equals the Good he enjoys, or exceeds it: And then indeed it does; but the Reason is, because in strictness of Speaking, upon the whole Account the man enjoys no Good at all: For if the Good and the Evil be equal-balanc'd, it must needs be indifferent to that man either to be or not to be, there being not the least Grain of good to determine his Choice: So that he can no more be said to be happy in that Condition, than he could before he was born. And much less, if the Evil exceeds the Good: For then he is not only not happy, but absolutely and purely miserable: For after an exact Commensuration supposed between the Good and the Evil, all that remains over of the Evil is pure and simple Misery; which is the Case of the Damn'd: And when 'tis once come to this (whatever some Mens Metaphysics may perswade them) I am very well satisfied, that 'tis better not to be than to be. But now on the other side, if the Good does never so little out-weigh the Evil, that Overplus of Good

is as pure and unallay'd in its Proportion, as if there were no such Mixture at all; and conse∣quently the Possession of it may properly be call'd Happiness.

4. I know the Masters of Moral Philosophy do not treat of Happiness in this Latitude; nei∣ther is it fit they should: For their Business be∣ing to point out the ultimate End of Human Actions, it would be an impertinent thing for them to give any other Idea of Happiness than the highest: But however this does not hinder but that the General Idea of Happiness may be extended farther, even to the Fruition of any Good whatsoever: Neither is there any reason to find Fault with the Latitude of this Notion, since we acknowledg Degrees even in Glory.

5. In this General Idea of Happiness two things are contain'd. One is, some Good, ei∣ther real or apparent, in the Fruition of which we are said to be in some measure or other hap∣py. The other is the very Fruition it self. The first of these is usually called Objective Happi∣ness, and the latter Formal. Some I know di∣vide Happiness into these as distinct Species; but I think not so artificially: For they are both but constituent Parts, which joyntly make up one and the same Happiness: Neither of them are sufficient alone, but they are both equally necessary. That the last of these is a necessary Ingredient, I think no doubt can reasonably be made: For what would the greatest Good

imaginable signifie without Fruition? And that the former is likewise necessary is no less certain: For how can there be such a thing as Fruition without an Object? I grant 'tis not at all necessary that the Object be a real substan∣tial Good; if it appear so, 'tis sufficient.

6. From this Distinction of real and appa∣rent Good, some have taken occasion to distin∣guish of Happiness likewise into two sorts, real and imaginary: But I believe, upon a more nar∣row Scrutiny into the matter, 'twill be found, that all Happiness, according to its Propor∣tion, is equally real; and that that which they term Imaginary, too well deserves the Name, there being no such thing in Nature: For let the Object of it be never so Phantastic, yet it must still carry the Semblance and Appearance of Good (otherwise it can neither move the Ap∣petite nor please it, and consequently be nei∣ther an Object of Desire nor of Fruition;) and if so, the Happiness must needs be real, because the Formality of the Object, tho 'twere never so true and real a good, would notwithstanding lie in the Appearance, not in the Reality: Whe∣ther it be real or no is purely accidental: For, since to be happy can be nothing else but to en∣joy somthing which I desire, the Object of my Happiness must needs be enjoy'd under the same Formality as 'tis desired. Now since 'tis desired only as apparently good, it must needs please me when obtained under the same Notion. So

that it matters not to the Reality of my Happi∣ness, whether the Object of it be really good, or only apprehended so, since if it were never so real, it pleases only as apparent. The Fool has his Paradise as well as the Wise-man, and for the time is as happy in it; and a kind Delu∣sion will make a Cloud as pleasing as the Queen of Heaven. And therefore I think it impossi∣ble for a man to think himself happy, and (du∣ring that Perswasion) not really to be so. He enjoys the Creature of his own Fancy, worships the Idol of his Imagination, and the happiest man upon Earth does no more: For let the Cir∣cumstances of his Life be what they will, 'tis his Opinion only that must give the Relish. With∣out this, Heaven it self would afford him no Content, nor the Vision of God prove Beatific. 'Tis true, the man is seated at the Spring-Head of Happiness, is surrounded with excellent Ob∣jects; but alas, it appears not so to him; he is not at all affected with his Condition, but, like Adam, lies fast in a dead Sleep in the midst of Paradise.

7. The Sum of this Argument is this; Good is in the same manner the Object of Fruition, as 'tis of Desire; and that is not as really good in its own Nature, but as 'tis judged so by the Understanding: And consequently, tho it be only apparent, it must needs be as effectual to gratifie the Appetite as it was at first to excite it during that Appearance. So long as it keeps

on its Vizor and imposes upon the Understand∣ing, what is wanting in the thing, is made up by an obliging Imposture, and Ignorance becomes here the Mother of Happiness as well as of De∣votion: But if the man will dare to be wise, and too curiously examine the superficial Tinsel-Good, he undeceives himself to his own Cost, and, like Adam, adventuring to eat of the Tree of Knowledg, sees himself naked, and is ashamed. And for this reason I think it impossible for any man to love to be flatter'd: 'Tis true, he may delight to hear himself commended by those who indeed do flatter him; but the true reason of that is, because he does not apprehend that to be Flattery which indeed is so; but when he once throughly knows it, 'tis impossible he should be any longer delighted with it. I shall conclude this Point with this useful Reflection, That since every Man's Happiness depends wholly upon his own opinion, the foundatiou upon which all envious men proceed, must needs be either false or very uncertain. False, if they think that outward Circumstances and States of life are all the Ingredients of Happi∣ness; but uncertain however: For since they measure the Happiness of other Men by their own Opinion, 'tis mere Chance if they do not misplace their Envy, unless they were sure the other Person was of the like opinion with themselves. And now what a vain irrational thing is it to disquiet our selves into a dislike

of our own Condition, merely because we mi∣stake another Man's?

8. Thus fa•• of the Notion of Happiness in General; I now proceed to consider that Hap∣piness which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as Plato speaks) sound and entire, perfect and compleat. Con∣cerning the general Notion of which, all men, I suppose, are as much agreed as they are in the Idea of a Triangle. That 'tis such a State than which a better cannot be conceiv'd: In which there is no Evil you can fear, no Good which you desire and have not; That which fully and constantly satisfies the Demand of every Appetite, and leaves no possibility for a desire of Change; or to summ it up in that com∣prehensive Expression of the Poet,

Quod sis esse velis, nihilque malis.

When you would always be what you are, and (as the Earl of Roscommon very significantly ren∣ders it) do Rather nothing.

9. This I suppose is the utmost that can be said or conceiv'd of it, and less than this will not be e∣nough. And thus far we are all agreed. For I sup∣pose, the many various Disputes maintained by Philosophers concerning Happiness, could not respect this general Notion of it, but only the particular causes or means whereby it might be acquired. And I find Tully concurring* 1.1 with me in the same Observation, Ea est beata vita (says he) quaerimus autem non quae

sit, sed unde. The difficulty is not to frame a conception of a perfectly happy State in the general, but to define in particular wherein it confists.

10. But before I undertake this Province, I think it might not be amiss to remove one Pre∣judice, which, because it has gain'd upon my self sometimes in my Melancholy Retirements, I am apt to think it may be incident to other men also. It is this, Whether after so many Disputes about, so many restless endeavours af∣ter this state of perfect Happiness, there be any such thing or no. Whether it be not a mere Idea, as imaginary as Plato's Common-wealth, as fictious as the Groves of Elysium. I confess, this suspicion has oftentimes overcast my mind with black thoughts, damp'd my Devotion, and as it were, clipp'd the Wings of my Aspi••ing Soul. And I happened to fall into it upon a serious reflection on the nature of Fruition in the seve∣ral Periods and Circumstances of my Life. For I observ'd according to my Narrow experience, that I never had in all my Life the same thoughts of any good in the very time of the enjoying it as I had before. I have known when I have promised my self vast Satisfactions, and my imagination has presented me at a di∣stance with a fair Landskip of Delights, yet when I drew nigh to grasp the alluring Happi∣ness, like the Sensitive Plant it contracted it self at the touch, and shrink'd almost to nothing in

the Fruition. And though after the Enjoyment is past, it seems great again upon Reflection as it did before in Expectation, yet should a Plato∣nical Revolution make the same Circumstances recur, I should not think so. I found 'twas ever with me as with the Traveller, to whom the Ground which is before him, and that which he has left behind him seems always more curious∣ly embroider'd and delightsome, than that which he stands upon. So that my Happiness, like the time wherein I thought to enjoy it, was always either past or to come, never present. Methought I could often say upon a Recollection, How happy was I at such a time! Or when I was in expectation. How happy shall I be if I compass such a design! But scarce ever, I am so. I was pretty well pleas'd methought while I expected, while I hoped, till Fruition jogg'd me out of my pleasing slumber and I knew it was but a Dream. And this single Considera∣tion has often made me even in the very pursuit after Happiness, and full career of my Passions, to stop short on this side of Fruition, and to chuse rather with Moses upon Mount Nebo to entertain my fancy with a remote Prospect of the Happy Land, than to go in, and Possess it, and then Repine. How then shall Man be hap∣py, when setting aside all the Crosses of For∣tune, he will complain even of Success, and Fruition it self shall disappoint him!

11. And this melancholy reflection bred in me a kind of Suspicion, that for all that I knew it might be so in Heaven too. That although at this distance I might frame to my self bright Ideas of that Region of Bliss; yet when I came to the Possession of it, I should not find that perfect Happiness there which I expected, but that it would be always to come as 'tis now, and that I should seek for Heaven even in Heaven it self. That I should not fully acquiesce in my condition there, but at length desire a Change. And that which confirm'd me the more in this unhappy Scepticism, was, because I consider'd that a great number of excellent Beings who enjoyed the very Quintessence of Bliss, who were as happy as God and Heaven could make them, grew soon uneasy and weary of their State and left their own Habitation. Which argues that their Happiness was not perfect and compleat, because otherwise they would not have desired a Change, since that very desire is an Imper∣fection. And if Happiness be not compleat in Heaven, sure 'tis impossible to be found any where else.

12. Before therefore I proceed to define wherein perfect Happiness does consist, I think it necessary to endeavour the removal of this Scruple, which, like the flaming Sword, forbids entrance into Paradice. In order to which, I shall enquire into the true Reason why these Sublunary good things when enjoyed do neither

answer our expectations, nor satisfy our Appe∣tites. Now this must proceed either from the nature of Fruition it self, or from the Imper∣fection of it, or from the Object of it, or from our selves. I confess, did this defect proceed from the very nature of Fruition (as is supposed in the Objection) 'tis impossible there should be any such thing as perfect Happiness, since 'twould faint away while enjoy'd, and expire in our embraces. But that it cannot proceed thence, I have this to offer, Because Fruition being no∣thing else but an Application or Union of the Soul to some good or agreeable Object, it is im∣possible that should lessen the good enjoyed. In∣deed it may lessen our estimation of it, but that is because we do not rightly consider the nature of things, but promise our selves infinite Satis∣factions in the enjoyment of finite Objects. We look upon things through a false Glass, which Magnifies the Object at a distance much be∣yond its just Dimensions. We represent our fu∣ture enjoyments to our selves in such favourable and partial Ideas which abstract from all the inconveniencies and allays which will really in the Event accompany them. And if we thus o∣ver-rate our Felicities before-hand, 'tis no won∣der if they baulk our Expectations in the Frui∣tion. But then it must be observed, that the Fruition does not cause this Deficiency in the Ob∣ject, but only discover it. We have a better in∣sight into the Nature of things near at hand,

than when we stood afar off, and consequently discern those defects and imperfections, which, like the qualities of an ill Mistriss, lay hid all the time of Courtship, and now begin to betray themselves, when 'tis come to enjoyment. But this can never happen but where the Object is finite. An infinite Object can never be over∣valued, and consequenty cannot frustrate our Expectations.

13. And as we are not to charge Fruition with our disappointments but our selves (because we are accessory to our own delusion by taking false measures of things) so neither is the Ʋnsatis∣factoriness of any condition to be imputed to the Nature of Fruition it self, but either to the imperfection of it or to the finiteness of the Ob∣ject. Let the Object be never so perfect, yet if the Fruition of it be in an imperfect measure there will still be room for Ʋnsatisfactoriness, as it appears in our enjoyment of God in this Life. Neither can a finite Object fully satisfy us though we enjoy it never so thoroughly. For since to a full satisfaction and acquiescence of Mind 'tis required that our Faculties be always entertained and we ever enjoying: it is impossi∣ble a finite Object should afford this Satisfaction, because all the good that is in it (being finite) is at length run over, and then the enjoyment is at an end, The flower is suck'd dry, and we ne∣cessarily desire a Change. Whenever therefore our enjoyment proves unsatisfying, we may con∣clude,

that either the Object is finite, or the Fruition imperfect. But then how came the Angels to be dissatisfy'd with their Condition in the Regions of light and immortality, when they drank freely of the Fountain of Life* 1.2 proceeding out of the Throne of God, with whom is fulness of Joy, and at whose Right hand are Pleasures for evermore. Here certain∣ly there is no room either for the finiteness of the Object, or the imperfection of Fruition. And therefore their dissatisfaction can be imputed to no other Cause, than the Nature of Fruition in general, which is to lessen the good enjoyed, as was supposed in the Objection. This I confess presses hard, and indeed, I have but one way to extricate my self from this difficulty, and that is by supposing a State of Probation in the Angels. That they did not immediatly upon their Creation enjoy an infinite Object, or if they did, yet that 'twas in an imperfect measure. For should it be granted that they were at first con∣firmed in Bliss and compleatly happy both in re∣spect of Fruition and Object, as we suppose they are now, I cannot conceive it possible they should be dissatisfy'd with their Condition. This being repugnant to the Idea of Perfect Happiness.

14. Since then this dissatisfaction must be de∣rived either from the imperfection of the Frui∣tion, or the finiteness of the Object, and not from the Nature of Fruition in the general, to infer the possibility of perfect Happiness, there

needs no more to be supposed than the existence of a Being full fraught with infinite inexhausti∣ble good, and that he is able to Communicate to the full. There may be then such a thing as Perfect Happiness. The possibility of which may also be further proved (tho not explicated) from those boundless Desires, that immortal Thirst every man has after it by Nature: Con∣cerning which I observe, that nothing does more constantly, more inseparably cleave to our Minds than this Desire of perfect and con∣summated Happiness: This, as Plato patheti∣cally expresses it, is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the most excellent end of all our Endeavours, the great Prize, the great Hope. This is the Mark every Man shoots at, and tho we miss our Aim never so often, yet we will not, cannot give over; but, like passio∣nate Lovers, take Resolution from a Repulse. The rest of our Passions are much at our own Disposal; yield either to Reason or Time; we either Argue our selves out of them, or at least out-live them. We are not always in Love with Pomp and Grandeur, nor always dazzled with the glittering of Riches; and there is a Season when Pleasure it self shall Court in vain: But the desire of perfect Happiness has no Intervals, no Vicissitudes, it out-lasts the Motion of the Pulse, and survives the Ruins of the Grave. Many Waters cannot quench it, neither can the Floods Drown it: And now certainly God would

never have planted such an Ardent, such an im∣portunate Appetite in our Souls, and as it were interwoven it with our very Natures, had he not been able to satisfie it.

15. I come now to shew wherein this perfect Happiness does consist, concerning which, I affirm in the first place, that it is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. The greatest Fruition we have of God here, is imperfect, and consequently unsatisfactory. And as for all other Objects they are finite, and consequently, though never so fully enjoy'd, cannot afford us perfect Satisfaction. No; Man knoweth not the price thereof: Neither is it* 1.3 to be found in the Land of the Living. The Depth saith, it is not in me, and the Sea saith, it is not in me. The Vanity of the Creature has been so copiously discoursed upon, both by Philosophers and Divines, and is withall so ob∣vious to every thinking man's Experience, that I need not here take an Inventory of the Crea∣tion, nor turn Ecclesiastes after Solomon. And besides, I have already anticipated this Argu∣ment in what I have said concerning Fruition. I shall only add one or two Remarks concern∣ing the Objects of Secular Happiness, which are not so commonly insisted upon, to what has been there said. The first is this, that the Ob∣jects wherein Men generally seek for Happiness here, are not only finite in their Nature, but al∣so few in number. Indeed, could a Man's Life

be so contrived, that he should have a new Plea∣sure still ready at hand assoon as he was grown weary of the Old, and every day enjoy a Virgin Delight, he might then perhaps like Mr. Hobbs his Notion, and for a while think himself hap∣py in this continued Succession of new Acquisitions. But alas, Nature does not treat us with this Va∣riety. The compass of our enjoyments is much shorter than that of our Lives, and there is a Periodical Circulation of our Pleasures as well as of our Blood.

—Versamur ibidem atque insumus usque. Nec nova vivendo procuditur ulla voluptas.

Lucretius.

The Enjoyments of our Lives run in a perpe∣tual Round like the Months in the Kalendar, but with a quicker Revolution; we dance like Fairies in a Circle, and our whole Life is but a nauseous Tautology: We rise like the Sun, and run the same Course we did the day before, and to morrow is but the same over again: So that the greatest Favourite of Fortune will have Reason often enough to cry out with him in Seneca, Quousque eadem? But there is another Grievance which contributes to defeat our En∣deavours after perfect Happiness in the Enjoy∣ments of this Life; Which is, that the Objects wherein we seek it, are not only finite and few; but that they commonly prove occasions of

greater Sorrow to us than ever they afforded us Content. This may be made out several ways, as from the Labour of Getting, the Care of Keeping, the fear of Losing, and the like To∣picks, commonly insisted on by others; but I wave these, and fix upon another Account less blown upon, and I think more material than any of the rest. It is this, that altho the Ob∣ject loses that great appearance in the Fruition which it had in the expectation, yet after it is gone it Resumes it again. Now we, when we lament the loss, do not take our measures from that appearance which the Object had in the Enjoyment (as we should do to make our sor∣row not exceed our Happiness) but from that which it has in the reflexion, and consequently we must needs be more miserable in the loss then we were happy in the enjoyment.

16. From these and the like Considerations, I think it will evidently appear, that this perfect Happiness is not to be found in any thing we can enjoy in this Life. Wherein then does it consist? I answer positively, in the full and en∣tire Fruition of God. He (as Plato speaks) is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Proper and Prin∣cipal end of Man, the Center of our Tendency, the Ark of our Rest. He is the Object which a∣lone can satisfy the appetite of the most Capa∣cious Soul, and stand the Test of Fruition to E∣ternity. And to enjoy him fully is perfect Fe∣licity. This in general, is no more than what

is deliver'd to us in Scripture, and was believ'd by many of the Heathen Philosophers. But the manner of this Fruition requires a more parti∣cular Consideration. Much is said by the School∣men upon this Subject, whereof, in the first place, I shall give a short and methodical ac∣count, and then fix upon the Opinion which I best approve of. The first thing that I ob∣serve, is, that 'tis generally agreed upon among them, that this Fruition of God consists in some Operation; and I think with very good Reason. For as by the Objective part of perfect Happiness we understand that which is best and last, and to which all other things are to be referr'd; So by the Formal part of it must be understood the best and last Habitude of Man toward that best Object, so that the Happiness may both ways satisfy the Appetite, that is, as 'tis the best thing, and as 'tis the Possession, Use, or Fruition of that best thing: Now this habitude whereby the best thing is perfectly possess'd, must needs be some Operation, because Operation is the ul∣timate perfection of every Being. Which Axion (as Cajetan well observes) must not be so under∣stood as if Operation taken by it self were more perfect than the thing which tends to it, but that every thing with its Operation is more perfect than without it.

17. The next thing which I observe, is, that 'tis also farther agreed upon among them, that this Operation wherein our Fruition of God

does consist, is an Operation of the Intellectual part, and not of the Sensitive. And this also I take to be very reasonable. First, because 'tis generally receiv'd, that the Essence of God cannot be the Object of any of our Senses. But Secondly, Suppose it could, yet since this Ope∣ration; wherein our perfect Happiness does con∣sist must be the perfectest Operation, and since that of the Intellectual part is more perfect than that of the Sensitive, it follows that the Opera∣tion whereby we enjoy God must be that of the Intellectual part only.

18. But now whereas the Intellectual part of man (as 'tis opposed to the Sensitive) is double, viz. That of the Ʋnderstanding, and that of the Will, there has commenced a great Controver∣sy between the Thomists and the Scotists, in which Act or Operation of the Rational Soul the Fruition of God does consist, whether in an Act of the Ʋnderstanding, or in an Act of the Will. The Thomists will have it consist purely in an Act of the Ʋnderstanding, which is Vision. The Scotists in the Act of the Will, which is Love. I intend not here to launch out into those Volu∣minous Intricacies and Abstrusities, occasioned by the management of this Argument: It may suffice to tell you, that I think they are both in the extream, and therefore I shall take the mid∣dle way and resolve the perfect Fruition of God partly into Vision and partly into Love. These are the two arms with which we embrace the

Divinity, and unite our Souls to the fair one and the good. These I conceive are both so essential to the perfect Fruition of God, that the Idea of it can by no means be maintained if ei∣ther of them be wanting. For, since God is both Supream Truth and infinite Goodness, he cannot be entirely possess'd but by the most clear knowledg and the most ardent love. And besides, since the Soul is happy by her Facul∣ties, her Happiness must consist in the most perfect Operation of each Faculty. For if Hap∣piness did consist formally in the sole Opera∣tion of the Ʋnderstanding (as most say) or in the sole Operation of the Will (as others) the Man would not be compleatly and in all respects Happy. For how is it possible a Man should be perfectly Happy in loving the greatest good if he did not know it, or in knowing it if he did not love it? And moreover, these two Ope∣rations do so mutually tend to the promotion and conservation of one another, that upon this depends the perpetuity and the constancy of our Happiness. For while the Blessed do 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Face to Face contemplate the Supream Truth and the infinite Goodness, they cannot chuse but love perpetually; and while they perpetually love, they cannot chuse but perpetually contemplate. And in this mu∣tual reciprocation of the Actions of the Soul consists the perpetuity of Heaven, the Circle of Felicity.

19. Besides this way of resolving our fruition of God into Vision and Love, there is a famous Opinion said to be broacht by Henricus Ganda∣vensis, who, upon a Supposition that God could not be so fully enjoy'd as is required to perfect Happiness, only by the Operations or Powers of the Soul, fancied a certain Illapse whereby the Divine Essence did fall in with, and as it were penetrate the Essence of the Blessed. Which Opinion he endeavours to illustrate by this Si∣militude. That as a piece of Iron, red hot by reason of the Illapse of the fire into it, appears all over like fire, so the Souls of the Blessed by this Illapse of the Divine Essence into them, shall be all over Divine.

20. I think he has scarce any followers in this Opinion, but I am sure he had a leader. For this is no more than what Plato taught before him, as is to be seen in his Discourses about the refusion of the Souls of good men into the Ani∣ma Mundi, which is the self-same in other terms with this Opinion. And the Truth of what I affirm may farther appear from an expression of that great Platonist Plotinus, (viz.) that the Soul will then be Happy when it shall de∣part* 1.4 hence to God, and as another and no longer her self shall become wholly his, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, having joyn'd her self to him as a Center to a Center.

21. That such an intimate Conjunction with God as is here described is possible, seems to

me more than credible from the Nature of the Hypostatic Union, but whether our Fruition of God after this Life shall consist in it, none know but those happy Souls who enjoy him, and therefore I shall determine nothing before the time. This only I observe, that should our Fruition of God consist in such an Union or rather Penetration of Essences, that would not exclude but rather infer those Operations of Vision and Love as necessary to Fruition; but on the other hand, there seems no such necessity of this Union to the Fruition, but that it may be conceiv'd entire without it. And therefore why we should multiply difficulties without cause, I see no reason. For my part I should think my self sufficiently happy in the clear Vi∣sion of my Maker, nor should I desire* 1.5 any thing beyond the Prayer of Moses, I beseech thee shew me thy Glory.

22. For what an infinite Satisfaction, Hap∣piness and Delight must it needs be to have a clear and intimate perception of that Primitive and Original Beauty, Perfection and Harmo∣ny, whereof all that appears fair and excellent either to our Senses or Ʋnderstandings in this Life is but a faint imitation, a pale Reflection! To see him who is the Fountain of all Being, containing in himself the perfection, not on∣ly of all that is, but of all that is possible to be, the Alpha and Omega, the beginning and* 1.6 the ending, the first and the last, which is,

and which was, and which is to come, the Almighty! To see him of whom all Nature is the Image, of whom all the Harmony both of the visible and invisible World is but the Eccho! To see him, who (as Plato divinely and magnificent∣ly expresses it) is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The immense Ocean of Beauty, which is it self by it self, with it self, uniform, always existing! This certainly will affect the Soul with all the pleasing and ravish∣ing Transports of Love and Desire, Joy and De∣light, Wonder and Amazement, together with a settled Acquiescence and Complacency of Spirit only less infinite than the Loveliness that causes it, and the peculiar Complacency of him who rejoyces in his own fulness, and the Compre∣hensions of Eternity. We see how strangely our Sense of Seeing is affected with the Harmony of Colours, and our sense of Hearing with the Har∣mony of Sounds, insomuch that some have been too weak for the enjoyment, and have grown mad with the Sublimate of Pleasure. And if so, what then shall we think of the Beatific Vi∣sion, the pleasure of which will so far transcend that of the other, as God who is all over Har∣mony and Proportion exceeds the sweetest Me∣lody of Sounds and Colours, and the perception of the Mind is more vigorous, quick and pier∣cing than that of the Senses? This is perfect Happiness, this is the Tree of Life which grows in the midst of the Paradise of God, this is Hea∣ven,

which while the Learned dispute about, the Good only enjoy. But I shall not venture to Soar any longer in these Heights, I find the Aether too thin here to breath in long, and the Brightness of the Region flashes too strong up∣on my tender Sense; I shall therefore hasten to descend from the Mount of God, lest I grow giddy with speculation, and lose those Secrets which I have learnt there, the Cabala of Feli∣city.

23. And now, (Sir) I come to consider your Question (viz.) Wherein the greatest Happi∣ness attainable by Man in this Life does consist. Concerning which, there is as great variety of Opinions among Philosophers, as there is among Geographers about the Seat of Paradise. The Learned Varro reckons up no less than 288 se∣veral Opinions about it, and yet notwithstand∣ing the number of Writers who have bequeath'd Volumes upon this Subject to Posterity, they seem to have been in the dark in nothing more than in this, and (excepting only a few Plato∣nists, who placed Man's greatest End in the Contemplation of Truth) they seem to have un∣dertaken nothing so unhappily, as when they essay'd to write of Happiness. Some measure their Happiness by the high-tide of their Ri∣ches, as the Egyptians did the Fertility of the Year by the increase of the River Nile. Others place it in the Pleasures of Sense, others in Ho∣nour and Greatness. But these and the like

were Men of the common Herd, low groveling Souls, that either understood not the Dignity of Human Nature, or else forgot that they were Men. But there were others of a Diviner Genius and Sublimer Spirit,

Queis meliore luto finxit praecordia Titan.

Who had a more generous blood running in their Veins, which made them put a just value upon themselves, and scorn to place their great∣est Happiness in that which they should blush to enjoy. And those were the Stoics and the Peri∣patetics, who both place the greatest Happiness of this Life in the Actions of Vertue, with this only difference, that whereas the former are contented with Naked Vertue, the latter require some other Collateral things to the farther ac∣complishment of Happiness, such as are Health and Strength of Body, a Competent Lively∣hood, and the like.

24. And this Opinion has been subscribed to by the hands of eminent Moralists in all Ages. And as it is Venerable for its Antiquity, so has it gain'd no small Authority from the Pen of a great Modern Writer (Descartes) who resolves the greatest Happiness of this Life into the right use of the Will, which consists in this, that a Man have a firm and constant purpose always to do that which he shall judge to be best.

25. I confess, the Practice of Vertue is a very

great instrument of Happiness, and that there is a great deal more true satisfaction and solid content to be found in a constant course of well living than in all the soft Caresses of the most studied Luxury, or the Voluptuousness of a Se∣raglio. And therefore I have oftentimes been exceedingly pleased in the reading of a certain Passage in that Divine Moralist Hierocles, where he tells you, that the Vertuous Man lives much more pleasantly than the Vicious Man. For (says he) all Pleasure is the Companion of Action, it has no Subsistence of its own, but accompanies us in our doing such and such things. Hence 'tis that the worser. Actions are accompanied with the mean∣er Pleasures. So that the good Man does not only excell the wicked Man in what is good, but has also the advantage of him even in Pleasure, for whose sake alone he is wicked. For he that chuses Pleasure with Filthiness, altho for a while he be sweetly and deliciously entertain'd, yet at last through the Eil∣thiness annexed to his Enjoyment, he is brought to a painful Repentance. But now he that prefers Vertue with all her Labours and Difficulties, though at first for want of use it sits heavy upon him, yet by the Conjunction of good be alleviates the Labour, and at last enjoys pare and unallay'd Pleasure with his Vertue. So that of necessity that Life is most unhappy, which is most wicked, and that most plea∣sant which is most vertuous.

26. Now this I readily submit to as a great truth, that the degrees of Happiness vary ac∣cording

to the degrees of Vertue, and conse∣quently that that Life which is most Vertuous is most Happy, with reference to those that are Vicious or less Vertuous, every degree of Ver∣tue having a proportionate degree of Happiness accompanying it, (which is all, I suppose, that excellent Author intends.) But I do not think the most Vertuous Life so the most Happy, but that it may become Happier, unless somthing more be comprehended in the Word (Vertue) then the Stoics, Peripatetics, and the generali∣ty of other Moralists understand by it. For with them it signifies no more but only such a firm 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or habitude of the Will to good, where∣by we are constantly disposed, notwithstanding the contrary tendency of our Passions, to per∣form the necessary Offices of Life. This they call Moral or Civil Vertue, and although this brings always Happiness enough with it to make ample amends for all the difficulties which at∣tend the practise of it: Yet I am not of Opi∣nion that the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life consists in it. But there is ano∣ther and a higher Sense of the Word, which frequently occurs in the Pythagorean and Pla∣tonic Writings, (viz.) Contemplation and the Ʋ∣nitive way of Religion. And this they call Divine Vertue. I allow of the distinction, but I would not be thought to derive it from the Principle, as if Moral Vertue were acquired, and this infused (for to speak ingeniously, infused

Vertue seem'd ever to me as great a Paradox in Divinity, as Occult qualities in Philosophy) but from the nobleness of the Object, the Object of the former being Moral good, and the Object of the latter God himself. The former is a State of Proficiency, the latter of Perfection. The former is a State of difficulty and contention, the latter of ease and ferenity. The former is employ'd in mastering the Passions, and regu∣lating the actions of common Life, the latter in Divine Meditation and the extasies of Sera∣phic Love. He that has only the former, is like Moses with much difficulty climbing up to the Holy Mount, but he that has the latter, is like the same Person conversing with God on the serene top of it, and shining with the Rays of anticipated Glory. So that this latter supposes the acquisition of the former, and consequent∣ly has all the Happiness retaining to the other, besides what it adds of its own. This is the last Stage of Human Perfection, the utmost round of the Ladder whereby we ascend to Heaven, one Step higher is Glory. Here then will I build my Tabernacle, for it is good to be here. Here will I set up my Pillar of Rest, here will I fix, for why should I travel on farther in pursuit of any greater Happiness, since Man in this Station is but a little lower than the Angels, one remove from Heaven. Here certainly is the greatest happiness, as well as Perfection attainable by Man in this State of imperfection. For since

that Happiness which is absolutely perfect and compleat consists in the clear and intimate Vi∣sion and most ardent Love of God, hence we ought to take our Measures, and conclude that to be the greatest Happiness attainable in this State, which is the greatest participation of the other. And that can be nothing else but the Ʋnitive way of Religion, which consists of the Contemplation and Love of God. I shall say somthing of each of these severally, and som∣thing of the Ʋnitive way of Religion, which is the result of both, and so shut up this Dis∣course.

27. By Contemplation in general (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) we understand, an application of the Understanding to some truth. But here in this place we take the word in a more peculiar sense, as it signifies an habitual, attentive, steddy application or conversion of the Spirit to God and his Divine Perfections. Of this the Masters of Mystic Theo∣logy commonly make fifteen Degrees. The first is Intuition of Truth, the second is a Retire∣ment of all the Vigour and Strength of the Fa∣culties into the innermost parts of the Soul, the third is Spiritual Silence, the fourth is Rest, the fifth is Union, the sixth is the Hearing of the still Voice of God, the seventh is Spiritual Slumber, the eighth is Ecstacy, the ninth is Rapture, the tenth is the Corporeal Appear∣ance of Christ and the Saints, the eleventh is the Imaginary Appearance of the Same, the

twelfth is the Intellectual Vision of God, the thirteenth is the Vision of God in Obscurity, the fourteenth is an admirable Manifestation of God, the fifteenth is a clear and intuitive Vision of him, such as St. Austin and Tho. Aqui∣nas attribute to St. Paul, when he was wrapt up into the third Heaven. Others of them reckon seven degrees only, (viz.) Taste, Desire, Satie∣ty, Ebriety, Security, Tranquility, but the name of the seventh (they say) is known only to God.

28. I shall not stand to examine the Scale of this Division, perhaps there may be a kind of a Pythagoric Superstition in the number. But this I think I may affirm in general, that the Soul may be wound up to a most strange degree of Abstraction by a silent and steddy Contempla∣tion of God. Plato defines Contemplation to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Solu∣tion and a Separation of the Soul from the Bo∣dy. And some of the severer Platonists have been of Opinion, that 'tis possible for a Man by mere intention of thought not only to with∣draw the Soul from all commerce with the Senses, but even really to separate it from the Body, to untwist the Ligaments of his Frame, and by degrees to resolve himself into the State of the Dead. And thus the Jews express the manner of the Death of Moses, calling it Os∣culum Oris Dei, the Kiss of God's Mouth. That is, that he breath'd out his Soul by the mere

Strength and Energy of Contemplation, and ex∣pired in the Embraces of his Maker. A Hap∣py way of Dying! How ambitious should I be of such a conveyance, were it practicable? How passionately should I joyn with the Church in the Canticles? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Let him Kiss me with the Kisses of his Mouth. Cant. 1. 2.

29. But however this be determin'd, certain it is, that there are exceeding great Measures of Abstraction in Contemplation, so great, that somtimes whether a Man be in the Body or out of the Body, he himsel can hardly tell. And consequently the Soul in these Praeludiums of Death, these Neighbourhoods of Separation, must needs have brighter glimpses, and more Beati∣fic Ideas of God, than in a state void of these Elevations, and consequently must love him with greater Ardency. Which is the next thing I am to consider.

30. The love of God in general may be con∣sidered either as it is purely intellectual, or as it is a Passion. The first is, when the Soul, upon an apprehension of God as a good, delectable, and agreeable Object, joyns her self to him by the Will. The latter is, when the motion of the Will is accompany'd with a sensible Com∣motion of the Spirits, and an estuation of the Blood. Some I know are of Opinion, that 'tis not possible for a man to be affected with this sensitive Love of God, which is a Passion, be∣cause

there is nothing in God which falls under our imagination, and consequently (the imagi∣nation being the only Medium of conveyance) it cannot be propagated from the Intellectual part to the Sensitive. Whereupon they affirm, that none are capable of this sensitive passion∣ate Love of God but Christians, who enjoy the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereby they know God has condescended so far as to cloath him∣self with Flesh, and to become like one of us. But 'tis not all the Sophistry of the cold Logi∣cians that shall work me out of the belief of what I feel and know, and rob me of the sweet∣est entertainment of my Life, the Passionate Love of God. Whatever some Men pretend, who are Strangers to all the affectionate heats of Religion, and therefore make their Philosophy a Plea for their indevotion, and extinguish all Holy Ardours with a Syllogism; yet I am firm∣ly persuaded, that our love of God may be not only passionate, but even Wonderfully so, and exceeding the Love of Women. 'Tis an Experi∣mental and therefore undeniable Truth, that Passion is a great Instrument of Devotion, and accordingly we find, that Men of the most warm and pathetick Tempers and Amorous Com∣plexions (Provided they have but Consideration enough withall to fix upon the right Object) prove the greatest Votaries in Religion. And upon this account it is, that to heighten our Love of God in our Religious Addresses, we en∣deavour

to excite our Passions by Music, which would be to as little purpose as the Fanatic thinks 'tis, if there were not such a thing as the Passionate Love of God. But then as to the Ob∣jection, I Answer with the excellent Descartes, that although in God who is the Object of our Love, we can imagine nothing, yet we can ima∣gine that our Love, which consists in this, that we would unite our selves to the Object beloved, and consider our selves as it were a part of it. And the sole Idea of this very Conjunction is e∣nough to stir up a heat about the Heart, and so kindle a very vehement Passion. To which I add, that although the Beauty or Amiableness of God be not the same with that which we see in Corporeal Beings, and consequently cannot di∣rectly fall within the Sphere of the imagination, yet it is somthing Analogous to it, and that ve∣ry Analogy is enough to excite a Passion. And this I think sufficient to warrant my general division of the Love of God into Intellectual and Sensitive.

31. But there is a more peculiar Acceptation of the Love of God proper to this place. And it is that which we call Seraphic. By which I understand in short, that Love of God which is the effect of an intense Contemplation of him. This differs not from the other in kind, but on∣ly in degree, and that it does exceedingly, in as much as the thoughtful Contemplative Man (as I hinted before) has clearer Perceptions and live∣lier

Impressions of the Divine Beauty, the lovely Attributes and Perfection of God, than he whose Soul is more deeply set in the Flesh, and lies groveling in the bottom of the Dungeon.

32. That the nature of this Seraphic Love may be the better understood, I shall consider how many degrees there may be in the Love of God. And I think the Computation of Bellarmin, lib. 2. de monachis, cap. 2. is accurate enough. He makes four. The first is to love God propor∣tionably to his Loveliness, that is, with an infi∣nite Love; and this degree is peculiar to God himself. The second is to Love him, not pro∣portionably to his Loveliness, but to the utmost Capacity of a Creature, and this degree is pecu∣liar to Saints and Angels in Heaven. The third is to love him not proportionably to his Loveli∣ness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Creature, absolutely consider'd; but to the utmost capa∣city of a Mortal Creature in this Life. And this (he says) is proper to the Religious. The fourth is to love him not proportionably to his Loveliness, nor to the utmost capacity of a Crea∣ture, consider'd either absolutely or with respect to this Life, but only so as to love nothing e∣qually with him or above him. That is, not to do any thing contrary to the Divine Love. And this is absolute indispensable duty, less than which will not qualify us for the enjoyment of God hereafter.

33. Now this Seraphic Love which we here discourse of is in the third degree: When a Man, after many degrees of Abstraction from the Animal Life, many a profound and steddy Meditation upon the Excellencies of God, sees such a vast Ocean of Beauty and Perfection in him, that he loves him to the utmost stretch of his Power; When he sits under his shadow with great delight, and his fruit is sweet to his Tast. Cant. 2. 3. When he Consecrates and Devotes him∣self whollly to him, and has no Passion for In∣feriour Objects. When he is ravished with the delights of his Service, and breaths out some of his Soul to him in every Prayer. When he is delighted with Anthems of Praise and Adora∣tion more than with Marrow and Fatness, and Feasts upon Alleluiah. When he melts in a Ca∣lenture of Devotion, and his Soul breaketh out with fervent Desire, Psal. 119. When the one thing he delights in is to converse with God in the Beauty of Holiness, and the one thing he desires to see him as he is in Heaven. This is Se∣raphic Love, and this with Contemplation makes up that which the Mystic Divines stile the Ʋni∣tive way of Religion: It is called so because it Unites us to God in the most excellent manner that we are capable of in this Life. By Union here I do not understand that which is local or presential, because I consider God as Omnipre∣sent. Neither do I mean a Union of Grace (as they call it) whereby we are reconciled to

God, or a Union of Charity, whereof it is said, he that dwelleth in love, dwelleth in God and God in him, Jo. 4. 16. The first of these being as common to the inanimate things as to the most Extasi'd Soul upon Earth. And the two last be∣ing common to all good men, who indeed love God, but yet want the excellency of Contempla∣tion and the Mystic Union. The Union then which I here speak of, is that which is between the Faculty and the Object. Which consists in some Habitude or Operation of one toward the other. The Faculties here are the Ʋnder∣standing and Will, the Object God, and the O∣perations Contemplation and Love. The result of which two is the Mystic Ʋnion. Which, ac∣cording to this complex Notion of it that I have here delivered, is thus most admirably represented by the excellent Bishop Taylour. It is (says he) a Prayer of quietness and silence, and a Meditation extraordinary,* 1.7 a Discourse without variety, a Vision and Intuition of Divine Excellencies, an im∣mediat entry into an Orb of light, and a resolu∣lution of all our Faculties into Sweetness, Affe∣ctions, and Starings upon the Divine Beauty. And is carried on to Extasies, Raptures, Suspen∣sions, Elevations, Abstractions and Apprehensions beatifical.

34. I make no doubt but that many an ho∣nest Pious Soul arrives to the heavenly Canaan, who is not fed with this Manna in the Wilder∣ness.

But though every one must not expect these Antepasts of Felicity that is vertuous, yet none else must. Paradise was never open but to a State of Innocence. But neither is that enough. No, this Mount of God's Presence is fenced not only from the profane, but also from the moderately vertuous. 'Tis the Privi∣ledge of Angelical Dispositions, and the Re∣ward of eminent Piety and an excellent Re∣ligion, to be admitted to these Divine Repasts, these Feasts of love. And here I place the greatest Happiness attainable by Man in this Life, as being the nearest Approach to the State of the Blessed above, the outer Court of Heaven.

35. These (Sir) are my thoughts concern∣ing Happiness. I might have spun them out into a greater length, but I think a little Plot of ground thick-sown is better than a great Field which for the most part of it lies Fallow. I have endeavour'd to deliver my Notions with as much Perspicuity and in as good Me∣thod as I could, and so to answer all the ends of Copiousness, with the advantage of a short∣er Cut. If I appear singular in any of my No∣tions, 'tis not out of an industrious affectation of Novelty, but because in the composing of this discourse (the Meditation of a few broken hours in a Garden) I consulted more my own experimental Notices of things and private Reflections than the Writings of others. So

that if somtimes I happen to be in the Road, and somtimes in a way by my self, 'tis no won∣der. I affect neither the one nor the other, but write as I think. Which as I do at other times, so more especially when I subscribe my self

SIR,

Yours most affectionately, J. N.

All-Souls Colledge Apr. 18. 1683.

Notes

• * 1.1

  lib. 3. de Fin.
• * 1.2

  Revel. 26.
• * 1.3

  Job 28.
• * 1.4

  Enn. 6. lib. 9. cap. 10.
• * 1.5

  Exod. 33. 18.
• * 1.6

  Rev. 1. 8.
• * 1.7

  The Great Exemplar, pag. 60.