Christian blessedness, or, Discourses upon the beatitudes of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ written by John Norris ... ; to which is added, reflections upon a late essay concerning human understanding, by the same author.

Cursory Reflections upon a Book call'd, An Essay concerning Human Understanding.

SIR,

YOU obliged me so highly by acquainting me with the Publi∣cation of so rare a Curiosity as Mr. Lock's Book, that should I dispute your Commands when you desire my Opini∣on of it, I should hazard the Credit of my Gratitude, as much as by my ill discharging them I am like to do that of my Judgment. This, Sir, already reduces me to an even Poise. But to this the just Authority you have over me, and the Right your other Obliga∣tions give you to all the Service I can do, being added, and thrown into the Scale, do quite weigh it down, and leave no room for any Deliberation, whether I should obey you or no. Without therefore any further Demur or Delay I shall apply my self to the

Task you set me, in giving you my Free Censure of Mr. Lock's Essay, which I shall do by reflecting upon what I think most liable to Exception in the same Order as the things lie before me.

Introduct. Pag. 1. Sect. 1. The Vnder∣standing like the Eye, whilest it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of it self. What the Ingenious Author intends in this Period, or how to make out any consistent Sense of it, I do not understand. For if his mean∣ing be, That the Understanding while it is intent upon other things, cannot at that time take notice of it self; this comes to no more, than that when 'tis intent upon one thing it cannot attend to another, which is too easily and obviously true of all Finite Powers to be any great Discovery. But if his meaning be (as it rather seems, because of the Particle (All) and the Compa∣rison here used) that the Understanding like the Eye, tho it maks us see all o∣ther things, yet it takes no notice of it self, then 'tis a Contradiction to his whole following Work, which upon this Supposition must needs be very un∣accountably undertaken.

Introduct. Pag. 2. Sect. 3. First I shall enquire into the Original of those Ideas which a Man observes, &c. But sure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Ori∣gination. For how can any Proposi∣tion be form'd with any certainty con∣cerning an Idea, that it is or is not Innate, that it does or does not come in at the Senses, before the meaning of the Word Idea be stated, and the nature of the thing, at least in general, be understood? If the Nature of Ideas were but once made known, our Di∣sputes would quickly be at an end con∣cerning their Original, whether from the Senses or not: But till that be done, all further Discourse about them is but to talk in the Dark. This there∣fore ought to have been his first, and indeed main Business to have given us an account of the Nature of Ideas. And yet this is not only neglected in its proper place, but wholly omitted and passed over in deep silence; which

I cannot but remark, as a Fundamental defect in this Work.

In the three following Chapters our Author sets himself to prove that there are no Innate Principles. But before I consider whether there be or no, I pre∣mise this double Remarque. First, That a thing may be false in it self, and yet not so because, or in vertue of such an Argument. Secondly, That tho a thing be really false, yet it may not become such a Man to deny the Existence of it, who by some other Principles of his may be obliged to hold the contrary. The first of these argues the Writer guilty of Inconse∣quence. The Second of Inconsistency. Upon both which Accounts this other∣wise very ingenious Writer seems in this part to be chargeable. Which from the Sequel I leave to be col∣lected.

His First Argument against Innate Principles is taken from the want of Universal Consent. There are, says he, Pag. 5. Sect. 4. No Principles to which all Mankind give an universal Assent. But in the first place how can this Au∣thor

say so, since in several places af∣terwards he resolves that Ready and prone Assent which is given to certain Propositions upon the first Proposal, into the Self-evidence of them? There are then even according to him Self∣evident Propositions. And will he say that Self-evident Propositions are not universally assented to? How then are they Self-evident? There must be therefore, according to him, some Principles to which all Mankind do give an universal Consent. I do not say that this proves them Innate, but only that there are such Propositions.

Well, but how does he prove there are no such? why, he instances in some of the most Celebrated, and says pag. 5. Sect. 5. that All Children and Ideots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy universal consent. Now I al∣ways thought that Universality of Con∣sent had been sufficiently secured by the Consent of all, and the Dissent of none that were capable of either. And what then have we to do with Ideots and Children? Do any or all of these Dissent or think otherwise? No,

that he will not say, because they think not at all, having (as he says) not the least Apprehension or Thought of them. And how then does the want of their Snffrage destroy universal Consent, when all Persons that think at all about such Propositions, think after one and the same way?

The most therefore that this Au∣thor can mean by want of Universal Consent, is that every individual Per∣son does not actually Assent. This per∣haps may be granted him from the Instance of Ideots and Children. But then the Question will be about the Consequence of his Argument, whether Actual Assent from every Individual be necessary to the Supposition of Innate Principles? Or, in other Words, whe∣ther from there not being any Proposi∣tions to which every individual Man gives an actual Assent, it follows that there are no Innate Truths. The Au∣thor is of Opinion that it does. For, says he, pag. 5. Sect. 5. It seems to me near a Contradiction to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not. And again in the same place, To imprint any thing

on the Mind, without the Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. And again, p. 12. Sect. 24. That a Truth should be Innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time. Here we have both the Conse∣quence of the Author, and the Ground upon which it stands. The Consequence is this. If there be no Truths actually perceiv'd by all Minds, then there are none naturally imprinted. The Proof of it is this. 'Tis impossible that what is imprinted on the Mind, should not be perceiv'd by the Mind. Therefore if there be no Truths actually perceiv'd by all Minds, there are none naturally imprinted. Now on the contrary to this I thus oppose. If there may be Im∣pressions made on the Mind, whereof we are not conscious, or which we do not perceive, then (by the Authors own measure) the not perception of them is no Argument against such Ori∣ginal Impressions. The Consequence is unexceptionable, not only as clear in it self, but as being the very Reverse of the Autho••'s own Argument. And now that there may be such Impressions whereof we are not Conscious, is what

the Author himself expresly does own, and what by his Principles he stands obliged to own.

First, 'tis what he does expresly own. For, says he, p. 38. Sect. 6. Being sur∣rounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect us, variety of Idea's, whe∣ther care be taken about it or no, are im∣printed on the minds of Children. And yet they do not perceive them, as he had said before. Therefore by his own Confession there may be an Im∣pression of Ideas where there is no Perception. The same he confesses again, p. 61. Sect. 4. How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employ'd in the contem∣plation of some Objects, and curiously sur∣veying some Ideas that are there, it takes no notice of Impressions, &c. And again, Sect. 5. I doubt not but Children by the exercise of their Senses about Objects that affect them in the Womb, receive some few Ideas before they are born, &c. And if before they are born, then certainly before they are conscious of them. There may therefore be Impression without Consciousness. Which he also plainly implies in his Account of Me∣mory.

Which he does not make to be a recovery of Ideas that were Lost, but a Re-advertency or Re-application of Mind to Ideas that are actually there, tho' not attended to. For, says he, p. 65. Sect. 2. The narrow mind of man not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of. And accordingly p. 66. Sect. 7. He calls them Ideas which are lodg'd in the memory. And pag. 67 Sect. 8. He calls them Dormant Ideas. So that according to him to remember is to retrieve, not the Ideas themselves, (for they are supposed to lie Dormant in the Mind) but only the Perception or Consciousness of them. This he makes to be the business of Memory, and therefore there may be an imprint∣ing of Ideas without Actual Perception, which may now, it seems, stand well enough together without any danger of a Contradiction.

And to the Acknowledgment of this, his own Principles will also oblige him. For since in conformity to the Aristotelian Philosophy, 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 all

our Ideas to be derived from our Senses, or rather by our Senses from sensible Objects, he must needs sup∣pose (considering the variety of sensi∣ble Objects wherewith we are sur∣rounded) that there are infinitely more Ideas impress'd upon our Minds than we can possibly attend to or per∣ceive. Which may also be argued from the Finiteness of our Faculties, as was hinted in the beginning.

Well then, since there may be an Impression of Ideas without any actual Perception of them, whether there be any Innate Ideas or no (which I shall not now dispute) it does not there∣fore follow that there are none, be∣cause thy are not universally perceiv'd. Which utterly silences that Argument taken from the Non-perception of them in Children. And since our Au∣thor both does, and is by his Principles obliged to allow that there are many Ideas impress'd upon us when we have no actual Perception of them, it does not certainly become him, tho there were really no such thing as Innate Ideas; and tho the Non-perception of them were an Argument against them,

to bring this as an Argument against the Existence of any such, because they are not universally perceiv'd. This is not to agree with himself, however he may agree with Truth.

Our ingenious Author further argues against Innate Principles from the Late∣ness of the Perception of such which are presumed to be of that number, in that they are not the first that pos∣sess the Minds of Children. Can it be imagin'd (says he, pag. 13. Sect. 25.) that they perceive the Impression from things without, and are at the same time ignorant of those Characters which Nature it self has taken care to stamp within? This I take to be a very uncertain way of arguing, and of less Cogency than the Former. For if Nullity of Per∣ception will not conclude against In∣nate Principles, much less will the Late∣ness of Perception be able to do it. And besides, there may be many Rea∣sons drawn from the inward, and to us unknown Contexture of our Minds, and from the manner of that Original Impression (if any such there be) which would also be to us equally un∣known, besides the Order of External 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

that they are not consented to by all that judge any thing about them; If the former, that proves nothing, as we have shewn already; If the latter, then I deny the Proposition, and af∣firm that there are not only as Certain but as Vncontested Propositions in Mo∣rality as in any other Science. But our Author demands, Pag. 15. Sect. 2. Where is that Practical Truth that is uni∣versally received? I answer by refer∣ring him to the 274 Page of his own Book, where he says Sect. 18. That this Proposition, Where there is no Proprie∣ty there is no Injustice, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid; I add and as plain too. It needing nothing to assure the Truth of it but only the Explication of the Terms And I further remarque that in the same place he says that Morali∣ty may be placed among the Sciences capable of Demonstration. Well then, if there may be Propositions demon∣strated in Morality, then those Propo∣sitions must at last be resolved into Principles evident and incontestable. Since otherwise there can be no De∣monstration. There are therefore in∣contestable Principles in Morality. And

he confesses as much in express terms; I doubt not, says he in the same place, but from Principles as incontestable as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences, the measures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one, &c. Here he expresly owns incon∣testable Principles in Morality, that is, incontestable Truths, that is, Truths that cannot be denied, and therefore must be assented to. And how then can he with any tolerable Self-Con∣sistency say that there are no Mo∣ral Principles universally consented to? If none are universally consen∣ted to, then all are by some contested. And yet he says there are in Mora∣lity incontestable Principles. How to adjust this I no more know, than he does to reconcile Morality and Mechanism.

His next Argument is, That there cannot any one Moral Rule be proposed whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason, Pag. 16. Sect. 4. Well, what then? Therefore they are not Innate. I do not see the Consequence. Why may not the same Proposition be Innate, and yet deducible from Rea∣son

too, as well as the same Proposi∣tion be the Object of both Faith and Science? Why may not Conclusions be Innate as well as Principles? Why may not God be supposed for a fur∣ther Security of our Vertue to implant even those Practical Propositions up∣on our Minds, which are also capa∣ble of being demonstrated from Prin∣ciples of Reason? Whether he has so done or no I do not dispute; I only say that their Dependence on Rea∣son is no Argument that he has not.

He argues again, Pag. 18. Sect. 9. from Mens transgressing these Moral Rules with Confidence and Serenity, which he says they could not do, were they Innate. I do not apprehend here the least Appearance of a Consequence. Why may not an Innate Law be trans∣gress'd as well as a Written Law? An Innate Law only dictates that such a thing ought or ought not to be done, and so does a Written Law. He might therefore as well have concluded that there is no Written Law because it is Transgress'd, as that there is no Innate Law because it is Transgress'd.

The Author seems to have been sen∣sible of the Weakness of this Argu∣ment, and therefore to strengthen it, says he, Pag. 19. Sect. 12. The break∣ing of a Rule say you is no Argument that it is unknown; I grant it, But the generally allow'd Breach of it any where, is a Proof that it is not Innate. Here I remarque by the way that he grants that the Breaking of a Law does not prove it not known, and why then should it prove it not Innate? If a known Law may be transgressed, why may not an Innate Law; Innate being only another way of being known? But says he, The generally allow'd Breach of it proves it not Innate. I do not see the Necessity of this neither. The allow'd Breach of a Law is only a more aggravated Breach of it, and if the Breach of a Law does not prove it not to be Innate, why should the allow'd Breach of it do so? And besides, why may not an Innate Law be Al∣lowedly broken as well as a Written Law?

But says our Author, Pag. 21. Sect. 14. Did Men find such Innate Propositions

stamp'd on their Minds, they would be easily able to distinguish them from other Truths, and there would be nothing more easie than to know what and how many they were. Perhaps not so very easie. For I see no absurdity in Supposing, and tis what I can very well conceive, that a Man may be sensible of a Truth impress'd, and yet not of the Impression, and so may not know that it is im∣press'd, but think it came some other way, and consequently may not be able to distinguish it from some other that does so. The truth of this may be seen in the Instance of Inspiration. Since there have been Prophets (Caia∣phas * 1.1 for one) who were not able to distinguish Divine Inspirations from their own proper genuin Thoughts. 'Tis therefore no Consequence to say that there are no Innate Principles, because we cannot distinguish them.

These are the main Arguments, and to which all that is further offered may be reduced, whereby this Author im∣pugns the Doctrin of Innate Principles; and I think neither any nor all of them are sufficient for the Cause wherein they are ingaged. And I am so far from

being surprized at their Deficiency, that I think it absolutely impossible for him or any Man else upon his Principles, to prove that there are no Innate Truths. For since with those of the Peripatetic School he allows that Ideas are impress'd upon the Mind from sen∣sible Objects, he cannot (as another might) object against the Possibility of such Impressions. He cannot say they are capable only of a Figurative and Metaphorical Sense; Since according to him the same is litterally and real∣ly done every Day, every Hour, every Minute. No, he must grant that 'tis possible there may be such Impressi∣ons. All the Question then will be concerning the Timing of it, whether any of these Impressions be Original Characters or no! And why may they not be at first as well as after∣wards? How can he or any man else tell (upon his Principles) whether the Author of Nature has imprinted any such or no? Or whether we brought any with us into the World or no? However that be, I am sa∣tisfy'd 'tis impossible for any man that holds Mental Impressions to prove the contrary; especially if with that he

allows the Possibility of Preexistence, which I believe no considering Man will say is Impossible.

For my part, I do as little believe there are any such things as Innate Principles strictly and properly so cal∣led, meaning by them certain Original Characters written upon or interwo∣ven with the Mind in the very first Moment of its Being and Constitu∣tion, I say I do as little believe this as the Author himself. Not for the Reasons by him alledged, with the Cogency of which I am not satisfy'd, but because I do not allow any such thing as Mental Impressions, or Cha∣racters written upon the mind, which if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor, I take to be mere Jargon, and unintelligible Cant. You know Sir I account for the Mode of Human Vnderstanding after a very different way, namely, by the Pre∣sentialness of the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Ideal World to our Souls, wherein we see and perceive all things. For a fuller account of which I refer you to my Reason and Religion, and to my Re∣flections lately publish'd. I cannot

therefore by my Principles admit of any such Innate Characters in a strict and proper Sense. Only I may, and am also inclined to admit something of near Analogy with it. Supposing that God may and does exhibt some parti∣cular Truths of the Ideal World more early, more clearly, and more con∣stantly to the view of the Soul than others, that by these she may be the better directed to the Good of the Reasonable Life, as Animals by sensi∣tive Instincts and Inclinations are to the Good of Sense. This is all that I con∣ceive to be strictly either Possible or True in that grey-headed venerable Doctrin of Innate or Common Prin∣ciples.

Having thus far considered our Au∣thor's Impugnation of Innate Princi∣ples, I come now to examin the Ori∣ginal which he gives to Ideas. These he derives Book 2. Chap. 1. from this double Fountain, Sensation and Re∣flection. Especially from the Former, telling us again and again, that the Senses let in Ideas and furnish the yet empty Cabinet, Pag. 8. Sect 15. That the Senses convey into the mind several di∣stinct

Perceptions of things, Pag. 37. Sect. 3. And that the Senses do fur∣nish the Soul with Ideas to think on, Pag. 44. Sect. 20. with many other such Expressions.

These indeed are pretty Smiling Sentences. But before we go a Step further I would willingly know of the Author what kind of things these Ideas are which are thus let in at the Gate of the Senses. This indeed I expected an Account of in the beginning of the Work; but since the Author has been pleased to cast a Shade upon this Part, I now demand, what are these Ideas? Why you shall know that presently. Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate Object of Percep∣tion, that I call Idea, says he, pag. 55. sect. 8. Very good; So much my Lexi∣con would have told me. But this does not satisfy. I would know what kind of things he makes these Ideas to be as to their Essence or Nature. Are they in the first place Real Beings or not? Without doubt Real Beings, as having Real Properties, and really dif∣ferent one from another, and represen∣ting things really different. Well, if

Real Beings, then I demand, are they Substances, or are they Modifications of Substances? He will not say they are Modifications. For besides that a Modification of Substance cannot be a Representative of a Substance, there being no manner of likeness between a Substance and a Mode; if an Idea be a Modification only it cannot subsist by it self, but must be the Modifica∣tion of some Substance or other, where∣of also there may be an Idea; which Idea being (as is supposed) only a Mode, must have another Substance, and so on without end. As for example, If my Idea of Figure be only a Mode, then it must have a Substance wherein to exist as well as Figure it self, which cannot exist alone; and since of that Substance whatever it be, there may be also an Idea, which is supposed to be a Modification, this Idea must also have another Substance, and so on to Infinity. He will not therefore, I sup∣pose, say that our Ideas are Modifica∣tions.

He must then say that they are Sub∣stances. Are they then Material Sub∣stances or Immaterial? If he says they

are Material Substances or Corporeal Emanations from sensible Objects, I would desire him to weigh with him∣self, and try if he can answer, what is * 1.2 alledged by M. Malebranch against the Possibility of such Emanations. Par∣ticularly, let him tell me how this can consist with the Impenetrability of Bo∣dies, which must needs hinder these Corporeal Essluvias from possessing the same Vbi or Point, which yet must be supposed, if these be the Representers of Objects, since there is no assignable Point where the same, and where mul∣titudes of Objects may not be seen. This one Difficulty is enough to make this way impassable. But let him fur∣ther tell me how any Body can eradi∣ate such an inconceivable Number of these Effluvias so as to fill every Point of such vast Spaces, without the least sensible Diminution. Well, but sup∣pose they could, let him tell me how these Corporeal Effluvias, sometimes of vast Extent and Magnitude, can enter the Fye; Or if they could, how they can do it in such Troops and Numbers without justling, refring∣ing, and inverting one another. Or if this might be avoided, where shall we

find room to receive such a numerous Company of Corporeal Images? And upon what part will you have them impressed? Upon the Soul? or upon the Brain? But who can understand either of these? How can an Indivi∣sible Substance, as the Soul is, receive any Stamp or Impression? And how can such a fluid Substance as the Brain is, retain any? The least jog of a Mans Head must needs obliterate such slight and Aerial Traces, as the Wind does the Figures that are written upon the Sand; Not to say that these Im∣pressions coming on so thick one up∣on another must needs work out them∣selves almost assoon as they are in, and in a short time consume the very Brain too. But suppose we could get over all this, yet the greatest Difficulty is yet behind; How will such Corporeal Effluvias be able to represent immate∣rial and intellectual Objects? They will at the most be able but to repre∣sent Material Objects, and not all of them neither, but only those whose E∣manations they are. And what shall we do with Ideas that will not do their Office, that cannot represent a quarter of the things which we are concern'd to understand?

These and a thousand more Absur∣dities must he wade through that will assert our Ideas to be Corporeal Efflu∣vias derived from external Objects. It remains then that they must be Imma∣terial Substances. And so without all question they are. All of them as to their Essence, and most of them as to their Representation. But how shall Bodies send forth such Immaterial Spe∣cies? They can emit nothing but what is Corporeal, like themselves. How then shall they commence Immaterial? Body can no more emit Spirit, than it can create it. And what is there after Emission that shall be the Principle of Transformation? Some I know talk of strange Feats done by the Dexterity of Intellectus Agens and Patiens, which they say refine and spiritualize these Material Phantasms; but I suppose our Author is of too Philosophical a Faith to admit of such a Romantick Tran∣substantiation.

The short of this Argument is, If our Ideas are derived from sensible Objects, then they are Material Beings, because Matter can send forth nothing

but Matter. But they are not Materi∣al Beings, for the Reasons alledg'd a∣bove. Therefore they are not derived from Sensible Objects. Which I think has the force of Demonstration. And to this purpose it may be further con∣sider'd (what I hinted before) that as our Ideas are all of them Immaterial as to their Essence and Substance, so many, perhaps most of them, are also immaterial as to their Representation, that is, they represent after an imma∣terial manner, as the Ideas of Truth, Vertue, and the like, which Cartesius * 1.3 makes to be the difference between Imagination and Pure Intellection, and whereof he gives an Instance in the Example of a Chiliagon, whose Angles we cannot represent in a distinct View, but may clearly understand it. But now how can that which represents after an immaterial manner come from sensible Objects? Again, we have Ideas of things that are not to be found in the Material and Sensible World, as of a Right Line, or an exact Circle, which our Author himself confesses, pag. 283. Sect. 6. not to be really extant in Na∣ture. And what does he think of the Idea of God? Will he say that that is

also derived from sensible Objects? Yes: For, says he, pag. 147. Sect. 33. If we examin the Idea we have of the In∣comprehensible Supreme Being, we shall find that we come by it the same way, that is, by Sensation. But in the first place, how does this agree with what he says, pag. 341. Sect. 2. That we have the know∣ledge of the existence of all things without us (except only of God) by our senses? So then it seems we do not know the Existence of God by our Senses. No? then neither have we the Idea of him by our Senses. For if we had, why should we not know his Existence by Sensation as well as the Existence of other things, which, as he says, we know only by Sensation? For, says he, pag. 311. Sect. 2. speaking of the know∣ledge of Existence, We have the know∣ledge of our own existence by Intuition, of the existence of God by Demonstration, and of other things by Sensation. Then it seems we do not know the Existence of God by Sensation, but that of other things we do. But why are other things known by Sensation, but only because their Ideas come in at our Senses? For I suppose he will not say that the things themselves come in at

our Senses; for then what need is there of Ideas at all? And if other things are therefore known by Sensation, be∣cause their Ideas come in by the Senses, then why is not God also known by Sensation, forasmuch as his Idea ac∣cording to him, comes also the same way? and yet he will not allow that God's Existence is known by Sensation; Which indeed is very true, but then he should not have said that the Idea of God comes in by the Senses.

But what a strange Adventure is it in Philosophy to make the Idea of God to come in by our Senses, and to be derived from Sensible Objects! For be∣sides the Difficulties and Absurdities already touch't upon, what is there in the Material World that can resem∣ble God? Nay, what is there in the whole Creation that can represent him to our Thoughts? God himself cannot make an Idea of himself: For such an Idea, what-ever it be, must be a Creature; and can a Creature re∣present God! Nothing certainly but God himself can do that. He must be his own Idea, or he can have none. There is but one possible Idea of God, and that is his Son, the Divine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

or Ideal World, the brightness of his Glory, and the express Image or Cha∣racter of his Person. 'Tis he that is the Idea of God, and of the whole Cre∣ation, that both is, and represents all things. And since the way of know∣ledge by our Senses turns to so poor an Account, I would desire our most Ingenious Author to consider, whe∣ther it be not abundantly more ratio∣nal and intelligible (not to say pious) to suppose that we see all things in God, or the Divine Ideas, that is, in the partial Representations of the Di∣vine Omniformity. For our Author himself confesses, pag. 315. Sect. 10. that Whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least all the Perfections that can ever after exist. Nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it has not, either actually in it self, or at least in an higher degree. God then, even accord∣ing to him, is all Beings; or, has the whole Plenitude of Being. And I wonder that this Principle had not led this Sagacious Person further. I know whither it would have carried him, if he had follow'd the Clue of it. For why should we seek any further, and

puzzle our selves with unintelligible Suppositions? What else need, and what else can be the immediate Object of our Understanding but the Divine Ideas, the Omniform Essence of God? This will open to us a plain intelligible Account of Human Vnderstanding, yea of Angelical and Divine too. Here I can tell what an Idea is, viz. the Om∣niform Essence of God partially repre∣sented or exhibited, and how it comes to be united to my Mind. But as for all other ways, I look upon them to be desperate. But these things are al∣ready by me purposely discours'd of elsewhere, and are also further to be * 1.4 deduc'd in my Theory of the Ideal World.

Having thus far reflected upon the two Principal Parts of this Work con∣cerning Innate Principles, and the Ori∣gin of Ideas, in a continued way of Discourse, all that further remains is now to consider only some few single Passages as they stand by themselves.

Pag. 16. Sect. 3. Practical Principles must produce Conformity of Action, or else they are in vain distinguished from Speculative Maxims. 'Tis enough to

distinguish them from Speculative Max∣ims, if they are in order to Action, that is, if they are concerning such things as may and ought to be done by us, tho in the event they do not produce any such Conformity. O∣therwise a Law would not be a Law till 'tis obey'd.

Pag. 57. Sect. 15. There is nothing like our Ideas existing in the Bodies themselves. They are in the Bodies only a Power to produce those Sensations in us. The first part I acknowledge to be true: For certainly Heat in the Fire is no way resembling what I call Heat in my self, meaning by it either such a grateful or ungrateful Sensation as I feel, when I approach the Fire more or less. But the latter Clause I cannot approve, thinking it impossible that any Body should directly and properly produce any Sensation in my Soul. 'Tis God certainly that is the Author of all my Sensations, as well as of my Ideas. Bodies can only be Conditions or Oc∣casional Causes of them.

Pag. 158. Sect. 10. Speaking of the Law of Vertue and Vice, says he, If we ex∣amin it right, we shall find that the measure of what is every where call'd and esteemed

Vertue and Vice, is the Approbation or Dislike, Praise or Dispraise which by a secret and tacit consent establishes it self in the several Societies of Men, &c. Praise or Dispraise may be a probable Sign, or secondary Measure, but it can never be the primary Measure or Law of Vertue and Vice; whose difference must be founded upon more certain and immutable grounds of Distin∣ction than the Praise or Dispraise of Men. For Praise or Dispraise does not make, but suppose the difference of Vertue and Vice as already set∣led, and antecedent to it. A thing is not good because 'tis praised, but is therefore praised because 'tis good. And how comes this Praise or Dis∣praise to be establish'd by such a secret and tacit consent, if there be not some other more certain measure of Good and Evil, according to which our Praise or Dispraise is to proceed?

Pag. 185. Sect. 5. I doubt not but if we could trace them to their Originals, we should find in all Languages the Names which stand for things that fall not under our Senses, to have had their first rise from sensible Ideas. Let him tell me

what he thinks of the Word (Although) Has he not a clear Conception of what is meant by that Word? And yet is there any thing of a Material Relation under it? I the rather instance in this Word, tho' I might instance in a thou∣sand more, because I have read of a Man (I think the Relation is in Dr. Cud∣worth's Intellectual System) that was of our Author's Mind, that there was no Word but what ultimately stood for something material and sensible, and was convinc'd of the contrary by light∣ing upon the first Word of Tully's Offices, which is Quanquam.

Pag. 196. Sect. 19. The Doctrin of the Immutability of Essences proves them only to be abstract Ideas, and is founded on the Relation that is establish'd between them and certain Sounds as signs of them. True indeed with respect to us, who because we do not know all the Es∣sences of things, must be supposed to make that only the Essence which we intend to signifie by calling it by such a Name. But I hope notwithstanding this, the Author will allow that there are also in reality Immutable Essences of things, independent on our Con∣ceptions,

as may appear in Mathemati∣cal Figures. Where the Nominal Es∣sence and the Real Essence are all one.

Pag. 205. Sect. 9. He tells us that Es∣sences are only Artifices of the Vnder∣standing. 'Tis true, those Collections of simple Ideas which we bind up toge∣ther under one Name, which he else∣where calls Nominal Essences, are only Creatures of the Understanding; but as I said before, there are also deter∣minate Essences in the things them∣selves, tho for the most to us unknown, which have a fix'd and immutable Na∣ture without any dependance on any Understanding but the Divine. 'Tis true indeed, we are fain to sort and rank things by their Nominal Essences, because the Real Ones are most times unknown; but that is no Argument against the Being of real Essences. And this is by the Author himself confess'd, pag. 234. Sect. 11. where he says that in our Ideas of substances we have not the Liberty as in mix'd modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit, to rank things by, but must follow Nature, and suit our Complex Ideas to real Existencies. So that here we have Patterns to follow, and I desire no more.

Pag. 242. Sect. 6. Were the significa∣tion of Body and Extension precisely the same, it would be as proper and intelli∣gible to say the Body of an Extension, as the Extension of a Body. Here he supposes it would be proper, to say the Extension of a Body upon that Sup∣position, whereas indeed were they precisely the same; neither of them would be proper.

Pag. 244. Sect. 14. The Platonists have their Soul of the World, the Epicu∣reans their Endeavour towards Motion, &c. These the Author reckons among unintelligible Forms of Speech, and supposes them to be no better than Gibberish. As to the Soul of the World 'tis a Subject of too great a Latitude to be discours'd of at present. But as to the Epicureans Endeavour towards Motion, that there is such a thing, he may be sufficiently convinc'd by look∣ing upon a pair of Scales, where tho the lesser Weight does not actually weigh down, yet that it presses and endeavours toward it is most certain, since otherwise as much Weight would be required to weigh it down as if it

were quite empty. But this we do not find; whence it must of necessity be concluded that the former Weight tho it did not pass into actual Motion, yet it did something toward it, that is, it Endeavoured. The same might also be illustrated from the Actions of the Will, some of which are perfect and compleat Determinations, others only Velleities or Endeavours. But if the Au∣thor would be further satisfied in this Matter, I desire him to read the 19 and 20 Chapter of Dr. Glisson, de Natura Substantiae Energetica, where he will find this Argument very curiously handled.

Pag. 274. Sect. 19. The Ideas of Quantity may be set down by sensible Marks, Diagrams, &c. But this can∣not be done in Moral Ideas, we have no sensible marks that resemble them. Very true, which is a plain Argument that such Ideas are not from our Senses.

Pag. 289. Sect. 2. Truth seems to me to signify nothing but the joyning or sepa∣rating of Signs, as the things signified do Agree or Disagree one with another. This

indeed is Truth of the Mind or of the Subject, but not Truth of the Thing or of the Object, which consists not in the minds joyning or separating either Signs or Ideas, but in the Essential Habi∣tudes that are between the Ideas them∣selves. And that these are such, our Author himself implies, by saying, as the things signified do Agree or Disagree with one another. Here then is Agree∣ment and Disagreement antecedently to any joyning or separating. And I very much wonder that our Author professing in the Title of the Chapter to discourse of Truth in general, and particularly of that Truth too which has been the Enquiry of so many Ages, should yet confine his Discourse to Truth of Words and Truth of Thoughts without the least mention of Objective Truth. Which indeed is the Principal Kind of Truth.

Pag. 300. Sect. 5. I think it is a self-evident Proposition, that two Bodies cannot be in the same place. If the Pro∣position be Self-evident how comes he only to Think 'tis so? If it were on∣ly Evident he must do more than so.

Pag. 323. Sect. 14. Eternal Truths are so not from being written in the minds of Men, Or that they were before the World: But wheresoever we can sup∣pose such a Creature as Man is, inabled with such faculties, we must conclude he must needs when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his Ideas, know the Truth of certain Propositions, &c. This is a true Aristotelian Account of Eternal Truths. But I demand? Are these Eternal Truths in being before the Ex∣istence of Man or no? If not, how comes he to understand them when he does exist? What, does he make that to be true, which before was not so? But if they were in being before the Existence of Man, then their Eternity does not consist in their being under∣stood by Man when ever he shall exist, but in their own fixt and immutable Relations, whereby they have an ante∣cedent Aptness so to be understood. Which the Author himself seems to im∣ply by saying, He must needs so under∣stand them. Why must needs? But only * 1.5 because they are necessarily so and no otherwise intelligible. But of this I have discours'd elsewhere.

Pag. 344. Sect. 8. He takes notice of one manifest Mistake in the Rules of Syllogism, viz. That No Syllogistical reasoning can be right and Conclusive, but what has at least one general Proposition in it. This our Author thinks to be a Mistake, and a manifest mistake. But perhaps if we rightly understand that Rule of Syllogism, there is no Mistake at all in it. All the Ground of the Dispute is from the Doubtfulness of what is meant by a general or uni∣versal Proposition. A Proposition may be said to be universal either when a Note of Universality (as All) is prefixed before the Subject. Or when tho that Note be not prefixed, yet the Predicate is said of the whole Sub∣ject according to the full Latitude of its Predication, so as to leave nothing of the Subject out, whereof the Pre∣dicate is not said. According to the former Sense of Universality it is not necessary that in every concluding Syllogism one Proposition be univer∣sal. But according to the latter sense of Universality (which indeed is the most proper sense of it) it is certain∣ly necessary. And I dare challenge

any Man to shew me one Instance of a concluding Syllogism that has not one Proposition universal in the lat∣ter Sense. For even a singular Pro∣position is thus universal, since being Indivisible, it can have nothing said of it, but what is said of it wholly and universally, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Aristotle expres∣ses it. The Author may see a further Account of this in Dr. Wallis his Thesis de Propositione singulari, at the latter end of his Institutio Logicae.

These, Sir, are the most considera∣ble Passages that at once reading I thought liable to Reflection in this Work, which notwithstanding these few Erratas, I think to be a very ex∣traordinary Performance, and worthy of the most publick Honour and Re∣spect. And tho I do not approve of every particular thing in this Book, yet I must say that the Author is just such a kind of Writer as I like, one that has thought much, and well, and who freely Writes what he thinks. I hate your Common-place Men of all the Wri∣ters in the World, who tho they hap∣pen sometimes to say things that are in

themselves not only True, but consi∣derable, yet they never write in any Train or Order of Thinking, which is one of the greatest Beauties of Com∣position.

But this Gentleman is a Writer of a very different Genius and Complexion of Soul, and whose Character I cannot easily give, but must leave it either to the Description of some finer Pen, or to the silent Admiration of Posterity. Only one Feature of his Disposition I am concern'd to point out, which is, that he seems to be a Person of so great Ingenuity and Candor, and of a Spirit so truly Philosophical, that I have thence great and fair Inducements to believe that he will not be offended with that Freedom I have used in these Reflections, which were not intended for the lessening his Fame, but solely for the promoting of Truth and right Thinking.

And this will justifie that part of the Reflections, where agreeing with the Author in the Proposition intended to

be proved, I lay open the insufficiency of his Proofs. For to say that a thing is false for such Reasons, when 'tis not false for such Reasons, tho it be abso∣lutely false, is as great an Injury to Truth, as to say a thing is false when 'tis not false. A false Inference is as much an Untruth, as a false Conclusi∣on; and accordingly he that might re∣flect upon the Conclusion if false, may with as much reason reflect upon a wrong way of inferring it, tho the Conclusion it self be true. Which I mention with respect to the former part about Innate Principles, where tho I agree with the Author in the thing denied, yet I think his Reasons are not cogent.

After all, notwithstanding my dis∣senting from this Author in so many things, I am perhaps as great an Ad∣mirer of him as any of his most sworn Followers, and would not part with his Book for half a Vatican. But eve∣ry Writer has his Alloy, and I exempt not any Writings of my own from the like Defects. Of which perhaps, Sir, I have been convincing you all this

while. But that shall not trouble me, if at the same time I may be able to convince you of my Readiness to serve you at any rate, as it highly becomes,

SIR,

Your Obliged and Humble Servant, J. N.

POSTSCRIPT.

WHereas in a certain Discourse of Mine Intitled, Considerations upon the Nature of Sin, I make Sin to be of a Po∣sitive Nature, upon better Consideration I find intolerable Consequences to follow upon that Supposition, and do therefore freely own my self to have been in a Mistake, and do here retract it under my Hand. As to the Present Dis∣courses I know of Nothing I have to Correct, only there is One Notion which I find Occa∣sion to inlarge and carry on further than at first I was aware of. It is in the Third Bea∣titude concerning the Meek's inheriting the Earth. By which I am now fully convinc'd is Principally meant that they shall possess that New Paradisiacal Earth which is to succeed the Great Conflagration, and to be the Seat of the Millennial Reign of Christ. I do not un∣say any part of my Former Explication, only I think it defective; and add this as a further Supplement to it. For which Notion I acknow∣ledge my self indebted to the Noble Author of the Theory of the Earth; whom the Reader may Consult for further Satisfaction in this Matter. Part 2. Chap. 5. Pag. 162.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Joh. 11.51.
• * 1.2

  De inqui∣rend. Verit. Lib. 3. Part. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.3

  Meditat. 6. p. 36.
• * 1.4

  Reason & Relig. p. 181.
• * 1.5

  Reason & Relig. p. 76.